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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
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Idaho Department Of Environmental Quality
╘╘╘╘Plaintiff,
vs.
David Gibson, Vhs Properties Llc
Defendant.

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Ada County District Court
Medema, Jonathan
03/05/2015
46217-2018

CASE INFORMATION
Case Type:

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and H1)

Case 08/01/2018 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-OC-2015-3540
Ada County District Court
04/20/2015
Medema, Jonathan

PARTY INFORMATION
Plaintiff

Idaho Department Of Environmental Quality

Defendant

Gibson, David R

Lead Attorneys
Early, Darrell G.
Retained
208-334-4126(W)
Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Retained
208-345-1125(W)

Smith, Vernon K, Jr
Removed: 12/02/2015
Court Order
Smith, Victoria H
Removed: 12/02/2015
Court Order
The Estate Of Vernon K Smith Senior
Removed: 12/15/2015
Court Order
Vhs Properties Llc

DATE

Smith, Vernon Kenneth, Jr
Retained
208-345-1125(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

03/05/2015

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

03/05/2015

Complaint Filed
Complaint Filed

03/05/2015

Summons Filed
(4) Summons Filed

04/07/2015

Sheriff's Return
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(3) Sheriff's Return On Order 3.31.15
04/07/2015

Affidavit of Service
(3) Affidavit Of Service 3.31.15

04/17/2015

Answer
Answer To Complaint, Affirmative Defenses And Counterclaim

04/20/2015

Transcript Filed
Notice Of Reassignment

04/20/2015

Change Assigned Judge: Reassignment
Change Assigned Judge: Reassignment

04/21/2015

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service 4.16.15

04/21/2015

Sheriff's Return
Sheriff's Return 4.16.15

07/06/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 08/14/2015 02:15 PM) Notice of Status
Conference

08/14/2015

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 08/14/2015 02:15 PM: Hearing
Vacated Notice of Status Conference - Counsel to call and reschedule after negotiations

08/14/2015

CANCELED Scheduling Conference (2:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Vacated
Notice of Status Conference Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on
08/14/2015 02:15 PM: Hearing Vacated

10/15/2015

Stipulation
Stipulation to Amend Complaint

11/12/2015

Order
Order Approving Stipulation to File Amended Complaint

12/02/2015

Civil Disposition Entered
Civil Disposition entered for: Smith, Vernon K Jr, Defendant; Smith, Victoria H, Defendant;
The Estate Of Vernon K Smith Senior,, Defendant; Idaho Department Of Environmental
Quality, Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/2/2015

12/02/2015

Amended
First Amended Complaint

12/02/2015

Judgment - Other:
Converted Disposition:
As Per Amended Complaint Filled On 12/02/15
Party (The Estate Of Vernon K Smith Senior)
Party (Smith, Victoria H)
Party (Smith, Vernon K, Jr)
Party (Idaho Department Of Environmental Quality)

12/04/2015

Summons Filed
(2) Amended Summons

01/21/2016

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service (1/12/16)
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01/26/2016

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service (01/21/16)

02/10/2016

Answer
Answer To First Amended Complaint (Vernon K Smith)

02/19/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 03/15/2016 01:45 PM)

03/15/2016

CANCELED Status Conference (1:45 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Vacated

03/16/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 03/15/2016 01:45 PM: Hearing Vacated

03/25/2016

Stipulation
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

05/16/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/25/2017 09:00 AM) (2) Day Trial

05/16/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 01/10/2017 01:30 PM)

05/16/2016

Continued
Continued (Status Conference 12/13/2016 01:30 PM)

05/16/2016

Order
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial

06/23/2016

Notice of Service
Notice Of Service 6/23/16

07/15/2016

Notice
Notice Of Compliance

10/11/2016

10/11/2016
10/11/2016
10/11/2016

10/11/2016

10/11/2016

10/11/2016

10/24/2016

•
•
•
•

Affidavit
of Brian Oakley with Exhibits
Notice of Hearing
Motion for Summary Judgment

Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

•

Affidavit
of Darrell G. Early with Exhibits

•

Affidavit
of Dean Ehlert with Exhibits

•

Affidavit
of Paula J. Wilson with Exhibits

•

Memorandum
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in opposition to DEQ's Motion for SJ and Affidavit
10/24/2016

10/27/2016

11/02/2016

11/02/2016

11/02/2016

11/03/2016

11/11/2016

11/11/2016
11/14/2016

11/14/2016

11/29/2016
11/29/2016
11/30/2016

12/07/2016

12/07/2016

12/07/2016

12/13/2016

12/13/2016

•
•

Affidavit
of David Gibson
Notice
Amended Notice of Hearing

•

Affidavit
Affidavit of Jack Gantz

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Affidavit
Supplemental Affidavit of Dean Ehlert
Response
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Objection
and Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of David R. Gibson
Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Idaho Code 39-108(4) and I.C. 22-4502
Motion to Dismiss

Notice
Second Amended Notice of Hearing 11/29/16 @2:00pm
Stipulation
Stipulation to Vacate and Reset SJ Hearing

Motion for Summary Judgment (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Court Minutes

Notice of Hearing
Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to I.C. 39-108 (4) and I.C. 22-4502 (12.13.2016 @
1:30 PM)
Memorandum
in Response to "Motion to Dismiss"
Affidavit
of Brian Rayne
Affidavit
Supplemental Affidavit of Darrell G. Early

Status Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
and for Motion to Dismiss Complaint

•

Court Minutes
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01/03/2017

01/09/2017

01/09/2017

01/10/2017
01/10/2017
01/13/2017

01/25/2017

02/09/2017

02/15/2017

03/09/2017

03/09/2017

03/14/2017

03/17/2017

03/17/2017

03/17/2017

03/17/2017

03/17/2017
03/20/2017

•

Memorandum
Pretrial Memorandum

•
•
•
•

Order
On Defendants Motion to Dismiss
Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Court Minutes

Notice
Resetting Court Trial

CANCELED Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Vacated

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Memorandum
Supplemental Memo Decision Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
Order
SUSTAIN PLAINTIFF OBJECTION & GRANT MOTION STRIKE PORTIONS AFFIDAVIT
GIBSON
Motion
in Limine to Prelude Evidence Concerningin Unplead Defenses
Memorandum In Support of Motion
in Limine to Prelude Evidnce Concerning Unplead Defenses
Memorandum
Amended Pre-Trial Memorandum
Miscellaneous
Acceptance of Service - Subpoena Kevin Horan
Miscellaneous
Acceptance of Service - Subpoena Mike Woodward
Miscellaneous
Acceptance of Service - Subpoena Scott Frisbie
Motion to Vacate
Trial and Stay Proceedings
Affidavit of Service

•

Motion
Defendant's Response to Department's Motion in Limine
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03/20/2017

03/20/2017

03/20/2017

03/20/2017

03/20/2017

03/21/2017
03/21/2017
04/05/2017

05/05/2017

05/30/2017
05/30/2017
07/28/2017

07/28/2017

08/10/2017
08/10/2017

08/10/2017

08/15/2017

08/16/2017

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Witness List
Witness and Exhibit List
Motion
to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial
Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial
Declaration
of Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of Motion to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant
VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial
Motion to Shorten Time
Re: Motion to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial

Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Court Minutes

CANCELED Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Vacated
Stipulation
Stipulation for Settlement and for Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims Against Noah Hillen
Special Administrator of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith

Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)

•
•

Court Minutes

Motion
Motion to Amend Answer to Include the Defense of the Statute of Limitations

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Amend Defendants Answer to Include the Defense of the Statute of Limitations

•
•
•
•
•

Notice of Appearance

Notice of Hearing
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence Concerning Unpled Defenses
Notice of Hearing
8/22/2017
Opposition to
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer
Notice
Notice of Special Appearance and Limited Association of Counsel(Fuhrman/Gibson)
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08/22/2017
08/22/2017
08/22/2017

08/22/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/01/2017

09/07/2017

Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Court Minutes

Witness List
Plaintiffs
Exhibit List/Log
Plaintiffs
Acceptance of Service
Ted Hutchinson
Acceptance of Service
Paula Wilson
Acceptance of Service
Sara Strachan
Acceptance of Service
Dean Ehlert
Acceptance of Service
Barry Burnell
Acceptance of Service
Mike Woodward

•

Acceptance of Service
Scott Frisbie

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Acceptance of Service
John Glenn Hall
Acceptance of Service
Susan Hamlin Nygard
Acceptance of Service
Jack Gantz
Acceptance of Service
Mike Reno
Acceptance of Service
Kevin Horan
Affidavit of Service
David R. Gibson
Amended
Plaintiff's First Amended Exhibit List
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09/08/2017

09/12/2017

09/12/2017

09/13/2017
09/13/2017

•
•
•
•

Amended
Plaintiff's Second Amended Exhibit List
Memorandum In Support of Motion
Pretrial Memorandum to Support Motion for Directed Verdict
Amended
Plaintiff's Third Amended Exhibit List

Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Court Minutes

09/13/2017

Court Trial Started

09/14/2017

Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Day 2

09/14/2017
09/15/2017

09/15/2017
09/20/2017

09/20/2017
09/21/2017
09/28/2017

10/06/2017

10/06/2017

10/10/2017

10/10/2017
10/10/2017

10/13/2017

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Court Minutes

Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
continued for court reporter availablity
Court Minutes

Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Cont'd day 3
Court Minutes
Exhibit List/Log

Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Strike Testimony
Response
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike Testimony
Declaration
Declaration of Mark Cecchini In Support Of Plaintiff's Response

Motion Hearing (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
To Suppress

•

Court Minutes

•
•

Notice
Plaintiff's, of Supplemental Authority
Reply
Memorandum to Support Defendants Motion to Strike
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11/20/2017

12/04/2017

12/04/2017

12/04/2017

12/04/2017

12/12/2017

01/15/2018

03/01/2018
03/01/2018

•

CASE NO. CV-OC-2015-3540

Order
Denying Motion to Strike

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Brief Filed
Closing Argument
Closing Arguments
Plaintiff's Closing Argument
Declaration
Declaration of Cynthia Yee-Wallace in Support of Plaintiff's Closing Argument
Miscellaneous
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Reply
to DEQ's Closing Argument
Reply
Supplemental Reply to DEQ's Closing Argument
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judgment

03/01/2018

Foreign Judgment (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Party (Gibson, David R; Idaho Department Of Environmental Quality)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Idaho Department Of Environmental Quality
Against: Gibson, David R
Entered Date: 03/01/2018
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 03/01/2018

03/01/2018

Civil Disposition Entered

03/13/2018

03/13/2018

03/15/2018

03/15/2018

03/15/2018

•
•
•
•
•

Motion
for Reconsideration
Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Reconsideration
Motion
Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees and Expenses
Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Plaintiff's Memorandm of Law in Support of Request for Attorney's Fees and Expenses
Declaration
Declaration of Cynthia Yee-Wallace in Support of Plaintiff's Request for Costs and Attorney's
Fees
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03/19/2018

03/22/2018

03/22/2018

03/28/2018

05/14/2018

05/14/2018

05/21/2018
05/21/2018
05/21/2018

05/21/2018

05/22/2018

06/21/2018

06/21/2018

06/21/2018
06/21/2018

07/20/2018

07/23/2018

07/23/2018

•
•
•
•
•
•

CASE NO. CV-OC-2015-3540

Notice of Hearing
3/30/2018 @ 2:00 pm
Notice of Hearing
5/21/18 at 2 pm
Amended
Amended Notice of Hearing 5/21/18 at 2pm
Objection
to DEQ's Memorandum of Law

Memorandum
in Opposition and Response to Defendants' Objection and Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees
and Expenses
Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment Entered March 1, 2018

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)

•

Court Minutes

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reply to Memorandum
in Support of Motion
Affidavit
of Seyedbagheri
Memorandum
Supplemental Memorandum in Regard to the mislabling of Pleading
Order
Re: motion for Reconsideration & Request For Attorney Fees and Expenses
Motion
Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion
Memorandum In Support of Motion

Notice of Hearing
07.23.18 @ 2 PM
Memorandum
in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 60, IRCP Relief of the Court's FoF and Conc of
Law, Judgment, and Amended J.

Motion Hearing - Civil (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Medema, Jonathan)
Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion

•

Court Minutes
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08/01/2018
08/01/2018
08/15/2018

08/22/2018
08/27/2018

11/23/2018
DATE

•
•
•
•
•

Notice of Appeal

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Correct the Amended Judgment
Amended Notice of Appeal

Amended Notice of Appeal
(Second Amended)
Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
x 3 - Supreme Court No. 46217
FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Smith, Vernon K, Jr
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/23/2018

0.00
0.00
0.00

Defendant Smith, Victoria H
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/23/2018

0.00
0.00
0.00

Defendant The Estate Of Vernon K Smith Senior
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/23/2018

100.00
100.00
0.00

Defendant Gibson, David R
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/23/2018

665.00
665.00
0.00
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

-=======-◄~

- ~

MARO 5 2015

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

CHAii~ D, '4tclif, Clerk
8y JAMIi MAm'IN
DePUT\'

DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~v--·_____
o c----15-0
___
;3 5 40

CASE No.:G
__

COMPLAINT
[Filing Fee Exempt]
Idaho Code§ 31-3212

Defendants.
Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("the Department"), by and
through the Office of the Idaho Attorney General, for its complaint ("Complaint") against David
R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products, the Estate of Vernon K. Smith Senior,
Victoria H. Smith, and Vernon K. Smith Junior individually and in his capacity as the personal

COMPLAINT - 1

000013

•

•

representative of the Estate of Vernon K. Smith Senior (collectively "the Defendants"), asserts
and alleges as follows:
NATURE OF ACTION

1.

The Department initiates this action pursuant to the Idaho Environmental

Protection and Health Act ("EPHA"), Idaho Code§§ 39-101 et seq., in order to compel
compliance with regulatory requirements necessary for the protection of human health and the
environment from the hazards presented by solid waste management activities occurring on
property owned and operated by the Defendants located in Ada County, Idaho as more
completely described below. In addition the Department seeks civil penalties in an amount up to
$10,000 per violation or up to $1,000 per day of ongoing and continuous violations.
JURISDICTION

2.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 39-108 and Idaho Code§ 1-705.
3.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code§

5-514 because, upon information and belief, the Defendants reside in the State of Idaho are
transacting or have transacted business within the State of Idaho and the wrongful acts and
omissions giving rise to this cause of action occurred within the State of Idaho.
VENUE

4.

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of

Idaho, in and for Ada County, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 39-108(3)(b) and Idaho Code§ 5-404,
because the Defendants are, upon information and belief, residents of Ada County, Idaho and the

COMPLAINT - 2

000014

•
violations and acts and omissions alleged herein occurred and the action arose in Ada County,
Idaho.
PARTIES

5.

The Department is an executive agency of the State ofldaho authorized by Idaho

Code§§ 39-109 to file suit by and through the Idaho Attorney General to enforce the EPHA and
rules and permits issued by the Department pursuant to the EPHA, and to recover agency costs,
expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing such actions pursuant to Idaho Code §
39-108, Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121.
6.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, a person residing in

Ada County in the State of Idaho.
7.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, doing business under

the assumed business name of "Black Diamond Compost Products."
8.

Defendant Estate of Vernon K. Smith Sr. is, upon information and belief, a

probate estate administered in the Fourth Judicial District, State ofldaho and is the owner of
some or all of the property at issue in this case.
9.

Defendant Victoria H. Smith is, upon information and belief, a person residing in

Ada County in the State of Idaho and is, upon information and belief, the owner of some or all of
the property at issue in this case.
10.

Defendant Vernon K. Smith Jr. is a person residing in Ada County in the State of

Idaho and is upon information and belief the owner of some or all of the property at issue in this
case.

COMPLAINT - 3

000015

11.

Defendant Vernon K. Smith Jr. is, upon information and belief, the personal

representative of the Estate of Vernon K. Smith Sr.
12.

Defendants are persons within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 39-103(9).

FACTS
13.

On March 29, 2013, the Department attempted to conduct an inspection of a

facility located on a portion of property located off Pleasant Valley Road, southwest of the
intersection of West Gowen Road and Pleasant Valley Road and identified by the Ada County '
Assessor's Office as Parcel Number S150522000, Boise, Idaho (hereinafter "the Property").
14.

Upon information and belief the Property on which the facility is located is owned

jointly by the Estate of Vernon K. Smith Sr., Victoria H. Smith and Vernon K. Smith Jr.
15.

At the time of the inspection attempt no persons were present at the Property.

16.

At the time of the inspection attempt, the Department staff was able to observe

from the public roadway and the driveway prior to any gate or fence, large piles and windrows of
grass clippings, leaves and other organic material constituting solid waste.
17.

At the time of the inspection attempt the Department staff observed amounts of

solid waste in excess of six hundred (600) cubic yards.
18.

Upon information and belief activities at the site include the composting oflarge

volumes of solid waste for the purpose of resale to the public as compost or .humus.
19.

Subsequent to the inspection, the Department staff became aware the facility was

operated under the name "Black Diamond Compost Products."

COMPLAINT-4

000016

20.

According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State and upon information and

belief, "Black Diamond Compost Products" is an assumed business name of Defendant David R.
Gibson.
21.

On April 2, 2013 the Department wrote Defendant David R. Gibson and notified

him of the need to comply with Department regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
22.

On April 10, 2013 the Department met with Defendant David R. Gibson to

discuss compliance with applicable regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
,,
23.

,During the meeting Defendant David R. Gibson disclaimed any obligation to

comply with Department regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
24.

On May 8, 2013, the Department wrote Defendant Gibson requesting further

information concerning his disclaimer. Defendant Gibson did not respond to the Department's
May 8, 2013 letter.
25.

On July 31, 2013 the Department issued a Notice of Violation to Defendant

Gibson by certified mail. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Violation is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
26.

Defendant David R. Gibson accepted delivery of the Notice of Violation on

August 6, 2013.
27.

Defendant David R. Gibson declined to participate in a compliance conference to

resolve the July 30, 2013 Notice of Violation.

COMPLAINT-5

000017

•
COUNTI
(Violation of ID APA 58.01.06.012)

28.

The allegations of paragraphs 1-27 of this Complaint are hereby incorporated by

reference as though fully set forth herein.
29.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-105(2) the Department has authority to promulgate

rules relating to solid waste disposal and licensure and certification requirements pertinent
thereto.
30.

Idaho Code§ 39-103(14) defines "Solid Waste Disposal" as: "the collection,

storage, treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste."
31.

Idaho Code§ 39-103(13) defines "Solid Waste" as:
"garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid material,
including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community
activities but does not included solid or dissolved material in
domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources,
such as silt, dissolved or suspended solids in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved material in irrigation return flows or other
·common water pollutants."

32.

The Department has promulgated rules relating to solid waste disposal at IDAP A

58.01.06.
33.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.05 defines a "Composting Facility" as a "Processing

Facility."
34.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32 defines a "Processing Facility" as: A facility that uses

biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for reuse, excluding waste handling
at transfer stations or recycling centers."

COMPLAINT-6

000018

•
Composting uses biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for
reuse.
36.

The Department has promulgated regulations governing processing facilities

based upon the volu~e of wastes processed or accumulated at the facility.
37.

IDAP A 58.01.06.009 .03 defines a "Tier II Facility" as a facility that is "a

processing facility or incinerator that has a cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at any one
time that is greater than six hundred (600) cubic yards.
38.

At the time of the March 29, 2013 inspection, Defendants had accepted and

processed solid waste and had accumulated a volume of such solid waste at its facility in excess
of six hundred (600) ·cubic yards.
39.

Some or all of the Property is a Tier II Processing Facility.

40.

IDAPA 58.01.06.012 sets forth the requirements for Tier II Facilities and states in

relevant part:
"The owner and operator of a new Tier II facility shall establish
compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining
Department approval of the applications required in Subsection
012.02 before beginning construction and Subsection 012.04 prior
to accepting waste."
41.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.29 defines the "owner" of a facility as: "The person(s) who

owns land or a portion ofland on which a site or facility is located."
42.

ID APA 58.01 .06.005.28 defines the "operator" of a facility as: "The person(s)

responsible for overall operation of all or part of a site or facility."
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43.

Defendants Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Sr., Victoria H. Smith, and Vernon K.

Smith, Jr. are, upon information and belief, the owners of the Property upon which a Tier II
Facility is located.
44.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, the operator of a Tier

II Facility.
45.

ID APA 58.01 .06.012.02 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit

documentation to the Department "demonstrating compliance with the siting requirements and
restrictions specified in subsection 012.01 within the time frames specified in Section 012."
46.

IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit to the

Department an" ... Operating Plan containing that information required by 58.01.012.03 within
the time frames stated in Section O12. An Operating Plan shall include a description of the
I

wastes to be accepted, the methods for maintaining compliance with each of the applicable
general operating requirement of Subsection 012.03 and complies with any applicable facility
specific requirements found in Subsections 012.09 through 012.11."
4 7.

Defendants failed to submit documentation demonstrating compliance with the

siting requirements ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012.01 or obtain site approval from the Department for a
Tier II Facility prior to commencing construction of a Tier II Facility.
48.

_Defendants failed to submit or obtain Operating Plan approval for the operation of

a Tier II Facility prior to accepting solid waste.
49.

Defendants are in violation ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012.

50.

The Department is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring

Defendants to submit an approvable Siting Application as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02
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and an approvable Operating Plan as required by ID APA 58.01 .06.012.04 and to comply with
and implement the requirements of the approved Operating Plan.
51.

The Department is further entitled to penalties up to $10,000 dollars for each

separate violation ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012 alleged herein or up to $1,000 dollars per day of
ongoing and continuous violations.
52.

The Department has incurred and will incur costs, expenses and attorney fees in

the prosecution of this matter in an amount to be proven at trial or in the event of default the
amount of $2,500.00. The Department is entitled to recover its expenses pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 39-108 and its costs including attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, respectfully
requests the Court grant as appropriate the following relief:
A.

Issue a permanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to submit a full and complete siting application as required
by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02.
B.

Issue a permanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-

108(3 )(b ), requiring the Defendants to submit a full and complete Operating Plan as required by
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04.
C.

Issue a permanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to comply with and implement the terms of the approved
Operating Plan as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04.
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D.

Assess against the Defendants statutory penalties in an amount up to $10,000.00 for each

separate violation of the EPHA and up to $1,000.00 per day for each continuing violation of the
EPHA alleged in this Complaint.
E.

Assess against all Defendants, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-108(6),

Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 all Department costs, expenses, attorney fees and witness fees
incurred in this action in an amount to be proven at trial or in the event of default in the amount
of $2,500.00.
F.

Grant such other relief as the Court deems equitable and just.

DATED this 5th day of March, 2015.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~;sc__.,;;-------Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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STATE OF IDAHO

DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

C.L. "Butch" Otter, Governor
Curt Fransen, Director

1410 North Hilton • Boise, Idaho 83706 • (208) 373-0502

July 31, 2013

CERTIFIED MAIL #: 7007 3020 0001 4045 9956
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
David Gibson
Black Diamond Compost Products
3000 Rose Hill
Boise, Idaho 83705
Dear Mr. Gibson:
The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (Department) administers programs designed to ensure that
businesses and individuals comply with specific permits and rules designed to protect the citizens and the
environment throughout the State. Based on available information, the Department believes Black Diamond
Compost Products may have violated such rules and/or permit requirements at the Black Diamond composting
site located on property identified as parcel number S 1505220000 in Boise, Idaho. The purpose of this letter is to
notify Black Diamond Compost Products of an apparent violation described in the document enclosed herein.
The Department is seeking the cooperation of Black Diamond Compost Products in resolving these matters to the
full satisfaction of the parties. Black Diamond Compost Company is advised to contact the Department within
fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of this letter. At such time, the Department will schedule a meeting at a
mutually agreeable date and time, at which the Notice of Violation can be discussed. If Black Diamond Compost
Products elects not to meet with the Department on the alleged violations, the Department will seek resolution of
these matters using its authorities as provided by law. Arrangements to meet should be made by contacting
Dean Ehlert at (208) 373-0416 or at the following address:
Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Coordinator
Department of Environmental Quality
Waste Management and Remediation Division
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter. The Department is confident that we can work
cooperatively to resolve these issues.
Sincerely,

~

Ac~,!J

Michael Mccurdy, P.E., CHMM
State Response Program Manager
Waste Management & Remediation Division

DE :tg

\black diamond compost. company Oov cover letter.doc

Enclosure
cc:

S. Hamlin, Deputy Attorney General
P. Wagner, DEQ- Boise
J. Gantz, DEQ-Boise

Printed

D. Ehlert, DEQ - WM&RD
A. Scheff, DEQ ~ Boise

EXHIBIT

on

Recycled

Paper
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NOTICE OF VIOLATION
David Robert Gibson
Black Diamond Compost Products
5120 W. Overland Road
Boise, Idaho 83 705

ISSUED TO:

On March 29, 2013, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (Department) conducted an inspection of
the Black Diamond Compost Products (Black Diamond) facility located off Pleasant Valley Road, southwest of
the intersection of West Gowen Road and Pleasant Valley Road and identified by the Ada County Assessor's
Office as Parcel Number S 150522000, Boise, Idaho. During the inspection the Department staff observed
storage and processing of regulated solid waste including numerous windrows containing grass clippings, leaves
and other organic solid waste. Pursuant to the Environmental Protection and Health Act (EPHA), Idaho Code
39-101, et seq. and the Solid Waste Management Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06, the Department has determined that
the following violation has occurred at the facility operated by Black Diamond in Boise, Idaho.

VIOLATIONS

Violation No. 1
Legal Provisions Violated:

IDAPA 58.01.06.012, Solid Waste Management Rules

IDAPA 58.01.06.012 states in relevant part:
"The owner and operator of a new Tier II facility shall establish compliance with the requirements of
Section 012 by obtaining Department approval of the applications required in Subsection 012.02
[requiring siting approval] before beginning construction and Subsection 012.04 [requiring operating
plan approval] prior to accepting waste. The owner and operator of an existing Tier II facility shall
establish compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining Department approval of the
applications required in Subsection 012.04 within two (2) years from April 26, 2002 and Subsection
012.02 within five (5) years from April 26, 2002."
The Solid Waste Management Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32 define a processing facility as a facility that uses
biological or chemical decomposition to prepare· solid waste for reuse, excluding waste handling at a transfer
station or recycling centers. At the time of the March 29, 2013, inspection Black Diamond had accepted and
processed solid waste. Black Diamond failed to submit or obtain site approval from the Department for a solid
waste processing facility and failed to submit or obtain operating plan approval for the operation of a solid
waste processing facility.

Penalty Assessed:

$3,500

Total Penalty Assessed: $3,500

Notice of Violation - Page 1
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4t
TIMETABLE
Black Diamond may request a compliance conference with the Department to explain the alleged violation and
discuss entry into a Consent Order which will include payment of assessed penalties, and a plan to remedy
damage caused by any violation and assure future compliance. To arrange a compliance conference, Black
Diamond must contact the Department within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of this Notice of Violation.
Failure to request a conference within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of this Notice of Violation, or
reach agreement on a Consent Order within sixty (60) calendar days may result in a civil enforcement action in
district court for penalties, injunctive relief, and costs including attorney fees.
Inquiries or correspondence concerning this Notice of Violation shall be directed to:
Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Program Manager
Department of Environmental Quality
Waste Management and Remediation Division
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208) 373-0416

J-~.c...;:;..---11---------

DATED THIS------~--- day of _ _

2013

~

CURTTRANEN,Direcfu
Idaho Department of Enviro~ental Quality

Notice of Violation - Page 2
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ORI GINA~
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

-...

JASON D. ~OTT
NARD 5 2015

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

CHRJ~D

.

8y JAi.ff£ u~~H, Olflttt
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DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.

~

No.CV OC 15 035 40

CASE
)
)
) SUMMONS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS. THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW:

TO:

THE ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written

SUMMONS-1
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response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as
demanded by the plaintiff(s) in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is serviced with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule l0(a)(l) and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or

denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of
the above-named court.
DATED this

'5

--

day of March, 2015. ' CH

· FtfSTOPHIIR D. RICH
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RIGINAL •
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.
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)
)
) SUMMONS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS. THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW:

TO:

DAVID R. GIBSON
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written
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response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as
demanded by the plaintiff(s) in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is serviced with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule IO(a)(l) and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or

denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of

SUMMONS-2
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RIGINAL
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

JASON D. SCOTT

:: -·Cy-~- -:
MARO 5 2015

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

CHAISToPHePt 0. AICH, C!ei,t
By JAMIE MARTIN
.
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DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAP A CITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.
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)
)
) SUMMONS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS. THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW:

TO:

VICTORIA H. SMITH
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written
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response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as
demanded by the plaintiff(s) in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is serviced with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule IO(a)(l) and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or

denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiff's attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of
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RIGINAL

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

1'1,ffl.....

JASON D. iCOTT

C7\\

FlLiO
P.ttl_ _ __-

MARO 5 2015

&)-

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

CHRfSTnat..-.

~~~ICH, Clerk
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DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

~

CASE

N~v oc

15 o3 s40.

)
)

) SUMMONS

V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPA CITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS. THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW:

TO:

VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written

SUMMONS-1
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response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as
demanded by the plaintiff(s) in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is serviced with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule IO(a)(l) and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or

denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of
the above-named court.
DATED this

SUMMONS-2

_5_ day of March, 2015.
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NO.----i;[e~

A.M.

VERNON K. SMITH
,ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

P.~.--14--

APR 17 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By HALEY MYERS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND )
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF )
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H. )
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR )
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY )
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
)
THE ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
)
SENIOR,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CV0C-1503540
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT,
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES \,
AND S:OUNTERCLAIM

\

COMES NOW the Defendants above named, by and through their attorney of
record, Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith answer the complaint filed by the Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality as follows:
FIRST DEFFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiffs
complaint and not otherwise specifically admitted herein.

ANSWERANDAFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES P.1
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SECOND DEFENSE
That Plaintiffs complaint fails to set forth any factual basis sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against any of these Defendants for which any relief can be granted, and
specifically, no such relief as therein requested by said Department of Environmental
Quality (hereafter referred to for convenience as DEQ); that none of the Defendants (or any
substitute Defendant(s), as may hereafter come about under Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P., in relation
to the defense of failure to name a real party in interest), is subject to any fine, penalty, or
imposition of any regulatory mandate or enforcement of any DEQ's rules and regulations, as
the substance at issue in this case, noted in the complaint itself to be specifically addressing
what was observed and identified to be only the substances of "grass clippings and leaves",
is a material and substance composition specifically excluded and exempted from the
jurisdiction, authority, and definition of what is within the relegated parameters of the
authority delegated to DEQ to promulgate rules and enforcement regulations of solid waste
materials and substances under their jurisdiction; that none of these Defendants, or any
substitute Defendants, are subject to any regulations or the effects of any enforcement of
DEQ rules promulgated under their regulatory authority, regarding agricultural solid waste
and plant or crop residue substances, as the same is excluded by the promulgated rules and
regulatory provisions ofDEQ, and the exclusive jurisdiction for the disposal, management,
operation, facility, site location and processing activity of such agricultural solid waste
materials and plant and crop residue substances is vested within the State of Idaho,
Department of Agriculture, which agency has the exclusive authority to regulate (§22103(3),(4),(9),(10), and (27), Idaho Code), and manage (§22-110(1), Idaho Code) said
substances as may be located upon any real property in the State of Idaho, and that State

\

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES P. 2
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agency has promulgated the regulations to apply to said solid waste materials under the
management and control of the Idaho Department of Agriculture, and such materials and
substances comes under the jurisdiction and provisions of the Right to Farm Act and the
Plant and Soil Amendment Act, as enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho, and said
DEQ, being another legislatively created agency of the State of Idaho, has no jurisdiction or
authority to regulate those materials and substances identified in said Acts, and specifically
the regulatory capacity and authority has been exempted by the DEQ Rules promulgated by
said DEQ in accordance with the provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act;
that consequently, as a matter of Idaho law, said DEQ does not have the fundamental
standing required to assert a claim of regulatory capability to manage and control said solid

waste materials and substances at issue, as said agency cannot regulate said materials and
substances within this State; that absent the requisite standing requirement, said DEQ cannot
secure any form of relief from this court upon this complaint, and said complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), I.R.C.P. for failure to state a claim upon which any
relief can be granted; that said Defendants are furthermore entitled to the entry of a
judgment upon the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), I.R.C.P.; that Defendants are entitled
to a dismissal of this action upon the grounds Plaintiff lacks the standing required under
Idaho Law to initiate any suit against said Defendants, in any effort to redress any claimed
violation of any regulatory provisions of solid waste materials, specifically excluded and
exempted from regulatory enforcement or imposition of such rules within their agency; that
the State of Idaho, Department of Environmental Quality, has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter identified and described in their complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES P. 3
\
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That said complaint fails to correctly identify the owner of the real property upon
which the subject matter materials and substances are located, being referenced and
described as "the property" within the allegations contained in the Complaint; that said
referenced Party Defendants, Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Senior, Victoria H. Smith, and
Vernon K. Smith, identified individually, and identified, by allegation, to be the personal
representative of the Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Senior, are not the real parties in interest, as
they are not the titled owners of the real property as stated by said DEQ upon their
information and belief; that said named party Defendants are not the real parties in interest,
as required by Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P.; that the real property, being referred to as "the

property", to be more appropriately described hereafter, is owned by VHS Properties, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company, established under the laws of the State of Idaho on July
3, 2012, which Entity received title to the real property on July 4, 2012, and said entity is
responsible for and pays all real property taxes and assessments so levied and assessed by
the Ada County Assessor, Ada County, Idaho, and said Entity is the real party in interest,
under Idaho law, and would be the Party required to be named to address this pending
litigation, if the real property owner is to be involved in this dispute.
FOURTH DEFENSE

As and for an Answer to the allegations set forth and contained in Plaintiffs
complaint, these Defendants do respond and allege as follows:
1.

In response to paragraph 1 thereof, Defendants would state said allegations

constitute a matter of law with respect to the application the Idaho Environmental Protection
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and Health Act, as set forth and contained in §39-lOlet seq, Idaho Code; that the dispute
over what has been identified to be the materials and substances referred to in the
Complaint, about which this litigation appears to identify the only subject matter "observed"
upon "the property" (to any extent it relates to "solid waste management activities") found
the presence of crop and plant residue and agricultural solid waste only; that none of those
materials and substances come within the purview or jurisdiction of DEQ, as the subject
matter about which this dispute seeks to address is specifically exempted and excluded from
any regulatory enforcement or requirements regarding DEQ jurisdiction or authority under
the Idaho Environmental Protection Agency Act, or that of the Department of
Environmental Quality, as delineated in IDAPA 58, Title 01, Chapter 06, 001. 03. (b), (b) ii
and (b) iii; 001. 04 (a), 004.; that no hazards are presented by any "solid waste management
activities" purportedly occurring on "the property" "owned and operated by the Defendants"
(owned by and titled to VHS Properties, LLC) which property is located in Ada County; that
the Defendants, as identified in the caption of this case, do not own or operate property
located in Ada County, but rather ''the property" in question is owned, titled to, managed,
and maintained by VHS Properties, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company, existing by
virtue of and in accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho, with articles of organization
filed with the Secretary of State on July 3, 2012, having acquired all rights and interests to
''the property" in question on July 4, 2012; that the estate of Vernon K. Smith Sr., Victoria
H. Smith, and Vernon K. Smith Jr., whether named individually or in any alleged capacity,
are not the real parties in interest, and those wrongfully named Defendants are entitled to the
dismissal of this action, after a reasonable time has been allowed after their objection has
been presented to that effect, after commencement of the action, and dismissal will be

ANSWERANDAFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES P. 5
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sought if substitution of the real party in interest is not undertaken forthwith, as provided for
by virtue of the pleading requirements of Rule 17, I.R.C.P.; that these Defendants do object
to the improper inclusion and violation of said pleading rules by wrongfully naming these
Defendants, and the reasonable time period has commenced upon filing of this responsive
pleading. '.That Defendants would deny said DEQ has any jurisdiction or authority to seek
any form of civil penalties in any amount, concerning any activities or presence of said
described and identified materials and substances located upon "the property" described
herein, that any such "solid waste" activities are exempt and excluded from the jurisdiction,
authority, and enforcement of any regulatory rules of said Department of Environmental
Quality ( DEQ) and any request for imposition of any such civil penalties is being made
without foundation in fact or in law, and violates the exclusionary and exempted provisions
from said Agency's own rules, as existing through the authority under the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act, under the Idaho Administrative Code, IDAP A 58, Title 1,
Ch. 6, wherein it does provide the specific exceptions announced in subsections 001.03 and
001.04, setting forth those exceptions, exemptions, exclusions, and limitations as to those
rules and requirements applicable to "solid waste" and "solid waste management facilities"
in Idaho, identifying specifically the following solid wastes that are not regulated:
.001 03. b. ii. manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic
rates .
.001 03. b. iii. any agricultural solid waste which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules
adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture .
.001 04. Solid Waste Management Facilities Not Regulated Under These Rules. These
Rules do not apply to the following solid waste management facilities:
.001 04. a. Solid waste management facilities accepting only solid waste excluded by
subsection 001.03.
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004. APPLICABILITY. These rules apply to all solid waste, unless excluded by subsection
001.03. (emphasis added to draw attention to the exclusion of the application of Rules)

That any allegations contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response
set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
2.

In response to paragraph 2 thereof, alleging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction,

these Defendants would state that such an allegation of "subject matter jurisdiction" is an
aspect of law, presenting a question of law about which these Parties in this litigation can
neither confer jurisdiction by their pleadings or by any admissions, nor can the parties waive
jurisdiction, by stipulation or otherwise,

and consequently, any jurisdictional issues

constitute an aspect of law to be determined by the Court, and Defendants contend their
response to the allegation of jurisdiction of the Court would constitute a legal opinion only,
and would neither confer, waive, nor impact any such allegation regarding the question of
this Court's jurisdiction; that notwithstanding the above statement, these Defendants would
state, based upon information and belief, that this Court is vested with subject matter
jurisdiction to render a disposition upon the applicable effects of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act and those IDAPA Rules cited above; that this Court has jurisdiction to
determine the issue whether DEQ does, or does not, have jurisdiction, authority, and
regulatory enforcement capacity over the materials, substances, and such subject matter
solid waste materials and facilities relating to crop and plant residues, ultimately to be
returned to the soil at agronomic rates, and any agricultural solid waste materials and
facilities which are managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho
Department of Agriculture; that this Court has the jurisdiction to determine the conclusion
of law that DEQ lacks the regulatory capacity and authority to address the solid waste
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materials, substances, and facilities as was observed to constitute the subject matter as was
identified within the allegations of this Complaint; that this Court has the jurisdiction to
determine that DEQ has no standing or foundation in fact or law from which to initiate this
suit, and the Court would have the subject matter jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of
law, it did not have authority to proceed with this Complaint upon the merits of the action,
as filed by the party Plaintiff that did not have the requisite standing and required authority
to exercise any regulatory authority; that the District Court has the inherent authority to
dismiss the action as a result of Plaintiff's lack of standing to seek any regulatory
enforcement of provisions regarding certain materials, substances, and facilities that are
specifically exempted and excluded from application thereof, as delineated within the
IDAPA Rules as were promulgated by DEQ, the effects of which precludes and pre-empts
the Agency from engaging in or any attempted engagement in the regulatory enforcement of
DEQ Rules regarding such described materials, substances, facilities, persons, and real
property upon which the same is located, as it has been so identified and described within
Plaintiff's Complaint; that said Court has the jurisdiction and authority to determine such
attempted regulation is not within the purview of DEQ's jurisdiction or authority to regulate
such subject matter as identified and described in this action, and that said Complaint is
subject to dismissal as a result thereof. That any allegation contained within said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
3.

In response to paragraph 3 thereof, Defendants would state this allegation is a

question of law as well, as was the preceding allegation; that Defendants reserve their
response to relate to questions and allegations of fact, not as to the law; that said Defendants
are (theoretically) not qualified to render a legal opinion as to such allegations of law;
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however, Defendants would state that David R. Gibson is an individual, residing in Boise,
Ada County Idaho; that at times he did, or still does, refer to one of his business entity or
entities to be that of Black Diamond Compost Products; that said Gibson has historically
been engaged in the production, analysis, utilization and development of crop and plant
residues for eventual use as a humus material and substance for return to the soil, and has
engaged in the production of same through an aging and decomposition process, with the
intent to ultimately return said materials and substances to the soils, at agronomic rates; that
Vernon K. Smith Sr. named as a Defendant in the caption above, became deceased May 2,
1966; that his estate was probated, though has not been closed; that notwithstanding closure,
the interests held by him were inherited by Victoria H. Smith, his spouse, pursuant to his
holographic Will; that Victoria H. Smith became deceased some 47 years later, on
September 11, 2013, and over a year preceding her death, all interests held by her in her
properties were conveyed, on July 4, 2012, to VHS Properties, LLC; that Vernon K. Smith
Jr. was identified in the holographic Will of Victoria H. Smith as her sole beneficiary and
declared to be the personal representative therein, should an estate be required, though all
assets were transferred to said VHS Properties, LLC, in lieu of effectuating the process or
need for any testamentary disposition; that the real property upon which the subject matter
of said crop and plant residue, and any agricultural solid waste is located, is that real
property owned by VHS Properties, LLC, referred to as ''the property" in the Complaint;
that neither said estates, nor Vernon K. Smith, Jr., are the real parties in interest in this
dispute, and are entitled to be dismissed from this action pursuant to the applicable
provisions of Rule 17 I.R.C.P.; that said "estates" are not deemed to have residencies, and
therefore are not residents" of Idaho; that Vernon K. Smith, Jr. is an individual and a
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resident of Ada County, Idaho, and although he is the registered agent and managing agent
of said VHS Properties, LLC, he is not to be regarded as a real party in interest, in either his
individual capacity or personal representative capacity; that to any extent any individual
Defendant is, has, or are transacting any business within the State of Idaho, it has not given
rise to any wrongful acts or omissions from which to establish any cause of action from the
subject matter as identified and alleged by DEQ in its Complaint, and no wrongful or
unlawful acts or omissions have occurred within the State of Idaho. Any allegation
contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is
herewith denied.
4.

In response to paragraph 4 thereof, Defendants would state the subject of venue is a

question of law, based upon the existence of certain factors; that Defendants would admit
"the property" identified in the Complaint, upon which the crop and plant residue materials
and alleged activity has taken place, is located in Ada County, Idaho; that said individually
named Defendants, David R. Gibson and Vernon K. Smith, Jr., are each residents of Ada
County, Idaho; that the individual, Victoria H. Smith, did reside in Ada County until her
demise on September 11, 2013; that Defendants would deny any violations, any acts, or any
omissions have occurred that would give rise to any action to be taken by DEQ that would
be within its jurisdiction or regulatory authority to initiate this action against any of the
named Defendants.
5.

In response to paragraph 5 thereof, these Defendants, through their counsel, are

aware of certain aspects relating to the establishment of, and the authorization regarding, the
Idaho Environmental Protection Health Act, various departments and agencies relating
thereto, and those certain Rules and Regulations regarding the enforcement of certain duties
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and obligations within the jurisdiction thereof; that although these Defendants are not
required to render legal opinions as to matters relating to questions of law in their response,
said Defendants would state, through their counsel, that the Department of Environmental
Quality is an executive agency of the State of Idaho, to whom it has been granted certain
powers and authority relating to the regulation of certain aspects of specifically described
solid waste, and matters relating to its treatment, not otherwise exempted or excluded
therefrom, and to the extent so authorized, to establish solid waste management rules and
regulations in relation thereto; that said authority to regulate same is subject to various
limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions, as expressed and as contained within
the rules specifically relating to the Department of Environmental Quality, as expressed in
IDAPA 58.01.06 "Solid Waste Management Rules", which therein establishes requirements
applicable to solid waste and solid waste management facilities in Idaho, excepting

therefrom those specifically exempted by the exclusionary effects of its subsections 001.03
and 001.04, which exemptions specifically identify manure and crop and plant residues,
ultimately intended for return to the soils at agronomic rates and all agricultural solid waste

materials and substances, which management and regulation is left to the enforcement of
those rules as adopted and enforced by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, as before
brought to the attention of some DEQ personnel by previous letter correspondence; that said
DEQ has no authority or regulatory capacity regarding any activity ongoing on "the
property" where such plant residue and agricultural solid waste materials are managed and
regulated pursuant to those rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture; that DEQ
has no authority to recover any agency costs, expenses, or attorney fees as may be incurred
as a result of this action against these Defendants, or any activity or business operations
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involving said exempt crop residue and agricultural solid waste materials. That any
allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth
hereinabove, is herewith denied.
6.

In response to paragraph 6 thereof, Defendants admit David R. Gibson does reside in

Ada County, Idaho.
7.

In response to paragraph 7 thereof, Defendants would state David R. Gibson does

have a business known generally as Black Diamond Compost Products; that said Defendant
has been engaged in composting plant residue materials in Ada County since 1974, and has
utilized such plant residues located on ''the property", in association with his composting
activities, which has continuously taken place in this general area referred to as the Gowen
Field Desert Front area, since 1988.
8.

In response to paragraph 8 thereof, Defendants would state the Estate of Vernon K.

Smith, Sr. was probated, in the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, and his community
property interests were inherited by his spouse, Victoria H. Smith; that her interests were
later transferred to VHS Properties, LLC on July 4, 2012, and the titled owner of "the
property", upon which the identified and referred substances and materials described in the
Complaint were "observed", is VHS Properties, LLC. That any allegation contained within
said paragraph, inconsistent with this response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
9.

In response to paragraph 9 thereof, Defendants would renew the response set forth in

paragraph 8 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in full herein.
10.

In response to paragraph 10 thereof, Defendants would state that Vernon K. Smith,

Jr. is a resident of Ada County, Idaho, that he is also the resident agent and managing agent
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of VHS Properties, LLC; that any allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent
with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
11.

In response to paragraph 11 thereof, Defendants deny same; that Victoria H. Smith

was the personal representative (Executrix) in the Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Sr., and she
inherited all of his community property interests, as his surviving spouse, in and to all real or
personal property assets and interests he held, pursuant to his holographic Will, as filed for
probate in that matter. That any allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with
the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
12.

In response to paragraph 12 thereof, Defendants are not obligated to render opinions

as to allegations relating to questions of law; however, Defendants would state, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 17, I.R.C.P., that the Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Sr., Victoria H.
Smith, individually, and Vernon K. Smith, Jr., alleged both individually and alleged to be
the personal representative of an above referenced estate, are not the real parties in interest
in this litigation, and are entitled to be dismissed from this action pursuant to the application
of the provisions of said Rule 17, I.R.C.P.
13.

In response to paragraph 13 thereof, these Defendants possess no personal

knowledge regarding any attempt made by DEQ personnel to inspect any "facility" located
on "the property" as so described to be parcel number S 150522000, located in Boise, Idaho,
and referred to in the Complaint as "the property"; that the Ada County Assessor's Office
has identified various parcels of real property with a tax parcel reference number for tax
assessment purposes only; that tax parcel number S 150522000 is a tax reference only, not a
legal description; that the tax parcel number refers to a parcel of property that consists of
eighty (80) acres, which acreage reference is contained within a larger parcel of real
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property, which description is contained within that deed dated July 4, 2012, and recorded in
the Ada County recorder's office, as described in the Instrument attached hereto; that all tax
assessment notices, for real property tax assessment purposes, are mailed to the titled
owners regarding the taxes that have been levied upon properties, and the tax parcel number
described above was delivered to VHS Properties, LLC, and copies of the referenced tax
parcel assessment Billing and the recorded deed, is attached hereto as Exhibits A, and B,
respectively, for convenient reference thereto. That Defendants would further respond by
stating that if any attempted inspection was undertaken on March 29, 2013, the DEQ
personnel involved in such an attempted inspection would have observed materials located
thereon that were comprised solely of plant residue and agricultural solid waste materials,
none of which come under the purview of any DEQ Rules for regulatory authority, as such
materials are specifically exempted and excluded from their jurisdiction of regulated
enforcement; that said materials are subject only to the rules adopted by the Idaho
Department of Agriculture, and not within any authority allowing DEQ to inspect or impose
any regulatory compliance mandates concerning the existence or management thereof; that
pursuant to IDAP A Rules of the Department of Environmental Quality, as contained in
IDAPA 58.01.06 entitled "Solid Waste Management Rules" the above cited exceptions,
exemptions, limitations, and exclusions are specifically set forth therein, and are restated by
Defendants to be part of this response.
14.

In response to paragraph 14 thereof, Defendants would state that Vernon K. Smith,

Sr., and Victoria H. Smith, husband and wife, held ownership interests in ''the property";
that Vernon K. Smith, Jr., their son, has been the attorney, managing agent, and acted in
accordance with the authority granted him pursuant to various powers of attorney for
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Victoria H. Smith, acting in various capacities over the years subsequent to the demise of
Victoria's husband, after his death on May 2, 1966; that the ownership of "the property" as
identified to be ''the property" in the Complaint, has been owned by VHS Properties, LLC,
since July 4, 2012, and Vernon K. Smith, Jr. has been the managing agent of said entity.
15.

In response to paragraph 15 thereof, these Defendants possess no knowledge from

which to formulate a factual response, and therefore must respectively deny same. That
notwithstanding said lack of knowledge, these Defendants would state that if there were any
attempted inspection of"the property" conducted by DEQ personnel, to the extent they were
at a location, and in such close proximity to "the property", so as to determine that no
persons were present at or on "the property", then any such DEQ personnel would have
observed the materials located on ''the property", and would have been able to confirm said
materials consisted solely of plant residue and agricultural solid waste materials, and
therefore subject only to the regulatory authority of the State of Idaho, Department of
Agriculture, and not the Department of Environmental Quality; that any observation to

confirm the absence of personnel on site would render a clear observation that all said
materials, facility, premises, and solid waste operation, as it is being claimed now to be,
were unconditionally exempt and excluded from any regulation or inspection by said DEQ
personnel.
16.

In response to paragraph 16 thereof, these Defendants would state, given the

allegation that said DEQ personnel did observe "large piles and windrows of grass

clippings, and leaves" located upon ''the property", they would have had a sufficient factual
basis from which to conclude their "solid waste management rules" did not apply, as they
contain specific exemptions of regulation and enforcement, to which effect they have been
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previously so informed and advised by Mr. Gibson, as said materials they observed are
plant residue and agricultural solid waste materials, regulated solely under rules adopted by
the Idaho Department of Agriculture, and are specifically outside the scope of any
regulatory authorization of DEQ, as so defined and contained within their solid waste
management rules.
17.

In response to paragraph 17 thereof, these Defendants have no information from

which to formulate an opinion as to the extent of the observation alleged to have taken place
by the Department staff personnel, and absent the establishment of any measurements
conducted by any mechanical, photographic, or physical process, undertaken to determine
any quantities, volumes, or amounts of the accumulated grass clippings, leaves, and any
other alleged organic materials purportedly observed, it would require speculation and
conjecture for these Defendants to respond, and therefore Defendants would respectfully
deny same.
18.

In response to paragraph 18 thereof, Defendants would state the allegations

contained therein are conjecture, not allegations of fact; that if no one was present on ''the
property", the observation from which conjecture is being expressed as to any "activity" to
"consisting of composting", or of "large volumes of solid waste", or for "resale" to the
"public" as "compost or humus" is speculation and conjecture only, and is herewith denied;
that notwithstanding said conjecture and speculation, the "department staff'' has purportedly
reported to have observed what they described to be "grass clippings, leaves and other
organic material", comprising what they describe to be the substance and composition of
"solid waste"; that by definition, such composition is plant residue and necessarily
agricultural solid waste materials, and reasonably should be known by DEQ personnel to be
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managed and regulated solely pursuant to the rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture only; that DEQ does not have any iurisdiction or authority to regulate "large
volumes of solid waste for the purpose of resale to the public as compost or humus" and by

definition, under their own established rules, they have no right of inspection or
enforcement, as said materials are unconditionally exempted and excluded from their
jurisdiction and right of regulatory enforcement. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
19.

In response to paragraph 19, Defendants deny same: that David R.Gibson has a

business and an activity associated with ventures that engage in composting activities of
crop and plant residue materials, and he does utilize his business name, at times, as referred
to in the Complaint. That by prior discussions, the plant residue materials located on "the
property" were intended for eventual return to soils on the surrounding 520 acres now
owned by VHS Properties, LLC, being the contiguous parcel to that of "the property",
which is a portion thereof, that the use of said materials and substances will be applied in
conjunction with the intended agricultural pursuit. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
20.

In response to paragraph 20 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson

did file of record with the Secretary of State, State of Idaho, an assumed business name in
years past, regarding certain other activities located on other properties.
21.

In response to paragraph 21 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson,

in his personal capacity, received a letter from DEQ, the content of which letter speaks for
itself; that the letter made reference to "solid waste" and to DEQ regulations; however the
letter failed to correctly cite any jurisdiction or authority from which said agency was
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empowered to regulate such materials located on "the property"; that DEQ has no authority,
jurisdiction or regulatory capacity to seek to impose any regulatory compliance upon any
property, premises or facility regarding plant residue and agricultural solid waste materials
that are to be regulated only pursuant to the rules adopted by the Department of Agricultural.
That David R. Gibson is registered and licensed with the Department of Agriculture,
regarding any management, operation, or production of any plant residue and agricultural
solid waste materials for return to the soils, and such solid waste materials, as located on
"the property", and as described in the Complaint, is unconditionally exempted and excluded
from any regulatory efforts or objectives undertaken by said DEQ.
22.

In response to paragraph 22 thereof, Defendants would state that on April 10, 2013,

DEQ personnel met with David R. Gibson, during which discussion Mr. Gibson reminded
DEQ as to the specific exemptions and exclusions to their regulatory capacity, and were
thereupon put on notice they had no regulatory authority to engage in any activities to
require any inspection or coordination with them, or compliance with any DEQ rules and
regulations. That during the conversation, DEQ personnel acknowledged the pre-emptive
and exclusionary effects contained within their own rules, but then chose to falsely represent

to Mr. Gibson that it was their belief the Department of Agriculture had authorized DEQ to
regulate such agricultural solid waste materials for them; that such a representation was
utterly false, fraudulent and a complete fabrication, as no such delegation of regulation had
ever taken place, and if not a grossly careless and reckless statement, was a blatant
fabrication as to the state of the regulatory authority regarding such materials and
substances; that Mr. Gibson immediately confronted that callous misstatement of authority;
that when told of such misrepresentation, and Mr. Gibson's demand for evidence of any
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such transfer of authority or substitute rules of application, the DEQ personnel retracted
their false statement, and acknowledged their error and submitted an email to Mr. Gibson, at
his request, to confirm their "mistake" of assumed authority.
23.

In response to paragraph 23 thereof, Defendants would state David R. Gibson

notified DEQ personnel as to their lack of authority and specifically cited the exempt
regulatory provisions to them, citing the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, and the solid
waste management rules and regulations, the effect of which was deemed to be a closed
subject, upon the email being the concluding discourse between them. That any allegation
contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith
denied.
24.

In response to paragraph 24 thereof, Defendants would state a letter of May 8, 2013,

was written to and received by Mr. Gibson, the content of which speaks for itself; that no
further response was perceived by Mr. Gibson to be required, as the Department's lack of
authority and regulatory capacity had become self-evident by the discussions and
communications conducted with DEQ personnel prior to that, all of which was made known
to the Department personnel who had engaged in the discussions with Mr. Gibson initially;
that the matter was deemed closed. That any allegation contained in said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
25.

In response to paragraph 25 thereof, Defendants would state the letter of July 31,

2013, sent by DEQ to David R. Gibson by certified mail, the contents of which does speak
for itself, contains reference to "notice of violation", the entire substance of which exceeded
the jurisdiction and authority of DEQ, and was regarded as meaningless, an abusive and a
willful disregard of DEQ's own limitations and exclusionary provisions within their Rules,
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and the letter was regarded as erroneous and void, of no force or effect, as there was a
complete lack of any enforceable capacity or lawful issuance, and was believed to be issued
either in error, as a result of what was assumed to be the involvement of uninformed DEQ
personnel, unfamiliar with their own exemptions and exceptions within their rules and
regulations and the limitations set forth therein, or was a malicious effort to assume
authority that would never be given to them by the Department of Agriculture. Any
allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove,
is herewith denied.
26.

In response to paragraph 26 thereof, Defendants would state David R. Gibson did

receive the certified mail as identified above, and he deemed it to be erroneous, void, and
unenforceable, in excess of any authority or jurisdiction of DEQ, and was issued in error,
out of ignorance, or a malicious attempt at a "power grab", an event that would only be
chastised in any judicial review; that Mr. Gibson deemed the matter closed and declined to
participate in any further discussions or conference gatherings, which to him would only
result in a need to reiterate the exemptions and exclusions that he before brought to the
attention of other DEQ personnel in previous discussions, and no recognition of any
regulatory authority would ever be acknowledged; that Gibson would not consent to any
waiver to any of the exclusionary provisions and qualification of the exempt status of the
materials and substances located on "the property" and DEQ's complete lack of jurisdiction
or authority to proceed further, or in the first instance.
27.

In response to paragraph 27 thereof, Defendants would state David R. Gibson relied

upon the exemptions, exclusions, exceptions and limitations identified in the IDAPA Rules
that specifically pre-empted the involvement of DEQ; that Gibson made clear his position to
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the DEQ personnel to whom he spoke to previously, and he before expressed no desire to
waive any exempt status, and declined to participate in any further discussions with any
DEQ officials trying to usurp authority from another State Agency; that there was no basis
in fact or any foundation in law, to support any application of the DEQ solid waste
management Rules, as they were specifically excluded from regulation as to Agricultural
solid waste materials and crop and plant residues, and no basis in fact or law existed to
support any claim to a right of regulatory enforcement or to claim any violation existed, and
in the absence of any right of application or regulatory enforcement, there existed no need to
discuss or to "resolve any conditions" over which DEQ had no authority, and the matter was
deemed close for all purposes. That any allegation contained within said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
FOURTH DEFENSE
As and for answer to the allegations set forth and contained in Count One of
Plaintiffs Complaint, alleging a violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012, Defendants do herewith
respond and allege as follows:
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response to

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 as set forth above, as though said
responses were set forth and alleged in full herein.
29.

In answer to paragraph 29 thereof, these Defendants would state such allegation is a

reference to a matter of law and not an allegation of fact; that these Defendants are not
required to render opinions in the nature of legal conclusions, but in a good faith attempt to
respond to such matters of law, Defendants would state, through their counsel, that § 39105(2) Idaho Code, is a statute contained within Title 39, Chapter 1, Statutes of the State of
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•

•

Idaho, regarding environmental quality and health; that §39-105,1.C. relates to powers and
duties of the director; that §39-105 (2),1.C. relates to the formulation and recommendation
by the director to the board as to the implementation of rules necessary to deal with
problems relating to water and air pollution, solid waste management and disposal,
licensure, and certification requirements, and confirming therein such rules may be limited
as to times, places, circumstances, or conditions; that said statute was enacted by the
legislature of the State of Idaho to authorize the promulgation of rules by the director,
relating to the subject of solid waste, its management and its disposal; that said director did
recommend such promulgation of Solid Waste Management Rules, which were
implemented pursuant to and in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IDAPA) and as previously set forth above, said Rules are specifically and expressly subject
to those limitations, exceptions, exemptions and exclusions identified within those
promulgated rules, and as referenced hereinabove in this responsive pleading, which are
herewith included in this response as though set forth and alleged in full herein.
30.

In answer to paragraph 30 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

seeks another opinion as to a matter of law, and does not assert an allegation of fact; that
these Defendants are not required to render legal opinions in the nature of legal conclusions,
but in a good faith attempt to respond to such matters of law, Defendants would state,
through their counsel, that§ 39-103(14) Idaho Code, is a statutory provision relating to
specific definitions of certain specified terms, the purpose being to establish the meaning to
be applied to the terms used and contained within Chapter 1, Title 39, as set forth above;
that said statute contains those various definitions of various terms that pertain to that Act;
that said statutory provision does define solid waste disposal to mean the collection, storage,
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•
treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste, as it is set forth therein;
that such definition is among the other various definitions as are contained within it, and the
terms, such as solid waste, solid waste management, and solid waste disposal, are subject to
the Solid Waste Management Rules, as promulgated in accordance with IDAPA, and said
Rules specifically relate to solid waste, its disposal, its management and its collection, and
included therein is identified those specific and certain limitations, exceptions, exemptions,
and exclusions, and therein specifically excludes any crop and plant residue materials and
agricultural solid waste, which is to be specifically regulated by the Department of

Agriculture; that the materials located on ''the property" are subject only to the regulation,
licensure and rules of the Department of Agriculture, and not DEQ. That any allegations
contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is
herewith denied.
31.

In answer to paragraph 31 thereof, these Defendants would restate the response as

set forth and contained in paragraph 30 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in
full herein.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 thereof, these Defendants would admit same.

33.

In answer to paragraph 33 thereof, these Defendants would state certain IDAPA

Rules exist, as proposed, recommended, and promulgated; that there exists Solid Waste
Management Rules, about which DEQ has made reference; that these Rules contain certain
definitions, and most importantly, do specifically address certain express limitations,
exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions regarding the jurisdiction or right of regulatory
enforcement, as identified therein, and said IDAPA Rules do specifically pre-empt any
regulatory enforcement and regulatory authority of DEQ with respect to the exercise of any
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activity, control or enforcement of those rules in regard to those exempt and excluded
materials and substances as have been addressed herein, and as to the location thereof on
"the property". That any allegations contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the
response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response as

set forth in paragraph 33 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in full herein.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 thereof, Defendants would state said allegation appears to

be a "scientific conclusion", as opposed to an allegation of fact; that David R. Gibson is
likely qualified to render a scientific opinion, given his knowledge of the subject and the
process regarding these crop and plant residue materials, but these other Defendants named
in the Complaint may not be as qualified to render such an opinion beyond a general
understanding as it relates to the "composting process" of agricultural materials; that upon
information, belief, and the general knowledge and experience as to such a biological
process, as such information is made available from both technical and traditional subject
matter research, Defendants would state, in general terms, that "composting" is a biological
and, typically, a natural occurring process, whereupon certain bacteria, temperatures,
moistures, and microorganisms engage in a process within a combination of natural
environmental conditions that, over a period of time, may result in a decomposition process
of various organic substances and materials, some or all of which may then be reintroduced
into the soil, as a soil amendment for plant growth, or onto plant foliage, applied as a plant
foliar, utilized to enhance plant foliage production and bloom development.

That any

allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove,
is herewith denied.
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36.

In answer to paragraph 36 thereof, these Defendants would state there are certain

rules and regulations apparently promulgated regarding various solid waste management
practices, including those certain identified facilities, the content of which speaks for itself,
but these "solid waste management rules" being the basis of their regulatory authority, have
no application to any of the materials, substances and their location on ''the property", given
the "observation" from which the facts and circumstances are being identified and alleged in
the Complaint; that the DEQ staff personnel claim an "observation" to be that of "grass
clippings and leaves", clearly materials comprised of crop and plant residue, and the
"observed" location being that as situated on "the property", provide no basis for the
imposition of any such rules or regulatory enforcements, as a matter ofldaho law, due to the
pre-emptive effects of the limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions contained
within said promulgated rules and regulations. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 thereof, these Defendants would state said IDAPA Rules

contain certain definitions, as do the statutory provisions; that the content of these IDAPA
Rules include not only definitions, but also identify certain limitations, exceptions,
exemptions and exclusions, thereby impacting the application of any such regulatory
enforcement of the rules or definitions set forth therein, and said IDAPA Rules specifically
exempt "the property" and the substances and materials located thereon, as it consists solely
of crop and plant residue, and constitutes agricultural solid waste that is exclusively
regulated by the Department of Agriculture, pre-empting any solid waste management rules,
such as those relating to garbage from household refuse and hazardous waste materials
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within IDAPA, and any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the
response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
38.

In answer to paragraph 38 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response as

set forth and contained in paragraph 17 above, as though said response were set forth and
alleged in full herein.
39.

In answer to paragraph 39 thereof, these Defendants would state this allegation

invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, which Defendants are not
required to render opinions on such matters; that in a good faith attempt to address such a
matter of statutory interpretation, these Defendants would state, through counsel, that any
"classification" of a category or "tier" reference to a solid waste site, facility, or operation or
disposal process, regardless of the reference to a "Tier II" processing facility, the right of
regulatory enforcement remains subject to the limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and

exclusions as contained within the IDAPA Rules, as it has been so identified within several
of the responses hereinabove set forth, and any such reference, whether or not it is deemed
to be an invitation to render a legal conclusion, the allegation remains irrelevant to what is
the issue of the materials, substances, and their location on "the property" referred to in this
Complaint, and defendants therefore must respectfully deny same.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 thereof, these Defendants would deny any relevancy or

application ofIDAPA Rule 58.01. 06. 012 to any aspect of the materials, substances, and the
location reference to ''the property" as previously identified herein, and any such "facility"
that processes crop and plant residue waste, all of which is agricultural solid waste, is
regulated exclusively by the Department of Agriculture, and is unconditionally exempt from
application of DEQ's regulatory provisions, and the enforceability or applicability of any
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such rules or "requirements", as they have been pre-empted, as a matter of law, and such
allegation, inviting an opinion as to such a question of law, or the interpretation and
application of such a "Tier II" requirement, is irrelevant to the issue and subject matter of
this Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
41.

In answer to paragraph 41 thereof, these Defendants understand the IDAP A

provision referred to in this paragraph has a definition regarding "owner" of a "facility", and
these Defendants would therefore restate their response as it is generally contained in
paragraph 40 above, and to be of the same effect as the above denial, since the IDAPA
provisions, whether it be that of the definition of "facility" or that of a definition of an
"owner" of a facility, the application is irrelevant to the issue and subject matter of this
Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
42.

In answer to paragraph 42 thereof, these Defendants understand the IDAPA

provision referred to in this paragraph has a definition regarding "operator" of a "facility",
and these Defendants would therefore restate their response as it is generally contained in
paragraphs 40 and 41 above, and to be of the same effect as the above denials, since the
IDAPA provisions, whether it be of the definition of "facility", or "owner", or that of a
definition of an "operator" of a facility, the application is irrelevant to the issue and subject
matter of this Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 thereof, Defendants deny same.

44.

In answer to paragraph 44 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson is

involved in a process that relates to the transition and decomposition of crop and plant
residues, into a soil amendment, resulting in the reintroduction of the materials back to the
plants and soils, accomplished at agronomic rates, being comprised solely of agricultural
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solid waste materials, managed and regulated exclusively pursuant to the rules adopted by
the Idaho Department of Agriculture, none of which comes under the jurisdiction, control,
supervision, or regulation of DEQ. That any allegation contained in said paragraph,
inconsistent with response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, which Defendants are not
required to render opinions on such matters; that in a good faith attempt to address such an
IDAPA provision and its application, and to the issue of whether Defendants need to submit
any documentation to demonstrate compliance to be received by the Department,
concerning a facility alleged to be in operation on "the property", these Defendants would
state, through counsel, that the IDAPA provisions, relating to "Tier II" solid waste facilities,
are not applicable to these Defendants, or to the materials, or to the substances, or to the
location described to be ''the property", as said IDAPA Rules and provisions relating to the
requirements of documentation and compliance have been pre-empted by the specific
limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions within the solid waste management rules
pertaining to solid waste facilities, treatments, disposal, and management, when the subject
matter of which involves crop and plant residue, and agricultural solid waste materials, as
the Department of Agriculture has the exclusive jurisdiction and right of regulation and
enforcement thereof as it regards any crop and plant residue and agricultural solid waste
materials, as identified and set forth above, and Defendants therefore respectfully deny
same.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

again invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, as previously
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requested above, regarding variously identified documentation required to demonstrate
compliance in certain waste matter environements, and in this instance the reference made is
to that of an "operating Plan" as being among the documentation to contain certain
information, also to be received by the Department, each of which concern aspects referring
to "Tier II" facilities; that these Defendants would therefore restate their response as
contained in paragraph 45 above, as it is understood the allegations similarly are addressing
"forms of documentation" required in relation to "Tier II" solid waste facilities, subject to
the regulatory authority of DEQ, which subject matter is irrelevant to the substance of the
Complaint herein, as set forth in Defendants' response to paragraph 45 above.
47.

In answer to paragraph 47 thereof, these Defendants would state they have no

obligation to submit any documentation regarding or concerning any IDAPA regulatory
compliance provisions or rules; that Defendants are not subject to any regulatory
enforcement by DEQ requirements or approvals regarding any agricultural solid waste
facilities comprised of crop and plant residue materials whatsoever, as those previously
identified Rules relating to solid waste management of solid waste facilities contains
specific limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions set forth within the IDAP A
Rules, and pre-empted by the exclusive authority of the Department of Agriculture, relating
to solid waste management and facilities with respect to crop and plant residue and
agricultural solid waste substances, as set forth above.
48.

In answer to paragraph 48 thereof, Defendants would state they have not submitted

any "operating plan" for approval, and will not submit any plan to any unauthorized agency,
as it relates to an operation of an exempt processing facility on ''the property"; that
defendants have no obligation to do; that Gibson has been engaged in the process of crop
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and plant residue decomposition, development of soil amendments, and plant foliar
materials, since his involvement in that agricultural activity and operation(s) starting in the
1970's, and is extensively familiar with the exclusive regulation vested in the Department of
Agriculture, as it regards such agricultural solid waste substances, materials and locations of
processing and decomposition of same, and he is well versed as to the pre-emptive effects in
the subsequently enacted and promulgated DEQ solid waste management rules and all
IDAP A provisions regarding such solid waste facilities, treatment, disposal and
management thereof, and the specific exclusions, exceptions, exemptions, and limitations
that are identified and expressly set forth therein and cited above, and Defendants deny any
allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove.
49.

In answer to paragraph 49 thereof, Defendants deny same.

50.

In answer to paragraph 50 thereof, Defendants deny same.

51.

In answer to paragraph 51 thereof, Defendants deny same.

52.

In answer to paragraph 52 thereof, Defendants deny that D.E.Q. has incurred any

costs, expenses, or attorney fees to which they are entitled to recover; that the prosecution of
this action is not a valid pursuit of any regulatory right vested in DEQ under the IDAPA
Rules and Regulations, or founded in any fact or law, as said processes, facilities, activities,
and operations have been pre-empted and are exempt from the imposition of any D.E.Q.
regulations whatsoever, and the action identified in their Complaint is being pursued by the
Department without any foundation or basis in fact or in law, and said Department could not
be the prevailing party in this action, and is not entitled to recover any of its expenses, costs,
or attorney fees, if any are incurred by them, as said Complaint is subject to dismissal by the
Court, as identified hereinabove, and as contained in the prayer for relief as set forth below.
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FIFTH DEFENSE
That said defendants do allege, as an affirmative defense, the application of each,
any, every, and all exclusions, exceptions, exemptions, and limitations set forth and
identified in the IDAPA Rules and provisions pertaining to the solid waste facilities,
treatment, disposal and management regulations thereof, specifically including reference as
it is made in IDAPA 58, Title 01, Ch. 06, regarding such reference to such solid waste and
the application of those exclusionary effects that crop and plant residue and agricultural
solid waste is excluded from and not regulated under these rules, being 001. 03. b. ii and
iii, which specifically exempts any right of regulatory authority of DEQ regarding the
subject of solid waste comprised of crop and plant residue and any agricultural solid waste
materials, managed and regulated pursuant to those rules adopted by the Idaho Department
of Agriculture.
That any materials found and located upon ''the property", and identified in said
Complaint, is a material and substance consisting and comprised solely of a crop and plant
residue, intended for return to soil as a soil amendment, at agronomic rates, and consists
solely of agricultural solid waste materials, being the decomposition of grass clippings and
leaves; that the exclusive management and regulatory authority regarding same is that
reflected in the rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, and is specifically
excluded from enforcement of any regulatory provisions of the Department of
Environmental Quality.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, having answered the allegations set forth and contained in
Plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise having generally denied same, and having set forth their
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exempt status from any regulatory enforcement by the Department of Environmental
Quality, do herewith pray for relief and entry of judgment as follows:
1. That Plaintiff recover nothing whatsoever by their Complaint, and that Plaintiff's
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, as said Department has no authority to
engage in any regulatory activity concerning the subject matter materials
identified in the Complaint, or as being located on "the property", as identified in
the Complaint.
2. That Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) I.R.C.P., as a
result of Plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action for which any relief can be
granted, as Plaintiff has no standing to allege a violation of ADAPA Rules.
3. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed as a result of Plaintiff's failure to
establish lawful standing as required under Idaho's established case authority.
4. That the named Party Defendants, The Estate of Vernon K. Smith Sr., Victoria
H. Smith, and Vernon K. Smith Jr. be dismissed from this complaint, pursuant to
Rule 17(a) I.R.C.P., as they are not among the real party in interest, as "the
property" is owned by VHS Properties, LLC, at all times relevant to the alleged
attempt to inspect, or any alleged attempt to confer, by virtue of the baseless
intervention undertaken by DEQ in the year 2013.
5.

That Defendants recover all costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in this
matter, pursuant to statute, including, but not limited to §12-117, 12-120, 12121, Idaho Code, and as authorized by Rule 54 I.R.C.P.
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6. That Defendants reserve the right to file a counterclaim against the Department
of Environmental Quality (DEQ), for such causes of action as may be found to
be just and proper under Idaho and Federal law.
7. For such other and further relief
the premises.

Dated this

I!}__ day of April, 2015.
Vernon K. Smi ,
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Lf7 day of April, 2015, I caused a true and

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the
correct copy of the above and foregoing to
following addresses as follows:

be delivered to the following persons at the

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(

)
)
X

)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. D Q
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd F
Boise, Idaho 83706
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EXHIBIT "A"
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TAX YEAR

2014

VICKY J. MCINTYRE, Treasurer & Tax Collector
For Taxing Districts in Ada County
200 W Front Street I P.O. BOX 2868
BOISE, ID 83701-2868

PHONE: (208) 287-6800
https ://www.adacou nty .id .gov/treasurer
Email: propertytaxquestions@adaweb.net

DUE DATE: DECEMBER 20, 2014

PARCEL NUMBER:

S1505220000

2014 Bill Number:
Property Type:
Tax Roll:
Code Area:

Property Description:
W2NW4
SEC 52N 2E

Property Address: S PLEASANT VALLEY RD
ADA COUNTY ISSUES A CONSOLIDATED PROPERTY TAX BILL ON BEHALF OF THE TAXING DISTRICTS LISTED BELOW.
REVENUE WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO EACH DISTRICT IN THE AMOUNT INDICATED. CERTIFICATIONS TO THE TAX
ROLL, VOTER-APPROVED BONDS & OVERRIDES ARE ALSO SHOWN IF APPLICABLE.
TAXING DISTRICT

PHONE#

SCHOOL #1 M & 0
SCHOOL#1BOND
SCH #1 SUPPLMNT
SCHOOL #1 OTHER
SCHOOL #1 - PERM OVERRIDE
ADA COUNTY
INDIGENT ~ELFARE) SERVICES
ADA COUN
HIGHWAY
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARY
COLLEGE OF WESTERN IDAHO
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
PEST EXTERMINATION
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT

854-4029
854-4029
854-4029
854-4029
854-4029
287-7000
287-7000
387-6123
362-0181
562-3299
287-2962
577-4646
577-4646

SUBTOTAL

TAX AMOUNT

DISTRICT LEVY
.003449660
.000700000
.000394511
.000011054
.000677715
.002715924
.000308508
.001083315
.000566678
.000166280
.000157028
.000141920
.000030348

41.77
8.47
4.77
0.13
8.20
32.86
3.73
13.11
6.86
2.01
1.90
1.72
0.37

.010402941

125.90

2643537
REAL
PRIMARY
233

BACK OF BILL INCLUDES
CRITICAL PROPERTY TAX DETAILS
,....,IMPORTANT - PLEASE READ,....,
BILL REQUESTED BY:

WHEN ANY PORTION OF THE TAX BECOMES
DELINQUENT. A 2% LATE CHARGE WILL BE
APPLIED. INTEREST ON THE DELINQUENT
BALANCE WILL ACCRUE AT 1% PER MONTH,
DATING FROM JANUARY 1ST. WHEN PAYING
DELINQUENT BALANCES, PLEASE CALL OUR
OFFICE FOR THE AMOUNT DUE INCLUDING
LATE CHARGES AND INTEREST.

TO AVOID ADDITIONAL CHARGES,
THE ENTIRE FIRST HALF MUST BE
PAID IN FULL BY DECEMBER 20TH
AND THE SECOND HALF MUST BE
PAID BY JUNE 20TH
PARTIAL PAYMENTS ARE ACCEPTED ON
REAL PROPERTY TAX AND APPLIED FIRST
TO THE OLDEST DELINQUENCY, THEN TO
CURRENT BALANCE DUE.
PREPAYMENTS FOR TAX YEARS NOT YET
BILLED ARE ACCEPTED.

2014 PROPERTY ASSESSED VALUE

Credit I Deb~ Payments Accepted at
1-800-272-9829 or Officialpayments.com
Enter Jurisdiction code: 2212
A 2.4% convenience fee will be charged.

TAX ADJUSTMENT:
CURRENT YEAR TAX:
PREPAYMENTS RECEIVED:
STATE PROPERTY TAX REDUCTION:

0.00
125.90
0.00
0.00

TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE:
HOMEOWNER'S EXEMPTION:
TOTAL TAXABLE VALUE:

12,100
0
12,100

TOTAL DUE:

125.90

PRIOR YEAR TAX:

109.22

PAYMENTS MUST BE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE POSTMARKED ON OR BEFORE THE DUE DATE TO AVOID ADDITION OF LATE CHARGE & INTEREST.

IMPORTANT - RETURN THIS COUPON WITH YOUR CHECK TO ENSURE ACCURATE PAYMENT PROCESSING

PAY TO: ADA COUNTY TREASURER, P.O. BOX 2868, BOISE ID 83701

(208) 287-6800
PARCEL NUMBER:

□ Check here if mailing address has changed and indicate
correction(s) on back of payment coupon.

S1505220000

PLEASE WRITE THE PARCEL NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK.

DUE DATE: DECEMBER 20, 2014
078298-0013813

g Please check payment option:
S1505220000

VHS PROPERTIES LLC
1900 W MAIN ST
BOISE ID 83702

0
0

HALF PAYMENT
FULL PAYMENT

0

OTHER PAYMENT $

$
$

62. 95
125. 90
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8349534853505048484848002643537000000000629500000000125900
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R._cE"-R.ec.oR D

•-AL

I NG-

To C.oRRec.r

ADA COUNTY RECORDER . p h e r D. Rich
BOISE IDAHO
Pgs=3 NIKOLA OLSON

2014-081672
10/06/2014 04:58 PM
AMOUNT:$16.00

Prepared By:
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

ADA COUNTY RECORDER Christopher D. Rich
BOISE IDAHO
Pgs=3 NIKOLA OLSON
VHS PROPERTIES LLC

2014-087142
10/24/2014 04:29 PM
AMOUNT:$16.00

II I II IIIIIll 00034215201400871420030034
II IIIII IIll III IIII III 111111111111111

After Recording Return To:
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

QUIT CLAIM DEED
On July 4, 2012 THE GRANTOR,
Victoria H. Smith, the First Party herein, residing in the City of Boise, Ada
County, Idaho, does herewith execute this Quitclaim Deed in both her individual
capacity, and as the sole heir to and Executrix and Personal Representative of the Estate
of Vernon K. Smith, Sr., deceased, who died on May 2, 1966, through her son, Vernon K.
Smith, Jr., pursuant to his exclusive, Durable, and Irrevocable Power of Attorney issued
by said Victoria H. Smith, for an in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, and does hereby release and quitclaim to VHS
Properties, LLC., the Second Party herein, an Idaho Limited Liability Company, with its
principal place of business located at 1900 West Main Street, Boise, Idaho, all of said
First Party's rights, title, and interest in and to the following described real property,
situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho;
•

Legal Description: The East half (El/2) of the Northeast Quarter
(NEl/4) of Section Seven (7), in Township Two (2) North of
Range Two (2) East of B.M. in Ada County, Idaho, consisting of
80 acres.

Tax Parcel Number: S1507110000
Property Address: South Cole Road, Boise, Idaho, 83709
•

Legal Description: The West half (Wl/2) of the Northwest Quarter
(NWl/4) of Section Eight (8), in Township Two (2) North of
Range Two (2) East of B.M. in Ada County, Idaho, consisting of
80 acres.

Tax Parcel Number: S 1508220000
Property Address: South Pleasant Valley Road, Boise, Idaho, 83705
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•
•

Legal Description: The South West quarter (SW¼) of the South
East quarter (SE ¼) of Section Thirty Two (32) in Township Three
(3) North of Range Two (2) East of B.M. in Ada County, Idaho,
consisting of 40 acres.

Tax Parcel Number: Sl032438400
Property Address: South Pleasant Valley Road, Boise, Idaho, 83705
•

Legal Description: The Eas~l:lalLCzl.Li) of the Northwest quarter
(NWl/4) of Section Five (5) N'dM!rot'Range Two (2) East of B.M.
in Ada County, Idaho, consisting of 80 acres.

Tax Parcel Number: S 1505210000
Property Address: South Pleasant Valley Road, Boise, Idaho, 83705

•

Legal Description: The ~ei! H..,JilJ~f the Northwest quarter
(NWl/4) of Section Five (5) Mollii~~4f{"ange Two (2) East of B.M.
in Ada County, Idaho, consisting of 80 acres.

Tax Parcel Number: S1505220000
Property Address: South Pleasant Valley Road, Boise, Idaho, 83705

•

Legal ~-ts~wti~ The South West quarter (SW ¼) of Section
Five (5) ~dfur tr Range Two Nerth.--ef:-R-ange--q:'wo (2) East of
B.M. in Ada County, Idaho, containing 160 acres.

Tax Parcel Number: S1505310000
Property Address: South Pleasant Valley Road, Boise, Idaho, 83705

Mail Tax Statements To:
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The s d First Party, ictoria H. Sm1
hand and seal to this Quitclaim Deed o uly 4, 2012, by and thro
Attorney to her son, Vernon K. Smith,
1
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•
Victoria H. Smith, Executrix of the Estate of Vernon K.
Smith, Deceased, and in her individual capacity, and as sole
heir to the Estate of Vernon K. Smith Sr., by and through
her Son, Vernon K. Smith Jr., pursuant'to his exclusive,
Durable, and Irrevocable Power of Attorney

STATEOFIDAHO)
) ss:
County of Ada
)
THIS IS TO CERTIFY That on this 4 th day of July, 2012, before me a Notary
Public in and for said State, personally appeared Vernon K. Smith, Jr., and before me and
in my presence said party did acknowledge to me that he executed the above and
foregoing Quitclaim Deed pursuant to his exclusive, Durable and Irrevocable Power of
Attorney issued to him by Victoria H. Smith.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
notarial seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

Not~- ublic ~or Idah9:,-J•f ROYAL VON PUCKETT
Res1dmg a t ~ Resides Eagle, Idaho
My Co~~~P~.ef 14

3.

Notary Commission ,an45
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... 2083451129

VERNON K SMITH

, ;........:.

LAWRENCB G~ WASDEN
Attorney General -· ' ·
NO.
A.M.

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General

.

El'..l/1:.14

---FIL~.tY1lt1 t; :
OCT 15 2015

Chief, Natural Resources Division

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SLVSHIA HOLMES
DEPUTY

DARRELL G. EARLJ, ISB #4748

Deputy Attorney General
Department of Enviro,unental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 37:,~0494.
Facsimile: (208) 373~0"481

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
~ Sl'ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAilO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRON~AL·QUALITY»
Plaintiff,

)

) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
)

) STIPULATION 'J:O A.MJ:ND
) COMPLAINT

v.

)

DAVllJ R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS> and VHS PROPERTIES, )

LLC

)

Defendants.

_______________

)
)

)
)

IT IS ~REBY STil?ULATED by counsel for all parties hereto that> pursuant to Rule
15(a) of the Idaho Ru~es,of Civil Proced~ Plamtiffmay file with this Court its First Amended

Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto.

OtRIGUNAL
~

STIPULATION TO·.t\MEND COMPLAINT- I
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,,,:.; ' 'di /~·.,; ' . 208345111

/ .~
DA1FD

thi•

VERNON K SMITH

03/1::14

of September, 2015.

Vernon K.. Smith
Attorney for the Defendants

.t-k

DATED this

/.J

()_e-ld,#-o.
day o f ~ ~ 2015 .

..
STATE OF 1DAB'.O
FFICE OF TIIE Arr

AR.RELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Atto01eys for Plaintiff

STIPULATION TO AMEND COM'PL\INT- Z
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-

'.Ll:H:!::14bll '.L':::1

/
.

.

Vt:.t<NUN K bM!IH

1::1'1/ 1::14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r-_

. a./2'b..b..

I HEREBY CER1JFY that on this /
day of ~ 2 0 1 5 , a 1rue and correct
copy of the foregoing STIPULATIOITTO AMEND CON.!PLAINT was served on the following
as indicated below: ·

Vernon K. Smith ·· ·
Attorney at Law .
1900 West Main.Su:eet
Boise, ID 83 702· .. ·

~/

'

L.:11):Inited States ~fail, Postage Prepaid

13

Facsimile; (208) 345-1129

\
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/

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, 'IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTN.IENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

)

) CASE NO.: CV-OC-2015-03540
)
)

) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
) [Filing Fee Exempt]
)
Idaho Code§ 31-3212

V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES )

LLC,.

)

Defendants.

)
)
)

----------------)
Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (''the Department''), by and

through the Office of the Idaho Attorney General, for its complaint (''Complaint") against David
R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products and VHS P~operties, LLC (collectively ''the

Defendants"), asserts and alleges as follows:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT -1
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/

NATURE OF ACTION
1.

The Department initiates this action pursuant to the Idaho Environmental

Protection and Health Act ("EPHA''), Idaho Code §§ 39-101 et seq., in order to compel
compliance with regulatory requirements necessary for the protection of human health and the
environment from the hazards presented by solid waste management activities occurring on
property owned and operated by the Defendants located in Ada County, Idab,o as more

completely described below. In addition the Department see~ civil penalties in an amount up to
$10,000 per violation or up to $1,000 per day of ongoing and continuous violations.

JlJRISDICTION
2.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 39~108 andldaho Code§ 1-705.
3.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 5-514 because, upon information and belief, the Defendants reside in the State ofldaho are

transacting or have transacted business within the State of!daho and the wrongful acts and
omissions giving rise to this cause of action occurred within the State ofidaho.

VENUE
4,

Venue is ptope·r in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of

Idaho, in and for Ada Collllty, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 39-108(3)(b) and Idaho Code§ 5-404.
because the Defendants are, upon information and belief, residents of Ada County, Idaho and the

violations and acts and omissions alleged herein occurred and the action arose in Ada County,
Idaho.
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PARTIES
5.

The Department is an executive agency of the State ofldaho authorized by Idaho

Code § 39~ 109 to file suit by and through the Idaho Attorney General to enforce the EPHA and
rules and permits issued by the Department pursuant to the EPHA, and to recover agency costs,
expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing such actions pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 39-108, Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121.

6.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, a person residing in

Ada County in the State 0fldaho.
7.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, doing business under

the asswned business name of ''Black Diamond Compost Products."
8.

Defendant VHS Properties, LLC is, upon infonnation and belief, an Idaho Limited

Liability Company formed pursuant to the laws of the S(ate of Idaho and doing business in Ada
County State ofldaho with a principal address of 1900 W. Main Street, Boise Idaho, 83702.
9.

Defendants are persons within the meaning ofldaho Code § 39~ 103(9).
FACTS

10.

On March 29, 2013, the Department attempted to conduct an inspection of a

facility located on a portion of property located off Pleasant Valley Road, southwest of the
intersection of West Gowen Road and Pleasant Valley Road described as the Northwest¼ of
Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County Assessor's
Office as Parcel Number S1505220000, (hereinafter "the Propertyn).
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11.

Upon information and belief the Property on which the facility is located is owned

by VHS Properties LLC.
12.

At the time of the inspection attempt no persons were present at the Property.

13.

At the time of the inspection attempt~ the Department staff was able to observe

from the public roadway and the driveway prior to any gate or fence, large piles and windrows of
grass clippings. leaves and other organic material constituting solid waste.
14.

At the time of the inspection attempt the Department staff observed amowits of

solid waste in excess of six hundred (600) cubic yards.
15.

Upon information and belief activities at the site include the composting oflarge

volumes of solid waste for the purpose of resale to the public as compost or humus.
l 6.

Subsequent to the inspection, the Department staff became aware the facility was

operated under the name '!J:llack Diamond Compost Products.~,
17.

According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State and upon information and

belief, "Black Diamond· Compost Products" is an assumed business name of Defendant David R.
Gibson.
18.

On April -2, 2013, the Department wrote Defendant David R Gibson and notified

him of the need to comply with Department regulations relating to solid waste disposal.

19.

On April IO, 2013, the Department met with Defendant DavidR. Gibson to

discuss compliance with applicable regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
20.

During the meeting Defendant David R. Gibson disclaimed any obljgation to

comply with Department regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
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21.

On May 8, 2013, the Department wrote Defendant Gibson requesting further

information concerning his disclaimer. Defendant Gibson did not respond to the Department's
May 8, 2013 letter.
22.

On July 31, 2013, the Department issued a Notice of Violation to Defendant

Gibson by certified mail. A true and cottect copy of the Notice of Violation is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
23.

Defendant David R. Gibson accepted delivery of the Notice of Violation on

August 6, 2013.
24.

Defendant David R. Gibson declined to participate in a compliance conference to

resolve the July 30, 2013 Notice of Violation.

COUNT!
(Violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012)
25.

The allegations of paragraphs 1-27 of this Complaint are hereby incorporated by

reference as though fully set forth herein.
26.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-105(2) the Department has authority to promulgate

rules relating to solid waste disposal and licensure and certification requirements pertinent
thereto.
.

27.

.

Idaho Code§ 39-103(14) defines "Solid Waste Disposal'' as: ''the collection,

storage, treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste."
28.

Idaho Code § 39-103(13) defines ''Solid Waste" ~s:

garbage. refuse, radionu.clides and other discru:ded solid material.
including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community
activities but does not included solid or dissolved material in

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5
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domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources,
such as silt, dissolved or suspended soli~s in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved material in irrigation return flows or other
common water pollutants.
29.

The Department has promulgated rules relating to solid waste disposal at IDAPA

58.01.06.
30.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.05 defines a "Composting Facility" as a ''Processing

Facility."
31.

IDAPA 58.01 .06.005.32 defmes a ''Processing Facility" as: A facility that uses

biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for reuse, excluding waste handling
at transfer stations or recycling centers.''
32.

Com.posting uses biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for

33.

The Department has promulgated regulations governing processing facilities

reuse.

based upon the volume of wastes processed or accumulated. at the facility.
34.

IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03 defmes a "Tier II Facility'' as a facility that is "a

processing facility or incinerator that has a cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at

any one

time that is greater than six hundred (600) cubic yru:ds.
35.

At the time of the March 29, 2013 inspection~ Defendants had accepted and

processed solid waste and had accumulated a volume of such solid waste at its facility in excess
of six hundred· (600) cubic yards.
36,

Some or all of the Property is a Tier II Processing Facility.
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37.

IDAPA 58.01.06.012 sets forth the requiremeµ.ts for Tier II Facilities and states in

relevant part:

The owner and operator of a new Tier II facility shall establish
compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining
Department approval of the applications required in Subsection
012.02 before beginning construction and Subsection 012.04 prior
to accepting waste.
38.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.29 defines the '1owner" ofa facility as: "The person(s) who

owns land or a portion of land on which a site or facility is located.''
39.

IDAPA 58.01 .06.005.28 defines the ''operator" of a facility as: "The person(s)

responsible for overall operation of all or part of a site or facility."
40.

Defendant VHS Properties LLC is, upon information and belief, the owner of the

Property upon which a Tier II Facility is located.
41.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, the operator of a Tier

II Facility,
42.

IDAPA 58.01 .06.012.02 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit

documentation to the Department "demonstrating compliance with the siting requirements and
restlictions specified in subsection 012.01 within the time frames specified in Section 012."
43.

IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04 provides that a Tier TI Facility must submit to the

Department an " ... Operating Plan containing that infonnation required by 58.01.012.03 within
the time frames stated in Section 012. An Operating Plan shall include a description of the
wastes to be accepted, the methods for maintaining compliance with each of the applicable
general operating requirement of Subsection 012.03 and complies with any applicable facility
specific requirements found in Subsections 012.09 through 012.11.''
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44.

Defendants failed to submit documentation demonstrating compliance with the

siting requirements of IDAPA 58.01.06.012.01 or obtain site approval from the Department for a

Tier II Facility prior to commencing construction of a Tier II Facility.
45.

Defendants failed to submit or obtain Operating Plan approval for the operation of

a Tier II Facility prior to accepting solid waste.

46.

Defendants are in violation oflDAPA 58.01.06.012.

47.

The Department is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring

Defendants to submit anapprovable Siting Application as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02
\

and an approvable Operating Plan as required by IDAPA 58.01 .06.012.04 and to comply with
and implement the requirements of the approved Operating Plan.
48.

The Department is further entitled to penalties up to $10,000 dollars for each

sepru·ate violation oflDAPA 58.01.06.012 alleged herein or up to $1,000 dollars per day of
ongoing and continuous violations.
49.

The Department has incurred and will incur costs. expenses and attorney fees in

the prosecution of this matter in an amoWlt to be proven at trial or in the event of default the
amount of $2J500.00. The Department is entitled to recover its expenses pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 39-108 and its costs including attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12~121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, respectfully

requests the Court grant ·as appropriate the following relief:
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A.

Issue a pennanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code § 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to submit a full and complete siting application as required

by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02.
B.

Issue a permanent mandatory injwiction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code § 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to submit a full and complete Operating Plan as required by

IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04.
C.

Issue a permanent mandatory injµnction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code § 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to comply with and implement the terms of the approved

Operating Plan as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04.

D.

Assess against the Defendants statutory penalties in an amount up to $10,000.00 for each

separate violation of the EPHA and up to $1,000.00 per day for each continuing violation of the
EPHA alleged in this Complaint
E.

Assess against all Defendants, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-108(6),

Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 all Department costs, expenses, attorney fees and witness fees
incurred in this action in an amoWlt to be proven at trial or in the event of default in the amount
of$2,500.00.

F.

Grant such other relief as the Court deems equitable and just.

DATED this 15 th day of October, 2015.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF 1HE ATIORNE
'

~
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STATE OF lll'\'t!O

DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
'

o,L ".ButoJi" on.er, Govornor

1410 Norin HIiton • Boise, Idaho 03708 • (208) 378--0502

C11rt Fl'e.naen, Direolor-

July 31, 2013

CERTIFIED MAIL#: 70013020 00014045 9966

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

DavlcJ Gibson
Black·DJamond compost Products
3000 Rose HIii
Boise, Idaho 83705
Dear Mr. Gibson:
.

.

,

The Idaho Department of Envlronmeotaf Quality (Department) ~dmlnlsters programs designed to em:mra that
bu~inasses and lndMduals comply with specific permits and rules designed to protect the cltfzana and the
envJronment throu_ghout the State. B~ed on available information, the Department beDeves Blaok Dramond
Compost Products may have vlolatad such rules and/or permit requirements at the Black Diamond composting
site loqated on property tdenHffed as parcel number S1505220000 ln Boise, Idaho. The purpose ofthis Jetter Is to
notify 13Iarik Diamond Compost Products of an apparent violation desorfbed in the document enclosed herein.
The Department is seeking the cooper~tlon of Black Diamond Compost Products in resolving these matters to the
full satisfaotion.of the parties. Black Diamond Compost Company Is advised to contact the Department witltln
fifteen (15) calendar d_ays after receipt of this letter. At such tlme1 the Department wlll schedule _a meeHng at a
mutualfy-agteeable data and time, at whk:h the Notice of Violation can b~ discusseg. If Black Diamond Compost
Products elects not to meet with the Department on the alleged violations, the Department will seek resoJutlon qt
these n:iattets using tts authormes as provided by law. Arrangements to meet should be made by contacting
Dean Ehlert at (208) 373-0416 or at the following address:
Dean l=hlert, Solid Wasta Coordinator

Department of Envlronmental Quality
Waste. Man~ement and Remediation bMslon
1410 N, Hilton
_
· Bolse, !daho 83708-1255
Thank you in advance for your prompt etfention to this matler. The Department is confident fhatwe can work
cooperattvely to resolve these lssue-s,
· ·

l

l

i
l

.!
!

Sincerely,

L

!

r

~)4.,a...~
Michael Mccurdy, P,E., CHMM
state Response Program Manager
Waste Management & Remediation Division
DE;tg

1Mltl<llir.nlllll°""ll(l!t~lllll'••V<!rlcl.lerA'OI,

Enclosure
S. Hamlin, Deputy Attorney General

0. Ehlert DEQ - WM&RO

P. Wagner, DEQ- Bolse

A Scheff, DEQ ,_ Boise

J. Gantz, PEQHBo[ee
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NOTICE OF VIOLATI:ON
ISSUED TO~

David Robert Gi'bson
Black Diamond Compost Products
5120 W. Overland Road
Boise, Idaho 83705

Op. March 29, 2013ii the Idaho Depar:t:rnent_ofEnviro:tm1ental Quality (Department) conducted an .inspection of
the Black piamond C~n;i:post Products (Black Diamond) facility located off Pleasant Valley Road, southwost of
tho intersection of West Gowea.Road4IldPleasantValley Road and idonti:fied by tho Ada County &ises~pr'~ .
Office as Parcel Number S150522000, Bois~ Idaho. During the inspection the Department staff o~orved
atorage and pr,ocossing of regulated solid waste including numorous wiwh'ows containing gl'ass clippinga~ leaws
and other organio solid waste. Pur~t to the. Bnviromnental Protectim:i. an.cl Health Act (EPHA), Ideho Codo
39w 101, et ~eq. 'and tho Solid Waste Management Ry:k;$, IDAPA 58.01.06, the Depm1ment has dete.1·.m.ined 'that ·
the following violation has occurred at the facility operated by Black Diamond in Boise, Idaho.
, VIOLATIONS

Violation No. 1

Legal Provisions Violated:

IDAPA'58.0l.06.012, Solid Waste Management Rules ·

IDAPA 58.01.06.012 statosinrwevantpw.t
''The own.er and operator of a new Tiet II facility shall esU},blish compl:iaru:e with the reqwements of
· Section 012 by qbtainmg Department approval of the applications required in Subs0ction 012.02
[requiring siting approval] ~oro begin,n.ing oonstruction. and Subsection 012.Q4 [:requiring operating
plan appmval] prior to accepting waste. The owner and operator of an exisfm.g Tier JI facility shall
establish compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining Department approvru:of'lhe
applications reqcdteain Subsection 012.04 within two (2) yeatSfoomApril .26, 2002 and Subsection
01202 w~ five (5) yeatS :from April 26~ 2002,"
·
·

11w Solid Wasto Management Rules, IDAFA 58.01.06.005 .32 define a processing .faoility as a facility that uses
biological or ohemical decomposition to prepru:e· solid;waste fur rerise, e~Iuding w~ handling at f\- 1:t~J.'
station or recycling centers. At the thne of tho Maroh 29, 2013) fuspeotio:n Black Diatnondllad accepted and
processed solid waste. Black Diamond failed to submit or obtain site approval from the Department for a solid
wasto prooossing facility and :failed to submit or obtain operating plan approval for the operation ofa solid
waste processing facility.
Penalty Assessed:

$3,500

Total Penalty Ass~sed: $3,500

Notice of Violation- :{)age 1

\
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••
TIMETABLE
.

.

Black DilUJlondma.y 1-equost a compliance conferel}.oe with th.e Department to explmn the alleged violation and
discuss enfry into a Consent Order which _:will include payment of assessed penalties, and a plan to rom~y
damage ca:used by any violation and assure :future compliance, To arrange a ooinplian.oe oonfexence, Black
Diamond must contact the Department withln.:fifteen (15) calendar days after reco:ipt ofthis N~oe of Violation.
Failure to reg_uest a oonference within fifteen (15) calendar days afteueoeipt ofthls Notice ofViola:tlon) 9r ,
reach agreement on a Consent Order within smy (60) calendar days may tl)Sult in a civil enforooment aotion in
district
court for panalties~ injunctive
.
. relief; and costs including attomey fees,

.

.

Jnqwdes or con-esponden.oo conceining this Notice of Violation 8balI be ffirect.ed to:
: DeanEhlel't, Solid Waste Program.Manager
·Depru.1:tnent ofEnvironm.ental Quality
Wasto ~agement and R.~ediatlonDivision
1410N.mlton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255

(208) 373.. 0416

M~--'--,-·_____ ZQ13

DATED TIIIS_~~--_ dayof__

Idaho Department
ofEnvironmental
Quality
.
.

Notioa ofViolation- Page 2
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ORI GINA~
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

NO. _ _ ___,.,,,.,,,,..---~- I IO
FILED
{J
P,M _ _ __

AM.

NOV 12 2015

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By JANET ELLIS
DEPUTY

DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIPR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPA CITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540

ORDER APPROVING
STIPULATION TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on the Stipulation to file an Amended
Complaint, filed by parties in the above-captioned matter on October 15, 2015.

~ ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Amended Complaint attached to the Stipulation to
File Amended Complaint shall be filed by the Clerk of the Court in this matter and Plaintiff shall
affect service of the Amended Complaint in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

17day of November, 2015.

//

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the l''rday of November, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83 702

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83 706

DATED this

/u.S.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Fax (208)
~.S.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Fax (208) 373-0481

\?-' day of November, 2015.

~~~

CLERK

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3
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. 0Rl-l3INAL

•

•

LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

!i-a {)

NO·-----:;:~-..·--·,.......,.__
A.M. _ _ _ _ _F-ilL~

~

tftc

0·2 2015
CHPUSTOPHER ·o. RICH, Clerk

CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division

By NICHOLE SNELL DEPUTY

DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES
LLC,.
Defendants.

------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV-OC-2015-03540

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
[Filing Fee Exempt]
Idaho Code§ 31-3212

)

Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("the Department"), by and
through the Office of the Idaho Attorney General, for its complaint ("Complaint") against David
R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products and VHS Properties, LLC (collectively "the
Defendants"), asserts and alleges as follows:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1
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•

•
NATURE OF ACTION

The Department initiates this action pursuant to the Idaho Environmental
Protection and Health Act ("EPHA"), Idaho Code§§ 39-101 et seq., in order to compel
compliance with regulatory requirements necessary for the protection of human health and the
environment from the hazards presented by solid waste management activities occurring on
property owned and operated by the Defendants located in Ada County, Idah,o as more
completely described below. In addition the Department seeks civil penalties in an amount up to
$10,000 per violation or up to $1,000 per day of ongoing and continuous violations.

JURISDICTION
2.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 39-108 and Idaho Code§ 1-705.

3.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 5-514 because, upon information and belief, the Defendants reside in the State ofldaho are

transacting or have transacted business within the State of Idaho and the wrongful acts and
omissions giving rise to this cause of action occurred within the State ofldaho.

VENUE
4.

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of

Idaho, in and for Ada County, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 39-108(3)(b) and Idaho Code§ 5-404,
because the Defendants are, upon information and belief, residents of Ada County, Idaho and the
violations and acts and omissions alleged herein occurred and the action arose in Ada County,
Idaho.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2
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•

•
PARTIES

The Department is an executive agency of the State ofldaho authorized by Idaho
Code§ 39-109 to file suit by and through the Idaho Attorney General to enforce the EPHA and
rules and permits issued by the Department pursuant to the EPHA, and to recover agency costs,
expenses and reasonable attorney ,fees incurred in bringing such actions pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 39-108, Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121.
6.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, a person residing in

Ada County in the State ofldaho.
7.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, doing business under

the assumed business name of "Black Diamond Compost Products."
8.

Defendant VHS Properties, LLC is, upon information and belief, an Idaho Limited

Liability Company formed pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho and doing business in Ada
County State ofldaho with a principal address of 1900 W. Main Street, Boise Idaho, 83702.
9.

Defendants are persons within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 39-103(9).

FACTS
10.

On March 29, 2013, the Department attempted to conduct an inspection of a

facility located on a portion of property located off Pleasant Valley Road, southwest of the
intersection of West Gowen Road and Pleasant Valley Road described as the Northwest¼ of
Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County Assessor's
Office as Parcel Number S 1505220000, (hereinafter "the Property").

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3
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•
11.

•

Upon information and belief the Property on which the facility is located is owned

by VHS Properties LLC.
12.

At the time of the inspection attempt no persons were present at the Property.

13.

At the time of the inspection attempt, the Department staff was able to observe

from the public roadway and the driveway prior to any gate or fence, large piles and windrows of
grass clippings, leaves and other organic material constituting solid waste.
14.

At the time of the inspection attempt the Department staff observed amounts of

solid waste in excess of six hundred (600) cubic yards.
15.

Upon information and belief activities at the site include the composting of large

volumes of solid waste for the purpose of resale to the public as compost or humus.
16.

Subsequent to the inspection, the Department staff became aware the facility was

operated under the name "Black Diamond Compost Products."
17.

According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State and upon information and

belief, "Black Diamond Compost Products" is an assumed business name of Defendant David R.
Gibson.
18.

On April 2, 2013, the Department wrote Defendant David R. Gibson and notified

him of the need to comply with Department regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
19.

On April 10, 2013, the Department met with Defendant David R. Gibson to

discuss compliance with applicable regulations relating to solid waste disposal.
20.

During the meeting Defendant David R. Gibson disclaimed any obligation to

comply with Department regulations relating to solid waste disposal.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 4
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21.

On May 8, 2013, the Department wrote Defendant Gibson requesting further

information concerning his disclaimer. Defendant Gibson did not respond to the Department's
May 8, 2013 letter.
22.

On July 31, 2013, the Department issued a Notice of Violation to Defendant

Gibson by certified mail. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Violation is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
23.

Defendant David R. Gibson accepted delivery of the Notice of Violation on

August 6, 2013.
24.

Defendant David R. Gibson declined to participate in a compliance conference to

resolve the July 30, 2013 Notice of Violation.
COUNTI
(Violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012)

25.

The allegations of paragraphs 1-27 of this Complaint are hereby incorporated by

reference as though fully set forth herein.
26.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 39-105(2) the Department has authority to promulgate

rules relating to solid waste disposal and licensure and certification requirements pertinent
thereto.
27.

Idaho Code§ 39-103(14) defines "Solid Waste Disposal" as: "the collection,

storage, treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste."
28.

Idaho Code§ 39-103(13) defines "Solid Waste" as:
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid material,
including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community
activities but does not included solid or dissolved material in

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5
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•
domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources,
such as silt, dissolved or suspended soli1s in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved material in irrigation return flows or other
common water pollutants.
29.

The Department has promulgated rules relating to solid waste disposal at IDAPA

58.01.06.
30.

IDAP A 58.01.06.005 .05 defines a "Composting Facility" as a "Processing

Facility."
31.

ID APA 58.01 .06.005.32 defines a "Processing Facility" as: A facility that uses

biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for reuse, excluding waste handling
at transfer stations or recycling centers."
32.

Composting uses biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for

33.

The Department has promulgated regulations governing processing facilities

reuse.

based upon the volume of wastes processed or accumulated at the facility.
34.

ID APA 58.01 .06.009.03 defines a "Tier II Facility" as a facility that is "a

processing facility or incinerator that has a cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at any one
time that is greater than six hundred (600) cubic yards.
35.

At the time of the March 29, 2013 inspection, Defendants had accepted and

processed solid waste and had accumulated a volume of such solid waste at its facility in excess
of six hundred' (600) cubic yards.
36.

Some or all of the Property is a Tier II Processing Facility.
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IDAPA 58.01.06.012 sets forth the requirements for Tier II Facilities and states in

relevant part:
The owner and operator of a new Tier II facility shall establish
compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining
Department approval of the applications required in Subsection
012.02 before _beginning construction and Subsection 012.04 prior
to accepting waste.
38.

ID APA 58.01 .06.005.29 defines the "owner" of a facility as: "The person(s) who

owns land or a portion ofland on which a site or facility is located."
39.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.28 defines the "operator" of a facility as: "The person(s)

responsible for overall operation of all or part of a site or facility."
40.

Defendant VHS Properties LLC is, upon information and belief, the owner of the

Property upon which a Tier II Facility is located.
41.

Defendant David R. Gibson is, upon information and belief, the operator of a Tier

II Facility.
42.

IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit

documentation to the Department "demonstrating compliance with the siting requirements and
restrictions specified in subsection 012.01 within the time frames specified in Section 012."
43.

IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit to the

Department an" ... Operating Plan containing that information required by 58.01.012.03 within
the time frames stated in Section 012. An Operating Plan shall include a description of the
wastes to be accepted, the methods for maintaining compliance with each of the applicable
general operating requirement of Subsection 012.03 and complies with any applicable facility
specific requirements found in Subsections 012.09 through 012.11."
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44.

Defendants failed to submit documentation demonstrating compliance with the

siting requirements ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012.01 or obtain site approval from the Department for a
Tier II Facility prior to commencing construction of a Tier II Facility.
45.

Defendants failed to submit or obtain Operating Plan approval for the operation of

a Tier II Facility prior to accepting solid waste.
46.

Defendants are in violation ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012.

47.

The Department is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring

Defendants to submit an approvable Siting Application as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02
and an approvable Operating Plan as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04 and to comply with
and implement the requirements of the approved Operating Plan.
48.

The Department is further entitled to penalties up to $10,000 dollars for each

separate violation ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012 alleged herein or up to $1,000 dollars per day of
ongoing and continuous violations.
49.

The Department has incurred and will incur costs, expenses and attorney fees in

the prosecution of this matter in an amount to be proven at trial or in the event of default the
amount of $2,500.00. The Department is entitled to recover its expenses pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 39-108 and its costs including attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, respectfully
requests the Court grant as appropriate the following relief:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 8

000098

•
A.

Issue a permanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to submit a full and complete siting application as required
byIDAPA 58.01.06.012.02.
B.

Issue a permanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to submit a full and complete Operating Plan as required by
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04.
C.

Issue a permanent mandatory injunction, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-

108(3)(b), requiring the Defendants to comply with and implement the terms of the approved
Operating Plan as required by IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04.
D.

Assess against the Defendants statutory penalties in an amount up to $10,000.00 for each

separate violation of the EPHA and up to $1,000.00 per day for each continuing violation of the
EPHA alleged in this Complaint.
E.

Assess against all Defendants, as authorized by the EPHA, Idaho Code§ 39-108(6),

Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 all Department costs, expenses, attorney fees and witness fees
incurred in this action in an amount to be proven at trial or in the event of default in the amount
of $2,500.00.
F.

Grant such other relief as the Court deems equitable and just.

DATED this 15th day of October, 1015.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE A TTORNE

~--============___!!_'flLL----b-'4----c::;;;,,.L_-f-_ __
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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STATE OF I0AHO

DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

G.L. "Butch" Otter, Governor
Curt Fransen, Director

1410 North HIiton • Boise, Idaho 83706 • (208) 373-0502

July 31, 2013

CERTIFIED MAIL#: 7007 3020 0001 4045 9956

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

David Gibson
Black Diamond Compost Products
3000 Rose Hill
Boise, Idaho 83705
Dear Mr. Gibson:
.

.

The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality {Department) administers programs designed to ensure that
businesses and individuaJs comply with specific permits and rules designed to protect the citizens and the
environment throughout the State. Based on available information, the Department believes Black Diamond
Compost Products may have violated such rules and/or permit requirements at the Black Diamond composting
site located on property identified as parcel number S1505220000 in Boise, Idaho. The purpose of this letter is to
notify Black Diamond Compost Products of an apparent violation described in the document enclosed herein.
The Department is seeking the cooper~tion of Black Diamond Compost Products in resolving these matters to the
full satisfaction. of the parties. Black Diamond Compost Company is advised to contact the Department within
fifteen (15) calendar d_ays after receipt of this letter. At such time, the Department will schedule _a meeting at a
mutually-agreeable date and time, at which the Notice of Violation can be discusse~. If Black Diamond Compost
Products elects not to meet with the Department on the alleged violations, the Department will seek resolution of
these matters using its authorities as provided by law. Arrangements to meet should be made by contacting
Dean Ehlert at (208) 373-0416 or at the following address:
Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Coordinator
Department of Environmental Quality
Waste Management and Remediation Division
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter. The Department is confident that we can work
· ·
cooperatively to resolve these issues.
Sincerely,

~A,JL-!f
Michael Mccurdy, P.E., CHMM
State Response Program Manager
Waste Management & Remediation Division

DE: tg

lhl•ck diamond ..,a,pos! company nov ooverleUer.doo

Enclosure
cc:

s. Hamlin, Deputy Attorney General

D. Ehlert, DEQ - WM&RD
A. Scheff, DEQ :.. Boise

P. Wagner, DEQ- Boise
J. Gantz, DEQ-Boise
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NOTICE OF VIOLAT(ON
ISSUED TO:

David Robert Gibson
Black Diamond Compost Products
5120 W. Overland Road
Boise, Idaho 83 705

On March 29, 2013, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (Department) conducted an inspection of
the Black Diamond C~mpost Products (Black Diamond) facility located off Pleasant Valley Road, southwest of
the intersection of West Gowen Road and Pleasant Valley Road and identified by the Ada County A$sesspr's .
Office as Parcel Number 8150522000, Boise, Idaho. During the inspection the Department staff observed
storage and pr_ocessing of regulated solid waste including numerous windrows containing grass clippings; leaves
and other organic solid waste. Pursuant to the Environmental Protection and Health Act (EPHA), Idaho Code
39-101, et seq. 'and the Solid Waste Management Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06, the Department has determined that
the following violation has occurred at the facility operated by Black Diamond in Boise, Idaho.

VIOLATIONS
Violation No.1

Legal Provisions Violated:

IDAPA 58.01.06.012, Solid Waste Management Rules

IDAPA 58.01.06.012 states in relevant part:
"The owner and operator of a new Tier II facility shall establish compliance with the requirements of
· Section 012 by obtaining Department approval of the applications required in Subsection 012.02
[requiring siting approval] before beginning construction and Subsection 012.04 [requiring operating
plan approval] prior to accepting waste. The owner and operator of an existing Tier II facility shall
establish compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining Department approval·of the
applications required in Subsection 012.04 within two (2) years from April 26, 2002 and Subsection
012.02 wi:thln :five (5) years from April 26, 2002,"
·
The Solid Waste Management Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32 define a processing facility as a facility that uses
biological or chemical decomposition to prepare· solid.waste for reuse, excluding waste handling at~ transfer
station or recycling centers. At the time of the March 29, 2013, inspection Black Diamond had accepted and
processed solid waste. Black Diamond failed to submit or obtain site approval from the Department for a solid
waste processing facility and failed to submit or obtain operating plan approval for the operation of a solid
waste processing facility.
Penalty Assessed:

$3,500

Total Penalty Assessed: $3,500

Notice ofViolation-:{>age 1
\
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4P
TIMETABLE

Black Diamond may request a compliance confere)J.ce with the Department to explain the alleged violation and
discuss entry into a Consent Order which :will include payment of assessed penalties, and a plan to remedy
damage caused by any violation and assure future compliance. To arrange a compliance conference, Black
Diamond must contact the Department within fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of this Notice of Violation.
Failure to request a conference within :fifteen (15) calendar days after J:eceipt of this Notice of Violation, or
reach agreement on a Consent Order within sixty (60) calendar days may rf.)sult in a civil enforcement action in
district court for penalties, injunc~ve relief, and costs including attorney fees,
Inquiries or correspondence concerning this Notice of Violation shall be directed to:
• Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Program Manager
·. Department of Environmental Quality
Waste Management and R<:?mediation Division
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208) 373-0416

J-¥-~~-'--r-·_____ 2._013

DATED TI:IIS _--=~---day of _ _

CUR~

Idaho Department ofEnviron.tr?-ental Quality

Notice of Violation - Page 2
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

CHR.STOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By AUSTIN LOWE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CV0C-1503540
)
ANSWER TO FIRST
)
AMENDED COMPLAINT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Defendants above named, by and through their attorney of
record, Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith answer the amended complaint filed by the Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiffs
amended complaint, not otherwise specifically admitted herein.
SECOND DEFENSE
That Plaintiff has chosen to utilize a definition of "Solid Waste", contained in
§39-103(13), Idaho Code, a definition that is different than is contained in the Solid

ORIGINAL
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000103
P. 1

Waste Management Rules and Regulations adopted by DEQ in their IDAPA definitions.
§39-103(13), Idaho Code, defines "solid waste" to be:
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid materials, including solid
waste materials resulting from industrial, commercial and agricultural operations and
from community activities but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic
sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources, such as silt, dissolved or
suspended solids in industrial waste water effluents, dissolved materials in irrigation
return flows or other common water pollutants. (emphasis added)
The promulgated rules of DEQ, regarding their regulatory definition of "Solid
Waste", is defined within the Idaho Administrative Code, under DEQ's "Solid Waste
Management Rules", wherein "solid waste" is defined in IDAPA 58 .01 .06 005. 44. To be:
Solid Waste. Any garbage or refuse, sludge from a waste water treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded
material including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations and from community
activities, but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid
or dissolved material in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point
sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source, special nuclear, or by-product material as defined
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923). (Emphasis ours)

That irrespective of the definition utilized, Plaintiff makes reference to such term
of "solid waste" on page 4, Par. 13 of the Amended Complaint, therein suggesting that
"grass clippings and leaves", are to be regarded as such substances within the definition
of "solid waste"; that using either the statutory definition or the IDAP A definition of
"solid waste", neither phrase referring to "discarded solid materials" or "materials
resulting from industrial, commercial. .. and agricultural operations" are expanded upon to
identify what is intended to be included in their overly broad and sweeping definition(s).
"Grass clippings and leaves" are not addressed (specifically) within the statutory or
IDAPA definition, other than as may be considered in the broad and sweeping context as
to what "discarded solid materials" or "materials resulting from industrial, commercial

ANSWERTOFIRSTAMENDEDCOMPLAINT

000104
P.2

•
and agricultural operations" could potentially be meant to include; that notwithstanding
the lack of specificity and clarity in the definition(s), the DEQ Solid Waste Management
Rules and Regulations, specifically promulgated exemptions and exclusions regarding
DEQ's regulatory authority, in the context of solid waste management. There is specific
reference to the exemptions and exclusions in their "Solid Waste Management Rules

And Regulations", therein referring to those exempt and excluded substances that come
under "crop and plant residue"; that "grass clippings and leaves", by every definition,
are substances that fall within "crop and plant residue", and it was "grass clippings and
leaves" that were observed by DEQ staff personnel, as referred to in the Amended
Complaint, Par. 13, page 4; that "grass clippings and leaves" are commonly understood to
be included within the meaning of "crop and plant residue" that the only "solid waste"
observed on the "property" were "grass clippings and leaves", as no other "organic
material is contained in the piles or rows of materials observed on the "property"; that
such substances are among the substances specifically excluded and exempted from the
"solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations; that it becomes difficult for DEQ to
establish their "scope of authority" to regulate any and all broadly defined "solid waste" ,
but it becomes impossible for DEQ to regulate that which is specifically excluded from
their regulatory authority, expressly identified in the exclusion of their own IDAP A
Rules. That "crop and plant residue" are not regulated by DEQ, and that is the only
materials located on the "property" identified in the Amended Complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE
That notwithstanding the source of the definition of the phrase "solid waste", it
represents a "technical" term, or a technical phrase; that technical terms, according to the
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Idaho Constitution, are to be avoided in the law, as declared by Article 3, Section 17 of
the Idaho Constitution. That Rules and Regulations are to comply with the constitutional
provisions, or they may be regarded to be rendered unconstitutional, have no force or
effect, and rendered void.
FOURTH DEFENSE
That DEQ asserts §39-105(2), Idaho Code, authorizes the Director to regulate
"solid waste disposal"; that to invoke such regulatory authorization, the specific
exclusions and exemptions to the solid waste management rules and regulations,
promulgated by DEQ, (as hereafter identified) would have to be repealed, that the very
substance observed on this property, identified to be "grass clippings and leaves", would
need to be specifically included within "discarded solid materials", and demonstrate
Defendants are then engaging in the act of the "disposing of such a regulated solid
waste". That "solid waste disposal" is defined in §39-103(14), Idaho Code, wherein it
states:
(14) "Solid waste disposal" means the collection, storage, treatment, utilization,
processing or final disposal of solid waste.
That such phrase is yet another "technical term", to be avoided under the
constitution, or be rendered in violation of Article 3, Section 17, Idaho Constitution,
rendered unconstitutional and declared void.
FIFTH DEFENSE
That Plaintiffs amended complaint fails to set forth any factual basis sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against these Defendants for which any relief can be granted, as
no such relief requested by said Department of Environmental Quality (hereafter DEQ) can
be granted for the following reasons: 1) that DEQ does not have the requisite standing, as a
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matter oflaw, as the "grass clippings and leaves", referred to as the materials and substances
described within the First Amended Complaint, are specifically exempted from regulation as
"solid waste materials" as defined within §39-103(13), Idaho Code or the IDAP A Solid
Waste Management Rules and Regulations, and the real property upon which the described
materials and substances are placed is therefore not a "solid waste disposal facility"; that
irrespective of whether such "crop and plant residue" materials is to be deemed to be
included within the generally broad and sweeping reference to "discarded solid materials",
the exclusions and exemptions specifically expressed within the "Solid Waste Management
Rules and Regulations" preclude any regulation thereof; 2) that neither of the Defendants is
subject to any fine, penalty, or imposition of any regulatory mandate or enforcement of any
DEQ's rules and regulations, as the materials and substances at issue, identified in the

amended complaint itself, specifically address what was observed by DEQ staff personnel to
be "grass clippings and leaves", all of which substances constitutes a material substance that
is derived from crop and plant residue, and specifically excluded and exempted from the
jurisdiction, authority, and definition of the regulatory parameters of DEQ, as such
substances and materials are identified in IDAPA 58.01.06.001, regarding the TITLE
AND SCOPE, sub-,part 03., wherein it specifically defines wastes not regulated under

these rules , to include certain enumerated substances, wherein it states, under sub-part
03.b.: These rules do not apply to the following solid waste .. .ii. Manures and crop

(plant) residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates; and... iii. Any
agricultural solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the
Idaho Department of Agriculture. That "grass clippings and leaves are derived from crop
and plant residue, and are not to be regarded as "solid waste materials" for regulatory
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urposes, as the same was not regarded to constitute a "waste" for permanent disposal, and
the said materials and substances are re-incorporated into the soil for plant growth and
foliation, and excluded and exempted from the enforcement of regulations of "solid waste
materials" and substances under the jurisdiction of DEQ; 3) that neither of these Defendants
are subject to any regulations or the effects of any enforcement of DEQ rules promulgated
under their regulatory authority, as this substance and material composition consists only of
plant and/or crop residue substances, and as such, the same is excluded by the promulgated

rules and regulatory provisions of DEQ, 4) that the substances and materials consisting of
plant and/or crop residue does not pose a regulatory need, as said substances and materials
do not pose a hazard to human health or the environment, being the mission and purpose for
the creation and existence of DEQ, as the legislative purpose and intent has been so declared
by the enactment of §39-102 and 102A, Idaho Code, and consequently the jurisdiction for
the disposal, management, operation, facility, site location and processing activity of any
such materials derived from plant and crop residue substances is both exempted and
specifically excluded from any regulatory authority under the Solid Waste Management
Rules of DEQ, as well is any other materials and products identified within

§22-

103(3),(4),(9),(10), and (27), Idaho Code, and otherwise managed (§22-110(1), Idaho Code)
by the Idaho Department of Agricultural, as may be located upon any real property in the
State of Idaho; that if agricultural materials and substances come under and within the
jurisdiction of any Agency, it would fall within and under the provisions of The Right to
Farm Act, as well as The Plant and Soil Amendment Act, as enacted by the Legislature of
the State of Idaho; that said DEQ, being another legislatively created agency of the State of
Idaho, has no jurisdiction or authority to regulate those specifically defined materials and
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ubstances or assume, by delegation or sub-delegation, any such regulatory authority that is
identified in those Acts, assuming such Acts have any application, and notwithstanding the
above enactments, such plant and crop residue material substances are specifically exempted
from the regulatory capacity and authority of the DEQ Rules as specifically promulgated by
said DEQ as set forth hereinabove and hereinafter, in accordance with the provisions of the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act; that consequently, as a matter ofldaho law, said DEQ
does not have the fundamental standing to assert a claim of regulatory capability to manage
and control said materials and substances (plant and crop residue materials) at issue in this
First Amended Complaint, as said Agency cannot regulate said materials and substances
within this State; that absent the requisite standing requirement, said DEQ cannot secure any
form of relief from this court upon this amended complaint, and said amended complaint is
subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), I.R.C.P. for failure to state a claim upon
which any relief can be granted; that said Defendants are furthermore entitled to the entry of
a judgment upon the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), I.R.C.P.; that Defendants are entitled
to a dismissal of this action upon the grounds Plaintiff lacks the standing required under
Idaho Law to initiate any suit against said Defendants in any effort to redress any claimed
violation of any regulatory provisions of solid waste materials, as said substances and
materials are specifically excluded and exempted from regulatory enforcement or imposition
of such rules within their agency; that the State of Idaho, Department of Environmental
Quality, has no jurisdiction over the subject matter identified and described in their First
Amended Complaint.
SIXTH DEFENSE
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As. and for an affirmative defense, these Defendants would assert that all substances
located upon "the Property", as identified in the amended complaint, are excluded and
exempt from any regulatory authority of DEQ; that there does exist a statutory definition of
"solid waste", contained in Title 39, concerning Health and Safety, Chapter 1, concerning
environmental quality-Health, specifically identified in §39-103(13), Idaho Code, wherein
that definition provides:

"(13) "Solid waste" means garbage, refuse, radionuclides and

other discarded solid materials, including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community activities but does not
include solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in
water resources, such as silt, dissolved or suspended solids in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or other common water
pollutants.";(Emphasis ours)
That "solid waste" , by such broad definition, does include "agricultural operations" within
the scope .of solid waste substances; that the promulgated rules of DEQ, regarding their
regulatory definition of "solid waste", contained and defined within the Idaho
Administrative Code, under DEQ's "Solid Waste Management Rules", specifically defines
"solid waste", under IDAPA 58 .01 .06 005. 44. To be:

Solid Waste. Any garbage or

refuse, sludge from a waste water treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air
pollution control facility and other discarded material including solid, liquid, semi-solid,
or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations and from community activities, but does not include solid or
dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved material in irrigation return
flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under Section
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402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source,
special nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (68 Stat 923). (Emphasis ours)
That the phrase "agricultural operations" is again contained within that broad
scope of solid waste substances addressed, and the use of such a broad definition created
the need to specifically address what substances were not to be regulated, and to
accomplish that, it was then defined within the "Solid Waste Management Rules" of
DEQ, specifically identified substances to be excluded to what was broadly defined as
"solid waste", and were delineated as wastes not regulated by DEO under their rules,
and that gave rise to the creation of those specific exclusions and exemptions, created
within IDAPA 58.01.06., which are identified in IDAPA 58.01.06.001, regarding the
TITLE AND SCOPE, sub-part 03., wherein it specifically defines wastes not regulated
under these rules, to include certain enumerated substances, wherein it states, under sub-

part 03.b.: These rules do not apply to the following solid waste ... ii. Manures and crop
(plant) residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates,· and... iii. Any
agricultural solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the
Idaho Department of Agriculture. Furthermore, within that Idaho Administrative Code,

as it regards "APPLICABILITY", under 58.01.06.004, it specifically states:
These rules apply to all solid waste unless excluded by Subsection 001.03.
That by definition, and specific exclusion and exemption, DEQ does not regulate
certain identified substances, as provided for under their Solid Waste Management Rules
adopted and promulgated within the Idaho Administrative Code for the regulatory
enforcement of regulated solid wastes, as those DEQ "Solid Waste Management Rules",
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have specifically exempted and excluded those substances composed of grass clippings

and leaves, as they constitute plant and/or crop residue, and/or may otherwise be
regulated by rules that may be adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
That as a further affirmative defense regarding the creation, adoption, and
enactment of the "Solid Waste Management Rules by DEQ, these Defendants would
raise, as an affirmative defense to all allegations set forth in this amended complaint, that
neither Defendant herein was ever notified by the Department of Environmental Quality,
or any other agency, as to the proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of any "solid
waste management rules" that purportedly was undertaken in 2003; that such notification
is required under Idaho law as it relates to any rule to be promulgated in accordance with
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act; that said requirement is mandated by Title 67,
Chapter 52, Statutes of the State ofldaho, specifically §67-5222, Idaho Code, wherein it
provides that notification must be provided by the agency or agencies to all interested
persons, to afford any interested person (which these Defendants consider themselves to
be) the reasonable opportunity to submit their views, data, and arguments regarding any
such proposal(s) relating to any such rule(s), and the agency shall receive comments from
such interested persons for not less than twenty-one (21) days after the date of publication
of the notke of any proposed rulemaking; that no form of notification, either through
bulletin publication or direct mailing to these Defendants, has ever been received or
confirmed to have been sent or published, from which to allow any expression of views
to the agency prior to any proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of same.
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EIGHTH DEFENSE
That as a further affirmative defense, these Defendants would assert that there
exists certain constitutional requirements, to the effect that all "Acts" that are to be
promulgated are to be plainly worded, and shall avoid, whenever possible, the use of
technical terms; that because of, and by virtue of, Article III, Section 17, Idaho
Constitution, it appears to have become necessary for this IDAP A Rule, identified as the
"Solid Waste Management Rules", to establish specific exceptions and exclusions in
order to avoid confusion by the uncertain use of complex and technical terms, and was
provided for in their IDAP A solid waste rule criteria, so as to avoid that which could be
considered a complex, convoluted and potentially inconsistent enactment regarding the
intended broad range and scope of "solid waste", and the intended regulatory authority of
DEQ regarding substances and solid waste materials, and to avoid such potential
ambiguity in relation to what is to be regulated as a "solid waste" substance under their
rules; that the formation of specific exemptions and exclusions was essential to prevent
any subjective interpretation of the waste management rules, as it may relate to certain
common composted materials, posing no harm or danger to human health or
environmental quality.

NINETH DEFENSE
As and for an Answer to the allegations set forth and contained in Plaintiff's amended
complaint, these Defendants do respond and allege as follows:
1.

In response to paragraph 1 thereof, referenced the Nature of Action, Defendants

would state said allegations constitute a matter or conclusion of law, with respect to the
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application the Idaho Environmental Protection and Health Act, as set forth and contained in
§39-lOlet seq, Idaho Code; that the dispute over what has been identified to be grass
clippings and leaves, the materials and substances referred to in the amended complaint,
about which this litigation has identified the only subject matter "observed" upon "the
property" comes under the criteria of either 1) crop and plant residue, or 2) an agricultural
solid waste; that none of those materials and substances come within the purview or
jurisdiction of DEQ, as the subject matter about which this dispute seeks to address is
specifically exempted and excluded from any regulatory enforcement or requirements
regarding DEQ jurisdiction or authority under the Idaho Environmental Protection Agency
Act, or that of the Department of Environmental Quality, as delineated in IDAP A 58, Title
01, Chapter 06, 001. 03. (b), (b) ii and (b) iii; 001. 04 (a), 004.; that no hazards are presented
by any "solid waste management activities" purportedly occurring on ''the property"
"owned and operated by the Defendants" (owned by and titled to VHS Properties, LLC)
which property is located in Ada County; That Defendants would deny said DEQ has any
jurisdiction or authority to seek any form of civil penalties in any amount, concerning any
activities or presence of said described and identified materials and substances located upon
"the property" described herein, that any such "solid waste" activities are exempt and
excluded from the jurisdiction, authority, and enforcement of any regulatory rules of said
Department of Environmental Quality ( DEQ) and any request for imposition of any such
civil penalties is being made without foundation in fact or in law, and violates the
exclusionary and exempted provisions from said Agency's own rules, as existing through
the authority under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, under the Idaho
Administrative Code, IDAPA 58, Title 1, Ch. 6, wherein it does provide the specific
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exceptions announced in subsections 001.03 and 001.04, setting forth those exceptions,
exemptions, exclusions, and limitations as to those rules and requirements applicable to
"solid waste" and "solid waste management facilities" in Idaho, identifying specifically the
following solid wastes that are not regulated:
.001 03. b. ii. manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic
rates .
.001 03. b. iii. any agricultural solid waste which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules
adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture .
.001 04. Solid Waste Management Facilities Not Regulated Under These Rules. These
Rules do not apply to the following solid waste management facilities:
.001 04. a. Solid waste management facilities accepting only solid waste excluded by
subsection 001.03.
004. APPLICABILITY. These rules apply to all solid waste, unless excluded by subsection
001.03. (emphasis added to draw attention to the exclusion of the application of Rules)
That any allegations contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response
set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
2.

In response to paragraph 2 thereof, alleging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction,

these Defendants would state that such an allegation of "subject matter jurisdiction" is an
aspect of law, presenting a question of law about which these Parties in this litigation can
neither confer jurisdiction by their pleadings or by any admissions, nor can the parties waive
jurisdiction, by stipulation or otherwise,

and consequently, any jurisdictional issues

constitute an aspect of law to be determined by the Court, and Defendants contend their
response to the allegation of jurisdiction of the Court would constitute a legal opinion only,
and would neither confer, waive, nor impact any such allegation regarding the question of
this Court's jurisdiction; that notwithstanding the above statement, these Defendants would
state, based upon information and belief, this Court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction
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to render a disposition upon the applicable effects of the Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act and those IDAPA Rules cited above; that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the
issue whether DEQ does, or does not, have jurisdiction, authority, and regulatory
enforcement capacity over the materials, substances, and such subject matter solid waste
materials and facilities relating to crop and plant residues, ultimately to be returned to the
soil at agronomic rates, and any agricultural solid waste materials and facilities which are
managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture;
that this Court has the jurisdiction to detemline the conclusion of law that DEQ lacks the
regulatory capacity and authority to address the solid waste materials, substances, and
facilities as was observed to constitute the subject matter as was identified within the
allegations of this amended complaint; that this Court has the jurisdiction to determine that
DEQ has no standing or foundation in fact or law from which to initiate this suit, and the
Court would have the subject matter jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of law, DEQ did
not have authority to proceed with this amended complaint upon the merits of the action, as
filed by the party Plaintiff that did not have the requisite standing and required authority to
exercise any regulatory authority; that the District Court has the inherent authority to dismiss
the action as a result of Plaintiffs lack of standing to seek any regulatory enforcement of
provisions regarding certain materials, substances, and facilities that are specifically
exempted and excluded from application thereof, as delineated within the IDAPA Rules as

were promulgated by DEQ, the effects of which precludes and pre-empts the Agency from
engaging in or any attempted engagement in the regulatory enforcement of DEQ Rules
regarding such described materials, substances, facilities, persons, and real property upon
which the same is located, as it has been so identified and described within Plaintiff's
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amended complaint; that said Court has the jurisdiction and authority to determine such
attempted regulation is not within the purview of DEQ's jurisdiction or authority to regulate
such subject matter as identified and described in this action, and that said amended
complaint is subject to dismissal as a result thereof. That any allegation contained within
said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
3.

In response to paragraph 3 thereof, regarding further matters of jurisdiction of the

court, Defendants would state this allegation is a question of law as well, as was the
preceding allegation; that Defendants reserve their response to relate to questions and
allegations of fact, not as to matters law; that said Defendants are (theoretically) not
qualified to render a legal opinion as to such allegations of law; however, Defendants would
state that David R. Gibson is an individual, residing in Boise, Ada County Idaho; that at
times he did, or still does, refer to one of his business entity or entities to be that of Black
Diamond Compost Products; that said Gibson has historically been engaged in the
production, analysis, utilization and development of crop and plant residues for eventual use
as a humus material and substance for return to the soil, and has engaged in the production
of same through an aging and decomposition process, with the intent to ultimately return
said materials and substances to the soils, at agronomic rates; that the real property upon
which the subject matter of said crop and plant residue, and any agricultural solid waste is
located, is that real property owned by VHS Properties, LLC, referred to as "the property" in
the amended complaint; that to any extent any individual Defendant is, has, or are
transacting any business within the State of Idaho, it has not given rise to any wrongful acts
or omissions from which to establish any cause of action from the subject matter as
identified and alleged by DEQ in its amended complaint, and no wrongful or unlawful acts
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or omissions have occurred within the State of Idaho. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
4.

In response to paragraph 4 thereof, regarding the issue of venue of the court,

Defendants would state the subject of venue is a question of law, based upon the existence
of certain factors; that Defendants would admit "the property" identified in the amended
complaint, upon which the crop and plant residue materials and alleged activity has taken
place, is located in Ada County, Idaho; that said individually named Defendant, David R.
Gibson is a resident of Ada County, Idaho; that Defendants would deny any violations, any
acts, or any omissions have occurred that would give rise to any action to be taken by DEQ
that would be within its jurisdiction or regulatory authority to initiate this action against the
named Defendants.
5.

In response to paragraph 5 thereof, regarding parties to the action, these Defendants,

through their counsel, are aware of certain aspects relating to the establishment of, and the
authorization regarding the Idaho Environmental Protection Health Act, various departments
and agencies relating thereto, and those certain Rules and Regulations regarding the
enforcement of certain duties and obligations within the jurisdiction thereof; that although
these Defendants are not required to render legal opinions as to matters relating to questions
of law in their response, said Defendants would state, through their counsel, that the
Department of Environmental Quality is an executive agency of the State of Idaho, to whom
it has been granted certain powers and authority relating to the regulation of certain aspects
of specifically described solid waste, and matters relating to its treatment, not otherwise
exempted or excluded therefrom, and to the extent so authorized, to establish solid waste
management rules and regulations in relation thereto; that said authority to regulate same is
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subject to various limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions, as expressed and as
contained within the rules specifically relating to the Department of Environmental Quality,
as expressed in IDAPA 58.01.06 "Solid Waste Management Rules", which therein
establishes requirements applicable to solid waste and solid waste management facilities in
Idaho, excepting therefrom those specifically exempted by the exclusionary effects of its
subsections 001.03 and 001.04, which exemptions specifically identify manure and crop and

plant residues, ultimately intended for return to the soils at agronomic rates and all
agricultural solid waste materials and substances, which management and regulation is left
to the enforcement of those rules as may be adopted and may be enforced by the Idaho
Department of Agriculture, all of which has before been brought to the attention of DEQ
personnel by previous letter correspondence; that said DEQ has no authority or regulatory
capacity regarding any activity ongoing on "the property" where such plant residue and
agricultural solid waste materials are managed and regulated pursuant to any rules that may
be adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture; that DEQ has no authority to recover
any agency costs, expenses, or attorney fees as may be incurred as a result of this action
against these Defendants, or any activity or business operations involving said exempt crop
residue and/or agricultural solid waste materials. That any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
6.

In response to paragraph 6 thereof, regarding parties, Defendants admit David R.

Gibson does reside in Ada County, Idaho.
7.

In response to paragraph 7 thereof, regarding parties, Defendants would state David

R. Gibson does have a business known generally as Black Diamond Compost Products; that
said Defendant has been engaged in composting plant residue materials in Ada County since
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1974, and has utilized such plant residues located on "the property" since 2004, in
association with his composting activities, which has continuously taken place in this
general area referred to as the Gowen Field Desert Front area, since 1988.
8.

In response to paragraph 8 thereof, regarding parties, Defendants would state that

VHS Properties, LLC, is a limited liability company, formed under and pursuant to the laws
of the state of Idaho, doing business in Ada County, and is the deeded and titled owner of
"the property" identified in the amended complaint, and has its principal business address at
1900 W. Main Street, Boise, Idaho, 83702; that it is "the property" upon which the
identified and referred substances and materials described in the amended complaint were
"observed", and which property is exclusively owned by VHS Properties, LLC. That any
allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with this response as set forth
hereinabove is herewith denied.
9.

In response to paragraph 9 thereof, regarding parties, these Defendants would state

that §39-103(9), Idaho Code, has no reference to the definition of "persons", as that code
section subpart refers to "laboratory", which has no relevance herein; that subpart (11) of
that code section refers to "persons", and would appear to include these named Defendants
as within that definition; that these Defendants, however, are not qualified to render legal
opinions, and since the correct subpart was not alleged in the amended complaint, these
Defendants would re-state the response as set forth in paragraph 8 hereinabove, as though
said response was set forth in full herein.
10.

In response to paragraph 10 thereof, regarding the facts as being alleged, these

Defendants possess no personal knowledge regarding any attempt made by DEQ personnel
to inspect any "facility" located on a portion of "the property" as so described to be parcel
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number S 1505220000, located in Boise, Idaho, and referred to in the amended complaint as
being "the property"; that the Ada County Assessor's Office does identify various parcels of
real property, for their records and convenience, with a tax parcel reference number for tax
assessment purposes; that tax parcel number S1505220000 is~ tax reference only, not a
legal description; that the further reference, as contained in the amended complaint, to a
parcel described to be the NWl/4 of Sec. 5, T. 2N, R. 2E, Boise Meridian, would serve to
identify a parcel of property that consists of one hundred sixty (160) acres in size; that VHS
Properties, LLC, does own that described parcel of land, and such described acreage is
contained within yet additionally described parcels of real property, all of which is owned
by said VHS Properties, LLC, which description is contained within that deed dated July 4,
2012, and subsequently recorded in the Ada County recorder's office; that Defendants
would further respond by stating that if any attempted inspection was undertaken on March
29, 2013, the DEQ personnel involved in such an attempted inspection would have observed
materials located thereon that were comprised solely of plant residue and/or otherwise
considered to be agricultural solid waste materials, none of which come under the purview
of any DEQ Rules for regulatory authority, as such materials are specifically exempted and
excluded from their jurisdiction of regulated enforcement; that said materials are subject

only to the rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, and not within any
authority allowing DEQ to inspect or impose any regulatory compliance mandates
concerning the existence or management thereof; that pursuant to IDAPA Rules of the
Department of Environmental Quality, as contained in IDAPA 58.01.06 entitled "Solid
Waste Management Rules" the above cited exceptions, exemptions, limitations, and
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exclusions are specifically set forth therein, and are restated by these Defendants to be part
of this response.
11.

In response to paragraph 11 thereof, these Defendants admit same; that the

ownership of "the property" as identified in the amended complaint, has been owned by
VHS Properties, LLC, since July 4, 2012, and Vernon K. Smith, Jr. has been the managing
agent of said entity.
12.

In response to paragraph 12 thereof, these Defendants possess no knowledge from

which to formulate a factual response, and therefore must respectively deny same. That
notwithstanding said lack of knowledge, these Defendants would state that if there were any
attempted inspection of "the property" conducted by DEQ personnel, to the extent they
were at a location, and in such close proximity to "the property", so as to determine that no
persons were present at or on "the property", then any such DEQ personnel would have
observed the materials located on "the property", and would have been able to confirm said
materials consisted solely of plant residue and/or otherwise considered as agricultural solid
waste materials, and therefore not subject to any regulatory authority of the State of Idaho,
Department of Environmental Quality; that any observation to confirm the absence of
personnel on site would render a clear observation that all said materials, facility, premises,
and plant residue/solid waste agricultural materials operation, were unconditionally exempt
and excluded from any regulation or inspection by said DEQ personnel.
13.

In response to paragraph 13 thereof, these Defendants would state, given the

allegation that said DEQ personnel did observe "large piles and windrows of grass

clippings, and leaves" located upon "the property", they would have had a sufficient factual
basis from which to conclude their "solid waste management rules" did not apply, as they
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contain specific exemptions of regulation and enforcement, to which effect they have been
previously so informed and advised by Mr. Gibson, and any materials they observed were
only plant residue materials, none of which is subject to regulation by DEQ, and
specifically outside the scope of any regulatory authorization of DEQ, as so defined and
contained within their solid waste management rules.
14.

In response to paragraph 14 thereof, these Defendants have no information from

which to formulate an opinion as to the extent of the observation alleged to have taken place
by the Department staff personnel, and absent the establishment of any measurements
conducted by any mechanical, photographic, or physical process, undertaken to determine
any quantities, volumes, or amounts of the accumulated grass clippings, leaves, and any
other alleged organic materials purportedly observed, it would require speculation and
conjecture for these Defendants to respond, and therefore Defendants would respectfully
deny same.
15.

In response to paragraph 15 thereof, Defendants would state the allegations

contained therein are conjecture, not allegations of fact; that if no one was present on "the
property", the observation from which conjecture is being expressed as to any "activity" to
that of "consisting of composting", or of "large volumes of solid waste", or for "resale" to
the "public" as "compost or humus" is speculation and conjecture only, and is herewith
0

denied; that notwithstanding said conjecture and speculation, the "department staff' has
purportedly reported to have observed what they described to be "grass clippings, leaves and
other organic material", comprising what they describe to be the substance and composition
of "solid waste"; that by definition, such composition is plant residue and necessarily an
agricultural solid waste material, and reasonably should be known by DEQ personnel to be
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managed and regulated, if at all, pursuant to the rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture only; that DEQ, in any event, does not have any iurisdiction or authority to

regulate "large volumes ofsolid waste for the purpose ofresale to the public as compost or
humus" and by definition, under their own established rules, they have no right of inspection

or enforcement, as said materials are unconditionally exempted and excluded from their
jurisdiction and right of regulatory enforcement. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
16.

In response to paragraph 16, these Defendants deny same: that David R. Gibson has

a business and an activity associated with ventures that engage in composting activities of
crop and plant residue materials, and he does utilize his business name, at times, as referred
to in the amended complaint. That by prior discussions, the plant residue materials located
on "the property" were intended for eventual return to soils on the surrounding 520 acres
owned by VHS Properties, LLC, being the contiguous parcel to "the property", which is a
portion thereof, that the use of said materials and substances will be applied in conjunction
with that intended agricultural pursuit. Any allegation contained within said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
17.

In response to paragraph 17 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson

did file of record with the Secretary of State, State of Idaho, an assumed business name in
years past, regarding certain other activities located on other properties, identifying one of
his business activities as being that of Black Diamond Compost Products; that in what
fashion the "Department staff became aware the facility was operated" under that name is
an assumption and conjecture, as DEQ had not identified in their allegations the source of
that awareness from which that assertion is based, and absent a factual allegation to that
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effect, Defendants cannot engage in speculation, assumption and conjecture, and Defendants
respectfully must deny same.
18.

In response to paragraph 18 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson,

in his personal capacity, received a letter from DEQ, the content of which letter speaks for
itself; that the letter made reference to "solid waste" and to DEQ regulations; however the
letter failed to correctly cite any jurisdiction or authority from which said agency was
empowered to regulate such materials located on "the property"; that DEQ has no authority,
jurisdiction or regulatory capacity to seek to impose any regulatory compliance upon any
property, premises or facility regarding the plant residue or any agricultural solid waste
materials that are to be regulated only pursuant to any rules adopted by the Department of
Agricultural. That David R. Gibson is registered and is licensed with the Department of
Agriculture, regarding any management, operation, or production of any plant residue and
agricultural solid waste materials for return to the soils, and such materials, as located on
"the property", and as described in the amended complaint, is unconditionally exempted and
excluded from any regulatory efforts or objectives undertaken by said DEQ. Defendants

deny any allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with this response.
19.

In response to paragraph 19 thereof, Defendants would state that on April 10, 2013,

DEQ personnel met with David R. Gibson, during which discussion Mr. Gibson reminded
DEQ as to the specific exemptions and exclusions to their regulatory capacity, and were
thereupon put on notice DEQ had no regulatory authority to engage in any activities to
require any inspection or coordination with them, or compliance with any DEQ rules and
regulations. That during the conversation, DEQ personnel acknowledged the pre-emptive
and exclusionary effects contained within their own rules, but then chose to falsely represent
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to Mr. Gibson that it was their beliefthe Department of Agriculture had authorizedDEQ to
regulate such agricultural solid waste materials for them; that such a representation was
utterly false at the time it was made, and constitute a fraudulent and complete fabrication at
the time it was made, as no such delegation or sub-delegation of regulation had ever taken
place at that time, or even shortly thereafter, and if not a grossly careless and reckless
statement, was a blatant fabrication as to the state of the regulatory authority regarding such
materials and substances; that Mr. Gibson immediately confronted their callous
misstatement of authority when told of such misrepresentation, and Mr. Gibson demanded
evidence of any such transfer, delegation, or sub-delegation of authority or any substitution
of rules of application; that the DEQ personnel retracted their false statement, and
acknowledged their error, and then submitted an email to Mr. Gibson, at his request, to
confirm their "mistake" of assumed authority, despite the lack of any legal basis for any
delegation or sub-delegation by any agency, regarding their statutorily created authority, to
be undertaken by another agency, either for creation of or the enforcement of that agency's
regulatory authority.
20.

In response to paragraph 20 thereof, these Defendants would state that David R.

Gibson notified DEQ personnel as to their lack of authority and specifically cited the
exclusions and exemptions in the regulatory provisions to them, citing the Department's
own regulations promulgated under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, and the solid
waste management rules and regulations, the effect of which was deemed to constitute
closure of the subject, upon the email being the concluding discourse between them. That
any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth
hereinabove is herewith denied.
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In response to paragraph 21 thereof, these Defendants would state a letter of May 8,
2013, was written to and received by Mr. Gibson, the content of which speaks for itself; that
no further response was perceived by Mr. Gibson to be required, as the Department's lack of
authority and regulatory capacity had become self-evident by the discussions and
communications conducted with DEQ personnel prior to that, all of which was made known
to the Department personnel who had engaged in the discussions with Mr. Gibson initially;
that the matter was deemed closed. That any allegation contained in said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
22.

In response to paragraph 22 thereof, these Defendants would state the letter of July

31, 2013, sent by DEQ to David R. Gibson by certified mail, the contents of which does
speak for itself, contains reference to "notice of violation", the entire substance of which
exceeded the jurisdiction and authority of DEQ, and was regarded as meaningless, an
abusive and a willful disregard of DEQ's own limitations and exclusionary provisions
within their Rules, and the letter was regarded as erroneous and void, of no force or effect,
as there was a complete lack of any enforceable capacity or lawful issuance, and was
believed to be issued either in error, as a result of what was assumed to be the involvement
of uninformed DEQ personnel, unfamiliar with their own exemptions and exceptions within
their rules and regulations and the limitations set forth therein, or was a malicious effort to
assume regulatory authority that would never be given to them by the Department of
Agriculture, and if ever given would not be a constitutional sub-delegation of authority by
one agency to another, and would not, in any event, alter the clear exemption referring to
plant and crop residue materials. Any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent
with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
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In response to paragraph 23 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson
did receive the certified mail as identified above, and he deemed it to be erroneous, void,
and unenforceable, in excess of any authority or jurisdiction of DEQ, and was issued in
error, out of ignorance, or a malicious attempt at a "power grab", an event that should be
chastised in any judicial review; that Mr. Gibson deemed the matter closed and declined to
participate in any further discussions or conference gatherings, which to him would only
result in a need to reiterate the exemptions and exclusions that he before brought to the
attention of other DEQ personnel in previous discussions, and no recognition of any
regulatory authority would ever be acknowledged; that Gibson would not consent to any
waiver to any of the exclusionary provisions and qualification of the exempt status of the
materials and substances located on "the property" and DEQ's complete lack of jurisdiction
or authority to proceed further, or in the first instance.
24.

In response to paragraph 24 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson

relied upon the exemptions, exclusions, exceptions and limitations identified in the IDAPA
Rules that specifically pre-empted the involvement of DEQ; that Gibson made clear his
position to the DEQ personnel to whom he spoke to previously, and he before expressed no
desire to waive any exempt status, and declined to participate in any further discussions with
any DEQ officials trying to usurp authority from another State Agency; that there was no
basis in fact or any foundation in law to support any application of the DEQ solid waste
management Rules, as they were specifically excluded from regulation, both as to
Agricultural solid waste materials and as to crop and plant residues, and no basis in fact or
law existed to support any claim to a right of regulatory enforcement or to claim any
violation existed, and in the absence of any right of application or regulatory enforcement,
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there existed no need to discuss or to "resolve any conditions" over which DEQ had no
authority, and the matter was deemed close for all purposes. That any allegation contained
within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith
denied.
TENTH DEFENSE
As and for answer to the allegations set forth and contained in Count One of
Plaintiffs amended complaint, alleging a violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012, Defendants do
herewith respond and allege as follows:
25.

In answer to paragraph 25 thereof, these Defendants would restate their responses to

the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs, therein alleged to be paragraphs "127 of this Complaint", but actually paragraph 25 means to allege paragraphs "1- 24 of this
Complaint" as the proper sequencing would suggest, and those responses are herewith
incorporated herein as though set forth and alleged in full herein.
26.

In answer to paragraph 26 thereof, these Defendants would state such allegation is a

reference to a matter of law and not an allegation of fact; that these Defendants are not
required to render opinions in the nature of legal conclusions, but in a good faith attempt to
respond to such matters of law, Defendants would state, through their counsel, that § 39105(2) Idaho Code, is a statute contained within Title 39, Chapter 1, Statutes of the State of
Idaho, regarding environmental quality and health; that §39-105,I.C. relates to powers and
duties of the director; that §39-105 (2),I.C. relates to the formulation and recommendation
by the director to the board as to the implementation of rules necessary to deal with
problems relating to water and air pollution, solid waste management and disposal,
licensure, and certification requirements, and confirming therein such rules may be limited
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as to times, places, circumstances, or conditions; that said statute was enacted by the
legislature of the State of Idaho to authorize the promulgation of rules by the director,
relating to the subject of solid waste, its management and its disposal; that said director did
recommend such promulgation of Solid Waste Management Rules, which were
implemented pursuant to and in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IDAPA) and as previously set forth above, said Rules are specifically and expressly subject
to those limitations, exceptions, exemptions and exclusions identified within those
promulgated rules, and as referenced hereinabove in this responsive pleading, which are
herewith included in this response as though set forth and alleged in full herein.
27.

In answer to paragraph 27 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

seeks another opinion as to a matter of law, and does not assert an allegation of fact; that
these Defendants are not required to render legal opinions in the nature of legal conclusions,
but in a good faith attempt to respond to such matters of law, Defendants would state,
through their counsel, that§ 39-103(14) Idaho Code, is a statutory provision relating to
specific definitions of certain specified terms, the purpose being to establish the meaning to
be applied to the terms used and contained within Chapter 1, Title 39, as set forth above;
that said statute contains those various definitions of various terms that pertain to that Act;
that said statutory provision does define solid waste disposal to mean the collection, storage,
treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste, as it is set forth therein;
that such definition is among the other various definitions as are contained within it, and the
terms, such as solid waste, solid waste management, and solid waste disposal, are subject to
the Solid Waste Management Rules, as promulgated in accordance with IDAPA, and said
Rules specifically relate to solid waste, its disposal, its management and its collection, and
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included therein is identified those specific and certain limitations, exceptions, exemptions,
and exclusions, and therein specifically excludes any crop and plant residue materials and
agricultural solid waste, which is to be specifically regulated, if at all, by the Department of

Agriculture; that the materials located on ''the property" are subject only, if ever, to the
regulation, licensure and rules of the Department of Agriculture, and not DEQ. That any
allegations contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth
hereinabove, is herewith denied.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 thereof, these Defendants would restate the response as

set forth and contained in paragraph 27 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in
full herein.
29.

In answer to paragraph 29 thereof, these Defendants would admit same.

30.

In answer to paragraph 30 thereof, these Defendants would state certain IDAPA

Rules exist, as proposed, recommended, and promulgated; that there exists Solid Waste
Management Rules, about which DEQ has made reference; that these Rules contain certain
definitions, and most importantly, do specifically address certain express limitations,
exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions regarding the jurisdiction or right of regulatory
enforcement, as identified therein, and said IDAPA Rules do specifically pre-empt any
regulatory enforcement and regulatory authority of DEQ with respect to the exercise of any
activity, control or enforcement of those rules in regard to those exempt and excluded
materials and substances as have been addressed herein, and as to the location thereof on
"the property". That any allegations contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the
response as set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
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31.

In answer to paragraph 31 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response as

set forth in paragraph 30 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in full herein.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

appears to be a "scientific conclusion", as opposed to an allegation of fact; that David R.
Gibson is likely qualified to render a scientific opinion, given his knowledge of the subject
and the process regarding these crop and plant residue materials, but the other Defendant
named in the amended complaint may not be as qualified to render such an opinion beyond
a general understanding as it relates to the "composting process" of plant residue materials
and/or agricultural materials; that upon information, belief, and the general knowledge and
experience as to such a biological process, as such information is made available from both
technical and traditional subject matter research, these Defendants would state, in general
terms, and upon the unique knowledge of David R. Gibson, that "composting" is a
biological, and typically, a natural occurring process, whereupon certain bacteria,
temperatures, moistures, elements, nutrients, enzymes, and microorganisms engage in a
process within a combination of natural environmental conditions that, over a period of
time, may result in a decomposition process of various organic substances and materials,
some or all of which may then be reintroduced into the soil, as a soil amendment for plant
growth, or onto plant foliage, applied as a plant foliar, utilized to enhance plant foliage
production and bloom development.

That any allegation contained in said paragraph,

inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
33.

In answer to paragraph 33 thereof, these Defendants would state there are certain

rules and regulations apparently promulgated regarding various solid waste management
practices, including those certain identified facilities, the content of which speaks for itself,
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but these "solid waste management rules" being the basis of their regulatory authority, have
no application to any of those materials, substances and their location on "the property",
given the "observation" from which the facts and circumstances are being identified and
alleged in the amended complaint; that the DEQ staff personnel claim an "observation" to
be that of "grass clippings and leaves", clearly materials comprised of crop and plant
residue, and the "observed" location being that as situated on "the property", provide no
basis for the imposition of any such rules or regulatory enforcements, as a matter of Idaho
law, due, including but not limited to, the pre-emptive effects of the limitations, exceptions,
exemptions, and exclusions contained within said promulgated rules and regulations. Any
allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth
hereinabove, is herewith denied.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 thereof, these Defendants would state said IDAPA Rules

contain certain definitions, as do the statutory provisions; that the content of these IDAPA
Rules include not only definitions, but also identify certain limitations, exceptions,
exemptions and exclusions, thereby impacting the application of any such regulatory
enforcement of the rules or definitions set forth therein, and said IDAPA Rules specifically
exempt "the property" and the substances and materials located thereon, as it consists solely
of crop and plant residue, and constitutes agricultural solid waste that is exclusively
regulated by the Department of Agriculture, pre-empting any solid waste management rules,
such as those relating to garbage from household refuse and hazardous waste materials
within IDAP A, and any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the
response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
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In answer to paragraph 35 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response as
set forth and contained in paragraph 14 above, as though said response were set forth and
alleged in full herein.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 thereof, these Defendants would state this allegation

invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, which Defendants are not
required to render opinions on such matters; that in a good faith attempt to address such a
matter of statutory interpretation, these Defendants would state, through counsel, that any
"classification" of a category or "tier" reference to a solid waste site, facility, or operation or
disposal process, regardless of the reference to a "Tier II" processing facility, the right of
regulatory enforcement remains subject to the limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and

exclusions as contained within the IDAP A Rules, as it has been so identified within several
of the responses hereinabove set forth, and any such reference, whether or not it is deemed
to be an invitation to render a legal conclusion, the allegation remains irrelevant to what is
the issue of the materials, substances, and their location on "the property" referred to in this
amended complaint, and Defendants therefore must respectfully deny same.
37.

In answer to paragraph 3 7 thereof, these Defendants would deny any relevancy or

application ofIDAPA Rule 58.01. 06. 012 to any aspect of the materials, substances, and the
location reference to "the property" as previously identified herein, and any such "facility"
that processes crop and plant residue waste, is exempted, and any agricultural solid waste is
to be regulated, if at all, exclusively by the Department of Agriculture, and is also
unconditionally exempted from application of DEQ's regulatory provisions, and the
enforceability or applicability of any such rules or "requirements", as they have been preempted, as a matter of law, and such allegation, inviting an opinion as to such a question of
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law, or the interpretation and application of such a "Tier II" requirement, is irrelevant to the
issue and subject matter of this Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny
same.
38.

In answer to paragraph 38 thereof, these Defendants understand the IDAPA

provision referred to in this paragraph has a definition regarding "owner" of a "facility", and
these Defendants would therefore restate their response as it is generally contained in
paragraph 37 above, and to be of the same effect as the above denial, since the IDAPA
provisions, whether it be that of the definition of "facility" or that of a definition of an
"owner" of a facility, the application is irrelevant to the issue and subject matter of this
amended complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
39.

In answer to paragraph 39 thereof, these Defendants understand the IDAPA

provision referred to in this paragraph has a definition regarding "operator" of a "facility",
and these Defendants would therefore restate their response as it is generally contained in
paragraphs 37 and 38 above, and to be of the same effect as the above denials, since the
IDAPA provisions, whether it be of the definition of "facility", or "owner", or that of a
definition of an "operator" of a facility, the application is irrelevant to the issue and subject
matter of this Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 thereof, Defendants deny same.

41.

In answer to paragraph 41 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson is

involved in a process that relates to the transition and decomposition of crop and plant
residues, into a soil amendment, resulting in the reintroduction of the materials back to the
plants and soils, accomplished at agronomic rates, being comprised solely of agricultural
solid waste materi~s, managed and regulated, if at all, exclusively pursuant to the rules

ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

000135
P.33

adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, none of which comes under the
jurisdiction, control, supervision, or regulation of DEQ jurisdiction. That any allegation
contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with response as set forth hereinabove is herewith
denied.
42.

In answer to paragraph 42 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, which Defendants are not
required to render opinions on such matters; that in a good faith attempt to address such an
IDAP A provision and its application, and to the issue of whether Defendants need to submit
any documentation to demonstrate compliance to be received by the Department,
concerning a facility alleged to be in operation on "the property", these Defendants would
state, through counsel, that the IDAPA provisions, relating to "Tier II" solid waste facilities,
are not applicable to these Defendants, or to the materials, or to the substances, or to the
location described to be "the property", as said IDAPA Rules and provisions relating to the
requirements of documentation and compliance have been pre-empted by the specific
limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions within the solid waste management rules
pertaining to solid waste facilities, treatments, disposal, and management, when the subject
matter of which involves crop and plant residue, and/or agricultural solid waste materials, as
the Department of Agriculture has the exclusive jurisdiction and right of regulation and
enforcement thereof as it regards any agricultural solid waste materials, as identified and set
forth above, and Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
43.

In answer to paragraph 43 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

again invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, as previously
requested above, regarding variously identified documentation required to demonstrate
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compliance in certain waste matter environments, and in this instance the reference made is
to that of an "operating Plan" as being among the documentation to contain certain
information, also to be received by the Department, each of which concern aspects referring
to "Tier II" facilities; that these Defendants would therefore restate their response as
contained in paragraph 42 above, as it is understood the allegations similarly are addressing
"forms of documentation" required in relation to "Tier II" solid waste facilities, subject to
the regulatory authority of DEQ, which subject matter is irrelevant to the substance of the
Complaint herein, as set forth in Defendants' response to paragraph 42 above.
44.

In answer to paragraph 44 thereof, these Defendants would state they have no

obligation to submit any documentation regarding or concerning any IDAPA regulatory
compliance provisions or rules; that Defendants are not subject to any regulatory
enforcement by DEQ requirements or approvals regarding any agricultural solid waste
facilities comprised of crop and plant residue materials whatsoever, as those previously
identified Rules relating to solid waste management of solid waste facilities contains
specific limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions set forth within the IDAP A
Rules, and/or are also pre-empted by the exclusive authority of the Department of
Agriculture, relating to solid waste management and facilities with respect to agricultural
solid waste substances, as set forth above.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 thereof, Defendants would state they have not submitted

any "operating plan" for approval, and will not submit any plan to any unauthorized agency,
as it relates to an operation of an exempt processing facility on "the property"; that
Defendants have no obligation to do; that Gibson has been engaged in the process of crop
and plant residue decomposition, development of soil amendments, and plant foliar
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materials, since his involvement in that agricultural activity and operation(s) starting in the
1970's, and is extensively familiar with the exempt status, or otherwise the exclusive
regulation vested in the Department of Agriculture, as it regards agricultural solid waste
substances, materials and locations of processing and decomposition of same, and he is well
versed as to the pre-emptive effects in the subsequently enacted and promulgated DEQ solid
waste management rules and all IDAP A provisions regarding such solid waste facilities,
treatment, disposal and management thereof, and the specific exclusions, exceptions,
exemptions, and limitations that are identified and expressly set forth therein and cited
above, and Defendants deny any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with
the response as set forth hereinabove.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 thereof, Defendants deny same.

47.

In answer to paragraph 47 thereof, Defendants deny same.

48.

In answer to paragraph 48 thereof, Defendants deny same.

49.

In answer to paragraph 49 thereof, Defendants deny that DEQ has incurred any

costs, expenses, or attorney fees to which they are entitled to recover; that the prosecution of
this action is not a valid pursuit of any regulatory right vested in DEQ under the IDAPA
Rules and Regulations, or founded in any fact or law, as said processes, facilities, activities,
and operations have been pre-empted and are exempt from the imposition of any DEQ
regulations whatsoever, and the action identified in their Complaint is being pursued by the
Department without any foundation or basis in fact or in law, and said Department could not
be the prevailing party in this action, and is not entitled to recover any of its expenses, costs,
or attorney fees, if any are incurred by them, as said amended complaint is subject to
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•
dismissal by the Court, as identified hereinabove, and as contained in the prayer for relief as
set forth below.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
That said Defendants do allege, as an affirmative defense, the application of each,
any, every, and all exclusions, exceptions, exemptions, and limitations set forth and
identified in the IDAP A Rules and provisions pertaining to the solid waste facilities,
treatment, disposal and management regulations thereof, specifically including reference as
it is made in IDAPA 58, Title 01, Ch. 06, regarding such reference to such solid waste and
the application of those exclusionary effects that crop and plant residue and agricultural
solid waste is excluded from and not regulated under these rules, being 001. 03. b. ii and
iii, which specifically exempts any right of regulatory authority of DEQ regarding the
subject of solid waste comprised of crop and plant residue and/or any agricultural solid
waste materials, subject to being managed and regulated pursuant to those rules adopted by
the Idaho Department of Agriculture.
That any materials found and located upon "the property", and identified in said
amended complaint, is a material and substance consisting and comprised solely of a crop
and plant residue, intended for return to soil as a soil amendment, at agronomic rates, being
the decomposition of grass clippings and leaves, and is specifically excluded from any
enforcement of any regulatory provisions of the Department of Environmental Quality.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants, having answered the allegations set forth and contained in
Plaintiffs amended complaint, or otherwise having generally denied same, and having set
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forth their exempt status from any regulatory enforcement by the Department of
Environmental Quality, do herewith pray for relief and entry of judgment as follows:
1. That Plaintiff recover nothing whatsoever by their amended complaint, and that
Plaintiffs amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice, as said Department
has no authority to engage in any regulatory activity concerning the subject
matter materials identified in the amended complaint, or as being located on "the
property", as identified in the amended complaint.
2. That Plaintiffs amended complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
I.R.C.P., as a result of Plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action for which any
relief can be granted, as Plaintiff has no standing to allege a violation of any
IDAP A Rules.
3. That Plaintiffs amended complaint be dismissed as a result of Plaintiff's failure
to establish lawful standing as required under Idaho's established case authority.
4. That Defendants recover all costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in this
matter, pursuant to statute, including, but not limited to §12-117, 12-120, 12121, Idaho Code, and as authorized by Rule 54 I.R.C.P.
5. That these Defendants, or either of them, reserve the right to file a counterclaim
against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), for such causes of
action as may be found to be just and proper under Idaho and/or Federal law.
6. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem to be just and proper in
the premises.

Dated this 10TH day of February, 2016.
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Vernon K. Smith, attorney
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 10th day of February, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

(
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Fax

)
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No. 0552

P. 2

1110_____
A.M.

-=

-:----Fiif1LF.i:Ei_a_?1.t_.....:_39-__-____
-_____

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attomey General
CLNE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton. 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
, THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, .
Plaintiff,

)

) CASE NO.: CV QC 2015-03540
)
)

) NOTICE OF SERVICE

V.

)
)

DAYID R GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES, )
LLC.
)

Defendants.

)
)

----------------)

Pursuant to Rule 34(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs hereby give
notice that on June 23, 2016, they served PLAINTIFF IDEQ'S REQUEST FOR ENTRY UPON
LAND FOR INSPECTION upon the parties as indicated in the attached certificate of service.

i
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DATED t h i ~ day of June, 2016.
STATE OF IDAHO

Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Department of Environmental Quality

CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
.

.

a<,l

.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
".I day of June 2016, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing NOTICE OF SERVICE was served on the following as indicated below:
Vern.on K Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

[3""'"united States Mail, Postage Prepaid
Gr'Facsimile: (208) 345"1129

Darrell G. Early
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO

* * *
LISA RAE FULLMER

)
)

VS.

CANYON COUNTY,
CANYONCOUNTY BOARDOF
COMMISSIONERS, CANYON
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER"S
OFFICE, DOES I-X

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT
CANYON COUNTY
CASE NO. 2015-9331-C

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has issued an Order that the venue for the above-entitled
action be transferred from Canyon County located in the Third Judicial District to Ada County
located in the Fourth District; and
WHEREAS, the Administrative District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District shall be
assigned this case for further reassignment for all purposes within the Fourth Judicial District;
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action be filed in Ada
County and assigned to Fourth District judge Jonathan Medema for purposes of hearing any
pending matters and all proceedings necessary for final disposition.

\~~
-----

r~

Timothy Hansen
Administrative District Judge

cc:

Ada County Clerk's Office (for issuance of notice to parties)
Judge Medema
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VERNON K SMITH -

PAGE
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JUL 15 2016

VERNON.K. SMITH .
AITORNEYATLAW
1900 W. Main Street. · :
Boise, Idaho 83702 .·
Idaho State
No. 1365
Telephone: · , (208) 345-1 125

0Hli118TOPHl!R O. RICH, Clerk

&/ JAMIE MAR11N
0EPUrv

Bar

Fax:· . . . · . (208) 345-1129
Attorney for.Defendant .

. IN THE DiSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
. THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

.Plaintiff,

)

) CASE NO.: CV 0C 1503540
)

)
) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE
)

v.

)
DAVID R. 'GIBS:ON,.d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES, )
LLC
)
Defendants.

)

)
)

~-------------)
. This_is to certify that Defendants did submit their Response to Plain. '
''

Upon Land for Inspection. therein denying their request, for the re
Dated'tbis 14th day of July~ 2016

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants

ORIGINAL
Page
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
..

.

I HERE$Y CERTIFY That on the 14th day of July, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of
the above and ·foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses as
follows:
· · Clerk of the Court
Fqurth..Judicial District
· Ada Coµrity
:iOO W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(

(

X

)

U.S.Mail

)

Fax
Hand Delivered

)

Darrell G. Early
·Deputy ,Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410-N.. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
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Electronically Filed
10/11/2016 1:43:04 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Electronic Mail: Darrell.early@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

__________________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN OAKEY

)

~

)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
)

Brian Oakey, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states that:
1.

I am employed by State of Idaho Department of Agriculture as the Deputy Director and I

have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

The Department of Agriculture does not regulate the composting of non-agricultural solid
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wastes such as grass clippings, leaves and other forms of yard waste.
3.

The Department of Agriculture does regulate plant and soil amendments pursuant to the

Plant and Soil Amendment Act, Idaho Code § 22-2201 et. seq. and ID APA 02.06. et. seq. but
this authority is only applied to the registration, and labeling of plant and soil amendments. The
Department of Agriculture does not regulate the production of soil amendments or the
composting processes used to produce such products.
4.

I have reviewed the files of the Department of Agriculture for any references to David R.

Gibson, Black Diamond Compost and VHS Prope1iies LLC and have found no documents
indicating any regulation of composting activities by any such individuals or entities. I did
locate documents indicating registration of plant and soil amendments by David R. Gibson true
and c01Tect copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

Registration of plant and soil amendments pursuant to IDAPA 02.06.41.000.010-.030

does not provide the Depmiment of Agriculture with authority to regulate the siting or operation
of composting processes used to create the plant and soil amendment.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
Dated this

~

day of October, 2016

Brian Oakey
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this this

-c:iday of October, 2016

t.,-,

No'taiy Public in andfothe State of Idaho

i

Residing at: Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires: 3-s:i.'$/.,,;lv
7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1-fifay

of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
I hereby certify that on the I
correct copy of the foregoing AFFWAVIT OF BRIAN OAKEY by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_L Hand Delivery
Fax (208) 345-1129
~ eService: vls59@live.com

ck~~
~f

Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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ST A TE OF XDAiiO
DiEP AIRT .MlENT Of AGRnCULTU!RE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Govcmor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON .
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705
208-344-4468

2016 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND/OR DENIAL FOR COMMERCIAL SOIL PRODUCTS
Certificate Number: 2759
Certificate Generated Date: 2/12/2016

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould
Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Deparment of Ariculture (ISDA), This document certifies that the COMMERCIAL
SOIL(S) listed on the following page(s) have been either:
1.

Registered: Product(s) that have been registered for the current year through December 31
2016 may be distributed, as registered, into or within the state of Idaho unless modified or
cancelled upon further review by ISDA. Currently registered products are listed on this certificate
as 'REGISTERED' or 'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS.'

Note: Some products may be registered with comments . Any product so designated will require
the submission of a revised label before the next registration period, or a written statement from
the registrant declaring when the revision will be printed and implemented. Details pertaining to
each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form" accompanying either this certificate
or the certificate issued when the product was initially registered with comments. Products
registered with comments are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of
'REGISTERED WlTH COMMENTS'.
OR
2.

Denied: Products that have been denied registration are not authorized to be distributed into or
within the state of Idaho. Any person distributing a product for which registration has been denied
is in violation of Idaho law and is subject to regulatory sanctions including, but not limited to, civil
penalties. Details pertain ing to each product are contained within the ISDA ''Tracking Form"
accompanying either this certificate or the certificate issued when the product was initially denied .
Denied products are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of 'DENIED.'

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701
(208) 332-8625

EXHIBIT

A-
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•

Idaho State Department of-Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 332-8625

(Please print any corrections)
Date:
Phone:

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

12/3/2015
208-344-4468

RENEW AL APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL SOIL 2016

$ 200.00

Registration Fees Due for Renewals
Less Registration Fees for DELETED products

• $

Late Product Fees Due (if postmarked after January 31)

+$

Total Fees Remitted

=$

2-00

~

Remittance payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover the annual renewal for registration(s). All
registrations expire December 31

of each year. Renewal applications not postmarked by

fees of $10.00 PER PRODUCT will be assessed.

January 31

will be considered delinquent and late

Products found unregistered will be subject to stop sale. Any product in CONDITIONAL

REGISTRATION STATUS may not be renewed unless label corrections are submitted on an APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW
OR REVISED PRODUCTS.

DIRECTIONS:
•

Strike revised, discontinued or incorrect product information in red ink.

•

Submit new and revised product information with a copy of the cmTent label and applicable registration fees on an APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED PRODUCTS." (available at www.agri.idaho.gov)

•

DO NOT submit a label for an unchanged product if that label is already on file with ISDA as noted on this renewal application

form .
•

Registration fees are $100.00 per product, regardless of package size

•

Unregistered product fee= $0.00

I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
package of the products listed on this renewal application form is labeled as described (and in addition, that net weight and
d address ill be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the ingredients of the
behal f th
gistrant.

(Signatur R quired)

JAc, IJ_

/!_

Title

G-1.be;, ~

(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)
This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, showing the product(s) you wish to
re-register in Idaho. Please return this application form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

RECEIVED

FEB
1"

1 W16
~ TRIE S
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REG#
27001

BRAND
INTERNATIONAL COMPOST
PRODUCTS, LLC

PRODUCT
RWC- 7/11/13-- NATURE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

27471

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST
PRODUCTS, LLC

HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT
GM

STATUS

CT

REGISTERED
REGISTERED
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IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR
CELIA R. GOULD
DIRECTOR

INVOICE

INVOICE#:
CUSTOMER ID#:
DATE:

45-00-346574
A3154DB5-TSESSEBE
02/01/2016

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC 2759
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

DATE

QTY

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

TOTAL

02/01/2016

1 2016 SOIL REGISTRATION FEE 27001 INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS,
CT
LLC RWC- 7/11/13-- NATURE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

$100.00

$100.00

02/01/2016

1 2016 SOIL REGISTRATION FEE 27471 INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS,
LLC HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT
GM

$100.00

$100.00

02/01/2016

1 2015 SOIL PLANT AMENDMENT TONNAGE FEE SECOND HALF TONNAGE
REPORT

$15.00

$15.00

TOTAL DUE: $215.00
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!DEPARTMENT Olf AGR!ClTLTUlRE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor
CELIA R. GOULD
Director

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705
208-344-4468

2015 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND/OR DENIAL FOR COMMERCIAL AMENDMENT
PRODUCTS
Certificate Number: 2759
Certificate Date: 7/16/2015

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould
Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Deparment of Ariculture (ISDA), This document certifies that the COMMERCIAL
AMENDMENT(S) listed on the following page(s) have been either:
1.

Registered: Product(s) that have been registered for the current year through December 31
2015 may be distributed, as registered, into or within the state of Idaho unless modified or
cancelled upon further review by ISDA. Currently registered products are listed on this certificate
as 'REGISTERED' or 'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS.'

Note: Some products may be registered with comments. Any product so designated will require
the submission of a revised label before the next registration period, or a written statement from
the registrant declaring when the revision will be printed and implemented. Details pertaining to
each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form" accompanying either this certificate
or the certificate issued when the product was initially registered with comments. Products
registered with comments are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of
'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS'.
OR
2.

Denied: Products that have been denied registration are not authorized to be distributed into or

within the state of Idaho. Any person distributing a product for which registration has been denied
is in violation of Idaho law and is subject to regulatory sanctions including, but not limited to, civil
penalties. Details pertaining to each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form"
accompanying either this certificate or the certificate issued when the product was initially denied .
Denied products are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of'DENIED.'
Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701
(208) 332-8625

000154

REG#

PRODUCTBRAND

PRODUCTNAME

27001

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST
PRODUCTS, LLC

RWC - 7/11/13 -- NATU RE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

27471

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST
PRODUCTS, LLC

HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT

STATUSNAME
REGISTERED

CT
GM

REGISTERED

000155

2

f;11;-

/3D/115 iJ

1

I tt 2.11£6
Hi::GEIVl::: D

Division of Plant Industries
P.O. BOX790
BOISE, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 332-8625

f.d-801 tr3tJ[)~

FEi:,r, 0 2 L0l5

(Please print any corrections)
Date:
Phone:

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

12/2/2014
208-344-4468

RENEW AL APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL SOIL 2015
$ 200.00

Registration Fees Due for Renewals
Less Registration Fees for DELETED products

• $_ _ _ _ __

Late Product Fees Due (if postmarked after January 31)

+$ _ _ _ __

Total Fees Remitted

=$

Remittance payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculhlfe is enclosed herewith to cover the annual renewal for registration(s). All
registrations expire December 31

of each year. Renewal applications not postmarked by

fees of$10.00 PER PRODUCT will be assessed.

January 31

will be considered delinquent and late

Products found unregistered will be subject to stop sale. Any product in CONDITIONAL

REGISTRATION STATUS may not be renewed unless label corrections are submitted on an APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW
OR REVISED PRODUCTS .

DIRECTIONS:
•

Strike revised, discontinued or incorrect product information in red ink.

•

Submit new and revised product info1mation with a copy of the cmTent label and applicable registration fees on an APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED PRODUCTS." (available at www.agri.idaho.gov)

•

DO NOT submit a label for an unchanged product if that label is already on file with ISDA as noted on this renewal application
form .

•

Registration fees are $100.00 per product, regardless of package size

•

Unregistered product fee = $0.00

I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
package of the products listed on this renywal application form is labeled as described (and in addition, that net weight and
shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the ingredients of the
manufact~F-'r;; name and address will
produci,s/listed for a9dyn)lhalf of 19{ reg istrant.

be

h

r/1/
(

(_,tf/

L./

- ~-~_s _ __

(Signature ~quifed)

,i:b u i J f2. G, (1so 1/\_
(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

Title

2

9 ,_J~ ~ (.s
Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, showing the product(s) you wish to
re-register in Idaho. Please return this application form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.
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REG# BRAND
27001 INTERNATIONAL COMPOST
PRODUCTS, LLC

PRODUCT
RWC - 7/11/13-- NATURE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

27471

HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT
GM

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST
PRODUCTS, LLC

n t: ( ' I.
F

1:3

STATUS

CT

REGISTERED
REGISTERED

I \/ 1-· U

e~- 1~'I)/,.·
000157

000158

·~gSTATE OP IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2014 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 463
Certificate Number : 3090
Certificate Date

: 01/30/2014

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2014.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 332-8620

· 2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2014 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho \

Certificate Number: 3090
Registrant Company Number 463
Certificate Date 01/30/2014
Product Name
HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT
RWC - 7/11/13 -- NATURE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

Status
GM

A

CT

A

000160

Page 2

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

Office Use
Date Received
Check Number
Amount$ - ~ ~0:c. .!O=---=1-+-~:....::.....L..___
=:C
Company Number

APPLICATION FOR RENEWArP£~ItTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
A EC
BOISE, ID 83705

E f VE 0

Company Number .. 463
Phone .. (208)344-4468

JAN 2 4 2014
PLANT INDUSTRIES

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$
Total Fees Remitted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $

-

200.00

...,

00

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration. Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste - derived product is identified with the current lab analysis

Title

Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000161

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals, including but not limited to arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure,
bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids, composted manure. bone meal, blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.
(2 Products)
Page 2
Product Name
HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT
RWC - 7/11/13 -- NATURE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

Renew

GM
CT

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No

No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000162

ST ATE OF IDAHO
]D)EPARTMENT Of AGllUCUlLTURE

C.L. "B UTCI-1" OTTER
Governor
CELIA R. GOULD
Director

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
{208)344-4468

2013 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 463
Certificate Number : 2913
Certificate Date

: 08/30/2013

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2013.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road • P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 8370 I • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2013 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 2913
Registrant Company Number 463
Certificate Date 08/30/2013
Product Name
RWC - 7/11/13 -- NATURE'S MIRACLE MOLECULES

Status
CT

A

000164

Page 2

Mail to: IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
Commercial Fertilizer Section
PO Box 790
Boise, ID 83701

RECEIVED

Telephone: (208) 332-8625
Fax Number: (208) 334-2283
Web Site: http://www.agri.idaho.gov

JUL 1 1 2013

ISDA Office Use Only .·

Date Received-··~ - .f-+-.;,r-,l-r--+,,,'' - - ' - - - Che cl< Num:t,er_ ___-'!!'.__....___ _ _ __
Ai:nount$_---'_ _.___._-4-r',-- ~ - - Compaily #_·_ _ _ ___,_....,._~- - - -

PLANT INDUSTRIES

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR
PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS
Company:

L~T't-{lµ frTlo,J lrL.. Cmt 5r f

Contact: _ __

0

-4_~_3_____

/k,)cJc:rs LLC...Registrant #: _ _

1 ""G_S_o_,J
J:>i_'lnl
_ 'L
_ _{;
__
____ ___ _____ Email: _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __

/+_t_l-_L
_________ Web Address: _ _ _ _ __ _ __

Mailing Address: _ _3_o_~
_0__{2.e,
__>_£-__

0 _1 5
City, State, Zip: _ _
~_
_€._ ,,__
r.J>---'-_ _ _'6"
_3_7_0_>
__________

Phone#: (').d)

311-41-~8"

_ _______

Fax#: _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __

(Number ot) _ _/ __ New·Products

$ --~/_o_o_,_e?_0_ _ ($100 each)

(Number ot) _ _ _ Revised Labels

$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ($100 each)

(No fee for products where annual renewal fee was paid, unless registration was previously denied)

-a

Late Fees for Late Renewal of all Revised Product Labels
$
($JO/product)
{Late fee is due on renewal registrations of all revised products received after February I st of each year)

o_
o,_oo
$ _ _ _/_
_ __

Total Fees Remitted

Please make remittances payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture - Feed and Fertilizer Section.
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
product listed on this product registration form will be labeled in accordance with Idaho Statute and Rules; that the attached
declarations are the guarante of the applicant as to the chemical composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the

(Signature Requirea)

Cbu ,d /2

(9-,LSOZ?

(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)
►

(Date)

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, applicable registration
and late fees, current lab analysis of waste-derived products and a current copy of the product label for each of the
products listed on this application.

000165

Product Listing, Page 2
•

Chapter 22, Title 22, Section 22-2205(7), Idaho Code, states: "Any waste-derived soil amendment or waste-derived plant amendment distributed as
a single ingredient product or blended with other soil amendments or plant amendment ingredients must be identified as "waste-derived soil
amendment or plant amendment" by the applicant in the application for registration ." Applications including waste-derived products must be
accompanied by complete lab analysis, including but not limited to: arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se) except
that the following waste-derived products are exempt from this requirement: biosolids, composted manure, bone and blood meal, fish emulsion,
vegetative and food wastes, and~ gypsum boards (not collected from demolition sites).

PLEASE COMPLETE THE INFORMATION BELOW FOR EACH PRODUCT:

1. Brand Name:

) l+n1f E,'

Dry

Product Name:

ev

Is this roduct waste-derived?

Dry

2. Brand Name:
Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

3. Brand Name:

Yes

~
Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

4. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

5. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

6. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

Is this product waste-derived?

Yes

No

Please copy this page to list additional products. Be sure to provide all of the required information.

000166

..
REce,veo
Made in IDAHO
From recycled materials

t

JUL 1 1 2013
PLANT INDUSTRIES

e,;Jc_
7/1,)3 R-/L

SOIL AMENDMENT

(All Natural Compost Extract)
Contains Naturally Occurring

FULVIC ACID and HUMIC ACID

veggies

non-hazardous

non-toxic

non-burning

Safe for all plants - Won't harm pets!

000167

'

.
RECEIVED
JUL 11 2013
PLANT INDUSTRIES

I E L F RI P OVING SOIL HEALTH
REDUCES THE NEED FOR WATER AND FERTILIZER
After more than 25 years in the composting business, we have developed an
extract that provides your plants with quicker access to the key components that
make compost so desirable - Fulvic Acid and Humic Acid ( Nature's Miracle
Molecules ). Together, they team up with the microbes in your soil to improve its
health, conserve water, and enhance your plants' ability to get and use the
available nutrients, producing results you can see and taste. In this form, a little
bit goes a long way.

IT'S JUST AS EFFECTIVE THROUGH FOLIAR APPLICATION
/ SOIL OR FOLIAR APPLICATION RATE:
4 oz. (1/2 cup) in 1 gallon of water applied to 500 sq. ft. or as directed by a
horticulture specialist. Repeat every 4 weeks. Can be applied by pump sprayer,
hose-end sprayer, watering can, or by irrigation.
May also be applied monthly to house plants as part of their normal watering
regimen.

(shake well before using)
INGREDIENTS: Water , c_ampost extract

✓

Produced by: International Compost Products LLC

5120 W. Overland Rd., Ste. 102, Boise, ID 83705 USA

Volume: 64 fl. oz. (½ gal.) ./

6

IIJJJ IJJ L

000168

ST A TE OF KDAHO
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER

DEPARTMENT Olf AGRICULTURE

Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2013 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 463
Certificate Number : 2722
Certificate Date

: 01/09/2013

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould
Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2013.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road • P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 8370 l • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2013 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho~

Certificate Number: 2722
Registrant Company Number 463
Certificate Date 01/09/2013
Product Name

HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT

Page 2

Status
GM

A

000170

...
Office Use
Date Received
Check Numbe
Amount$ -'--~O~O
c..__.,~ -=-~ c,-=-Company Number - - ~ ~ - - -

IDAHC DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625

(Please print any corrections)

&013

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLCR

DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

EC EI VE

Company Number .. 463
G hane .. (208)344 - 4468

DEC 28 2012
PLANT INDUSTRIES

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due ................... $
Total Fees Remitted ..................... $

100.00

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste-deri~ved produc. # / 4 with the current lab analysis

~~
~
( Signature Required
1

Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

f'rro p,

- - - - - - T~1~.-t~l_e______

Z(

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.
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Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids, composted manure.
bone meal. blood meal, fish emulsion, vegetative wastes, food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option, but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations, 40 CFR 503. as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal, blood meal. fish emulsion, vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.

(1 Product)
Page 2
Renew

Product Name
HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT

GM

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW ana

.D!:!o.uin;.i,,

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No
No

.u •

.....

= _,,,,,,,,--.r:--~-~-

Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.
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ST ATE OJF KDATiiO
DEPARTMENT Of AGJUCllTLTUlRE

C.L. ''BUTCH" OTTER

Governor
CELIA R. GOULD

Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705
208-344-4468

2016 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND/OR DENIAL FOR COMMERCIAL SOIL PRODUCTS
Certificate Number: 2661
Certificate Generated Date: 2/11/2016

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould
Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Deparment of Ariculture (ISDA), This document certifies that the COMMERCIAL
SOIL(S) listed on the following page(s) have been either:
1.

Registered: Product(s) that have been registered for the current year through December 31
2016 may be distributed, as registered, into or within the state of Idaho unless modified or
cancelled upon further review by ISDA. Currently registered products are listed on this certificate
as 'REGISTERED' or 'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS.'

Note: Some products may be registered with comments. Any product so designated will require
the submission of a revised label before the next registration period, or a written statement from
the registrant declaring when the revision will be printed and implemented. Details pertaining to
each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form" accompanying either this certificate
or the certificate issued when the product was initially registered with comments. Products
registered with comments are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of
'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS'.
OR
2.

Denied: Products that have been denied registration are not authorized to be distributed into or
within the state of Idaho. Any person distributing a product for which registration has been denied
is in violation of Idaho law and is subject to regulatory sanctions including, but not limited to, civil
penalties. Details pertaining to each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form"
accompanying either this certificate or the certificate issued when the .product was initially denied .
Denied products are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of 'DENIED.'

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701
(208) 332-8625

000173

lcj11ho State Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.Q. BOX790
BOISE, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)
Date:
Phone:

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

12/3/2015
208-344-4468

RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL SOIL 2016
$ 100.00

Registration Fees Due for Renewals
Less Registration Fees for DELETED products

. $

Late Product Fees Due (if postmarked after January 31)

+$

Total Fees Remitted

=$

l

/{YDg!:JL

Remittance payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover the annual renewal for registration(s). All
registrations expire December 31

of each year. Renewal applications not postmarked by

fees of$10.00 PER PRODUCT will be assessed.

January 31

will be considered delinquent and late

Pr.oducts found unregistered will be subject to stop sale. Any product in CONDITIONAL

REGISTRATION STATUS may not be renewed unless label corrections are submitted on an APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW
OR REVISED PRODUCTS .

DIRECTIONS:
•

Strike revised, discontinued or inc01Tect product info1mation in red ink.

•

Submit new and revised product information with a copy of the cuITent label and applicable registration fees on an APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED PRODUCTS." (available at www.agri.idaho.gov)

•

DO NOT submit a label for an unchanged product if that label is already on file with ISDA as noted on this renewal application
form .

•

Registration fees are $100.00 per product, regardless of package size

•

Unregistered product fee

= $0.00

I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
package of the products listed on this renewal application form is labeled as described (and in addition, that net weight and
manufacturer's name and address w· I be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the ingredients of the
products Ii led for a
behalf o
e r gistrant.

Title

(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, showing the product(s) you wish to
re-register in Idaho. Please return this application forin to the above address . A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

RECEIVED

FEB ~ 1 2016
PLANT INOUSTR/f<::

000174

_________________ ______________________ __
REG#

BRAND

26728 BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS

......;;..
PRODUCT

LEAF MOLD

STATUS

GM

REGISTERED

000175

IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
P.O. BOX790
BOISE, ID 83701

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR
CELIA R. GOULD
DIRECTOR

INVOICE

INVOICE#:
CUSTOMER ID#:
DATE:

45-00-346567
0F574296-DISTANCE
02/01/2016

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS 2661
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

DATE
QTY DESCRIPTION
02/01/2016
2015 SOIL PLANT AMENDMENT TONNAGE FEE SECOND HALF ZERO
TONNAGE REPORT
02/01/2016
1 2016 SOIL REGISTRATION FEE 26728 BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
GM
LEAF MOLD

AMOUNT
$15.00

TOTAL
$15.00

$100.00

$100.00

TOTAL DUE: $115.00

Page: 1

000176

~

ST A TE OF IDAHO
DEPART.MlENT Of AGRICULTURE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor
CELIAR. GOULD

Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705
208-344-4468

2015 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND/OR DENIAL FOR COMMERCIAL AMENDMENT
PRODUCTS
Certificate Number: 2661
Certificate Date: 7/16/2015

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould
Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Deparment of Ariculture (ISDA), This document certifies that the COMMERCIAL
AMENDMENT(S) listed on the following page(s) have been either:
1.

Registered: Product(s) that have been registered for the current year through December 31
2015 may be distributed, as registered, into or within the state of Idaho unless modified or
cancelled upon further review by ISDA. Currently registered products are listed on this certificate
as 'REGISTERED' or 'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS.'

Note: Some products may be registered with comments. Any product so designated will require
the submission of a revised label before the next registration period, or a written statement from
the registrant declaring when the revision will be printed and implemented. Details pertaining to
each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form" accompanying either this certificate
or the certificate issued when the product was initially registered with comments. Products
registered with comments are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of
'REGISTERED WITH COMMENTS'.
OR
2.

Denied: Products that have been denied registration are not authorized to be distributed into or
within the state of Idaho. Any person distributing a product for which registration has been denied
is in violation of Idaho law and is subject to regulatory sanctions including, but not limited to, civil
penalties. Details pertaining to each product are contained within the ISDA "Tracking Form"
accompanying either this certificate or the certificate issued when the product was initially denied .
Denied products are listed on this certificate by product name with a status of 'DENIED.'

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701
(208) 332-8625

000177

REG#

PRODUCTBRAND

PRODUCTNAME

26728

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
PRODUCTS

LEAF MOLD

STATUS NAME
GM

REGISTERED

2

000178

Division of Pla~t Industries
P.O. BOX 790
BOISE, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 332-8625

(Please print any corrections)
Date:
Phone:

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

12/2/2014
208-344-4468

RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL SOIL 2015
$

Registration Fees Due for Renewals

100.00

Less Registration Fees for DELETED products

-$_ _ _ _ __

Late Product Fees Due (if postmarked after January 3 I)

+$ _ _ _ _ __

Total Fees Remitted

=$

/ 00 ~

Remittance payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover the annual renewal for registration(s). Ali
registrations expire December 31

of each year. Renewal applications not postmarked by

January 31

will be considered delinquent and late

fees of$10.00 PER PRODUCT will be assessed. Products found umegistered will be subject to stop sale. Any product in CONDITIONAL
REGISTRATION STATUS may not be renewed unless label corrections are submitted on an APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW
OR REVISED PRODUCTS.

DIRECTIONS:
•

Strike revised, discontinued or inco1Tect product information in red ink.

•

Submit new and revised product information with a copy of the current label and applicable registration fees on an APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED PRODUCTS." (available at www.agri.idaho.gov)

•

DO NOT submit a label for an unchanged product if that label is already on file with ISDA as noted on this renewal application
form .

•

Registration fees are $100.00 per product, regardless of package size

•

Unregistered product fee= $0.00

I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
package of the products listed on this renewal application form is labeled as described (and in addition, that net weight and
manufacturer's name and atjdress will be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the ingredients of the
products listed for an1/n h6half of th~ registrant.

·{ b¾L I¼!:

~

0 ('\. () \ cL fc

t

(77

I

bso

(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

/P
_ .;0-eJ
~S _ _
Title

q,ignature ,Required)

VI

c_r'
J u-''--i:--c~
_ _____._·?
c...=----+--"""--'

, ,,.-;)

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, showing the product(s) you wish to
re-register in Idaho. Please return this application form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

RECEIVED

000179

PRODUCT
26728 BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST
• PRODUCTS

LEAF MOLD

STATUS
GM

REGISTERED

RECEIVED

f"f D. 0 ?r.,·~
'

t

f. '.' 1V

000180

I

--....,.
::.

..::..

000181

STATE OF IDAHO
DJEPARTMENT Of AGm:ClIJLTURE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2014.CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
. Certificate Number : 3078
Certificate Date

: 01/30/2014

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or·computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2014.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

· 2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov

000182

2014 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 3078
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 01/30/2014
Product Name
LEAF MOLD

Page 2

Status
GM

A

000183

Office Use
Date Received
Check Number
Amount$ _.i..._::O=----=
O=----=-14----"-..;.__J.-__
Company Number

IDAHO D~PARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Di vision of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208} 332-8625

(Please print any corrections)

0

APPLICATION FOR RENEfL /lSTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS

DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

RECEIVED

Company Number . . 278
Phone .. (208} 344-4468

JAN 2 4 2014
PLANT INDUSTRIES

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due ... . . .. . . .... . ..... $
Total Fees Remitted ...... . .............. $

100.00

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 di each year (Idaho Code 22 - 2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS .
New or revised labels must be submitted on the e_n closed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste - derived product ·s id tified with the current lab analysis

Title

Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address . A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000184

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg). lead (Pb). and selenium (Se).
The fo llm•1ing waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosol ids. composted manure.
bone meal. blood meal, fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503, as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative 1vastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.
(1 Product)
Page 2
?roduct Name
;LL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Renew
GM

V

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No
No

?lease indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000185

STATE OF IDAHO
DJEPARTMENT Of' AGRICUJLTURJE

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor
CELIA R. GOULD
Director

Telephone Number
(208} 344-4468

2013. CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
. Certificate Number : 2781
Certificate Date

: 01/09/2013

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or-computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2013.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Te 1 ephone : ( 2 O8 ) 3 3 2 - 8 6 2 O

000186
' 2270 O1dPenitentiazy Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.aeri.ir!Rh~ ,,,."'

2013 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 2781
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 01/09/2013
Product Name
LEAF MOLD

Page 2

Status

GM

A

000187

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

Office Use
Date Received
Check Number
Amount$
Company Number--~~~--

rRo!3

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

A EC EI VE D Company

Number .. 278
Phone .. (208)344-4468

DEC 2 8 2012
PLANT INDUS"I rne::s
/00.0 0

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due ................... $
Total Fees Remitted ..................... $

-2-9-G-.-0-<Y

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
the current lab analysis

z_./
Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

~

(Z...

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address.
A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000188

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals, including but not limited to arsenic (As) , cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg), lead (Pb). and selenium (Se) .
The fo 11 owing waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: bi osol ids. composted manure.
bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion . vegetative 1~astes. food 1•1astes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites .
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended .
The fo 11 owing waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutriti ve metal s:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion . vegetative wastes, food 1~astes and nevi gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites .

(2 Prdducts)
Page 2
Product Name

LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Renew

SC
GM

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No

No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.
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~

ST A TE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT Of AGRJICULTURlE

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor
CELIA R. GOULD
Director

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2012 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 2417
Certificate Date

: 01/11/2012

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2012.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

000190
2270 Old Penitentiary Roa<l • P.O. Box 790 • 13oise, Idaho 8370 I • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov

2012 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 2417
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 01/11/2012
Product Name

LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Status
SC
GM

A
A

000191

Page

..
I

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625

Office Use Oni
Date Received
/;/ ?J'
Check Number
Amount $ {l oo
d
Company Number
278

a

c¥-

!J- fl

s:

(Please print any corrections)

{j.O/~

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Company Number .. 278
Phone .. (208)344-4468

AECEIVED

DEC 2 9 2011
PLANT INDUSTRIES
Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due
......... $
Total Fees Remitted ..................... $

200.00

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised lab~l on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materi ls listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste-deri~product,,. i
i d ;,.·;>ed with the current lab analys~

l__)

.-·1

( S

Please Print or Type Name Clearly

___
I_ir>_D----"-lf_ _ _ __

Title

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho . Please return this application
form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000192

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg), lead (Pb). and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure,
bone meal. blood meal, fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended.·
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal, fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.

(2 Products)
Page 2
Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Renew
SC
GM

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No
No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000193

ST A TE OF KDAIH[O
DlEP ARTMlENT Of AGlRKCUlLTUlRlE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

INTERNATIONAL COMPOST PRODUCTS, LLC
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSE HILL STREET
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
{208)344-4468

2012 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 463
Certificate Number : 2610
Certificate Date

: 03/21/2012

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2012.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 8370 I • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov000194

2012 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 2610
Registrant Company Number 463
Certificate Date 03/21/2012
Product Name
HUMXTRA CONCENTRATED COMPOST EXTRACT

Status
GM

A

000195

Page 2

J_

Lo-be_ l

3/26/f '2
Mail to : IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
ISDA Office Use Only
I>ivision of Plant Industries
Commercial Fertilizer Section
Date Received- - --'---,,........- ~ ....,....- PO Box 790
Boise, ID 83701
RECEIVE heck Number_ _ ___,____ .,.....,._.__,--"-- Amount $_ _ __ _ _,__-r-T.------ - Company
#_ _ _ _ ___,_...>..e..,_,.__ _ _
Telephone: (208) 332-8625
MAR 2 D
Fax Number: (208) 334-2283
Web Site: http://www.agri.idaho.gov

2012

PLANT INDUSTRIES

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR
PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS
Company:

.,. ., L. ,

)... J/1 .

Contact: _ _

I

l,'l

a.-/.crJ'"1c.)

/

.

/) ' .).,
rc;F;;;.t. f?"'dv-..'

{2
__
a..~~~ ---~-r_l_h_:>_9_c',rv(
_·
-

t--_ __

!PcS;e, t[((
City, State, Zip: _13=--0
~ 1- ~
L~d~ --'.B:~;3__7_o_··_<-::. _

_

_ __

_

Scrx:)

Mailing Address:

L L-

Co w

e

Registrant#: _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _

_

Email: _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _
Web Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _
Fax#:....,__ ___.__ --_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _

(Number of)_~/_ _ New Products

c>...9
$ - ~,,/_~
0 _0_ _
_ _ ($100 each)

(Number of) _ _ _ Revised Labels

$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ($100 each)

(No fee for products where annual renewal fee was paid, unless registration was previously denied)

Late Fees for Late Renewal of all Revised Product Labels
$·
($ I 0/product)
(Late fee is due on renewal registrations of all revised products received after February I st of each year)

/ ooc,o

Total Fees Remitted

$ ----''--------

Please make remittances payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture - Feed and Fertilizer Section.
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
product listed on this product registration form will be labeled in accordance with Idaho Statute and Rules; that the attached
declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the

"~,t~
(Signature Required)

e &,l">0'-1

(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)
►

(Title)

/&:J Mc:u,,.
(Date)

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, applicable registration
and late fees, current lab analysis of waste-derived products and a current copy of the product label for each of the
products listed on this application.

000196

Product Listing, Page 2
•

Chapter 22, Title 22, Section 22-2205(7), Idaho Code, states: "Any waste-derived soil amendment or waste-derived plant amendment distributed as
a single ingredient product or blended with other soil amendments or plant amendment ingredients must be identified as "waste-derived soil
amendment or plant amendment" by the applicant in the application for registration." Applications including waste-derived products must be
accompanied by complete lab analysis, including but not limited to: arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se) except
that the following waste-derived products are exempt from this requirement: biosolids, composted manure, bone and blood meal, fish emulsion,
vegetative and food wastes, and !!£lY gypsum boards (not collected from demolition sites).

PLEASE COMPLETE THE INFORMATION BELOW FOR EACH PRODUCT:

1. Brand Name:

Product Name:

£

fl

bu

11'1. 0-

X

orLiquid

-~«M.7

Liu JU 'tl0c:1
j

2. Brand Name:

bs this roduct waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

3. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

4. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Packa e Sizes in Net Wei

5. Brand Name:

Is this roduct waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

6. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

Yes

No

or Liquid

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

Is this product waste-derived?

Yes

No

Please copy this page to list additional products. Be sure to provide all of the required information.
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Concentrated Compost Extract

Concentrated Compost Extract

All Natural Soil Amendment

All Natural Soil Amendment

Contains Naturally Occurring

Contains Naturally Occurring

Fulvic Acid and Humic Acid

Fulvic Acid and Humic Acid

non-hazardous

non-toxic non-burning

non-hazardous

non-toxic non-burning

Ideal for improving soil health by
reducing the need for water and fertilizer

Ideal for improving soil health by
reducing the need for water and fertilizer

Soil or Foliar Application rate: 2 Tablespoons in 1 gallon
of water applied to 500 sq . ft. or as directed by a horticulture
specialist. Repeat as needed

Soil or Foliar Application rate: 2 Tablespoons in 1 gallon

(shake, stir or agitate well before using)
Ingredients: Water, concentrated compost extract
Produced by: International Compost Products LLC

of water applied to 500 sq. ft. or as directed by a horticulture
specialist. Repeat as needed

(shake, stir or agitate well before using)
Ingredients: Water, concentrated compost extract
Produced by: International Compost Products LLC

5120 W. Overland Rd., Suite 102, Boise, ID 83705 USA

Volume: _ _ _ _ gal.
6

l ll

lllll 111111111 1111111111

10256 96929

9

5120 W. Overland Rd., Suite 102, Boise, ID 83705 USA

Volume:

----
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gal.
6

RE C E ! V E D

10256 9692 9

9

MAR 2 0 2012

Concentrated Compost Extract

Concentrated Compost Extract

All Natural Soil Amendment

All Natural Soil Amendment

Contains Naturally Occurring

Contains Naturally Occurring

Fulvic Acid and Humic Acid

Fulvic Acid and Humic Acid

non-hazardous

non-toxic non-burning

non-hazardous

non-toxic non-burning

Ideal for improving soil health by
reducing the need for water and fertilizer

Ideal for improving soil health by
reducing the need for water and fertilizer

Soil or Foliar Application rate: 2 Tablespoons in 1 gallon
of water applied to 500 sq. ft. or as directed by a horticulture
specialist. Repeat as needed

Soil or Foliar Application rate: 2 Tablespoons in 1 gallon

(shake, stir or agitate well before using)
Ingredients: Water, concentrated compost extract
Produced by: International Compost Products LLC

lllllllllll 111111111 1111111111
6

102 56 96929

(shake, stir or agitate well before using)
Ingredients: Water, concentrated compost extract
Produced by: International Com post Products LLC

5120 W. Overland Rd., Suite 102, Boise, ID 83705 USA

Volume: _ _ _ _ gal.

of water applied to 500 sq. ft. or as directed by a horticulture
specialist. Repeat as needed

9

5120 W. Overland Rd., Suite 102, Boise, ID 83705 USA

Volume: _ _ _ _ gal.
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10256 96929
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.. "STATE OF IDAHO
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2011 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 2242
Certificate Date

: 01/05/2011

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2011.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2011 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Iqaho

Certificate Number: 2242
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 01/05/2011
Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Page 2

Status
SC

A

~

A

000200

~

Office Use
Date Received
Check Number
Amount $ - -""-'---=-......,;_----e,.~~=--'--,-+--00
Company Number

IDA'HO ..--Df.;PARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Diy±ffion of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625

(Please print any corrections)
Ai:>PLICATION FQR . REN~WAL R~GlS'l'~'I'ION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS ;la 11
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS

DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

· E \V E o company Number .. 278
REC
Phone .. (208) 344-4468

JAN - 5 20"
pt.AN1 INDUSTRIES

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ..
Late Product Fees Due
Total Fees Remitted ............... .

$
$

200.00

$

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration - fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later t _h an February 1 of each year (Idaho <:;ode 22-2205 (6)) .
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees ~nd denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are . submitting a · revised .label on the e~closed ·
· APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each

woote-der/:D(f/2
v

f ied with the

current

Cab anslysi

( s±~(ure Required

p,o f'

Title

r

Please Print or Type Name Clearly ) ·

3

· Date

This application must be accompanied -by .the product registration list on reverseside,
showing the product (s) you wish to register in I ·d ah'o.
Please· return this_ application
form to the above address.
A certificate of registration will be returned to you up.on
approval.

000201

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg), lead (Pb). and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure,
bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative 1-1astes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments inc 1ude those derived from an i ndustri a1 byproduct. coproduct or other materi a1 that would other1-1i se
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503, as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exemrt from the requirements of-_providing aJab a.nalysis Qf: no~nutritive metals: ..
Biosolids. composted manure, bone meal, blood meal, fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.

(2 Products)
Page 2
Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Renew

SC
GM

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No

No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000202

~

STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OP AGRICULTURE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2010 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 2050
Certificate Date

: 01/26/2010

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2010.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2010 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idahe

Certificate Number: 2050
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 01/26/2010
Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Status

SC
GM

A
A

000204

Page 2

Office Use Q
Date Received - - - -/,
,,-+'r--,'c....+-....--1,- Check Number
Amount$
Company Number

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRI CULTURE
Divi sion o f Plant Indust r i e s
P . O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332 - 8625

(Please print any corrections)
APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMME~CIA~.
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS c;J.0/U
BLACK DI AMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS

DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

RECEIVED

Company Number .. 278
Phone .. (208) 344-4468

JAN 2 5 2010
PLANT INDUSTRIES

Registration Fees Due for Renewals.
Late Product Fees Due
Total Fees Remitted ... .. .. . . ..... .

200.00

$
$
$

2...00.<;G:...

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual ·renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with .this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF :NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials ·listed for and on behalf of t hP. r.Pg i str~rrt; ~h~r 0 ~~~
waste - derived product is identified with the current lab analysis

/l
~

/I~

a6Zi.reRequired

( Please Print or Type Name Clearly

Hrl~p.

VTitle

Date

'

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000205

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg). lead (Pb). and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure.
bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.

(2 Products)
Page 2
Renew

Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

SC
GM

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No
No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000206

~p.'l S!:4{

~~

~g-ST Av-R~E (QF IDAHO

0
;

DElPARTfr\lENT Of AGRliCULTURE

C.I.. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Dirccto1

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208 )'344-446 8

2009 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 1862
Certificate Date

: 03/26/2009

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2009.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (2 08) 332 -862 0

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2009 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Id~o

Certificate Number: 1862
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 03/26/2009
Product Name

LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS

Page=.

Status

SC
GM

A

A

000208

\

l"

.,

Office Use Only
Date Received
Check Number ~=---~
(o ~
h3~ - - - Amount
I~ o+- c900.(X)

IDJ'iliO ~ E.PARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Di~ ision of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone {208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

RECEIVED

Company Number .. 278
Phone .. {208)344 - 4468

FEB - 9 2009

PLANT INDUSTRIES
Registration Fees Due for Renewals .......
Late Product Fees Due .... . ..............
Credit On Account .. .... .................
Total ?ees Remi~ted

$
200.00
$
$
15.00
$ _ ,~<f:a~S'_

Remittance payable to the: Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant .and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10 . 00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)) .
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit . labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW_OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the . enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the .information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste-derived product is identified with the current lab analysis

~~ed

J

Pvet/itle

Please Print or Type Name Clearly)
This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address . A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000209

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg). lead (Pb), and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure.
bone meal, blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option, but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.

(2 Products)
Page 2
Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS ·OR~MIC LEAF COMPOST-

Renew

SC
GM

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No

No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000210

Idaho Statutes
TITLE 22
AGRICULTURE AND HORTICULTURE
CHAPTER 22
SOIL AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
22-2205.
PRODUCTS -- REGISTRATION REQUIRED . (1) Each separately
identifiable soil amendment or plant amendment product shall be registered
before being distributed in this state. The application for registration
shall be submitted to the department on a form furnished by the department,
and shall be accompanied by a nonrefundable fee of one hundred dollars ($100)
per product and a label of each product , unless a current label is on file at
the department . Companies planning to mix customer formu l a soil amendments or
plant amendments shall include the statement " customer formula mixes" under
the "products" column on the registration application form. Upon approval by
the department, a certificate of registration shall be furnished to the
applicant.
(2)
In determining whether a label statement of an ingredient is
appropriate , the department may require the submission of a written statement
describing the method of laboratory analysis used, the source of all
ingredient material and any reference material relied on to support the label
statement or guarantee of the ingredients.
(3)
Upon receipt of a complete application for registration of a
product, the department may test and analyze an official sample of the
product to determine whether the contents of the official sample conform to
the label. In his discretion, the director may also require an applicant for
registration of a soil amendment or a plant amendment to submit any data
concerning the efficacy or safety of the product for its intended use.
(4)
Refusal to register, denial , suspension.
(a)
If it appears to the director that composition of the soil amendment
or plant amendment does not warrant the proposed claims for it, or if the
soil amendment or plant amendment and its labeling or other material
required to be submitted do not comply with this chapter or rules adopted
under this chapter, the director shall notify the applicant of the manner
in which the soil amendment or plant amendment labeling or other material
required to be submitted fails to comply with this chapter so as to give
the applicant an opportunity to make the necessary corrections. If the
applicant does not make the required changes within ninety (90) days from
the receipt of the notice, the director may refuse to register the soil
amendment or plant amendment. The applicant may request a hearing as
provided in the administrative procedure act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code .
(b)
When the director determines that a soil amendment or plant
amendment or its labeling does not comply with this chapter or rules adopted
under this chapter, or when necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment, the director may refuse to register or may suspend,
revoke or modify the registration of the soil amendment or plant amendment
in accordance with the provisions of the administrative procedure act ,
chapter 52, title 67 , Idaho Code.
(5)
Registrations are effective through the last day of the calendar
year in which they are issued . If a registration is being renewed, the

000211

director may suspend the requirement that a soil amendment or plant amendment
be analyzed if there is no material change in the label for the product.
(6)
If the application for renewal of the soil amendment or plant
amendment registration provided for in this section is not submitted before
February 1 of any one (1) year, a penalty of ten dollars ($10.00) per product
sha11· be assessed and added to the original fee.
The applicant shall pay the
penalty before the renewal soil amendment or plant amendment registration may
be issued.
(7)
Any waste-derived soil amendment or waste-derived plant amendment
distributed as a single ingredient product or blended with other soil
amendments or plant amendment ingredients must be identified as "wastederived soil amendment or plant amendment" by the applicant in the
application for registration;
(8)
An applicant applying to register a waste-derived soil amendment or
plant amendment shall state in the application the concentration of metals or
metalloids including, but not limited to, arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury
(Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se). The applicant shall provide a laboratory
report or other documentation verifying the levels of the metals or
metalloids in the waste-derived soil amendment or plant amendment.
(9)
A distributor is not required to register a soil amendment or plant
amendment product that is already registered under this chapter, so long as
the label remains unchanged.

The Idaho Code is made available on the Internet by the Idaho Legislature as a public service.
This Internet version of the Idaho Code may not be used for commercial purposes, nor may this
database be published or repackaged for commercial sale without express written permission.

Search the Idaho Statutes
Available Reference: Search Instructions .

The Idaho Code is the property of the state ofIdaho, and is copyrighted by Idaho law, IC. § 9350. According to Idaho law, any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for
commercial purposes in violation of the provisions of this statute shall be deemed to be an
infringer of the state ofIdaho's copyright.
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director may suspend the requirement that a soil amendment or plant amendment
be analyzed if there is no material change in the label for the product.
(6)
If the application for renewal of the soil amendment or plant
amendment registration provided for in this section is not submitted before
February 1 of any one (1) year, a penalty of ten dollars ($10.00) per product
shall be assessed and added to the original fee.
The applicant shall pay the
penalty before the renewal soil amendment or plant amendment registration may
be issued.
(7)
Any waste-derived soil amendment or waste-derived plant amendment
distributed as a single ingredient product or blended with other soil
amendments or plant amendment ingredients must be identified as "wastederived soil amendment or plant amendment" by the applicant in the
application for registration.
(8) An applicant applying to register a waste-derived soil amendment or
plant amendment shall state in the application the concentration of metals or
metalloids including, but not limited to, arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury
(Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se). The applicant shall provide a laboratory
report or other documentation verifying the levels of the metals or
metalloids in the waste-derived soil amendment or plant amendment.
(9) A distributor is not required to register a soil amendment or plant
amendment product that is already registered under this chapter, so long as
the label remains unchanged.

The Idaho Code is made available on the Internet by the Idaho Legislature as a public service.
This Internet version of the Idaho Code may not be used for commercial purposes, nor may this
database be published or repackaged for commercial sale without express written permission.

Search the Idaho Statutes
Available Reference: Search Instructions.
The Idaho Code is the property of the state ofIdaho, and is copyrighted by Idaho law, 1 C. § 9350. According to Idaho law, any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for
commercial purposes in violation of the provisions of this statute shall be deemed to be an
infringer of the state ofIdaho's copyright.
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David R. Gibson
Black Diamond Compost Products
3000 Rose Hill
Boise, ID 87305

RECEIVED

MAR 1 9 2009
PLANT INDUSTRIES

To: Rick Killabrew
Dear Rick:
This letter is to memorialize our conversation regarding late fees charged
to me on the second half 2008 tonnage report and the annual label renewal for
2009.
On 29 January 2009, my wife mailed the above mentioned report and
application, in the same envelope, from the Key Bank on Orchard & Overland,
where she works. All Bank branch mail is picked up daily by the carrier.
The chain of possession from this point is: the mail carrier picks up the
mail and takes it to the Post Office on Federal Way. Sometimes, if the carrier
has an overage of mail, it is left in a transfer box where it will be picked up by
another employee to be taken to Federal Way. From here it is taken to the Post
Office on Cole Road to be run through post marking machines where this
envelope, somehow, did not get post marked until 6 February, 2009, more than
a full week later.
When I spoke to Post Office employees, I was told that the mail is
dumped from bin to bin, transported and put into machinery. They told me that
mail does get lost and stuck along the way. When they find it they make note
of it.
My wife left for Seattle on the 4 th of February and therefore, it was not a
case that she simply mailed it late.
I am also aware of other mail problems experienced near the same period
of time.

It is my position that said report and application were mailed timely and
no late fees are due and therefore will not be paid.
If affidavits are needed, they will be supplied.
Thanks for your help on this matter, Rick.
Since

y,

_,,,,,-

Yi'7.---I_,,
.&

Dave Gibson
Black Diamond Compost Products
000214

ST A TE OF IDAHO
DlEPARTMlENT OF AGRICULTURE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2008 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 1644
Certificate Date

: 02/19/2008

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2008.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 332-8620

000215
2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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2008 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 1644
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 02/19/2008
Product Name
LEAF MOLD
All NATURAL HIGH HUMUS ORGANIC LEAF COMPOST

Page 2

Status
SC
GM

A
A

000216
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

Office Use Only
Date Received
Check Number
Amount $ <~
Company Number
78

Ja '-[$ ~ o?ti O

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

RECEIVED

Company Number .. 278
Phone .. (208) 344 - 4468

FEB\ 9 2008
PLANT INDUSTRIES

Registration Fees Due for Renewals .... . ..
Late Product Fees Due . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Credit On Account ................. . .....
Total Fees Remitted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~$
$

200 . 00
7-D

$

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registra'f ion fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10 . 00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22 - 2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the mat e rials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in additi o n that net weight,
content analy sis ( %), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste - deri
product is identi ied with the current lab analysis

1'itle

Please Print or Type Name Clearly

bate

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wis h to register in Idaho . Please return this application
form to the above address.
A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000217

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg). lead (Pb). and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure.
bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.
(2 Products)
Page 2

Product Name
LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS ORGANIC LEAF COMPOST

Renew
SC
GM

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No

No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000218

ST A TE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF AGR.KGUJLTUJRE

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor
CELIA R. GOULD
Director

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2007 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 1450
Certificate Date

: 05/01/2007

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2007.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 8370 I • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov

000219

2007 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 1450
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 05/01/2007
Product Name

LEAF MOLD
ALL NATURAL HIGH HUMUS ORGANIC LEAF.COMPOST

Page 2

Status

GM

A
A

000220

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

Office Use Only
Date Received
Check Number of S :J b
Amount $
/fJ-t) ~ c:lVO '
Company Number
278

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

f\ E. C

E.\ \ c i r2any Number .. 278
P - Ile

.. (208) 344-4468

f.\~~ ·, L 1~
~s,f\\E.S

?'-"tr, ,~o

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due ................... $
Total Fees Remitted ..................... $

100.00

tD

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enc_losed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each

waste-da ? ~fied with the current iab_a_n~~-1-~_ s _ i _ s ~ - - - - - - - - - -

( Signature Required

Title

/ 2This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval .

000221

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg). lead (Pb). and selenium (Se) .
The follov1ing v1aste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis : biosolids. composted manure.
bone meal . blood meal. fish emulsion . vegetative v1astes . food wastes and nev1 gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites .
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct . coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended .
The follov1ing waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals :
Biosolids. composted manure . bone meal. blood meal , fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food v1astes and nevi gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.
(1 Product)
Page 2
Product Name

LEAF MOLD

Renew

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No

No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.

000222

{I

'

Mail to: IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
Commercial Fertilizer Section
PO Box 790
Boise, ID 83701

ISDA Office Use Only

Telephone: (208) 332-8625
Fax Number: (208) 334-2283
Web Site: http://www.agri.idaho.gov

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL

f'

PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS
Compaoy,

B j.,,_f (2, -I.M)Cx;t<!:!Sj

Contact: _ _...V
'--""
q"""u=-----.-.-;: ·

_G
=--....< """"'"-~- =-_._--. ......,--

Mailing Address:

3,c:oo

/?o~

(/

City, State, Zip:

l's::>, SL LJ

)1 S, ? 0

Phone#:.._(.,..2=
0....,£}""'--_'S>
-"--'-/
----'--_(_ ,,,.-_

RO J R,gisfrant#,_2-----a-J_{l_f_ ....._/

- - - - Email: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Web Address:

C~?-::,/ 0',
I'),

~

>--..

c_r
___i-(
_.__G
= -~- - -

j__ ~;
-(

Fax#:.....__.....____ _ _ __ _ _ _

$-

(Number of)_.../__ New Products

~+f-O
~ O~_-__ ($l00 each)

(Number of) _ _ _ Revised Labels
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ($ I 00 each)
{No fee for products where annual renewal fee was paid, unless registration was previously denied)
Late Fees for Late Renewal of all Revised Product Labels
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ($IO/product)
(Late fee is due on renewal registrations of all revised products received after February l st of each year)

~oo ·--

Total Fees Remitted

$ _ _~ - - - - - -

Please make remittances payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture - Feed and Fertilizer Section.

z:d

I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and every
package of the materials listed on this product registration form will be labeled as described (in addition to net weight,
ingredient list, manufacturer's name and address, and application directions will be shown); that the attached declarations are

tho

" "' " Z

(Si..

~

a "i,O
d-~

ic,I compo,mon oftho material,

Oa d 12 c;, l~M.-

c2,
(Please Print or Type Name Clearly)
►

on behalf of tho regfatrant.

-{T_i_tl-e)~~-~------------

(Date)

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, applicable registration
fees, current lab analysis of waste-derived products and a current copy of the product label for each of the products
listed on this application.

000223

4

1.1
~~

·1

I•

Product Listing, Page 2
•

Chapter 22, Title 22, Section 22-2205(7), Idaho Code, states: "Any waste-derived soil amendment or waste-derived plant amendment distributed as
a single ingredient product or blended with other soil amendments or plant amendment ingredients must be identified as "waste-derived soil
amendment or plant amendment'' by the applicant in the application for registration." Applications including waste-derived products must be
accompanied by complete lab analysis, including but not limited to: arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se).

•

The following waste-derived products are exempt from this requirement: biosolids, composted manure, bone and blood meal, fish emulsion,
vegetative and food wastes, and .!!fil! gypsum boards (not collected from demolition sites).

PLEASE COMPLETE THE INFORMATION BELOW FOR EACH PRODUCT:

.j -=

or Liquid

1. Brand Name:

D

U-

Product Name:
Packa e Sizes in Net Wei ht:

2. Brand Name:

Is this roduct waste-derived?

Dry

D

YesONo

orLiguid

W

D

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

3. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

D

Yes

D No D

orLiquid

D

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

4. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

D

Yes D No

orLiguid

D

D

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

5. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

D

Yes

D No 0

orLiquid

D

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

6. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry

D

Yes

D No D

orLiquid

D

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

Is this product waste-derived?

Yes

D No D

Please copy this page to list additional products. Be sure to provide all of the required information.

000224

ST A TE -O F IDAHO
DIEPAlRTMIEITT OF AGlRICULTUlRIE

JAMES E. RISCH
Governor

PATRICK A. TAKASUGI
Director I Secretary

BLAC~ DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208) 344-4468

2006 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 1260
Certificate Date

: 07/12/2006

Director of Agriculture
Patrick A . Takasugi

Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2006.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

000225
2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov

2006 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 1260
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 07/12/2006
Product Name

LEAF MOLD

Page 2

Status
A

000226

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

Office Use Only
Date Received
1, ~/0~
Check Number
~~.O >Amount $ II D ~.E.
~ 11 s~~
Company Number
278
c)

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83 705

Company Number . . 278
Phone .. (208)344 - 4468

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due ................... $
Total Fees Remitted . .................... $

100.00
10.00
I (O .OD

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year (Idaho Code 22-2205(6)) .
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration.
Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
compositior. cf. th-= :nateria).s listed for and 0.:1 beba].f of the :::-eg:!..t!trant.;

w a s t e - d ~ f i e d with the current lab_a_n_a_l_y_~_i_~_o_ J,{J
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

( Signature Required

Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

'Title

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address.
A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.

000227

Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd) . mercury (Hg), lead (Pb). and selenium (Se) .
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis : biosolids . composted manure ,
bone meal . blood meal, fish emulsion . vegetative wastes ; food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites .
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct . coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option . but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under t he code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503 . as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals :
Biosolids. composted manure . bone meal. blood meal . fish emulsion . vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.
(1 Product)
Page 2
Product Name
LE?\.P MOLD

Renew

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No
Ne.,

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column .
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form .

000228

STATE OF IDAHO

J f

r

DlEPAIRTMlENT OF AGlRHGUlLTUIRE

I
DIRK KEMPTHORNE
Governor

PATRICK A. TAKASUGI
Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

05 CERJ"IFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
Certificate Number : 1044
Certificate Date

: 03/21 /05

Director of Agriculture
Patrick A. Takasugi
Under authority of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 05.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : (208) 332-8620

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500

000229

'

c'

05 SOIL

&

PLANT AMENDMENTS Certified for Sale in Idaho

Certificate Number: 1044
Registrant Company Number 278
Certificate Date 03/21/05
Product Name
LEAF MOLD

Page 2

Status
A

000230

..

Mail to: IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
Commercial Fertilizer Section

ISDA Office Use Only

ECtlVEO

PO Box790 .
Boise, ID 83701

MAR \ l 2005

Telephone: (208) 332-8625
Fax Number: (208) 334-2283
Email: ewilliams@a!!Ti.state.id.us
Web Site: http://www.idahoag.us

INDUSlRI S

IOl

r

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCI~
PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS
Company:

{3 /4~ L

/) r q n-c

,Tkf

L

~

f /?oef.

<!:I.)'$

.

SOIL OR

ff.P/rv v~
3

Registrant#:

A~

-/ l-.. OJ-

{)Q.~
Cn~s~
Email: _ _ _ __ __
_
0
Mailing Address: _A
__':_-=._-1-,..;;;Bv~:_:._-:_ir-d_-=._-1rib
_~~~~:_
~=:_"=..
__~.,.~
-c:._~":_:_~:_-=-____ web Address: - - - -- - - - City, State, Zip:
160 I ~ .T_ ~ Lo
Phone#: ( Z 03l > Ve/
YY G~
Fax#: ( --->=::Contact:

e_
·' ° "

(Number of) _ _,./_ New Products

$

too

($HJO each)

(Number of) _ _ _ Revised Labels
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ($ 100 each)
<No fee for products where annual renewal fee was paid. unless registration was previously denied)

Late Fees for Late Renewal of all Revised Product Labels
$._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ($10/product)
(Late fee is due on renewal registrations of all revised products received after February I st of each year)
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Total Fees Remitted .

Please make remittances payable to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture - Feed and Fertilizer Section.
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and correct in every respect; that each and ev_ery
package of '1te materials listed on this product registration form will be labeled as described (in addition to net weight,
ingredient list. manufacturer's name and address, and application directio~ will be shown); that the attached declarations are the
e applicant as to the
composition of the materials listed for and on behalfof the regi,_t

guaran?

Ao/-'

(Title)

(Please Print or Type Name qearly) ..
►

(Date)

This a pplication must be accompanied by the product registration list on the reverse side, applicable registration
fees, current lab analysis or waste-derived products and a current copy or the product label for each of the products
listed on this application.

000231

Product Listing, Page 2
•

Chapter 22, Title 22, Section 22-2205(7), Idaho Code, states: "Any waste-derived soil amendment or waste-derived plant amendment distributed as
11 single ingredient product or blended with other soil amendments or plant amendment ingredients must be
identified as "waste-derived soil
11.1mndment or plant 11IDendment" by the applicant in the applic11tion for registration." Applications including waste-derived products must be
accompanied by complete lab analysis, including but not limited to: arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products arc exempt from this requirement: biosolids;composted manure, bone and blood meal, fish emulsion,
vegetative and food wastes, and fil.lf gypsum boards (not collected from demolition sites).

PLEASE COMPLETE THE INFORMATION BELOW FOR EACH PRODUCT:
I. Brand Name:

{:'CD bvt... 'S

f

!~Ju.. ~vi S

Dry 01 Liguiff?,

Product Name:
Packa e Sizes in Net Wei ht:

2. Brand Name:

- /7

v

+F-

Is this roduct waste-derived?

V') 0

Dry or Liquid?

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:
3. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry or Liquid?

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

4. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry or Liquid?

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

5. Brand Name:

Is this product waste-derived?

Dry or Liquid?

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

6. Brand Name:

Is thisproduct waste-derived?

Dry or Liquid?

Product Name:
Package Sizes in Net Weight:

Is this product waste-derived?

Please copy this page to list additional products. Be sure to provide all of the required information.

000232

0

STATE OF IDAHO
lDlElP AlRTMlENT OF AGJRJICULTUlRlE

JAMES E. RISCH
Governor

PATRICK A. TAKASUGI
Director / Secretary

June 29, 2006

CERTIFIED MAIL# 7005 1160 0000 1541 8250
Electronic Tracking

Dave Gibson
c/o Black Diamond Compost Products
3000 Rosehill
Boise, ID 93705
Mr. Gibson:

Due to the lack of response to our letter of 5/10/06 outlining registration renewal requirements,
the Idaho State Department of Agriculture can only assume that Black Diamond Compost
Products chooses to no longer conduct business in Idaho. As such, and in accordance with Idaho
Code§ 22-2217 STOP-SALE ORDERS, the product previously registered by Black Diamond
Compost Products has been identified to the Department's field inspection staff as unregistered
products and are to be Stop-Sale Ordered whenever and wherever found.
Unregistered products sold, offered for sale of, or the otherwise distributed in or into Idaho may
be assessed a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each offense.
If you have any questions regarding these actions, I may be reached at ISDA by phone at
208.332.8697.

Richard Killebrew, Program Specialist/ Compliance Auditor
Plant Industries Division
Idaho State Department of Agriculture
208.332.8697 - Phone
208.334.2283 - Fax
rkillebrew@idahoag.us- email

2270 Old Penitentiaiy Road• P.O . Box· 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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ST A TE OF IDAHO
lDEPARTMlENT OP AGllUCULTUlRlE

(

)

\

J
DIRK KEMPTHORNE
Governor

PATRICK A. TAKASUGI
Director

May 10, 2006
CERTIFIED MAIL NO: 7003 0500 0003 1973 0804
ONLINE TRACKING
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705
RE:

Soil & Plant Amendments 2006 Renewal
Company Number: 278

Ladies and Gentlemen:
The Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA) has not received an Application for
Renewal Registration of Commercial Soil Amendments and Plant Amendments for the
2006 registration period from your company
Unregistered Soil & Plant Amendment products sold or offered for sale by your firm are
in violation of the Idaho Soil & Plant Amendment Law, Chapter 22 Title 6, Section 22"'.
2205 ( 1) and may be subject to a "Stop Sale Order'' and/or fines. If you wish to continue
to sell Soil & Plant Amendment products in Idaho during the current registration year,
please send the required forms and payment to the ISDA within two weeks of receipt of
this letter. Pursuant to Idaho Soil & Plant Amendment Law, Chapter 22, Title 6, $ection
22-2205 (6), please include a late fee of ten dollars ($10.00) per product with your Soil &
Plant Amendment renewal, and reference to your company number listed .above to
assure proper credit.
If your company is no longer selling Soil & Plant Amendment ·in the state of Idaho,
please contact the ISDA in writing, so we can mark your company registration as
discontinued .
Below is a fee schedule to assist you in computing renewal fees due;!:
- ,.:.

Registration

Associated Fees

Product Registration

$100.00 each per year

Product Registration Late Fee

$10.00 per produ_ct -

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500

.~

000234

'.
Mail required documents and fees to:
Idaho State Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
Feed & Fertilizer Section
PO Box790
Boise, ID 83701

If you have any questions regarding the above information, please contact the Commercial
Feed Section at (208) 332-8697.
Sincerely,

Q,__/::.,_.? ~ ~
Richard Killebrew, Program Specialist/ Compliance Auditor
Plant Industries Division
Idaho State Department of Agriculture
208.332.8697 - Phone
208.334.2283 - Fax
rkillebr@idahoag.us - email

000235

f

C
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D
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D

U.S. Postal Service™
CERTIFIED MAIL™ RECEIPT
(Domestic Mail Only; No Insurance Coverage Provided)

P"pstmark
1-jete

' '
'

rn

D r=-.-.., - - - - - - - - - ---.,1--- - --

~ ~~<!f,..,P-2
or PO Box No•.,
Staie, ZJP+4

city;

------

J '

-'I-- -"'---'-

··- ··· ··· · ··· ········ · · ··-················· ······ . •

PS Form 3800, June 2002

See Reverse for lnslructions

Search Results
Label/Receipt Number: 7003 0500 0003 1973 0804
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 10:46 am on May 13, 2006 in BOISE, ID
83705.

000236

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

Office Use Only
Date Received
Check Number
Amount$
Company Number
278

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMMERCIAL
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Company Number .. 278
Phone .. (208)344-4468

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ....... $
Late Product Fees Due ................... $
Total Fees Remitted ..................... $

100.00
10.00

Remittance payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.00 per product for commercial plant and soil
amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A late fee penalty of $10.00 will be assesed
for each product renewal filed later than February 1 of each year {Idaho Code 22-2205(6)).
Incomplete renewals will be returned and become subject to late fees and denial of
registration. Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF NEW OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New or revised labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing on the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as described (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer's name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of the registrant; that each
waste-derived product is identified with the current lab analysis

( Signature Required)

( Please Print or Type Name Clearly)

Title

Date

This application must be accompanied by the product registration list on reverse side,
showing the product(s) you wish to register in Idaho.
Please return this application
form to the above address. A certificate of registration will be returned to you upon
approval.
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Product Renewal Listing
Fill out this product list completely and include a lab analysis for each waste-derived amendment that states the level
of nonnutritive metals. including but not limited to arsenic (As). cadmium (Cd). mercury (Hg), lead (Pb). and selenium (Se).
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirement of providing a lab analysis: biosolids. composted manure.
bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board that is not taken from demolition sites.
Waste derived amendments include those derived from an industrial byproduct. coproduct or other material that would otherwise
be disposed of if a market for refuse were not an option. but does not include amendments derived from biosolids or biosolid
products regulated under the code of federal regulations. 40 CFR 503. as amended.
The following waste-derived products are exempt from the requirements of providing a lab analysis of nonnutritive metals:
Biosolids. composted manure. bone meal. blood meal. fish emulsion. vegetative wastes. food wastes and new gypsum board (not
collected from demolition sites.
(1 Product)
Page 2
Product Name
LEAF MOLD

Renew

Delete

Waste
Derived
Yes / No
No

Please indicate which products you wish to RENEW and DELETE in the appropriate column.
Please submit new or revised products on the enclosed application form.
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In your garden as a mulch, or tilled in, just one-half inch or more will produce
outstanding results or use as a top dressing for greener, healthier lawns.
"MANURE FREE NON-BURNING FORMULATION!"
You can use as much as you like
All Natural nutrient rich Ingredients: Leaves, lawn clippings and Jen than 1% woodwaste. Specially aged over 8 years. COMPARE
Ph Neutral

Average E.C.
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All Natural

High Humus
Organic leaf compost - aged more than a
decade to produce humus. Add to potted
plants or your garden. Top dress or till in for
unmatched soil and plant health.
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Natures Miracle
2 Qt.

Black Diamond Compost Products • 5120 W. Overland Rd PMB# 102 • Boise, ID 83705
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ST A TE OF JIDAHO
JAMES E. RISCH

DlEPARTMlENT OF AGRICULTURlE

Governor

PATRICK A. TAKASUGI
Director / Secretary

June 29, 2006

CERTIFIED MAIL# 7005116000001541 8250
Electronic Tracking

Dave Gibson
c/o Black Diamond Compost Products
3000 Rosehill
Boise, ID 93705
Mr. Gibson:
Due to the lack of response to our letter of 5/10/06 outlining registration renewal requirements,
the Idaho State Department of Agriculture can only assume that Black Diamond Compost
Products chooses to no longer conduct business in Idaho. As such, and in accordance with Idaho
Code § 22-2217 STOP-SALE ORDERS, the product previously registered by Black Diamond
Compost Products has been identified to the Department's field inspection staff as unregistered
products and are to be Stop-Sale Ordered whenever and wherever found.
Unregistered products sold, offered for sale of, or the otherwise distributed in or into Idaho may
be assessed a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each offense.

If you have any questions regarding these actions, I may be reached at ISDA by phone at
208.332.8697.

Richard Killebrew, Program Specialist/ Compliance Auditor
Plant Industries Division
Idaho State Department of Agriculture
208.332.8697 - Phone
208.334.2283 - Fax
rkillebrew@idahoag.us- email

2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov
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Richard J. Killebrew
From:

Richard J. Killebrew

Sent:

Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:07 AM

To:

Brad Newbry; Brad Saito; Christine Braumiller; Gary Smith; Julia Chavez-Reynoso; Mark E. Barnes; Rod
Andreasen; Suzanne Pfeffer

Cc:

Eoin B. Davis; Garry West; Mike Cooper

Subject: Unregistered Products
After receiving proper notification, the following company(s) has failed to renew the registration(s) of their products. Should you
find any of the listed products during the course of your routine marketplace inspections; the following identified products may be
Stop-Saled whenever and wherever found:
FERTILIZERS :
Sulfegro
Sandy, UT
Sulfegro Granular Iron/Zinc Sulfate
Sulfegro Liquid Iron/Zinc Sulfate

SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS:

U.S. Postal Servicem
D
LI")

CERTIFIED MAILm RECEIPT

ru

(Domestic Mall Only; No Insurance Coverage Provided)
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Black Diamond Compost Products
Boise, ID
Leaf Mold

Postage
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□

$
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Magic 100 Powersoil, Inc
Nampa, ID
Magic 100 Enriched Powersoil
Magic 100 Organic

L__~ l-4~~:....:::::=--=:::::::=:::::~~ ....:_~ :::.::::e::....~ - _j

,....::i

Certified Fee

0

·

Return Receipt Fee
(Endorsement Required)
Restricted Delivery Fee t - - - - - - - - t

..II (Endorsement Required)
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,....::i

------

Total Postage & Fees

$ ').. - ·

Soil Conditioners, Inc
Zillah, WA
El Toro Composted Steer Manure
Grow earth Premium Organic Compost
Grow Earth Premium Organic Potting Soil
Rainbow's End Superior Potting Soil

If anyone has any questions regarding these companies or products, my number in Boise is 332.8697.
Rick Killebrew
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ST A TE OP IDAHO
DEPARTMENT Of' AGRICULTURE

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD

September 17, 2007

Director

CERTIFIED MAIL NO: 7005 1160 0000 1507 4531
ONLINE TRACKING
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705
RE:

Soil & Plant Amendments Tonnage Report(s)
Company Number: 278

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:
The Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA) has not received 1H07 tonnage report(s)
from your company.
Please send the completed report(s) with the appropriate fees and late collection fees within two
weeks of receipt of this letter to avoid a "Stop Sale Order'' and/or fines by the ISDA. Pursuant
to the Idaho Commercial Soil & Plant Amendment Law, Section 22-2208(3), Idaho Code a
tonnage report not filed and inspection fee not paid within thirty days after the end of the
specified filing period is assessed a collection fee of ten percent (10%) of the amount due, or
twenty-five dollars ($25.00), whichever is greater.
Mail required documents and fees to:
Idaho State Department of Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
Feed & Fertilizer Section
PO Box 790
Boise, ID 83701

If you have any questions regarding the above information, please contact the Commercial
Feed Section at (208) 332-8697.
Sincerely,

a✓~l-£_{)

~{,_ ~

Richard Killebrew, Section Manager I Compliance Auditor
Plant Industries Division
208.332.8697 - Phone
208.334.2283 - Fax
rkillebrew@agri.idaho.gov - email
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Electronically Filed
10/11/2016 1:41:53 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
)
LLC.
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff, through the Office of the Idaho Attorney General respectfully submits the
following Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
The Defendants operate a business that engages in composting various organic materials
on property located south of the Boise Airport. On December 4, 2015 the Plaintiff, Department
of Environmental Quality (the Department) filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the
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Defendants were operating an unauthorized Tier II solid waste processing facility in violation of
the Solid Waste Management Rules (Rules), IDAPA 58.01.06. et. seq. Defendants’ Answer to
the Amended Complaint largely admits the allegations of the complaint but asserts numerous
defenses. The primary theme of the Defendants’ Answer is that the facility is not subject to the
Rules due to the Defendants’ interpretation of exclusions in the Rules, and that the Department’s
authority is preempted or is otherwise void for various reasons. Each defense is without merit,
and as set forth below and supported by the accompanying affidavits, the Department is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
I.R.C.P. 56(a). In the present case, the Defendants have not requested a jury trial in accordance
with I.R.C.P. 38. Therefore, this Court is the trier of fact and, as such, need not draw inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272,
1275 (1991). The court may instead make the most probable inferences from the undisputed
evidence properly before it and grant summary judgment even if conflicting inferences are
possible. Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233,
235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001).
APPLICABLE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The Idaho Legislature has given the Department, through the Idaho Board of
Environmental Quality (Board), authority to promulgate rules “as may be necessary to deal with
problems related to … solid waste disposal and licensure and certification requirements pertinent
thereto.” Idaho Code § 39-105(2). “Solid Waste Disposal” is defined as: “the collection,
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storage, treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste.” Idaho Code § 39103(14) (emphasis added). And, “Solid Waste” is defined as:
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid material,
including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community
activities but does not include solid or dissolved material in
domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources,
such as silt, dissolved or suspended solids in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved material in irrigation return flows or other
common water pollutants.
Idaho Code § 39-103(13) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to this authority, the Department promulgated rules relating to solid waste
management at IDAPA 58.01.06. et. seq. which were approved by the Idaho Legislature by
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 109 (SCR 109). See 2003 Idaho Sess. L. p. 1035. The
structure of these rules can be summarized as follows: facilities that manage solid waste are
divided into four categories: (1) Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) Facilities; (2) Tier I
Facilities; (3) Tier II Facilities; and (4) Tier III Facilities. IDAPA 58.01.06.009. Each category is
defined by the type and amount of material it handles and each is subject to differing levels of
regulatory oversight. BRC Facilities are exclusively “processing facilities” that at any given time
have less than 300 cubic yards of waste material on site and which do not handle petroleum
contaminated soil or “pumpable waste.” See IDAPA 58.01.06.009.01. A Tier I facility is either
a landfill managing less than 2,000 cubic yards of material that is not likely to form leachate, or a
processing facility managing less than 600 cubic yards of wastes “including, but not limited to,
untreated or unpainted wood, yard waste, sheet rock, clean paper products, animal manures, plant
or crop residues, or garbage without meats or animal fats,…” IDAPA 58.01.06.009.02.b.
(emphasis added). A Tier II facility is defined to include either a landfill or a processing facility
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that exceeds the respective 2,000 and 600 cubic yard thresholds for a Tier I facility so long as
type/form of those wastes do not trigger the applicability of Tier III status. IDAPA
58.01.06.009.03.a and b. Finally, a Tier III facility is a facility that, regardless of volume, is
“landfilling or disposing” of (1) any Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generator (CESQG)
hazardous waste, (2) materials with high human pathogenic potential, (3) waste with a potential
to form toxic leachate or gas; or (4) any other facility managing solid waste in a manner likely to
pose a substantial risk to human health or the environment.
Important for this case, a “Composting Facility” is specifically defined to be a
“Processing Facility.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005.05. And “Processing Facility” is defined to mean “a
facility that uses biological or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for reuse,
excluding waste handling at transfer stations or recycling centers.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32.
(emphasis added). The clear language of these Rules demonstrates that a facility composting
solid waste including yard waste, crop or plant residue in volumes greater that 600 cubic yards is
a Tier II Processing Facility and must meet the regulatory requirements associated with that
status. A Tier II Facility must submit a siting application and an operating plan to the
Department for approval, (IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02 and .04) demonstrating compliance with
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.
Also important for purposes of this case and the Defendants’ affirmative defenses, the
Rules exclude certain materials from the definition of “solid waste.” Specifically, the Rules
exclude: “Manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates”
(IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii.) and “any agricultural solid waste which is managed and regulated
pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture….” (IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.iii.). Facilities receiving these excluded wastes are exempt from regulation
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under the Rules, see IDAPA 58.01.06.001.04.a., as are “Backyard composting sites,” IDAPA
58.01.06.001.04.c.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
For purposes of this Motion, the Answer to First Amended Complaint (Amended
Answer) provides many admissions key to resolving this case. To the extent that the Amended
Answer is vague or confusing, the remaining issues are resolved by sworn testimony provided by
David R. Gibson and Vernon K Smith in affidavits filed in Ada County v. The Estate of Vernon
K. Smith, Victoria H. Smith and Vernon K Smith, Case No.: CVOC-1002298 (Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County) which are attached to the Affidavit of Darrell G. Early as Exhibit A
(hereinafter “Gibson Affidavit”) and Exhibit B (hereinafter “Smith Affidavit”) respectively.
1.

Defendants admit they are composting materials on a portion of the property

identified in the Complaint. Amended Answer Ninth Defense ¶3, pg.15; ¶ 7 pg. 17; Gibson
Affidavit ¶ 11-12; Smith Affidavit ¶ 7.
2.

Defendants admit that Defendant Gibson operates the facility. Amended Answer

¶3, pg. 15. Gibson Affidavit ¶ 11-12; Smith Affidavit ¶ 7.
3.

Defendants admit that Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, owns the property on

which the facility operates. Amended Answer ¶3, pg. 15; ¶ 8 pg. 18.
4.

Defendants admit they are accepting materials at the facility consisting mostly of

leaves and grass clippings. Amended Answer Ninth Defense ¶ 13, pg. 20; ¶ 15 pg. 21. Gibson
Affidavit ¶ 12.
5.

Defendants admit that they are composting the materials that are received at the

property. Amended Answer Ninth Defense ¶ 16, pg. 22. Gibson Affidavit ¶ 11-12.
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6.

Defendants admit that they have not submitted a siting application to the

Department. Amended Answer Tenth Defense ¶ 44, pg. 35.
7.

Defendants admit that they have not submitted an operating plan to the

Department. Id. ¶ 45, pg. 35.
8.

It is admitted that Defendants are composting “several thousand more yards of

humus product” on the property. Gibson Affidavit ¶ 9 pg. 5.
These admissions establish the necessary factual elements regarding the Department’s
prima facie case.
With respect to the Defendants’ affirmative defenses, the Department’s Rules, by their
plain and unambiguous language apply to the Defendants’ activities. If the Court were to find an
ambiguity, however, it is undisputed that the Department interprets its Rules to apply to the
Defendants’ activities in composting grass clippings and leaves. See Affidavit of Dean Ehlert
(Ehlert Aff.) ¶ 7 and 9, Exh. A. Indeed, the undisputed evidence shows that prior to the adoption
of the Rules by the Board in 2003, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s 1, “Solid Waste
Management Regulations and Standards” applied to composting facilities. See IDAPA
16.01.06008 (1992); Affidavit of Paula J. Wilson (Wilson Aff.), ¶ 4 Exh. A; Ehlert Aff. ¶ 5. At
the time the Board adopted the Rules in 2002, there was no intent to change the regulatory scope
of the Rules as related to composting facilities. Ehlert Aff. ¶ 6. The Department has consistently
interpreted the exclusion in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii to apply only to the actual application of
crop residue to the land at agronomic rates at the time they are so applied. Ehlert Aff. ¶ 11 and
12. The only question therefore, is whether as a matter of law, the Department’s Regulations

1

Prior to July 1, 2000, the Department of Environmental Quality was a Division of the Department of Health and
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plainly apply, or – assuming for argument’s sake there is any ambiguity – is the Department’s
interpretation reasonable and consistent with the language of the statutes and rules. With respect
the Defendants’ argument that they are regulated by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, the
undisputed evidence and the law demonstrates that they are not regulated by that agency. With
respect to the defense that the Department violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Affidavit of Paula J. Wilson establishes that the Department complied with the Administrative
Procedure Act by publishing numerous notices in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin and in the
newspaper of largest circulation. The remaining defenses are questions of law and are not
dependent upon factual evidence.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Defendants are operating a Tier II Processing Facility Without Proper
Authorization in Violation of Idaho Law.

The Amended Complaint alleges Defendants are operating a Tier II Solid Waste
Processing Facility in violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02 and .04 because they have failed to
submit the necessary documents to the Department for approval. Amended Complaint ¶ 44-45.
As noted above, Defendants have admitted this and all the other facts necessary for entry of
summary judgment—that Defendants own and operate a facility composting yard waste, crop or
plant residue in volumes greater that 600 cubic yards, which is a Tier II Processing Facility, and
that they have failed to comply with the requirements applicable to such a facility. Barring
recognition of any of the arguments advanced by the Defendants on their affirmative defenses,
the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Amended Complaint.

Welfare. See Idaho Code 39-102A; 2000 Idaho Sess. L. Ch. 132 § 39.
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2.

The Department is Entitled to Summary Judgement on the Affirmative
Defenses.

The Defendants allege seven affirmative defenses to the Complaint in Defenses Two
through Eight and Eleven. 2 These defenses can be distilled to four arguments. First, Defendants
assert that the Department’s Rules specifically exclude the “plant and crop residue” they are
composting from the definition of “solid waste” and thus, by operation of IDAPA
58.01.06.001.04.a., their facility is excluded from the Department’s regulatory authority. Second
Defense (Amended Answer pg. 3) Fifth Defense (Amended Answer pg. 5), Sixth Defense
(Amended Answer pg. 9) and Eleventh Defense (Amended Answer pg. 37). Next, the
Defendants assert that the Department’s Rules do not apply because either their composting
operations are regulated by the Department of Agriculture, and thus exempt under IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.iii, (Amended Answer pg. 37) or the Department’s authority is in some
manner preempted under the “Right to Farm Act” or the “Plant and Soil Amendment Act.”
(Amended Answer pg. 6). Thirdly, the Defendants assert either the Idaho Legislature or the
Department violated Idaho Constitution Art. III, § 17 by creating statutory and regulatory
definitions that are “technical terms.” Amended Answer pg. 3-4. Finally, Defendants assert that
the Department’s Rules violated Idaho Code § 67-5222 because Mr. Gibson claims he was not
given specific notice of the rulemaking. See Amended Answer pg. 10. Each of these affirmative
defenses is without merit.
A. The Plain Language of Department’s Rules Include Defendants’ Facility.
Administrative rules are subject to same principles of construction as are statutes.
Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 247 P.3d 644 (2011). Interpretation of

2

Defendants’ Amended Answer is not a model of clarity given its penchant for repetition and run-on sentences. This
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administrative rules should begin with an examination of the literal words of the rule. Mason v.
Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001). Words should be given their plain,
obvious and rational meaning, construed in the context of the rule and statute as a whole to give
effect to the rule and to the statutory language the rule is meant to supplement. Wheeler v. Idaho
Transp. Dep’t, 148 Idaho 378, 384, 223 P.3d 761, 766 (Ct. App. 2009); Mason, 135 Idaho at 586,
21 P.3d at 908. Where the language of a rule is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the
rule as written, without engaging in construction; if a court must engage in construction, then its
duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the promulgating entity. In re Schroeder, 147
Idaho 476, 479, 210 P.3d 584, 479 (Ct. App. 2009).
As noted above, the Idaho Legislature has given the Department broad authority to
regulate solid waste disposal, Idaho Code § 39-105(2) and included within the definition of
“solid waste disposal” the “treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste.”
See Idaho Code § 39-103(14) (emphasis added). The Definition of “solid waste” in both the
statute and the Rules broadly includes any “discarded material…” Idaho Code § 39-103(13),
IDAPA 58.01.06.005.44. A material is “discarded” once it has served its original intended
purpose and is no longer useful to its original user. Even when a waste can be reused for a
beneficial purpose, it is nonetheless considered discarded. See American Petroleum Institute v.
U.S. E.P.A., 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (waste slag intended for reclamation by a
different industry is a discarded material within the meaning of the definition of solid waste even
if valuable materials can be recovered); Ticonderoga Farms, Inc. v. County of Loudoun, et al.,
409 S.E. 2.d 446, 449 (Va. 1991) (tree prunings, leaves, brush, stumps and other organic

Motion and Memorandum, however, attempts to distill for the Court the essential defenses raised.
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materials collected and managed for composting are discarded solid waste even if they will
eventually be reused). The Defendants admit to composting grass clippings and leaves.
Amended Answer pg. 21-22. These materials served their original intended purpose and were
discarded by the original owner. It is undisputed that composting uses biological processes to
decompose the materials for reuse. See Amended Answer ¶ 32 ll. Pg. 30; Ehlert Aff. ¶ 8;
A “facility” is defined to include “any area used for any solid waste management activity,
including but not limited to: a. Storage; b. Transfer; c. Processing; d. Separation; e. Incineration;
f. Treatment; g. Salvaging; or, h Disposal of solid waste.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005.14. (emphasis
added). As discussed above a Tier I Facility is any facility that is processing:
wastes including, but not limited to untreated or unpainted wood,
yard waste, sheet rock, clean paper products, animal manures, plant
or crop residue, or garbage without meats or animal fats and the
cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at any one time is less
than or equal to six hundred cubic yards.
IDAPA 58.01.06.009.02.b (emphasis added). A Tier II Facility is any facility that exceeds the
600 cubic yard limit. IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03.b. The clear and unambiguous language of these
Rules applies to the Defendants’ activities of composting “yard waste” and plant residue, and the
Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Defendants’ reliance upon the exclusion from the definition of “solid waste”
contained in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii., “Manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately
returned to the soils at agronomic rates,” is misplaced. The plain meaning of this provision
applies only to agricultural crop residues, being physically returned to the soil for the purpose of
agronomic benefit and only at the point in time they are actually returned. This meaning is
consistent with the plain language. First, it is undisputed that the materials Defendants are
composting are not “crops.” The term “crop” is not defined in the Rules. However, where a
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term is not defined in statute or rule, courts may look to common meanings and resort to
dictionary definitions if helpful. See e.g. Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 858, 893 P.2d
801, 804 (Ct. App. 1995) (reference to dictionary definitions used to ascertain meaning of term
“junkyard”). The term “crop” is defined in numerous dictionaries in one form or another as
follows:
a (1): a plant or animal or plant or animal product that can be
grown and harvested extensively for profit or subsistence <an
apple crop> <a crop of wool> (2): the total yearly production from
a specified area.
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crop Also:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/crop; http://www.thefreedictionary.com/crop. The
grass clippings and leaves collected by the Defendants on the property are not grown and
harvested for profit or subsistence and thus do not constitute “crop residue.” The term “(plant),”
placed in parentheses following the word “crop,” does not create an independent category of
material that is exempt as Defendants might argue. When words are placed in parentheses
following another term, the grammatical intent is to provide clarification concerning the first
word but is not intended to be part of the subject.
http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/parens.asp. As stated otherwise, parentheses, are
“used in writing to mark off an interjected explanatory or qualifying remark,...”
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/parenthesis . Here, the term “(plant)” following the word
“crop” in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii. only qualifies and explains the term “crop”; it does not
constitute an independent category of material that is exempt from the Department’s authority.
The purpose for putting it in parentheses was to make it clear that the term “crop” applies only to
plant crops, and not as might otherwise be suggested “animal crops.” Ehlert Aff. ¶ 10.” Also
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Definition of “Crop” supra.
Equally important, the Defendants’ argument that IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii applies to
their operation ignores the remaining language “ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic
rates.” This clearly modifies the phrase “crop (plant) residue” in both a temporal and physical
sense. In the temporal sense the word “ultimate” is defined in Black’s as: “At last, finally or at
the end. The last in the train of progression or sequence tended toward by all that precedes;
arrived at as the last result; final.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed. 1979). MerriamWebster defines it as: “at the end of a process, period of time, etc.; at the most basic level; in the
central or most important way; in the end; eventually.” http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ultimately. In physical sense, the verb “returned” makes clear that the
“crop (plant) residue” is excluded by virtue of its physical return to the soil. Importantly, the
verb is stated in the past tense: “returned.” Finally, the prepositional phrase “at agronomic rates”
must be read consistent with the verb “returned” to make clear that it is only under the conditions
expressed that the material is excluded. In other words “crop” residue is only excluded if it is
“returned” at the agronomic rate. Read as a whole, the exclusion in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
is clearly to be read as: Manures or crop residue finally, in the end or at the conclusion of a
process, returned to the soil at agronomic rates. Defendants’ operations do not fall within this
plain meaning.
The plain meaning of the exclusion in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii is to apply to the crop
residue at the point in time that it is returned to the soil under the condition that it is done so
according to the agronomic rate. This plain meaning interpretation is consistent then with the
rest of the Rules and the definitions of a Tier I and Tier II facility to the extent they clearly intend
to regulate the “processing” or “composting” of “yard waste” and “plant or crop residue” See
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IDAPA 58.01.06.009.02.b. The interpretation urged by Defendants is entirely inconsistent with
this and makes no sense. If, as argued, “plant” residue is not a solid waste, including the
processing of such specifically in the description of a Tier I and Tier II processing facility is
nonsensical. Moreover, the exemption of “Backyard Composting” in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.04.c
would be entirely unnecessary if the Defendants’ interpretation is correct. The exclusion in
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii cannot reasonably be read in conjunction with the rest of the Rules
to apply to the processing of solid waste material for years and years prior to its return at some
unknown location at some unknown rate as Defendants would propose. 3 Read as a whole and in
conjunction with the entire regulatory framework, it is clear and unambiguous that the Rules
apply to the Defendants and the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. The Department’s Interpretation of its Rules is Entitled to Deference.
As established by the Affidavit of Dean Ehlert, the Department has long interpreted and
long applied the requirements of IDAPA 58.01.06.009 to composting facilities like the
Defendants’. Ehlert Aff. ¶ 11 and 12, Exh. A (1/5/2009 Letter Hardesty to Raybould re BioEnvironmental Resource Recovery). Moreover, the Department has long interpreted the
exclusion in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii to apply only to the actual return of crop residue to the
soil at the time it is so returned. Id. ¶ 9. Assuming for argument’s sake that the Court finds this
portion of the Rules ambiguous, the Court should give deference to the Department’s
longstanding and reasonable interpretation of its Rules.
Where an agency interprets a statute or rule, the Court applies the four-pronged Simplot
test to determine the appropriate level of deference to the agency interpretation. See J.R. Simplot

3 The Defendant has described that his composting process can take up to fourteen years to complete. See Ehlert
Aff. ¶ 14 Exh. B & C (Website Information re Black Diamond Composting).
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Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). Under Simplot, the
Court must determine whether: (1) the agency is responsible for administration of the rule at
issue; (2) the agency’s construction is reasonable; (3) the language of the rule does not expressly
treat the matter at issue; and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of agency deference are
present. Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 232 P.3d 322 (2010); Simplot, 120
Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219.
In the present case, the Department’s interpretation meets all of these criteria and is
entitled to, deference. The first prong of Simplot asks if the agency is entrusted to administer the
statute at issue, so it is “impliedly clothed with power to construe” this law. See, Canty v. Idaho
State Tax Comm’n, 138 Idaho 178, 183, 59 P.3d 983, 988 (2002). It is undisputed that the
Department is responsible for administration of the Rules and has been expressly granted this
power by the Idaho Legislature. See Idaho Code § 39-105. The second prong is met if an
agency's interpretation is not “so obscure and doubtful that it is entitled to no weight or
consideration.” J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. As discussed above, the
Department’s construction is a reasonable interpretation of the definition of “solid waste” and the
exclusion therefrom in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii, especially considering the regulatory
framework set forth in IDAPA 58.01.06.009 that clearly envisions regulating the
processing/composting of yard waste and crop and plant residue. The next prong requires that
the language of the rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue. Here the exclusion relied
upon by the Defendants in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii does not expressly address the matter of
composting. Whereas IDAPA 58.01.06.009, expressly states that a processing/composting
facility managing “yard waste,” “crop or plant residue” is regulated as a Tier I or II facility.
Accordingly the express language supports the Department’s interpretation.
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The fourth prong of the Simplot test asks the Court to examine whether the rationales
underlying the rule of agency deference are present. The five rationales underlying the rule of
deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute or rule are: (1) that a practical interpretation of
the rule exists; (2) the presumption of legislative acquiescence; (3) reliance on the agency’s
expertise in interpretation of the rule; (4) the rationale of repose; and (5) the requirement of
contemporaneous agency interpretation. Duncan, 149 Idaho at 3, 232 P.3d at 324. If these
reasons are absent, it may present ‘cogent reasons' justifying the court in adopting a statutory
construction which differs from that of the agency.” J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho at 862, 820
P.2d at 1219. If only some of the rationales are present, the court must balance the supporting
rationales, as all are not weighted equally. Id. But, “if one or more of the rationales underlying
the rule are present, and no ‘cogent reason’ exists for denying the agency some deference, the
court should afford ‘considerable weight’ to the agency's statutory interpretation.” Id.
Examining the rationales supports granting deference to the Department. First and as
noted above, a practical interpretation of the Rules exists. The processing/composting of solid
waste including “yard waste” and “plant and crop residue” is clearly intended to be regulated
under IDAPA 58.01.06.009, and the plain meaning of the exclusion in IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii excludes only the actual return of crop residue to the soil at agronomic rates.
It is also clear that the Department has specialized expertise in regulating solid waste
management which was recognized by the Idaho Legislature. See, Idaho Code § 39-102A and
Idaho Code § 39-105. This rationale was explained in Simplot as follows:
because the judiciary in Idaho is intended to apply a general
background to the law, the expertise of an agency is often useful in
technical areas of the law where the risks of failing to understand
all of the implications of a decision are great.
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J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho at 859, 820 P.2d at 1216. Here understanding and crafting rules to
address possible environmental risks of solid waste management have clearly been entrusted to
the Department. Thus this rationale is present. Regarding the rationale of “repose,” this element
looks to determine if the interpretation has been consistently applied for a sufficient period of
time such that it comports with settled expectations. See Simplot, 120 Idaho at 863, 820 P.2d at
1220. No specific period of time is required, Id., but there must be a sufficient period so as to
conclude that the public has come to rely upon the interpretation. In this regard, it is undisputed
that the Department has long applied its regulatory authority to the composting of solid waste.
Ehlert Aff. ¶ 5-13. Prior to adoption of the Rules in 2002, the regulations in effect clearly
governed composting facilities. See Wilson Aff. ¶ 4 Exh. A; IDAPA 16.01.06008 (1992). There
is no evidence of intent to change the regulatory scope of facilities regulated at the time the
Board adopted the Rules and IDAPA 58.01.06.009 clearly classifies composting facilities
processing more than 600 cubic yards of “yard waste” “crop and plant residue” as Tier II
facilities. Other facilities similar to the Defendants’ are complying with the Department’s Rules.
Ehlert Aff. ¶ 12. For these reasons the rationale of “repose” is satisfied. As to the requirement
of “contemporaneous agency interpretation,” it is undisputable that the agency has consistently
applied the Rules to composting facilities such as the Defendants’. See Ehlert Aff. ¶ 11 and 12.
Moreover, in 2009 the Department provided an explanation to Senator Del Raybould of how its
Rules apply to composting facilities. Ehlert Aff. ¶ 13; Exh. A. While this is not necessarily
“contemporaneous” to promulgation of the rule it is sufficiently proximate and consistent to
support granting deference to the agency’s interpretation. Finally, in Simplot the Court held that
to find the presumption of legislative acquiescence in agency construction of a statute,
“‘something more than mere silence is required’ .... [W]e require ‘something more’ to determine
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actual legislative intent than merely reenacting the statute after it has received an agency
construction.” J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho at 864, 820 P.2d at 1221 (citations omitted).
However, when looking at whether to grant deference to an agency interpretation of an
administrative rule in Duncan, the Court held that because the agency had been empowered by
the Idaho Legislature to adopt the rules, the Idaho Legislature had presumably acquiesced in the
agency’s interpretation of its rules. Duncan, 149 Idaho at 5, 232 P.3d at 326. It is undisputed
that the Idaho Legislature has given authority over the implementation and interpretation of the
Rules regarding solid waste management to the Department. See Idaho Code § 39-105. Thus,
under Duncan, the Court can properly conclude that the legislature has acquiesced in the
Department’s interpretation. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Idaho Legislature had
involvement in the drafting of the Rules since in 2001 the draft rules were considered by the
“Joint Legislative Environmental Common Sense Committee.” Wilson Aff. ¶ 14-17 Exh. K.
After the Board adopted the Rules in 2002, the 2003 Idaho Legislature affirmatively approved the
rules by concurrent resolution. See 2003 Idaho Sess. L. p. 1035. And in 2009, at least one State
Senator was provided with an explanation of how the Department interprets the Rules as related
to composting (See Ehlert Aff. ¶ 13; Exh. A) and no changes to the Department’s authority have
been made by the Legislature. This is evidence of at least some degree of legislative
acquiescence. Since all four of the Simplot/Duncan criteria for agency deference are met,
including the five rationales for granting deference, the Court should uphold the Department’s
interpretation and grant summary judgment.
C. The Defendants’ Facility and Operations are not Regulated by the
Department of Agriculture.
Throughout the Amended Answer, Defendants assert their operations are exempt from

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17
000263

the Rules by operation of IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.iii, which exempts “any agricultural solid
waste which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture…” It is undisputed, however, that the Department of Agriculture does not regulate
any aspect of the Defendants’ composting business other than the registration of some of the
commodities they produce. See Affidavit of Brian Oakley ¶ 3-5. The Department of Agriculture
does not regulate the siting or operation of the Defendants’ facility in any way. Id. ¶ 3. Nor do
the grass clippings and leaves composted by the Defendants constitute “agricultural solid waste”
as defined in any regulation of the Department of Agriculture.
The Department of Agriculture’s authorities are set out in Title 22 of the Idaho Code, and
its regulations compiled in IDAPA Title 02. A review of the Department of Agriculture’s rules
reveals no rules that specifically govern the Defendants’ on-site activities in composting.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 22-110, the Department of Agriculture has authority to regulate
“agricultural solid waste, agricultural composting and other similar agricultural activities.”
(emphasis added). However, the terms, “agricultural solid waste” and “agricultural composting”
are undefined in statute. The Department of Agriculture has exercised this authority in only
limited situations. The Department of Agriculture has promulgated the Rules Governing the
Stockpiling of Agricultural Waste, IDAPA 02.04.31. Under those rules: "Agricultural waste" is
specifically defined and limited to "livestock waste," IDAPA 02.04.31.010.02, which is further
defined as:
[m]anure that may also contain bedding, spilled feed, feathers,
water, or soil. It also includes wastes not particularly associated
with manure, such as milking center or wasting wastes, milk, feed
leachate, or livestock carcasses or parts thereof.
IDAPA 02.04.31.010.08. The Department of Agriculture’s rules, at IDAPA 02.04.31., therefore,
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are inapplicable to the Defendants’ activities composting grass clippings and leaves. The
Department of Agriculture has also promulgated the Rules Governing the Disposal of Cull
Onions and Potatoes. IDAPA 02.06.17.000 et. seq. These rules clearly do not apply to the
Defendants’ activities since, by their own admission, Defendants are composting grass and
leaves. Finally, the Department of Agriculture has authority to regulate dead animal movement
and disposal under Idaho Code § 25-237 and the Rules Governing Dead Animal Movement and
Disposal, IDAPA 02.04.17.030.000 et seq. While, composting of dead animals is regulated
under these rules (See IDAPA 02.04.17.030.06), there is no contention that Defendants are
composting dead animals. Other than as set forth above, the Department of Agriculture has not
promulgated any specific rules related to the siting or operation of a facility such as the
Defendants’. It is therefore undisputed that Defendants’ composting operations are not regulated
by the Department of Agriculture under Idaho Code § 22-110, and therefore the exception in
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.iii does not apply.
Defendants make oblique reference to the Soil and Plant Amendment Act of 2001, Idaho
Code § 22-2201 et seq., as some purported basis for regulation by the Department of Agriculture.
A review of this chapter of the Idaho Code and the Department of Agriculture’s accompanying
rules at IDAPA 02.06., however, shows that it is inapplicable to the physical operation of the
Defendants’ composting facility, but rather applies only to the labeling and marketing of any
finished product they may produce. Per the Act, the Department of Agriculture exercises the
authority to: Register soil and plant amendments, including review of product labels. Idaho
Code § 22-2205 and IDAPA 02.06.41. 010 - .030.; Collect tonnage fees on soil and plant
amendments distributed in Idaho, Idaho Code § 22-2208; Collect and analyze samples of soil and
plant amendments distributed in Idaho to determine that the amendments comply with Idaho law,
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that they are in accordance with label guarantees, and that they are not adulterated or misbranded,
Idaho Code §§ 22-2210, 2214, and 2215; and IDAPA 02.06.41.049 - .050. These authorities
clearly do not apply to the actual composting of the materials. The Department of Agriculture
has not ever regulated the composting of grass clippings and leaves by the Defendants. Oakley
Aff. ¶ 2. Therefore, IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.iii, does not apply and the Department is entitled
to summary judgment on this argument.
D. The Department is not Barred from Regulating the Defendants’ Facility.
The Defendants’ Amended Answer asserts obliquely as follows: “that if agricultural
materials and substances come under and within the jurisdiction of any Agency it would fall
within and under the provisions of the Right to Farm Act, as well as the Plant and Soil
Amendment Act, …” Amended Answer pg. 6. It is unclear exactly what Defendants mean by
this assertion, but for purposes of completeness in this Motion, it should be noted that the “Right
to Farm Act” does not limit the regulatory authority of state agencies such as the Department.
Idaho Code § 22-4504 only limits the authority of a “city, county, taxing district or other political
subdivision of this state…” The Department is not a “political subdivision of the State” it is “the
State.” See e.g. Idaho Code § 6-902(1)and(2).
Finally, the “Plant and Soil Amendments Act, gives the Department of Agriculture
authority to
…administer, enforce, and carry out this chapter and may adopt
rules necessary to carry out its purposes including, but not limited
to, the proper use, handling, transportation, storage, display,
distribution, sampling, records, analysis, form, minimum
percentages, soil amending or plant amending ingredients,
exempted materials, investigational allowances, definitions, labels,
labeling, misbranding, mislabeling and disposal of soil
amendments and plant amendments and their containers.
Idaho Code § 22-2204. The Act, however, does not contain any language of preclusion,
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preemption or exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, the Director of the Department of Agriculture may
“cooperate with and enter into agreements with other government agencies whether of this state,
other states, or agencies of the federal government… in order to carry out the purpose of this
chapter.” See Idaho Code § 22-2221. Moreover, the Act preserves the authority of local
government to govern “the physical location or siting of soil and plant amendment
manufacturing, storage and sales facilities or protecting the quality of ground water or surface
water in accordance with applicable state and federal law.” Idaho Code § 22-2226(3). In the
absence of express language of preemption or the clear intent to occupy this field of law, there is
no preemption of other laws and the Plant and Soil Amendment Act provides no defense.
E. The Department Followed the Administrative Procedure Act in Adopting its
Rules.
Defendants assert in their Seventh Defense, that the Department violated Idaho Code §
67-5222 when it promulgated the Rules. Specifically they complain that “no form of
notification, either through bulletin publication or direct mailing to these Defendants, has ever
been received or confirmed to have been sent or published, from which to allow any expression
of views to the agency prior to any proposed adoption amendment or repeal of” the Rules. See
Amended Answer pg. 10. First any challenge to the Rules based on non-compliance with
Chapter 52, Title 67 is barred by Idaho Code § 67-5231(2) since it is well past the two year
period within which such a challenge must be brought. Moreover, Defendants misunderstand
and misstate the requirements of Idaho Code § 67-5222 as it applied in the period of time prior to
2002 and the Board’s action adopting the Rules. Finally, as established by the Wilson Affidavit,
the Department followed the requirements of Idaho Administrative Procedure Act by conducting
a lengthy negotiated rulemaking, holding numerous public hearings and publishing numerous
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notices in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin and in the newspaper of largest circulation.
First, there is no requirement for the Department to provide specific individualized notice
via a “direct mailing” as implied by Defendants’ Amended Answer. Idaho Code § 67-5222
requires:
(1) Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, the
agency shall afford interested persons reasonable opportunity to
submit data, views and arguments, orally or in writing. The agency
shall receive comment for not less than twenty-one (21) days after
the date of publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking in the
bulletin.
This provision does not require a written notice specifically mailed to the Defendant as
the Defendants seem to suggest. The requirements for notification are specified in Idaho Code
§§ 67-5220 and 5221 and, even today, require only publication in the bulletin and newspapers.
See Idaho Code § 67-5221. The undisputed evidence establishes that each of these requirements
was met commencing in 1997 with the original notice of intent to engage in negotiated
rulemaking. Wilson Aff. ¶ 5 Exh. B. This was followed by numerous other notices and
publication of proposed rules. See Wilson Aff. ¶ 6-24; Exhs. C-R. Indeed, Ms. Wilson’s
affidavit demonstrates that the Department’s Rules took over five years to promulgate from the
date of first publication and involved 20 negotiated rulemaking meetings, four public hearings
during the proposed rule public comment periods, and five meetings of the Idaho Board of
Environmental Quality. Wilson Aff. ¶ 6-24. The Rules were considered in open meetings by a
committee of the Idaho Legislature, the “Joint Legislative Environmental Common Sense
Committee.” Wilson Aff. ¶ 17. There was no shortage of notice to the public and the
Defendants’ assertions are without merit.
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F. The Definition of Solid Waste in Idaho Code § 39-103 and the Department’s
Regulations are “Plainly Worded” and Do Not Violate Idaho Constitution
Article III, § 17.
Finally, the Defendants assert that in some manner either the statutory definition of “solid
waste” or the regulatory definition and its exclusions violate Article III § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution which provides: “Every act or joint resolution shall be plainly worded, avoiding as
far as practicable the use of technical terms.” Const. Art. III § 17. Very little case law exists
interpreting this section as to the meaning of “technical terms.” In Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v.
State, 158 Idaho 671, 351 P3d 599 (2015) however, the Court noted that Article III § 17
…does not ban the use of technical terms. It states that every act or
joint resolution shall ‘avoid as far as practicable the use of
technical terms.’ It would not be practicable to enact legislation
dealing with technology without using technical terms.
Id. at 677, 351 P.3d at 605 (citation omitted). The Court went on to rule that because the term at
issue was defined in the statute, construing the term as it was written does not violate the Idaho
Constitution. Id. Similarly, in addressing a challenge to a revenue act, the Idaho Supreme Court
stated in Ada County v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, 92 P.2d 134 (1939), “It is not impossible to give
the provision a workable construction. We hold that the act is not obnoxious to sec. 17, art.3, of
the constitution…” Id. at 402, 92 P.2d at 138. These cases suggest that so long as a statute or
regulation can be understood and construed, and particularly when the act or rule provides
definition to those terms, it does not violate Article III Section 17. Here the Idaho Legislature
and the Department have defined the term “solid waste” to be broadly inclusive of “discarded
materials.” The Department’s regulatory definitions, exclusions and regulatory terms when read
together as a whole are subject to a plain and workable construction and do not violate Idaho’s
Constitution.
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CONCLUSION

The Defendants have admitted the prima facie elements of the Complaint, and the
undisputed evidence establishes they have violated IDAPA 58 .01.06.012 because they have
failed to submit the required applications and plans. The Department's Rules are applicable to
the Defendants' activities and the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on the
Amended Complaint and the injunctive relief and penalties sought therein.
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2.

That Affiant has resided in the City of Boise, State of Idaho, for over 50 years.

3.

That the "property" as it has been referred to by Ada County in their Complaint filed against

Defendant(s), is a small portion of a larger parcel of dryland grazing farm ground owned by Victoria
P
(f~:~10· c~l~r?r:~;~)!.. ..~\~
·
},Jral
a
m
H. Smith, and is located directly in the area referred to as agricultural lands' 'logaf .,;
AFFIDAVIT of DAVID R. GIBSON

P. l

I-

m
-

:r:

><
w

000274

preservation district, generally referred to as the Gowen Field Dese1t Front, located west of the
Pleasant Valley Road. I have been allowed the possession and use of approximately 10 acres of
their agricultural land, where I have been allowed to continue my organic and natural "compost
process" of leaves, grasses, and crop trimmings in my organic humus agricultural product
development in the fanning-composting process since August, 2004.
4.

Since August, 2004, to the present , and within this 10 acre portion of Defendant(s)'

property, I have undertaken the continued production of this organic product, a long standing
agricultural activity I have pursued since 1975, and this product is what generally described and
commonly referred to by the Department of Agriculture as the Black Diamond humus product"
produced in my organic composting operation, whereby, and in such a composting process, I take
leaves, grass clippings, and crop trimmings, and mix that product on a regular schedule, to which I
add to the quantities of water to maintain the organic process, and through that composting process,
I eventually turn this organic mixture of vegetation products into what the Department of
Agriculture has classified a humus agricultural product, or leaf mold, being an agricultural soil
amendment product, which the State has identified within affiant's certification with the Idaho
Department of Agriculture, which is identified in the registration and certification of my agricultural
product attached to this affidavit.
5.

In order to explain to the Court the means by which I came to place my operations on this

property, from where I before had been producing my product in this rural preservation district, that
I was given permission by Vernon K. Smith, Jr., to locate my agricultural activity onto this 10 acre
parcel of land, as I was court ordered to relocate from the 20 acres where I had been conducting my
ongoing agricultural organic humus business since 1991. This 20 acre parcel of land was located
approximately 660 feet to the west of this 10 acre parcel of property and it was court ordered for me
to relocate of my personal property, equipment and 50,000 cubic yards of humus pr~duct from that
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20 acre, because the Merrills were declared the titled owners of the land and they wanted me to
vacate the property so they could possess it exclusively.
6.

I was allowed to move onto this 10 acre parcel of property owned by Defendant(s), to serve

as a convenience to me, and to facilitate the relocation of my personal property and belongings.
When the court declared the Merrills the titled owners in my litigation with them, the court had
directed I then vacate the property, and the court then also ordered the Merrills to begin the process
to remove my property from the 20 acre parcel of land and to deliver it to over onto this 10 acre
parcel of property owned by Defendant(s), Mr. Smith allowed my use of this property so as to
accommodate my need to move, and in that manner it was to be a temporary location for my
relocated operation, but it was the exact same activity that I had been doing in this rural preservation
district since 1988 .
7.

I had obtained my permission to relocate onto this 10 acre parcel of land from the

Defendant(s), through Vernon K. Smith, who at the time was also my coWJSel of record in some of
this ongoing litigation I had with the Merrills, and that permission was given so as to accommodate
the immediate relocation of my personal property and to allow me to continue my agricultural
activity as I had been doing on the 20 acre parcel. Defendant(s) property was a very convenient
location to resolve that immediate need to relocate. The District Court, Fourth Judicial District,
Honorable Darla S. Williamson, in part of that process, had directed the Merrills to undertake to
move all of my humus product, my personal property, equipment, and my agricultural operations
from the 20 acre parcel premises to Defendant(s) 10 acre parcel, where I have been permitted to
continue my operation to produce my organic agricultural product, just as he had been doing on the
20 acre parcel of land since 1991, and before that on State owned land, under lease, in the same
Rural Preservation District, since 1988, without ever having secured a conditional use permit to
conduct my farming activities on this recognized agricultural land in this urbanizing area. The ~ourt
order was intended to require the Merrills to deliver all of my property, with the Merrills having the
AFFIDAVIT of DAVID R GIBSON

P.3

000276

reserved right to later apply to the court for reimbursement of the cost of the removal expenses, so
from my perspective the location of Defendant(s) land was critical to serve my best interests to
minimize the amount of cost and expense of moving this personal property, equipment, and 50,000
cubic yards of humus product. The close proximity of Defendant(s) property did provide the
Merrills the convenience of a short distance to conduct that relocation process.
8.

I have conducted my agricultural operations, utilizing this organic composting process since

1988,'being a 22 year period of continuous operation in this Rural Preservation District, and both
the 20 acre parcel now owned by the Merrills, and Defendant(s)' 10 acre parcel, and the State
property I leased from 1988 to 1991, are classified as agricultural land, located in an urbanizing
area, and the operation I conduct has never had a conditional use permit issued as a condition before
the operation was permitted to occur. I did have discussions about that very issue in 1991, and
again in 2003, and in each instance the idea of requiring a conditional use permit, to conduct this
agricultural activity on agricultural lands was then abandoned, after the county official and code
enforcement officials had reviewed the State law and concluded a. "CUP" for this organic operation
was unnecessary and could not be required.
9.

That I did personally inform members of the County Board of Commissioners in 1991 and

2003 that there was a "Right to Farm Act" and it had been declared by the Idaho Legislature to be· a
"natural" right, and my organic agricultural product "farming" process was recognized as a
permitted use on land throughout the State of Idaho, and the Land Use Planning Act would preclude
the imposition of a restriction to obtain a conditional use permit on such an agricultural operation.
The litigation between affiant and the Merrills has continued on, as it developed into further
litigation over my allegations to the effect the Merrills had not completed the delivery of all my
property, as directed by the comt to this 10 acre location, and that because of the years that had then
lapsed, with only part of my property being delivered to this site, I concluded it was the Merrills'
intent to appropriate and convert most of my property to their own use and benefit, and new
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litigation evolved into further allegations against the Merrills, including an action for conversion,
and an action for contempt of the court's order, as a result of the Merrills failure to relocate most of
my personal property, and especially their apparent intent to retain the approximate amount of

50,000 cubic yards of my agricultural product, being a valuable humus and leaf mold product. I
have remained in possession of Defendant(s) 10 acre parcel continuously since August, 2004, with
Defendant(s) consent, waiting for the delivery of my belongings, and Vernon K. Smith has
remained steadfast in continued effort to accommodate my business and allow me to recover my

.

'

personal property and all of my agricultural product. I had produced in excess of 50,000 cubic
yards of humus product that was on the 20 acre parcel when I was required to surrender possession
of the land, and all of that product, except for approximately 5,000 cubic yards sill remains there. It
is my contention the Merrills had appropriated 5,000 cubic yards of humus to their own financial
gain or use, delivering it to other locations. My 45,000 cubic yards of product still remains on the
Merrill prope1ty, and through the last 6 years, I have developed several thousands more yards of
humus product on Defendant(s) property, which will eventually be used in an agricultural operation
for soil amendment. This product has become refined into what the Department of Agriculture has
classified as "leaf mold" or "humus soil amendment", which has a substantial economic value, and
is recognized as an agricultural product, used for soil amendment and agricultural oriented farming,
as it is an organic nutrient product to be utilized to enhance all plant, soil and farm production
commodities. To this date, I have yet to receive all of his product, being now in excess of 6 years,
all of which been exacerbated and compounded by the ongoing litigation and the non-performance
of the Merrills.
10.

From a historical standpoint, I have been conducting this type of operation, being an

agricultural farming activity, on farm and agricultural lands dating back to 1975. I actually began
my operations through lease of other fannland ·in Ada County in 1975, and I then relocated my
agricultural activities in 1988 to the site owned by the State, which was a 10 acre parcel of land at a
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location along South Pleasant Valley Road, less than 2,500 feet from the 20 acre parcel and the
property owned by Defendant(s). I maintained my composting agricultural activity on the State
property from 1988 until 1991, when I then secured the purchase of the 20 acre parcel identified
above, which itself is located less than 660 feet from Defendant(s) property. I had moved onto the
20 acre parcel under my financing arrangements with the Merrills, believing I was the equitable
owner of the 20 acre parcel, as I placed in title in their name to protect their financial assistance. My
atTangement with the Merrills was that Orson Merrill would finance my purchase. Some 12-13
years later and after Orson Merrill developed a mind deteriorating condition, and after a decayed
friendship with Lydia Merrill, she filed suit to evict me from the land, saying I was a tenant only.
After extensive litigation, I was directed by court order to vacate that premises and as stated above,
allowed to come onto this "property" in August, 2004, where I have continued the exact same
activity as I had done before since 1975 on these agricultural properties.
11.

My agricultural activity and operation has always been an organic compost process, used

to convert grasses, leaves and crop trimmings into this organic agricultural product, referred to as a
humus type product, utilized extensively in farm soil amendments, intended for crop enhancement,
plant growth, nutritional fortification and plant biological development, precisely being defined by
the State Agricultural Department as "leaf mold" and "humus", being an agricultural product
generated from organic activity and compost operation solely pursued for an agricultural purpose
and farm use objective, confirmed by the records and criteria of the Idaho Department of
Agriculture. This product is organic in nature, composed to generate biological nutrients, to benefit
all aspects of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, crops, vegetables, soil preparation, soil
amendments, restore depleted soil nutrients and enhance the processing of all agricultural
commodities.
12.

My agricultural activities are generally described as a form of organic "composting activity", .

though my composting process includes ingredients limited to grasses, leaves and crop ttimmings
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type vegetation, and does not include any other ingredients used by others, such as chicken manure,
livestock manure or dairy by-product materials, utilized in other composting processes. The
ingredients are among the classification criteria the Department of Agriculture will identify the
product on a certificate of registration. All composting processes that generate farmland organic
nutrient soil amendments are similarly considered "agricultural activities".

I have kept my

operation purely organic in nature, producing a humus type product, endorsed by the Department of
Agriculture, as I use only vegetation growth and no animal waste product or by-product. My
product is nearly sodium free, organic, and I do not modify or undermine the purity of my product
for its intended purpose as a soil building amendment for agricultural crop growth, nutritional
development and food production in farming operations.
13.

I refer to my business operation as "Black Diamond Compost Products", and I have

maintained a certificate of registration with the Department of Agriculture for commercial soil and
plant amendments for food production on an annual basis, and I have provided my latest annual

I
j

certification for 2010 in this affidavit as an attachment, and I have maintained my certification and
registration as a commercial soil and plant amendment producer for leaf mold and humus products
as required by the State, which State agency does recognize me as a producer of an agricultural

I'
11

I

I;

product to be applied to an agricultural beneficial use.
14.

It has been affiant's position from the inception of my agricultural activities that I do not

require a conditional use permit, as this activity is protected by Title 67, Chapter 65, and Title 22,
Chapter 45, Statutes of the State of Idaho. My activities, operations and the generation of my
organic product are defined as agricultural activities and agricultural products, and I have been
pursuing that activity continuously in this rural preservation district area since 1988, being a 22 year
period and it has been my informed understanding my activity is an allowed use or allowed activity
on farmland, and has never been claimed to be in violation of any nuisance ordinance and I have

.

'

not been required to get a conditional use permit for my operation, though it was extensively visited
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and discussed in 1991 and 2003. I had the opportunity to discuss the concept of a conditional use
permit at length, and after it was discussed extensively in 1991, I did believe it was understood with
the County officials that I was acting in conformity with the purpose and intent of the Idaho
Legislature, as Idaho was seeking to preserve, maintain, foster and perpetuate agricultural activities
that benefit all aspects of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, crops, vegetables, soil preparation,
soil amendments, soil nutrients and processing of organic products for commercial purposes in the
production of agricultural commodities. That no time has any aspect of my agricultural activities or
operations been held or declared to be a nuisance operation, and I have never jeopardized or
impaired the public safety in any manner or to any degree. To the contrary, I have fostered and
embraced an environmental and valuable organic product, developed through well established
organic activities, identified and confirmed with the Department of Agriculture that the agricultural
activity produces a humus product, used in the development as a soil amendment for crop growth,
plant enhancement, and for production and development of farmland commodities in the
agricultural farming industry.
15.

After affianthad come to believe it was not necessary to have a conditional use permit for

my fanning type operations, and I was infmmed by County officials the issue was settled with the
County commissioners in 1991, I received a letter some 12 years later, dated January 30, 2003,
from the Ada County Development Services, written by Michael J. Williams, a code enforcement
specialist, who then suggested to me I may need to secure a Conditional Use Permit (CUP), under
the belief the Ada County Ordinance may allow him to require me to secure such a permit when
conducting a "composting facility". Because I was personally and extensively involved with the
County officials that had analyzed that issue back in 1991, and i was the one who had extensive
discussion with some of the Ada County Commissioners, I told Mr. Williams I could not be held to
a condition precedent to obtain a conditional use permit before my operations were allowed, and I
informed Mr. Williams of§ 67-6529, Idaho Code and§ 22-4501- 4504, Idaho Code, and after that
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discussion with Mr. Williams, I had Vernon K. Smith, who was then also acting as my counsel,
send a response letter to Mr. Williams, confirming my positions, and that I was producing of an
organic agricultural product on agricultural land, and was exempt from any conditional use permit
regulation from that event in 2003. It again became my belief this new code enforcement staff
member was now aware of my understanding of Idaho law, and he and the County officials came to
accept the historic fact my operations were not subject to a conditional use permit as a matter of
Idaho law. That response sent to Mr. Williams by my counsel, Vernon K. Smith, on February 24,
2003, is also attached to my affidavit and the Vernon K. Smith affidavit.
16.

The County officials recognized my engaged activities were in the context of the

production of an agricultural product, being both soil and plant development and enhancement and
being engaged in the creation of an "agricultural product", on agricultural land, and such operation
and conduct could not be regulated by any requirement to obtain a conditional use permit, as it was
recognized as a "permitted use" under the Right to Farm Act. I was engaged in an agricultural
pursuit developing an agricultural product, generated in an agricultural production operation on
recognized agriculturally classified land. Once I achieved that clarification and understanding with
Ada County code enforcement officer in 2003, it was again my belief the idea ofrequiring a
conditional use permit for my operation was once again abandoned.
17.

Almost 5 years later, I again received a letter from a new "code enforcement specialist", Mr.

Anderson, suggesting to me a conditional use permit was required for the operation of my
composting operation, because it was a "composting facility". I spoke to Mr. Anderson and
apparent!y he was not familiar with the earlier acknowledgments in 1991 and again in 2003 by other
specialists that the operation was a statutorily permitted use, and no conditional use permit was
required, and I told Mr. Smith a further response was not needed from his office. Mr. Anderson
wrote me again, suggesting the issue was not settled, and after the letter of April 15, 2008 was
received, which also was addressed to Vernon K. Smith, as well as David Gibson and Black
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Diamond Composting. I agreed a written response was necessary, and Vernon K. Smith then sent a
letter on April 23, 2008, to which he also attached a copy of his previous response sent to the Ada
County Development Services on February 24, 2003. I have attached a copy of that response to this
affidavit.
18.

Following our response of April 24, 2008, approximately 2 years later, on Febmary 8, 2010,

Ada County chose to initiate suit against the landowner, being the Defendant(s) in this action,
giving•rise to this dispute over the County's authority to impose a requirement upon Defendant(s) as
'

the landowner, or upon affiant as the business operator, to obtain a conditional use permit to
conduct an organic composting fruming operations and activity on agricultural land in this
agricultural preservation area, which has been referred to for tax purposes as a rural preservation
district and dryland farm grazing land, where I have maintained my organic composting activity
within district from 1988 to the present date, spanning a period.of 22 years, without restriction.
19.

I !mow Ada County has continuously declared the property in this area to be designated as

agricultural, used primarily as dryland grazing for the past 50 years, and I have personal lmowledge
Defendant(s) entire 520 acres is underlease to the Aldacoa family for periodic grazing purposes.
20,

The Idaho State Tax Commission has continuously recognized my business to be an

agricultural operation, and therefore is exempt from sale's tax.
21.

Furthermore, the Ada County Tax Assessor's office has continuously recognized my

business to be tax exempt, due to its agriculture nature and operation.
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Dated this 29th day of Septeiµber 2010.

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBEDTO AND BEFORE ME, this 29th day of September, 2010.

Residing a
Commission Expires: 6/03/2014
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 30th day of September 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses
as follows;

Cle1k of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(

)
)-----

,,,..,.---;

U.S.Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered

Ada County Prosecuting ttomey
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Vernon K. Smith
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ST A TIE OJf IDAHO
DEPARTMENT Olf AGl!UCULTlURE ·

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor

CELIA R. GOULD
Director

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS.
DAVE GIBSON
3 0 0. 0 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Telephone Number
(208)344-4468

2010 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR COMMERCIAL
SOIL & PLANT AMENDMENTS

Company Number : 278
i'

Certificate Number : 2050
Certificate Date

11

: 01/26/2010

I

if

i

Director of Agriculture
Celia R. Gould

Under authority. of the director of the Idaho State Department of
Agriculture, this document certifies that the PLANT & SOIL
AMENDMENT(s) listed on the attached product certification form
and/or computer print-out have been duly registered for the
current year through December 31, 2010.

Questions concerning this listing should be sent to:
Idaho Department of.Agriculture
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone : · (208) 332-862.0
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2270 Old Penitentiary Road• P.O. Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701 • (208) 332-8500 • www.agri.idaho.gov

!

I
I

STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT Of AGRJIOULTIJRE

CL_ "BUTCH" OTTER
Gover.nor

CELIA R_ GOULD
Din:etor

Soil and Plant Amendments
Semi-Annual Tonnage Report
July 1- December 31, 2009
(Due by January 31, 2010)

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSl::HILL
BOISE, ID 83705

.

.--------------,

ISDAOfficeUseOnly-2H09
Date Received
Check Number
Ammmt
$_ _ _ _ _ __
Record Number 278

Amendment Quantities

Products

Dry
Materials
(tons)

Li~t product names as they appear on your

Certificate of Registration.

I ~ , ,\// .,11
. J ) 0,
J . ,,,.,_,.,..A

I ,J<../0 [
D

·~ (:_

-~

Total Dry
&Liquid
Tons

Liquid
Materials
(tons)

Total Due
(Total Tons
X $.15)
:wt /C-00

I
.

.

.

Late Fee (min. $25 or 10%) $
Tonnage Due:
$
Grand Total Due:
$
. I,

·a,, l

f ('..., ba"W_'

i

;J' ~l.o

=•~

, do hereby

,/

(dne on all reports postmarked after January 31, 2010)
($15.00 minimum for 0- 33.33 tons)

/q15"'
•

a· resident of,
affinn-that I am

u,carporaled urdor tao Ja;,s of the al<tle of

"'

:J:.),;

f3tot"';,<Z
{?eof'

l,;;

'

/i<lA

County of

, of the

' State

of

finn o, eetp""'tforr named above which is .

, and that during the period-covered by this report, the named

~~?~~~ m.,,w..-m,&oo oo wmM ,- ~~oo ~•ore .a

Signature
PriniedNam~
Phone (z.61,)

~

Oo,,,j I(,
3(( </-l/<ft;,<,J

Date

($,/.,r,.,,..t.

Fax (

-=::t=:=

A/.• ,,/4

'Z,(

, -~ cu L,__

tD

Title_~P.~·;,.~o=f'fJ~·•··_ _ _ _ _ _ __

1/.IA

Email: ----'-+-+"'----~~-~-.. ·

Make checks payable to the Idaho State Iiepai:tment of Agriculture. If you have questions, please call the Feed & Fertilizer
Section at (208) 736-2195 or (208) 332-8625.
NOTE: No credits or refunds will be acknowledged without complete and proper documentation.
2270 Old Penitentiary Road • PO Box 790 • Boise, Idaho 83701

000287

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Division of Plant Industries
P.O. Box 790
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 332-8625
(Please print any corrections)

·

r.==== Office Use Only===~

.Date Received
Check Number
Amount$
Company Number

278

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL REGISTRATION OF COMME~CI.Al",
SOIL AMENDMENTS AND PLANT AMENDMENTS /;AO/ (J

BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS
DAVE GIBSON
3000 ROSEHILL
BOISE, ID 83705

Company Number . . 2 7 8
Phone .. (208)344-4468

Registration Fees Due for Renewals ... : ... $
Late Product Fees Due ................... $
Total Fees Remitted ..................... $

200.00
Q Of),~

Remitta~ce payable to the Idaho Department of Agriculture is enclosed herewith to cover
the annual renewal registration fee of $100.0Q per product for commercial plant and soil

.:amendments distributed for sale in Idaho. A .late fee penalty of $10. 00 will be assesed
for .each .Product renewal filed· later' than February 1 of each year (Ida:ho Code 22-2205 (6)) .
:i:ric9mpletff renewals will· be returned and. becotrle subjecit 'to late fees and denial of
registration. Do Not submit labels with this product renewal application! Delete all
product registrations for which you are submitting a revised label on the enclosed

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION oF·NEw OR REVISED COMMERCIAL SOIL OR·PLANT AMENDMENT PRODUCTS.
New· or revised ·labels must be submitted on the enclosed application for new or
revised products!
I hereby certify that the information appearing o_n the referenced labels is true and
correct in every respect; that each and every package of the materials listed on this
renewal registration form is labeled as ?escribed (and in addition that net weight,
content analysis (%), application directions, and manufacturer 1 s name and address will
be shown); that the declarations are the guarantee of the applicant as to the.chemical
composition of the materials listed for and on behalf of .t..h.P- r.~g:i,strant:; .that each

' " " ' • ' ~ : : ' " '"" ee=e• ,~

a~;:::f•TiUe
jlt'. H,

2f){0

Date '

This application must be a:ccompanie"d by the product registration list on reverse: ~ide·,
showing the product Cs) you wish to register in Idaho. Please return this application

form to ·the above address.
approval.

A cert"if°iCate of.registratio~ will be returned to you upon
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone (208) 345-1125
Faesimile (208) 345-1129

RECEIVED
1APR

2 4 2008'

AllACOUNTY
OEVELOPMENTSER~CES

April 23, 2008
Ada County Development Services
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
RE: YOUR FILE REGARDING:
Pleasant Valley Desert Farm Property, Alleged Commercial Composting located east of
Pleasant Valley Road, South of Lake Hazel extension.
Parcel NO. S1505220000; Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2B. BM:
Zones AP, RUT, RP.
ATIN: Sidney Anderson
Code Enforcement Specialist
Dear Mr. Anderson:
On April 15, 2008, you sent a letter addressed to Vernon K. Smith, David Gibson,
and Black Diamond Composting, claiming the existence of a large scale production of
composted materials, you claim intended for sale and use on premises, other than where
such compost is produced, and for that alleged event you contend the defmition of A.C.C.
8-lA-1 applies, and a violation of A.C.C. 8-2A-1 is now being alleged to exist, for failure
to secure a conditional use permit for the alleged operation of a Commercial Composting
Facility.
Your letter then threatens with the likely future event the matter will be turned
over to the Ada County Prosecutor's office to pursue a violation, in the event the property
is not brought "into compliance" by applying for a conditional use permit by April 30,
2008.
For your convenience, I enclose a copy of a letter I before sent to ACDS and Mr.
Michael J. Williams, a county code enforcement specialist, as it related to this exact same
subject matter inquiry. I thought that response I made in 2003 resolved the inquiry and
issue over.the ordinance.
EXHIBIT
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In light of your current inquiry, I spoke to Mr. Gibson and he indicated he had
discussed the matter with you, and thought that dialogue with you again resolved the
current inquiry, as you might not have been familiar with the letter to Mr. Williams in
2003. In the event his efforts have not brought the matter to resolution, let me state
formally that my position remains as I before stated it in my letter of February 24, 2003
to Michael J. Williams, a copy of which is enclosed for your review and for that of the
County Prosecutor's. office.
Additionally, as a convenience to your effort in developing a factual assessment
of the situation, it is important for you to understand this site is not intended to be a
permanent location for the ongoing creation of the composted materials in question. As
you may be aware, Mr. Gibson held possession and perceived ownership to a 20 acre
parcel of property just North and West of this property in question, and by court order, he
was divested of his perceived ownership, and was ordered off that 20 acre parcel, and the
Merrills, who then were declared the lawful owners of that parce~ were ordered by the
court to remove all of Mr. Gibson's personal property (including his 50,000 cubic yards
of composted materials) and to deliver all of it to this temporary site made available on
the Smith Property. That removal and relocation process was to be commenced in
September, 2004. This site remains under court order as the depository site for that court
ordered removal process, and the Merrills have failed to complete the mandated delivery
to date, and have failed to abide by the court's order, and most of the property subject to
delivery still remains on the Merrill premises, and because of that fact, these parties have
been in litigation in recent months, and I believe litigation will be ongoing for some
period of time to come.
In the meantime, Mr. Gibson continued to receive city and county leaves
delivered to the temporary site by Boise City and ACHD, for the intended use to blend it
with the awaited delivery of the composted product from the Merrill premises in 20042005. Mr. Gibson had no choice but to begin the process of composting the new
materials, as he before did at the old site under his agricultural exemption as identified in
the February 24, 2003 letter.
I realize Mr. Gibson has the desire to someday bag and distribute his composted
materials on a wholesale and/or retail venture, given the quality of his humus product, but
as of the present date, he has no immediate plans of any large scale commercial
production of a packaged product for use and sale to be conducted from this premises.
The compost is being stored, blended, or produced on this site as an agricultural product.
He did in earlier months undertake a screening process, hand bag approximately 300 bags
of humus materials as a sample product to distribute to interested outlets for them to
examine the nutrient, texture, solubility, and salinity specifications under available
product consideration in the market industry to determine who would be interested in
what he had for product. That endeavor was limited to a small quantity for analysis only,
and was completed months ago.
My objective has been to provide Mr. Gibson with a temporary site, to enable him
to make a transition from his 20 acre parcel he operated for 12 years, to another parcel he
can acquire to continue his life long dream and business venture.
Consequently, this site is temporary and will be used and maintained as an interim
destination, for product preservation, and for providing him the opportunity to keep his
contributing source ofleaves, grass and such similar materials, should he elect in the
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future to receive delivery of his other quantities of composted materials from the Merrill
premises.
I am not interested in either the endorsement of a large scale commercial process
of a composting facility as you envision, or in participating in the venture as a capital
contributor for such an operation. However, that being said, you must understand I have
become involved to help Mr. Gibson, not abandon his need and current dependency on a
place to store his materials, and I will stand firm on my efforts to assist him, and do
adamantly stand fnm on the legal principles I announced in my earlier correspondence of
February 24, 2003.
I have no desire to apply for or to secure a conditional use permit for this
property, ·and do respectfully decline your invitation to· do so as a means to avert any
further scrutiny of the legal and factual
ems, or in an effort to avoid
further dialogue and encounter ov
potential dispute.
Your courtesies and past respect ave been genuinely appr
an
st
continue our informal communic tions as we work our ay through the fo
present concern. Should you need discuss the ma r further, you may con
office (345-1125) or on my cell phon 440-2466) d until then, I remain

VKS/vlj
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February 24, 2003

Ada County Development Services
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Re: Letter of January 30, 2003
David Gibson
300 Rose Hill
Boise, Idaho 83705
Concerning: Composting Facility location in T3N, R2E, Sec 31, W2SE4SE4
Attn:

Michael J. Williams
Code Enforcement Specialist

Dear Mr. Williams:
Your letter of January 30, 2003, has been received by Mr. Gibson, and he
brought it to my office for preparation of his response, as I was familiar with the
past events and his involvement with Ada County in 1991, and In various
proceedings as the years followed.
Mr. Gibson did initially apply for a CUP in 1991, as he was first told by
staff members that may be the needed course of action. Mr. Gibson did not then
question their opinion, and he did not then review the law to realize it was
unnecessary, in light of the facts, and statutory limitations prohibiting County
Commissioners from enacting an ordinance or resolution that would deprive any
land owner or land operator of full and complete use of agricultural land for
production of~ agricultural product (see§ 67-6529, Idaho Code). His intended
use was an allowed and accessory use, as a matter of law, intended for
production of agricultural products, always being the reason for his presence and
operation, and what his intended purpose was then, and at all times thereafter,
was the production of an agricultural product. Because of that, he was exempt
by virtue of State law as announced in§ 67-6529, Idaho Code.
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He spoke with staff members after he reviewed the law, and spoke also
with some of the commissioners, after the denial of his unneeded application,
and based upon State law, he then withdrew his appeal of the unneeded
application, all of which was done with County, knowledge, blessing, and
approval. There was no need for formal review of his application, as State law
controlled the issue since 1975 (now amended in 2000, but no change, except to
CAFO facilities). With full knowledge of the statute by the County, and being
aware of his operations, the County recognized his engaged activities were in the
context of the production of agricultural products, being both soil enhancement
and compost production, and being an "agricultural producr, his agricultural land
use could not be regulated. It is agriculturally oriented, not commercially
oriented, You cannot call this a "commercial" anything; it is an agricultural
pursuit, developing an agricultural product, generated in an agricultural
production operation. Once we had achieved that unconditional clarification and
understanding with Ada County, the issue was then properly focused, and Mr.
Gibson then embarked on a four-year period of litigation with Ada County, over
the fundamental issue whether Mr. Gibson's placement of various items of
personal property on the premises, constituted the unauthorized operation of a
"junkyard", {because of certain appearances) under the Ada County Ordinance
Provisions, not otherwise regulated and restrained by agricultural production
restraints. This was an interesting dispute, and ultimately in February 1995, Mr.
Gibson prevailed on the issue at the Supreme Court, and that settled the final
challenge Ada County had with the appearance and/or operations and activities
on the premises. It's been a settled issue for over a decade now, and curiously,
your letter is sent, apparently after being contracted by Tim Merrill, whose mother
is engaged in a dispute with Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson does rely upon the facts, circumstances, code provisions,
Idaho statutes, agricultural production, and definitions of agricultural products,
allowed uses, accessory uses, purposes, settled issues, representations,
inducements, understandings, and nature of his activity and/or operations
undertaken on the property since 1991, and continuously thereafter, and each of
these factors control his legal relationship, rights, responsibility and involvement
with Ada County, and he would therefore respectfully decline your suggestion or
recommendation he must now undertake action to pursue a CUP, in order to
comply with Ordinance 426, Ada County Code, subsection 8-1A-1., concerning
what you have chosen to call a "commercial" composting facility. Mr. Gibson
went through that debate 12 years ago, back when the land was zoned AP-2 and
it was concluded he was right in his stance. The decisions then made, and
applied to this AP-2 Zone region, also would constitute "grandfather" rights, even
if we didn't have the statue prohibiting the attempt to regulate a condition of the
premises.·
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Simply stated, the county cannot enact any ordinance that deprives the
full and complete use of agricultural land for the production of any agricultural
product. The Department of Agricultural has defined "composting" as being
under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Agriculture, and has defined
composf as a soil amendment, as an "agricultural product", and is also
addressed and defined by the State Tax Commission as an "agricultural product•,
exempt from sale's tax, citing the State's sales tax agricultural product
exemption.
Possibly your analyses must be revisited, as you must come to
understand that a composting process, under any definition, where the intended
purpose is to produce soil amenities for use on surrounding properties or even
for possible future sale, could never be considered the legitimate subject of
regulation by the County, as the compost is, and always will be, an agricultural
product, and if it ever were put on the market for sale, it remains tax exempt by
the State Tax Commission because of its definition, and every producer has the
right to sell his agricultural product.
Mr. Gibson's historic objective was to generate materials sufficient to
develop enriched soil composition on the site to a depth of 2 feet, so he could
adequately plant, grow and produce quality enriched nursery stock, including
trees, grasses, shrubs and flora species in his agricultural pursuit as authorized
under Title 22, Chapter 45, Idaho Code, specifically§§ 22-4501,02,03, & 04, and
under State law criteria, creating local land use planning restraints on Counties,
under Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code, specifically § 67-6529.
Mr. Gibson has only recently been confronted with the possible need to
relocate his materials because of this developing ownership dispute. Mr. Gibson
is currently in a dispute with Lydia Merrill over the issues of possession and
ownership of the property, and should he ever decide to relocate his agricultural
products, he may consider the option of sale of some of his agricultural product. ·
You must appreciate, given the clear language set forth in § 67-6529, Idaho
Code, the "full and complete use" as it relates to agricultural land, necessarily
and inherently includes the right to sell the agricultural product, as it may be
produced. All hay, grain, high moisture corn, ensilage, mint, onions, potatoes,
sweet com, cantaloupe, honey dew melons, watermelons, cabbage, cauliflower,
broccoli, tomatoes, peppers, beans, peas, artichoke, brussels sprouts,
asparagus, squash, pumpkins, sunflowers, apples, pears, peaches, apricots,
cherries, prunes, plums, grapes, corn stocks, and all of their related bi-products,
such as fruit tree smoke wood, firewood, straw, chaff, beet pulp, corn cobs, mint
sludge, hay silage, grass and fodder, ensilage, dried raisins, dried prunes,
vintage wines, vinegars, alcohols, ethanol, cider, grass clippings, leaves, and all
animal wastes (manure) and crop decompositions (humus-compost) are all
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"agricultural products", accepted by all State departments as unquestioned
"agricultural products". This vegetable, fruit and legume production can be
further refined with the introduction of bacteria to re-structure its elements to
create "compost•, the fundamental essence and "mother" source that creates all
agricultural products. In essence, compost is the most elemental and basic of all
agricultural products, as it contains all of the elemental, nutritional, and biological
ingredients necessary to foster and produce all flora growth and plant life.
The right to farm, right to enhance soil, and right to generate compost for
that soil, and the unconditional right to sell any product produced on that land, is
a natural right, inherent throughout all civilization and fully protected under Idaho
Law. It is not only recognized as a fundamental right throughout the State of
Idaho (§§ 67-6529 and 22-4501, Idaho Code) but also it is decreed no
ordinance, zoning, restraint, nuisance or otherwise, shall be enacted to restrict
any such agricultural operations (§§ 67-6529 and 22-4501, Idaho Code).
It' remains Mr, Gibson's position the compost materials are an agricultural
product, protected and preserved under Idaho Law, regarded as tax exempt by
the State Tax Commission and defined and controlled by the State Department
of Agriculture, and Ada County shall not impose any condition on this authorized,
fundamental land use, now or in the future, as that has been statutorily
addressed years ago to prevent this attempted regulation, and specifically
developedio prohibit any regulation.
Should you find it beneficial to discuss this matter further, we remain
available to participate in further discussion for resolution of this re-surfacing
issue from your department, and should you find need for an audience with us,
then so advise, and we will accommodate your scheduling needs. Until then, I
remain,
Yours very truly,

Vernon K, Smith
VKS/jmg

000295

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
(208) 345-1129
Fax:

SEP ~, 0 2010

,

V

J . DAVlD NAVARRO, Ci8,:,;
Sy A. GARDE.i,l

CIVIL DIVISION
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY''
'
OFFICF

1,fP1lf',·

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)

ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Idaho,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
V.

THE ESTATE OF VERNIN K. SMITH,
VICTORIA H. SMITH, AND
VERNON K. SMITH
Defendant(s)

Case No. CV0C-1002298
AFFIDAVIT OF
VERNON K. SMITH

)

______ _______ _ __)
STATEOFIDAH O
County of Ada

)
) ss:
)

VERNON K. SMITH, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That Affiant is the Attorney of record for each of the Defendant(s) in the above entitled

proceeding, and the statements contained herein are based upon Affiant's personal knowledge
and those facts known to him from his personal involvement.
2.

That Affiant is a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho; has been actively engaged in a law

practice in Idaho continuously since 1971; that Affiant resides in the City of Boise, Ada County,
State of Idaho.

EXHIBIT

AFFIDAVIT of VERNON K. SMITH

P. 1
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3.

That the individual Defendant in this action, Victoria H. Smith, is the actual owner of the

"property", being described in Ada County's Complaint, and Mrs. Smith is currently
and has held ownership to the property, initially as a community property interest with her
husband, Vernon K. Smith, Sr., before his death in 1966, and thereafter has held exclusive
ownership as the sole heir of her late husband's estate.
4.

That Vernon K. Smith, Jr., affiant herein, is the son of Victoria H. Smith, and pursuant to his

Durable and Irrevocable Power of Attorney, affiant Vernon K. Smith, Jr., is responsible for the
management and well being of the assets of his mother.
5.

That the "property" as it has been referred to by Ada County, is a small portion of a larger

parcel of dryland grazing farm land, which in total consists of 520 acres, and is located in the area
referred to generally as the Gowen Field Desert Front, west of the Pleasant Valley Road, and that
total acreage is contained within the Rural Preservation District, zoned RP, and Defendant(s)
property consists of three quarter sections (160 acres each), which are three contiguous 160 acre
parcels, along with one additional parcel that is a one sixteenth section, being a 40 acre parcel of
land.
6.

That Plaintiffs Complaint, when it refers to the "property", is an attempt to generally

describe an area that is approximately 10 acres in size, and part of what they have described to be an
80 acre parcel, being a portion of the west (Wl/2) of the NW Quarter (NW 1/4) of Section 5,
Township 2, North Range 2E, Boise Meridian. It is the northwest portion where the 10 acres of that
80 acre parcel of land is located, and where the individual named David R. Gibson has been allowed
to continue his "compost process" of leaves, grasses and crop trimmings in his organic humus
development process since August, 2004.
7.

That for tax reference purposes, the 80 acre parcel of land has a tax parcel identification

number of S1505220000. Affiant has attached the tax assessments and classification of the entire
520 acres of land, which has been classified as agricultural land. Within that 10 acre portion of that
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80 acre parcel of land, David R. Gibson has undertaken to maintain his long standing agricultural
activity, what generally is described by him and commonly referred to by the Department of
Agriculture as his organic agricultural composting operation, whereby, and in such a composting
process, he takes leaves, grass clippings, and crop trimmings and mixes and turns that product ona
scheduled routine, and adds to that material mixture quantities of water, and through that
composting process, he eventually turns that mixture of vegetative product into what the
Department of Agriculture calls a humus product, or leaf mold, being an agricultural soil
amendment product, which is identified within Mr. Gibson's certification with the Idaho
Department of Agriculture, as identified in the registration and certification he receives annually,
attached to his affidavit and this affidavit.
7.

In the month of August, 2004, David R. Gibson, a long standing producer of these

agricultural humus products, was given permission by your affiant, Vernon K. Smith, Jr., to locate
his organic agricultural activity onto this 10 acre parcel of land, as he had to relocate from the 20
acres where he had been conducting his ongoing agricultural business since 1991. where That 20
acre parcel of land is approximately 660 feet to the west of this 10 acre parcel of property, and it
was court ordered that his personal property, equipment and humus product was to be from that 20
acres, as the Merrills were declared the titled owners of the land. The Merrills, wanted Mr. Gibson
to vacate the property, so they could take and hold exclusive possession of the land.
8.

Mr. Gibson was allowed to move onto this 10 acre parcel of property, to serve as a

convenience to Mr. Gibson, as a result of his need to immediately relocate his organic product
agricultural activity, due to the dispute_ with the Merrill's and the issue of ownership of that 20 acre
parcel of land. When the court declared the Merrills to be the titled owners in that litigation, the
court then directed the Merrills to remove Mr. Gibson's property from the 20 acre parcel of land and
deliver it to over onto this 10 acre parcel of property owned by Defendant(s), as it was affiant's

'

desire to accommodate Mr. Gibson's need to move, and in that manner it was to be a temporary
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location for Mr. Gibson's operation, but the activity was an allowed activity in that immediate urban
area of this rural preservation zoned district.
9.

Mr. Gibson had obtained his permission to relocate onto the 10 acre parcel of land from

Vemon K. Smith, who at the time was Mr. Gibson's counsel of record in some of the ongoing
litigation Mr. Gibson had with the Merrills, and that permission was given so as to accommodate
the immediate relocation of his personal property and agricultural activity from the 20 acre parcel,
since Defendant(s) property was in a very convenient location, and it did resolve that immediate
need. The District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Darla S. Williamson, in part of that
process, then directed the Merrills to undertake to move all of Mr. Gibson's product, his personal
property, equipment, and his agricultural operations from the 20 acre parcel premises to
Defendant(s) 10 acre parcel, where Mr. Gibson was then permitted to continue his operation to
produce his agricultural product, just as he had been doing in that rural preservation district since
1988. The court order was intended to require the Merrills to deliver all of Mr. Gibson's property,
with the Merrills having the reserved right to later apply to the court for reimbursement of the cost
of the removal expenses, so the location of Defendant(s) land was critical to the situation in order to
minimize the expense of moving this personal property and equipment, as the close proximity of
Defendant(s) property would provide the Merrills the convenience of a short distance to conduct
that relocation process.
10.

Mr. Gibson has conducted his agricultural operations, utilizing this organic composting

process, for 22 years in this Rural Preservation District, and both the 20 acre parcel and
Defendant(s)' 10 acre parcel are classified as agricultural land, and although the concept of a
conditional use permit was discussed in 1991 and 2003, the operation has never been required to
obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) to be issued before the operation was allowed to occur. It has
always been affiant's belief and that of Mr. Gibson that his agricultural activity is an· act of
"farming", as he is producing an organic product to be use in plant development and soil
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amendment, as his affidavit defined. It has been affiant's belief, that as a matter of Idaho law,
"Right to Farm Act" has declared by the Idaho Legislature that farming type activities and
agricultural operations are to be a "natural" right, and such operations are recognized as a "permitted
use of land" throughout the State of Idaho, and would not require any special or conditional use
permit, as it is a permitted use already, and the Land Use Planning Act adopted by the Idaho
Legislature would appear to preclude the impositio9,_.-0fii restriction or duty to obtam
/

//

use permit as a condition to conduct such an a icultural operation.

Dated this 30th day of September 2010.

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBEDTO AND BEFORE ME, this 30th day of September, 201 .

\

Notary Pubiyc for Idaho
Residing at: 'Bloise
Commission Expires: 6/03/2014
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

th

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 30 day of September 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses
as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered

Ada County Prosecuting Att~ey
(
200 W. Front Street
\
(
Boise, Idaho 83702
~

)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax

/led

l/"f

.............
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Robert H. McQuade

ASSESSMENT NOTICE

Ada County Assessor
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702-7300
adacountyassessor.org

For any questions, please notify the Assessor's Office immediately

PARCEL DESCRIPTION:

(208) 287-7236
asfiscll@adaweb.net
s PLEASANT VALLEY RD
BOISE ID 83705

Assessor's Telephone Number:

E2NW4
SEC 5 2N 2E

Parcel Address:

S1505210000

*************5-DIGIT 83714
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Appeals of your property value must be filed in
writing, on a form provided by the County, by:

June 22, 2009

SMITH VERNON K
5933 N BRANSTETTER ST
GARDEN CITY ID 83714-1108

Tax Code Area:

233
Parcel Number:

Sl505210000

ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY
CURRENT DESCRIPTION

DRY GRAZING

SUBTOTAL:
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION:
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE:

LOTS/ACRES

LAST YEAR'S VALUE

CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE

80.400

3,600

3,300

80.400

3,600
0
3,600

3,300
0
3,300

These values may not include personal property values. Taxes are based on the values shown on this Notice and on the Budgets of the taxing districts.

TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION
PHONE NUMBER

TAXING DISTRICTS

(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)

ADA COUNTY
PEST EXTERMINATION
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DIST
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARY
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT
COLLEGE OF WESTERN IDAHO

287-7000
577-4646
287-2950
387-6120
854-4029
362-0181
577-4646
562-3299

DATE OF PUBLIC
BUDGET HEARING

7-21-2009
7-21-2009
7-21-2009
8-26-2009
6-8-2009
8-25-2009
7-21-2009
8-18-2009

See the back of this Notice for details

THIS IS

A

000302
APPRAISALS SHOULD REFLECT MARKET VALUE AS OF 1/1/2009.
Please direct HOMEOWNERS & Circuit Breaker calls to 287-7200

THIS IS NOT A BILL.
DO NOT PAY.

2009

Robert H. McQuade

ASSESSMENT NOTICE

Ada County Assessor
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702-7300
adacountyassessor.org

For any questions, please notify the Assessor's Office immediately

PARCEL DESCRIPTION:

(208) 287-7236
asfiscll@adaweb.net
s PLEASANT VALLEY RD
BOISE ID 83705

Assessor's Telephone Number:

W2NW4
SEC 5 2N 2E

Parcel Address:

S1505220000

*************5-DIGIT 83714
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Appeals of your property value must be filed in
writing, on a form provided by the County, by:

June 22, 2009

SMITH VERNON K
5933 N BRANSTETTER ST
GARDEN CITY ID 83714-1108

Tax Code Area:

233
Parcel Number:

Sl505220000

ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY
CURRENT DESCRIPTION

DRY GRAZING

SUBTOTAL:
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION:
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE:

LOTS/ACRES

LAST YEAR'S VALUE

CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE

80.540

3,600

3,300

80.540

3,600
0
3,600

3,300
0
3,300

These values may not include personal property values. Taxes are based on the values shown on this Notice and on the Budgets of the taxing districts.

TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION
TAXING DISTRICTS

PHONE NUMBER

(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)

ADA COUNTY
PEST EXTERMINATION
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DIST
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARY
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT
COLLEGE OF WESTERN IDAHO

THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT PAY.

287-7000
577-4646
287-2950
387-6120
854-4029
362-0181
577-4646
562-3299

DATE OF PUBLIC
BUDGET HEARING

7-21-2009
7-21-2009
7-21-2009
8-26-2009
6-8-2009
8-25-2009
7-21-2009
8-18-2009

See the back of this Notice for details

000303
APPRAISALS SHOULD REFLECT MARKET VALUE AS OF 1/1/2009.
Please direct HOMEOWNERS & Circuit Breaker calls to 287-7200

01183 k4\JT-2009

THIS IS NOT A BILL.
DO NOT PAY.

2009

Robert H. McQuade

ASSESSMENT NOTICE

Ada County Assessor
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702-7300
adacountyassessor.org

For any questions, please notify the Assessor's Office immediately

PARCEL DESCRIPTION:
Assessor's Telephone Number:

E2NE4
SEC 7 2N 2E
#8305406

Parcel Address:

104857 S1507110000

(208) 287-7236
asfiscll@adaweb.net

S COLE RD
BOISE ID 83709

*************5-DIGIT 83714
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SMITH VERNON K
5933 BRANSTETTER ST
GARDEN CITY ID 83714-1108

Appeals of your property value must be filed in
writing, on a form provided by the County, by:

June 22, 2009
Tax Code Area:

233
Parcel Number:

S1507110000

ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY
CURRENT DESCRIPTION

DRY GRAZING

SUBTOTAL:
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION:
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE:

LOTS/ACRES

LAST YEAR'S VALUE

CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE

80.000

2,700

2,500

80.000

2,700
0
2,700

2,500
0
2,500

These values may not include personal property values. Taxes are based on the values shown on this Notice and on the Budgets of the taxing districts.

TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION
TAXING DISTRICTS

PHONE NUMBER

ADA COUNTY
PEST EXTERMINATION
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DIST
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARY
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT
COLLEGE OF WESTERN IDAHO

(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)

287-7000
577-4646
287-2950
387-6120
854-4029
362-0181
577-4646
562-3299

DATE OF PUBLIC
BUDGET HEARING
7-21-2009
7-21-2009
7-21-2009
8-26-2009
6-8-2009

8-25-2009
7-21-2009
8-18-2009

i

THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT PAY.

See the back of this Notice for details

000304
APPRAISALS SHOULD REFLECT MARKET VALUE AS OF 1/1/2009.
Please direct HOMEOWNERS & Circuit Breaker calls to 287-7200

011S3~\JT-2009

THIS IS NOT A BILL.
DO NOT PAY.

2009

Robert H. McQuade

ASSESSMENT NOTICE

Ada County Assessor
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702-7300
adacountyassessor.org

For any questions, please notify the Assessor's Office immediately

PARCEL DESCRIPTION:

{ 2 08} 2 87 -7242
rstolz@adaweb.net
s PLEASANT VALLEY RD
BOISE ID 83705

Assessor's Telephone Number:

SW4SE4
SEC 32 3N 2E
#430000 R

Parcel Address:

S1032438400

*************5-DIGIT 83714
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SMITH VERNON K
5933 N BRANSTETTER ST
GARDEN CITY ID 83714-1108

Appeals of your property value must be filed in
writing, on a form provided by the County, by:

June 22, 2009
Tax Code Area:

42
Parcel Number:

S1032438400

ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY
CURRENT DESCRIPTION

DRY GRAZING

SUBTOTAL:
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION:
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE:

LOTS/ACRES

LAST YEAR'S VALUE

CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE

40.000

1,800

1,700

40.000

1,800
0
1,800

1,700
0
1,700

These values may not include personal property values. Taxes are based on the values shown on this Notice and on the Budgets of the taxing districts.

TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION
TAXING DISTRICTS

PHONE NUMBER

(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)

ADA COUNTY
PEST EXTERMINATION
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DIST
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARY
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT
COLLEGE OF WESTERN ID.AHO

THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT PAY.

287-7000
577-4646
287-2950
387-6120
854-4029
362-0181
577-4646
562-3299

DATE OF PUBLIC
BUDGET HEARING

7-21-2009
7-21-2009
7-21-2009
8-26-2009
6-8-2009
8-25-2009
7-21-2009
8-18-2009

See the back of this Notice for details

000305
APPRAISALS SHOULD REFLECT MARKET VALUE AS OF 1/1/2009.
Please direct HOMEOWNERS & Circuit Breaker calls to 287-7200

THIS IS NOT A BILL.
DO NOT PAY.

2009

Robert H. McQuade

ASSESSMENT NOTICE

Ada County Assessor
200 West Front Street
Boise, ID 83702-7300
adacountyassessor.org

For any questions, please notify the Assessor's Office immediately

PARCEL DESCRIPTION:

(208) 287-7236
asfiscll@adaweb.net
s PLEASANT VALLEY RD
BOISE ID 83705

Assessor's Telephone Number:

SW4
SEC 5 2N 2E

Parcel Address:

Sl505310000

*************5-DIGIT 83714

I1•• 1••• II, I, .. I,. ,II, I,. 1... 11 ••• 1111 ••• 1.. 1••• 11 ••• 11 .... 111

Appeals of your property value must be filed in
writing, on a form provided by the County, by:

June 22, 2009

SMITH VERNON K
5933 N BRANSTETTER ST
GARDEN CITY ID 83714-1108

Tax Code Area:

233
Parcel Number:

S1505310000

ASSESSED VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY
CURRENT DESCRIPTION

DRY GRAZING

SUBTOTAL:
LESS HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION:
NET TAXABLE PROPERTY VALUE:

LOTS/ACRES

LAST YEAR'S VALUE

CURRENT YEAR'S VALUE

160.000

7,200

6,600

160.000

7,200
0
7,200

6,600
0
6,600

These values may not include personal property values. Taxes are based on the values shown on this Notice and on the Budgets of the taxing districts.

TAXING DISTRICT INFORMATION
TAXING DISTRICTS

PHONE NUMBER

(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
(208)
{208)
(208)

ADA COUNTY
PEST EXTERMINATION
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DIST
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
ADA COMMUNITY LIBRARY
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT
COLLEGE OF WESTERN IDAHO

287-7000
577-4646
287-2950
387-6120
854-4029
362-0181
577-4646
562-3299

DATE OF PUBLIC
BUDGET HEARING

7-21-2009
7-21-2009
7-21-2009
8-26-2009
6-8-2009
8-25-2009
7-21-2009
8-18-2009

See the back of this Notice for details

THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO NOT PAY.

000306
APPRAISALS SHOULD REFLECT MARKET VALUE AS OF 1/1/2009.
Please direct HOMEOWNERS & Circuit Breaker calls to 287-7200

Ol l B3 ~~NT-2009

•

•

,

VERNON K. SMITH

ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No.1365
Telephone (208) 345-1125
Facsimile (208) 345-1129

RECEIVED
1APR 2 ·4 2008'
ADA COUNTY
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

April 23, 2008
Ada County Development Services
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
RE: YOUR FILE REGARDING:
Pleasant Valley Desert Farm Property, Alleged Commercial Composting located east of
Pleasant Valley Road, South of Lake Hazel extension.
Parcel NO. S1505220000; Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E. BM:
Zones AP, RUT, RP.
ATIN: Sidney Anderson
Code Enforcement Specialist
Dear Mr. Anderson:
On April 15, 2008, you sent a letter addressed to Vernon K. Smith, David Gibson,
and Black Diamond Composting, claiming the existence of a large scale production of
composted materials, you claim intended for sale and use on premises, other than where
such compost is produced, and for that alleged event you contend the definition of A.C.C.
8-lA-1 applies, and a violation of A.C.C. ,8-2A-1 is now being alleged to exist, for failure
to secure a conditional use pennit for the alleged operation of a Commercial Composting
Facility.
Your letter then threatens with the likely future event the matter will be turned
over to the Ada County Prosecutor's office to pursue a violation, in the event the property
is not brought "into compliance" by applying for a conditional use permit by April 30,
2008.
For your convenience, I enclose a copy of a letter I before sent to ACDS and Mr.
Michael J. Williams, a county code enforcement specialist, as it related to this exact same
subject matter inquiry. I thought that response I made in 2003 resolved the inquiry and
issue over the ordinance.
EXHIBIT

D
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In light of your current inquiry, I spoke to Mr. Gibson and he indicated he had

discussed the matter with you, and thought that dialogue with you again resolved the
current inquiry, as you might not have been familiar with the letter to Mr. Williams in
2003. In the event his efforts have not brought the matter to resolution, let me state
formally that my position remains as I before stated it in my letter of February 24, 2003
to Michael J. Williams, a copy of which is enclosed for your review and for that of the
County Prosecutor's office.
Additionally, as a convenience to your effort in developing a factual assessment
of the situation, it is important for you to understand this site is not intended to be a
permanent location for the ongoing creation of the composted materials in question. As
you may be aware, Mr. Gibson held possession and perceived ownership to a 20 acre
parcel of property just North and West of this property in question, and by court order, he
was divested of his perceived ownership, and was ordered off that 20 acre parcel, and the
Merrills, who then were declared the lawful owners of that parcel, were ordered by the
court to remove all of Mr. Gibson's personal property (including his 50,000 cubic yards
of composted materials) and to deliver all of it to this temporary site made available on
the Smith Property. That removal and relocation process was to be commenced in
September, 2004. This site remains under court order as the depository site for that court
ordered removal process, and the Merrills have failed to complete the mandated delivery
to date, and have failed to abide by the court's order, and most of the property subject to
delivery still remains on the Merrill premises, and because of that fact, these parties have
been in litigation in recent months, and I believe litigation will be ongoing for some
period of time to come.
In the meantime, Mr. Gibson continued to receive city and county leaves
delivered to the temporary site by Boise City and ACHD, for the intended use to blend it
with the awaited delivery of the composted product from the Merrill premises in 20042005. Mr. Gibson had no choice but to begin the process of composting the new
materials, as he before did at the old site under his agricultural exemption as identified in
the February 24, 2003 letter.
I realize Mr. Gibson has the desire to someday bag and distribute his composted
materials on a wholesale and/or retail venture, given the quality of his humus product, but
as of the present date, he has no immediate plans of any large scale commercial
production of a packaged product for use and sale to be conducted from this premises.
The compost is being stored, blended, or produced on this site as an agricultural product.
He did in earlier months undertake a screening process, hand bag approximately 300 bags
of humus materials as a sample product to distribute to interested outlets for them to
examine the nutrient, texture, solubility, and salinity specifications under available
product consideration in the market industry to determine who would be interested in
what he had for product. That endeavor was limited to a small quantity for analysis only,
and was completed months ago.
My objective has been to provide Mr. Gibson with a temporary site, to enable him
to make a transition from his 20 acre parcel he operated for 12 years, to another parcel he
can acquire to continue his life long dream and business venture.
Consequently, this site is temporary and will be used and maintained as an interim
destination, for product preservation, and for providing him the opportunity to keep his
contributing source of leaves, grass and such similar materials, should he elect in the

2
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future to receive delivery of his other quantities of composted materials from the Merrill
premises.
I am not interested in either the endorsement of a large scale commercial process
of a composting facility as you envision, or in participating in the venture as a capital
contributor for such an operation. However, that being said, you must understand I have
become involved to help Mr. Gibson, not abandon his need and current dependency on a
place to store his materials, and I will stand firm on my efforts to assist him, and do
adamantly stand firm on the legal principles I announced in my earlier correspondence of
February 24, 2003.
I have no desire to apply for or to secure a conditional use permit for this
property, and do respectfully decline your invitation to do so as a means to avert any
further scrutiny of the legal and factual a.st~ts--c,t,"Otti~m.cems, or in an effort to avoid
further dialogue and encounter ov
potential dispute.
, an
st
Your courtesies and past respect ave been genuinely appr ·
continue our informal communic tions as we work our ay through the fo
present concern. Should you need discuss the ma r further, you may con
office (345-1125) or on my cell phon 440-2466) d until then, I remain

VKS/vlj
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February 24, 2003

Ada County Development Services
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Re: Letter of January 30, 2003
David Gibson
300 Rose Hill
Boise, Idaho 83705
Concerning: Composting Facility location in T3N, R2E, Sec 31, W2SE4SE4
Attn:

Michael J. Williams
Code Enforcement Specialist

Dear Mr. Williams:
Your letter of January 30, 2003, has been received by Mr. Gibson, and he
brought it to my office for preparation of his response, as I was familiar with the
past events and his involvement with Ada County in 1991, and in various
proceedings as the years followed.
Mr. Gibson did initially apply for a CUP in 1991, as he was first told by
staff members that may be the needed course of action. Mr. Gibson did not then
question their opinion, and he did not then review the law to realize it was
unnecessary, in light of the facts, and statutory limitations prohibiting County
Commissioners from enacting an ordinance or resolution that would deprive any
land owner or land operator of full and complete use of agricultural land for
production of any agricultural product (see§ 67-6529, Idaho Code). His intended
use was an allowed and accessory use, as a matter of law, intended for
production of agricultural products, always being the reason for his presence and
operation, and what his intended purpose was then, and at all times thereafter,
was the production of an agricultural product. Because of that, he was exempt
by virtue of State law as announced in § 67-6529, Idaho Code.

1

I
I

,I
000310

I

•

r

•

Page2
February 24, 2003
He spoke with staff members after he reviewed the law, and spoke also
with some of the commissioners, after the denial of his unneeded application,
and based upon State law, he then withdrew his appeal of the unneeded
application, all of which was done with County, knowledge, blessing, and
approval. There was no need for formal review of his application, as State law
controlled the issue since 1975 (now amended in 2000, but no change, except to
CAFO facilities). With full knowledge of the statute by the County, and being
aware of his operations, the County recognized his engaged activities were in the
context of the production of agricultural products, being both soil enhancement
and compost production, and being an "agricultural product", his agricultural land
use could not be regulated. It is agriculturally oriented, not commercially
oriented. You cannot call this a "commercial" anything; it is an agricultural
pursuit, developing an agricultural product, generated in an agricultural
production operation. Once we had achieved that unconditional clarification and
understanding with Ada County, the issue was then properly focused, and Mr.
Gibson then embarked on a four-year period of litigation with Ada County, over
the fundamental issue whether Mr. Gibson's placement of various items of
personal property on the premises, constituted the unauthorized operation of a
"junkyard", (because of certain appearances) under the Ada County Ordinance
Provisions, not otherwise regulated and restrained by agricultural production
restraints. This was an interesting dispute, and ultimately in February 1995, Mr.
Gibson prevailed on the issue at the Supreme Court, and that settled the final
challenge Ada County had with the appearance and/or operations and activities
on the premises. It's been a settled issue for over a decade now, and curiously,
your letter is sent, apparently after being contracted by Tim Merrill, whose mother
is engaged in a dispute with Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson does rely upon the facts, circumstances, code provisions,
Idaho statutes, agricultural production, and definitions of agricultural products,
allowed uses, accessory uses, purposes, settled issues, representations,
inducements, understandings, and nature of his activity and/or operations
undertaken on the property since 1991, and continuously thereafter, and each of
these factors control his legal relationship, rights, responsibility and involvement
with Ada County, and he would therefore respectfully decline your suggestion or
recommendation he must now undertake action to pursue a CUP, in order to
comply with Ordinance 426, Ada County Code, subsection 8-1A-1., concerning
what you have chosen to call a "commercial" composting facility. Mr. Gibson
went through that debate 12 years ago, back when the land was zoned AP-2 and
it was concluded he was right in his stance. The decisions then made, and
applied to this AP-2 Zone region, also would constitute "grandfather" rights, even
if we didn't have the statue prohibiting the attempt to regulate a condition of the
premises.

000311

•

•

Page 3
February 24, 2003
Simply stated, the county cannot enact any ordinance that deprives the
full and complete use of agricultural land for the production of any agricultural
product. The Department of Agricultural has defined "composting" as being
under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Agriculture, and has defined
compost as a soil amendment, as an "agricultural producf', and is also
addressed and defined by the State Tax Commission as an "agricultural product",
exempt from sale's tax, citing the State's sales tax agricultural product
exemption.
Possibly your analyses must be revisited, as you must come to
understand that a composting process, under any definition, where the intended
purpose is to produce soil amenities for use on surrounding properties or even
for possible future sale, could never be considered the legitimate subject of
regulation by the County, as the compost is, and always will be, an agricultural
product, and if it ever were put on the market for sale, it remains tax exempt by
the State Tax Commission because of its definition, and every producer has the
right to sell his agricultural product.
Mr. Gibson's historic objective was to generate materials sufficient to
develop enriched soil composition on the site to a depth of 2 feet, so he could
adequately plant, grow and produce quality enriched nursery stock, including
trees, grasses, shrubs and flora species in his agricultural pursuit as authorized
under Title 22.z. Chapter 45, Idaho Code, specifically§§ 22-4501,02,03, & 04, and
under State law criteria, creating local land use planning restraints on Counties,
under Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code, specifically § 67-6529.
Mr. Gibson has only recently been confronted with the possible need to
relocate his materials because of this developing ownership dispute. Mr. Gibson
is currently in a dispute with Lydia Merrill over the issues of possession and
ownership of the property, and should he ever decide to relocate his agricultural
products, he may consider the option of sale of some of his agricultural product.
You must appreciate, given the clear language set forth in § 67-6529, Idaho
Code, the "full and complete use" as it relates to agricultural land, necessarily
and inherently includes the right to sell the agricultural product, as it may be
produced. All hay, grain, high moisture corn, ensilage, mint, onions, potatoes,
sweet corn, cantaloupe, honey dew melons, watermelons, cabbage, cauliflower,
broccoli, tomatoes, peppers, beans, peas, artichoke, brussels sprouts,
asparagus, squash, pumpkins, sunflowers, apples, pears, peaches, apricots,
cherries, prunes, plums, grapes, corn stocks, and all of their related bi-products,
such as fruit tree smoke wood, firewood, straw, chaff, beet pulp, corn cobs, mint
sludge, hay silage, grass and fodder, ensilage, dried raisins, dried prunes,
vintage wines, vinegars, alcohols, ethanol, cider, grass clippings, leaves, and all
animal wastes (manure) and crop decompositions (humus-compost) are all
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February 24, 2003
"agricultural products", accepted by all State departments as unquestioned
"agricultural products". This vegetable, fruit and legume production can be
further refined with the introduction of bacteria to re-structure its elements to
create "compost", the fundamental essence and "mother" source that creates all
agricultural products. In essence, compost is the most elemental and basic of all
agricultural products, as it contains all of the elemental, nutritional, and biological
ingredients necessary to foster and produce all flora growth and plant life.
The right to farm, right to enhance soil, and right to generate compost for
that soil, and the unconditional right to sell any product p~oduced on that land, is
a natural right, inherent throughout all civilization and fully protected under Idaho
Law. It is not only recognized as a fundamental right throughout the State of
Idaho (§§ 67-6529 and 22-4501, Idaho Code) but also it is decreed no
ordinance, zoning, restraint, nuisance or otherwise, shall be enacted to restrict
any such agricultural operations (§§ 67-6529 and 22-4501, Idaho Code).
It remains Mr. Gibson's position the compost materials are an agricultural
product, protected and preserved under Idaho Law, regarded as tax exempt by
the State Tax Commission and defined and controlled by the State Department
of Agriculture, and Ada County shall not impose any condition on this authorized,
fundamental land use, now or in the future, as that has been statutorily
addressed years ago to prevent this attempted regulation, and specifically
developed-to prohibit any regulation.
Should you find it beneficial to discuss this matter further, we remain
available to participate in further discussion for resolution of this re-surfacing
issue from your department, and should you find need for an audience with us,
then so advise, and we will accommodate your scheduling needs. Until then, I
remain,
Yours very truly,

Vernon K. Smith

VKS/jmg
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Electronically Filed
10/11/2016 1:41:53 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

__________________

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN EHLERT

)

~

)
)
)
)

DEAN EHLERT being first duly sworn deposes and states that:
1.

I am currently employed by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as the

Ground Water and Remediation Manager for the Boise Regional Office of DEQ and have
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

I have held my current position since July 20, 2015. Prior to taking this position I was the

Solid Waste Program Manager for the State Office ofDEQ commencing on September 5, 1999.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN EHLERT - 1
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In that position I was responsible for statewide administration and enforcement of the "Solid
Waste Management Regulations and Standards," IDAPA 16.01.0600 et. seq. of the Division of
Environmental Quality, Department of Health and Welfare and later the Solid Waste
Management Rules" IDAPA 58.01.06. et seq. of the Department of Environmental Quality.
3.

I was personally involved in the rulemaking procedures that led to adoption of the Solid

Waste Management Rules, and from that point forward I was personally involved in overseeing
statewide implementation and enforcement of the Rules.
4.

In my current position I remain involved in implementation of the Solid Waste

Management Rules due to my previous position as the Solid Waste Program Manager.
5.

Prior to adoption of the Solid Waste Management Rules in 2002, the Solid Waste

Management Regulations and Standards promulgated in 1992 by the Department of Health and
Welfare regulated the operation of composting facilities at IDAPA 16.01.06.008.
6.

During the negotiated rulemaking and process of adopting the Solid Waste Management

Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06. et seq. there was never an intention to change the scope ofregulations
as it related to the application of regulatory authority over composting facilities.
7.

IDAPA 58.01.06.009.01-.03 were intended to apply to composting facilities.

8.

Composting uses biological and chemical decomposition to prepare organic material for a

subsequent re-use and thus meets the definition of a "Processing Facility" in IDAP A
58.01.06.003.32 .
9.

IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii was not intended to exempt composting facilities from

regulation. This exclusion from the definition of solid waste was intended to apply to the
application of crop residue such as com stubble, wheat stubble, potato vine and beet tops to the
fann field so long as the actual return was made for the purpose of achieving agronomic benefit

AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN EHLERT - 2
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to future crops rather than simply disposal of the waste material.
10.

The parenthetical term "(plant)" following the term "crop" in ID APA

58 .01.06.001.03.b.ii. was intended to clarify that the term "crop" meant plant crops rather than
animal crops such as eggs, milk or animal carcasses.
11.

Since promulgation ofIDAPA 58.01.06. et seq. the Department has consistently applied

the requirements ofIDAPA 58.01.06.009 and 58.01.06.012 to facilities such as Black Diamond
Composting that engage in the composting of yard waste.
12.

13.

Examples of this application of the requirements include the following facilities:
a.

Diamond Street Recycling

b.

Dennis O'Brien Composting

c.

Winn' s Compost

In December of 2008, DEQ received an inquiry from Senator Del Raybould regarding a

business, Bio-Environmental Resource Recovery International, LLC (BERRI). This company
proposed to operate a business for the disposal of dead animal carcasses and municipal solid
wastes by composting. DEQ provided an explanation to Senator Raybould concerning how the
Solid Waste Management Rules applied to composting facilities. I assisted Director Hardesty in
drafting a summary letter to Senator Raybould including a flow chart regarding how the Rules
apply to "Processing Factilities." A true and correct copy of Director Toni Hardesty's January 5,
2009 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
14.

On October 4, 2016 I conducted an internet search using the Yahoo™ search engine for

the search term "Black Diamond Composting." Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and
correct copy of screen shot image of a website located at the following URL address:
www.blackdiamondcompost.com and a printable brochure printed from the same website. This
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internet site identifies David Gibson as the founder and president of Black Diamond Composting
and describes that he composts only grass clippings and leaves for up to fourteen years as part of
his operations.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
Dated this

fI

day of October, 2016

Dean Ehlert

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this this / / ~ day of October, 2016

Notary Public in and for the State ofl
Residing at: Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires:
I ~ - /(✓Pl)i,,,O
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _J_}th.y of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN EHLERT by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
______X_ Hand Delivery
Fax (208) 345-1129
eService: vls59@live.com

-----:X-

Christi( J 0 ~
Paralegal
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STATE OF IDAHO

DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

1410 North Hilton• Boise, Idaho 83706 • (208) 373-0502

C.L. "Butch" Otter, Governor
Toni Hardesty, Director

January 5, 2009

The Honorable Del Raybould
3215 N. 2000 W.
Rexburg, ID 83440
RE:

Bio-Environmental Resource Recovery International-LLC (BERRJ) operations in Idaho.

Dear Representative Raybould:
Thank you for the opportunity to review BERRI's request to locate their proposed composting
operations at various locations in Idaho. My staff and I met with representatives of BERRJ on
December 16, 2008. During our meeting we explained how the DEQ Solid Waste Rules
regulate composting operations and discussed BERRI' s pending applications.
BERRI currently has an application pending before the DEQ to compost dead animals at a dairy,
and another application before Southeast District Health to amend its operations plan at the
Rattlesnake Canyon Solid Waste Site to include municipal waste.
At our meeting, we provided BERRI with a copy of our comments to their Rattlesnake Canyon
operations plan. The comments generally outline the additional information that is needed for a
complete operations plan. BERRI indicated that they would provide that information to
Southeast District Health.
My staff has also met with BERRI representatives several times to assist in the application
process for their proposal at the dairy. Staff will continue to be available to provide information
to BERRI in its application process. Staff has provided BERRI a copy of an approved site
application to use as an example, and also provided contact information for the US Fish &
Wildlife Service, US Army Corp of Engineers and the Idaho Dept of Fish and Game.
BERRI has expressed a desire to open several similar compositing sites. Given that the
processing operations proposed by BERRI may be very similar from site to site and be limited to
certain quantities and types of materials, a site application for a different location would
presumably be very similar, varying only because of unique site conditions and public input
opportunities. Thus, after an initial application package is developed, subsequent applications
would likely only require a few changes or additions to their initial application package to
address site specific information related to the location.

EXHIBIT

A
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The Honorable Del Raybould
January 8, 2009
Page2

Finally, BERRI has asked that we consider an exemption from the Solid Waste Management
Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06 for their proposed operation and similar operations. The Solid Waste
Management rules were designed to follow federal criteria as well as to protect human health and
the environment. The rules were drafted with extensive public involvement. To protect surface
water, ground water, and minimize impacts to neighbors due to odors and vectors, each site is
evaluated based on established criteria in the rules, and operations plans are tailored to address
the unique aspects of each site. A regulatory exemption would not provide the necessary
protection to ensure that these types of processing operations would not negatively impact
human health and environment, and would exclude the public from commenting on proposed
operations at new sites.
I have attached a brief overview of the rules governing composting operations and a flow
diagram illustrating how waste characteristics and volumes at composting facilities determine the
level of regulatory oversight by the Department and local health districts.
As you can see, the current Solid Waste Management rules govern composting operations within
a structure that provides flexibility depending on the type and volume of waste the operator
chooses to take, while still protecting human health and the environment.
Please contact me should you have additional questions or wish to discuss the rules'
applicability to BERRI' s proposed composting plans.
Best Regards,

~"~ c___
Toni Hardesty
Director
Cc Paul Kelly

•
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Idaho's Solid Waste Management Rules for Composting Operations
The Solid Waste Management Rules provide four different classifications for composting
operations. The lowest or least restrictive level is the Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) facility.
Facilities composting waste such as unpainted or untreated wood, yard waste, clean paper, sheet
rock, animal manures, plant or crop residue or food waste without meat or animal fats and the
total volume of waste on-site at any one time is 300 cubic yards or less may be classified as a
BRC facility. BRC facilities would need to comply with basic operating standards such as
controlling odor, vectors, and litter. BRC facility owners or operators are also required to
maintain on-site documentation such as a daily log that identifies quantities and types of waste
that verify the BRC status. BRC facilities are not required to obtain Department or health district
approval.
The next classification is a Tier I composting facility. A Tier I composting facility would
manage similar waste however, the volume of waste on-site at any one time is 600 cubic yards or
less. In addition to the operating criteria identified in the BRC level, Tier I composting
operations are required to control storm water and submit a notice to the Department prior to
operating. The notice provides the Department the facility owners' name, physical location of
the operation, facility contact information and type of facility. The notice does not require
Department approval.
Tier II facilities accept a wider range of waste materials and higher volume of waste is allowed
on-site. Tier II facilities are required to receive site, design and operations plan approval prior to
accepting waste. As part of the approval process, a public notice is published to allow citizens
an opportunity to review the site application and submit comments. This is the tier classification
applied to most commercial composting operations in Idaho that are regulated under the Solid
Waste Management Rules.
Tier III facilities are composting operations that are determined by the Department to have a
likely affect on ground or surface water, waste with a high human pathogenic potential or
managing waste in a manner or volume that would likely pose a substantial risk to human health
or the environment. Composting operations falling into this category would be required to install
a liner system under the composting area, install and conduct ground water monitoring and may
be required to control air emissions. Currently, there are no composting facilities in Idaho that
are currently regulated as a Tier III facility.
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Processing (Composting) Facility Guide for Determine Tier Status
Under Idaho's Solid Waste Management Rules
The flow diagram will assist potential processing facility owners and operators determine appropriate
Tier level within Idaho's Solid Waste Management Rules based on waste characteristics and volume of
waste. The flow diagram may not be applicable for processing operations co-located with other solid
waste activities such as landfills or transfer stations. It is highly recommended that processing facility
owners and operators contact their regional DEQ office and local health district to discuss the proposed
processing facility early in their planning process. Site-specific conditions may affect Tier
designation.

Does the processing facility
manage only agricultural waste?

YES

tact the Idaho State
griculture for assist

NO
Does the processing facility manage solid
waste in a manner or volume that is likely
to pose a substantial risk to human health
or environment?

t

YES

J\

NO
NO

Does the processing facility manage solid
waste in a manner or volume that is NOT
likely to pose a substantial risk to human
health or environment?

'(

,

NO

...,

J '

NO

.....

,-

YES

Is the cumulative volume of solid waste at any
one time ~300 cubic yards?

'(

Comply with general & facility-specific
requirements for a Tier TI facility as
specified in the Solid Waste
Management Rules.

YES

Does the facility only process solid waste
including but not limited to unpainted or
untreated wood, yard waste, sheet rock, clean
paper, animal manures, plant or crop residue, or
food waste without meats or animal fat?

''

.....

YES

Is the cumulative volume of solid waste at
any one lime ~600 cubic yards?
'

''

Comply with general & facilityspecific requirements for a Tier
III facility as specified in the
Solid Waste Management Rules

NO

....
r

Comply with the Tier I facility
requirements as specified in Idaho's
Solid Waste Management Rules

YES

Comply with the Below Regulatory Concern
requirements in the Solid Waste Management Rules
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Black Diamond Compost

http://www.blackdiamondcompost.com

Black Diamond Compost Company
The proud producer and packager of all natural FOREST HUMUS brand and
HIGH HUMUS products.

Click here to download an informative flyer on our product.
Where to Buy

Mother nature is the intelligence behind humus, the most versatile substance you can use in your soil.
Although most of what humus is, and how it does what is does for your soil and plants is still a deep
scientific mystery, here are some very important facts that we do know, about our carefully produced
humus products:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

I of3

Humus regulates the biological and non-biological processes in the soil.
Humus improves your soil texture.
Humus helps bind sandy soils and improves moisture retention.
Humus loosens hard clay soils by binding small clay particles into larger aggregates for better
water and oxygen penetration.
Humus is the soils warehouse for elements and compounds essential to your soils microbes and
your plant health. It absorbs and holds these elements as they are available and then slowly
releases them as needed.
Humus helps to neutralize contaminates introduced to your soil.
Humus produced by Black Diamond will not bum your plants - no matter how much you use.
It would take 7-10 bags of high quality compost and at least 10 years to make just 1 bag of our
quality humus product.

!::
m
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http://www.blackdiamondcompost.com/

Black Diamond Compost

PMB 102
Boise, ID 83 705
Contact
Copyright© 2008,2009 Black Diamond Compost
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HOW TO USE:
You may use our humus products as
freely as you wish as a top dress or
tilled into the soiJ. It will not burn.

Start by adding approximately one cup
or more as you desire, to a square
foot-indoor or outdoor. You may do
this as often as you wish. Although
very nutrient rich, it is not meant as a
fertilizer-but just watch the results.

'This steff is bionic.
It 11101-ks JJ)Onders"
Ramon Ysursa,
Bisct!JI Landscape
Boise, Idaho

BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST COMPANY

''P11ts lift back into old soils
and retains moist11re soyou
don't have to water
as 1m1ch"
Robin Canninl,J
Boise homeo1JJner

BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST COMPANY
5120 West Overland, PMB 102
Boise, ID 83705

The proud producer
and packager
of all natural
FOREST HUMUS
brand and
HIGHHUMUS
products.

www.blackdiamon dcompost.com
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BLACK DAIMOND
COMPOST COMPANY
is the proud producer and packager of all natural FOREST HUMUS brand and HIGH HUMUS products. Mother nature is the intelligence behind humus, the most versa tile substance you can use in your soil. Although
most of what humus is, and how it does what
is does for your soil and plants is still a deep
scientific myste1y, here are some ve1y important facts that we do know, about our carefully
produced humus products.
Hw1rns regulates the biological and
non-biological processes in the soil.

•

Humus helps to neutralize contaminates
introduced to your soil.
Humus produced by Black Diamond
will not bum your plants- no matter
how much you use.

It would take 7-10 bags of high quality
compost and at least 10 years to make
just I bag of our quality humus product.

In shmt, we begin with grass and
leaves, as nature would do, and carefully, scientifically mix and nurture
these ingredients into a very special
compost. From this point we tmn and
monitor it for about a decade (current
stock being used is over 14 years old).
With this method, and other proprietary
lore, we have produced a humus product, using NO MANURE, and NO

A NOTE FROM THE FOUNDER AND
PRESIDENT OF BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST COMPANY,

CHEMICALS, that is unsurpassed. We
found that manure added salt and decreased our nutJient values, as well as

DAVE GIBSON:

the chance of adding pathogens. It is

Humus helps bind sandy soils and improves moisture retention.

Soil without humus (not just organic mat-

with our special lore we are able to

ter) cannot sustain any plant life whatso-

bring to you HUMUS with a nutrient

Humus loosens hard clay soils by binding small clay particles into larger aggregates for better water and oxygen
penetration.

ever.

packed lunch box.

Humus improves your soil texture.

Humus is the soils warehouse for elements and compounds essential to your
soils microbes and your plant health. It
absorbs and holds these elements as
they are available and then slowly releases them as needed.

Some people have spent lifetimes

Humus added to

trying to understand the complexities of

yam.soil now can last for decades, even

humus and all its substances. My studies

millennia and keep doing its magic.
Science has not been able to separate,

on hwuus have led me to believe that life is
as dependant on humus as it is on bees-if

or identify, all of the varied humic sub-

not more so. Humus, though uniquely ver-

stances and compounds.

satile in what is known about it, is still as
myste1ious as nature itself. At Black Dia-

make sense to purchase a product that
is complete in the way nature intended,

mond Compost we set about to copy nature

rather than a derivative that is unknown

as closely as possible because we believe

as to what substances may be missing.

that humus made the natural way is far superior and contains the road map that was

Doesn't it

WE SUPPLY THAT
COMPLETE PRODUCT

intended to make healthy soil and plants.
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Electronically Filed
10/11/2016 1:41:53 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

____________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540
)
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF PAULA J.
) WILSON
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
)

I, Paula J. Wilson, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states that:
1.

I am the Administrative Rules Coordinator for the Department of Environmental Quality

(DEQ) and have been since 1994. I am custodian ofDEQ's records compiled under IDAPA
58.01.23.834 and Idaho Code§ 67-5225 and have personal knowledge of the matters herein.
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2.

I certify that the attached rulemaking documents (Exhibits A-R) are official copies from

the rulemaking record for the Solid Waste Management Rules, IDAPA 58.01.06, promulgated
under Docket No. 58-0106-0201 with a final effective date of April 2, 2003.
3.

The attached notices were published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin (Bulletin) as

required by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. In
addition, coinciding with Bulletin publication of the Notices of Proposed Rule, an abbreviated
notice for each rule docket was published in the newspaper of largest circulation in each county.
4.

Prior to initiating rulemaking Docket No. 16-0106-9701 , the Division of Environmental

Quality, Department of Health and Welfare had promulgated in 1992 the "Solid Waste
Management Regulations and Standards" and published them at IDAPA 16.01.06001, et seq. A
true and correct copy of the 1992 Solid Waste Management Regulations and Standards is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

In 1997, the Division of Environmental Quality of the Department of Health and Welfare

commenced the process to revise the Solid Waste Management Regulations and Standards.
Promulgation of this rule was initiated under Docket No. 16-0106-9701 with the publication of
the Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking in the Bulletin on May 7, 1997. A true and correct copy of
the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

Between May 29, 1997 and April 28, 1999, DEQ held 20 negotiated rulemaking

meetings. A true and correct copy of the Negotiated Rulemaking Meeting Timetable and sign-in
sheets from 16 meetings are attached hereto as Exhibit C.
7.

On August 4, 1999, DEQ published a Notice of Proposed rule for Docket No. 16-0106-

9701 in the Bulletin. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
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8.

Between August 4, 1999 and August 25, 1999, DEQ took public comment on the

proposed rule for Docket No. 16-0106-9701.
9.

Effective July 1, 2000, the Division of Environmental Quality of the Department of

Health and Welfare became an independent executive agency denominated the Department of
Environmental Quality. As a result, the numbering for DEQ rule dockets changed from IDAP A
16 to ID APA 58 on July 1, 2000. 16 is the ID APA number for the Department of Health and
Welfare; 58 is the IDAPA number for the Department of Environmental Quality.
10.

On July 4, 2001 , DEQ published a Notice of Vacation of Rulemaking for Docket No. 58-

0106-9701 in the Bulletin (this docket was originally numbered 16-0106-9701). A true and
correct copy of the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit E. The notice states in part:
In August 1999, DEQ published a proposed rule under Docket
No. 16-0106-9701. In response to comments received, DEQ has
revised the proposed rule. The revised proposed rule substantially
varies in content from that which was proposed in August 1999;
therefore, DEQ has vacated the August 1999 proposed rulemaking
and has published the revised proposed rule under Docket No. 580106-0101.
11.

On July 4, 2001, DEQ published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Docket No. 58-

0106-0101. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
12.

On September 5, 2001, DEQ published a Notice of Hearing and Extension of Comment

Period for Docket No. 58-0106-0101 in the Bulletin. A true and correct copy of the notice is
attached hereto as Exhibit G.
13.

On October 18, 2001, DEQ presented a final proposed rule to the Idaho Board of

Environmental Quality (Board) for adoption of a pending rule under Docket No. 58-0106-0101.
Several members of the public attended the meeting and provided comments. After review of the
rule and public comments, the Board did not adopt the rule and returned the rule to DEQ for
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review and revision. A true and correct copy of the minutes of the October 18, 2001 meeting of
the Idaho Board of Environmental Quality is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
14.

On November 8, 2001, DEQ made a recommendation to the Board that the rule be referred

to the Joint Legislative Environmental Common Sense Committee for review and recommendation.
A true and correct copy of the minutes of the November 8, 2001 meeting of the Idaho Board of
Environmental Quality is attached hereto as Exhibit I. The Board directed DEQ to "extend the
public comment period on rule Docket No. 58-0106-0101 and refer the rule to the Environmental
Common Sense Committee for review and recommendations." Board meeting minutes p. 18.
15.

On December 5, 2001, DEQ published a Notice of Extension of Comment Period for

Docket No.58-0106-0101 in the Bulletin. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached hereto
as Exhibit J.
16.

Between July 4, 2001 and December 26, 2001, DEQ took public comment on the

proposed rule for Docket No. 58-0106-0101.
17.

On February 7, 2002, DEQ updated the Board on the status of the rule and gave a report

on the outstanding issues identified by the Joint Legislative Environmental Common Sense
Committee. A true and correct copy of the January 31, 2002 letter to the Board from the
Environmental Common Sense Committee Co-Chairs is attached hereto as Exhibit K. A true
and correct copy of the minutes of the February 7, 2002 meeting of the Idaho Board of
Environmental Quality is attached hereto as Exhibit L. During its presentation, "DEQ requested
the Board delay action on the rules until its April 2002 meeting to allow time to address the
remaining issues" and "to allow interested parties additional time to review the changes to the
rules." DEQ also stated that a "final draft will be provided to the Board for review prior to the
April meeting" and that the "Environmental Common Sense Committee will make a
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recommendation to the Board at the April Board meeting." Board meeting minutes p. 7. The
Board agreed to set an April 2002 meeting date to consider approval of the rules as temporary
rules.
18.

On April 25, 2002, DEQ presented a rule proposal to the Board for adoption as a

temporary rule under Docket No. 58-0106-0201. The Board adopted the temporary rule as
modified during the meeting. A true and correct copy of the minutes of the April 25, 2002
meeting of the Idaho Board of Environmental Quality is attached hereto as Exhibit M.
19.

On June 5, 2002, DEQ published a Notice of Vacation ofRulemaking for previously

proposed rule Docket No. 58-0106-0101 in the Bulletin. A true and correct copy of the notice is
attached hereto as Exhibit N. The notice states in part:
In July 2001, DEQ published a proposed rule under Docket No.
58-0106-0101. In response to comments received, DEQ has
revised the proposed rule. The revised proposed rule substantially
varies in content from that which was proposed in July 2001.
DEQ has vacated the July 2001 proposed rule and has published
the revised proposed rule under Docket No. 58-0106-0201.
20.

On June 5, 2002, DEQ published the Notice of Rulemaking - Temporary and Proposed

Rule for Docket No. 58-0106-0201 in the Bulletin. A true and correct copy of the notice is
attached hereto as Exhibit 0. This publication gives notice to the public that the Board adopted a
temporary rule and that DEQ was commencing proposed rulemaking to promulgate a final rule.
21.

Between June 5, 2002 and July 3, 2002, DEQ took public comment on the proposed rule

for Docket No. 58-0106-0201. On July 2, 2002, DEQ issued a news release extending the July 3,
2002 public comment deadline to July 31, 2002. A true and correct copy of the news release is
attached hereto as Exhibit P.
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22.

On October 17, 2002, DEQ presented the final rule proposal to the Board for adoption as

a pending rule/amendment to temporary rule under Docket No. 58-0106-0201. The final rule
proposal presented by DEQ included revisions made to the initial proposal as a result of public
comments. The Board adopted the pending rule and amended the temporary rule so that the
temporary rule would be the same as the text of the pending rule. A true and correct copy of the
minutes of the October 17, 2002 meeting of the Idaho Board of Environmental Quality is
attached hereto as Exhibit Q.
23.

On December 4, 2002, DEQ published the Notice ofRulemaking- Pending Rule and

Amendment to Temporary Rule (Fee Rule) for Docket No. 58-0106-0201 in the Bulletin. A true
and correct copy of the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit R. This publication gives notice to
the public of the Board's adoption of the pending rule and amendment to the temporary rule. The
pending rule was set to be reviewed by the 2003 Idaho Legislature for approval.
24.

The pending rule was reviewed and approved by the 2003 Idaho Legislature. The final

rule was effective on April 2, 2003. At that time, the temporary rule expired.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Dated tbis

b ay

of October, 2016
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (( ~ ay of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PAULA J. WILSON by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83 702

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
~ Hand Delivery
_ _ Fax(208)345-1129
_L eService: vls59@live.com
_ _

~~

Christine Riggs
Paralegal

·

AFFIDAVIT OF PAULA J. WILSON - 7

000333

TITLE 1
Chapter 6
IDAHO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS MANUAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
01.06000

LEGAL AUTHORITY

01.06001

TITLE

01.06002

SCOPE

01.06003, DEFINITIONS
01.06003,01.
01.06003,02.
01.06003,03.
01.06003,04.
01.06003,05.
01.06003,06.
01.06003,07.
01.06003,08.
01.06003,09.
01 . 06003,10.
01.06003,11.
01.06003,12.
01.06003,13.
01.06003,14.
01.06003,15.
. 01. 06003, 16.
01.06003,17.
01.06003,18 .
01.06003,19.
01.06003;20.
01.06003,21.
01.06003,22.
01.06003,23.
01.06003,24 .
01.06003,25.
01.06003,26.
01.06003,27.
01.06003,28.
01.06003,29.
01.06003,30.
01.06003,31.
01.06003,32.
01.06003,33.
01.06003,34.
01.06003,35.
01.06003,36.
01.06003,37.
01.06003,38.
01.06003,39.

Account
Board
Composting
Conditional Use Permit
Cover Material
Department
Director
Districts
Division
Domestic Solid Waste
Hazardous Solid Waste
Idaho Retreader
Incinerator
Land Fill
Leachate
Lift
Motor Vehicle
Municiple Solid Waste Landfill (MSWLF)
Open Dump
Passenger and Light Truck Tire
Person
Public Waters
Recycling
Residue
Retail Seller of Motor Vehicle Tires and
Wholesale Seller of Motor Vehicle Tires
Reuse
Review Committe
Salvage
Sanitary Landfill
Site
Solid Waste
Solid Waste Management Site
Solid Waste Management System
Tire
N
Transfer Station
en
Waste Tire
O>
Waste Tires Generated in Idaho
N
Waste Tire Collection Site
N
Working Face

>
0
z

EXHIBIT

I

A

000334

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

IDAPA 16.01.06000 CONTENTS

01.06004, REGULATIONS
01.06004,01.
01.06004,02.

Solid Waste Management
Requirements

01.06005, GENERAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SITE OPERATION STANDARDS
01.06005,01. Standards
01.06005,02. Compliance Requirements
01.06006, LANDFILLS
01.06006,01.
01.06006,02.
01.06006,03.
01.06006,04.
01.06006,05.
01.06006,06.

Operational Plan
Location
Depth of Cover
Grading
Seeding
Site Closure

01.06007, INCINERATORS
01.06007,01.
01.06007,02.
01.06007,03.
01.06007,04.

Incinerators
Air Pollution Control Devices
Discharge of Liquid Effluents
Proposed Incinerators

01.06008, COMPOST PLANTS
01.06008,01.
01.06008,02.
01.06008,03.

Use Permits
Air Pollution
Requirements

01.06009, TRANSFER STATIONS
01.06009,01. Use Permit
01.06009,02. Application
01.06010, RECYCLING
01.06011 -- 01.06099

(RESERVED)

01.06100, DISPERSEMENTS FROM THE WASTE TIRE GRANT ACCOUNT
01.06100,01. Reimbursement for Retreading Tires
01.06100,02. Registration of Idaho Retreaders
01.06100,03. Application for Partial Reimbursement
for Retreading
01.06100,04. Processing and Approval of Applications
01.06100,05. Reimbursement for Other Uses of Waste Tires
01.06100,06. Grants to Counties or Contracts With
Private Entities
01.06101

01.06995

(RESERVED)

01.06996

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

01.06997

CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS

01.06998

INCLUSIVE GENDER AND NUMBER

01.06999

SEVERABILITY

000335

-- -

--~-- -- -- --

- - - - -- - --

-------

TITLE 1
Chapter 6 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS
01.06000

LEGAL AUTHORITY. Title 39, Chapters 1, 65 and 74, Idaho
Code, grants authority to the Board of Health and Welfare to adopt, and to the Director, Department of
Health and Welfare, to administer solid waste management and waste tire disposal regulations.
(12 - 25-92)

01.06001

TITLE. These regulations are to be known and cited as
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Rules and Regulations,· Title 1, Chapter 6, "Solid Waste Management
Regulations and Standards."
(12-25-92)

01.06002

SCOPE. These regulations establish requirements applicable to solid waste management and waste tire disposal.
(12-25 - 92)

01.06003, DEFINITIONS.
01.

Account. The Waste Tire Grant Account as established pursuant to Section 39-6505, Idaho Code.
(12-25-92)

02.

Board. The Idaho State Board of
fare .

03.

Composting.
The
biological
decomposition of
organic
waste
under
controlled
conditions.

Health

and Wel( 12 -31-91)

(12-31-91)

04.

Conditional Use Permit. A written authorization
issued by a District which, by its conditions, may
authorize the permittee to construct, install, or
operate facilities and conduct specific activities
in
accordance
with
specified
limitations.
(12-25-92)

05.

Cover Material. Any soil or other suitable material that is used to protect the active portion of
the solid waste management site.
(12-25-92)

06.

Department. The Idaho
Welfare.

Department

of

Health

and

(12-25-92)

07.

Director. The Director of the Department of Health
and Welfare or his designee.
(12-25-92)

08.

Districts. One (1) of the -seven (7) district
health departments which were created by Title 39,
Chapter 4, Idaho Code.
(12-25-92)

09.

Division. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Division of Environmental Quality. (12-25-92)
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IDAPA 16. 01. 06 00~, 10.

10.

Domestic Solid Waste. All solid waste which normally originates in the household.
(12-31-91)

11.

Hazardous Solid Waste. A solid waste that may, by
itself or in combination with other solid waste,
be infectious, explosive, poisonous, highly flammable, caustic, or otherwise dangerous or injurious to human, plant, or animal life.
(12-31-91)

12.

Idaho Retreader. A person who accepts passenger
and light truck tires generated in Idaho and
retreads such tires in Idaho and is registered
with the Division in accordance with Subsection
(12-25-92)
01.06100,02.

13.

Incinerator. A combustion device
specifically
designed for the volume reduction by burning of
combustible community solid wastes.
(12-31-91)

14.

Land Fill. An area of land or excavation in which
solid wastes are placed for permanent disposal and
that is not a land application unit, surface
impoundment, injection well
or
waste
pile.
(12-25-92)

15.

Leachate. A liquid that has passed through or
emerged from waste and contains soluable, suspended, or miscible materials removed from such
waste.
(12-25-92)

16.

Lift. A compacted layer of solid waste plus its
overlying cover material in a sanitary landfill.
(12- 31-91)

17.

Motor Vehicle. Any automobile, motorcycle, truck,
trailer, semitrailer, truck tractor and semitrailer combination or other vehicle operated on
the roads of this state, used to transport persons
or property and propelled by power other than muscular power, but motor vehicle does not include
bicycles.
(12-25-92)

18.

Municipal Solid Waste Landfill (MSWLF) A discrete
area of land or an excavation that receives household waste and that is not a land application
unit, surface impoundment, injection well, or
waste pile, as those terms are defined.under 40
CFR 2~7.2. A MSWLF unit may also receive other
types of RCRA subtitle D wastes, such as commercial solid waste, nonhazardous sludge, small quantity generator waste, and industrial solid waste.
Such a landfill may be publicly or privately
owned. A MSWLF unit also may be a new MSWLF, an
existing MSWLF, or lateral expansion.
(12-25-92)
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19.

Open Dump. A landfill which lacks proper management and is not operated with compaction and
cover.
(12-25-92)

20.

Passenger and Light Truck Tire. Any motor vehicle
tire with a rim diameter of twelve
(12)
inches
through sixteen (16) inches.
(12-25-92)

21.

Person. Any individual, association, partnership,
firm, joint stock company, trust, political subdivision, public or private corporation, state or
federal governmental department, agency or instrumentality, or any other legal entity which is recognized by law as the subject of rights and
duties.
(12-25-92)

22.

Public Waters. Includes lakes, ponds, reservoirs,
springs, wells, rivers, streams, creeks, marshes,
canals, drainage ditches, and all other bodies of
surface or underground waters, natural or artificial, public or . private (except those private
waters which do not combine or effect a junction
with natural surface or underground waters) which
are wholly or partially within or bordering the
State or within its jurisdiction.
(12-31-91)

23.

Recycling. The reclamation of solid waste and its
subsequent introduction into an industrial process
by which the material is transformed into a new
product in s~ch a manner that the original identity as a·product is lost.
(12-31-91)

24.

Residue. All of the solid material remaining after
combustion of solid waste.
(12-31-91)

25.

Retail Seller of Motor Vehicle Tires and Wholesale
Seller of Motor Vehicle Tires. Includes those persons who sell or lease motor vehicles to others in
the ordinary course of business.
(12-25-92)

26.

Reuse. The reintroduction of a product into the
economic stream without total loss of the original
identity.
(12-31-91)

27.

Review Committee. An advisory committee appointed
by the Administrator of the Division of Environmental Quality to establish and/or review the percentages
in
Subsections
01.06100,10.a.
and
01.06100,05.a. and review proposals
submitted
under Subsections 01.06100,05. and 01.06100,06.
(12-25-92)

28

Salvage. The reclamation of solid waste at a disposal site.
(12-31-91)
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29.

Sanitary Landfill. A solid waste disposal operation where the wastes are spread on land in thin
layers, compacted to the smallest practical volume, and covered with cover material once each day
of operation in order to safeguard against environmental pollution, nuisances, and health hazards.
(12-31-91)

30.

Site. A solid waste management site.

31.

Solid Waste. Any material defined by Sections
39-103(10) and 39-7403(51), Idaho Code. (12-25-92)

32.

Solid Waste Management Site. Any land area used
for storage, transfer, processing, separation,
incineration, composting, treatment,
recycling,
reuse, or disposal of solid wastes.
(12-31-91)

33.

Solid Waste Management System. The entire process,
method, or technique used to control solid waste- including generation through reuse, recycling, or
disposal, also including the plans, maps, specifications,
sites and facilities for the same.
(12-31-91)

34.

Tire. Shall have the meaning contained in Section
49-121, Idaho Code.
(12-25-92)

35.

Transfer Station. A fixed or mobile facility used
as an adjunct to a solid waste management system
whereby solid wastes may be recompacted or otherwise processed and transferred from one (1) vehicle or container to another for transportation to
another place.
(12-31-91)

36.

Waste Tire. A tire that is no longer suitable for
its original intended purpose because of wear,
damage or defect.
(12-25-92)

37.

Waste Tires Generated in Idaho. Tires which first
become waste tires in Idaho.
(12-25-92)

38.

Waste Tire Collection Site. A site where waste
tires are collected before being offered for recycling or reuse and where more than one thousand
five hundred (1,500) tires are kept on site on any
day .
. ( 12 - 2 5 - 9 2 )

39.

Working Face" That portion of a sanitary landfill
where solid waste is being dumped and compacted
prior
to placement of daily cover material.
( 12 - 31- 91)

(12-25-92)

01.06004, REGULATIONS.

I

l
(:;
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01.

Solid Waste Management. All solid wastes shall be
managed, whether it be during storage, collection,
transfer,
transport,
processing,
separation,
incineration,
composting, treatment, reuse, recycling, or disposal,
to prevent health hazards,
public nuisances, or pollution of the environment.
( 12 -2 5-92)

02.

Requirements. Solid
that they shall not:

wastes shall be managed such
( 12-2 5- 92)

a.

Provide sustenance to rodents or insects
which are capable of causing human disease
or discomfort.
(6-28-73)

b.

Cause or contribute to the pollution of air.
(6-28-73)

c.

Cause or contribute to the pollution of surface or underground waters.
(6-28-73)

d.

Cause excessive abuse of land.

e.

Cause

or

contribute

to

noise

(6-28-73)

pollution.
(6-28-73)

f.

Abuse the natural aesthetic
area .

g.

Physically impair the environment to the
detriment of man and beneficial plant life,
fish, and wildlife.
(6-28-73)

01.06005, GENERAL

SOLID

WASTE

MANAGEMENT

quality of an
(6 - 2 8 - 73 )

SITE OPERATION STAN-

DARDS.
01.

Standards. All solid waste management sites must
comply with the standards establiished in this
chapter.
(12-25-92)

02.

Compliance Requirements. Solid waste
sites shall comply with the following:

management
(12-25-92)

a.

All-weather
access
roads negotiable by
loaded collection vehicles shall be provided
to the entrance of the site where a public
road does not exist.
(6-28-73)

b.

Provisions shall be made for weighing or
measuring all solid waste delivered to the
site.
(6-28-73)

c.

Communication devices shall be available at
or readily accessible to the site. (6-28-73)

000340

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
d.

IDAPA 16.01.06 005,02.d.

Necessary measures shall be taken to prevent
and extinguish fires.
(6-28-73)
i.

Adequate equipment
for
controlling
fires shall be available at the site or
readily
available
to
the
site.
(6-28-73)

ii.

e.

All eqUipment and buildings shall be
equipped with functional fire extinguishers.
(6-28-73)

Access to the site shall be limited to those
times when an attendant
is
on
duty.
(6-28-73)

i.

Hours of operation and other limitations shall be prominently displayed at
the entrance.
(6-28-73)

ii.

The site shall° be fenced or otherwise
blocked to access when an attendant is
not on duty.
(6-28-73)

iii. Unauthorized vehicles and persons shall
be prohibited access to the
site.
(6-28-73)

f.

Live domestic animals brought to the site in
vehicles shall be confined to the vehicle,
and livestock shall be excluded from the
site by adequate fencing or other acceptable
methods.
(6-28-73)

g.

Unloading of solid wastes shall be controlled for proper operation.
(6-28-73)

h.

Salvaging or recycling
operations
will
require a conditional use permit from the
District. Recycling or salvaging of discarded foods and drugs and scavenging is
prohibited.
(12-25-92)

i.

Vector control procedures shall be carried
out to prevent or control vectors which may
cause health hazards or nuisances. (6-28-73)

j .

Adequate sanitary facilities shall be provided for employees.
(12-25-92)

k.

A daily written log, which lists the types
and quantities of solid waste received, special provisions made for hazardous waste
disposal, and any deviation from the operat000341
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ing plans and specifications shall be maintained by the site operator. Operational
plans
and specifications and daily log
entries shall be made available
during
inspections of the operation to detennine
compliance with the pertinent rules, regulations, and standards.
(12-25-92)
01.06006, LANDFILLS. All landfills shall confonn to the standards
listed under Section 01.06005, and to the following
specific standards for landfill operations:
(12-25-92)
01.

Operational Plan. A plan of operations shall
include details relative to compaction of solid
waste, application of daily cover material, elevation and grade of final cover, management of surface water, traffic control, erosion control, and
revegetation procedures to be used. The plan of
operation shall be adhered to throughout site utilization. A topographic map or maps shall be prepared to distinguish existing site contour characteristics and shall be drawn to a reasonable scale
with two (2) foot contour intervals for the proposed operational area. Where the slope of the
site is not critical, a five (5) to ten (10) • foot
contour interval may be acceptable. The maps shall
be submitted to the District for review and
approval. The map or maps shall include the following
points
of
infonnation
and
record:
(12-25-92)

a.
b.

Property boundaries and direction
tance to the nearest community.

and

dis-

(6-28-73)

Water supplies on or proposed on the site
and within one-quarter (1/4) mile of the
proposed
landfill
site property lines.
(12-25-92)

C.

Borrow areas.

d.

High tension power line rights-of-way,
fuel
transmission
pipeline rights-of-way,
and
proposed and existing utilities.
(6-28-73)

e.

Water courses, ponds, lakes

(6-28-73)

or

reservoirs.
(6-28-73)

f.

Proposed fill area.

(6-28-73)

g.

Total acreage of the site.

(6-28-73)

h.

Proposed or existing fencing.

(6-28-73)

N
a,

O>

N
N

>

0

z
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i.

Proposed and existing structures on the site
and within five hundred (500) feet of any
border of the -site.
(6-28-73)

j.

Off-site and on-site access roads.

(6-28-73)

k.

Grades for proper
drainage devices.

special
(6-28-73)

1.

Proposed employee or public sanitary facilities.
( 6- 2 8 - 73)

m.

Estimated population to be served.

n.

Any
special disposal trenches or areas
(i.e., for hazardous wastes,
animal carcasses,
construction and demolition wastes,
tree trunks and stumps, and car bodies).
(6 - 28 - 73)

o.

Water table test boring holes or wells or
excavations and depth to water table if
encountered.
(6-28 - 73)

p.

Weighing facilities, if present.

(6 - 28 - 73)

q.

Direction of prevailing winds.

(6-28 - 73)

drainage

and

(6 - 28-73)

Location. All landfills shall be located and operated such that solid waste is not dumped directly
into ground or surface waters, and adequate protection shall be provided to prevent the pollution
of ground and surface waters .
(12-25-92)
a.

Surface drainage waters
from the landfill .

shall be diverted
(12-25-92)

b.

Where there is a probability that surface
waters may cause a leachate problem or if a
leachate problem develops, a collection and
treatment
system for leachate shall be
required.
(6-28-73)

Depth of Cover. Except as provided in Subsection
01.06006,03.c., a uniform six (6) inch compacted
layer of cover material shall be placed on all
exposed solid waste before the equipment operator
terminates landfill operations for
the
day.
(12-25-92)

a.

An intermediate layer of cover material,
compacted to a minimum uniform depth of one
(1)
foot shall be placed on completed lifts
in areas where there is clear intention to
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place another lift on top within one (1)
year. Areas to be left longer than one
(1)
year before another lift is added will
require two
(2)
feet of compacted cover
material.
(6-28-73)
b.

A final layer of cover material,
compacted
to a minimum uniform depth of two (2) feet
shall be placed over the entire surface of
each portion of the final lift. Final cover
shall be completed within one (1) week after
the placement of solid waste in the final
lift.
(6-28-73)

c.

MSWLF shall comply with cover requirements
in sections 39-7411(2) and 39-7415, Idaho
Code.
(12-25-92)

04.

Grading. The entire site, including the landfill
surfaces, shall be graded and provided with drainage facilities to minimize runoff onto and into
the sanitary landfill to prevent erosion or washing and to prevent the collection of standing
water. The grading of the final surface of the
fill area must provide a slope of not less than
one percent
(1%), but not exceeding fifteen percent (15%), except as approved by the Department
or as required in Section 39-7415(3), Idaho Code.
(12-25-92)

05.

Seeding. Seeding to promote stabilization of the
final soil cover shall be done as soon as weather
permits seed bed preparation and planting operations and when seasonal conditions are suitable
for the type of vegetation to be used. Re-seeding
is mandatory until adequate vegetative cover is
established to prevent erosion.
(6-28-73)

06.

Site Closure. An inspection of the entire site of
the completed sanitary landfill, or other solid
waste management site that is to be vacated, shall
be made by a representative of the District before
earth moving equipment or other equipment vital to
disposal of solid waste is removed from the site
or used on other projects. Any necessary corrective work shall be performed before the operation
is accepted as completed.
(12-25-92)

a.

b.

;/

An official notice of closure of the site
shall be sent to the District at the time
the site is closed.
(12-25-92)
Arrangements shall be made for the repair of
all cracked, eroded, and uneven areas in the
000344
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final cover during the year
pletion of fill operations.

following

com-

(6-28-73)

01.06007, INCINERATORS.
01.

Incinerators. Incinerators shall be operated under
an air permit issued by the Department. (12 - 25-92)

02.

Air Pollution Control Devices. Air polution control devices shall be sufficient to meet the standards of air
pollution
control
in
Idaho.
(12-25 - 92)

03.

Discharge of Liquid Effluents. All liquid effluents to be discharged to surface or underground
waters of the state shall meet federal and Idaho
water quality standards and requirements including
permit requirements.
(12 - 25-92)

04.

Proposed Incinerators. Any Proposed incinerator
shall meet the requirements of Section 01.06005.
(12-25-92)

01.06008, COMPOST PLANTS.
01.

Use Permit. Compost plants shall be operated under
a conditional use permit issued by the District.
(12-25-92)

Pollution. Air pollution control devices shall
sufficient to meet Idaho Department of Health
Welfare Rules and Regulations, Title 1, Chap1,
"Rules and Regulations for the Contr61 of
Pollution in Idaho. 11
(12-31-91)

02.

Air
be
and
ter
Air

03.

Requirements. Any proposed
meet
the
requirements

compost plant, shall
of Section 01.06005.
(12-25-92)

01.06009, TRANSFER STATIONS.
01.

Use Permit. Transfer stations for solid waste
shall be operated under a conditional use permit
issued by the District.
(12-25-92)

02.

Application. Application
permit
shall
include
01.06005.

01.06010

for a conditional use
the items in Section
(12-25-92)

RECYCLING AND PROCESSING OPERATIONS. A solid waste management site for storage or transfer of solid wastes
for recycling or other processing and treatment, other
than by sanitary landfilling or inceration,
shall
require a conditional use permit issued by the Dis-

N

m

0)
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~

>

0

z:
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01.06011 -- 01.06099

(12-25-92)

(RESERVED).

01.06100, DISBURSEMENTS FROM THE WASTE TIRE GRANT ACCOUNT.
01.

02.

Reimbursement for Retreading Tires.
a.

Ten percent
(10%)
of the funds in the
Account at the close of the previous state
fiscal year may be used for partial reimbursement for waste passenger and light
truck tires generated and retreaded in Idaho
during the current state fiscal year. The
Review Committee may review this percentage
annually and advise DEQ to adjust the percentage if necessary to promote the use of
waste tires.
(12-25-92)

b.

The Divi~ion may limit or eliminate reimbursements if the Division determines they
are not necessary to promote the use of
waste tires.
(12-25-92)

c.

An

Idaho Retreader may apply to the Division
for partial reimbursement from the Account
for retreading waste passenger and light
truck tires generated in Idaho.
(12-25-92)

Registration of Idaho Retreaders.
a.

To qualify as an Idaho Retreader and be eligible for partial reimbursement for waste
passenger and light truck tires generated
and retreaded in Idaho, persons shall register annually with the Division on a form
provided by the Division.
(12-25-92)

b.

The registration shall be effective for one
(1) year from the date of registration.
(12-25-92)

c.

03.

application submitted to the Division
pursuant to Subsection 01.06100,03. shall
not be considered for reimbursement by the
Division if a person has not registered with
the .Division as an Idaho Retreader prior to
or concurrent with the submittal of the
application.
(12-25-92)
An

Application
Retreading.
a.

for

Partial

Reimbursement

~

for$!!
N

To apply for partial reimbursement for waste C\l

>

0
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passenger and light truck tires generated
and retreaded in Idaho, an Idaho Retreader
shall:
(12-25-92)
i.

Utilize
sion;

a

form

provided by the Divi(12-25 - 92)

ii.

Provide adequate documentation to the
Division to demonstrate that the waste
passenger and light truck tires for
which
partial
reimbursement
is
requested were retreaded in Idaho during the state fiscal quarter for which
reimbursement is requested;
(12-25-92)

iii. Provide certification to the Division
that the retreaded tires for which
reimbursement is being requested utilized waste passenger and light truck
tires
generated
in
Idaho;
and
(12-25-92)
iv.

Submit the form and accompanying documentation to the Division no later than
thirty (30) days after the end of each
state fiscal quarter. The applications
shall be postmarked by the following
deadlines:
(12-25-92)
(a)

October
(July,

30

for the first quarter
August,
September);
(12-25-92)

b.

04.

(b)

January 30 for the second quarter
(October,
November,
December);
(12-25-92)

( C)

April 30
(January,

(d)

July 30 for the fourth quarter
(April, May, June).
(12-25-92)

for the third quarter
February, March); and
(12-25-92)

Applications for partial reimbursements may
be submitted to the Division starting with
the first complete state fiscal quarter
after August 27, 1992.
(12-25-92)

Processing and Approval of Applications.
a.

If an application fails to meet the requirements
of
Subsections
01.06100,02.
and
01.06100,03., the application shall not be
000347
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considered for reimbursement by the Division
and the applicant shall be so notified in
writing.
(12-25-92)
b.

. The partial reimbursement shall be one dollar ($1) for each waste passenger and light
truck tire generated and retreaded in Idaho.
However, in the event the amount of eligible
reimbursements requested in any given quarter exceeds the remaining funds available
for reimbursements as established in Subsection 01.06100,01., the Division shall apportion and distribute the remaining funds. The
apportionment shall be calculated by dividing the total amount of eligible reimbursements requested in that quarter by the
remaining funds.
(12-25-92)

c.

Once the funds determined by the Division
pursuant to Subsection 01.06100,01. have
been expended, no further reimbursements
shall be made during that state fiscal year.
(12-25-92)

05.

Reimbursement for Other Uses of Waste Tires.
a.

A percentage of the funds in the Account at
the close of the previous state fiscal year
may be used for partial reimbursement for
the purchase or use of waste tires generated
in Idaho or tire chips, or similar materials
from waste tires generated in Idaho. The
Review Committee may advise DEQ on establishing and adjusting the percentage on an
annual basis as necessary to promote the use
of waste tires.
(12-25-92)

b.

The Division shall partially reimburse persons for the purchase or use of waste tires
generated in Idaho or tire chips, or similar
materials from waste tires generated in
Idaho through a competit~ve request for proposal
(RFP) process. Uses of waste tires
which may be considered for reimbursement
are:
(12-25-92)
i ..

Constructing

collision

barriers.
(12-25-92)

ii.

Controlling of soil erosion or for
flood control only if used in accordance with approved engineering practices.
(12-25-92)
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iii. Chopping or shredding.

(12-25-92)

iv.

Grinding for use in asphalt and as a
raw
material
for
other products.
(12-25-92)

v.

Using

vi.

Incinerating or using as a fuel or
pyrolysis if permitted by law, regulations or ordinances relating to burning
of fuel.
(12-25-92)

as

playground

vii. Hauling to out-to-state
processing sites.
viii.Energy recovery.
ix.

equipment.
(12-25-92)

collection or
(12-25-92)
(12-25-92)

Any other beneficial use, reuse, or
recycling of waste tires, chips or similar material from waste tires generated in Idaho which meets the criteria
set forth by the Division in the RFP.
( 12 -25 -92)

c.

The RFP issued by the Division shall include
the procedures for applying for the reimbursement, the deadline for submitting proposals, and the percentage of funds available
as
established
in
Subsection
01.06100,05.a.
(12-25-92)

d.

The RFP may define a preferred hierarchy of
uses of waste tires, tire chips, and other
similar material which enhance markets for
waste tires and may list other criteria that
may be used to
judge
the
proposals.
(12-25-92)

e.

The Review Committee shall review the proposals and advise DEQ on which proposals are
eligible for reimbursement based on the criteria set forth in Subsection 01.16100,05.d.
(12-25-92)

f.

The Division shall award reimbursements to
eligible persons taking into consideration
the recommendations from the review committee and within the limitation of available
funding collected and maintained in the
Account.
(12-25-92)

g.

The Division shall reimburse

eligible
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sons or entities at the rate of twenty dollars ($20) per ton for purchase or use of
waste tires generated in Idaho or tire chips
or similar materials from waste tires generated in Idaho.
(12-25-92)
h.

Incomplete proposals shall not be considered
for reimbursement by the Division and the
person shall be so notified in writing.
(12-25-92)

i.

06.

The Division shall limit or eliminate reimbursements if the Division determines reimbursements are not necessary to promote the
use of waste tires.
(12-25-92)

Grants to Counties or Contracts With Private Entities.
a.

The Division shall award grants to counties
or contracts with private entiti"es on a competitive basis through a RFP process to do
any of the following, either individually or
collectively:
(12-25-92)
i.
ii.

Contract for a waste
facility service.

tire

processing
(12-25-92)

Remove or contract for the removal of
waste tires from county landfills or
removal of other existing unlawful tire
piles in the state.
(12-25-92)

iii. Establish waste tire collection centers
at solid waste disposal facilities or
waste
tire
processing
facilities.
(12-25-92)
b.

The RFP issued by the Division shall contain
the procedure for applying for the grant or
contract and the deadline for submitting
proposals.
(12-25-92)

c.

Concurrent with releasing a RFP for grants
to counties and contracts with private entities,
the Division may establish criteria
that may be used to judge the proposals.
(12-25-92)
C\J

d.

,

/

7

The Review Committee shall review the proposals and advise DEQ on which proposals are
eligible for awards based on the criteria
set
forth
in Subsection 01.06100,06.c.
(12-25-92)
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e.

The Division shall award reimbursements to
eligible persons taking into consideration
the recommendations from the review committee and within the limitation of available
funding collected and maintained in the
Account.
(12-25-92)

f.

Incomplete proposals shall not be considered
for awards by the Division and the person
shall be so notified in writing.
(12-25-92)

01.06101 -- 01.06995 (RESERVED).
01.06996

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS. Contested case appeals shall
be governed by Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
Rules and Regulations Title 5, Chapter 3, Sections
05.03000 et seq., "Rules Governing Contested Cases and
Declaratory Rulings."·
(12-31-91)

01.06997

CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS. Any disclosure of information obtained by the Department is subject to the
restrictions contained in Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare Rules and Regulations Title 5, Chapter 1,
"Rules Governing the Protection and Disclosure of
Department Records."
(12-31-91)

01.06998

INCLUSIVE GENDER AND NUMBER. For the purposes of these
rules, words used in the masculine gender include the
feminine, or vice versa, where appropriate.
(12-31-91)

01.06999

SEVERABILITY. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
Rules and Regulations, Title 1, Chapter 6, are severable. If any rule or regulation, or part thereof, or
the application of such rule or regulation to any person or circumstance, is declared invalid, that invalidity does not affect the validity of any remaining portion of this chapter.
(12-31-91)
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IDAPA 16 - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE
16.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
DOCKET NO. 16-0106-9701
NOTICE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY: In compliance with Section 67-5220, Idaho Code, and IDAPA 04.11.01.810 through .815, notice is
hereby given that this agency intends to promulgate a rule and desires public participation in an informal, negotiated
rulemaking process prior to the initiation of formal rulemaking procedures by the agency. The action is authorized by
Sections 39-105 and 39-107, Idaho Code.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The following is a statement in nontechnical language of the purpose and substance
of the negotiated rulemaking and the principle issues involved:
The proposed negotiated rule will define and clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Health and
Welfare, Division of Environmental Quality (Department) and the district health departments for the management of
non-municipal solid waste. The purpose of the rule is to clarify roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in
regulating non-municipal solid waste and to establish a consistent statewide application of the rules. The principal
issues involved in the non- municipal solid waste rulemaking are what types of solid wastes need to be regulated, who
will be responsible to regulate these non-municipal solid wastes and what is the process for making an application for
a permit to operate a non-municipal solid waste landfill. The interests likely to be affected by this rulemaking are
generators of non-municipal solid waste, which may include industry, cities, counties, highway departments,
commercial establishments, and others.
The text of the rule will be developed by the Department in conjunction with a negotiating committee made up of
persons having interests in the development of this rule. Persons interested in participating in the negotiated
rulemaking process are encouraged to attend a preliminary meeting to be held on May 29, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. in
Conference Room B of the Division of Environmental Quality, 1410 N. Hilton, Boise, Idaho. Interested persons may
also participate in the negotiated rulemaking process by submitting written comments as provided below. After the
preliminary meeting is held and interested persons and the relevant issues are identified, it is expected that a series of
meetings will be held in an attempt to reach a consensus with regard to the text of the rule.
The goal of the negotiated rulemaking process will be to develop by consensus the text of a recommended rule. If a
consensus is reached, a draft of the rule, incorporating the consensus and any other appropriate information,
recommendations, or materials, will be transmitted to the Department for consideration and use in the formal
rulemaking process. If a consensus is unable to be achieved on particular issues, the negotiated rulemaking process
may result in a report specifying those areas on which consensus was and was not reached, together with arguments
for and against positions advocated by various participants. At the conclusion of the negotiated rulemaking process,
the Department intends to commence formal rulemaking with the publication of a proposed rule, using and taking
into consideration the results of the negotiated rulemaking process. The final rule is expected to be in place and
effective upon the conclusion of the 1999 session of the Idaho Legislature.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS:
For assistance on questions concerning the negotiated rulemaking, contact Barry Burnell at (208)373-0502.
Anyone may submit written comments regarding this proposal to initiate negotiated rulemaking. All written
comments must be received by the undersigned on or before May 28, 1997.
Dated this 7th day of May, 1997.

Paula Junae Saul
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
Fax No. (208)373-0481

May 7, 1997
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Solid Waste Management Rules and Standards
Negotiated Rulemaking - Docket No. 0106-9701
Meeting Timetable

3/24/97

DEQ requests the Office of Administration to publish a notice of negotiated
rulemaking.

5/7/97

DEQ publishes Notice ofNegotiated Rulemaking in Bulletin Volume No. 97-4.

5/29/97

DEQ holds initial meeting of Negotiating Committee.

6/24/97
7/29/97
9/23/97_
11/12/97
.1/14/98
2/25/98
4/l/98
·5/6-7/98
6/2-3/98
6/30/98
8/5-6/98
9/24/98
.10/20/98
12/1/98
1/27/99
2/24/99
. 3/30/99
4/15/99
A/28/99

DEQ conducts negotiated rulemaking meetings.

DEQ conducts final negotiated rulemaking meeting.

*This schedule was prepared solely as a general guidance tool. It is a record of the times in
which DEQ conducted negotiated rulemaking meetings.
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IDAPA 16 - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE
16.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
DOCKET NO. 16-0106-9701
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE

AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221(1), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this agency has
proposed rulemaking. The action is authorized by Chapters 1 and 74, Title 39, Idaho Code. In this rulemaking, the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Division of Environmental Quality (DEQ) proposes to adoption of a new
rule in conjunction with the proposal repeal of the current rule (Docket No. 16-0106-9901), as described in the
descriptive summary below.
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE: Public hearing(s) concerning the proposed adoption of a new rule and the
proposed repeal of the current rule (Docket No. 16-0106-9901) will be held as a statewide, interactive video
teleconference originating in Boise, Idaho on August 18, 1999 at 7:00 p.m. (6:00 p.m. PDT). A representative
from DEQ will be at each site to facilitate the hearing. The allotted time for the hearing will be distributed evenly
between the six sites. The interactive public hearing will enable the participants to listen to comments that are being
made throughout the state, not just the comments that are made at their hearing site.
Hearing locations are:
J. R. Williams Bldg. (Hall of Mirrors)
East Conference Room
700 W. State
Boise, Idaho

College of Southern Idaho
Evergreen Bldg. Room C91
315 Falls Ave.
Twin Falls, Idaho

Idaho State University
Library Room B78
850 S. 9th
Pocatello, Idaho

Center for Higher Education
Room 314
1776 Science Center Dr.
Idaho Falls, Idaho

Work Force Training Center
Room 108
525 W. Clearwater Loop
Post Falls, Idaho

Lewis & Clark State College
Sam Glenn Bldg. Room 50
500 8th Ave.
Lewiston, Idaho

The hearing site(s) will be accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for accommodation must be made not
later than five (5) days prior to the hearing. For arrangements, contact the undersigned at (208)373-0418.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The proposed negotiated rule defines and clarifies the requirements for the
management, processing, waste handling, and disposal of non-municipal solid waste. The proposed rule identifies
waste types that are not regulated by this rule, establishes a solid waste management facility classification system, and
identifies the regulatory requirements for each classified facility. The proposed rule clarifies the content of solid waste
management facility applications and states the application review and approval process. The proposed rule lists the
general siting and general operating requirements for facilities and establishes ground water monitoring and financial
assurance requirements for some facilities. The proposed rule clarifies the closure requirements for facilities. The
proposed rule establishes specific criteria for processing facilities, identifies additional requirements for waste
handling operations at incinerators and transfer stations, and identifies additional requirements for non-municipal
solid waste land fill facilities . The proposed rule also establishes a procedure to implement corrective action at
facilities that have caused a significant increase of contaminants above background levels.
DEQ is specifically asking for public comments regarding the list of proposed waste types exempt from this rule. The
negotiated rulemaking committee recommended to the DEQ that the rule not include the following waste types, as
proposed in Subsection 001.03.b.:
v.

Slag from the production of elementaf phosphorus.

vi.

Phospho-gypsum from the production of phosphate fertilizers, which includes the production of
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phosphoric acid.
The proposed rule also reestablishes the commercial solid waste siting license fee . DEQ was directed by the
Legislature (Section 39-7408C, Idaho Code) to adopt a siting license fee to cover the cost incurred by the DEQ when
reviewing a commercial solid waste siting application. This fee was approved by the 1999 Legislature and no changes
were made to this portion of the existing Solid Waste Management Rules and Standards.
Coinciding with the publication of the proposed new rule, DEQ is proposing repeal of the current rule under Docket
No. 16-0106-9901. The proposed actions have been scheduled so that both actions, once adopted by the Board of
Health and Welfare and approved by the Legislature, will take effect simultaneously.
After consideration of public comments, DEQ intends to present the final proposal to the Board of Health and
Welfare in November 1999 for adoption of a pending rule. The rule is expected to be fmal and effective upon the
conclusion of the 2000 session of the Idaho Legislature.
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: The text of the rule is based on a consensus recommendation resulting from the
negotiated rulemaking process. The negotiation was open to the public. Participants in the negotiation included
industry and government representatives. The Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking was published in the Idaho
Administrative Bulletin, Volume 97-5, May 7, 1997, page 47.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit DEQ's web site at
www.state.id.us/deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For
assistance on technical questions concerning this rule, contact Barry Burnell at (208)373-0502 or
bburnell@deq .state.id.us.

Anyone can submit written comments by mail, fax or e-mail at the address below regarding this proposed rule. All
written comments must be received by the undersigned on or before August 25 , 1999.
DATED this 23rd day ofJune, 1999.

Paula Junae Saul
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N . Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
Fax No. (208)373 -0481
psaul@deq.state.id.us

THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DOCKET NO. 16-0106-9701
IDAPA 16
TITLE 01
Chapter 06

16.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
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IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01 .06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-9701
(This docket was originally numbered 16-0106-9701)
NOTICE OF VACATION OF RULEMAKING

AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221(1), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this agency has
vacated this rulemaking previously initiated under this docket. The action is authorized by Chapters 1 and 74, Title 39,
Idaho Code.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The following is a summary of the reasons for vacating this rulemaking:

In August 1999, DEQ published a proposed rule under Docket No. 16-0106-9701. In response to comments received,
DEQ has revised the proposed rule. The revised proposed rule substantially varies in content from that which was
proposed in August 1999; therefore, DEQ has vacated the August 1999 proposed rulemaking and has published the
revised proposed rule under Docket No. 58-0106-0101.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit DEQ's web site at
www.state.id. us/deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For
assistance on technical questions concerning this vacation of rulemaking, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502 or
dehlert@deq.state.id.us.

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2001.

Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-125 5
(208)373-0418
Fax No. (208)373-0481
pgradwoh@deq.state.id.us
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IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01 .06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0101 (REWRITE)
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221(1), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this agency has
proposed rulemaking. The action is authorized by Sections 39-105, 39-107 and 39-7408C, Idaho Code.
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE: Public hearing(s) concerning this proposed new rule and the proposed repeal of
the current rule (Docket No. 58-0106-0102) will be held as a statewide, interactive video teleconference originating in
Boise, Idaho on July 31, 2001 at 7:00 p .m. MDT (6:00 p.m. PDT). A representative from DEQ will be at each site to
facilitate the hearing. The allotted time for the hearing will be distributed evenly between the six sites. The interactive
public hearing will enable the participants to listen to comments that are being made throughout the state, not just the
comments that are made at their hearing site. Hearing locations are:
J. R. Williams Bldg. (Hall of Mirrors)
East Conference Room
700 W. State, Boise, Id

College of Southern Idaho
Evergreen Bldg. Room C95
315 Falls Ave., Twin Falls, Id

Idaho State University
Eli M. Oboler Library Room B35
850 S. 9th, Pocatello, Id

ISU Center for Higher Education
Room 314
1770 Science Center Dr., Idaho Falls, Id

North Idaho College
Molstead Library Room 270
1000 W. Garden Ave., Coeur d'Alene, Id

Lewis & Clark State College
Sam Glenn Bldg., Room 50
500 8th Ave., Lewiston, Id

The hearing site(s) will be accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for accommodation must be made not
later than five (5) days prior to the hearing. For arrangements, contact the undersigned at (208)373-0418.

DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: In this rulemaking, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) proposes
the adoption of a new rule in conjunction with the proposed repeal of the current rule (Docket No. 58-0106-0102).
The purpose of this rulemaking is to address non-municipal solid waste as directed by the Joint Legislative Task Force
on Environmental Common Sense Initiative. The proposed rule will provide statewide consistency for non-municipal
solid waste management, ensure proper management of non-municipal solid waste, and provide specific siting and
operational requirements based on volume of waste, waste characteristics, type of waste management facility, and
potential impact to human health and the environment. The proposed rule provides an application submittal process
for owners and operators and provides DEQ with an application review and approval process.

In 1996 DEQ was directed by the Legislature (Section 39-7408C, Idaho Code) to adopt a siting license fee to cover
the cost incurred by DEQ when reviewing a commercial solid waste siting application. This fee was approved by the
1999 Legislature. The commercial solid waste siting license fee found at Section 994 of the existing Solid Waste
Management Rules and Standards has been included in this proposed rule.
Coinciding with the publication of this proposed rule, DEQ is proposing repeal of the current rule (published under
Docket No. 58-0106-0102). The proposed actions have been scheduled so that both actions, once adopted by the
Board of Environmental Quality and approved by the Legislature, will take effect simultaneously.
After consideration of public comments, DEQ intends to present the final proposal to the Board of Environmental
Quality in October or November 2001 for adoption of a pending rule. The rule is expected to be final and effective
upon the conclusion of the 2002 session of the Idaho Legislature.

NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: The text of the rule has been drafted based on discussions held and concerns
raised during a negotiation conducted pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5220 and IDAPA 04.11.01.812-815. The
negotiation was open to the public. Participants in the negotiation included industry and government representatives.
The Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking was published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin, Volume 97-5, May 7,
IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN
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1997, page 47, under Docket No. 16-0106-9701.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ 's programs and activities, visit DEQ's web site at
www.state.id.us/deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For
assistance on technical questions concerning this rulemaking, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502 or
dehlert@deq .state.id.us .

Anyone may submit written comments by mail, fax or e-mail at the address below regarding this proposed rule. DEQ
will consider all written comments received by the undersigned on or before August 3, 2001.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2001.
Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton, Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208)373-0418/Fax No. (208)373-0481
pgradwoh@deq.state.id.us

THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0101

IDAPA 58, TITLE 01, Chapter 06
58.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES
000.
LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Sections 39-105 and 39-107, Idaho Code, authorize the Board of Environmental Quality to adopt rules and administer
programs to protect surface water quality, ground water quality and air quality, and to regulate solid waste treatment
or disposal and the licensure and certification requirements pertinent thereto. Section 39-7408C, Idaho Code,
authorizes the Board of Environmental Quality to establish by rule municipal solid waste commercial siting license
fees.
(
)
001.

TITLE AND SCOPE.

01.
Title. These rules shall be cited as Rules of the Department of Environmental Quality IDAPA
(
)
58.01.06, "Solid Waste Management Rules".
02.
Scope. These rules establish requirements applicable to all solid waste and solid waste management
(
)
sites in Idaho, except as specifically provided in Subsection 001.03.
03.
Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules. These rules do not apply to the following solid wastes
provided that the wastes are not mixed with wastes otherwise regulated by these rules:
(
)

a.
Liquid wastes the discharge or potential discharge of which is regulated under a federal, state or
local water pollution or wastewater land application permit, including management of any solids if management of
the solids is a permit term or condition;
(
)
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IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0101
NOTICE OF HEARING AND EXTENSION OF COMMENT PERIOD

AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221(1), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this agency has
proposed rulemaking. The action is authorized by Sections 39-105, 39-107 and 39-7408C, Idaho Code.
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE: A public hearing concerning this proposed rulemaking will be held as follows:
September 11, 2001, 6:30 p.m.
Department of Environmental Quality
Large Conference Room
900 N. Skyline, Suite B
Idaho Falls, Idaho
The hearing site(s) will be accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for accommodation must be made not
later than five (5) days prior to the hearing. For arrangements, contact the undersigned at (208)373-0418 .

DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The proposed rule was published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin, Volume O1-7,
July 4, 2001, pages 167 thrnugh 193. On July 31, 2001, a public hearing was broadcast statewide through interactive
video teleconferencing. Because of technical difficulties, the Idaho Falls and Pocatello sites were unable to participate
in the public hearing. In order to give those sites an opportunity to attend a public hearing, DEQ has scheduled
another hearing and extended the comment period through September 14, 2001.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit DE Q 's web site at
www.state.id. us/ deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For
assistance on technical questions concerning this rulemaking, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502 or
dehlert@deq.state.id. us.
Anyone may submit written comments by mail, fax or e-mail at the address below regarding this proposed rule. DEQ
will consider all written comments received by the undersigned on or before September 14, 2001.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2001.

Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208)373-0418/Fax No. (208) 373-0481
pgradwoh@deq.state.id.us
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State of Idaho

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Board of Environmental Quality

1410 North Hilton, Boise, ID 83706-1255, (208) 373-0502

Dirk Kempthorne, Governor
C. Stephen Allred, Director

IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
MINUTES

October 17 & 18, 2001
The Board of Environmental Quality convened on October 17, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. at:
Shilo Inn Convention Center
780 Lindsay Boulevard
Idaho Falls, Idaho
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
· Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ST AF.F PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Jon Sandoval, Chief of Staff
Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Bill Jerrel, Loan Programs
Jim Johnston, Idaho Falls Regional Administrator
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Kathleen Trever, !NEEL Oversight Program
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OTHERS PRESENT:

David Atkinson, Ph.D, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL)
Jack Barraclough, Idaho State Representative
Bill Becker, INEEL
Robert Breckenridge, INEEL
Jay Calderwood, Teton County Commissioner
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Lisa Green, Department of Energy (DOE)
Dennis Green, DOE
Melinda Hamilton, INEEL
Peggy Hinman
Alan Jines, DOE Public Affairs
Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining Assoc.
Clay Nichols, DOE
Donald Rasch, DOE
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
Ralph J. Steele, Bonneville County Commissioner
❖

All attachments referenced in these minutes are permanent attachments to the minutes on file
at the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.

Work Session
Kathleen Trever, State Coordinator of INEEL issues and head of the INEEL Oversight
Program, presented a brief overview of the program and introduced staff from the Department of
Energy and INEEL. Lisa A. Green, DOE, presented a slide presentation (Attachment 1) and
Bob
discussed the history of INEEL, its missions, current focus, and infrastructure.
Breckenridge, Manager of INEEL Ecological and Cultural Resources Department, presented a
slide presentation (Attachment 2) on advances in ecological and cultural sciences. David A.
Atkinson, Ph.D, INEEL, discussed the new technology used for odor detection, Ion Mobility
Spectrometry (Attachment 3). Melinda Hamilton, INEEL, gave a slide presentation (Attachment
4) and discussed how biotechnology is developing biological solutions to the challenges of the
DOE's environmental, energy, and national security missions. Russ Hertzog, Ph.D, gave a
presentation on advances in sensor technologies related to subsurface science and how they are
utilized at INEEL (Attachment 5).
The Board adjourned at 12:00 p.m. for a working luncheon where it heard a presentation
(Attachment 6) by Larry Koenig, Administrator, DEQ State Planning and Special Projects. Mr.
Koenig discussed the draft goals and issues for the department.
Board members and staff attended a brief tour of the INEEL Oversight Program monitoring
station, then returned to the Shilo Inn Convention Center and reconvened its work session at 2:00
p.m. DEQ staff briefed the Board on the rule dockets to be presented at the Board meeting on
October 18, 2001. No motions were made or passed and no votes were taken during the work
session.
The meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m.
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October 18, 2001
Joint Work Session with the Idaho Water Resource Board

The Board of Environmental Quality members and staff joined the Idaho Water Resource
Board (IWRB) for a joint work session at 9:30 a.m. on October 18, 2001 at the Shilo Inn
Convention Center. All Board members were present with the exception of Marguerite
McLaughlin, who was absent and excused.
Bill Graham, Water Planning Bureau Chief, Idaho Department of Water Resources and
Hal Anderson, Administrator of the Planning and Technical Services Division for IDWR, gave
slide presentations on the IWRB's financial programs (Attachment 7).
Dave Mabe,
Administrator of the DEQ State Water Quality Program and Bill Jerrel, DEQ Loan Program
Manager, provided an overview of DEQ's financial programs. Dick Wyatt, IWRB member,
explained their water master plans. Jim Wrigley, Wells Fargo Bank, discussed water project
funding and explained ways the two boards might be able to coordinate joint funding of projects.
Board members and staff discussed the growing demands placed on small water and sewer
systems by federal regulations, and the need to coordinate and make the application process
easier. Joe Jordan, Chairman of the IWRB, stated his support for joint funding and coordination
of the application process.
Staff presented overviews of the IWRB and DEQ planning programs. Bill Graham gave
an overview of the Comprehensive State Water Plan process and Dave Mabe talked about the
TMDL process. Nate Fisher, Office of Species Conservation, provided information on the
subbasin planning process. Opportunities to coordinate planning and information gathering
activities were discussed.
Karl Dreher, Director of IDWR, discussed rev1s10ns to the Underground Injection
Control rules requested by the Environmental Protection Agency . . The EPA has requested six
significant changes to the rules for the state to retain primacy of the program. The IDWR is
working to develop rules that will meet the needs of the EPA and the IDWR.
Director Steve Allred and Director Karl Dreher both stated their support for collaboration
and coordination of efforts. DEQ will look at better ways to coordinate efforts with the IDWR
and the IWRB. Director Allred stated there is great need and confusion in small communities
and water systems regarding regulations and opportunities for funding projects. Director Dreher
stated he would some day like to see a consolidation of activities to combine the sub basin plans
of the Northwest Power Planning Council, the State Water Plans, and the TMDL process into
one effort and one document.
The joint work session adjourned at 12:00 p.m.
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The Board of Environmental Quality convened on October 18~ 2001 at 1:00 p.m.:
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Jon Sandoval, Chief of Staff
Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator State Waste Management & Remediation
Bill Jerrel, Loan Programs Manager
Barbara Jewell, Remediation Environmental Regional Manager
Jim Johnston, Idaho Falls Regional Administrator
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Melissa Thompson, Water Quality Science Officer
Kathleen Trever, INEEL Oversight Program
OTHERS PRESENT:

David Atkinson, Ph.D, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL)
Jack Barraclough, Idaho State Representative
Bill Becker, INEEL
Robert Breckenridge, INEEL
Jay Calderwood, Teton County Commissioner
Alice M. Campbell, Upper Valley Rep. Women
Darwin Casper, Jefferson Co. Commissioner
Karla Covington, private citizen
Michael Covington, private citizen
Roy Eiguren, Givens Pursley, on behalf of American Ecology
Beth Elroy, Monsanto
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Lisa Green, Department of Energy (DOE)
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Dennis Green, DOE
Melinda Hamilton, INEEL
Peggy Hinman, private citizen
Chad Hyslop, Amstran Ecology
Alan Jines, DOE Public Affairs
Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining Assoc.
Clay Nichols, DOE
Scott Nicholson, American Ecology
Teresa Perkins, DOE
Steve Pief, private citizen
Donald Rasch, DOE
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
Kortney Rush, Post Register
Ralph J. Steele, Bonneville County Commissioner
PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD - THE BOARD ALLOWS UP TO 30 MINUTES FOR THE PUBLIC TO
ADDRESS THE BOARD ON ISSUES NOT SPECIFICALLY SHOWN AS
AGENDA ITEMS.

No comments were received.

AGENDAITEMN0.1:

a.

ADOPTION OF MINUTES

May 25, 2001 Board Meeting

► MOTION:

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the minutes of the May 25, 2001 Board meeting be
adopted as prepared.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)
b.

June 14, 2001 Board Meeting

► MOTION: Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the minutes of the June 14, 2001 Board meeting be

adopted as prepared.
SECOND: Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)
AGENDA ITEM No. 2:

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

Nick Purdy nominated Don Chisholm as chairman, No other nominations were received.
► MOTION:

Marti Calabretta moved Don Chisholm be elected chairman of the Board by
acclamation.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

Dr. Randy MacMillian nominated Paul Agidius as vice chairman. No other nominations
were received.
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OCTOBER 17 & 18, 2001 M1NuTES- PAGE 5

000395

► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved Paul Agidius be elected vice chairman of the Board by
acclamation.
SECOND: Marti Calabretta
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

Paul Agidius nominated Marti Calabretta as secretary. No other nominations were
received.
► MOTION:

Nick Purdy moved Marti Calabretta be elected secretary of the Board by
acclamation.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

AGENDA ITEM NO.

3:

DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Director Steve Allred reported substantial progress is being made in the air permitting
program. A schedule was set at the beginning of this fiscal year to clear up the backlog. The
program is on schedule. He distributed a report prepared for the Joint Finance and
Appropriations Committee on air quality permitting activities from July 1 through September 30,
2001 (Attachment 8).
·
Director Allred also briefly discussed the proposed clean-up plan for the Coeur d'Alene
Basin, the status of court actions regarding the TMDL process, actions being taken by DEQ to
ensure adequate safety and security procedures, and possible affects of holdbacks on DEQ's
budget.
Director Allred distributed a report, Nitrates in Ground Water A Continuing Issue for
Idaho Citizens, (Attachment 9) and stressed his continuing concern for groundwater quality.
There are specific areas within 22 of 44 counties in Idaho where a pollutant is in excess of the
drinking water standards. People who live in rural areas and have individual domestic wells are
most at risk. The Director emphasized this situation is entirely unacceptable and must be turned
around. All activities within DEQ are now required to consider the impact on groundwater
quality. This problem developed over many years, and it will take many years to resolve. DEQ
is encouraging the cities, counties, and other non-governmental organizations to help on the front
end by designing best management practices, programs, zoning, etc. to help solve the problem
and develop solutions.
AGENDA ITEM No.

4:

RULES FOR NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT, DOCKET No.
0101 {PENDING RULE)

58-0116-

Dave Mabe, Administrator, State Water Quality Program, explained the purpose of this
docket is to repeal the rules because statutory authority no longer exists. During the 2000
legislative session, Senate Bill 1426 was passed creating the Department of Environmental
Quality. In addition to several technical corrections, SB1426 deleted Section 39105(3)(0), Idaho
Code, which contained authority for the adoption of a state nutrient management plan and
promulgation of rules to implement the plan. No comments were received on the proposal to
repeal the rules; however, a request for a public hearing was received. A meeting was held with
the parties requesting the hearing to explain the reason for the repeal of the rules and discuss
alternative tools being used to protect groundwater quality. The request for hearing was then
withdrawn.
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► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board repeal the Rules for Nutrient Management as
presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0116-0101.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

AGENDA ITEM No. 5:

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO,
DOCKET No. 58-0101-0102 {PENDING RULE)

Kate Kelly, Administrator, State Air Quality Program, explained this docket amends the
air quality rules to add a sentence to the section dealing with petroleum remediation efforts. That
section allows the rapid and effective remediation of petroleum spills and leaks into soil and
groundwater while protecting the environment and public health. However, there is a potential
conflict with Section 513 of the air rules dealing with good engineering practices and dispersion
techniques in permitting sources with stacks. In order to allow DEQ the flexibility and discretion
to continue to deal with petroleum remediation, this conflict must be resolved. No comments
were received on the proposed rule change.
► MOTION:

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt the Rules for the Control of Air
Pollution In Idaho as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0101-0102.
SECOND: Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

AGENDA ITEM NO.

6:

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO,

DocKET No.

ss-0101-0103 {PENDING RuLE)

Kate Kelly reported this docket is an amendment to the rules to provide clarification
regarding Section 861, Standards of Performance for Hospital/Medical/Infectious Waste
Incinerators. In 1999 DEQ promulgated Section 861, as directed by the Legislature in§ 39-128,
Idaho Code.
This proposed rule simply clarifies that all owners or operators of
hospital/medical/infectious waste incinerators subject to Section 861 must comply with the
provisions of §39-128, Idaho Code. The proposed rule also updates citations to the federal
regulations incorporated by reference to July 1, 2001 in order to maintain conformance with
EPA's regulations as well as fulfilling the requirements of Idaho's delegation agreement with
EPA under Section 112(1) of the Clean Air Act. No comments were received.
► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt the Rules for the Control of Air
Pollution in Idaho as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0101-0103.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

AGENDA ITEM No. 7:

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO,
DOCKET No. 58-0101-0002 {PENDING RULE)

Kate Kelly explained the Board adopted this rule last summer as a temporary rule. The
rule creates a "permit by rule" which is a streamlined permitting process for portable equipment
such as rock crushers and asphalt plants. The temporary rule has been in place since June 2001
and has been used by several facilities. A few minor changes were made to the rule as a result of
public comments.
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Marti Calabretta questioned whether the rule dealt with situations such as the temporary
asphalt plant that caused the problems Michael Covington experienced in Jefferson County. Ms.
Kelly stated she was not familiar with the situation in Jefferson County. She noted it was not
unusual for rock crushers and asphalt plants to locate together on a project.
► MOTION:

Nick Purdy moved the Board adopt the Rules for the Control of Air Pollution in
Idaho under Docket No. 58~0101-0002. He further moved that the Board adopt the revisions
included in the final proposal as amendments to the previously adopted temporary rules,
with the amendments becoming effective October 19, 2001.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
DISCUSSION:
Marti Calabretta was uncomfortable with the rule because it was her
understanding that the rule would allow such operations to be set up and self-regulated by
the owners of the operation. She was concerned that the public would not be able to take
complaints and enforcement issues to a regulating authority other than the owners of the
operations, and that enforcement actions would be dependent on the . accuracy of the
complaint logs maintained by the owners. Director Steve Allred clarified the public would
be able to bring complaints to DEQ. The rule does not restrict the public to filing
complaints with the owners. The public is welcome to file a complaint with DEQ and DEQ
would be obligated to investigate the complaint. Director Allred believed the rules would
actually improve enforcement. Ms. Calabretta stated that if, in fact, DEQ would act on a
citizen complaint and not just refer it back to the owner, she could support the rule.
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)

AGENDA ITEM No. 8:

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES, DOCKET No. 58-0106-0101
AND 0102 {PENDING RULE)

Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Program Coordinator for DEQ, advised these rules were
developed at the request of the Joint Legislative Task Force on the Environmental Commonsense
Initiative and went through the negotiated rulemaking process. The negotiated rulemaking
committee was comprised ofrepresentatives from industry, cities, counties, local health districts,
and other state agencies. The proposed rules would regulate non-municipal solid waste landfills,
transfer stations, and solid waste processing facilities. Hazardous waste and municipal waste
have detailed federal regulations and comprehensive state regulations; however, non-municipal
solid waste does not have a comprehensive federal program and is left up to the state. The
proposed rules contain siting, operating, and closure requirements for regulated facilities and
would ensure statewide consistency for non-municipal solid waste management. They would
provide greater protection to groundwater, public health, and the environment. In addition, the
rules would bring consistency and certainty to the management of solid waste and assist the DEQ
regional offices in dealing with current solid waste issues.
Dean Ehlert reviewed revisions made to the proposed rules as a result of discussions in
the work session. They include:
■

•
•

Page 105, Section 001.03.a. - add another exemption reading, Waste otherwise regulated
under department authorities.
Page 106, Subsection b. - regarding slag and phospho-gypsum, delete the words te-be
adopted by the Board from v. and vi.
Page 115, Section O13 - in the last sentence of the first paragraph, correct " ... requirements
of Subsection 013.0lf-prior to facility closure." To read" ... requirements of Subsection
013.01.g.,_ prior to facility closure."
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Director Steve Allred emphasized the proposed rules do not provide new authorities to the
agency and the director. The director already has these authorities by law. There are old rules,
but they are not definitive and leave a tremendous amount of discretion to the director. Director
Allred expressed his concern that people should be able to anticipate what the requirements are
and that those requirements are applied uniformly. He was also concerned that counties and
others are undertaking substantial financial investments without any degree of certainty that
those investments will be found to be within the laws. Under the current situation, regulatory
actions are taken against enterprises after the fact. He felt it was an important role of
government to provide guidance up front.
Nick Purdy questioned why the rules on page 106, Section 001.03.b.iii., exempt agricultural
solid waste "which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department
of Agriculture only when such rules are at least as protective of human health and the
environment as these rules". Mr. Purdy felt the exemption was too open ended and left too much
to judgment. Dean Ehlert stated the exemption was included as a result of some issues DEQ
dealt with involving cull onion and potato dumping. The Department of Agriculture rules
dealing with this issue only address the potential impact to crops, they do not address public
health and environment issues. The health districts and DEQ must deal with those issues. Mr.
Purdy asked if the Department of Agriculture could expand their rules to avoid duplication of
efforts. Steve Allred pointed out the Department of Agriculture does not have the authority to
adopt rules for purposes other than plant health. He agreed that it does not make sense to have
several agencies looking at the same issue. They may want to consider revising the laws.
Dr. Joan Cloonan asked for a clarification on Page 111, Section 009.04. Tier III Facility,
regarding the term "hazardous substances." She questioned whether the term was a defined term
in the regulations, and referred only to those substances that are defined as hazardous substances.
Dean Ehlert confirmed that the term hazardous substances is defined under the CERCLA
regulations referenced on Page 107, Section 005.12 of the rules. She further questioned whether
the term "materials" as used in Section 009.04 referred to only materials with high pathogen
potential and not to hazardous materials. Dean Ehlert confirmed that the term materials referred
only to materials with high pathogen potential and not to hazardous materials. The term
"hazardous materials" was used as opposed to the term "hazardous waste," which are regulated
separately. Dr. Cloonan was concerned because if the term hazardous materials were used, it
would be an undefined term. Steve Allred suggested a comma be inserted after the term
hazardous substances for clarity.
Dr. Cloonan also expressed concern with the wording in Section 009.04, " . . . or
· managing solid waste in a manner or volume that the Department determines may form toxic
leachate or gases, or may pose a high risk to human health or the environment." While not as
broad as the old rules, it still allows the Department to determine whether something may pose a
high risk to human health or the environment. There are no particular standards that define that
risk.
Dr. Cloonan asked if it was anticipated that some of the disposal of cull onions and cull
potatoes would fall under the Tier I or Tier II facility requirements. Dean Ehlert advised it
would be handled on a case-by-case basis. A commercial site where greater quantities are
handled would be treated differently than a one-time disposal site where they would handle
volumes such as those listed in the definitions of the tier facilities. There is a possibility to go to
a lower classification under some circumstances.
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Don Chisholm suggested a change be made under the general operating requirements on
Page 119, Section 035.03 to add language to the signs to inform the public what types of waste
are accepted at the site and directing them to alternative sites for other types of waste. This
might alleviate problems with people dumping waste alongside the road or in barrow pits
because they are frustrated. Director Steve Allred agreed and directed the additional language be
added to the rules.
Chairman Chisholm noted that individual conversations with Board members indicate
they feel this rule should be sent back to the Department for additional work and be brought back
to the November Board meeting. He stressed the Board has made no decision, but pointed out
that this would allow for additional comments and discussions with staff. He asked those
considering giving testimony to consider this in order to use time efficiently.
Representative Jack Barraclough discussed his experience and history with water quality
issues in the state. He felt the rules should not be adopted based on the Jefferson County landfill
because there was no potential for contamination. As Chairman of the House Environmental
Affairs Committee, he believed that unless the rules are changed so they have the support of
more people, they would not pass the legislature. As an original member of Environmental
Commonsense Initiative Committee he stated the intent was that the rules be comparable or
equitable but not more stringent than federal regulations. He urged the Board to look at the rules
and see what changes could be made to balance environmental protection and industry.
Karla Covington, resident of Bonneville County, testified in support of the rules. She
discussed how Idaho's current regulations concerning nonmunicipal solid waste landfills have
affected her life and family. When they purchased their home in 1992, there was an old gravel
pit across the street that was almost depleted. She was told by the county that the area was zoned
as residential/agricultural, but the gravel pit was grandfathered in and was supposed to sit empty
once depleted. In 1995 the county turned the gravel pit into a construction demolition landfill
and tore down the trees that sheltered the view of the area. No public notice was ever given of
the action, and there was no opportunity for comment. Upon investigating the situation, she
learned that there are no laws in Idaho to provide for the enforcement of local county zoning
regarding nonmunicipal landfills. District Seven Health Department was contacted with pictures
(Attachment 10) of violations that were occurring on a regular basis at the landfill, but the
problems continued. Ms. Covington believed this was due to the fact that the governing board of
the district was made up of county commissioners - the same county commissioners who own
and operate the landfill. Numerous problems developed with the operation of the landfill
including:
■
The landfill was open 24 hours a day, seven days a week for public dumping
■
Hazardous waste has been dumped and buried, including oil, transmission fluid, antifreeze,
car batteries, D-con poison, veterinarian supplies, household garbage, dead animals, manure,
tires, lawnmower motors with gas and oil still in them, etc.
The Covingtons are very concerned about the hazardous waste because the landfill is less
than 200 feet upgradient from their domestic well. Having a poorly run landfill right across the
street has also caused their home to depreciate in value by 30%. They are now involved in a
lawsuit over the matter. After three years of working with state agencies, they have found no
relief from the problems. Ms. Covington stated she fears for her family's health, and urged the
Board to adopt the rules to prevent other families from having to face such problems. The rules
are needed to provide clear-cut guidelines on how we site, operate, and govern nonmunicipal
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landfills in the state. She believed her personal experiences are an example of what happens
when these facilities are left to operate without the benefit of well-defined rules. Ms. Covington
commented that she believed Representative Barraclough had failed to investigate both sides of
the issue and urged him to do a full and complete investigation of the matter.
Mike Covington, resident of Bonneville County and husband of Karla Covington,
discussed health problems his family had experienced due to a portable asphalt plant that had
been set up at the gravel pit across from their home on May 28, 1998. By July of that year, the
children, his wife, mother-in-law, and various pets and livestock had all developed respiratory
problems and required medical care. When DEQ investigated and tested emissions, they found
the asphalt plant was up to four times over the acceptable particulate emissions. Mr. Covington
discussed problems he experienced getting the District Seven Health Department to respond to
their concerns over the violations and continuing problems with the landfill. He stressed that the
proposed rules were needed because, when left alone, people cut comers in an attempt to save
money or effort. He urged the Board to adopt the proposed rules to protect the public from
government and public agencies.
Dick Rush, Vice-president for Natural Resources for the Idaho Association of Commerce
and Industry, submitted written comments (Attachment 11) and testified against the proposed
rules. He discussed the financial problems the forest products industry, agriculture, and other
industries are currently experiencing. He believed the proposed rules would substantially
increase the cost of maintaining current nonmunicipal waste facilities or establishing new ones.
He questioned how the new regulatory program would be managed by DEQ staff. He noted that
in the response to public comments, DEQ stated they received five new positions for solid waste
management. Mr. Rush checked with the Division of Financial Management, the Governor's
office, and Legislative Services and was told no new positions were authorized for DEQ. He felt
this was misleading because it gave the impression that the Legislature endorsed these rules and
that is not the case. An additional concern is rather broad wording in the fee schedule that would
allow increases in the fees based on the Department's expenses reviewing a matter. He also
believed the rules were more stringent than the federal rules, and that there was no public health
or environmental need shown for such comprehensive and all-encompassing rules. He
commented that DEQ exceeded the direction of the Environmental Commonsense Committee in
creating the rules, and that the public health districts, county and city governments, and industry
cannot afford the extra cost the proposed rules would cause. IACI requested the proposed rules
be rejected by the Board and referred back to DEQ to develop rules that comply with the
direction given by the legislative Environmental Commonsense Committee.
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association, discussed the concerns of the members
of the association. They feel the proposed rules would increase the cost of doing business in an
already stressed industry. There are legacy issues from 100 years of logging in Idaho that will
create instant problems with old residuals and siting issues. They are also concerned with the
volume levels set for the tiers, and suggested extending the closure date to allow a reasonable
period to site a new facility for log yard and mill residuals. The IF A would like to work with
DEQ to develop a landfill alternative for the logging industry using the technical guidance
manual developed by the Technical Guidance Committee for'Log and Mill Yard Debris. That
committee is in the process of being reconstituted to address their concerns before the end of the
year. Ms. Gorsuch feared the proposed rules could go through before the Committee could act,
and would then define the perimeters of the debate they would enter into with DEQ.
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Jay Calderwood, Teton County Commissioner, stated the county is currently struggling
with another unfunded mandate they cannot afford. Teton County and Fremont County are
being forced to conduct groundwater monitoring at their landfills by an unfunded mandate. They
estimate the monitoring will cost the county around $30,000 per year. This represents over onethird of the landfill budget. The county has a small population of 110,000 who will have to bear
the financial burden of any additional expenses. Commissioner Calderwood asked for the
Board's help in preventing any more unfunded mandates.
Peggy Hinman attended the negotiated rulemaking and .submitted written comments in
support of the proposed rules (Attachment 12).
► MOTION:

Marti Calabretta moved the Board return rule Docket No. 58-0106-0101 to DEQ
for review and revision. The review and revision effort should be focused on the issues
identified by the 1996 Commonsense Environmental Taskforce and address only issues
clearly associated with threats to human health and the potential for environmental damage.
SECOND: Dr. Joan Cloonan
DISCUSSION:
Marti Calabretta expressed tremendous concern with the difficulties being
experienced in getting enforcement actions under the current situation. Such difficulties
have also been encountered in her region, and a problem clearly exists. Ms. Calabretta
stated it was not clear to her whether the proposed rules would address or prevent the type of
situation the Covingtons are facing. She discussed the struggle the people in Northern Idaho
have faced dealing with government, and commented she was very sensitive to the problems
and concerns of the Covingtons. She urged them to continue to be tenacious about reporting
violations. She questioned whether the rules were being proposed due to one incident at the
expense of already stressed industries, and urged DEQ to develop creative solutions. Ms.
Calabretta emphasized she was very sensitive to the difference between proven public health
and environmental threats and perceived threats.
Dr. Joan Cloonan clarified that in seconding the motion, she did not want to give the
impression that she believed we should not have such rules. She served on the
Environmental Commonsense Taskforce and was chairman of the solid waste committee in
1996. She felt the existing rules needed to be changed and updated to eliminate antiquated
provisions and requirements such as the "seven deadly sins." Dr. Cloonan agreed that
consistency and predictability are needed in the rules. They should be understandable, userfriendly, and precise in language. She supported sending the rules back to DEQ to ensure
they reflect what was intended by the Environmental Commonsense Task Force.
Paul Agidius was concerned that the language of the motion was too restrictive. He
wanted to make sure the review included economic feasibility and impact and extending
finalization or implementation dates.
Randy MacMillan felt a fundamental guiding principle for the Board should be the
protection of public and individual health and the environment in a way that makes sense for
Idaho. He commented that the Department should not be held dependent on the state
legislature or the Environmental Commonsense Taskforce in determining whether or not to
develop rules. The Department's mission ought to be to protect public health and the
environment and if they see a need, they should have the right to act independent of the
legislature or the taskforce. He urged that the revisions to the rules be done soon and that
they ensure better enforcement.
Nick Purdy favored sending the rules back for revision, but was not comfortable with the
motion because of the limitations it sets. He felt the rule revision should address existing
sites and grandfather them in or allow them to be phased out to prevent serious economic
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impact. Paul Agidius agreed and felt deleting the word "only" from the motion would solve
the problem.
AMENDMENT:
Nick Purdy moved the motion be amended to delete the restrictive
language (delete the word "only" and change the words "be focused" to "address." The
maker of the motion agreed to the amendment.
SECOND:
Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE ON AMENDMENT: Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite
McLaughlin)
VOTE ON MAIN MOTION: Motion passed by unanimous vote.; 1 absent (Marguerite
McLaughlin)
AGENDA ITEM NO. 9

RULES REGULATING THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS, DOCKET No. 58-0110-0101

Dean Ehlert stated this rule implements the 2001 legislation enacted under House Bill
192 wherein DEQ was directed to develop rules specifying radioactive materials or other
radioactive material occurring naturally that may be disposed of at a commercial hazardous
waste facility or site. This proposed rule will establish radiation protection standards for the
disposal of radioactive materials not subject to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (AEA). DEQ received public comments concerning the proposed rule and has
revised the initial proposal. The following changes are also recommended as a result of
discussions at the worksession:
■
Page 68, 001.01 and .02, Title and Scope - strike the reference to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
■
Page 69 - Add a definition for "byproduct materials" to read: Byproduct material.
Byproduct material means: a. any radioactive material except special nuclear material
yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of
producing or utilizing special nuclear material; and b. the tailings or waste produced by the
extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from ore processed primarily for its source
material content.
■
Page 69, 010.09.a. - Delete a. Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material.
■
Reference NRC
Roy Eiguren, Attorney for the law firm of Givens Pursley, testified on behalf of his client,
American Ecology. American Ecology operates the Envirosafe facility in Grandview, Idaho.
The types of materials regulated in the proposed rules could be imported into and disposed of at
that facility. They took part in the negotiated rulemaking and fully support the rule. He noted
that all parties involved in the rulemaking supported the proposed rule. The negotiated
rulemaking committee worked together collaboratively with the Snake River Alliance to create a
positive result. Mr. Eiguren urged to Board to adopt the proposed rules.
► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt, as temporary and pending rules, the
Rules Regulating the Disposal of Radioactive Materials Not Regulated by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as Amended, as presented in
the final proposal as amended on October 18, 2001 under Docket No. 58-0110-0101, with
the temporary rules becoming effective October 19, 2001.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote; 1 absent (Marguerite McLaughlin)
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LOCAL REPORTS AND ITEMS BOARD MEMBERS MAY WISH TO
PRESENT

Dr. Randy MacMillan discussed the growing concern nationally and internationally about
the presence of pharmaceutical agents and similar types of compounds in the surface waters and
perhaps even the groundwater of the United States. The pollution may be coming from sewage
treatment plants, confined animal feeding operations, or other facilities - there are a whole host
of possibilities. The USGS is currently doing studies. The main question of the scientific and
regulatory community is whether or not those minute quantities of compounds have any
biological impact. Marti Calabretta asked Dr. MacMillan to provide her with any reference lists
or mailing lists he might receive so she could learn more about the topic.
Chairman Don Chisholm reported he recently attended a tour conducted by the Idaho
Forest Products Commission in Northern Idaho at Bonners Ferry and Sandpoint. The tour
covered forest practices, forest diseases, and the efforts of the industry to implement technology
to ensure worker safety and protect the environment. Chairman Chisholm felt it was a valuable
and educational experience and recommended it to the other Board members, should they have
an opportunity to attend in the future.
Paul Agidius reported he attended an Environmental Protection Agency meeting in
Spokane, Washington regarding the TMDL process. Federal agencies, the states and the tribes
attended to discuss the temperature standards for the Columbia River and the lower part of the
Snake River. Mr. Agidius felt the meeting was rather frustrating and there was little consensus
with the EPA Region X position.
Nick Purdy has been attending local meetings regarding site/source assessment of wells
for aquifer determination and protection. He recently toured the sewage treatment plant in
Blaine County. Approximately 800 gallons per minute is discharged into the Wood River from
the plant.
a.

Meeting Schedule for 2002

Director Steve Allred recommended the Board meet in January or early February so they
could meet with the appropriate legislative committees early in the session. He felt it was
important for the Board to meet with the germane committees. Representative Jack Barraclough
agreed and felt the Board should meet with both the House and Senate committees. Chairman
Chisholm directed the Board's assistant to schedule the meetings.
The Board scheduled meetings for:
•
•
•
•
•

February 6 and 7 in Boise, Idaho
April 24 and 25 in Twin Falls
June 19 and 20- location to be determined
October 16 and 17 - location to be determined
November 13 and 14 in Boise

Director Allred extended an invitation Board members to attend the DEQ senior
management meetings and the department-wide meetings. If they are interested, members can
contact the Director's office for more information.
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b.

Docket Status Reports

Paula Gradwohl, administrative rules coordinator for DEQ, reviewed the Promulgation
Status Report for DEQ Administrative Rulemaking and the Contested Case Status Report. A
drinking water rule regarding engineering standards for the design, construction, and operation of
public water systems will begin negotiated rulemaking soon. The rule will come to the Board
next year.
The meeting adjourned at 4:15 p.m.

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman

Marti Calabretta, Secretary

Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant and Recorder
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State of Idaho

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Board of Environmental Quality
1410 North Hilton, Boise, ID 83706-1255, (208) 373-0502

Dirk Kempthorne, Governor
C. Stephen Allred, Director

IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
MINUTES

November 7 & 8, 2001 .
The Board of Environmental Quality convened on November 7, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. at:
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Tom Aucutt, Drinking Water Program Planning and Outreach Manager
Jess Byrne, Staff Resource Officer
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Bill Jerrel, Loan Programs
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Lisa Koenig, DAG, DEQ
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program
Chris Mebane, Water Quality Standards Manager
Robert Wilkosz, Air Quality Program Manager

EXHIBIT

I
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OTHERS PRESENT:

Gayle Batt, Idaho Water Users Assn.
Carl Ellsworth, City of Boise
Roy Eiguren, Givens Pursley for Safe Air for Everyone (SAFE)
Beth Elroy, Monsanto
Patti Gora, SAFE
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining Assoc.
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
Betsy Russell, The Spokesman-Review
Angela Schaer, Moffatt Thomas, for Pioneer Irrigation
Norm Semanko, Idaho Water User's Assn.

❖

All attachments referenced in these minutes are permanent attachments to the minutes on file
at the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.

Work Session
DEQ staff briefed the Board on the rule dockets to be presented at the Board meeting on
November 8, 2001. No motions were made or passed and no votes were taken during the work
session.
The meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m.

November 8, 2001
The Board of Environmental Quality convened on November 8~ 2001 at 8:30 a.m.:
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None
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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Jon Sandoval, Chief of Staff
Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Tom Aucutt, Drinking Water Program Planning and Outreach Manager
John Brueck, Hazardous Waste Regulation & Policy Coordinator
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Bryan Horsburg, Boise Regional Office
Bill Jerrel, Loan Programs
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Lisa Koenig, DAG, DEQ
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program
Chris Mebane, Water Quality Standards Manager
Diane Riley, Air Quality Analyst, Smoke Management
Robert Wilkosz, Air Quality Program Manager
OTHERS PRESENT:

Gayle Batt, Idaho Water Users Assn.
Laura Baxter, private citizen
Carl Ellsworth, City of Boise
Beth Elroy, Monsanto
Bryce Farris, Ringert Clark
Patti Gora, SAFE
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining Assoc.
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
Betsy Russell, The Spokesman-Review
Angela Schaer, Moffatt Thomas, for Pioneer Irrigation
Norm Semanko, Idaho Water User's Assn.
Dan Steenson, Nampa-Meridian Irrigation District (Nampa-Meridian)
PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD - THE BOARD ALLOWS UP TO 30 MINUTES FOR THE PUBLIC TO
ADDRESS THE BOARD ON ISSUES NOT SPECIFICALLY SHOWN AS
AGENDA ITEMS.

No comments were received.
AGENDAITEMNO.

l:

ADOPTION OF MINUTES

► MOTION:

Nick Purdy moved the minutes of the October 17 and 18, 2001 Board meeting be
adopted as prepared.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote
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AGENDA ITEM No. 2:

DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Director Steve Allred discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's plan for the
cleanup of the Coeur d'Alene basin. The state of Idaho would like to see a plan that brings more
certainty and puts an end the controversy and stigma. He feared the EPA plan would only add to
the economic problems in the basin. Mr. Allred felt the plan was not very definitive and was
concerned that the study area appeared to include the entire basin. The state's plan has very
specific work areas and identifies projects. It identifies a very small amount of the basin as being
subject to environmental cleanup.
Director Allred reported on the status of the Pit 9 cleanup at !NEEL and discussed
growing demands for stricter regulation of the Department of Energy and !NEEL.
The Astaris facility in Pocatello has been closed. A task force comprised of state and
local groups has been formed to assist in the closure and address economic impacts to the area.
AGENDA ITEM No.

3:

RULES OFADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE BOARD OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, DOCKET Nos. 58-0123-0001 AND

58-0100-0002

Doug Conde presented the Rules of Administrative Procedure Before the Board and an
accompanying docket, Non-substantive Changes Affecting Administrative Rules of DEQ, for
adoption as temporary rules. These rules were adopted by the Board in June 2001 as pending
rules, and do not become effective until approved by the legislature in the 2002 session. Until
that time, DEQ contested cases must be conducted under the Department of Health and Welfare
rules. Those rules have recently been changed making them unsuitable for handling DEQ cases.
Adoption of the pending Rules of Administrative Procedure Before the Board will resolve the
problem and allow DEQ contested cases to be conducted under rules designed for DEQ and
already adopted by the Board.
► MOTION:

Paul Agidius moved the Board adopt, as temporary rules, pending Rules docket
Nos. 58-0123-0001 and 58-0100-0002 with an effective date of November 9, 2001.
SECOND: Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDA ITEM No.

4:

RULES FOR ADMINISTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL WATER
QUALITY PROGRAM, DOCKET No. 58-0114-0101 (PENDING
RULE)

Dave Mabe, Administrator, State Water Quality Program, explained this docket repeals
the DEQ Rules for Administration of Agricultural Water Quality Program. This program was
turned over to the Soil Conservation Commission by the legislature. They have developed a new
program and adopted Rules for Administration of Agricultural Water Quality Cost-Share
Program for Idaho, IDAPA 58.01.04. The DEQ rules need to be repealed so they do not have to
pay for the annual codification of an unnecessary rule chapter.
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► MOTION:

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board repeal the Rules for Administration of
Agricultural Water Quality Program as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 580114-0101.
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDA ITEM NO.

5:

RULES AND STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE, DOCKET
58-0105-0101 (PENDING RULE)

No.

John Brueck, Hazardous Waste Policy Regulation Coordinator for DEQ, presented the
annual update of the Hazardous Waste Rules. It reflects rules promulgated through the Federal
Register by the EPA from July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001. This annual procedure maintains
consistency with the federal requirements as mandated by the Idaho Waste Management Act, and
also allows DEQ to maintain primacy and authorization from EPA for the Idaho DEQ Hazardous
Waste Program. Public notice was given, and no adverse comments were received on the rules.
► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt the Rules and Standards for Hazardous
Waste as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0105-0101.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDA ITEM No.

6:

IDAHO RULES FOR PUBLIC DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS, DOCKET

No. 58-0108-0101 (PENDING RULE)
Tom Aucutt, Drinking Water Program Planning and Outreach Manager for DEQ,
explained this proposed rule incorporates by reference citations to the 1996 Public Notification
Rule, 40 CFR Part 141, Subpart Q. It includes revisions to the guidelines that require public
drinking water systems to notify their customers when national primary regulations are violated
thereby posing a risk to public health, makes non-substantive corrections, and adds language for
clarification. The rule also incorporates by reference citations to the 1976 Radionuclides Rule
that deals with radioactive contaminants. It sets levels for uranium and creates a more efficient
monitoring framework to provide improved health protection. No comments were received on
the rule.
Marti Calabretta questioned why the summary provided to the Board stated there would
be no cost impact from the rule. Tom Aucutt responded the summary reflected costs to the
Department. The cost to the water systems for the public notification would be very minimal;
however, the cost of the monitoring and treatment could cost from $30 - $100 per year per
household, depending on the size of the system. It is estimated that only nine to eleven systems
in Idaho would be required to do the monitoring due to their uranium levels.
Nick Purdy expressed concern that the rule would put an additional financial burden on
already stressed small water systems. He feared many small water systems would be forced to
shut down due to the expense of all the federal and state requirements. If individuals are forced
to drill private wells, there will be no testing at all. Director Allred commented the impacts of
the Safe Drinking Water Act on small water systems can be frustrating. He also was concerned
people would be forced into less protective systems. Many of the requirements are designed for
big eastern cities and don't make sense in rural Idaho.
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Marti Calabretta noted her intent in questioning the cost impact was to bring the Board's
attention to the fact that there is often a cost to the Idaho citizens through other taxing entities
that is not reflected in the information provided. She stated she would like to see a breakdown
on the indirect costs, even if the EPA requires them. Director Allred suggested the form used to
provide information to the Board be revised to show the EPA cost forecast.
► MOTION:

Marti Calabretta moved the Board adopt the Idaho Rules for Public Drinking
Water Systems as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0108-0101.
SECOND: Marguerite McLaughlin
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed.

Dave Mabe, Administrator of the State Water Quality Program, stated they recognized
the problems small water systems were having in complying with the regulations of the Safe
Drinking Water Act. He discussed alternatives they have been considering to help small water
systems deal with federal and state regulations, such as variances or exemptions. Marti
Calabretta commented that another alternative would be to generalize the cost of additional
regulations, rather than having unfunded mandates. A case could be built, over time, by
educating the public. She felt the costs should be stated in the public notice for such regulations,
and not just in the information given to the Board.
AGENDA ITEM NO.

7:

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO,
DOCKET No. 58-0101-0101 (TEMPORARY/PENDING RULE)

Kate Kelly, Administrator of the State Air Quality Program, distributed a document,
Authorities Regarding Open Burning, dated November 8, 2001 (Attachment 1). The document
was prepared by DEQ in response to the Chairman's request during the work session. It is a
brief summary, and time did not permit comprehensive research. The document provides a
picture of what kind of authorities exist to potentially or actually regulate both field burning and
prescribed burning. Ms. Kelly explained this rulemaking deals with the Air Pollution
Emergency Rule. The rule has four stages for dealing with increasing levels of pollutants. Each
of the four levels has progressively more stringent response requirements. This rule resulted
from DEQ's concern about potentially unhealthful levels of ambient particulates (PM-2.5 and
PM-10) during smoke-related events. It deals mainly with stage 1 emergency episodes, and is a
required part of the State Implementation Plan adopted by DEQ under the federal Clean Air Act.
The Director can declare this cautionary stage when high pollutant levels combine with
atmospheric stagnation to create a potential threat to public health.
The Board adopted the rule as a temporary rule last summer with the condition that
negotiated rulemaking commence immediately. Negotiated rulemaking began and five public
meetings were held across the state. As a result of the discussions, an initial rule was proposed,
published in the Administrative Bulletin, and put out for public comment. A significant amount
of public comment was received. One of the main changes from the rule adopted by the Board
and the proposed rule, is a decrease in the particulate level from 100 to 80. Ms. Kelly reviewed
the changes to the initial proposed rule. They include:
■
Add 24-hour and one-hour averaging levels for particulate matter
■ Add visibility criteria to help determine whether an emergency episode Stage 1
should be declared
• Allows consideration of meteorology and weather conditions, and for consideration
of source perimeters in determining an emergency
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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•
•

•

Provides an emergency can be declared when levels are forecasted to reach those
numbers identified in the rule
Clarifies that once a Stage 1 emergency is declared, no new fires can be started; and
provides the Director with the option, when possible, to require existing fires be put
out.
Clarifies (for all emergency stages) the means by which and to whom emergency
episode situations will be transmitted. This will help get the information out to the
people who need it.

Ms. Kelly summarized the comments and DEQ's responses. One comment stated that
the practice of field burning should be banned out right, or at a minimum, the number of acres to
be burned should be very limited. However, this is outside the scope of this rulemaking. This
rulemaking deals with the very specific issue of emergency episodes and the Director's authority.
She noted that under this rule, when a Stage 1 emergency is declared, acreage burned will be
limited and people will not be allowed to start new fires.
The incidents of last summer regarding field burning and wild fires were discussed.
Robert Wilkosz, Air Quality Program Manager, discussed the events that led to the air quality
problems. DEQ is working with the Department of Agriculture to try to predict and prevent such
problems. It is a complex situation that involves interstate issues, tribal authorities, and other
authorities.
Patti Gora testified on behalf of Safe Air for Everyone (SAFE). (See Attachment 2 for
full testimony.) SAFE is a new, nonprofit organization founded by the local physicians in the
Sandpoint area. Over 85% of the local physicians have organized to call for an end to the
practice of field burning because it is incompatible with human health. The doctors feel it is an
unacceptable situation and they must respond to protect human life. They have reviewed the
temporary rule, and based on the results of last summer when it was in place, feel very strongly
that it is not protective of human health.
SAFE submitted documentation (Attachment 3) they feel clearly demonstrates from a
scientific, and medical prospective that a level of 80 micrograms per cubic meter, even in a onehour period, is really not protective of human health. The documentation includes a large
number of complaints from residents of Northern Idaho documenting the health effects of field
burning, including medical personnel from Bonner County General Hospital and Kootenai Care
Center and many other regional care facilities.
Ms. Gora urged the Board to consider the rule carefully to address this public health
issue. The physicians of SAFE want to make the strongest statement possible that grass field
burning is not compatible with human health and public health. Ms. Gora distributed an article
from the September 3, 2001, US. News & World Report (Attachment 4) detailing how Marsha
Mason, a Rathdrum, Idaho resident, died from air pollution caused by field burning. The
materials submitted by SAFE in Attachment 3 include evidence from both the Idaho Medical
Association and the Spokane Medical Society condemning field burning. Basic scientific studies
that document clear and conclusive scientific evidence that increased particulate matter is
associated with increased mortality and morbidity was also enclosed. She noted there are also
toxins contained in the smoke from pesticides and other materials applied to the crops such as
carcinogens, mutagens, and tumorogenic components as demonstrated in several scientific
studies. The EPA is currently conducting research that should be available by June 2002.
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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Roy Eiguren, Givens Pursley, has been retained as legal counsel for SAFE. Mr. Eiguren
stated he understood the Board's authority in this matter and notified the Board his client
intended to address the issues in other forums under separate jurisdictional authorities. He noted
that SAFE does not contest the fact that the scope of this rulemaking is confined to specific
issues dealing with emergency episodes. However, in the broader context of both the Clean Air
Act and the Idaho Environmental Protection and Health Act, they believe the Board does have
authority, if it would so choose to exercise it, to ban grass field burning relative to concerns for
public health. He acknowledged that was not the issue before the Board at this time, and did not
ask the Board to take that action.

Mr. Eiguren discussed the documentation submitted in Attachment 3 which attempts to
identify all the medical literature currently available on the health effects of grass burning. The
studies are quite definitive as to the impacts on both mortality and morbidity associated with the
toxic elements of grass ·burning. Mr. Eiguren did not recommend a specific level because
medical studies simply do not support any particular level. The literature suggests that at even
very low levels, depending on the individual involved, there are potentially deadly impacts from
grass burning. In conclusion, he stated the information was being supplied for the record to
identify what they believe to be the case as it relates to the medical impacts of grass burning.
SAFE will address the broader issue of a ban on grass burning through a variety of different
forums. Mr. Eiguren thanked the Board and stated he looked forward to working with the Board
and DEQ on this issue over the longer term.
Paul Agidius asked if SAFE supported approval of the proposed rule, or if they felt it
would be detrimental. Roy Eiguren stated they supported passage of the rule, but wanted to
stress that based upon the work of the 46 physicians associated with SAFE, and an in-depth
review of the medical literature, there is simply no level that can be identified that fully protects
human health.
Don Chisholm asked if Mr. Eiguren believed SAFE, in light of the Smoke Management
Crop Residue Disposal Act, could make a request for rulemaking asking the Board to eliminate
mass field burning, and if the Board had the authority to make such a rule. Mr. Eiguren
responded he believed SAFE could make such a request and the Board would have the authority
both under the Environmental Protection and Health Act and more specifically under the Clean
Air Act. SAFE will be addressing that issue in a multiplicity of forums including the EPA.
Chairman Chisholm asked if SAFE planned to make such a rulemaking request to the Board.
Mr. Eiguren responded they have not made that decision yet. The organization was recently
formed and has not had the chance to fully assess that option. They are associated with another
law firm, Arnold and Porter in Washington, DC, which will also advise the group. They are
looking at a variety of different ways to address the health issue. The bottom line is they believe
the only way to be fully protective of human health is to stop grass burning.
Chairman Chisholm pointed out the Idaho Legislature has stated it is a permitted practice
under rules adopted by EPA or DEQ. He asked if SAFE would still ask the Board to adopt a rule
that would ban grass burning under any circumstances, even when there are no forest fires or
other conditions affecting the ambient air quality. Mr. Eiguren asserted that under the delegated
authority provided by the EPA and the Clean Air Act, there is authority for the Board to take
such action. It may in fact be preemptive of other state actions or agencies. They do not have a
complete answer at this time, but it is an issue that is on the table. Since the rules adopted by the
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALTT'Y
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Board must be approved by the legislature, Chairman Chisholm suggested the most efficient
venue might be to bring the issue to the legislature. Mr. Eiguren confirmed that was clearly their
intent.
Marguerite McLaughlin questioned whether an autopsy had been performed on the
woman discussed in the literature submitted by SAFE. She was concerned about using the
information in the context it was used if no autopsy had been performed. Roy Eiguren
responded no autopsy was performed, but pointed out that as a matter of law, a death certificate
is the legal presumption as to the cause of death and it speaks for itself. It very specifically
identified the cause of death to be the impacts associated with field burning. Marguerite
Mclaughlin remarked the coroner was a doctor who had previously treated the woman and
performed a mastectomy on her the previous year. Mr. Eiguren asserted the doctor received his
medical degree from Harvard Medical School and was very competent to make the
determination.
Steve Allred stated DEQ has experienced difficulties because the studies primarily look
at chronic exposure. They have not seen any studies that focus on episodic exposure. Such
information would be very beneficial. Patti Gora advised the American Heart Association just
published a study in March 2001 demonstrating that even a one-hour exposure at 25 micrograms
per cubic meter leads to a 17% increase in heart attacks. Exposure over a 24-hour period of just
20 micrograms also has that increased effect on heart attacks. The evidence seems to be very
clear that even short exposures at much lower levels are indicative of severe health problems.
Steve Allred asked where the study was performed. Don Chisholm asked what population level
was used to determine the 17% level. Ms. Gora will report back with that information. She
indicated they do know that the smoke predominately effects children and the elderly.
Paul Agidius asked if SAFE took the same position on stubble burning. Ms. Gora
indicated they had no position on stubble burning at this time. They are currently concerned
with grass burning in Northern Idaho.
Steve Allred pointed out this matter previously failed in the legislature. Only through
extensive reasoning, were they able to get the temporary rule extended. The proposed rule will
actually be less than the temporary rule. It may be difficult getting the proposed rule approved
by the legislature--even at the 80 micrograms level. He stressed the difference between a
criteria and a standard. Idaho law prohibits having standards more stringent than EPA standards.
EPA has a standard, which is not yet implemented, that is considerably higher than the 24-hour
criteria in this rule.
Roy Eiguren responded to an earlier comment regarding the availability of studies
dealing with short-term exposure. The "Six City Study" conducted by Harvard University
reviews impacted populations for up to 16 years. Several of the researchers from Harvard
Medical School that conducted the study have agreed to serve as consultants to SAFE. They will
be available to address this issue on an Idaho basis.
Marguerite McLaughlin asked what conditions caused Northern Idaho to be so impacted
by field burning. Robert Wilkosz explained smoke management is affected by geography,
weather patterns, metrologic conditions, and the number of people conducting field burning.
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Nick Purdy stated it was his understanding the Board had the duty and authority to
supervise and administer a system to safeguard air quality. The discussion has focused on the
health aspects, but air quality is also based on the quality of life, the enjoyment of your property,
and protection of your property values. He felt scientific means should be used to determine
what level is protective of those rights. The Board should add those parameters and set
protective levels. Mr. Purdy stated he supported the proposed rule as a step in the right direction,
but was not satisfied with it. He believed the Board should put the state on notice that it will
start considering the quality of life allowed by the air quality. Chairman Chisholm asked if the
stringency requirement would allow such action. Kate Kelly explained that there are federal
standards in place, but they have not determined how they will implement them. Chairman
Chisholm asked Doug Conde to advise the Board on the stringency issue once the EPA has
acted.
► MOTION:

Paul Agidius moved the Board adopt as temporary and pending rules, the Rules
for the Control of Air Pollution in Idaho, as presented in the final proposal under Docket No.
58-0101-0101, with the temporary rules becoming effective November 9, 2001.
SECOND: Dr. Joan Cloonan
Motion passed by unanimous vote.
VOICE VOTE:

Director Steve Allred stated if the Board wanted DEQ to revisit this issue, it would be
appropriate to request it at this time. Kate Kelly clarified that the proactive management of air
quality is not addressed in this rule, so it would probably not be beneficial to go back into
rulemaking on this particular rule which deals specifically with emergency episodes. Chairman
Chisholm suggested it might be more productive to wait and see what action is taken by the
Idaho Legislature to determine the appropriate rulemaking.
Nick Purdy agreed with the recommendation, but felt the current data supported a much
lower level, perhaps of 25, to protect the quality of life and public health. He felt the Board
should become proactive on the issue by passing a motion or taking the necessary actions to
direct DEQ to reconsider the level of protection. Chairman Chisholm recommended the Board
ask Kate Kelly and Doug Conde to develop a proposal that addresses the concerns expressed by
Mr. Purdy. The proposal should also address the scope of authority and stringency issue.
Marti Calabretta commented her years as a legislator gave her some perspective into the
politics ofthis issue. She hoped Mr. Eiguren would be able to develop a strategy that would only
affect Northern Idaho, and only affect grass burning and not forest products. She felt if the
Board wants to be proactive, it should have discussions with the Department of Agriculture and
the agricultural community.
Director Allred invited the Board to attend the legislative hearing on the rule to give them
a better understanding of the view of the legislature on the matter.
Marguerite McLaughlin asked how the rule would affect the tribes. Lisa Kronberg
explained the tribes are treated as separate states and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the
federal government. If the tribes are found to be contributing to levels that exceed national
ambient air quality standards, action can be taken.
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AGENDA ITEM No.

8:

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO,
DOCKET No. 58-0101-0104 (PENDING RULE)

Kate Kelly reported DEQ is in the process of revising the open burning regulations.
These rules will not include field burning or prescribed burning, but simply open burning of
debris and other things. The rules should be ready for the Board's consideration next spring.
The current rule before the Board creates a fee structure for the Permit to Construct
(PTC) and Tier II Operating Permit programs. The fees will partially support the costs to DEQ
for processing applications for PTCs and Tier II operating permits and registrations for permits
by rule, allowing the agency to better meet the needs of the regulated community. The fees are
needed due to economic growth in Idaho, which resulted in a rise in the air quality permitting
needs of the regulated community. In the past, general funds and EPA grants supported these
programs; however, these sources no longer provide adequate funding. The fee schedules are
structured to provide an incentive for emission reduction as required by state law. The fee will
not be a "per-ton" fee, but will be charged according to the range of emissions. DEQ received
public comments concerning the proposed rule and has revised the initial rule in response to the
comments. DEQ proposes the effective date for the rule be delayed until July 1, 2002 to allow a
fair time for the regulated community to prepare for the fiscal impact. DEQ is also currently
investigating how the fees will be applied to applications that are received, but are in backlog
and may not be processed until after July 1.
Dr. Joan Cloonan suggested the regulatory timeframe be used to determine whether fees
are charged. Ms. Kelly indicated they had considered that option. However, the rules allow a
90-day timeframe for processing Tier II applications, and that does not reflect reality. It almost
always takes longer than 90 days to process these applications. Legal issues and fairness will be
considered to determine the appropriate date, and guidelines will be created.
Dr. Joan Cloonan asked for clarification on the issue of fees for Tier II applications that
are filed specifically with the intent of being rolled up into a Title V permit. She questioned
whether fees would have to be paid for both applications. Kate Kelly stated she was not familiar
with specific situations, but noted the fee structure being proposed is a funding mechanism for
permitting costs to DEQ that are not allowed to be charged to Title V. Title V of the Clean Air
Act is very prescriptive regarding what can and cannot be charged to Title V. If a situation
requires a facility to get a permit, even if it is a Title V facility and the permit is not under the
Clean Air Act and the guidance that implements it, and it is not allowed to be charged to Title V,
then the agency intends to charge a processing fee for that application. This would apply to a
PTC or a Tier II.
Dick Rush, IACI, stated that while they are not officially opposing the rules, they do have
some concerns. IACI recognizes the need for a funding source for the permits, but is concerned
about how the backlog situation and effective date will be handled. The facilities who have filed
for the permits have done so thinking there would not be a fee, and there is a fairness issue. Mr.
Rush felt notifying the affected facilities would help to a certain degree, but it is still an issue of
concern. He also discussed the accountability issue. If fees have to be paid, it is hoped the
process will speed up and the backlog will be cleared. IACI suggested financial incentives be
used to encourage timely processing of the applications. They would also support a method of
dealing with the retroactive issue based on the timeframes for issuing permits set out by law. In
their comments on the rulemaking, IACI also asked that both an accounting and performance
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review be performed periodically to ensure the funds are being used appropriately and that there
is good performance. During the Board's work session, Director Allred explained the processes
being used by DEQ to track expenses, ensure accountability, and judge performance. Mr. Rush
accepted an invitation to visit the Department and personally review those processes.
► MOTION:

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt the Rules for the Control of Air
Pollution in Idaho, as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0101-0104, with
an effective date of July 1, 2002.
SECOND: Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed: 4 ayes, 2 nays (Calabretta, McLaughlin).

AGENDA ITEM NO. 9

WATER QUALITY STANDARDS,
(TEMPORARY/PENDING RULE)

DOCKET No.

58-0102-0101

Chris Mebane, DEQ Water Quality Standards Manager, explained there are three water
quality dockets before the Board for consideration and they are interrelated. This first docket
proposes use changes and criteria to protect those uses for several tributaries to the Lower Boise
River and Bucktail Creek in the Salmon River basin. DEQ is requesting this docket be adopted
as a temporary rule so it will be immediately effective and can be submitted to EPA for approval
concurrent with TMDLs that are due for the Lower Boise River, and for Superfund actions in the
Blackbird Mine. Mr. Mebane reviewed the changes proposed by the rule. A public hearing was
held and comments were received. The initial rule was revised as a result of the comments.
The initial rule proposed removing recreational uses from Five and Ten Mile Creeks
based on the fact that those uses were not allowed and could be dangerous. However, EPA
commented that although it may be dangerous or illegal, it does not fit the allowed reasons for
removing uses when the water quality is sufficient for recreation. DEQ has now proposed they
be designated that the water quality be sufficient for recreation, even though it may never
actually occur. Discussions in the work session led to the design of language that may address
some of the concerns of the stakeholders. It points out that while the water quality is supposed to
be sufficient to allow recreational uses, the recreational designation in no way confers any
property right, right of access, or any sort of endorsement by the state that it is a safe activity.
Paul Agidius pointed out that Idaho Code § 36-1601 defines a navigable stream as "any
stream, which in its natural state drained normal high water, will float cut timber having a
diameter in excess of six inches. " The code also includes additional aspects that define a
navigable stream. Therefore, if it is a navigable stream, the public has the right to walk down the
center of the waterway, regardless who owns the stream or water right. This seems to further
increase the chance that someone could be in the stream for secondary recreation, and it is legal.
Designating a natural, navigable stream as an irrigation channel does not mean you can keep
people out.
Angela Schaer, attorney with the law firm of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields,
addressed the Board on behalf of her client, Pioneer Irrigation District (Pioneer). Pioneer is very
strong in its view that recreation is inappropriate, if not completely dangerous in these drains and
in all canals and irrigation laterals. She commented she would defer the question of navigable
stream definition to Dan Steenson or Bryce Farris because they did the research on use
attainability analysis and are more familiar with the physical characteristics. She discussed
easements in irrigation facilities and emphasized that:
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•

•

In the case of Rehwalt vs. American Falls Reservoir District, the court clearly said,
"We disagree with the conclusion of the district court that the easement owner's duty
to maintain requires that he maintain and repair the easement for the benefit of the
servient landowner. Certainly, the easement owner can exclude the servient
landowner altogether when it is necessary for the protection of the easement, and he
cannot be expected to maintain the easement for the landowner's benefit."
In the case of Reynolds Irrigation District vs. Sproat, the court cited an earlier case,
Coulson vs. Aberdeen Springfield Canal Company and said that while the servient
landowners had no right to make use of the easement in any way that would interfere
with the dominant estate, if the ditch could be capable of being used by the servient
landowners without injury or interference to the canal company's use of the ditch, it
could be.

Ms. Schaer believed these decisions show that the purpose of these canals and drains is
conveyance of irrigation water. Pioneer is opposed to a recreational use designation and feels it
is not appropriate in any way in these streams. The additional language discussed by Chris
Mebane was reviewed by Ms. Schaer and Scott Campbell, head legal counsel for Pioneer
Irrigation District. They support the language, but feel it does not go far enough and believe the
recreational designation needs to be removed.
Don Chisholm asked if Pioneer was concerned solely with safety, or if they wanted the
recreational designations removed to escape some of the water quality regulations the
designation would bring. The Board sees it as two different issues and feels its regulations will
not prevent people from entering and using these structures for recreational purposes. Only
physically barring access can prevent that.
Angela Schaer asserted that Pioneer was not trying to escape water quality regulations in
any form. They have actively participated in the effluent training workshops on the Lower Boise
River and were very active in the Snake River Hells Canyon TMDL process. Pioneer recognizes
there are water quality regulations and does not wish to avoid those that make sense. She
emphasized that Pioneer's concern with public safety was not an effort to avoid water quality
regulations. Although state regulations would not prevent people from using the drains for
recreational use, implying in any . way that recreation is somehow appropriate will cause
problems. The additional language presented will be in the rules; but most people will know that
it is designated for secondary contact recreational use but will not see the language.
Pioneer is also concerned about the narrative criteria regarding keeping the streams free
of algae just for cosmetic purposes. They do intend to comply with water quality regulations
where these drains dump into the Boise River. Ms. Schaer reiterated that Pioneer did not want to
avoid regulations, they simply want regulations and designations that are appropriate, make
sense, and protect the public health, safety and welfare.
Dr. Randy MacMillan asked if the water bodies in question were private property or state
owned. Angela Schaer stated the facilities are owned by the Bureau of Reclamation with
easements to the irrigation districts. Director Allred asked if there were easements from the
property owner to the Bureau of Reclamation, or from the property owner to the irrigation
district. Dan Steenson explained that Five and Ten Mile Drain were constructed between 1915
to 1920 by the Bureau of Reclamation under separate contracts with Nampa-Meridian Irrigation
District (Nampa-Meridian) and Pioneer. They were retainment contracts that stated the Bureau
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agreed to construct the facilities for the districts for a certain sum. The contracts contained no
reservation by the Bureau of easements. There has been some uncertainty as to the ownership of
those easements--whether the Bureau or the districts own them. To resolve the uncertainty a title
transfer was done last year between the Bureau and the districts. The Bureau transferred all its
right, title and interest to its property rights in these facilities to Nampa-Meridian for the portion
of the facilities that lie within Nampa-Meridian. Those interests included some pre-titled lands,
some granted easements, and the Bureau's claim of easements under the 1890 Canal Act.
Therefore, for Nampa-Meridian, there is no question that the ownership of the easements belongs
to the irrigation district. There is no case law in this jurisdiction that addresses the question of
whether the owner of the easement can prevent access to the interior banks of the canal itself.
Nick Purdy asked if the Board had the option to designate the waters for aquatic use only
and eliminate the recreational use. Chris Mebane explained EPA regulations define six ways
where recreational use is not attainable. None of those six conditions fit this situation. Physical
danger is not a reason for not having water quality sufficient for recreation. If a county or city's
jurisdiction said it was illegal to use it and it was physically blocked off, then the condition of
"human caused conditions prevent attainable use" would apply. However, as things are now,
none of the six conditions applies. Recreational use has not been found to be inconsistent with
the use by the irrigation company for the operation and maintenance of the canal. Don Chisholm
commented he believed the law was stronger in its requirement, and stated that the use must
unreasonably interfere in a significant way with the use of the easement before it is a prohibited
use.
Director Allred pointed out these waters are already designated for cold water biota and
recreational use. This rule does not add anything. DEQ simply attempted to say that cold water
biota and recreational use designations do not make sense on these drains. In order to
downgrade those designations we must have EPA's approval. To gain approval DEQ must
prepare an analysis sufficient to convince EPA that recreation is not possible and none takes
place. If DEQ is not successful in proving that, EPA then has the opportunity to classify it
themselves. The problem is, recreation is taking place in these drains. Hunters and other
recreators are frequently seen in the area and often cross the streams, and EPA is aware of this.
If irrigation districts had title and could physically restrict access to the drains, perhaps a case
could be made. It is not a question of whether these drains should be used for recreation. DEQ
must be certain the case for removal of the designations is justified (by EPA regulations), or face
the risk of a federal designation.
Dan Steenson did not believe that a risk of a federal designation existed. Since the water
bodies are already designated, if the proposal failed, the use designation would simply stay the
way it is now. Regarding access, Nampa-Meridian believes an irrigation district holding an
easement does have the right, and it is a trespass if someone who does not have the permission of
the servient estate owner is recreating in the easement. This applies to all members of the public.
In that context, both the easement owner and the servient estate owner have the right to restrict
access to all members of the public.
Mr. Steenson asserted Nampa-Meridian is within the ambit of its rights to prohibit
recreational use. The standards that allow removal of recreational use designations for human
caused conditions contain unclear language. The language, " . . . human caused conditions
prevent attainment or dams, diversions, and other types of hydrologic modifications preclude the
attainment of the use" is at question. It is unclear whether "prevent or preclude" includes illegal
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access that is prohibited and violates the rights of the servient estate owner and easement owner.
It sounds like EPA is willing to consider the possibility that if it is illegal and violates someone
else's rights, it meets the standard. The standards also state that "each state must identify
appropriate water uses to be achieved and protected. " Mr. Steenson stressed recreation is
clearly not an appropriate or valuable use to the public since there is such a well-documented
history of severely adverse consequences from human contact with these facilities. Mr. Steenson
submitted the Five Mile Drain and Ten Mile Drain Recreational Use Analysis as documentation
and asked it be made part of the record (Attachment 5) .
.Chairman Chisholm pointed out that case law exists where a trespasser or burglar entered
private property and sued the owner because of injury due to a dangerous condition. He believed
this was a similar issue and felt it was the responsibility of the Board to regulate the water quality
to protect public health, even though it may be through unlawful access. He observed that if the
irrigation districts are only concerned with the term recreational use, it is a semantic difference
that can be resolved. Dan Steenson emphasized that the proposed rule leaves the criteria
protective of human health for bacteria in place. Additionally, the standards state that manmade
waterways shall be protected for the purpose for which they were created. Irrigation district
employees must come in contact with the water to maintain the waterways, so the bacteria
criteria was specifically retained.
Doug Conde noted there are many water bodies that aren't otherwise designated and they
fall within the scope of the provision discussed by Mr. Steenson. The provision states " ... that
unless otherwise designated for uses" and if it's a manmade waterway it will be protected for the
purpose for which it was created. However, the water body under discussion was already
designated for other uses, and was originally a natural drainage that was modified for irrigation
purposes. Therefore, the provision does not apply. Mr. Steenson commented he would stipulate
this water body meets the definition of a manmade waterway. He felt it was well established by
the extensive record they submitted. There were millions of tons of dirt moved to construct these
facilities in 1915. The streambeds were originally dry except for unusual flood events in the
watershed. By any commonsense approach, these are manmade facilities, and Nampa-Meridian
believes that definition would hold up in court.
Nick Purdy felt the matter should be tabled and referred back to the Department for
further negotiations. In the briefing materials sent to the Board only a week ago, DEQ was
proposing the recreational use designation be removed. This last minute change has caused a
setback that makes it appropriate to table the matter. Doug Conde noted it was common to make
such changes to the initial proposal as a result of information received during the public
comment period. Mr. Purdy asked if the change was made after the negotiations. Dave Mabe
explained the original proposal was published as it was presented. At that point, DEQ believed
the irrigation districts could control access and legally had the right to control all access to the
facilities. DEQ continued to research the matter during the public comment period. As a result
of investigations, it was discovered that was not the case in all areas. The comment period ended
September 24, 2001. After analyzing the issue and responding to comments, a change was
made.
Don Chisholm asked what other regulated characteristics would be removed by the
proposed change. Dave Mabe felt the most important change would be in the aquatic life use
designations. By changing from cold water biota to modified, it will relieve the burden of the
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agency and the facility operators to complete a TMDL. If the change to modified is not made, a
TMDL will be due by December 2001 along with the other Boise River TMDLs.
Director Allred asked if the irrigation districts would prefer the rule be adopted as it is
currently proposed, or be tabled, leaving the cold water biota and the recreational use
designations in place. Don Chisholm observed it might be better to adopt the rule as presented
and continue to work on solutions for the secondary recreational use designation. Dan Steenson
stated the district supported the change of the cold water biota designation and vowed to work
vigorously on the recreational use issue after the Board meeting.
Laura Baxter testified against the secondary recreational use designation. In 1992, Ms.
drowned in an irrigation canal that runs through the city of Twin
Baxter's
Falls. The canal was in her neighborhood, and the morning of the accident many children were
tubing and floating in the canal. Ms. Baxter has been a very vocal proponent of canal water
safety since that time. Much has been accomplished in Twin Falls. There is now a city
ordinance making it illegal to recreate in the canal system. There are certain features of canals
that make them very dangerous for recreational use. The banks tend to be straight up and down,
sometimes as high as ten feet and the water can be very swift. It must be made clear to the
public that it is totally inappropriate to recreate in the canal systems in any way. Ms. Baxter felt
applying a recreational use designation to these waters implied they were fit for recreation and
could in fact be used for recreation.
Director Allred asked if the word recreation could be replaced with language such as
"human contact" or "secondary human contact"? Doug Conde believed it would be acceptable if
it could be proven this language would have equivalent water quality protection. Chairman
Chisholm suggested the Board adopt the rule with the additional clarifying language and request
that DEQ begin rulemaking to develop a new use designation with alternative language that
provides equivalent water quality protection.
Dr. Joan Cloonan asked if there were other areas in the state where this problem existed.
Chris Mebane confirmed there were similar situations with drains that had recreational use
designations.
► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt, as temporary and pending rules, the
Water Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment as presented in the final proposal under
Docket No. 58-0102-0101, with the following amendment: in section 278.03, add to the
stream list "Fifteen Mile Creek SW-7." The temporary rule effective date shall be
November 9, 2001.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt, as a temporary and pending rule,
under Docket No. 58-0102-0101, the following amendment to Section 100 of the Idaho
Water Quality Standards. The temporary rule's effective date shall be November 9, 2001.
100.
SURFACE WATER USE DESIGNATIONS.
Water bodies are
designated in Idaho to protect water quality for existing or designated uses. The
designated use of a water body does not imply any rights to access or ability to
conduct any activity related to the use designation; nor does it imply that any
activity is safe. For example, a designation of primary or secondary contact
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recreation may occur in areas where it is unsafe to enter .the water due to water
flows, depth, or other hazardous conditions. Another example is that aquatic life
uses may be designated in areas that are closed to fishing or access is not allowed
by property owners.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote
► MOTION:

Nick Purdy moved the Board direct DEQ to initiate rulemaking to create a new
use designation with equivalent water quality protection as the secondary recreational use
designation and using different language such as "human contact."
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDAITEMNO.10

WATER

QUALITY

STANDARDS,

DOCKET

No.

58-0102-0102

{PENDING RULE)

Chris Mebane presented a proposal to adopt use designations and site-specific criteria for
metals for the South Fork of the Coeur d'Alene River (SFCDA) upstream of Wallace. Public
comments were received. The Hecla Mining Company expressed concerned with the cold water
aquatic use designation. They felt a modified use designation would be more appropriate.
However, in order for such a designation to be made, a Use Attainability Analysis must be
performed. Until one has not been performed, the only alternative is a cold water aquatic use
designation. Hecla also supported the lead and zinc site-specific criteria but did not favor
adoption of the cadmium criteria, which is lower than the current Idaho cadmium criteria. The
proposed level is higher than the EPA recommended criteria because species that drive the EPA
level do not exist in these waters. DEQ feels it is an intermediate level between the EPA level
and current conditions.
Extensive comments were also received from the Lands Council stating they believed the
types of studies relied upon to set the criteria were not adequate. They believe other science
exists that would yield more appropriate criteria.
·
The EPA has been extensively involved in this process and endorses the site-specific
criteria as proposed.
► MOTION:

Paul Agidius moved the Board adopt the Water Quality Standards and
Wastewater Treatment Requirements as presented in the final proposal under Docket No.
58-0102-0102.
SECOND: Marguerite McLaughlin
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDAITEMNO.11

WATER

QUALITY

STANDARDS,

DOCKET

No.

58-0102-0103

{PENDING RULE)

Chris Mebane explained this rule addresses statewide considerations for metals criteria;
aquatic life use designations; revisions to ammonia criteria; minor changes regarding
temperature, natural background, and variance .procedures; time limits for schedules of
compliance for point source discharges; and minor corrections or inconsistencies remaining from
previous rulemaking. A hearing was held and public comments were received. Mr. Mebane
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noted that Marti Calabretta had expressed concern that there were some streams and areas in the
SFCDA where it is unlikely these criteria could be attained for decades or even centuries and
wondered if a lower designation might be more appropriate. Mr. Mebane agreed and explained
the engineering studies containing this information were not complete at the time these rules
were prepared. There is a federal regulation applying these cold water aquatic life uses in the
SFCDA. DEQ's proposal would be identical if this rule is adopted and the federal designation
can then be removed. DEQ could then modify the use as appropriate.
Chris Mebane discussed the proposed changes in detail and responded to questions
regarding temperature standards and nutrient criteria.
► MOTION:

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt the Water Quality Standards and
Wastewater Treatment Requirements as presented in the final proposal under Docket No.
58-0102-0103.
SECOND: Nick Purdy
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDA ITEM No.

12:

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES, DOCKET No.
AND 0102 (PENDING RULE)

58-0106-0101

Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program, made a recommendation, based on
the suggestion of Senator Hal Bunderson, that the rules be referred to the Joint Legislative
Environmental Common Sense Committee for review and recommendation. The rule can then
be presented at the February Board meeting for consideration. The Committee will receive the
latest version with the suggested changes from the work session. Marguerite McLaughlin asked
if the changes regarding review by Fish & Wildlife and Fish & Game were included. Dean
Ehlert confirmed the requirement for documentation had been removed and the rule now
provides that an owner and operator shall insure that a facility does not violate the Endangered
Species Act. Chairman Chisholm asked if the changes requested by Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining
Association, had been incorporated. Mr. Ehlert stated the changes have not been made. He seen
no problem with making the changes as requested, but first needed to review the federal
regulations to confirm compliance.
Dr. Randy MacMillan asked if the rules addressed veterinary waste as well as medical
waste. Dean Ehlert did not believe it was currently in the rule, but will bring the matter up with
the Environmental Common Sense Committee.
► MOTION:

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board extend the comment period on rule Docket No.
58-0106-0101 and refer the rule to the Environmental Common Sense Committee for review
and recommendations. The rules will be brought back to the Board at its February 6 & 7,
2002 meeting, with the understanding that there may be a need to republish the rule.
SECOND: Marguerite McLaughlin
VOTE: Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDA ITEM No.

10

LOCAL REPORTS AND ITEMS BOARD MEMBERS MAY WISH TO
PRESENT

No reports received.
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The meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m.

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman

Marti Calabretta, Secretary

Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant and Recorder
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IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0101
NOTICE OF EXTENSION OF COMMENT PERIOD

AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221(1), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this agency has
proposed rulemaking. The action is authorized by Sections 39-105, 39-107 and 39-7408C, Idaho Code.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The proposed rule was published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin, Volume O1-7,
July 4, 2001, pages 167 through 193. The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has extended the comment
period through December 26, 2001 to solicit additional public comment before presenting a final proposal to the
Board of Environmental Quality in February 2002 for adoption of a pending rule. In addition to submitting written
comment, the public can participate in the development of the final proposal by attending the December meeting of
the Environmental Common Sense committee. For information regarding the meeting, and to obtain a copy of the
version of the rule that will be up for discussion during the meeting, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502 or
dehlert@deq .state .id. us.
·
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit DEQ's web site at
www.state.id.us/deq .
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For
assistance on technical questions concerning this rulemaking, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502 or
dehlert@deq.state.id.us.
Anyone may submit written comments by mail , fax or e-mail at the address below regarding this proposed rule. DEQ
will consider all written comments received by the undersigned on or before December 26, 2001.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2001.

Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208)373-0418/Fax No. (208)373-0481
pgradwoh@deq.state.id.us
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Hal Bunderson
Senator, District 14
W estem Ada County

IDAHO STATE SENATE
State Capitol Building
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0081

582 River Heights Drive
Meridian, Idaho 83642
(208) 888-7156

January 31, 2002

Idaho Board of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83 706
Dear Board Members:
This letter is to update you on the Joint Legislative Environmental Common Sense Committee's ·
progress on resolving issues associated with the proposed Solid Waste Rule.
The Committee met on December 6, 2001 to identify the issues that need to be resolved to reach
consensus. A subcommittee was appointed including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Orville Green, DEQ, Facilitator
Dean Ehlert, DEQ
Tom Turco, Public Health District
Dr. Joan Cloonan, J.R. Simplot
Dick Rush, IACI
Keith Donahue, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association

Other Committee members were also invited to attend and provided input, including Ed Bulgin,
Amalgamated Sugar Company. The subcommittee held five meetings and was able to resolve
forty-two issues. The following four issues remain unresolved.
1. Commenters asserted that the rule imposes requirements more stringent than federal solid
waste requirements and therefore exceed IDEQ's specifically limited authority under federal
law. DEQ responded that the rules are not more stringent. Rather than focus on the issue of
stringency, we recommend that the issue of reasonableness be addressed instead. If the rules
are reasonable, then they should move forward.
2. Commenters noted that there should to be a realistic transition phase that recognizes the time
it will take to close a site and open a new facility. Discussions to date have not yet settled on
what would be a realistic transition phase.
3. Commenters asked that in the definition of "inert waste", incorporate, Noncombustible as
defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation ...
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4. Wood & Mill Yard Debris facilities would be regulated as Tier I facilities for one year or
comply with the Wood & Mill Yard Debris Technical Guidance Manual. After this one-year
period, these facilities would be classified per the rule. It was noted that DEQ would change
the rule to allow the one-year period to start from the date the rules becomes permanent,
rather than from the date the rule becomes effective.
Of these four, items number 2 and 3 can be resolved with minor changes to the rule.
Since there are still unresolved issues, the Joint Legislative Environmental Common Sense
Committ ee is recommending the Board postpone action on the Solid Waste Rule until the April
Board meeting. During this time, the subcommittee will continue to work through these issues.
Sincerely,

~/

t&z,vt_ucL/

a.:ESEN TATIVE JACK BARRACL OUGH

Co

nmental
Committee

Co-Chair, Environmental
Common Sense Committee
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State of Idaho

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Board of Environmental Quality
1410 North Hilton, Boise, ID 83706-1255, (208) 373-0502

Dirk Kempthorne, Governor
C. Stephen Allred, Director

IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
MINUTES

February 6 & 7, 2002

The Board of Environmental Quality convened on February 6, 2002 at 10:15 a.m. at:
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Jess Byrne, Staff Resource Officer
Debra Cline, Management Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Larry Koenig, Administrator, State Planning and Special Projects
Lisa Kronberg, DAG, DEQ
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program

EXHIBIT

L
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OTHERS PRESENT:

Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
❖

All attachments referenced in these minutes are permanent attachments to the minutes on file
at the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.

Work Session

Prior to the beginning of the work session, the Board members and Director Steve Allred
met with the Senate Health and Welfare Committee at the state capitol. Director Allred
introduced each of the Board members and they discussed their backgrounds and areas of
interest. Chairman Don Chisholm discussed the mission and goals of the Board. Minutes from
the meeting are attached (Attachment 1) and are available on the Internet at
http://www2.state.id.us/legislat/shelmin.html#feb6.
DEQ staff briefed the Board on the rule dockets to be presented at the Board meeting on
February 7, 2002. No motions were made or passed and no votes were taken during the work
session.
The meeting adjourned at 12:00 p.m.
After adjournment, all Board members attended a joint meeting of the Senate Resources and
Conservation Committee and the House Environmental Affairs Committee in the Gold Room at
the state capitol. Board members discussed a number of environmental issues with the
committees. The minutes of the meeting are attached (Attachment 2) and are available on the
Internet at http://www2.state.id.us/legislat/sresmin.html#feb6.

February 7, 2002

The Board of Environmental Quality convened on February 7, 2002 at 9:00 a.m.:
ROLL CALL

BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
Nick Purdy, Member

IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Jon Sandoval, Chief of Staff
Debra L. Cline, Administrative Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General , DEQ
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Larry Koenig, Administrator, State Planning and Special Projects
Lisa Kronberg, DAG, DEQ
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program
OTHERS PRESENT:

John Emery, Potlatch Corp.
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Matthew Moore, Idaho Transportation Department
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD -

THE BOARD ALLOWS UP TO 30 MJNUTES FOR THE PUBLIC TO
ADDRESS THE BOARD ON JSSUES NOT SPECIFICALLY SHOWN AS
AGENDA ITEMS.

Chairman Don Chisholm called the meeting to order and opened the floor for public
comments. No comments being received, the Chair closed the public comment period.
AGENDA ITEM N 0. 1:

ADOPTION OF MINUTES

Chairman Chisholm noted that a correction to the draft minutes was made on page I 3 to
correct the spelling of Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir District.
► MOTION:

Paul Agidius moved the minutes of the November 7 & 8, 200 l Board meeting be
adopted as corrected.
SECOND: Marti Calabretta
Motion passed by unanimous vote
VOICE VOTE:

Chairman Chisholm reported Board members and staff met with the Senate Health and
Welfare Committee. A copy of the minutes of the committee meeting are available on the
internet at http://www2.state.id.us/legislat/shelmin.html#feb6

IDAHO BoARDOF ~VlRONMENTAL QUALITY
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AGENDA ITEM No. 2:

DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Director Steve Allred discussed the additional 1% budget holdback announced by the
The holdback will cut about $200,000 in general funds from DEQ's budget.
Legislature.
Idaho
DEQ is in the process of developing a proposal on how it will implement this latest cut. Jt is not
yet known what the effect will be, but it will obviously have an impact on the services the
department supplies.
A decision was reached in the hearing held yesterday in the Garnet Power Plant case.
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Gamet was granted, and a preliminary order will be
issued. The petitioner and the intervenors will then have the opportunity to file an appeal to the
Board. If an appeal is filed, the Board may need to schedule a special meeting in Boise for the
hearing.
Larry Koenig, Administrator, DEQ Planning and Special Projects, reported a draft
Strategic Plan for the department will be released for comment around the first of April, with a
second draft around the end of April. Director Allred explained the Department is developing
two plans. One is a short-term Strategic Plan that is required by law and addresses how the
Department performs its responsibilities; the other is a long-term plan. The Director feels the
long-term plan should be the Board's plan, and will seek its input on the process.
Director Allred distributed the State of Idaho's draft comments on the EPA plan for the
cleanup of the Coeur d'Alene Basin. DEQ submitted these comments to the Governor's office.
The draft comments may be revised as work continues. The final comments are due by the end
of February.
Dave Mabe, Administrator, DEQ Water Quality Program, discussed the Idaho Watershed
319 grant program and a controversial project. The Department is currently reviewing the grant
process and will establish additional guidance and clarification. One such clarification is that
watershed advisory groups have the ability to turn down a project if they feel it does not have
merit. Director Allred stressed the guidance will require the rejection of a project to be based on
technical, scientific facts.
Nick Purdy pointed out that one problem that needs to be addressed in the review process
is the situation where the grant applicant and the landowner are the same person or entity. He
felt there was insufficient oversight in such situations, and there should be a firewall of some
kind. Director Allred agreed there was a need for more guidance. The process may need to be
more formalized, particularly in the ranking of projects.
Dr. Randy MacMillan asked what the Board could do to in terms of the TNEEL and the
Department of Energy's reluctance to follow through with the cleanup of Pit 9. Director Allred
stated the decision of how to handle the situation is in the hands of the Governor. Chairman
Chisholm wondered if recent budget actions signaled an effort on the part of the DOE to
Director Allred discussed the federal budget and possible
renegotiate the issue.
misunderstandings in how things are represented in the budget. It appears there is an overall
reduction in spending on EPA and !NEEL. There is an obvious effort by the DOE to create a
situation to renegotiate their agreements with most states. Idaho is in a unique situation because
it has a tri-party agreement between the state, DOE, and EPA; plus another agreement that is a
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settlement of two court actions. The court retains jurisdiction.
important to support the Governor's agreement.

Director Allred felt it was

Chairman Chisholm felt economic pressure on Bonneville County should not change the
resolve of the people of the state of Idaho to enforce the cleanup agreement. He suggested the
Board draft a resolution supporting the Governor's agreement and urging the state not to
undercut support for the environmental cleanup due to political or economic pressure.
Marti Calabretta suggested Chairman Chisholm appoint a subcommittee to review the
issue and frame a resolution. She recommended he act as chair of the committee and that he
meet with the Governor to discuss the matter and then make recommendations to the Board.
The Chairman appointed Marti Calabretta, Paul Agidius, and Dr. Randy MacMillan to
serve on the subcommittee to draft a resolution and make recommendations to the Board.
Chairman Chisholm felt he should hear the report and feedback of the subcommittee before
scheduling a meeting with the Governor. Marti Calabretta clarified that her intent for the
meeting with the Governor was to advise him that a subcommittee had been formed and a
resolution was being prepared. Specifics of the matter need not be addressed, and it might offer
an opportunity to gain information.
AGENDA ITEM No. 3:

STATUS REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION ISSUES IN IDAHO

Kate Kelly reported all air quality rules have passed the legislative committees. The
Permit to Construct and Tier II fee rule will become effective on July I, 2002. As a result of
discussions when the Board adopted this rule, a committee has been formed to develop guidance,
both internally and externally, on how the rule will be implemented in July. DEQ will develop a
process to educate the public and regulated community on how the rule will be implemented.
DEQ initiated Negotiated Rulemaking on the Title V Program fee issue several months
ago. The process will continue into the summer. DEQ hopes to bring a rule to the Board at the
June or October meeting. Paul Agidius asked if the revenues under the new fee structure were
received as anticipated. Kate Kelly stated payments under the new fee structure began on May
2001. The amount received was below what was projected by both industry and DEQ. The fee
structure is not producing as much as was anticipated for a number of reasons. DEQ will be able
to maintain the Title V Program in its current form through another fiscal year, but new fees
must be in place before the May 2003 payment is made. This means a new rule must be in place.
DEQ is on track to meet its commitment to issue all of the initial Title V permits by December
2002.
Nick Purdy commented that many of IACI's newsletters and publications allege that the
Idaho Title V Program fees are higher than any other state and are excessive. He questioned how
this situation could be resolved if the current fee structure is already inadequate. Kate Kelly
stated DEQ is currently studying other state programs and comparing numbers to determine if
the accusations are based in fact and to ensure that Idaho has the most effective, efficient Title V
Program possible. DEQ believes the program is operating at appropriate levels given the types
of facilities regulated and the level of implementation of the program in Idaho. The fact that
Idaho does not have many big air pollution producers also affects the fees. There are only about
50 facilities in the Title V Program and most of them do not have very high emissions compared
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to other states. Most fee schedules are based on tons of emissions. Lower volumes of emissions
cause the fees to spread out differently. DEQ wants to be equitable, but the comparison must be
fair.
Nick Purdy stated it was his understanding that many of the largest air pollution
producers were grandfathered out of the program. He asked if they would be brought into the
program at some point in time. Kate Kelly clarified the large producers were in the Title V
Program and were paying fees; whether or not they are fully subject to all air quality
requirements is a different matter. It is an issue DEQ struggles with.
Chairman Chisholm asked if the rulemaking would allow opportunity for public
comment and participation. Ms. Kelly assured there would be adequate opportunity for public
participation during the process. In the past this rule typically has not had a lot of interest
outside of the regulated community. Chairman Chisholm asked if any public interest groups
were participating in the process. Ms. Kelly responded that none were actively involved at this
time.
DEQ had hoped to bring f01ward two new rules this year patterned after the portable rock
crusher rule the Board adopted last year. This "permit by rule" is an innovative approach
developed by DEQ that provides an alternative to going through the extensive permit process. It
allows portable rock crushing units to operate by following best management practices. Similar
rules for hot-mix asphalt and concrete batch plants have been postponed until next year to ensure
the best possible pattern is used. Demands placed on staff to issue permits have also slowed the
process.
Kate Kelly briefly discussed open burning and field burning. The emergency episode
rule adopted by the Board in November has gone through the legislature with no problem. DEQ
continues to deal with the field burning issue. DEQ is dedicating resources and implementing a
smoke management program in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture.
Dr. Randy MacMillan complimented Ms. Kelly and her staff on the briefing materials
they prepared on the rules. The information was very easy to follow and understand and
provided a clear explanation of the issues.
DEQ is currently reviewing the toxic air pollutant rules. Toxic air pollutants are
becoming an issue more frequently in Idaho, and have been a matter of concern in dairy odor
problems. Hydrogen sulfide is a toxic air pollutant that is not closely regulated by the federal
government, but may be a pollutant of concern in Idaho. DEQ wants to clarify its rules
regarding such issues so facilities can better understand the expectations of the air quality
standards regarding toxic air pollutants.
The Air Quality Program is planning a rulemaking to streamline and improve its rules.
The rulemaking will be designed to identify places in the rules where the permit procedure is
either unnecessarily cumbersome or unclear.
DEQ has initiated a rulemaking to update the air quality rules governing open burning in
Idaho. The open burning rules deal with general open burning, and do not pertain to field
burning issues or smoke management. These rules have been in effect for many years and need
updating to correct some fundamental flaws and clarify issues. Ms. Kelly emphasized the intent
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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of the rulemaking was to bring clarification - not to tread on fundamental rights to bum. DEQ
does not want to have rules in place that it does not enforce. The rulemaking will also address
finding ways to educate the public about the rules and the consequences of noncompliance.
Pamphlets are available from DEQ to help the public understand the rules. Marti Calabretta
asked if the public education process would include offering creative solutions and alternatives
to prohibited activities. Kate Kelly confirmed that was exactly the kind of thing DEQ was
considering in its analysis of the rules.
Kate Kelly discussed how local agencies work to control air pollution through auto
emission testing and other means. DEQ works with the agencies to provide input and guidance
as needed.
AGENDA ITEM NO.

4:

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES, DOCKET

Nos. 58-0106-

0201 AND 0202 (TEMPORARY/PROPOSED RULE)
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program, reported on the status of the rules.
At the last Board meeting, the rules were referred to the Joint Legislative Environmental
Common Sense Committee for review and recommendation. The Committee formed a task
force to address the outstanding issues. The task force met several times and was able to resolve
a majority of the issues. Four issues remain: 1) Stringency - are the rules more stringent than
the federal rules; 2) Transition phase - a realistic transition phase for closing facilities is
needed; 3) Include a definition for the Department of Transportation for noncombustible; 4) a
one-year period for wood and mill yard debris facilities needs to be clarified to allow time to
update the Wood and Mill Yard Debris Technical Guidance Manual.
DEQ requested the Board delay action on the rules until its April 2002 meeting to allow
time to address the remaining issues. The delay would also allow interested parties additional
time to review the changes to the rules. Keith Donahue, Deputy Attorney General, noted the
concerns expressed by the Board in its work session will also be reviewed during that time. A
final draft will be provided to the Board for review prior to the April meeting. The
Environmental Common Sense Committee will make a recommendation to the Board at the
April Board meeting.
Marti Calabretta questioned how the Department determined whether a rule was brought
forward as a temporary rule, which becomes effective immediately; or a pending rule, which
allows public comment and hearings. She stated it appears the Department is on a crisis course
when so many temporary rules are presented.
Paula Gradwohl, Administrative Rules
Coordinator, explained there are many reasons that could cause a rule to be presented as
temporary. Many times it is related to the Administrative Rules process and the required
timeframes. A lot of rules adopted as temporary have already been through the public comment
process and are adopted as temporary so they can go to the legislature without waiting an
additional year. This is the case with the Solid Waste rules. They have been through the public
comment process and negotiated rulemaking. lf they are adopted by the Board as pending in
April, they will not become effective for another year.
Chairman Chisholm pointed out that Director Allred has expressed his concern that the
current solid waste rules are so vague that they may be unenforceable. The negotiated
rulemaking on these rules has been quite protracted. Tt seems prudent to move forward with the
best rule possible and get something in place as a temporary rule. The public will still have a
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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chance to provide input and changes can be made if needed. The Department and the Board
have given this rule a lot of consideration and the regulated community has had ample time for
input and participation.
Paula Gradwohl emphasized that DEQ presented less temporary rules for adoption last
year than at any time in the past. The Department has worked hard to organize and plan ahead
on its rulemaking. This year in the legislature no DEQ rules had to be extended until a rule
could be brought to them next year. For the first time, all DEQ rules before the legislature were
pending rules ready to be finaled.
Doug Conde warned that if a legislative solution is not found or if DEQ loses the Idaho
Supreme Court appeal in the South Fork TMDL case, the Board may be faced with a great deal
of temporary rulemaking to meet the schedule. The Department will have to be very innovative
to find a way to deal with all the TMDLs that will have to be adopted as rules.
Dr. Joan Cloonan pointed out the Solid Waste rules will go before the Environmental
Common Sense Committee on April 9, 2002 before being brought back to the Board at the April
meeting.
Marti Calabretta suggested the Board have a conversation on public participation at some
point in the future.
► MOTION:

Marguerite Mclaughlin moved the Board express its apprec1at1on to all
participants and accept the report of the Environmental Common Sense Committee.
She further moved the Board set a date certain at the April 2002 meeting to consider
approval of the proposed Solid Waste Management rules as temporary rules of the
Department of Environmental Quality.
DISCUSSION: Marti Calabretta clarified the motion states the Board will meet to consider
approval of the temporary rule. By voting for the motion, she is not personally voting for
approval of the rules as temporary rules.
SECOND: Nick Purdy
VOTE: Motion passed by unanimous vote

AGENDA ITEM N 0. 5

CONTESTED CASE AND DOCKET STATUS REPORTS

Paula Gradwohl reviewed the status of rulemaking activities at DEQ. Information on the
rules is available on DEQ's website on the Internet. She discussed the rulemaking process and
why temporary rules are sometimes needed.
Ms. Gradwohl discussed the status of contested cases before DEQ and the Board. She
explained the timelines for the Gamet Energy contested case.
AGENDA ITEM N 0. 6

LOCAL REPORTS AND ITEMS BOARD MEMBERS MAY WISH TO
PRESENT

Dr. Randy MacMillian discussed the need to have a Board member visit with the DEQ
offices in Idaho Falls and Pocatello more frequently. Board members are appointed based on
their areas of expertise and interest and not by regions. Since there are no members from Eastern
Idaho, that area does not receive much representation on the Board. The Board has held
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meetings in the area to learn about the issues, but an ongoing process is needed to gain input.
Board members discussed possible solutions to the issue. Marti Calabretta questioned what the
expectation was regarding the Board working with the region offices. Dr. MacMillan felt it was
important for the Board to contact the regions regularly, even if just by phone, to ensure the
Board is aware of pertinent issues.
Chairman Chisholm suggested a monthly report from the regional administrators to the
Board might be helpful. As issues arise, a member or subcommittee could be appointed to cover
the matter and report to the Board. Paul Agidius felt it was not necessary for the Board to have
that level of involvement with the Department. It would also take up valuable time and
resources that may not be available. He did not want to micro manage the Department and felt it
was more appropriate for such reports to go through the Director. The Director could then bring
pertinent issues to the Board. Marti Calabretta thought a simpler process would be to make sure
the Board members are on mailing lists to receive regular mailings from the regions regarding
meetings and other activities. This would insure an ongoing flow of information rather than just
crisis management.
Director Allred discussed the existing reporting processes available to the Board. The
Department holds staff meetings by teleconference every Monday morning. Senior management
meetings are held monthly at the state office in Boise. The meetings last two days and include
all regional administrators and program administrators. The Director welcomed Board members
to attend. The regional administrators also send the Director weekly reports on new or critical
issues. The DEQ internet site also has a wealth of information regarding all meetings, deadlines
for public notices and rulemaking, and specific regional information. Any Board members
wanting to take part in any of these events should contact the Director's Management Assistant,
Rosie Alonzo.
Chairman Chisholm wondered if a letter to the regional administrators asking for their
input and suggestions might be a good way to refine a process. Paul Agidius again feared this
might be micro managing. He felt the Board should be working with the Director and
Department heads. If the Director feels that level of input is needed, then Mr. Agidius would be
comfortable with the suggestion.
Chairman Chisholm feared this could be a political issue that could develop into an attack
on the way the Board is structured. If the Board fails to provide fair geographical representation,
the public may want to change the way members are appointed. The Board could overcome the
problem by being sensitive to these concerns.
Director Allred stressed the reason the Department has hosted the tours and meetings in
the various parts of the state is to integrate the region offices with Board operations and to
educate the Board on regional issues. He was unaware of any frustrations or concerns about
representation by the regional staff. The Director has encouraged the regional administrators and
program administrators to speak openly with the Board members. He assured the Board they
have full access to the administrators and encouraged them to call occasionally to check on
specific issues or regional activities. This will be beneficial in building a productive relationship
between the Board and the Department.
Chairman Chisholm asked if it would help to have a Board member assigned to each
region to follow activities and report to the Board. Marguerite McLaughlin felt the Board should
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be very careful with such structuring. She thought the Board worked very well the way it is, and
did not support regionalization. Regional representation can bring political pressures. She
believed the Board could make better decisions without such pressure.
AGENDA ITEM No. 7

BOARD DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

Larry Koenig, Administrator, State Planning and Special Projects, discussed the
Department' s strategic plan. DEQ also publishes other reports such as the DEQ Annual Report
and the State of the Environment report. One element missing from the process is a long-range
strategic plan. The long-range plan should look ahead about 25 years and provide policy and
guidance for the Department. The Director would like the Board to provide input and direction
to set a clear vision in the long-range strategic plan. Mr. Koenig will make a presentation at the
Board 's April meeting to report on the status of the planning process and gain direction from the
Board.
Paul Agidius reported the subcommittee appointed earlier in the meeting to study ways to
support the environmental cleanup at INEEL was ready to present a draft resolution for the
Board's consideration. The subcommittee recommended the Board adopt the following
resolution:
WHEREAS, removal of hazardous radioactive waste from the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory site by the Department of
Energy is vital to protection of Idaho ' s environment, and
WHEREAS, there is no justification for the Department of Energy to fail
to meet its commitments to the State of Idaho and its citizens.
NOW, THERREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of
Environmental Quality of the State of Idaho that the Honorable Dirk Kempthorne ,
Governor of the State of Idaho, aggressively use all resources of the State to
require the Department of Energy to clean up all radioactive wastes at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory as previously agreed without
delay and not be deterred by implied threats of closure of the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory site.
►

MOTION: Marti Calabretta moved the Board adopt the motion prepared by the

subcommittee on the environmental cleanup at INEEL as read into the record.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
Motion passed by unanimous vote.
VOICE VOTE:
Director Steve Allred wil I hand deliver the resolution to Governor Kempthorne.
Dr. Randy MacMillan suggested the subcommittee stay active to monitor and become
well versed on the INEEL issues and report to the Board at future meetings. Chairman Chisholm
agreed with the suggestion and asked the subcommittee members to monitor INEEL issues and
report at future Board meetings.
Dr. Randy MacMillan discussed ideas for the Board ' s field trip and meeting in Twin
Falls in April 2002. Dr. MacMillan invited the Board to tour the Clear Springs Foods trout farm
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in Buhl, Idaho. It is the largest trout farm in the world. Other issues the Board may want to
consider are dairies, and the irrigation canals and the efforts of the canal companies to capture
the topsoil that erodes off irrigated agricultural land. Chairman Chisholm suggested the Board
also visit the Regional Landfill. It is a good example of a very modem solid waste facility.
The Board discussed the TMDL case and possible legislative solutions to resolve the
problem. If the matter is not resolved it will result in the Board and the Legislature having to
adopt about 500 rules.
Chairman Chisholm discussed the process currently used to develop the agenda for Board
meetings. The Board's management assistant works with the Chairman, DEQ ' s administrative
rules coordinator, staff, and the Director's office to develop the agenda. Board members may
submit items for the agenda at any time to the Chairman or the management assistant. Board
members agreed that the current system was satisfactory.
Board members discussed ideas for the June field trip and meeting. The location for the
meeting was set for Salmon or Stanley. The Board will learn about a number of mining related
issues and may tour the Thompson Creek Mine. It is a large, operating mine and is under a
reclamation plan.
Board members discussed the negotiated rulemaking process.
Dr. Joan Cloonan
commented the Board should not always expect negotiated rulemaking to result in a rule that is
totally acceptable to everyone. She felt it was a very good process because it brings the major
stakeholders to the table. It may be valuable to have someone outside the rulemaking process to
review the rule before it comes to the Board. Director Allred thought it might be more
productive to set a different expectation at the beginning of the rulemaking. The negotiated
rulemaking group gets so involved in writing the exact language of the rule, that it becomes very
difficult for others to understand. The group should be involved in the philosophy and
requirements of the rule, but not necessarily in the drafting of the rule. Dr. Cloonan agreed with
the Director's comments, and felt it was important to have clear, understandable rules.
Director Allred discussed swine and dairy odor problems. The issue of what is and is not
acceptable must be defined. There is also the question of whether Idaho should have a hydrogen
sulfide standard. The Director asked for the Boards' input on this controversial issue. Chairman
Chisholm asked if any other compounds, such as ammonia, would be included in such a rule.
Director Allred stated it would most likely include only hydrogen sulfide because of the health
threat it presents. Ammonia is more of a nuisance that dissipates rather quickly. It does not
present the same health concerns as hydrogen sulfide. Recent testing has provided information
on background or normal levels of hydrogen sulfide around the state. Most levels are less than
25 parts per billion. A level of somewhere between 30 and 70 parts per billion has been
discussed as a possible standard to protect health . Odor problems are created at much lower
levels. There would be very few instances in normal operations that would exceed the upper
level of 70. However, DEQ has measured levels as high as several hundred parts per billion at
some dairies. Many states have already set standards, but the federal government currently does
not have a standard.
Marti Calabretta questioned whether the state was being asked to fix a problem that was
caused by poor siting at the local level. Director Allred responded that many problems have
resulted from siting housing development next to existing dairies, or siting dairies near housing.
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Nevertheless, if a health threat exists, or to some extents even a nuisance problem, DEQ should
be a part of the resolution. Doug Conde stated the problem is sometimes caused by a lack of
expertise at the local level. The Legislature dealt with the problem by passing the siting act,
which allows the counties to enlist the help of DEQ, the Department of Water Resources, and the
Department of Agriculture.
Director Allred explained that one advantage of setting a number or standard is that it sets
criteria for future development of facilities. Chairman Chisholm felt two standards might be
needed. A health standard and a quality of life standard would provide guidance for local
communities on siting and permitting that would prevent many of these problems from
developing. Nick Purdy felt public demand, such as we have seen with this issue, along with the
standard, should trigger action. When most people agree that a certain level interferes with the
quality of life, it should be included in the standards. Dr. Joan Cloonan feared it would make the
rules difficult to interpret and apply if there were two separate standards. It would be useful to
have the information available as a planning and zoning perspective, but in terms of setting
ambient standards that would be enforceable, it would be very difficult to have two standards.
Chairman Chisholm believed a nuisance standard expressed in parts per billion would be a
valuable tool and a step in the right direction.
►

MOTION: Nick Purdy moved the Board direct the Department of Environmental Quality to

investigate and consider setting a state standard for Hydrogen Sulfide.
Paul Agidius
DISCUSSION:
Marti Calabretta stressed that a risk factor should be identified, so the
DEQ is not just expanding its authority to help communities with a nuisance or a siting
problem that should be resolved by other parties. She also questioned whether this was the
best way to bring about change.
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote.
SECOND:

The November 2002 Board meeting was rescheduled to November 12 and 13.
meeting will be held in Boise, Idaho.

The

The meeting adjourned at 2: 15 p.m.

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman

Marti Calabretta, Secretary

Debra L. Cline, Management Assistant and Recorder
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IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENT AL QUALITY
MINUTES

April 25, 2002
The Board of Environmental Quality convened on April 25, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. at:
Westcoast Twin Falls Hotel
Juniper Room
1357 Blue Lakes Blvd., North
Twin Falls, Idaho
ROLLCALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Debra Cline, Management Assistant to the Board
Barry Burnell, Technical Services
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Keith Donahue, DAG, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl, Paralegal, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Steve Goddard, DAG, DEQ
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Larry Koenig, Administrator, State Planning and Special Projects
Pam Smolczynski, Environmental Program Planner
Doug Howard, Administrator, Twin Falls Region Office
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program

EXHIBIT

in

000441

OTHERS PRESENT:

Rick Simmons, Monsanto
Representative Sharon Block, Idaho Legislature
Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining Assoc.
Phyllis Beard, Amalgamated Sugar Co.
Steve Price, Idaho Sanitary Services Assoc. (ISSA)
Don Simmons, ISSA
Robert Simmons, ISSA
Representative Charles Cuddy, Idaho Legislature
Senator Laird Noh, Idaho Legislature
Tom Turco, Central District Health
Mike Reno, Central District Health
Dan Kriz, South Central District Health
Cheryl Juntunen, South Central District Health
Larry Pennington, North Side Canal Co.
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Assoc.
Beth Elroy, Monsanto
Dan Gogger, Idaho Rural Committee
Nick Tzanakakis, private citizen
Ginny Gunn, private citizen
Helen McCracken, private citizen
Lorraine, Times News
Pat Hansing, private individual
Katie Simmons, private citizen
Phuong Smith, private citizen
Craig Slane, private citizen
Ed Smith, private citizen
Peter Rickards, private citizen
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry

❖

All attachments referenced in these minutes are permanent attachments to the minutes on file
at the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.

Work Session
Kate Kelly, Administrator, DEQ Air Quality Program, provided a report on the status of
air quality permitting. The Department is on track to meet its goals to clear up the permit
backlog. She noted there is a potential for some permits to be appealed to the Board, but they
hope to resolve the issues during the permitting process. Ms. Kelly also briefly discussed some
upcoming rulemaking on open burning, Title V fees, a regulatory level for hydrogen sulfide, and
the field burning issue in Northern Idaho. DEQ is currently working with the Department of
Agriculture to develop and implement a program for smoke management. Significant resources
are being used to act aggressively to resolve this problem.
Larry Koenig, Administrator, DEQ Planning and Special projects, reported on the DEQ
long-range strategic plan. The Department would like to have the Boards' input on the plan. Dr.
Joan Cloonan suggested the Board hold an informal, open meeting with a facilitator to develop
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its recommendations on the plan. Chairman Chisholm asked each Board member to prepare five
main issues or suggestions of goals to stimulate the discussion at the upcoming meeting.
Director Steve Allred indicated the long-range strategic plan should set a path for where the
Department should be 25 years from now. Marti Calabretta questioned what the expectation was
of the Board for leadership. Members believed it was to interface between the Department, the
laws, and the public and what they want. Nick Purdy asked Larry Koenig to prepare a summary
of the comments received at the public meetings. The meeting will be scheduled for early June.
DEQ staff briefed the Board on the rule dockets. No motions were made or passed and no
votes were taken during the work session.
The Board adjourned for lunch at 12:00 p.m.

The Board of Environmental Quality reconvenes on April 25, 2002 at 1:00 p.m.:
ROLL CALL

BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman
Paul C. Agidius, Vice chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None

Chairman Don Chisholm called the meeting to order and advised that Dick Rush, Idaho
Association of Commerce and Industry, had requested to present testimony on Agenda Item No.
4, Solid Waste Management Rules, at this time due to travel arrangements.
Dick Rush stated IACI would not oppose the Solid Waste Rules, but felt they were not in
final shape yet. He noted the Department had brought the rules before the Board three times
asking for temporary rules, and IACI initially resisted their adoption. He applauded the Board
for allowing the process to work through negotiations and resolve their concerns. Mr. Rush
thanked the Department for their work on the rules. IACI still has some concern about whether
the rules should be adopted as temporary rules.
Dick Rush read the written testimony of Jane Gorsuch, lntermountain Forest Association,
into the record. Ms. Gorsuch was unable to attend the meeting. The written comments are
attached (Attachment 1). The IF A has been involved in development of these rules for many
years. As a result of the last Environmental Common Sense meeting, the majority of the forest
products sector concerns have been resolved. It was agreed that all wood and mill yard debris
facilities will be considered Tier I facilities unless the Department can prove that due to specific
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site criteria, it should not be Tier I. At the suggestion of the health districts, the Department will
develop a practical computer model to provide a quick way to determine whether a site proposed
for use would create an environmental problem. The criteria used in the model will include site
geology, site soils, groundwater characteristics, distance to surface water, and site climatic data.
Log and mill yard debris managers will "ground truth" the model to assure that it works to
identify potentially poor sites. The IF A believes this is a workable solution and looks forward to
working with DEQ and the health districts on this project. Once the rule is in final form, the IFA
will perform a legal and technical review and submit comments as necessary. One issue that still
generates multiple comments and concern is the 2000 cubic yard total disposal capacity
It is suggested that to completely clarify this matter, Section
limitation on Tier I facilities.
009.05 be amended to note that log and mill yard debris facilities are Tier I regardless of total
annual volume. The IFA will address this matter during the public comment period.
Dick Rush thanked the health districts for taking part in the negotiations and providing
valuable input.
PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD -

THE BOARD ALLOWS UP TO

30 MINUTES FOR THE PUBLIC TO

ADDRESS THE BOARD ON ISSUES NOT SPECIFICALLY SHOWN AS
AGENDA ITEMS.

Chairman Chisholm opened the floor for public comments. Mr. Nick Tzanakakis, private
citizen from Hagerman, expressed concern that private citizens who wish to report
environmental violations are fearful because their confidentiality is not protected. He urged the
Department of Environmental Quality to protect citizens and their property by maintaining
confidentiality when complaints or reports are filed. Director Steve Allred explained that the
DEQ policy is to keep complaints confidential until they have investigated them and determined
enforcement action is necessary. If enforcement action is taken, evidence is needed to proceed,
and the complainant may need to testify. Mr. Tzanakakis stated numerous people in Gooding
County have had problems because their names were provided to the violators they had reported.
Director Allred pointed out that the confidentiality policy he discussed was used by all DEQ
offices. He was not certain of the policies of other city or county offices.
Mr. Tzanakakis also discussed the health and environmental problems associated with dead
animals being left on public roads and other areas. The city, county, and state agencies do not
seem to provide adequate services to remove and dispose of the carcasses.
Helen McCracken, who lives two miles north of the Haflinger Desert Rose Dairy, testified
regarding the odor, potential water pollution, and health problems in the area. About a year ago,
a formal complaint was sent to the Inspector General of the Environmental Protection Agency.
The letter was signed by 45 citizens. The EPA investigation confirmed that there were problems
with odor, dust, and flies, but there was no proof of water pollution. EPA stated they would not
take action until water pollution is proven to be a problem, but they will keep the file open. Area
residents are in the process of trying to prove water pollution under the Clean Waters Act. The
Sierra Club of the USA has attorneys investigating documentation. A lawsuit may be filed.
DEQ has done testing for hydrogen sulfide levels on Ms. McCracken's property a number of
times and found ratings up to and over 600, with levels of 1,500 right by the dairy. She was very
distressed to overhear a DEQ employee state, "Odor is not a health hazard in Idaho as far as the
dairies go." DEQ has 52 pages, single spaced, of telephone calls from residents in the area
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complaining about the problem. Don Chisholm indicated that Kate Kelly, Administrator of the
Air Quality Program, provided the Board with a study from the state of Iowa on hydrogen sulfide
standards. The Board has directed the Department to initiate rulemaking to address the health
hazards of hydrogen sulfide and set a state standard. A rule should be before the Board by the
November meeting if not sooner. Ms. McCracken stressed her concern with the averaging
process used to assess health risks. Her husband's asthma was in remission until the two dairies,
the Dutch Touch and the Desert Rose, went into production two miles south of their home. She
felt that given the overwhelming documentation on the health hazards of hydrogen sulfide, the
problem was not being dealt with realistically.
Director Allred thanked Ms. McCracken for her cooperation with the testing process. He
stated that based on the information obtained near her home and all over the state, it is clear that
it is time to make a decision on a state standard for hydrogen sulfide. The standard will first
have to be adopted by the Board of Environmental Quality, and then by the Idaho Legislature.
There will be many challenges before it can be accomplished. The Director cautioned that the
standard will not solve the odor problems. The goal will be to protect public health and set
expectations for dairies and all other sources. The odor from hydrogen sulfide can be detected at
very low levels not normally associated with health risks.
Helen McCracken emphasized that odor was not the main problem. They are concerned
about their lives and all of the health hazards, including flies spreading disease. Residents have
contacted South Central Health District with their concerns, but were told that it is an Idaho State
Department of Agriculture issue. ISDA was contacted about the flies, and they said it was a
South Central Health District issue. Residents are very frustrated from being referred back and
forth between agencies.
Ginny Gunn, resident of the Cedar Draw area, asked what the DEQ could do to protect the
health of residents until the standard for hydrogen sulfide is set. They have been subjected to
high levels of hydrogen sulfide for two years and suffer headaches, nausea, breathing problems,
memory loss and many other problems. The ISDA has not been the helpfol with the problem.
The DEQ last year was extremely helpful in moving in the right direction, but then the matter
was placed in the ISDA's hands. Director Allred stated he could not promise a short-term fix.
He confmned that the responsibility for enforcing the agricultural odor laws was removed from
DEQ and placed within the Department of Agriculture. However, DEQ does have the continuing
responsibility for establishing standards that have to be observed by the ISDA, the agricultural
industries, cities, and all other industries and activities in the state. The process of setting a
standard is a long and complicated process. It will most likely be subject to a great deal of public
comment and controversy. An enforceable standard will probably not be in place before the end
of the next session of the Legislature. DEQ will continue to document conditions. Those
documented conditions could be used perhaps in a number of ways by those who are most
impacted by the problem.
Director Allred again emphasized that the health-related number will not solve the odor
problem. Recent reports including the Iowa study have confmned what was already suspected,
and provide sufficient additional data that can be used to establish a standard. The standard will
probably be significantly higher than five parts per million. The odor caused by hydrogen
sulfide can be detected at something less than five parts per million. Additionally, the odors are
not just hydrogen sulfide. There are about 140 components in the odor. DEQ will also consider
the effects of hydrogen sulfide combined with ammonia.
IDAHO BOARD OF ENVffiONMENTAL QUALITY
APRIL 25, 2002 MINUTES - PAGE 5

000445

Ginny Gunn stressed that she was not so concerned about the smell as the neurological
and breathing problems caused by the odors.
Local residents have been complaining and
reporting these problems for the last two years to no avail. Chairman Chisholm sympathized
with the situation, and reiterated that the Board has no authority over dairy odor issues. He
urged the residents to report their concerns to their legislators. Ms. Gunn indicated they had
contacted their legislators and the ISDA. She stated their concerns were met with arrogance and
indifference by the ISDA and feared it would take someone dying before their concerns were
heard. Residents have been bounced from one department to another, with each saying it is
another's responsibility.
Chairman Chisholm noted that the public comment period time was up and asked that
anyone who still wished to address the Board send their written comments to the Board' s
secretary for distribution to the members.
Marguerite McLaughlin suggested the Board send a letter to the Department of
Agriculture advising them of the concerns expressed by the citizens at the meeting and
expressing the Board's concern about the odor problem and the potential health risks. Chairman
Chisholm agreed and felt the letter should be co-signed by Director Allred and copied to the
legislators. Paul Agidius suggested a transcript of the testimony be attached to the letter.
AGENDAITEMNO.

l:

ADOPTION OF MINUTFB

Dr. Joan Cloonan noted a correction to the spelling of Lisa Kronberg on page me and three,
and an addition of Larry Koenig to the list of attendees.
►

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the minutes of the February 6 & 7, 2002 Board
meeting be adopted as corrected.
SECOND: Paul Agidius
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed by unanimous vote

MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM NO. 2:

a.

DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Legislative Wrap-up

Director Steve Allred gave a brief report on legislative actions affecting the Board and
DEQ. All of the rules adopted by the Board were approved by the legislature with little dispute
including the emergency episode air pollution rule. A bill was also passed that directly affects
DEQ regarding the stringency of rules. Director Allred opposed the bill because it requires the
Depaitment to make a determination as to whether or not a rule is more stringent than, or covers
more than federal legislation. Such a determination is almost always a judgment decision. The
Director felt this would open the door to litigation whenever someone wanted to challenge a rule.
Legislation was introduced to bring a non-judicial determination to whether or not
TMDLs are plans or rules. DEQ deals with TMDLs as plans that are not enforceable on the face.
The Department uses essentially the same procedure for public notice and input as rules, but they
are not adopted by the Board as rules. However, in a lawsuit brought against the Coeur d'Alene
TMDL, a state district court set aside the TMDL because it did not follow the Administrative
Procedures Act for rulemaking. DEQ appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. It wis hoped
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this legislation would resolve the lawsuit. The legislation would have clarified a procedure in
statute by which the TMDLs are adopted. DEQ withdrew the bill because they were not able to
reach agreement with the parties who objected to it. The solution now rests with the Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, a number of 1MDLs need to be adopted. Since Idaho no longer has a
TMDL on the Coeur d'Alene, there is a significant chance the federal government will adopt
one.
Legislation was also passed to settle an objection by the state of Washington on how they
will be represented on the Coeur d'Alene Basin Commission. Prior to the legislation, the law
required the representative from Washington to be a Spokane County commissioner. The new
legislation removes that requirement and will allow the governor of Washington to appoint his
choice as the representative.
The Coeur d'Alene Commission has been activated and Director Allred has been
appointed as a state representative. The Tribe has signed an agreement with the Governor to
participate, but a representative has not been officially appointed. The state of Washington and
the federal government have indicated they will participate and an agreement is being prepared.
The federal government has not decided how they will be represented. The legislation requires
the President to approve the appointee for the federal government. It is thought that EPA may be
selected as the representative. The federal government will participate as an observer until the
matter is settled. The first meeting of the Commission will take place in early May 2002 to deal
with business matters to establish the organization. DEQ will provide initial staff support to the
Commission until they decide how they want to proceed with staffing and other matters. The
Commissions first program will be to adopt an interim plan to proceed. Congress appropriated
two million dollars in funding for the Commission. The legislature appropriated one million
dollars to DEQ to assign for the Commission this fiscal year.
Director Allred expects the Record of Decision for the Coeur d'Alene Basin clean up to
be issued in June 2002. Informal and written communications with the EPA indicate they will be
able to meet the comments of the State of Idaho, aid that the State will agree with the Record of
Decision.
DEQ has signed an agreement with the Department of Energy on the clean up of the Pit 9
area at the INEEL. The agreement has substantial advantages for the State of Idaho and resolves
many of the issues of the last several years. Following signing of the agreement, DEQ filed suit
in federal court asking the court to interpret the 1995 agreement that requires all transuranics to
be removed from Idaho. The DOE interprets the agreement to mean that hey have to remove
only aboveground transuranics. DEQ is confident the court will find that the agreement requires
the removal of all transuranics from Idaho.
DEQ has issued a Notice of Violation and $70,000 fine to the Idaho Department of
Transportation and its contractor for violations of the Water Quality Act. A consent order is
being negotiated that will require the DOT to comply with the Water Quality Act and reparr
some of the damage. The fine may be handled through a Supplemental Environmental Project.
Director Allred discussed the impact of the recent $686,000 budget holdback of general
funds for DEQ. The holdback for DEQ for fiscal year 2003 will total $1,322,000. DEQ will
maintain its core responsibilities, but many projects that are not required to be completed in a
certain tirneframe will be delayed. An example of the projects would be non-1MDL related
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water quality monitoring. During the period of time DEQ is operating on a reduced budget, it
will not proceed with some of the groundwater investigations and studies it had planned.
Projects regarding Coeur d'Alene Lake, Priest Lake, and Payette Lake will be reduced or
delayed. The Coeur d'Alene Lake Management Plan will be completed. Monitoring with the
USGS and some ambient water quality monitoring will also be reduced. Non-critical drinking
water activities and endangered species activities regarding Bull Trout will be reduced. DEQ
also plans to defer about six remedial programs it had anticipated conducting.
Jack Lyman, Idaho Mining Association, explained the IMA's concerns in co-sponsoring
the legislation to require DEQ to declare when a mle is more stringent or broader in scope than
corresponding federal rules. There is already a statutory prohibition against adoption of mies
that are more stringent or broader in scope than federal rules, but IMA feels there seems to be
some doubt about whether some mlemaking comes under that prohibition. They felt a way to
advance the cause was to require that DEQ disclose to the public when it proposes mlemaking to
the Board, and when the Board proposes a rule to the legislature, an evaluation that has been
done by DEQ as to whether or not the proposed mle is more stringent, broader m scope, or
proposes to regulate an activity that isn't being regulated by the federal government.
Mr. Lyman stated he understood Director Allred's concern that this will often be a
judgment call and may in fact open some of the rules up to litigation. He was unaware of any
litigation arising from the strict statutory prohibition. It is the gray areas that are in question.
The legislation was not meant as a punitive measure, a means to complicate the system, or to
provide other litigious ways to overturn mies. IACI and IMA educated the legislators that tre
statutory prohibition applied only to specific areas of the code. The bill passed the legislature
unanimously. Mr. Lyman believes this sends a very clear message to the Board that the
legislature is going to look to the Board to avoid those areas that it can that are more stringent or
broader in scope than the federal government. In the areas where the Board chooses to be more
stringent, broader in scope, or to regulate something the federal government does not, there
should be good justification, because he fully expects the legislature to question such mies and
DEQ will have to make a good case to get them past the legislature.
Director Allred advised the Board that intent language was added to DEQ's appropriation
legislation by Senator Hawkins to encourage DEQ to be more cooperative with local
government. In response to that language both the Association of Counties and the Idaho
Association of Cities sent letters to all legislators on the Joint Finance and Appropriations
Committee stating that the cooperation between their organizations and DEQ was the best it had
ever been.
AGENDAITEMNO. 3:

INDMDUAI..JSUBSURFACE SEWAGE DISPOSAL RULES 1 DOCKET
No. 58-0103-0201 (TEMPORARYRULE)

David Mabe, Administrator, Idaho Water Quality Program, discussed how the new
stringency law might be applied regarding the Subsurface Sewage Disposal Rules. The rules are
probably broader in scope than federal rules because there are no specific federal mies applying
to these types of facilities, but there are other wastewater rules. This is one area that is in
question and DEQ will investigate further exactly how the stringency issue should be addressed.
The Board had three areas of concern with the mies. DEQ will address the concerns and
bring the rule back to the Board at its June meeting for consideration as a proposed rule. The
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rule will not go forward as a temporary rule. Mr. Mabe discussed the three areas of concern and
possible solutions. The areas are:
1) Notification of failing systems. New language to be added, "the owner of any
failing system shall obtain a permit as soon as practical after the owner becomes
aware of the system failure. In no case shall the timeframe for obtaining a permit
exceed seven working days. Construction shall be completed within 30 calendar days
of permit issuance unless otherwise specified by the Director."
2) How will the rules affect existing permits that have been issued, but no
Clarifying language would read, "Individual
construction has taken place?
subsurface sewage disposal installation permits or other lot-specific approvals for
systems issued prior to (insert effective date of rules) pursuant to Idaho Code, Title
39, Chapter 1 or Title 39, Chapter 6 shall be valid until expiration. This language
would allow a permit issued prior to the rule becoming effective to be valid for the
life of the permit (a one-year period plus opportunity for extensions if needed). Nick
Purdy asked how the proposed change would affect previously platted subdivisions,
some as far back as the 1917, that were previously guaranteed permits by a
grandfather policy. David Mabe explained that the language, "or other lot-specific
approvals" was left in the rule to cover such situations. If there is a specific set of
conditions that were approved with the plat, they would still be viewed as valid and
would go on basically indefinitely. Mr. Purdy stated many of the older plats do not
have conditions and were approved by the county before the DEQ or the health
department existed. Mr. Mabe stated that if there were not lot-specific approvals for
the septic, they would fall under the new rule. The plat would still be valid, but the
lots would have to meet the new septic system requirements to be permitted. Barry
Burnell, DEQ Technical Services, agreed there is a great deal of land within the state
that was platted before there were any rules. When owners of property platted prior
to 1971 apply for an on-site system, current rules are applied. Permits are not issued
based on rules that were not available in 1917. There is a lot of platted ground with
lots that cannot be built on because they do not meet separation distances, set backs,
or other conditions required today. DEQ attempts to work with these situations by
finding innovative ways to resolve the problem such as finding a septic lot, easement,
combining lots, and using community septic systems. Nick Purdy asked if DEQ
planned to continue the policy of being flexible and innovative with the new rules.
Mr. Burnell confirmed that they would.
3) How will failing systems be handled? On page 19 in the Failing Subsurface Sewage
section, clarifying language will be added to allow a system that has failed and cannot
meet the new rule to use a replacement system design that is approved by the
Director. Individuals will not be held to the new standards if they simply cannot meet
them. Flexibility will be used to get a new system in place. Don Chisholm noted that
the language does not guarantee that a design will be approved by the Director. There
may still be situations in which the Director cannot in good judgment approve a
system. Mr. Mabe stated that would be a very difficult decision to make and DEQ
intends to do the best it can to get a working system in place in these situations.
Gary Allen, attorney with the law firm of Givens Pursley in Boise, testified in support of
the Subsurface Sewage Disposal Rules on behalf of his client, Valley Advocates for Responsible
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Development. They support the rules as presented and have no concerns with the proposed
changes discussed earlier in the meeting. Valley Advocates for Responsible Development was
one of the parties to the lawsuit that led to this rulemaking. He encouraged the Board and DEQ
to move fotward with the rules quickly and stated his confidence that DEQ would reasonably
implement existing rules until the new rules are in place.
Steve Goddard, Deputy Attorney General for DEQ, noted that all the parties to the
lawsuit participated in the negotiated rulemaking for this rule.
AGENDAITEMNO. 4:

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES, DOCKET Nos. 58-01060201 AND 0202 (TEMPORARY RULE)

Dean Ehlert, State Waste and Remediation Program coordinator, reviewed recent changes
(Attachment 2) made to the rules.
Changes were made regarding the closure of existing
facilities, language regarding compliance with other state and federal laws, changes to
definitions to add more certainty to how the rules will be applied, and wood and mill yard debris
Mr. Ehlert discussed some of the issues regarding wood and mill yard debris
facilities.
facilities. He pointed out that by adopting these rules, no new rules are being imposed on wood
and mill yard debris facilities. They are already regulated under the existing solid waste rules.
DEQ is requesting the rules be adopted as temporary rules so they will become effective
immediately. They will apply to new facilities coming on line and start the timeframe for
existing facilities. Mr. Ehlert asked that the Board adopt the rules with the changes proposed
earlier in the meeting and a change on Page 9, section 009 .c. to correct the reference number to
Section 001.03.a.ix. The reference also needs to be corrected on Page IO.
Marguerite McLaughlin asked for clarification that the 2000 cubic yard criteria would not be
the only criteria used to determine at which tier a wood and mill yard debris facility would be
regulated. Dean Ehlert confirmed that in addition to the volume, DEQ would look at the whole
site including climatic conditions, soil, and distance to groundwater.
Chairman Chisholm asked Mr. Ehlert to discuss and respond to the comments received from
Representative John Campbell. Mr. Ehlert read and responded to each of the comments:
I) All log yard debris will now be considered as solid waste unless it is handled as per the
Technical Guidance Manual. Response: Wood and mill yard debris is already regulated
under the current Solid Waste Rule unless it is managed according to the Technical
Guidance Manual. If a facility is using the TGM, it will be exempt from the proposed
rules.
2) Neither the proposed rules nor the TGM allow for materials to be handled in accordance
with typical current practices such as stockpiles and non-regulated landfills. Response:
It will depend on what the materials are being stockpiled for. Under the TGM some of
the uses are for beauty bark, firewood, soil amendment, etc. If they are stockpiling for
those reasons, to get enough volume to pick up, those materials would be regulated
under the TGM. There should not be any non-regulated landfills. They should be
operated under the current rule or the TGM.
3) The Tier One categorization of log yard debris is appropriate; however, the proposed
rules limit the amount of material to 2,000 cubic yards in a landfill and 600 cubic yards
or cumulative for a processing facility. No where does it state that wood processing
facilities are exempt from these limits. Response: As stated earlier, under the proposed
rules in section 009., the Tier One classification would apply to all non-wood waste
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4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

management facilities. Section 009.05 applies specifically to wood and mill yard debris
facilities and that section has no reference to the volume levels mentioned. The volume
will not be the sole reason for classifying a facility as Tier one, two, or three.
A typical sawmill will generate approximately 30,000 - 40,000 cubic yards of log yard
material per year. On-site piles can range from 10,000 - 20,000 cubic yards in size.
Response: The proposed rule will not apply the cubic yard limit.
It is appropriate to include boiler ash in the wood waste handling because it is often
combined. Response: Under the TGM, facilities are allowed to landfill wood waste
including up to 6% boiler ash and it will still be considered wood and mill yard debris.
Higher percentages would be considered as more of a typical industrial landfill.
On page 9 the proposed rules refer to site-specific criteria and granting the department
flexibility to regulate the site under a different tier classification. Many mills are located
on or near rivers and they have shallow groundwater. It would be possible under the
current wording for the department to request any of the data specified and reclassify the
site. Response: That is true, and DEQ would do that if there was a concern that a
facility was impacting groundwater. DEQ looks at potential uses as required under the
Ground Water rule to see if a facility is impacting groundwater. Regarding the distance
to rivers and streams, federal requirements also set floodplain restrictions for any type of
facility and would apply to any type of solid waste landfill.
It would be more appropriate to limit the length of time a pile exists, than the size of the
pile for the following reasons: if the environmental concern is leaching and it takes time
for the wood to degrade before it begins to leach; piles can vary in size and a 10,000
cubic yard wood waste pile does not have the same odor, vector, etc. concerns that a
10,000 cubic yard household waste pile would have. Response: DEQ agrees with these
comments and will consider these conditions when evaluating a site to determine
whether a Tier one classification is appropriate.
Through conversing with one of the mills regarding their attempt to follow the wood
waste TGM, it had become apparent that the Panhandle Health District was not capable
of making a decision in this area of expertise. Since the wood waste is now classified as
a solid waste, IDEQ should have jurisdiction. Response: The staff at the Panhandle
Health District who deals with this has considerable experience with this type of
mate1ial. DEQ is involved with the decisions and the health districts often consult with
DEQ on whether a facility is protective of environmental health and public health.
Again, wood waste is currently classified as a solid waste, so the proposed rule will not
change that.
It would be a good idea for someone to identify what the cost to industry would be once
these rules are enacted.
There will be hauling, recycling, environmental testing,
environmental consultants, and in-house expenses to meet these new rules. It may be
enough to push some of the mills into closure. Response: As currently proposed, the
requirements under Tier one are less restrictive than the current rules. For facilities that
are managing their waste according to the current Solid Waste Rules, the costs should
remain equal or decrease.

Other suggested changes included:
Page 4, "statistically significant" needs to be more
clearly defined, and linear regression in correlation requires large data sets which are not
typically available in this situation. Mr. Ehlert suggested the Technical Guidance Committee
address these issues. On Page 9 under 02.a. and b., - for clarification purposes the term "log yard
debris" should be added to the list of definitions. Mr. Ehlert noted there is a separate section that
specifically discusses the classification of a wood and mill yard debris facility. On Page 9, 05. IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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suggested a change from one year to three years after the effective date to allow IDEQ time to
prepare the ash spreadsheet and for industry to work on the TGM. Mr. Ehlert noted that the oneyear timeframe was developed and agreed upon during the negotiated rulemaking. The parties
felt the one-year time period was adequate time for the Technical Guidance Committee to meet
and develop recommended changes to the manual. On Page 13, under O11.01.g. - the term
"sufficient storm water management provisions must be implemented" should be clarified in
scope. Mr. Ehlert explained that the term sufficient will depend on site conditions-what is
sufficient for one facility may not necessarily be sufficient for another, or what is sufficient for
one could be too much for another. It is a site-by-site determination.
The comments also included suggestions for the TGM including: 1) A new team composed
of individuals operating in Idaho and impacted directly by the new rules should look at updating
the TGM. Mr. Ehlert advised that new members have been nominated for the Technical
Guidance Committee and the first meeting should be held within the next month. 2) The TGM
should add the option of storage piles with storm water runoff containment.
Again, the
limitation should be on time stored, not the size of the pile. Mr. Ehlert felt the Technical
Guidance Committee could consider this suggestion.
Representative Charles Cuddy presented letters from the Clearwater County
Commissioners, the Three Rivers Timber Company, and the Konkolville Lumber Company to
be included in the record (Attachment 3).
Representative Cuddy testified on behalf five
sawmills that operate in the Clearwater area. The timber business in this area is very depressed
and under great economic and environmental pressure. He thanked Director Allred, Orville
Green, the Environmental Common Sense Committee, Dean Ehlert, and all DEQ staff who
helped develop the Solid Waste Management rules and reach an agreement that the environment
and industry can live with. He stressed that the timber industry remains to be a concerned with
the 2,000 cubic yard criteria. This volume automatically puts most log yard debris facilities in
the higher Tier 11 classification. Most log yard waste is dirt, rock, and very little wood fiber due
to the management systems used to screen out wood fiber for use as hog fuel , firewood, etc.
There is very little cedar in the log yard debris facilities in the area because the timber is either
sold with the bark on or the waste is sold as hog fuel and hauled off Representative Cuddy
acknowledged that the 2,000 yard criteria had been addressed, but reminded that the laymen
reviewing the rules may not fully understand and further discussions may be necessary.
Chairman Chisholm asked if the TGM made consideration for facilities that contained
mostly dirt and rock, and had no bark with the kind of tannins that create groundwater problems.
Dean Ehlert explained that in the rules under the definition of inert, a section was added for inert
wood and mill yard debris. DEQ plans to develop a guidance so a facility can determine
whether their waste meets the inert description. Inert waste is exempt from the proposed rules.
Steve Price, Idaho Sanitary Services Association, served as general counsel for a solid
waste company in Idaho for the last four years and was involved in the negotiated rulemaking
for the Solid Waste Management Rules. The proposed rules in their current form are acceptable
to the ISSA. He suggested a technical revision to the proposed rules on Page 1, section 03.b.5.
to clarify that the rules do not apply to any facility that operates under the TGM. The definition
on Page 8, 51 implies that a wood or mill yard debris facility has to be in conformity with the
requirements of the Wood and Mill Yard Technical Guidance Manual. The language on Page
10 appears to say that even if a facility is following the TGM, they are still subject to the Solid
Waste Management Rules. He pointed out that Page 6, item 33 also contained confusing
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language in the definition of "projected waste volume." The phrase "total actual" conflicts with
the word projected. He suggested the definition be changed to "waste volume." He also
supported some additional changes to the language regarding the 2,000 cubic yard criteria, such
as "2,000 cubic yards at any one time." Mr. Price supported the rules in their current fonn and
felt the suggested changes could be addressed during the public comment period and should not
prevent the temporary rule from going forward. As a general counsel in the industry, he
appreciated the guidance provided in the proposed rules and felt they made sense.

Mr. Price felt the Environmental Common Sense Committee was very valuable in
bringing about consensus in the rulemaking. He gave special thanks to Orville Green for going
out of his way to work with the stakeholders and insure the best possible product for everyone.
He also recognized Keith Donahue and Dean Ehlert for their outstanding work in keeping
everyone informed and being responsive to their concerns.
Dr. Joan Cloonan stated she was comfortable with adopting the rules as temporary rules,
but questioned whether there was any interest in having a different effective date and if it was
appropriate. Doug Conde explained the Governor's office approved the rules as temporary rules
due to the need to µ-otect the public health. Chairman Chisholm felt it would be best go forward
with the immediate effective date.
Dr. Cloonan expressed her appreciation for the efforts of the DEQ staff and the
Environmental Common Sense Committee and also acknowledged the efforts of Bairy Burnell
who also spent many years working on Solid Waste Management rules.
►

MOTION:

►

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board repeal the Solid Waste Management Rules
and Standards as a temporary action presented under Docket No. 58-0106-0202 with an
effective date of April 26, 2002.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOTE: Motion passed by unanimous vote

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt the Temporary Rules presented under
Docket No. 58-0106-0201 as amended orally and in the document presented by Dean Ehlert
in today's meeting with an effective date of April 26, 2002.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOTE: Motion passed by unanimous vote
MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM N 0.

5

CONTESTED CASE AND DOCKET STATUS REPORTS

Paula. Gradwohl discussed the status of contested cases before DEQ and the Board.
Most of the cases are still in negotiations; several cases are near the six-month dismissal
tirneframe. Doug Conde advised the Idaho Rivers United, American Rivers United appeal on the
C J Strike 401 Certification for relicensing will probably be decided in the next several months.
The case may come before the Board.
Paula Gradwohl reviewed the status of rulemaking activities at DEQ.
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AGENDA ITEM N 0.

6

LOCAL REPORTS AND ITEMS BOARD MEMBERS MAY WISH TO
PRESENT

Dr. Joan Cloonan reported she is part1c1pating in the Treasure Valley Airshed public
process. The process involves a great deal of public input and community planning on goals. It
is a very long complicated process, but is very worthwhile
AGENDA ITEM N 0. 7

BOARD DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

Two
Chainnan Don Chisholm discussed the reappointment of Board members.
members' (Marguerite McLaughlin and Don Chisholm) tenns will expire on July 1, 2002; both
expressed willingness to continue to serve and will seek reappointment. In addition, two Board
members (Or. Joan Cloonan and Marti Calabretta) are running for the Idaho Senate. If elected,
they will resign their positions on the Board.
Doug Conde asked that future Board work sessions be recorded to preserve information
for the rulemaking process. Nick Purdy felt it would be more efficient to incorporate the work
session into the formal meeting. Marti Calabretta preferred the informal working environment of
the work sessions and felt they allowed a free, open environment for discussion and review. The
Board will consider the matter.
The meeting adjourned at 3:00 p.m.

Donald J. Chisholm, Chairman

Marti Calabretta, Secretary

Debra L. Cline, Management Assistant and Recorder
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IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01.06- SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0101
NOTICE OF VACATION OF RULEMAKING (REWRITE)

AUTHORITY: Tn compliance with Sections 67-5221 (1 ), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this agency has
vacated the rulemaking previously initiated under this docket number. The action is authorized by Chapters I and 74,
Title 39, Idaho Code.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: In July 2001, DEQ published a proposed rule under Docket No. 58-0106-0101. In
response to comments received, DEQ has revised the proposed rule. The revised proposed rule substantially varies in
content from that which was proposed in July 200 I. DEQ has vacated the July 200 I proposed rule and has published
the revised proposed rule under Docket No. 58-0 I 06-020 I.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit DEQ's web site at
· www.state.id.us/deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS: For assistance on technical questions concerning this
rulemaking, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)3 73-0502 or dehlert@deq.state.id.us.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2002.

Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Tdaho 83706-1255
Fax No. (208)373-0481
pgradwoh@deq.state.id.us

IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN

Page 56

June 5, 2002 - Vol. 02-6

EXHIBIT

i

n

000456

IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0201
NOTICE OF RULEMAKING - TEMPORARY AND PROPOSED RULE
(REWRITE OF CHAPTER)

EFFECTIVE DATE: The temporary rule was effective April 26, 2002.
AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5226(1) and 67-5221(1), Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that the
Board of Environmental Quality (Board) has adopted a temporary rule and the Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) is commencing proposed rulemak.ing to promulgate a final rule. The action is authorized by Sections 39-105,
39-107 and 39-7408C, Idaho Code.
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE: A public hearing concerning this proposed rulemaking will be held as follows:
June 27, 2002, 7 p.m.
Conference Room B
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Boise, Idaho.

The hearing site(s) will be accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for accommodation must be made no later
than five (5) days prior to the hearing. For arrangements, contact the undersigned at (208)373-0418.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The purpose of this rulemaking is to address the proper management of nonmunicipal solid waste. The rule will provide statewide consistency for non-municipal solid waste management,
provide specific siting, operational, closure and post-closure care based on the volume of waste, waste characteristics,
type of waste management facility, and potential impact to human health and the environment. The rule also provides
variances to siting and operational requirements if the variance is equally as protective of human health and the
environment. The rule provides an application submittal process for owners and operators and an application review
and approval process for DEQ.
Coinciding with the publication of this proposed rule, DEQ is proposing repeal of the current rule (published under
Docket No. 58-0106-0202). After consideration of public comments, DEQ intends to present the final proposal to the
Board of Environmental Quality in October 2002 for adoption of a pending rule. The rule is expected to be final upon
the conclusion of the 2003 session of the Idaho Legislature.
TEMPORARY RULE JUSTIFICATION: Pursuant to Sections 67-5226(l)(a), Idaho Code, the Governor has
found that temporary adoption of the rule is appropriate in that the rule is necessary to protect public health.
FEE SUMMARY: ln 1996 DEQ was directed by the Legislature (Section 39-7408C, Idaho Code) to adopt a siting
license fee to cover the cost incurred by DEQ when reviewing a commercial solid waste siting application. This fee
was approved by the 1999 Legislature. The commercial solid waste siting license fee found at Section 994 of the
existing Solid Waste Management Rules and Standards has been included in this proposed rule.
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: The text of the rule has been drafted based on discussions held and concerns
raised during a negotiation conducted pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5220 and IDAPA 04.11.01.812 through
815. The negotiation was open to the public. Participants in the negotiation included industry and government
representatives. The Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking was published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin, Volume
97-5, May 7, 1997, page 47, under Docket No. 16-0106-9701.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit DEQ's web site at
www.state.id.us/deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For
assistance on technical questions concerning this rulemaking, contact Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502 or
dehlert@deq.state.id. us.
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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Solid Waste Management Rules

Docket No. 58-0106-0201
Temporary and Proposed Rulemaking

Anyone may submit written comments by mail, fax or e-mai l at the address below regarding this proposed rule. DEQ
will consider all written comments received by the undersigned on or before July 3, 2002.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2002.

Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton, Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208)3 73-0418/Fax No. (208)3 73-0481
p gradw oh@deq. state. id. us

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0201

IDAPA58
TITLE 01
Chapter 06

58.01.06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES
000.
LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Sections 39-1 05 and 39-107, Idaho Code, authorize the Board of Environmental Quality to adopt rules and administer
programs to protect surface water quality, ground water quality and air quality, and to regulate solid waste treatment
or disposal and the licensure and certification requirements pertinent thereto. Section 39-7408C, Idaho Code,
authorizes the Board of Environmental Quality to establish by rule municipal solid waste commercial siting license
fees.
(4-26-02)T
001.

TITLE AND SCOPE.

01.
Title. These rules shall be cited as Rules of the Department of Environmental Quality IDAPA
58.01.06, "Solid Waste Management Rules".
(4-26-02)T
02.
Scope. These rules establish requirements applicable to all solid waste and solid waste management
facilities in Idaho, except as specifically provided in Subsections 001.03 and 001.04.
(4-26-02)T
03.

Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules.

(4-26-02)T

a.

These mies do not apply to the following solid wastes:

(4-26-02)T

i.
Liquid wastes when the discharge or potential discharge of the liquid waste is regulated under a
federal, state or local water pollution discharge or wastewater land application permit, including management of any
solids if management of the solids are addressed in a permit term or condition;
(4-26-02)T
ii.
Hazardous wastes regulated by the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Chapter 44, Title 39, Idaho
Code, and the rules adopted thereunder;
(4-26-02)T
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Draft

NewsRelease
DEQ extends deadline for public comment
on rewrite ofsolid waste rule
MED I A
CONTACT
■

Dean Ehlert
Waste Management
& Remediation
Division
DEQ State Office

(208) 373-0502

BOISE - The Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) has
extended the public comment period on a
temporary and proposed rule to manage
non-municipal solid waste.
Public comment will be accepted
through 5 p .m. MDT, Wednesday, July 31,
2002.
The temporary and proposed rule is
designed to provide statewide consistency
for non-municipal solid waste management.
It establishes siting and operational
requirements for landfills, based on
volume of waste, waste characteristics,
type of waste management facility, and
potential impact to human health and the
environment. It also provides variances
where applicable.

The temporary and proposed rule
. (Docket No. 58-0106-0201) is available for
review at DEQ's State Office and on the
Department of Administration's Web site ·
at http://www2.state.id.us/adm/
adminrules/bulletin/02jun.pdf
Address questions, comments, and
requests to:
Dean Ehlert
Waste Management & Remediation
Division
DEQ State Office
1410N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706
Phone: 208/373-0502
Email: dehlert@deq.state.id.us.
End
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State of Idaho

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Board of Environmental Quality
1410 North Hilton, Boise, ID 83706-1255, (208) 373-0502

Dirk Kempthorne, Governor
C. Stephen Allred, Director

IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
MINUTES

October 16 & 17, 2002
The Board of Environmental Quality convened on October 16, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. at:
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, Conference Rooms A & B
Boise, Idaho
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Paul C. Agidius, Chairman
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Vice-chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Donald J. Chisholm, Member
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Susan Burke, State Water Quality Program
Jess Byrne, Resource Officer
Barry Burnell, Life Sciences Discipline Lead, On-site Wastewater Program Coordinator
Debra Cline, Management Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Keith Donahue, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Program Coordinator
Paula Gradwohl, Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Rick Jarvis, Underground Storage Tank/Leaking Petroleum Storage Tank Program Coordinator
Jason Jedry, Administrative Services
Bill Jerrel , Loan Program Manager
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Tom John, Microbiology Rules Manager
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program
EXHIBIT
Chris Mebane, Water Quality Program

Q
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Diane Riley, Air Quality Analyst, Smoke Management
Jon Sandoval, Chief of Staff
Alan Stanford, Senior Water Quality Analyst
Steve West, Administrator, Boise Regional Office
OTHERS PRESENT:

Gayle Batt, Idaho Water Users Association
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Harriet Hensley, Deputy Attorney General, representing the Board of Environmental Quality
Dick Rush, Idaho Association of Commerce & Industry
Suzanne Schaefer, SBS Associates LLC
Travis Thompson, Barker Rosholt & Simpson; representing Idaho Power Co.
❖
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assistant.

DELIBERATION IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION FOR
RELICENSING OF THE C. J. STRIKE HYDROELECTRIC FACILITY, DOCKET No. 0102-01-06

Chairman Paul Agidius stated Board members had received the draft decision prepared
by Don Chisholm and Harriet Hensley, and asked for comments on the draft. Mr. Chisholm felt
Idaho Rivers United and American Rivers had shown representational standing in the case and
believed the matter should be returned to the hearing officer for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion. He did not feel specific directions were needed . The hearing officer should
have the full range of authority to proceed with the matter as she or the parties wish. Mr.
Chisholm believed the Board should not deny Idaho Rivers United and American Rivers and the
people they represent from raising these issues.
Dr. Joan Cloonan agreed with the direction of the draft and supported granting
representational standing. Ma1ti Calabretta was not satisfied standing existed on the issue of
aesthetic and recreational uses. She believed there were presently recreational uses, and that it
was not an issue of degradation, but restoration to a different perceived quality of aesthetic and
recreational uses. Ms. Calabretta said she voted in support of standing at the last meeting
because the group had participated appropriately from the beginning of the process.
Nick Purdy reluctantly agreed with the draft decision. He believed the groups did have
standing in the case, but did not present it well in the petition. Marguerite McLaughlin also
reluctantly agreed to suppo1t the draft decision. She was not convinced legal standing existed
and felt the issue had been converted from what was first intended.
Dr. Randy MacMillan believed the groups did have standing in the case. He felt a key
issue was the paragraph in the draft that stated the goals of the Clean Water Act include
restoration and maintenance of fishable and swimable waters. He asked if the draft order would
become part of the record if the case were appealed to the courts, and if it was important that the
order clearly and strongly identify the reasons for determining standing. Harriet Hensley
responded that the final opinion would be part of the record on appeal, if it were appealed, and
she envisioned doing considerable work on the draft before it is final.
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Paul Agidius reluctantly supported the draft decision. He believed current Idaho law did
not support standing, but federal law does; so it seems probable there will be a finding in state
law in the near future that would support standing. He felt the finding of standing should be very
narrow and should be based on the federal law. He stated his reluctance to be in the position of
changing or interpreting the law, but felt it was the duty of the Board to make such decisions and
enforce the Clean Water Act.
Marguerite McLaughlin asked if a Board decision granting standing would set a
precedent that would be cited and used to make future decisions. Paul Agidius believed it would
set a precedent and noted that the Board would be taking this step ahead of the Idaho Supreme
Court. Marti Calabretta clarified that it had to do with aesthetic and recreational damage versus
an economic damage.
Don Chisholm believed the people of the state wanted a strong Department of
Environmental Quality that fulfilled its responsibilities under the Clean Water Act. If Idaho
wants to have primacy of the programs under the CW A, we must establish that we have
credibility and are willing to enforce federal law. He felt the Board should not ignore federal
case law on the issue of standing under the CW A, just because the Idaho Supreme Court has not
had a chance to act on it. To have credibility, the Board must not be afraid to stand up and
address these issues. This case is somewhat unique because it deals with an existing facility with
existing environmental problems. There will be cases in the future opposing applications for
permits where the environmental damage has not yet occurred. This case deals with remediation
or restoration, where certain parties do not believe DEQ's actions are adequately addressing the
problem. The question is, who has the right to come forward and ask the Board to correct the
problem when they feel the Department has not adequately addressed the issue in the 40 I
certification. Under this situation, he felt the Board should be open to addressing the issue and
not require the public to go all the way to the Idaho Supreme Court or the federal courts to find a
solution.
Harriet Hensley, Deputy Attorney General, advised that at this point the Board should
take a vote on the matter and reach agreement on the general concepts that should be in the final
opinion. She will then draft the final opinion for the Board using the draft opinion and other
materials. Chairman Agidius stated he also wanted to have another vote on the final order to
ensure that all members are comfortable with the language.
Marti Calabretta discussed her concern relating to the state goal of restoration of the
beneficial uses as stated in the petition. She feared it was not realistic to expect restoration to a
pristine condition. Dr. Joan Cloonan commented that this issue seemed beyond the scope of
what the Board was supposed to consider in this matter. She believed the legal question before
the Board was, who has the right to come forward and bring their concerns to the Board or
challenge an action. Marti Calabretta questioned when the legal process would address the
economic issues for those who would have a loss if the requested action were taken.
Randy MacMillan said the Clean Water Act has provisions (131.l0(g)) that could
recognize hydro-modification as a legitimate cause for not meeting water quality standards thus
preventing removal of a dam for the purposes of meeting the Act. The pleadings do not suggest
the dam should be removed, so that does not appear to be an issue.
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Chairman Paul Agidius confirmed that the Board's responsibility at this point was to
determine what parties could seek this forum, and not to discuss or determine the underlying
issues of the case. The final order should address the standing issue, and not discuss the merits
of the case. He asked the Board to focus on the standing issue and asked them to use caution in
wording the decision because it will set a precedent for future cases.
Don Chisholm noted that one of the factors in determining standing is, "can the party
requesting standing obtain redress if they are allowed to proceed?" He felt it was appropriate to
discuss what relief they were seeking to determine if the Board or a court could redress the
grievance. The Board can impose modifications on the 401 Certification or order DEQ to
withdraw the 40 I Certification if it deems that is the appropriate relief. There is a broad range of
modifications that could be made to the certification. Mr. Chisholm did not believe anyone
thought a practical solution was removing the dam, or that there was any way that would be the
outcome of this case.
He felt it was unfair to limit standing only to those who suffer an economic loss, and that
it would not be a valid process if you denied a voice to those with concerns about significant
aesthetic and recreational issues. He thought the order should be expanded to show that there is
information in the record to support aesthetic and recreational standing.
Paul Agidius believed the petitioners were asking for a free flowing river and water
quality changes. The TMDL process affects water quality, so there are things they are asking for
that can be addressed . Since there is not a requirement to provide redress for all issues, he did
not feel it was necessary to discuss the free flowing issue. The Board need only find that there
are some issues that can be addressed through the TMDL process.
Marti Calabretta questioned why the Board was taking the step to broaden standing to
aesthetic and recreational interests, based on federal standing doctrine, instead of waiting for the
Idaho Legislature to act. Harriet Hensley stated the Idaho Supreme Court has not ruled on this
issue, and has not made a definitive ruling that economic injury is required to establish standing.
However, in the Fernan Lake case, the court indicated that something other than a pecuniary
interest would be adequate for appeal. This is somewhat of a gray area. Dr. Joan Cloonan
pointed out that the Idaho Supreme Court has not made a finding that aesthetic and recreational
interests are not adequate to establish standing either.
Ms. Calabretta asked if there was anything in Idaho legislation that defined standing. Ms.
Hensley explained that the Environmental Protection and Health Act (EPHA) provides "a right
to appeal by any person aggrieved." A person aggrieved is further defined in the rules as "any
person that has a legal standing."
Harriet Hensley clarified that while the Board would be setting a precedent with this
order, it would be bound by the facts of the case. It is not really accurate to say that it will set a
precedent for all 401 Certification cases. Don Chisholm pointed out that a case may come before
the Idaho Supreme Court from a different agency that provides additional guidance on the issue
of standing. The law of standing will constantly be in a state of development. Ms. Calabretta
observed that presently by federal law the 40 I Certification is a state process that is influenced
by federal agencies, laws and regulations; so others feel it is appropriate for the Board to take
this step.
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Paul Agidius discussed his legal analysis of the standing issue. Because Idaho courts
have not made a ruling, we must look to other guidance such as the Clean Water Act. He felt
certain there would eventually be a finding of standing for aesthetic and recreational interests in
the state courts. While he would be more comfortable letting the courts or the legislature
establish the finding, he felt it was the duty of the Board to take that action in this case.
Matti Calabretta clarified her position that the petitioners participated appropriately from
the first stages of the decisions made in issuing the 40 I Certification. She believed this
established the groups as having an interest in the issue, but was unclear about their grievance.
They have a grievance with the present degraded condition, and appear to have a perception of a
return to a pristine condition. She acknowledged that there could be partial redress.
Paul Agidius noted that he did not see anything in the petition that alleged that granting
this 401 Certification would make the water quality worse. His perception was that the
ceitification would maintain the status quo, while improving the water quality, but the petitioners
felt the improvement was not enough.
Dr. Joan Cloonan felt many of the issues discussed in the confidential memo from Harriet
Hensley should be put in the order. The current draft order is a good overview of the ideas
discussed previously by the Board, but does not clearly cite the case law and reasons for granting
standing. She felt a combination of the two documents with a little tightening of the concepts
and expansion of the legal areas would produce a good result.
Board members discussed the process they would use to produce and approve the final
order. Don Chisholm pointed out that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is
generally not appealable; an order granting summary judgment is appealable. Marguerite
McLaughlin stated she wanted the finding to be as narrow as possible. She emphasized her
concern with the action of the Board in setting this precedent.
Doug Conde noted that Section 710 of the rules of procedure before the Board have a
specific section that deals with the issue of whether the order would be appealable in district
court if it doesn't dispose of all the issues raised in the contested case. It is in the Board's
discretion to decide that this is a final appealable order, if it so chooses.
The Board directed Harriet Hensley to prepare another draft based on portions of the
previous draft, her memorandum on the case, and their discussions. The basis of the finding
should stress the petitioners' involvement in the FERC and 401 processes from the beginning.
The purpose and goals of the CW A and the EPHA should also be included. The order should
grant representational standing only, not organizational standing. The draft order will be
distributed to Board members for review later today, and added to tomorrow's agenda for
consideration.
WORKSESSION
RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO, DOCKET No. 58-0101-0201
(PENDING RULE)

Kate Kelly, Administrator, Idaho Air Quality Program, explained the purpose of this
rulemaking is to revise the open burning rule. The open burning rule is intended to set general
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parameters under which open burning can and cannot occur in Idaho with a goal toward
protecting human health and the environment from air pollutants in smoke. Ms. Kelly
distributed a fact sheet that outlined the proposed revisions to the rule (Attachment 1) and briefly
discussed each change. Most critically, the proposed changes will remedy inconsistencies with
other local , state and federal rules, regulations and laws, and remove awkward or ambiguous
phasing. Also , burn periods for prescribed fires , additional prohibitions and reasonable
precautions are proposed. The proposed rule adds reference to the Smoke Management and
Crop Residue Disposal Act.
Diane Riley, Smoke Management Air Quality Analyst, discussed the reference to smoke
management programs. Kate Kelly clarified they were not being incorporated or adopted by
reference into the rule to make them an enforceable part of the rule; they are simply crossreferencing them. It does not carry the same weight. Language was also added to the rules to
require that anyone who is not part of a smoke management program must abide by the DEQ
prescribed burning restrictions on the toll-free hotline.
Marti Calabretta asked Ms. Kelly to characterize the difference between the Crop
Residue Disposal Act and the Forest Practices Act. Kate Kelly explained the Department of
Agriculture administers the Crop Residue Disposal program. It is a management program to
manage that particular agricultural practice. The Department of Lands ' Forest Practices Act is
aimed more at safety practices. Neither act is an air quality protection statute; that authority
expressly continues to rest with DEQ. Ms. Calabretta requested copies of the Crop Residue
Disposal Act and the Forest Practices Act be provided for Board members to review prior to
tomorrow' s meeting.

Rules for Governing Fees for Environmental Operating Permits, Licenses and Inspection
Services, Docket Nos. 58-0114-0201 and 16-0505-0201 (Pending Rule)
Barry Burnell, DEQ Technical Services Division, discussed these two dockets that are
proposed to transfer sections regarding environmental fees from the Department of Health and
Welfare to a new DEQ rule chapter. No comments were received from the public on this
rulemaking. The rules will also allow local government and the health districts to adopt their
own fees to cover their costs for providing environmental services. This will provide an
environmental fee structure that is flexible, across the state, to reflect the costs of providing
environmental services rather than using a flat fee.
Don Chisholm suggested a change to Section 110 to clarify the language in the second
line to say, "the greater of $10 per household or 250 gallons of flow. " The change will be
presented in tomorrow' s meeting.

Solid Waste Management Rules and Standards, Docket Nos. 58-0106-0201 and 58-01060202 (Pending Rule/Amendments to Temporary Rule)
Dean Ehlert, DEQ Solid Waste Program Coordinator, explained the purpose of the rule is
to address the proper management of non-municipal solid waste in Idaho and provide flexibility
for the facilities that manage solid waste . These rules went through an extensive negotiated
process. They were adopted as a temporary rule at the April 2002 Board meeting, and went out
for public comment from June 5 - July 31 , 2002 . Some changes were made as a result of the
comments received. Mr. Ehlert reviewed each of the changes.
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Rules for Owners and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks and Leaking Petroleum
Storage Tanks, Docket No. 58-0107-0201
Rick Jarvis, Underground Storage Tank Program Coordinator, reviewed the proposed
rules for the regulation of underground storage tanks systems (USTs) and leaking petroleum
storage tanks (PSTs). These rules will implement DEQ authority to regulate USTs and PSTs;
and cover design, construction, installation, operation , release detection, closure and financial
assurance requirements. The rule essentially uses the federal USTs rules with some minor
changes. The changes were made with input from the Petroleum Storage Tank Advisory
Committee. Negotiated rulemaking was conducted. No public comment was received on the
rules. DEQ previously regulated USTs and PSTs though Sections 851 and 852 of the Water
Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment Requirements; those sections have been
incorporated into these rules without modification.
Dr. Randy MacMillan asked if the rules were more stringent than the federal rules. Mr.
Jarvis responded that the rules could be interpreted as being more stringent because of some
changes. For example, the federal rules had a provision that allowed the use of groundwater
monitoring or vapor monitoring for leak detection. DEQ eliminated the provision from this rule
because no one was using it and there is no solid standard to evaluate whether a leak is
occurring. Those changes were properly identified and approved.
Dr. Joan Cloonan discussed the 30-day inspection requirement. She suggested the
wording be changed to "at least once every month" to provide a more flexible timeframe. The
change will be made to the final rule.

Water Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment Requirements, Docket No. 58-01020203 (Temporary/Pending Rule)
Chris Mebane, Water Quality Standards Manager, briefed the Board on this rulemaking
to adopt site-specific water quality criteria for portions of the Boise River for copper and lead for
the City of Boise NPDES discharge. The only public comment received on the rule was from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in support of the rule. DEQ had some question whether
the rule was necessary because they have the existing authority to apply these water-effect ratios
for the City of Boise through the state certification of the federal discharge permit. It is
presented as a rulemaking for documentation and to provide a public record. Also, discharge
permits expire after five years, and this rule will be in the record and could be used again.

Water Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment Requirements, Docket No. 58-01020204 (Pending Rule)
Chris Mebane explained this rule has two major components. The first is to make annual
updates in designated beneficial uses for a number of different waters around the state. The
standards are reviewed and public comment is taken. The second part is to publish applicable
water quality standards for toxic chemicals directly in the state's rules. Presently, these standards
are adopted by reference from the 1993 edition of the federal regulations' National Toxics Rule.
This edition is difficult to find because it is out of print, and it is different from the current
edition. There are no substantive changes in the actual values or how they would be
implemented.
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Two substantive comments were received on the rule; one was from EPA, the other was
from the Nez Perce tribe. EPA supported the rule, and suggested two changes (regarding the
equations for metals and cadmium). The changes were not made because they were beyond the
scope of what was originally presented in the rule. The Nez Perce Tribe commented on the
beneficial use designation for Butcher Creek. The tribe wanted Butcher Creek designated for
salmonid spawning. They conducted a survey and submitted data to support the designation;
therefore, DEQ supports the designation. Paul Agidius commented that when a designation is
made on a section of a water body that may not be appropriate, it seems to be a major problem to
down grade the designation. Mr. Mebane agreed that it is a difficult process to downgrade a
designation. That is why care must be taken not to over designate in the first place.
Dr. Randy MacMillan asked if the Clearwater Basin Advisory Group (BAG) supported
the change in beneficial use for Butcher Creek. David Mabe, Administrator of the Water Quality
Program, discussed the matter with the Clearwater BAG. The BAG does not recommend any
salmonid spawning designations because of concerns over temperature criteria. However, there
are individuals within the BAG who are concerned that DEQ is not making enough salmonid
spawning designations in the area. DEQ has attempted to reach a balance.
Paul Agidius has served on the Clearwater BAG and felt that the majority of the members
would probably think it was appropriate to designate the lower reach of Butcher Creek for
salmon id spawning, but would want a cutoff for the upper reach.
Dr. MacMillan served on the Upper Snake BAG, and in spite of tremendous effort, it was
difficult to get the group to consider salmonid spawning designations. He wondered if it would
cause a problem for the Board to approve the designation without first giving the BAG an
opportunity to review the matter and make a recommendation. Dave Mabe said his discussions
with the BAG resulted in a clear understanding that DEQ would not actively seek out and make
salmonid spawning designations; but if the agency finds evidence or feels it needs to add
salmonid spawning to a designation to legitimately reflect what is going on, the BAG will not
endorse it, but they do recognize that it could occur through the process. The BAG has a general
concern about salmonid spawning designations because of the temperatures that are required,
and the ability to attain those temperatures on the ground in the Clearwater Basin. They are also
concerned about the level of evidence that is acceptable to prove the need for a salmonid
spawning designation.
Doug Conde added that the designation of Butcher Creek for salmonid spawning is
consistent with the guidance DEQ developed for the identification of beneficial uses and
designations. The guidance document used to make the designation has gone out for public
comment and there have been extensive discussions on the process.
Chris Mebane noted that the rule also contains several other salmonid spawning
designations in other areas, and they have not been controversial.

Idaho Rules for Public Drinking Water Systems, Docket No. 58-0108-0102
Tom John, Microbiology Rules Manager, presented an overview of the rulemaking to
update engineering standards for public water systems. Engineering standards dealing with
design, construction, and operation of public water systems have not been systematically
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revisited since the l 980's. Advancing technologies and new national regulations have combined
to make some portions of the rules increasingly dated and, in some instances, overly restrictive.
This rulemaking is to update obsolete provisions, add flexibility where possible and appropriate,
and clarify ce1iain language that has been difficult to interpret. Some general housekeeping
changes are also included. Mr. John reviewed the major changes to the rules. Negotiated
rulemaking was conducted, and a hearing was held. No comments were received during the
public comment period.
Director Steve Allred discussed security issues and the need to have language in the rules
requiring an analysis of the security system for public drinking water systems during the
construction phase. The systems need to be protected from intentional contamination by acts of
terrorism or vandalism. Tom John questioned whether the analysis would be required for
existing systems as well. Doug Conde noted that this could be considered a significant, new
requirement that was not initially proposed in the rulemaking, and it is not in response to public
comment. If the proposed change is not within the scope of the original rulemaking, it is not
appropriate to add it at this stage. He suggested it might be better to address the matter in a
separate rulemaking if it is not a logical of outgrowth of the rule as it was originally proposed
and presented to the public.
Don Chisholm suggested the security issue be addressed in a separate rulemaking to
ensure the public and stakeholders have an opportunity to comment and participate fully.

Idaho Rules for Public Drinking Water Systems, Docket No. 58-0108-0201
Tom John explained the purpose of this rulemaking is to incorporate by reference the
EPA Filter Backwash Recycling Rule and the Long Term 1 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment
Rule. These are national primary drinking water regulations. Idaho must adopt these rules to
maintain primacy for administering the Safe Drinking Water Act. Congress wanted EPA to
adopt rules that would to enhance the protection of the public from pathogenic organisms. It was
believed the national drinking water regulations were too focused on contaminants that are only
dangerous to people when consumed over a long period of time, and ignoring organisms that can
make people sick instantly. The problem was highlighted by the cryptosporidium outbreak in
Milwaukee that killed 50 people and sickened over I 00,000, and other outbreaks. Mr. John
briefly discussed the two rules.

Wastewater and Drinking Water Loans and Grants, Docket Nos. 58-0104-020, 58-01120201, and 58-0120-0201
Bill Jerrel, Loan Program Manager, stated this rulemaking is needed to update and clarify
the rules governing the review and approval of contracts for consulting engineers and
determining eligible costs for grants and loans. Negotiated rulemaking was conducted with a
broad group of representatives from large and small cities, engineers, and rural water
associations. Mr. Jerrell briefly reviewed the changes.
Doug Conde commented that one of DEQ's main objectives in this rulemaking was to
make it clear how the Department determines what costs are eligible for reimbursement under
the grants and loans. There have been frequent misunderstandings in the past because it was not
clear what costs were eligible and what process was used to make the determination. The
confusion lead to lawsuits. This rule clearly states the types of contracts that will be allowed,
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what costs contained in the contracts and other costs will be eligible, and how the contracts and
costs are reviewed.
Nick Purdy discussed the need for communication and coordination between the DEQ
loan programs and the Idaho Water Resource Board loan programs to ensure the best assistance
to the public and particularly small water systems. He was concerned that the application
process for the DEQ loan programs was too difficult and costly for small water systems. The
Water Resource Board loans have a simpler, faster application process. Bill Jerrel acknowledged
the limitations of the DEQ programs and explained that most of the money for the programs
comes from the federal government. When federal dollars are used, there are requirements
associated with the National Environmental Policy Act that must be addressed. He said staff will
continue to work with Department of Water Resources staff to identify projects that might be a
better fit for the Water Resource Board programs and refer them when appropriate. One
advantage of the DEQ programs is that a technical, managerial, and financial capacity review is
performed for each project. DEQ staff make recommendations on how improvements can be
made to help systems comply with requirements.
Director Allred discussed the financial demands on the loan programs. DE Q may come
to the Board in the future to request a bond issue.
Board members raised questions on several definitions. Staff will investigate and follow
up with responses and changes if needed the following day.
The meeting adjourned at 3: 15 p.m.
OCTOBER

17, 2002

The Board of Environmental Quality reconvened on October 17, 2002 and Chairman
Paul Agidius called the meeting to order at 8:30 a.m. He announced an additional item would be
added to the agenda. The deliberation of the C. J. Strike contested case will be carried over from
the previous day's agenda.
ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Paul C. Agidius, Chairman
Dr. J. Randy MacMillan, Vice-chairman
Marti Calabretta, Secretary
Donald J. Chisholm, Member
Dr. Joan Cloonan, Member
Marguerite McLaughlin, Member
Nick Purdy, Member
BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT:

None
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STAFF PRESENT:

C. Stephen Allred, Director
Susan Burke, State Water Quality Program
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Jess Byrne, Resource Officer
Barry Burnell, Life Sciences Discipline Lead
Debra Cline, Management Assistant to the Board
Doug Conde, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Keith Donahue, Deputy Attorney General, DEQ
Dean Ehlert, Remediation Program
Paula Gradwohl , Administrative Rules Coordinator
Orville Green, Administrator, State Waste Management & Remediation Program
Rick Jarvis, Underground Storage Tank/Leaking Petroleum Storage Tank Program Coordinator
Jason Jedry, Administrative Services
Bill Jerrel, Loan Program Manager
Kate Kelly, Administrator, Air Quality Program
Tom John, Drinking Water Program
Dave Mabe, Administrator, Water Quality Program
Chris Mebane, Water Quality Program
Diane Riley, Air Quality Analyst, Smoke Management
Jon Sandoval, Chief of Staff
Alan Stanford, Senior Water Quality Analyst
Steve West, Administrator, Boise Regional Office
OTHERS PRESENT:

Gayle Batt, Idaho Water Users Assoc.
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association
Dick Rush, Idaho Assoc. of Commerce & Industry
Suzanne Schaefer, SBS Associates LLC
PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD - THE BOARD ALLOWS UP TO

30

MINUTES FOR THE PUBLIC TO

ADDRESS THE BOARD ON ISSUES NOT SPECIFICALLY SHOWN AS
AGENDA ITEMS.

Chairman Agidius opened the floor to public comments.
Dick Rush, IACI, said he would not be presenting testimony on any of the items on
today's agenda, but distributed written comments on some air issues that will be presented at the
next Board meeting. IACI will be working with DEQ over the next month on these issues
regarding the proposed standard for hydrogen sulfide, the air program streamlining rules, and the
Title V fee rule.
AGENDA ITEM No. 1:
►

ADOPTION OF AUGUST

6, 2002

MINUTES

Don Chisholm moved the Board adopt the minutes of the August 6, 2002 Board
meeting as prepared and distributed.
SECOND:
Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously

MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM NO. 2:

DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Director Steve Allred briefly discussed issues affecting the Department including the
latest budget holdback, the Coeur d'Alene Basin Commission, upcoming legislation, and the
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Title V permitting program. The Department will meet its commitment to clear the backlog of
Title V permits by the end of the year. He recognized the efforts and cooperation of industry to
comply with the Air Quality Program. The Amalgamated Sugar Company and Monsanto have
made significant commitments to improve the air quality.
Members discussed the affects of the budget cutbacks on the Department's monitoring
efforts and ways of dealing with the loss of funding.
Director Allred discussed the long-range strategic plan and suggested he and the Board
meet with the Governor and legislative leadership after the elections to discuss the plan. A
meeting will be set up just before the Board's November meeting.
DELIBERATION IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION FOR
RELICENSING OF THE C. J. STRIKE HYDROELECTRIC FACILITY, DOCKET No. 0102-01-06

Harriet Hensley presented a revised draft order incorporating the Board's comments from
the previous day. Chairman Agidius opened the floor to discussion.
Dr. Randy MacMillan thought the order was well done and said he would support it.
Board members suggested language be added to strengthen and clarify that the
petitioners' participation in the FERC and 401 Certification processes from the beginning is
material to the finding of representational standing, that petitioners were representing the
interests of their members, that their members demonstrated palpable injury, and that the Board
finds under these specific facts and circumstances there is representational standing. Don
Chisholm recommended the final paragraph be changed to read: "The matter is remanded to the
hearing officer for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." He also suggested the
language on page 11, paragraph 2 be changed to read: " ... aesthetic, recreational, as well as
economic . . ." Minor clerical changes were also suggested. Harriet Hensley will make
necessary formatting and clerical changes and changes to the conclusion to capture the
overriding principles expressed by the Board. She will distribute the revised draft later in the
meeting for the Board ' s consideration.
Don Chisholm felt the order should not be certified as an appealable order until someone
requests it. It can be certified as a final order at a later date if it is requested. Harriet Hensley
suggested it might be best to remand the case to the hearing officer for a decision on the
substantive issues; then both the standing issue and the substantive issue will be ripe for appeal.
AGENDA ITEM No.

3

APPROVAL OF HEARING OFFICER APPLICANTS

Paula Gradwohl presented a list of the applicants and resumes for the Board's approval.
The list included Edward Lockwood, Coeur d'Alene; Kim Toryanski, Boise; and Mitchell
Toryanski, Boise. Edward Lockwood has served as a hearing for the Department of Health and
Welfare for many years. They have been very pleased with Mr. Lockwood's services.
►

MOTION: Marti Calabretta moved the Board approve the addition Edward Lockwood, Kim

Toryanski, and Mitchell Toryanski to the hearing officer list.
Dr. Joan Cloonan
Motion passed unanimously.

SECOND:
VOICE VOTE:
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Paula Gradwhol commented that hearing officers are compensated at the rate of $95 per
hour. The fee is set to be consistent with what other state agencies pay. It is set out in a standard
contract and is not negotiated on a per case basis. Doug Conde noted that the Board's rules
require the hearing officer to issue a decision within 180 days, and billable time is defined in the
contract.
AGENDA ITEM

No. 4

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAHO,
DOCKET No. 58-0101-0201 (PENDING RULE)

Kate Kelly presented this amendment to the general open burning rules. The rules are
submitted to EPA as part of the state implementation program and are required by EPA as basic
controls and restrictions on general burning in Idaho. Ms. Kelly briefly reviewed the rules.
Education is a major component. The rules have not been comprehensively updated for over 15
years. This update provides needed clarification and guidance. She distributed changes that
were made as a result of Board comments.
Marguerite McLaughlin questioned Section 614 regarding Prescribed Burning in
Accordance with Smoke Management Program. She questioned whether the language gave
DEQ new authority and oversight over the Department of Lands' Forest Practices Act. Kate
Kelly explained the Forest Practices Act was cited in the rules simply because it similarly applies
to this activity, not because it supplants DEQ's authority. It is just to note that the Forest
Practices Act is there, and is something that people are complying with as well.
Marti Calabretta suggested a definition for household be added to Section 611 on
domestic household waste. She questioned why Section 614 regarding prescribed burning was
needed and if there was a specific area where a health threat existed that prompted this rule.
Kate Kelly explained the provision is needed to protect public health. Prescribed burning is
defined as a planned event to manage wild land fuels. There is a small subset of people who
conduct prescribed burning, including the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), who are members of the Montana Idaho Airshed Group. It is a voluntary group that
requires the payment of fees and regular meetings. They have hired a full-time meteorologist
who evaluates the atmospheric conditions and makes a daily call on whether or not burning can
occur. The members of the Group comply with those calls. There is another subset of people
who are not members of this voluntary group who also conduct prescribed burning. The
proposed rule does not require these people to become members of a group; it simply requires
them to call the DEQ hotline to find out if it is a burn or no burn day, and comply with the call.
If they burn on a day when atmospheric conditions are not conducive, it can cause an unhealthful
condition.
Marti Calabretta felt it was not a small subset that would be affected by this rule in the
counties in Northern Idaho. She asked if it was the responsibility of the property owner or the
contractor to comply with the rule. Ms. Kelly noted that the rule says, "any person who may
conduct or allow prescribed burning .. " It could be interpreted as being the contractor, but there
are rules of law that could impose it on the landowner as well. Marti Calabretta asked how this
provision would be implemented and what the cost would be to DEQ. Ms. Kelly indicated there
would be very limited costs. DEQ already coordinates closely with the local authorities, the
Department of Lands, and the federal land management agencies. The Forest Practices Act
requires individuals to contact the Department of Lands for burn permits. The permits require
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compliance with DEQ air quality rules. DEQ will coordinate with Lands and distribute
pamphlets to educate the public about the program.
Nick Purdy said prescribed burning is used quite a bit in agriculture for private rangeland
in cooperation with the BLM. He asked how enforcement would be handled and what the
penalty would be for a violation if someone were not aware of the requirement. Kate Kelly
explained the enforcement authority is in the EPHA. The notice of violation (NOV) process will
be used. DEQ uses discretion when dealing with violations of a new rule. Ms. Kelly thought it
would be very unlikely that any enforcement action would take place against a first offense;
education would be the focus. Director Allred clarified this rule would not affect cases where
prescribed burning is coordinated with the BLM. The BLM is part of the Oregon Idaho Smoke
Management Program.
Marti Calabretta felt it was still unclear why the rule was needed and how problematic it
would be for individuals to comply.
Marguerite McLaughlin asked what changes would be made to the Department of Lands
permitting process as a result of this rule. Kate Kelly did not foresee any changes to the way the
Department of Lands conducts its operation. DEQ works very closely with Lands to coordinate
activities. Lands' burn permits specifically references DEQ's air quality rules and the need to
comply with the rules. Part of the education component of this rule will be to supply pamphlets
to the Department of Lands so they can make anyone applying for a burn permit (for a prescribed
burn) aware of this additional requirement to call the hotline. Ms. McLaughlin reiterated her
concern that the rule would change the jurisdiction of the Department of Lands. Ms. Kelly noted
it was not uncommon for more than one agency to regulate such an activity. The Department of
Lands acknowledges that DEQ has jurisdiction over the air quality issue. The burn permits
issued by Lands are good for ten days and do not address air quality issues such as atmospheric
conditions, smoke dispersion, and smoke management.
Jane Gorsuch, Intermountain Forest Association (IF A), submitted written comments
(Attachment 2) and expressed concern about the actual applicability and implementation of the
proposed rules. Ms. Gorsuch thanked DEQ for the opportunity to take part in the negotiated
rulemaking and for making some changes in response to the last set of comments the IF A
submitted. The IF A questions the need for the rule when the majority of the forest land in Idaho
is already covered by the Montana Idaho voluntary smoke management program, which is more
stringent than this rule. She asserted there was not a real problem for air quality due to
forestland activities. There are over 55,000 individual forestland owners who will be impacted
by this rule. The IF A does not represent these individuals. Ms. Gorsuch felt educating these
individuals would be a huge effort that could go on for years. She felt the issue could result in
lawsuits between neighbors. The IF A is concerned that this rule is an additional layer of
regulation. The Forest Practices Act, the rules, and the best management practices address
concerns about the impacts of smoke on human health and the environment.
Don Chisholm asked if the information on the DEQ hotline could be incorporated into
existing hotlines that must be called to determine the fire danger rating, to eliminate the
additional call. Diane Riley explained there are numerous different levels of government and
agencies that operate other hotlines, and they are often seasonal.
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Chairman Agidius asked if the alternative language proposed by the IF A in its October 16
letter (Attachment 2) was intended to provide an exemption from the emergency episode rule.
Ms. Gorsuch indicated that was not the intent; however, it appears to do that as it is now written.
Dr. Joan Cloonan commented that the Forest Practices Act regulations clearly state that it
is the purpose of the rules to establish a management system for smoke from prescribed fires that
will protect air quality and public health. She discussed language proposed by the IF A to
provide an exemption from the rules if prescribed burning is conducted in accordance with the
Forest Practices Act or an approved smoke management plan. She suggested the word exempt
be replaced with "presumed to be in compliance with . .. " This would remove the exemption
from the emergency episode rule. Ms. Gorsuch agreed with the proposed change in language.
Kate Kelly objected to the use of the word "or" in the proposed language. The fact that
prescribed burners would have to comply with the Forest Practices Act QI_a smoke management
plan defeats the purpose that prescribed burning be conducted only on days when there is good
dispersion for the smoke.
Marguerite McLaughlin felt there was a definite overlay of authority with the proposed
rule and questioned whether this was something the Board wanted in this rule.
Nick Purdy was in favor of adopting the rule, but felt Section 614 should be left as it is in
the existing rule until DEQ develops an education plan and cost estimate. He feared that without
an extensive education program people would unknowingly be at risk of lawsuits from
neighbors. Since the majority of potential burners are already regulated under the Forest
Practices Act or smoke management plans, he felt the value of the rule did not justify the risk it
had for causing problems for many people.
Director Allred clarified the intention was not to create an overlay with another program.
If burners are complying with another program, this rule does not require them to do both. He
felt the language suggested by Dr. Cloonan (if you comply with the Forest Practices Act and an
approved smoke management plan, you are deemed to comply with this rule) addressed this
concern. The intent of Section 614 is to recognize the Forest Practices Act.
Kate Kelly pointed out that DEQ intends to put the educational component in place
before the burning season occurs next spring. She invited Mr. Purdy to take pa1i in the process
to see how it is implemented. She noted that DEQ recognizes the importance of maintaining
particulate matter levels in Idaho below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. The
minimal cost of implementing this rule is a worthwhile investment. Recent events in the
Treasure Valley have highlighted the importance and need to maintain these levels. The
implications of not complying with the standards are very severe. She strongly supported the
minimal investment of resources this rule would require to protect the air quality. The rule is
simply an extension of efforts the Department is already making to ensure that the atmospheric
conditions needed to disperse smoke exist before burning takes place . It does not change the
Forest Practices Act or the smoke management plans.
Jane Gorsuch did not disagree with the concerns for the Treasure Valley, but pointed out
that her members operate in the woods and areas where particulate matter is not a problem. The
IF A is not questioning the budget element, but is concerned with how the educational element
will reach all of the individuals in the remote areas of Idaho who will be affected by this rule.
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Some of the remote areas where slash burning is required by law may not have phone service to
comply with this rule.
Don Chisholm noted that it would not trigger a violation if you did not call the hotline;
only if you burned on a no burn day when atmospheric conditions do not allow smoke
dispersion. Most people who work the land tend to know when there is an inversion or other
situation that will cause a problem. Mr. Chisholm felt the general goal was good air quality, and
believed the concerns about the rule were overstated. The rules should be written to be uniform
in application throughout the state. He felt confident DEQ could handle the combination of
education and rolling out the enforcement.
Marguerite McLaughlin commented the forest industty is not trying to avoid
management. They are concerned about air quality, but want common sense rules. She noted
that the inversions in Northern Idaho are entirely different than in the Magic Valley. There are
areas that are very remote and may have little or no outside contact. The Forest Practices Act is
familiar with the issues and is better prepared to regulate these areas. Ms. McLaughlin supported
portions of the rule, but wanted to ensure the forest industry was able to perform necessary work
without conflict or confusion between the Forest Practices Act and this rule.
Chairman Agidius commented his concerns would be addressed with the change in
language providing that compliance with the Forest Practices Act and a smoke management plan
would be presumed to be compliance with this rule. Doug Conde cautioned against using the
word presumed because it is unclear and might be hard to enforce. The language should clearly
state that if you follow the Forest Practices Act and a smoke management program, you are in
compliance with these rules. It should also be clear what is being complied with.
Kate Kelly added that DEQ worked with the Department of Lands to develop this rule.
The Depaitment of Lands helped write the language, particularly in Section 614, and they
support the rule.
Chairman Agidius suggested the language state, "Prescribed burning is an allowable form
of burning if done in compliance with the Forest Practices Act and an approved smoke
management plan."
Dr. Cloonan suggested that for now, Section 02. Other Prescribed Burning, (that requires
persons not meeting all conditions of a smoke management plan must adhere to the time periods
for burning set by the Department and made available on the hotline) be revised so that it is
recommended, instead of mandatory. This change would address the concerns expressed about
liability from violations and lawsuits from neighbors. The section could later be changed so that
it is mandatory. This would allow a roll out of the education and enforcement elements without
risk. Jane Gorsuch felt this would be a useful way of dealing with the concerns.
Nick Purdy stated he could support Section 614 with the changes recommended by Dr.
Cloonan. He mentioned that it would be very helpful to the public if these issues could be
addressed consistently throughout the state under one agency, instead of having to deal with
numerous different state, county, and local entities.
Don Chisholm recommended the Board ask staff to amend Section 614 and bring the rule
back at the November Board meeting. There were substantial changes discussed and he felt care
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should be taken not to rush into adopting a rule with hastily prepared revisions that have not been
fully reviewed.
Kate Kelly asked for clarification of exactly what changes the Board was requesting to
Section 614. She stressed that making the provisions of subsection 02. voluntary instead of
mandatory would in essence gut Section 614.
►

MOTION: Don Chisholm moved the Board direct staff to redraft Section 614 to say that
prescribed burning will not be exempted from the emergency episode rules, that it will be
allowed for individuals who comply with the Forest Practices Act and an approved smoke
management plan, and people who are not part of an approved smoke management plan will
be required to call the Department to determine whether they will be allowed to burn on a
particular day.
SECOND:
Motion failed for lack of second.

►

MOTION: Nick Purdy moved the Board direct staff to redraft Section 614 to say that
prescribed burning will not be exempted from the emergency episode rules, that it will be
allowed for individuals who comply with the Forest Practices Act and an approved smoke
management plan, and people who are not part of an approved smoke management plan
should call the Department to detennine whether they will be allowed to burn on a particular
day, and that compliance for those who are not part of a smoke management plan will be
voluntary until DEQ has an educational program in place.
SECOND: Dr. Randy MacMillan
DISCUSSION:
Dr. Randy MacMillan understood the need for a strong education effort,
but felt there should be no doubt about moving forward with a rule that was needed to protect
the public health. If the Board chooses to make compliance voluntary for those who are not
in a smoke management program, there should be a clear understanding and direction to
DEQ to transition the compliance from voluntary to mandatory within a reasonable amount
of time. Nick Purdy agreed with the suggested direction. Dr. MacMillan commented that in
Twin Falls County they periodically have problems with burning that takes place at
obviously inappropriate times. It is a real public health concern for the community. Paul
Agidius voiced two concerns; the motion changes nothing for the group of people who are
unregulated and they can continue to burn whenever they want to, and he felt the rule should
have a time certain indicating when compliance becomes mandatory so the rule will not have
to come before the Board again. Don Chisholm agreed and suggested language be added to
make compliance mandatory after April I, 2004. Dr. Joan Cloonan agreed that setting a time
certain for the transition was a good approach.
AMENDMENT:
Nick Purdy moved the motion be amended to include language in the
redraft of Section 614 providing that after April I, 2004 people who are not part of an
approved smoke management plan will be required to call the Department to determine
whether they will be allowed to burn on a particular day. During this transition period the
Department will conduct a strong education program.
SECOND ON AMENDMENT:
Dr. Randy MacMillan
DISCUSSION:
Don Chisholm asked if the requested revisions could be made and brought
back to the Board later in the meeting. Kate Kelly agreed to bring the redrafted rule back to
the Board later in the day. She will update the Board periodically on the status of the
education and outreach plan.
MOTION WITHDRAWN: Nick Purdy withdrew the motion so action could be taken on the
matter later in the meeting.
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AGENDA ITEM No. 5

RULES GOVERNING FEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING
PERMITS, LICENSES AND INSPECTION SERVICES, DOCKET Nos.
58-0114-0201 AND 16-0505-0201 (PENDING RULE)

Barry Burnell, DEQ Technical Services Division, noted this rule was adopted by the
Board as a temporary rule in June 2002, and has been in effect since July I, 2002. The public
comment period was held during August, and DEQ received no comments. This rulemaking
shifts the fee authority from the Department of Health and Welfare to DEQ for programs DEQ
has delegated to the health districts. The regulated community includes property owners, septic
tank pumpers and installers, and land developers.
The rule was amended at Section 110.02. regarding Multiple Households or Buildings
that use a common subsurface sewage disposal system. The revised language will read:
"For individual and subsurface sewage disposal systems serving more than one
(I) household or building in any combination, the fee shall be ninety dollars ($90)
plus ten dollars ($10) er each household or ~ each two hundred fifty (250
gallons of flow from buildin gJ,."
►

Don Chisholm moved the Board adopt the Rules Governing Fees for
Environmental Operating Permits, Licenses, and Inspection Services as presented in the final
proposal under Docket No. 58-0114-020 I with the amendment presented today.
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

►

Don Chisholm moved the Board adopt the Rules Governing Fees for
Health Operating Permits, Licenses, and Inspection Services as presented in the final
proposal under Docket No. 16-0505-020 I.
SECOND :
Marguerite McLaughlin
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

MOTION:

MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM

No. 6

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS, DOCKET
Nos. 58-0106-0201 AND 58-0106-0202 {PENDING/AMENDMENTS
TO TEMPORARY RULE)

Dean Ehlert, Solid Waste Program Coordinator, stated these rules governing the
management of non-municipal solid waste were adopted by the Board in April 2002 as
temporary and went through a public comment period during June and July. Some changes were
made as a result of comments DEQ received. Most of the changes were to provide clarification.
Substantive changes included a change to provide that open burning be conducted pursuant to
conditions set by DEQ or the local fire authority; a parks, scenic or natural use siting restriction
including but not limited to wild and scenic areas, national monuments, wilderness areas,
historical sites, recreational areas, preserves and scenic trails; and notification to local
government that an application has been filed.

IDAHO BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OCTOBER 16 & 17, 2002 MINUTES- PAGE 18

000477

►

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved that the Board repeal the Solid Waste
Management Rules and Standards as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 580106-0202.
Dr. Randy MacMillan
SECOND:
Motion passed unanimously.
VOICE VOTE:

►

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved that the Board adopt the Solid Waste
Management Rules as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0 l 06-020 I, and
further moved that the Board adopt the revisions included in the final proposal as
amendments to the previously adopted temporary rules, with the amendments becoming
effective October 18, 2002 and that the additional changes discussed by Dean Ehlert in this
meeting are included in this motion.
SECOND:
Don Chisholm
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

MOTION:

MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM No. 4

RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN IDAH0 1
DOCKET No. 58-0101-0201 (PENDING RULE)

Chairman Paul Agidius reopened this agenda item to review and consider the redrafted
Section 614 per discussion earlier in the meeting.
Kate Kelly distributed the redrafted Section 614 containing the revisions requested by
Board members earlier in the meeting (Attachment 3). She noted that Section 606 as shown on
the attachment is already in the rule and is not before the Board for change. It was included on
the attachment to clarify that revisions are not needed to provide that prescribed burning is not
exempt from the emergency episode rule.
►

MOTION:
Don Chisholm moved the Board adopt the Rules for the Control of Air
Pollution in Idaho, as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0 l O1-020 l
incorporating the amendments to Section 611 and 614 as distributed today.
SECOND:
Dr. Randy MacMillan
DISCUSSION:
Marti Calabretta requested clarification on whether a smoke management
plan and a smoke management program were the same thing. Kate Kelly stated the
definitions set out in the rules broadly define a smoke management program and would
include an approved plan. Ms. Calabretta asked if all smoke management plans or programs
were currently approved by DEQ and what was required to get approval. Kate Kelly
responded all smoke management plans or programs she was aware of had been approved by
DEQ. Ms. Calabretta explained that she would vote against the motion because she believed
compliance should be voluntary for those individuals who are not part of a smoke
management plan or program and are not currently regulated. She hoped that the education
and outreach program would be effective so it does not create a hardship.
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed. 6 ayes; 1 nays (Calabretta); 0 absent.

AGENDA ITEM No. 7:

RULES FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF UNDERGROUND
STORAGE TANKS AND LEAKING PETROLEUM STORAGE TANKS,
DOCKET No. 58-0107-0201, AND WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT REQUIREMENTS, DOCKET No.
58-0102-0202 (PENDING RULE)
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Rick Jarvis presented the Rules for Owners and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks
and Leaking Petroleum Storage Tanks and a docket to repeal Sections 851 and 852 of the Water
Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment Requirements. Sections 851 and 852 currently
regulate leaking petroleum storage tanks. These sections will be adopted as part of the proposed
Rules for Owners and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks and Leaking Petroleum Storage
Tanks. They are being transferred, without modification, for ease of use, so the requirements for
UST systems and PST systems will be located in the same rules.
Negotiated rulemaking was conducted and the rules were reviewed during the last year
by the Petroleum Storage Tank Advisory Committee. No public comment was received on the
rule. The proposed rule implements DEQ authority to regulate UST systems at the state level.
The rule in most part adopts the federal underground storage tank regulations.
Mr. Jarvis reviewed the changes made to the federal rule (Attachment 4) which address
issues that were identified over the last ten years as needing clarification. There is also a change
to Section 023.03. to change the 30 day inspection requirement to a monthly inspection.
If the rules are not adopted, the U.S. EPA will enforce the federal UST rules through its
Seattle and Washington D.C. offices.
►

MOTION:

►

MOTION:

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt the Rules for Owners and
Operators of Underground Storage Tanks and Leaking Petroleum Storage Tanks as presented
in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0l07-0201 as amended (Sec. 023.03).
SECOND:
Marti Calabretta
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.
Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt the Water Quality
Standards and Wastewater Treatment Requirements as presented in the final proposal under
Docket No. 58-0102-0202.
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

Dr. Joan Cloonan questioned how the stringency issue was handled in the rule making
process. This rule has some changes from the federal law that could be construed as being more
stringent. Paula Gradwohl, Administrative Rules Coordinator, responded that the Notice of
Pending Rule, authorities section, included the stringency language required to meet the statute.
AGENDA ITEM No. 8

WATER QUALITY STANDARDS AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT
REQUIREMENTS, DOCKET NO. 58-0102-0203 (TEMPORARY/
PENDING RULE)

Chris Mebane explained these standards address water quality criteria for the Boise River
for copper and lead. Testing commissioned by the City of Boise supported raising the water
quality criteria for copper and lead by 2.5 and 2 times, respectively.
Although DEQ has the authority to adopt this change through the state certification of the
federal discharge permit, they are recommending adoption of this rule to provide clarity and to
establish a public record. Putting the change in the rule will also make it easier to address the
issue in the future.
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►

Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt as temporary rules and
pending rules, the Water Quality Standards and Wastewater Treatment Requirements as
presented under Docket No. 58-0102-0203 with the temporary rules becoming effective
October 18, 2002.
SECOND:
Don Chisholm
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.
MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM NO. 9

WATER QUALITY STANDARDS AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT
REQUIREMENTS, DOCKET No. 58-0102-0204

Chris Mebane briefly reviewed the purpose of the rulemaking. The substantive change in
the rule is the annual update in designated beneficial uses for a number of different waters
around the state. There are about 200 such amendments. The only one that received specific
public comment was on Butcher Creek, which is a tributary to the South Fork of the Clearwater
River. The Nez Perce Tribe and the EPA believe it should be protected for salmonid spawning,
which imposes a colder temperature requirement. Initially, DEQ did not make the designation
because they did not have data supporting the salmonid spawning designation. The Nez Perce
Tribe surveyed the creek and presented data to support the designation, so DEQ designated
Butcher Creek for salmonid spawning.
Discussions questioned whether it was appropriate to designate the entire 19 miles of
Butcher Creek for salmonid spawning, if the only evidence Uuvenile rainbow trout) was found in
the lower part of the creek. The upper part of the creek in on the Camas Prairie and the lower
part is forested. DEQ prepared alternative language for the Board's consideration that would
split the designation so only the lower portion of Butcher Creek would be designated for
salmonid spawning.
►

Nick Purdy moved the Board adopt the Water Quality Standards and
Wastewater Treatment Requirements as presented in the initial proposal under Docket No .
58-0102-0204 with the following amendment. The use designation for Butcher Creek, at
section 120.07, unit C-11, is amended to include salmonid spawning on the lower, forested,
canyon segment of the stream, to be designated by distance later.
SECOND:
Dr. Randy MacMillan
DISCUSSION:
Dr. Joan Cloonan asked if the amendment was specific enough for the
purposes of the regulation. Chris Mebane stated generally a mapping database is used to provide
the detailed latitude and longitude and legal description. DEQ will work with its Grangeville
office to provide the specifics.
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.
MOTION:

DELIBERATION IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION FOR
RELICENSING OF THE C. J. STRIKE HYDROELECTRIC FACILITY, DOCKET No. 0102-01-06

Harriet Hensley stated in her opinion, the affidavit submitted by American Rivers does
not support a finding of representational standing. After closely reviewing the affidavit of Rob
Masonis, Ms. Hensley felt it did not allege a distinct, palpable injury related to water quality.
The affidavits submitted by Idaho Rivers United do support a finding of representational
standing. She recommended the opinion be revised to reflect that only the affidavits submitted
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by Idaho Rivers United meet the standard for distinct, palpable injury; and American Rivers did
not submit adequate affidavits to meet the standard for representational standing.
Nick Purdy believed American Rivers had established representational standing because
they filed a petition and fully participated in the FERC and 401 Certification processes. Dr. Joan
Cloonan and Paul Agidius believed that both participation and injury were necessary to meet the
legal requirement for standing.
The Board agreed the conclusion and order should be revised to provide that Idaho Rivers
United has standing to bring the contested case based on its participation in the FERC and 401
Certification process and the establishment of individualized and palpable injuries to its
members, that American Rivers did not submit adequate affidavits to meet the standard for
representational standing, that neither Idaho Rivers United nor American Rivers established
organizational standing, and that the hearing officer's order be rejected as to Idaho Rivers
United's claim of standing, that the matter be remanded to the hearing officer for a determination
on the substantive claims raised by Idaho Rivers United., and accepting the hearing officer's
recommended order regarding American Rivers.
►

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved that the Board in Docket No. 0102-01-06 adopt
the Conclusion and Final Order with the language of the conclusion as agreed upon during
discussion of the order, and that the Board return the draft Order to Harriet Hensley for final
editorial changes consistent with the discussions on October 16 and 17, 2002.
SECOND:
Nick Purdy
DISCUSSION:
Don Chisholm clarified that the Board was adopting the conclusion as
discussed, and it is not subject to further revision.
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.
MOTION:

Harriet Hensley will send the final draft to the Board members for review within one or
two weeks.
AGENDA ITEM

No. 10

IDAHO RULES FOR PUBLIC DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS, DOCKET
No. 58-0108-0102 (PENDrNG RULE)

Tom John, Microbiology Rules Manager, DEQ Drinking Water Program, presented this
docket to update engineering standards dealing with design, construction, and operation of public
water systems. He briefly reviewed some of the changes.
►

Marguerite McLaughlin moved the Board adopt the Idaho Rules for Public
Drinking Water Systems, as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0 I 08-0 I 02.
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed. 6 Ayes; I Absent (Marti Calabretta)

MOTION:

AGENDA ITEM

No. 11

IDAHO RULES FOR PUBLIC DRINKING WATER SYSTEMS, DOCKET
No. 58-0108-0201 (PENDING RULE)

Tom John presented this docket to incorporate by reference new federal drinking water
regulations regarding the filter backwash recycling rule and the long-term I enhanced surface
water treatment rule.
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►

MOTION:
Dr. Randy MacMillan moved the Board adopt the Idaho Rules for Public
Drinking Water Systems, as presented in the final proposal, for Docket No. 58-0108-0201.
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passe unanimously.

AGENDAITEMNO.12

WASTEWATER AND DRINKING WATER LOANS AND GRANTS,
DOCKET Nos. 58-0104-0201, 58-0112-0201, 58-0120-0201, AND
58-0122-0201 (PENDING RULE)

Bill Jerrel, Loan Program Manager, stated these dockets address the review and approval
of contracts for consulting engineers, how eligible costs are determined for grants and loans, and
more clearly state what types of contracts are eligible. All four dockets were addressed
simultaneously through negotiated rulemaking. No public comment was received.
Doug Conde discussed a suggested change in the definition of municipality. He
explained the definition used in the rule came directly from the Idaho Code, and recommended it
be left as is. There was also a question about the definition of contaminate. The definition was
taken directly from the Drinking Water Rules and should not be changed.
►

MOTION:

►

MOTION:

►

MOTION:

►

MOTION:

Don Chisholm moved the Board adopt the Rules for Administration of
Wastewater Treatment Facility Grants as presented in the final proposal under Docket No.
58-0104-0201.
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

Nick Purdy moved the Board adopt the rules for Administration of Water
Pollution Control Loans as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0112-0201 .
SECOND:
Dr. Joan Cloonan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

Dr. Joan Cloonan moved the Board adopt the Rules for the Administration
for Drinking Water Loan Program as presented in the final proposal under Docket No. 580120-0201.
SECOND:
Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

Marguerite McLaughlin moved the Board adopt the Rules for the
Administration of Planning Grants for Public Drinking Water Facilities as presented under
the final proposal under Docket No. 58-0122-0201.
SECOND:
Dr. Randy MacMillan
VOICE VOTE:
Motion passed unanimously.

AGENDA ITEM No. 12

LOCAL REPORTS AND ITEMS BOARD MEMBERS MAY WISH TO
PRESENT

Marti Calabretta discussed the summary of the blood lead sampling data distributed
earlier in the meeting (Attachment 5). She noted that the information beginning on page 7 is for
the Coeur d'Alene River Basin area. The information on pages 1-6 represents testing in the
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"box" in the Bunker Hill area. Once again, the testing shows continuing improvement in blood
levels. She questioned the continuing expenditure of state and federal dollars for removal of soil
to meet EPA's level of 1,000 ppm, rather than focusing efforts on the health issue with children.
She felt this was misdirected activity and a waste of state and federal resources.
Director Allred discussed soil remediation issues and the risk evaluation used by EPA for
risk assessment at Superfund sites.
AGENDA ITEM No. 13

CONTESTED CASE AND RULE DOCKET STATUS REPORT

Paula Gradwohl briefly reviewed the contested case and rulemaking activities. Doug
Conde noted the Glanbia Foods matter was not shown as a contested case at this time, but should
be added to the November agenda for board review. DEQ is meeting with the parties to try to
negotiate a solution.
Dr. Joan Cloonan commented she has heard concerns expressed by some IACI members
that the stringency statements DEQ is using for rulemaking are not adequate to fulfill the
requirements of the law. The statements simply say that the rule may or may not be more
stringent or broader in scope than the federal law, without any details as to where or how it is
more stringent or broader in scope. There appears to be an expectation among some people that
there would be more detail.
Paul Agidius asked how the statements are developed. Doug Conde responded that when
there is a question whether certain provisions are more stringent, DEQ identifies each section
they feel might be considered more stringent or broader in scope. There is detailed information
in the binders given to the Board and in the legal notice that accompanies the rule when it is
published. The underground storage tank rules, for example, included this information. Dr.
Cloonan suggested that the detailed information be included in the package that goes to the
legislature.
Doug Conde noted that it is not always easy to tell when someone might perceive that
something is more stringent or broader in scope. For example there are often federal programs
that address a certain area, but anticipate some state action. In these instances, the state is not
really being broader in scope, but some people may perceive it that way. DEQ has tried to be
conservative by stating that such issues may be interpreted as being broader in scope. If there
has been a deficiency, it may be in not always providing the detailed information to the
legislature. Chairman Agidius thought the best solution would be for DEQ to always provide the
legislature with the detailed information up front, unless there is a good reason not to.
Marti Calabretta stated there was a long struggle regarding stringency beginning in I 984.
She felt the legislature was essentially giving DEQ more latitude now by allowing the rules to
move into areas that are either not covered by federal law or for whatever reasons are more
stringent than federal law. To respect this development, she felt the department should fully
identify such matters for the legislature.
Don Chisholm believed there was never any time when DEQ did not try to comply with
the law. There may be times when these issues are hard to identify and are subject to argument,
but the department should try to disclose the information fully so the legislature can understand
the situation.
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Director Allred stated DEQ is very willing to supply the legislature with such detailed
information on stringency issues. The information is available, but publishing it in the
Administrative Rules Bulletin would be very costly. He pointed out that the Attorney Generals
office prepares the stringency statements for DEQ and Legislative Services reviews them .
The meeting adjourned at 3 :00 p.m.

Paul C. Agidius, Chairman

Marti Calabretta, Secretary

Debra L. Cline, Management Assistant and Recorder
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All attachments referenced in these minutes are permanent attachments to the minutes on file
at the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. A copy can be obtained from the
assistant to the Board of Environmental Quality.
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IDAPA 58 - DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
58.01 .06 - SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0201 - (CHAPTER REWRITE)
NOTICE OF RULEMAKING
PENDING RULE AND AMENDMENT TO TEMPORARY RULE - (FEE RULE)

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments to the temporary rule were effective October 18, 2002. This rule has been
adopted by the Board of Environmental Quality (Board) and is now pending review by the 2003 Idaho State
Legislature for final approval. The pending rule will become final immediately upon the adjournment sine die of the
First Regular Session of the Fifty-seventh Idaho Legislature if the rule is approved by concurrent resolution in
accordance with Sections 67-5224 and 67-5291, Idaho Code. The rule may be rejected, amended or modified by
concurrent resolution of the Legislature.
AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5224 and 67-5226, Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that the
Board has adopted a pending rule and amended a temporary rule. The action is authorized by Sections 39-105, 39-107
and 39-7408C, Idaho Code.
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The purpose of this rulemaking is to address the proper management of nonmunicipal solid waste. The rule will provide statewide consistency for non-municipal solid waste management,
provide specific siting, operational, closure and post-closure care based on the volume of waste, waste characteristics,
type of waste management facility, and potential impact to human health and the environment. The rule also provides
variances to siting and operational requirements if the variance is equally as protective of human health and the
environment. The rule provides an application submittal process for owners and operators and an application review
and approval process for DEQ.
In April 2002 the Board adopted this rule as a temporary rule. In June 2002, DEQ published the temporary/proposed
rule, inviting the public to comment on the rule. Idaho Administrative Bulletin, June 5, 2002, Vol. 02-6, pages 58
through 94. DEQ received public comments concerning the proposed rule and has revised the initial proposal as
allowed under Section 67-5227, Idaho Code, at Sections 001, 005, 009 through 013, and 032. The remaining sections
have been adopted as initially proposed. DEQ's Rulemaking and Public Comment Summary, which contains a
complete consideration of the issues raised by the public and an explanation of the reasons for changes between the
text of the proposed rule and the text of the pending rule, is included in the rulemaking record, which can be obtained
by contacting the undersigned.

IDAHO CODE SECTION 39-107D STATEMENT: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) explains
the federal role in the regulation of non-municipal solid waste (NMSW) as follows:
Subtitle D of the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act establishes a framework for federal, state, and local
government cooperation in controlling the management of nonhazardous solid waste. The federal role in this
arrangement is to establish the overall regulatory direction, by providing minimum nationwide standards for
protecting human health and the environment, and to provide technical assistance to States for planning and
developing their own environmentally sound waste management practices. The actual planning and direct
implementation ofsolid waste programs under subtitle D, however. remain largely State and local functions,
and the act authorizes States to devise programs to deal with State-specific conditions and needs.
56 Fed. Reg. 50978, 50979, (October 9, 1991)(emphasis added); also, see generally the SWDA, Section 4005
through 4007.
Thus, while federal regulations do provide minimal criteria for identifying those facilities that constitute an "illegal
open dump", federal regulations do not provide an Idaho solid waste management program. These rules fulfill the
above-described state role of developing an Idaho-specific program with respect to disposal ofNMSW in Idaho. The
most accurate way to describe the rules, within the confines of Section 39-107D, Idaho Code, is that the rules regulate
an activity, the environmentally sound disposal ofNMSW in Idaho, not regulated by the federal government.
FEE SUMMARY: In 1996 DEQ was directed by the Legislature (Section 39-7408C, Idaho Code) to adopt a siting
license fee to cover the cost incurred by DEQ when reviewing a commercial solid waste siting application. This fee
was approved by the 1999 Legislature. The commercial solid waste siting license fee found at Section 994 of the
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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Solid Waste Management Rules and Standards

Docket No. 58-0106-0201
Pending Rule/Amendment to Temporary Rule

existing Solid Waste Management Rules and Standards has been included in this rule.
GENERAL INFORMATION: For more information about DEQ's programs and activities, visit its web site at
www.state.id. us/ deq.
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS: For assistance on questions concerning this rulemaking, contact
Dean Ehlert at (208)373-0502, dehlert@deq.state.id.us.
Dated this 23rd day of October, 2002.

Paula J. Gradwohl
Environmental Quality Section
Attorney General's Office
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255
(208)373-0418/Fax No. (208)373-0481
pgradwoh@deq.state.id.us

IDAPA 58, TITLE 01, Chapter 06
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT RULES AND STANDARDS
There are substantive changes from the proposed rule text.
Only those sections that have changed from the original proposed
text are printed in this Bulletin following this notice.
The text of the proposed rule was published in the Idaho Administrative
Bulletin, Volume 02-6, June 5, 2002, pages 58 through 94.
This rule has been adopted as a pending rule by the Agency and is now pending
review and approval by the 2003 Idaho State Legislature as a final rule.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE AMENDED TEXT OF DOCKET NO. 58-0106-0201

SUBSECTIONS 001.03.a.x., 001.03.b.iii., AND 001.04.b.d.
001.

TITLE AND SCOPE.

03.

Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules.
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CV0C-1503540
)
MEMORANDUM IN
)
)
OPPOSITION TO DEQ'S
)
MOTION FOR
)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION

The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has filed their motion for
summary judgment, together with a forty-eight (48) page Memorandum, somewhat in
excess of the twenty-five (25) page limit allowed by the local rule, expressing their
contention in support of their allegations in their First Amended Complaint, to the effect the
Agency has the authority, jurisdiction, and power to regulate the operational activities and
site locations of the composting operations on the property described in the amended
complaint, being agricultural land upon which these "composting operations" are ongoing

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEQ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 000487
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for many years, where there is only grass clippings and leaves being processed in this
composting activity on the premises for future use for soil amendment and plant foliar
purposes, not as a "waste disposal" site or operation.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court is infinitely familiar with the standards to be applied m summary
proceedings. A moving party initially carries the burden to establish there exists no genuine
issue of material fact. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988
(Ct.App.1992). The question presented in this Motion for Summary Judgment appears,
however, to raise a question oflaw, as opposed to disputed issues of fact.
As to summary proceedings, the court is required to liberally construe disputed facts
in favor of the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in
favor of the non-moving party. Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho, 373 375, 3 P.3d, 51, 53 (2000).
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions
or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho
391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). To overcome a motion for summary judgment a party
need only raise a genuine issue of material fact. Prudential Fed Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v.

Johnson, 93 Idaho 850,853,476 P.2d 786, 789 (1970). A material issue of fact is one that is
relevant to an element of the claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome
of the case. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,849,908 P.2d 143, 151 (1995).
Factual disputes may not be resolved on summary judgment. Posey v. Ford Motor

Credit Co., 141 Idaho 477, 481, 111 P.3d 162, 166 (Ct.App.2005). A genuine issue of
material fact is one on which the outcome of the case may be different. 0 'Guin v. Bingham

County, 139 Idaho 9, 13, 72 P.3d 849,853 (2003). Summary judgment can only be granted

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEQ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 000488
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when there are no genuine issues of material fact. JR. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 61 I, 613,
167 P.3d 748, 750 (2006). Issues of credibility are not resolved on a motion for summary
judgment. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 419, 283 P.3d 728,
736 (2012).
NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY WITH DEQ

DEQ has utilized the definition of"Solid Waste" contained in J.C. §39-103(13), a
definition that is somewhat different than as contained in the Solid Waste Management
Rules and Regulations that were adopted by DEQ in their IDAPA definitions in 2003.
J.C. §39-103(13) defines "solid waste" to be:
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid materials, including
solid waste materials resulting from industrial, commercial and agricultural operations
and from community activities but does not include solid or dissolved materials in
domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources, such as silt, dissolved
or suspended solids in industrial waste water effluents, dissolved materials in irrigation
return flows or other common water pollutants. (emphasis added)
The promulgated rules of DEQ, regarding their regulatory definition of "Solid
Waste", is defined within the Idaho Administrative Code, under DEQ's "Solid Waste
Management Rules", wherein "solid waste" is defined in IDAPA 58 .01 .06 005. 44. to be:
Solid Waste. Any garbage or refuse, sludge from a waste water treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded
material including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations and from community
activities, but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid
or dissolved material in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point
sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source, special nuclear, or by-product material as defined
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923). (Emphasis ours)

Irrespective which definition is to be utilized, DEQ makes reference to such term
of "solid waste" on page 4, Par. 13 of the Amended Complaint that "grass clippings and
leaves", are or should be regarded as being among the substances within the definition of
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"solid waste"; whether using the statutory definition or the IDAPA definition of "solid
waste". Assuming it could be argued that these substances (grass clippings and leaves)
should initially be included within that range of definitive language, potentially being
regarded as other discarded solid materials, or as other discarded material, the IDAP A
Rules and Regulation regarding the management of solid waste materials, as adopted and
implement by DEQ in 2003, specifically excludes the regulation of the following: These
rules do not apply to the following solid waste .. .ii. Manures and crop (olant/ residues
ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates; and ... iii. Any agricultural solid
waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho
Department ofAgriculture.

Neither of the above definitive phrases referring to "other discarded solid
materials" or "other discarded materials resulting from industrial, commercial.. .and
agricultural operations" is ever otherwise expounded upon to indicate what is specifically
intended to be included in their overly broad and sweeping definition(s), but instead the
IDAPA Rules and Regulations takes the opportunity to declare what is specifically !l!!J...!!!.
be included in their regulatory authority. The substances, "Grass clippings and leaves"

are clearly "crop (plant) residue", as grasses and leaves are either crops, or are plant
residue, just as wheat stubble, straw, hay, beet foliage, potato foliage, vines, etc..
Notwithstanding this initially overly broad all-inclusive definition, and the
intentional lack of specificity and clarity in the definition(s), there is the clear DEQ
regulatory pronouncement in the Agency's Solid Waste Management Rules and
Regulations, wherein the Agency has specifically promulgated exemptions and
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exclusions regarding DEQ's regulatory authority, and is being expressed in the context

of the Agency's solid waste management Rules.
There is a specific reference to the exemptions and exclusions in their "Solid
Waste Management Rules And Regulations" wherein they make direct reference to those
exempt and excluded substances that come under "crop (olant) residue", and Any
agricultural solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the
Idaho Department ofAgriculture.

that "grass clippings and leaves", by every definition, are substances that fall
within "crop and plant residue", and it precisely the "grass clippings and leaves" that
were observed by DEQ staff personnel, as referred to in their initial and Amended
Complaint, Par. 13, page 4; that "grass clippings and leaves" are commonly understood
to be included within the meaning of a crop, or of a plant residue", and that was the only
"solid waste" observed on the "property" in 2013, as it has been every year before, back
to the DEQ's first inspection in 1992. There has only been these "grass clippings and
leaves", as no other "organic material (such as manure, animal flesh, or animal carcasses)
has ever been brought to the composting operation, or ever contained in the piles or rows
of materials observed on the "property". What materials the DEQ personnel saw in 2013
is the very substances specifically excluded and exempted from the "solid Waste
Management Rules and Regulations.

It becomes rather disingenuous for DEQ to claim the Agency has within its
"scope of authority" to regulate any and all broadly defined "solid waste", and attempt to
promote that all-inclusive descriptive language and use tier references to the size of the
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activity, as the Agency must adhere to its own IDAPA enactments that the Agency chose
to seek to enact in 2003.

It is without authority that DEQ would seek to regulate what they know they
declared themselves to be specificallv excluded, which is consistent with what they told
Mr. Gibson over the preceding years, as identified in his Affidavit. The Agency curtailed
their regulatory authority as to what they knew did not create any health or environmental
hazard to any animals, humans, or the environment, and expressly identified in the
exclusion of their own IDAPA Rules, confirming that any organic materials that fit the
"crop (plant) residue" are not to be, and were never intended to be, regulated by DEQ, as
these substances are not slated for disposal, as would be brought to a solid waste disposal
site.
DEQ asserts that I.C. §39-105(2) authorizes the Director to regulate "solid waste
disposal", and when addressing that authorization, the emphasis must be placed on the
word "disposal", as that is the purpose of the regulation, and it becomes critically
important to understand what the Agency actually says about their

regulatory

authorization, and it is precisely there, contained within their declarations about their
"regulatory authorization" that we find the specific exclusions and exemptions contained
within their own adopted "solid waste disposal management rules and regulations",
promulgated by DEQ. To change their regulatory authority, DEQ would have to initiate
the process of repealing and modifying their IDAPA Rules that currently has served to
define what they have regarded their regulatory authority to be, and those rules were
enacted in 2003, and for ten years thereafter, they have never come to confront Mr.
Gibson and his composting operations that they were infinitely familiar with from their
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on-going inspections in 1992-93-94-95, and then said to him that no further inspections
were needed after 1995. (see Gibson Aff.).
Additionally, and as Mr. Gibson has made clear to the DEQ personnel, this grass
and leaf substance is not being "disposed of' like substances are at a landfill, but rather
processed as a compost product for later application as a soil amendment, as
contemplated in the Plant and Soil Amendment Act enacted by the Idaho Legislature in
2001, following the earlier enactment of the Right to Farm Act, enacted in 1981, and
recently clarified to emphasize the inclusion and application to all aspects of composting,
through the clarifying amendment that went into effect in July, 2011. Each of the
statutory enactments (Right to Farm and Plant and Soil Amendment) were made
congruent in relation to these composting activities, operations, and site facilities, and
made clear they come under the control of Idaho Department of Agriculture (!DOA).
That Department has annually registered Mr. Gibson's composted products and are fully
aware of the nature of the composting operation.
DEQ has not contemplated becoming involved with composting activities, as the
fact remains DEQ has had no regard or concern of the Gibson composting operations
after 1995, and even from the date of their new regulations in 2003, for ten years
thereafter they have ignored him entirely (2003-2013).
DEQ personnel has acknowledged and declared what it was they observed, and
what they have identified, is not a "solid waste disposal site" but rather a composting
operation of grass clippings and leaves, and in every respect an agricultural operation that
involves the mixing and manufacture-production of a composting product derived from
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"grass clippings and leaves", which is what they saw, what they claim and what they
alleged in the Amended Complaint.
For DEQ to claim a basis to regulate this operation, their IDAPA Rules would
need to be modified to remove the exclusion and exemption they have expressly allowed
by their reference to crop and plant residue, which substances are currently excluded
from regulation, by the ordinary meaning of the words used, and they would need to then
incorporate language that specifically identify what substances derived from "crop and
plant residue" they want now to regulate within their otherwise broad definition of
"discarded solid materials" slated for disposal, when it is clear these substances (crop and
plant residue materials, such as grass clippings and leaves, are not intended for "disposal"
in a "solid waste disposal site", but rather for plant and soil amendments in an
agricultural application as a soil amendment or a plant foliar.
Not only is "Disposal" not what is occurring in this situation, but the specific
substances pose no harm to human health, as they are plant and soil additives and
amendments, critical to crop production in the agricultural industry. They have been
recognized as such by the Department of Agricultural to be to that effect, and
strengthened by the two enactments mentioned above.
Should DEQ ever determine they need to regulate what currently is excluded from
that regulatory authority, then every residential homeowner who has elected to compost
their own grass and lawn clippings, tree and shrub plant leaves, and their landscape
trimmings, and conduct a home operated organic composting operation on their
residential property will, by such a general definition, come under DEQ regulation, and
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would be only excluded by a size criteria, which does not change the substance m
question.
The legislature's intention when the agency presented their rules and regulations
was not to regulate these substances, as there was no disposal site to regulate in relation
to the operation, as there is no hazardous waste materials declared to be dangerous to
human health in such a composting operation.
These Defendants are not engaging in the act of "disposing" of any regulated
solid waste". The act of"solid waste disposal" is defined in LC. §39-103(14), wherein it
states:
( 14) "Solid waste disposal" means the collection, storage, treatment, utilization,
processing or final disposal of solid waste.

DEQ's Amended Complaint fails to set forth any factual basis that is found to be
sufficient to constitute a claim to a right of regulation of these Defendants for which any
relief can be granted, as no such relief can be granted to DEQ for the following reasons:
1) That DEQ does not have the requisite standing, as a matter of law, as the "grass
clippings and leaves" under their IDAPA regulatory rules and regulations, being the
materials and substances described within the Amended Complaint, as such substances are
specifically exempted from regulation of what is defined as "solid waste materials" within
I.C.§39-103(13), because the IDAPA Solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations
exempt the substances by that exclusionary language. Furthermore, the real property upon
which the described materials and substances are being processed is not a "solid waste
disposal facility", and irrespective whether "crop" and "plant residue" materials could
otherwise be broadly included by the generically sweeping reference to "discarded solid
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materials", the exclusions and exemptions specifically announced and expressed within the
"Solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations" has precluded any regulation of such an
agriculturally oriented re-usable products defined as "compost" from within the two
legislative enactments, being the Right to Farm Act, and the Plant and Soil Amendment Act.
2) That neither Defendant is subject to any fine, penalty, or imposition of any

regulatory mandate or enforcement of any DEQ's rules and regulations, as the materials and
substances at issue, identified in the amended complaint itself, has addressed what was
observed by DEQ staff personnel to be solely "grass clippings and leaves", all of which
substances constitutes a material substance derived from a "crop" a "plant", or a "residue",
and specifically excluded and exempted from the jurisdiction, authority, and definition of the
regulatory parameters of DEQ, as such substances and materials are identified in IDAPA
58.01.06.001, regarding the TITLE AND SCOPE, sub-part 03., wherein it specifically
defines wastes not regulated under these rules, to include certain enumerated
substances, wherein it states, under sub-part 03.b.: These rules do not apply to the

following solid waste ... ii. Manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately returned to the
soils at agronomic rates; and ... iii. Any agricultural solid waste that is managed and
regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department ofAgriculture.
No logical argument can be advanced that "grass clippings and leaves" are derived
from anything other than "crop" and/or "plant residue", and Mr. Gibson is registered and
controlled by the Department of Agriculture. These substances are not to be regarded as
"solid waste materials" intended for "disposal" and deemed to be hazardous for regulatory
purposes, as the same was not regarded to constitute a "waste" for permanent disposal, and
the materials and substances are re-incorporated into the soil for plant growth and foliation,
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and are intentionally excluded and exempted from the enforcement of regulations of "solid
waste materials" and substances subject to waste management ofDEQ.
3) That neither of these Defendants are subject to any regulations or the effects of
any enforcement of DEQ rules promulgated under their regulatory authority, as this

substance and material composition has been identified by DEQ itself to consist only of
plant and/or crop residue substances, and as such, is excluded by the promulgated rules and
regulatory provisions ofDEQ.
4) That the substances and materials consisting of "plant" "crop" "residue" does not
pose a regulatory need, as such substances and materials do not pose a hazard to animal,
human health, or the environment, being the specific mission and purpose for the creation
and existence of DEQ, as the legislative purpose and intent has been so declared by the
enactment of I.C.§39-102 and 102A, declaring that the jurisdiction for the disposal,
management, operation, facility, site location and processing activity of any such materials
derived from plant and crop residue substances is both exempted and specifically excluded
from any regulatory authority under the Solid Waste Management Rules ofDEQ, as well is
any other materials and products identified within I. C. §22-103(3),(4),(9),(10), and (27),
and otherwise managed under LC. §22-110(1 ), by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, as
may be located upon any real property in the State ofldaho; that if agricultural materials and
substances come under and within the regulatory authority and jurisdiction of any Agency, it
would fall under !DOA through the provisions of The Right to Farm Act and the Plant and
Soil Amendment Act, as enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho; that DEQ, is
another legislatively created agency of the State of Idaho, and has no jurisdiction or
authority to regulate those specifically defined materials and substances or allowed to
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assume, by delegation or sub-delegation, any such regulatory authority from any other
agency responsible for the enforcement of those Acts, and notwithstanding those two above
enactments, the exclusion within the rules applied to all plant and crop residue material
substances, as they are all organic, and are intended to be returned to the soil or plant at
recognized rates, and therefore specifically intended to be exempted from the regulatory
authority of the DEQ Rules, in accordance with the provisions of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act, and consequently, as a matter of Idaho law, DEQ does not have the
fundamental standing to assert a claim of a regulatory capability to manage and control
materials and substances (plant/crop/residue materials) that has been made the issue in this
Amended Complaint. Statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations are to be liberally construed
in favor of the free ownership and use of property, without regulation. In Ada County v.
David R. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854,893 P.2d 802 (1995) the Idaho Court of Appeals said:
" Finally, we must consider the general rule that because zoning laws
are in derogation of common law rights of free ownership and use of
property, where more than one reasonable interpretation is possible, the
interpretation that places the least restriction on use of property is favored.
Schwartz v. Hamden Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 146, 543
A.2d 1339 (1988); Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Elmwood
Park, 113 Ill.App.2d 121, 251 N.E.2d 788 (1969); Smith v. Howard, 407
S.W.2d 139 (Ky.1966); LaPointe v. City ofSaco, 419 A.2d 1013 (Me.1980);
Cohen v. Dane Cty. Bd. of Aqjustment, 74 Wis.2d 87, 246 N.W.2d 112
(1976); 3A Norman J Singer, SOUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 75.07 at 439 (5th ed. 1992). In
addition, when choosing between alternative constructions of a statute or
ordinance, unnecessarily harsh consequences are to be avoided. Higginson v.
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,691,604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979).
These rules of construction favor Gibson's interpretation of the
definition of "junkyard." Under the County's view, the ordinance would
preclude the outdoor storage of even one item of salvaged material on any
property in the RT zone or any other zone where junkyards are prohibited.
Any farmer or homeowner in such zones who stored outside even a small
quantity of salvaged supplies or equipment parts, used fencing materials,
scrap metal or used lumber for later use would be in violation of the
ordinance. The County's interpretation would, however, allow the outdoor
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storage of newly manufactured items of the same character or appearance
since they are not "salvaged." Such an interpretation leads to inconsistent and
unreasonably harsh results and places a significant restraint on land use,
particularly for agricultural areas.
Having considered the literal words of the ordinance and the
foregoing standards for construction of ambiguous ordinances, we
conclude that Ada County Zoning Ordinance 8-2-1 was intended to define
"junkyard" so as to include only business operations with the primary
purpose of handling or conducting transactions in used, discarded, or
salvaged materials. Accordingly, Gibson's storage of salvaged items
incidental to his construction of an on-site composting machine and eventual
tree and shrub nursery does not constitute a use of the premises as a
''junkyard." The district court therefore erred in holding Gibson to be in
violation of the ordinance and in contempt of court."
DEQ is not entitled to any form of relief from this court upon this Amended
Complaint, and is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), I.R.C.P. for failure to state
a claim upon which any relief can be granted. These Defendants are entitled to the entry of a
judgment upon DEQ's own pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), I.R.C.P.as well as from the
required application of the statute of limitations that precludes this baseless claim under the
very provisions of I. C.§39-108(4), for the reasons stated within the Affidavit of David R.
Gibson. DEQ has known of the activities and operations of Mr. Gibson since the very latest
of 1991, having inspected his operation in 1992,'93,'94-'95, and declared his exempt status
in prior years, even excluding any need for him to secure any form of further permitting, as
what he original received in 1992 was declared to be a perpetual permit, and
notwithstanding, the Department of Agriculture would have the sole jurisdiction to monitor
his registration and product contents.
This Court must deny the Motion for Summary Judgment, and these Defendants are
entitled to a dismissal of this action upon the grounds that DEQ lacks the standing required
under Idaho Law to initiate any suit against these Defendants, and no basis to seek any
claimed violation of regulatory provisions of solid waste materials that has no declared
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application, as the substances and materials are specifically excluded and exempted from
regulatory enforcement or imposition of the regulatory rules within their agency, together
with the fact the statute of limitations has barred this action as described above.
CONCLUSION

These Defendants contend that all substances located upon the "Property", that has
been identified in the Amended Complaint, are excluded and exempt from the regulatory
authority of DEQ, even though the statutory definition of "solid waste", contained in Title
39, concerning Health and Safety, Chapter I, concerning environmental quality-Health,
specifically identified in §39-103(13), refers to solid waste materials resulting from
industrial, commercial, and agricultural operations.
That "solid waste", by such broad definition, does include "agricultural operations" within
the scope of solid waste substances that are not intended for disposal; and the promulgated
rules of DEQ, regarding their regulatory definition of "solid waste", contained and defined
within the Idaho Administrative Code, under DEQ's "Solid Waste Management Rules",
specifically defines their exclusions to the regulation of "solid waste"It was because that
broad scope of solid waste substances of DEQ's definition that the Agency then
determined what substances were not to be regulated, and to accomplish that, it was then
defined within the "Solid Waste Management Rules" of DEQ, those specifically
identified substances to be excluded from what was broadly defined as "solid waste", and
were delineated as wastes not regulated hv DEO under their rules , and that gave rise to
the creation of those specific exclusions and exemptions, created within IDAP A
58.01.06., which are identified in IDAPA 58.01.06.001, regarding the TITLE AND
SCOPE, sub-part 03., wherein it specifically defines wastes not regulated under these
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rules , to include certain enumerated substances, wherein it states, under sub-part 03.b.:
These rules do not apply to the following solid waste .. .ii. Manures and crop (plant)

residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates; and ... iii. Any agricultural
solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho
Department ofAgriculture.
Also, within that Idaho Administrative Code, it defines "APPLICABILITY",
under 58.01.06.004, where it also specifically states:
These rules apply to all solid waste unless excluded by Subsection 001.03.
That, by the above definition, and by that specific exclusion and exemption, DEQ
does not regulate certain identified substances, as provided for under their Solid Waste
Management Rules adopted and promulgated within the Idaho Administrative Code for
the regulatory enforcement of regulated solid wastes, as DEQ "Solid Waste Management
Rules", specifically exempted and excluded substances composed of grass clippings and

leaves, as they constitute "plant" and/or "crop residue", and/or may otherwise be
regulated by rules that may be adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture.
These Defendants have acknowledged that the substances identified and located on
the property is grass clippings and leaves, being the only materials and substances referred
to in the Amended Complaint, and that substance is the only subject matter "observed" upon
"the property" , and consequently comes under the criteria of either I) crop and plant
residue, or 2) an agricultural material regulated by IDOA, and none of those materials and
substances come within the purview of the regulatory authority or jurisdiction of DEQ, as
the subject matter about which this dispute seeks to address is specifically exempted and

excluded from any regulatory enforcement or requirements regarding DEQ jurisdiction or
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authority under the Idaho Environmental Protection Agency Act, or that of the Department
of Environmental Quality, as it is specifically delineated in IDAPA 58, Title 01, Chapter 06,
001. 03. (b), (b) ii and (b) iii; 001. 04 (a), 004.; that no hazards are presented by any "solid
waste management activities" occurring on "the property", and such "solid waste" activities
are exempt and excluded from the enforcement of any regulatory rules of DEQ and any
request for imposition of any such civil penalties has no foundation in fact or in law, and
violates the exclusionary and exempted provisions from the Agency's own rules, as existing
through the authority under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, under the Idaho
Administrative Code, IDAPA 58, Title 1, Ch. 6, that enunciates specific exceptions in
subsections 001.03 and 001.04, setting forth those exceptions, exemptions, exclusions, and
limitations applicable to "solid waste" and "solid waste management facilities" in Idaho,
identifying specifically the following solid wastes not regulated:
.00 I 03. b. ii. manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic
rates .
.001 03. b. iii. any agricultural solid waste which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules
adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture .
.001 04. Solid Waste Management Facilities Not Regulated Under These Rules. These
Rules do not applv to the following solid waste management facilities:
.001 04. a. Solid waste management facilities accepting only solid waste excluded by
subsection 001.03.
004. APPLICABILITY. These rules apply to all solid waste, unless excluded by subsection
001.03. (emphasis added to draw attention to the exclusion of the application of Rules)

To any extent there is to be any regulation, that should be left to the Idaho
Department of Agriculture, all of which before was brought to the attention of DEQ
personnel by previous correspondence, after DEQ personnel observed "large piles and
windrows of grass clippings, and leaves" located upon "the property" in 2013, which
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had been there for ten years before, giving rise to the application of LC. §39-108(4), and
in 2013, Mr. Gibson told them their specific exemptions of regulation had not been
changed, and they had not said one word to him in almost two decades.

It is correct that DEQ personnel did met with David R. Gibson on April 10, 2013,
during which discussion Mr. Gibson reiterated the specific exemptions and exclusions to
their regulatory capacity that had been promulgated (from what he was told) back in
2002. Mr. Gibson informed DEQ that he was told by past DEQ personnel that he was
not under their jurisdiction to regulate, and that he no longer needed to participate in any
annual inspections or submit to any further permitting process that he participated in
back in the early 1990's, and he was told there would be no more annual inspections
back in 1995. He has never engaged in any permitting, site operation study, or any
annual inspections with DEQ since 1995. DEQ has been put or actual notice of the
existence of the operation, at the very latest, since 1991, and the composting operations
of Mr. Gibson has been ongoing within and upon the Gowen Field Desert Front since
1988, and DEQ has made no attempt after 1995, until 2013, to engage in any regulatory
involvement in Mr. Gibson's composting operation. There has been no attempt to
engage in any inspection or seek any coordination with Mr. Gibson in any fashion since
1995, and the application of the statute of limitations announced in LC. §39-108(4) is
controlling in this matter, which statutory provision provides as follows:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover
for a violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule,
permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than
two (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have
had knowledge of the violation.
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That during the conversation with DEQ personnel in 2013, The DEQ personnel
acknowledged the existence ofthe pre-emptive and exclusionary effects contained within

their management rules, and as they acknowledged that concept in their discussion,
those officials then chose to represent to Mr. Gibson that it was their belief the
Department of Agriculture had authorized DEQ to now regulate these agricultural solid
waste materials for them. There was no such delegation or sub-delegation of regulatory
authority in existence revealed to Mr. Gibson by IDOA, when that representation was
made, and Mr. Gibson then conferred with the Idaho Department of Agriculture
(IDOA), and told no such sub-delegation ever occurred. Mr. Gibson then confronted
DEQ thereafter, confronting them as to their misstatement of authority with that
misrepresentation, and Mr. Gibson then requested "evidence" of any such delegation, or
sub-delegation or right of authority from IDOA, or the existence of any substitution of
rules for application to his exempted operation, as he understood the 2003 adoption to
exclude, and upon his insistence, the DEQ personnel retracted their statement, and
acknowledged their error, and submitted an email to Mr. Gibson, to confirm their
"mistake" of assumed authority. DEQ thereafter declined to identify any other basis for
any such claim to regulate his operation, and none was ever thereafter forthcoming.

Mr. Gibson specifically notified DEQ personnel about his awareness of the cited
exclusions and exemptions in the regulatory provisions of what had been adopted in
2003, and the effect of that dialogue was thought to have brought closure to the subject,
especially upon receiving the email from DEQ.
On July 31, 2013, DEQ sent Mr. Gibson a certified letter, stating it to be a "notice of
violation", relating to the same ongoing composting operation that had been in

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEQ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 000504
P. 18

production for over two decades, all of which was known to DEQ, and clearly subject to
the statute of limitations for such attempted action, and Mr. Gibson regarded that Notice
to be either issued in error by DEQ personnel, who were unfamiliar with the exemptions
and exceptions within their rules and regulations, and possibly unaware of the statute of
limitations, or it was otherwise an attempt to bring his operations under their regulation,
despite their past representations and specific exclusions in their lack of regulatory
authority.
Mr. Gibson has relied upon the exemptions, exclusions, exceptions, and limitations
identified in the IDAPA Rules adopted in 2003, specifically pre-empting any regulatory
involvement of DEQ with existing composting operations, as well as his prior
"1,'fandfather" rights that existed to his operations before the initial enactment of the
solid waste management Regulations and Standards that may have been promulgated in
1992, as his operations have existed since thel970's. Mr. Gibson has made clear his
position to the DEQ personnel over the previous years of his operations, becoming an
issue in 1992, I 993-94 and then finally in 1995, when he was told he was not under their
regulatory authority and no more annual inspections. From 1995 forward, Mr. Gibson
has not had any intrusion from DEQ until the contact that was made in 2013, and Mr.
Gibson has continuously maintained his position he will not surrender his grandfather
rights, his exempt status, or the statute of limitations, and will not waive any exempt
status, and will not voluntarily participate in any further effort to regulate what they have
neither a right or authority to do. Mr. Gibson ceased any further "permitting" procedures
or site inspection procedures back in 1995, and there has been none since, and none to
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the present date. Mr. Gibson concluded there was no need for him to engage in any
further discussions or " resolve any conditions" for over two decades.
These Defendants do rely upon the exclusionary provisions and the application of
the statute of limitations, and rely upon the "grandfather" rights that have attached to this
operation that pre-dates their Rules and Regulations _and t.he-contin ·
the statute of limitations.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of October,

Vernon K. Smith, a
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 24th day of October, 2016, T caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
( X

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DE Q
141 0 N. Hilton, 2 nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

(
(

X

)
)
)

U.S. Mail

Fax

)

Hand Delivered
E-Filed

)

U.S. Mail

l

Fax

--c--- )

Hana Delivered
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Electronically Filed
10/24/2016 6:20:13 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC
Defendants.

________________

)

) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF
) DAVID R GIBSON
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO)
) : ss
County of Ada
)
COMES NOW David R. Gibson, and being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

That Affiant is a named Defendant in the above-captioned action; that I am over

the age of majority; competent to testify; and that I make this Affidavit upon my own personal
knowledge and recollection of the facts as they are stated herein.
2.

That I have been engaged in the process of generating composted substances and
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products ever since the early 1970' s, and have been doing so in several locations within Ada
County. I have been located for the past twenty-eight (28) years in the area that has been generally
referred to as the Gowen Field Desert Front property, beginning in 1988 when I leased a parcel of
property owned by the State of Idaho. This area is located South of Gowen Field, located along
the southern area of the Boise Municipal Airport, and off of Pleasant Valley Road, and currently
located a half mile west of Pleasant Valley Road, where I first located in that area in 1991. I have
conducted my composting operations continuously in that immediate area since 1988, and continue
to do so to the present date on the real property described in the pleadings since 2004. I have been
conducting my business under the name of Black Diamond Compost Products for many years, and
have been registered with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (!DOA) for many years as well,
having registered my product with them as they requested, and have been under their jurisdiction
and regulation concerning my registration and composting activities and operations. I have been
familiar with various agencies over the many years, including the Ada County Developmental
Services, DEQ, Fire District agencies, landfill agency, Central District Health, !DOA, and the Ada
County Code Enforcement personnel, and in recent years have been involved in a dispute with
Ada County over what has been the issue of the statewide "permitted use" of land in conjunction
with agricultural operations and activities, including composting activity. There exists a statewide
permitted use of agricultural activity and operations recognized under the Right to Farm Act
(enacted in 1981) and the Plant and Soil Amendment Act (enacted in 2001), and with respect to
those enactments, I have been involved in various litigation proceedings over the years regarding
my composting, and whether I need a conditional use permit (CUP) or not. These operations have
more recently been addressed in the controversy with Ada County over what has statutorily been

Affidavit of David R. Gibson

P.2

000508

defined as that recognized "statewide" grant of a "permitted use" of land involving certain
agricultural operations, which brought forth the question of my composting facility. Composting
had been declared to be included within the use of land that was zoned for agriculture, and my
operations were conducted on agricultural land, and was being operated as a composting operation
and facility. My operations have been unconditionally defined and declared to be an engaged
agricultural activity in accordance with those above Acts; that Ada County, nonetheless, chose to
question that fact and matter of law in 2009, having the mis-placed perception that such activities
I was conducting was subject to the County's right to require the issuance of a conditional use
permit (CUP), which was finally resolved in favor of the pre-emptive effects of the statutory
enactments that allowed statewide permitted use of such lands for such purposes. Ada County had
no authority or jurisdiction over the permitting process for land use in that capacity, and that
remains the law throughout the state. That such composting activities have been protected
continuously before the Right to Farm Act, and ever since that Act came into effect in 1981,
coupled with the enactment of the Plant and Soil Amendment Act in 2001. The positive aspect of
that Statewide permitted use, versus a conditional use issued by a county, served to bring forth a
clarifying amendment to the Right to Farm Act by the Idaho Legislature in 2011, undertaken to
emphasize and strengthen what was originally meant and intended for the Act to protect and to
have included in its definition of activities, always meant to encompass composting activities, and
upon that clarifying language to the Right to Farm Act in 2011, it confirmed that protection by the
inclusion of additional specific language consistent with what was contained in the 200 I enactment
ofldaho's Plant and Soil Amendment Act, along with their inter-relationship and correlation with
the Land Use Planning Act in effect in Idaho.
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3.

Of interest, it was only upon the conclusion of that case in 2013 that I then was

contacted by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which has given rise to this
pending controversy over the regulatory authority ofDEQ in the activities of composting facilities.
4.

That your Affiant has been familiar with and has been observed by the Idaho

Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) since my operations which had actually begun in the
1970's, and I had direct contact with that Agency after I had located to the Gowen Field Desert
Front area referenced above, following 1988. Their initial contact was in 1992, at which time I
was told by DEQ and Central District Health officials that I had to have an operating permit issued
by their Agency to conduct my operations; that upon that pretense, I was very skeptical, but
nonetheless, in the spirit of cooperation, I then agreed to apply for and then did immediately receive
from that Agency a permit to conduct my composting facility, even though my review of the
applicable laws suggested quite differently, as it remained your Affiant's beliefl did not need any
agency permission to conduct any agricultural plant and crop residue composting activity on
agricultural land, and that what I was doing had already been deemed to be a permitted use
statewide under the Act identified above. This business activity was not involved with any
materials that were intended for disposal, as the compost was to be used as a soil amendment or
plant humus additive to the foliar plant growth process. Furthermore, my operations were clearly
"grandfathered" activities, as my operations pre-dated any of their rule-making process. I was
conducting an agricultural operation under the Right to Farm Act, as well as under the Plant and
Soil Amendment Act upon it taking effect in 2001, each of which were under the jurisdiction and
authority of the Department of Agriculture, and nothing I did was ever deemed to be associated
with hazardous substances that were harmful to human or animal health or the environment, and
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nothing I conducted was to be disposed of or placed as a solid waste at any waste management
disposal site, as everything I had was intended for a subsequent agricultural application on fields
and plants. There was nothing involved that would require any DEQ intervention. All of my
registration and operational activities were limited to the jurisdiction of the Agriculture
Department, as I had been so informed by the various personnel with the Agriculture Department
over the years. That notwithstanding my beliefs, and what I was told was the position taken by the
Agriculture Department, I went ahead and applied for and secured the permit from DEQ/Central
District Health, and when it was issued, I was also told that their permit was in perpetuity, and that
I did not need to ever re-apply or renew what was given to me.
3.

Thereafter, following 1992, new "rules" were then being considered by DEQ, and in

what manner that Agency was then intending to engage in the regulation and treatment of solid waste
management at disposal sites of various substances, which came to be identified in their I.D.A.P.A
rules concerning "solid waste" as the IDAPA Rules and Regulations 58.01.06 et seq. I spoke with
DEQ officials about the situation and their management intentions, and I was specifically told by the
personnel I spoke to at DEQ that I did not need to worry or attend any of their meetings, as nothing
in regard to my operation and the permit they had before given to me would be in jeopardy or change
many manner.
Thereafter in approximately 1993, DEQ personnel decided to conduct an "inspection" of my
operation, which was attended by various officials, including two individuals I knew and were
familiar with, being Dr. Ronald Baird (Central District Health) and Dave Neal (Ada County landfill
operations). The third person I did not personally know, and whose name I currently do not remember,
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but he was with DEQ and represented himself as their agent. They were impressed and nothing came
from that on-site inspection to suggest any change in what I was doing.
4.

Thereafter, approximately in late 1994 or early 1995, there was another inspection

conducted by DEQ, and that inspection included two of the same individuals, and others from DEQ
that I did not know, and what was said was that they indicated they only wanted to confirm that there
was no contamination from the possibility of other substances arriving along with the grass and leaf
materials, as they all knew and acknowledged I was processing only grass clippings and leaves,
brought to me by landscapers, yard tenders throughout the summer season, and what had become the
annual delivery of leaves by ACHD that had been swept off the streets of Boise by ACHD. Once
again, they were satisfied with what they observed. That during that 1994-95 inspection, a gentleman
named Garth Sickles was in attendance at the site when that inspection took place, and he attended
the occasion throughout the inspection and would confirm the fact that when the inspection was
finished, the inspectors stated to me and Mr. Sickles there was not need to make any further yearly
inspections ofmy operations, as they were satisfied the operations were as they had always been, and
that I was processing only grass and leaf materials, and that type of plant residue was of no concern
to them, and further acknowledged the materials were not intended to be disposed of at the site at any
time, and recognized the substances were to be used for an agricultural purpose. They confirmed the
materials were not, and would never become, an environmental concern. I did not hear from anyone
with Health & welfare, "DEQ, or Central District Health until on April 2, 2013, which interestingly,
was just shortly after the controversy with Ada County had confirmed no conditional use permit was
required from Ada County to operate a compost site on agricultural land.
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5.

I have read and well understand the provisions of Title 22, Chapters 1, 11, 22, 23 and

45, and I am very familiar with DEQ's IDAPA Rules, and what is regarded to be their Rules and
Regulations regarding solid waste management at disposal facilities, and I am very familiar with the
exclusions, exemptions, and limitations of the DEQ regulatory authority with regard to Plant and crop
residue, and agricultural activities under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture. I am also
familiar with the provisions of I. C. §39-108(4) which identifies a statute oflimitations imposed upon
DEQ with respect to belated claims asserting any right to impose penalties or fines by DEQ for any
alleged violations of their regulations. That Agency has been aware that I have been in operation in
Ada County since the 1970's; that I had been located on the Gowen Field Desert Front since 1988,
and they were well aware of my operations when they became directly involved in soliciting my
participation in their permitting process in 1992, in their inspection in 1993, and then again in 199495, and I have never been held to be in violation of anything, and they knew of my operation
continuously since then, and they have declined to conduct any other inspections since 1994-95,
saying none were ever again needed to be conducted, and they have only now confronted me in April,
2013, virtually eighteen years later, and the two year statute of limitations as provided for in I. C.
§39-108(4) has expired about 9 times over, assuming they ever thought there was any violation taking
place, and they would have known of it, or should have known of it, over eighteen years ago, had it
occurred, as the operation has not changed or been conducted in any manner inconsistent with the
ongoing process they observed during the 1993-94-95 inspections, when they saw this operation was
a composting process of grass clippings and leaves, going on for over four decades in my composting
business activity.
Further your Affinat sayetl1 not.
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Dated this 24th day of October, 2016.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me ti
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 24th day of October, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

)

(

)
)

( X

)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
E-Filed

U.S. Mail
Fax

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
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(
(
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Electronically Filed
10/27/2016 4:04:09 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540
)
Plaintiff,
)
) AMENDED NOTICE OF
v.
) HEARING
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
)
LLC.
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality, will call its MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, for hearing
before the above-entitled Court on Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 2:30 p.m., or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard.
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DATED this 27th day of October, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Darrell G. Early
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
X____ Fax (208) 345-1129
X
eService: vls59@live.com

/s/Christine Riggs
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
11/2/2016 11:45:14 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK GANTZ

)

j

)
)
)

---------------- )
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of Ada
I, JACK GANTZ, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states that:
1.

I am currently employed by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ and/or

Department) as a Technical Engineer I, in the Boise Regional Office ofDEQ and have personal
knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
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2.

I have held my cunent position since April 12, 1993. In this position I was responsible

for administration and enforcement of the "Solid Waste Management Regulations and
Standards," IDAPA 16.01.0600 et. seq. of the Division of Environmental Quality, Department of
Health and Welfare and later the Solid Waste Management Rules" IDAPA 58.01.06. et seq. of
the Department of Environmental Quality with respect to facilities located in the Boise Region
which includes the area south of Boise where the Defendants' facility is located.
3.

I have reviewed the Department's files and records for any references to David R.

Gibson, or Black Diamond Composting and have found no records indicating the Department
was aware of the facility at its present location prior to the inspection on March 29, 2013.
4.

I personally was not aware that the Defendants' facility existed or was in violation of

IDAPA 58.01.06.012 prior to conducting the inspection on March 29, 2013.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Dated this ==--~·day of November, 2016

Gantz
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR~Ao befo~S

e this this

ulday of November, 2016

. ~1

/f

•

• I

i{;;,,;fi•J_
Notary Public in and for the State ofldaho
Residing at: Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the / day ofNovember, 2016, I caused to be served a tme and
cotTect copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JACK GANTZ by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delive1y
___'{_ Fax (208) 345-1129
~ eService: vls59@live.com

'; +

/:hi){
Christine -Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
11/2/2016 11:45:14 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

_________________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF DEAN EHLERT

)
) ss.
)

I, DEAN EHLERT, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states that:

1.

I am currently employed by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as the

Ground Water and Remediation Manager for the Boise Regional Office ofDEQ and have
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personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

I have held my current position since July 20, 2015. Prior to taking this position I was the

Solid Waste Program Manager for the State Office ofDEQ commencing on September 5, 1999.
In that position I was responsible for statewide administration and enforcement of the "Solid
Waste Management Regulations and Standards," IDAPA 16.01 .0600 eL seq. of the Division of
Environmental Quality, Department of Health and Welfare and later the Solid Waste
Management Rules" IDAPA 58.01.06. et seq. of the Depaiiment of Environmental Quality.
3.

I have reviewed the Department's files and records for any references to David R.

Gibson, or Black Diamond Composting and have found no records indicating the Department
was aware of the facility at its present location prior to the inspection on March 29, 2013.
4.

I personally was not aware of any composting operations by the Defendants prior to the

inspection on March 29, 2013.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Dated this---'--~"'-\~day ofNovember, 2016

DeanEhle1i

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this this

;:l rt!/· day of November, 2016

i
i
I

Notary Public in and for the Statifd!iho
Residing at: Boise, Idalio
.
Commission Expires:
/ [) · I/(· 7 C pC

I

I

I

'

!
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I
iI

CERTrICATE OF SERVICE
.r, )):

I hereby certify that on the :J' day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
conect copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN EHLERT by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Fax(208)345-ll29
....½.____. eService: vls59@live.com

Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
11/2/2016 11:45:14 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

REPLYMEMORANDUMIN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----------------)
The Plaintiff, through the Office of the Idaho Attorney General respectfully submits the
following Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality's
(Department) Motion for Summary Judgment in which the Department presented the following
arguments supported by undisputed facts and legal analysis.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-1

000524

1.

The Defendants have admitted to violating the Rules by constructing and

operating a Tier II processing facility without proper authorization from the Department.
2.

The plain and unambiguous meaning ofIDAPA 58.01.06.01.003.b.ii exempts

only the actual application of agricultural crop residue to the land at agronomic rates and does not
exempt the composting ofleaves and grass clippings at the Defendants' facility.
3.

The Depaiiment is entitled to deference in its interpretation of the Solid Waste

Management Rules, IDAPA 58.01 .06. et seq. (the Rules).
4.

The Idaho Depaiirnent of Agriculture (ISDA) does not regulate the construction

and operation of the Defendants' facility and thus the facility is not exempt from regulation by
the Department pursuant to ID APA 58.01 .06.001.03.b.iii.
5.

The Depaiiment complied with the Administrative Procedure Act in promulgating

the Rules.
6.

The Depmiment did not violate Article III, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

In response, the Defendants offer absolutely no facts or legal analysis to refute any of these
points. 1 Instead, Defendants merely reiterate the conclus01y allegations of their Amended
Answer and attempt to assert newly-minted defenses and arguments that have not been properly
preserved and which lack legal merit. As set forth in its opening memorandum, and as more
fully explained below the Depaiiment is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.

I Defendants make no effort to support their affirmative defenses that the Department violated the Adminish·ative
Procedures Act, or the Idaho Constitution.
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ARGUMENT
1. The Rules Apply to Defendants' Facility.
The Defendants' response to the Department's motion asserts without any analysis or
explanation that they are exempt from the Rules by virtue of the exemptions in IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii and 58.01.06.001.03.b.iii. The Defendants' however, merely cut and paste
the conclusory allegations contained in their Answer to the First Amended Complaint (Amended
Answer) and make no effo1t to refute the analysis provided by the Department.
A. Grass Clippings and Leaves are not "crop (plant) residue" Within the Meaning of
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii.
Defendants argue without any suppo1t that "'grass clippings and leaves' are commonly
understood to be included within the meaning of crop, or of plant residue." Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition pg. 5 (emphasis original). This conclus01y statement in no way
refutes or responds to the Depattment's explanation that the exclusion found in IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii is limited to agricultural crops and that definition of"crop" supported by
numerous definitional citations does not include grass clippings and leaves.

a (1): a plant or animal or plant or animal product that can be
grown and harvested extensively for profit or subsistence <an
apple crop> <a crop ofwool> and that the parenthetical "(plant)"
only modifies the term "crop."
http://\l\'\\'W.merrian1-webster.com/dictionary/crop. The Defendants make no effort to address the
obvious use of parentheses around the term "(plant)" to merely modify the word "crop" and not
to create a separate categ01y of plant material exempt from the definition of"solid waste." See
Memorandum in Support pgs. 10-11; Affidavit of Dean Ehlert ,r 10. Defendants offer no
explanation for how their activities meet the remaining conditions ofIDAP A
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii "ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic rates." See Memorandum in
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Support pg. 12; Ehlert Aff. ,r 9. Finally, the Defendants make no effort to reconcile their
interpretation ofIDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii with the express language in IDAPA
58.01 .06.009.02.b. that specifically includes: "a processing facility that only processes wastes
including, but not limited to, ... yard waste .... plant or crop residue" in the definition of a Tier I
processing facility. When construing statutory and regulatory provisions courts should not read
them in isolation, but must interpret them in the context of the entire document. State v. Schultz,
151 Idaho 863, 866-7, 264 P.3d 970, 973-4 (2011) quoting Faber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147
Idaho 307, 310, 208 P .3d 289, 292 (2009). Comi must give effect to all the words and provisions
of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. Id. The interpretation urged
by the Defendants would make the language in IDAPA 58.01 .06.009.02.b void since including
"grass clippings and leaves" in the exclusion would nullify the inclusion of"yard waste ... plant
or crop residues" in the definition of a Tier I processing facility. ID APA 58.01.06.009.02.b. In
contrast the interpretation offered by the Department, and to which the Defendants make no
response, is entirely consistent. The exclusion for "crop (plant) residues ultimately retmned to
the soil at agronomic rates" in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii applies only to the actual return of
agricultural crop residue to the land as an agronomic supplement and not to the processing of
such material before-hand. See Ehlert Aff.

,r's 9-12.

Also absent from the Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, is any argument or
authority to suggest that the Department's interpretation is not entitled to Simplot deference. J.R.
Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). When a party
moves for surnmaty judgment and presents undisputed facts to show that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw, the burden is shifted to the non-moving party to come forward with
facts and law to show that summary judgment should not be entered. Northwest Bee-Corp. v.
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Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263,266 (2002). The nonmoving party "may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the patiy's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial" Id. Here the Defendants have presented to this Cami with nothing but
conclusory allegations unsupported by facts or law and the Department is entitled to summary
judgment.
B. The Defendants are not regulated by the Idaho Depatiment of Agriculture.
Next, the Defendants offer no support for the argument that they are regulated by the
ISDA and make no effort to refute the swom testimony of the Deputy Director of the ISDA,
Brian Oakey. "The Depatiment of Agriculture does not regulate the composting of nonagricultural solid wastes such as grass clippings, leaves and other forms of yard waste."
Affidavit of Brian Oakey ,r 2. "The Depatiment of Agriculture does not regulate the production
of soil amendments or the composting processes used to produce such products." Affidavit of
Brian Oakey if 3. Nor do Defendants point to any authority that preempts the Depmiment of
Environmental Quality from regulating them since neither the Right to Farm Act, Idaho Code §
22-4501 et seq., nor the Plant and Soil Amendment Act, Idaho Code§ 22-2401 et seq., preclude
regulation by the Department. The "Right to Farm Act" has nothing to do with regulation by the
ISDA or the Depatiment. It merely prohibits counties and cities from passing zoning ordinances
that would result in the closure of pre-existing agricultural facilities. See Idaho Code §§ 224503-4504. Likewise the Plant and Soil Amendment Act, Idaho Code § 22-2401 et seq. only
provides for the registration of soil mnendment products. ISDA does not regulate the production
of such material under this authority. See Oakey Affidavit ,r 3. Defendants' reliance on the
exclusion in ID APA 58.01.06.001.03.b.iii is without merit.
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C. The Department has Authority to Regulate Composting Pursuant to the
Environmental Protection and Health Act, Idaho Code§ 39-101 et seq.
The Defendants make the argument that the Department only has authority to regulate
"solid waste disposal" which they say does not include their composting facility since they are
not "disposing" of the material. See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition pg. 7. This
ignores the express definition of"solid waste disposal" which includes: "the collection, storage,
treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste." Idaho Code§ 39-103(14)
(emphasis added). This clear definition gives the Depaiiment the authority to promulgate
regulations that govern the entire management system from the point of generation through to the
point of final disposal and specifically includes "processing." The Rules as approved by the
Idaho Legislature provide numerous regulations that address the processing of solid waste,
including the composting of such waste, even when that waste is intended for re-use. The
Defendants argument is thus directly refuted by the express law.
Moreover this argument is factually and legally misleading. The term "disposal" is
defined in the Rules as:
"Discharge, deposit, injection dumping, spilling, leaking, leaching,
migration, or placing of any solid waste into or on any land or
water so that such solid waste or any constituent thereof may enter
the environment or be emitted into the air or dischai·ged into any
waters, including ground waters.
IDAPA 58.01.06.005.12 (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (Federal Solid Waste
Disposal Act definition of "disposal"). The Defendants admit they are placing solid waste on the
land and the Department has determined in the reasonable exercise of its rulemaking discretion
that such an activity "may" lead to solid waste or constituents entering the environment. It is
therefore entirely within the scope of the Depaiiment' s regulatory authority to impose certain
requirements upon this facility.
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The only legal authority cited by the Defendants in their Memorandum is Ada County v.
Gibson, 126 Idaho 854,893 P .2d 802 (1995). which they cite for the proposition that "ordinances
rules and regulations are to be liberally construed in favor of the free ownership and use of
property without regulation." See Memorandum in Opposition pg. 12. That case however does
not stand for the proposition asserted but states instead:
because zoning laws are in derogation of common law rights of
free ownership and use of property, where more than one
reasonable interpretation is possible the interpretation that places
the least restriction on use of property is favored.
Id. at 858: 893 P.2d at 805 (emphasis added). The Environmental Protection and Health Act
(EPHA) Idaho Code§ 39-101 et seq. and the Rules are not "zoning laws." Rather, the EPHA is a
"remedial statute" and subject to the "well-known canon of statutmy construction that remedial
legislation is to be liberally construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature." Hill v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 150 Idaho 619. 625. 249 P.3d 812,818 (2010). (quoting
State v. Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor & Equip. Co., 129 Idaho 565. 567, 929 P.2d 742, 743
(1996)) Moreover, exceptions to most remedial legislation are to be construed naITowly.
Branchflower v. State. Dept. of Employment. 128 Idaho 593, 597. 917 P.2d 750, 754 (1996).
Idaho Code § 39-102 states Idaho policy on environmental protection:

It is therefore declared to be the policy of the state to provide for
the protection of the environment and promotion of personal health
and to thereby protect and promote the health, safety and general
welfare of the people of this state.
Idaho Code § 3 9-102. It is without question that the EPHA is a remedial measure designed to
protect Idaho's citizens and environment and it should be liberally construed to give effect to that
legislative intent. A liberal construction ofldaho Code§ 39-103(14) (definition of"solid waste
disposal") and§ 39-105 (authority to regulate "solid waste disposal") grants the Department the
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authority to regulate the management of solid waste including regulations governing the
composting of such materials. Likewise, the regulations promulgated by the agency are subject
to the same rules of statutory construction. Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho
417, 420, 247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011). The Rules should be liberally construed to affect the
statutory purpose of regulating the management of solid waste including the composting of such
waste and the exceptions found in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii and iii should be narrowly
construed so as not to defeat that purpose.
2. Defendants Cannot Rely upon the Statute of Limitations.
For the first time the Defendants argue at page 13 of their Opposition Memorandum that
they are entitled to dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule l 2(b)( 6) because allegedly the statute
of limitations found in Idaho Code § 39-108(4) applies.2 Defendants however, have n~t filed a
dispositive motion in accordance with this Court's scheduling order which set the deadline for
such a motion on October 14, 2016. Thus, at a minimum the Defendants are not entitled to any
affirmative relief under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56. Moreover, the Defendants have at no
time pleaded or asserted this affirmative defense as required by Rule 8(c) and 12(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and thus they have waived any such defense.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides: "(I) In General. In responding to a pleading,
a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: ***;(Q) statute
oflimitations ... " Idaho R. Civ. P. 8(c)(l)(Q) (emphasis added). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) provides: "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a

2 Idaho Code§ 39-108(4) provides: "No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover for a
violation of any provision of his chapter or a violation of any rule, permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to
this chapter, more than two (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of

the violation."
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claim, counterclaim, cross claim or third party claim, must be asserted in the responsive pleading
if one is required." Idaho. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Comt has
held "the statute of limitations is an affinnative defense which must be pleaded and proved by
the defendant." Resource Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (l 972t Where
the answer or reply to a counterclaim is mandatmy, the affirmative defense of statute of
limitation is waived if not included in the responsive pleading. Id. at 938: 500 P.2d at 839. See
also, Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820,825 (Ct. App. 2000): Anderson v. State,
133 Idaho 788,791,992 P.2d 783,786 (Ct. App. 1999). InBluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho
453, 649 P.2d 1209 (1982), however, the Supreme Comt allowed a pmty to raise the Statute of
Frauds as an affirmative defense for the first time in a summmy judgment motion, even though
they had not plead the matter in their reply to a counterclaim. Construing the rules liberally,
under Rule l(a), the Court reasoned that the opposing party knew of the affi1mative defense and
was given time to present argument in opposition. Id. at 454,649 P.2d at 1210. The Court
noted, however, that the "waiver of affirmative defenses can be supported upon the general
statutory constrnction principles in view of the mandatmy character of the language of Rule 8( c).
Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 455 fn. 3, 649 P.2d at 1211 fn.3. Nonetheless, under the circumstances
in that case the Comt allowed the Defense to be asserted. In Patterson v. State, Dept. of Health
and Welfare, 151 Idaho 310. 316,256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011) the Comtfound the statute of
limitations defense was not waived by the State where it was presented in a motion for summary
judgment and opposing party had time to respond. Here, facts are distinguishable. Defendants
have filed two answers to the Complaint and the First Amended Complaint. In neither document _
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is there any assertion of a defense based upon Idaho Code § 39-108(4). Over twenty months
have elapsed since the original complaint and the matter is set for trial in less than three months.

3

The time for amending pleadings passed on April 30, 2016, discovery was closed on August 16,
2016, and the time for the Defendants to have raised this in their own motion for summary
judgment expired on October 14, 2016. Unlike the facts inBluestone or Patterson, the
Defendants did not raise the matter in a motion for summary judgment. Rather, they raise it for
the first time in their "Opposition Memorandum" to the Department's motion, leaving only seven
days to respond pursuant to Rule 56. The Department is thus highly prejudiced by the
Defendants' untimely assertion. This Court should decline to follow Bluestone or Patterson
because they are distinguishable from this case and find consistent with Resource Engineering,
Inc. v. Siler. 94 Idaho 935,500 P.2d 836; Cole, 135 Idaho 107. 110. 15 P.3d 820 and Anderson
133 Idaho 788. 791 992 P.2d 783. 786 that Defendants have waived any defense based on the
statute of limitations by failing to timely raise it and prejudicing the Department.
If the Court does consider a defense based on Idaho Code § 3 9-108(4)4, the Defendants

have failed to show facts to establish the defense or to create a genuine dispute for trial. IDAPA
58.01.06.012 requires a person desiring to operate a Tier II facility to submit documentation to
the Department before engaging in the regulated conduct.
The owner and operator of a new Tier II facility shall establish
compliance with the requirements of Section 012 by obtaining
Department approval of the applications required in Subsection
012.02 before beginning construction and Subsection 012.04 prior
to accepting waste.

3 In his special concu1Tence, Justice Bistline noted that the trial in Bluestone had not been set at the time the Motion
for Summary Judgment was filed. See Bluestone, I 03 Idaho at 456, 649 P.2d at 1212 (Bistline specially concu1Ting).
4 By including the following argument, the Department in no way waives the preceding argument or consents to trial
of any defense based upon Idaho Code§ 39-108(4).
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IDAP A 58.01.06.012 (emphasis added). Just as importantly, until a facility meets or intends to
meet the threshold quantity requirement (600 cubic yards) to trigger IDAPA 58.01.06.012, they
remain a "Below Regulatory Concern Facility" and are not required to provide any notice to the
Department. IDAPA 58.01.06.011.02. Thus, if an individual does not submit the documentation
to the Department at the time the requirement is triggered, the Depaiiment will have no reason to
know the facility exists unless it happens to get a complaint or otherwise discover its existence.
By the Defendants' own admission they moved from a different location to their present
location sometime in 2004 after the effective date of the Rules. Under IDAP A 58.01.06.012 the
Defendants were required to obtain site approval and operating plan approval "before beginning
construction" and "prior to accepting waste" in an amount in excess of the 600 cubic yard
threshold. It is undisputed that the Defendants did not provide the docun1entation to the
Department as required. Thus, the Defendants' failed to place the Department on notice that they
were subject to the new rules. The First Amended Complaint alleges that the Department
attempted to conduct an inspection of the Defendants' new facility on March 29, 2013. See First
Amended Complaint 1 13. This was the first time the Depaiiment had been to the new facility to
determine whether it was required to comply with the Rules and the first time the Department
had lmowledge of the Defendants operations at this location. Supplemental Affidavit of Dean
Ehlert 13-4; Affidavit of Jack Gantz 13-4. It was at that time the Department first become
aware that the Defendants were operating a facility subject to the requirements ofIDAP A
58.01.06.012. Approximately four months later, an administrative case was commenced against
Defendant Gibson on July 31, 2013 (First Amended Complaint 125) well within the two year
statute oflimitation and the original Complaint in this matter was filed on March 5, 2015 prior to
expiration of the statute. The undisputed facts show that the Department filed its complaint
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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within two years of becoming aware of the facility at its present location.
The only facts offered in the Affidavit of David R. Gibson (Gibson Aff.) relate to the
operation of a different facility at a different location nnder the old Solid Waste Rules. Those mies
did not require a permit from the Department as Mr. Gibson infers, but rather a "conditional use
permit from the District." 5 Affidavit of Paula J. Wilson, Exhibit A (IDAPA 16.01.06008 (1992)).
The Gibson Affidavit alleges no facts to establish that the Department knew of the new location and
new operations commencing in 2004. Nor does the affidavit of Gibson provide any evidence
concerning when the facility exceeded the 600 cubic yard threshold to trigger ID APA 58.01.06.012.
All his affidavit states is that in 1993 Gibson's other facility was inspected by "various officials" one
of whom he "did not personally know and whose name I do not remember but he was with DEQ ... "
Gibson Aff ,r 3. pg. 5. And, in late 1994 or early 1995 his old facility was inspected by "others from
DEQ that I did not !mow ... " Gibson Aff. ,r 4 pg. 6. These entirely speculative averments do not give
rise to any inference that approximately eight years later when the Department's Rules became
effective the Department should have had reasonable knowledge that he had opened anew facility at
a new location. Indeed when the new mies went into effect Mr. Gibson had been evicted from the
old facility by the owners of that land. See Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840. 87 P.3d 949 (2004)

(Merrill I) and Merrill v. Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 132 P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2006)(Merrill II). Thus
when the Rules became effective in 2003, Mr. Gibson was effectively out of business. Moreover,

ii

argued that he had been nnable to move his operations to new land without getting approval from the

I

government. Merrill II, 142 Idaho at 695 fn. I; 132 P.3d at 452 fn. 1. Later, Mr. Gibson and Mr.

I

Mr. Gibson also contradicts himself since during his appeal in Merrill II his attorney specifically

I
5 The "District" is defined in IDAPA 16.01.06003.07 as "One(!) of the seven (7) district health departments which
were created by Title 39, Chapter 4, Idaho Code.
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Smith contradicted themselves yet again when they disputed the need to obtain a conditional use
permit from Ada County for the facility. See Ada County v. The Estate of Vernon K. Smith et. al.,
CV-OC-10-02298, Memorandum Decision and Order (December 10,2010). The Gibson Affidavit is
thus contradictory and insufficient to establish a genuine dispute that the Department knew or should
have known that Defendants were constructing a facility at its present location commencing in 2004
or that at some point thereafter they exceeded the 600 cubic yard threshold to trigger the applicability
ofIDAPA 58.01.06.012. For this reason, even if the Comt were to consider this argmnent, it is
without merit and should be denied.
3. The Defendants may not assert any defense based upon "Estoppel" nor is the facility
"Grandfathered."
Defendants seem to infer at pages 17-18 of their Memorand\Jlll in Opposition various
themes of "estoppel" based upon vague representations and alleged acquiescence by unknown
state employees. Like their arg\Jlllents concerning the statute oflimitations, this affirmative
defense is untimely since it should have been pleaded in their Amended Answer per Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(c)(l)(F), 12(b). If the Court were to consider this defense it is without merit
since it is well recognized that estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a government or
public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental capacity. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex
rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200-01, 207 P.3d 169, 176-77 (2009); State ex rel.
Williams v. Adams. 90 Idaho 195,201,409 P.2d 415. 419 (1965); Buell v. Idaho Dep't of
Transp., 151 Idaho 257,265,254 P.3d 1253, 1261. (Ct.App.2011). Cf. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v.
State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138. 997 P.2d 591,599 (2000) ("The general rule is that
administrative officers of the state cannot estop the state through mistaken statements oflaw.").
There is no doubt that the Department is acting in its regulat01y capacity. Whether any of the
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statements avened to by Mr. Gibson are true or not, they are legally inelevant to the matter at
hand and provide no defense. 6
Likewise the Defendants cannot assert that they are "grandfathered" in any way. See
Memorandum in Opposition pg. 20. Defendants admit their new facility was constructed after
the effective date of the Solid Waste Management Rules and the Rules themselves are applicable
retroactively to existing facilities. See IDAl'A 58.01.06.012 (requiring compliance by existing
facilities with IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04 within two years of April 26, 2002 and with IDAP A
58.01.06.012.02 within five years of April 26, 2002). Thus, even if this was an existing facility
the Rules provide no "grandfather" protections.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed the Defendants' facility meets the definition of a Tier II Processing

Facility because it is processing greater than 600 cubic yards of solid waste. It is admitted that
Defendants have not complied with the requirement for siting and operating plan approval. The
exclusions relied upon by the Defendants do not apply to their operations and the Department's
action to compel compliance is appropriate. The Department is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on its complaint, to injunctive relief requiring compliance, to the statutorily prescribed
penalty of $10,000.00 and to its reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 39108(6), Idaho Code§ 12-117 and Idaho Code§ 12-121.

6 The statements relied upon by Mr. Gibson constitute speculation and hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence and
are the subject of a separate Objection and Motion to Strike filed in conjunction with this Reply.
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DATED this l'.'._ day ofNovember, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE A1TORNEY GENERAL

Isl Dan·ell G. Early
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I hereby certify that on the 1st day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
conect copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delive1y
/Fax:(208)345-1129
i.,/'eService: vls59@live.com

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
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s
I
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Electronically Filed
11/3/2016 10:24:44 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
)
LLC.
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID R.
GIBSON

The Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (the Department) objects to
portions of the Affidavit of David R. Gibson (Gibson Affidavit”) on the grounds that it seeks to
inject inadmissible evidence into the record of this matter. Accordingly, the Court should not
consider the following portions of the Gibson Affidavit for any purpose. The State does not
request a hearing on this motion.
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STANDARD
I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides: “A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a
fact is not admissible in evidence at the hearing.” “The admissibility of evidence contained in
affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a
threshold matter to be addressed by the court” before it decides a motion for summary judgment.
Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 241, 280 P.3d 740, 744 (2012).
ARGUMENT
The following portions of the Gibson Affidavit are inadmissible for the reasons stated.
1. Objection - Hearsay – I.R.E. 802 and 803 – Relevance, I.R.E. 402:
At page 6 the following statement:
That during the 1994-95 inspection, a gentleman named Garth
Sickles was in attendance at the site when that inspection took
place and he attended the occasion throughout the inspection and
would confirm the fact that when the inspection was finished the
inspectors stated to me and Mr. Sickles there was not need to make
any further yearly inspection of my operations as they were
satisfied the operations were as they had always been and that I
was processing only grass and leaf materials, and that type of plant
residue was of no concern to them, and further acknowledged the
materials were not intended to be disposed of at the site at any
time, and recognized the substances were to be used for an
agricultures purpose. They confirmed the materials were not and
would never become an environmental concern.
To the extent this portion of the testimony is represented to be what Mr. Sickles would say, it
constitutes hearsay prohibited by I.R.E. 802.
To the extent these statements are offered by Mr. Gibson as to his recollection of the
content of these statements they remain hearsay since there is no foundation to show that the
statements were made by employees of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality versus
employees of the Central District Health Department which is not a party to this matter. For that
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID
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matter no foundation is laid was to who made the statements and in what capacity other than Mr.
Gibson’s opinion that the individuals “included two of the same individuals, and others from
DEQ that I did not know…” This is insufficient foundation to establish any exception to Rule
802. Moreover, these alleged statements are irrelevant to the matter at hand which concerns
whether Mr. Gibson’s current facility at a new location is subject to a new set of Rules that
became applicable in 2003. In addition as set forth in the Department’s Reply Memorandum,
past statements by agents of the State cannot be the basis for a defense to a current enforcement
matter since doctrines of estoppel are not applicable to the State when acting in its sovereign
capacity. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200–01, 207 P.3d
169, 176–77 (2009); State ex rel. Williams v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 419
(1965); Buell v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 265, 254 P.3d 1253, 1261,
(Ct.App.2011). Cf. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591,
599 (2000) Thus, even if the statements could be attributed to DEQ, they remain irrelevant.
2. Objection lack of Personal Knowledge – I.R.E. 602, Id. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
At page 7 the following statement:
That Agency has been aware that I have been in operation in Ada
County since the 1970’s; that I had been located on the Gowen
Field Desert Front since 1988, and they were well aware of my
operations when they became directly involved in soliciting my
participation in their permitting process in 1992, in their inspection
in 1993, and then again in 1994-95, and I have never been held in
to be in violation of anything and they knew of my operation
continuously since then, and they have declined to conduct any
other inspection since 1994-95, saying none were ever again
needed to be conducted.”
This portion of Mr. Gibson’s Affidavit constitutes rank speculation concerning what the
Department was aware of and what they knew at any given point in time. This testimony is not
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based upon personal knowledge and should be struck pursuant to I.R.E. 602 and Id. R. Civ.P.
56(c)(4).
3. Objection – Inadmissible Opinion Testimony I.R.E. 702 – Lack of
Foundation/Personal Knowledge I.R.E. 602 – Best Evidence I.R.E. 1002 – Lack of
Relevance I.R.E. 401
At page 3 the following statements:
*Composting has been declared to be included within the use of
land that was zoned for agriculture…
*My operations have been unconditionally defined and declared to
be an engaged agricultural activity in accordance with those above
Acts;
*Ada County had no authority or jurisdiction over the permitting
process for land use in that capacity, and that remains the law
throughout the state. That such composting activities have been
protected continuously before the Right to Farm Act, and ever
since that Act came into effect in 1981, coupled with the enactment
of the Plant and Soil Amendment Act in 2001. The positive aspect
of that Statewide permitted uses versus a conditional use issued by
a county, served to bring forth a clarifying amendment to the Right
to Farm Act by the Idaho Legislature in 2011, undertaken to
emphasize and strengthen what was originally meant and intended
for the Act to protect and to have included in its definition
activities always meant to encompass composting activities upon
that clarifying language to the right to Farm Act in 2011, it
confirmed that protection by the inclusion of additional specific
language consistent with what was contained in the 2011
enactment of Idaho’s Plant and Soil Amendment Act, along with
their inter-relationship and correlation with the Land Use Planning
Act in effect in Idaho.
Each of these statements constitutes Mr. Gibson’s lay opinion and speculation concerning the
legal meaning of or the reasons for enactments by the Idaho Legislature. Mr. Gibson’s opinion or
belief as to the meaning of these enactments is irrelevant to the matter at hand. Mr. Gibson lacks
any foundation for offering these legal opinions. Moreover, opinion testimony is only admissible
if it would “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID
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I.R.E. 702. Mr. Gibson’s opinion of the effect of various Statutes will be of no assistance to the
Court. Finally, Mr. Gibson’s opinion concerning the effect of the Right to Farm Act prior to its
2011 amendment is also incorrect to the extent it conflicts with the legal holding of Ada County
v. The Estate of Vernon K. Smith et. al., CV-OC-10-02298, Memorandum Decision and Order
(December 10, 2010). 1 Mr. Gibson’s opinion testimony regarding the reasons for the 2011
Amendments to the Right to Farm Act are likewise speculative, lack foundation and irrelevant.
The express language of the Right to Farm Act as amended, the Plant and Soil Amendment Act,
and the holdings of the Ada County District Court are the best evidence of what those laws and
judicial decisions state.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gibson’s affidavit largely consists of his opinion that he is exempt from the IDAPA
58.01.06. et seq. because of his erroneous interpretation of the law. This lay opinion testimony is
not helpful to this Court since it lacks any foundation and is inconsistent with the express
language of the applicable law. Mr. Gibson offers rank speculation about what the Department
knew or should have had known and offers hearsay testimony to support the defense of estoppel
which is not applicable to this case. The foregoing portions of Mr. Gibson’s affidavit are
inadmissible and should be struck.

1 A true and correct copy of this decision is attached hereto as Attachment A and the Court may take judicial notice
of this ruling. I.R.E. 201. The opinion has not been vacated, nor overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court.
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DATED this 2nd day of November, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Darrell G. Early________________________
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
THE AFFAVIT OF DAVID R. GIBSON by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
__X _ Fax (208) 345-1129
_____ eService: vls59@live.com

/s/Christine Riggs
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4
5
6

,,

ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State ofldaho,

7

Case No. CV-OC-10-02298

Plaintiff,
8

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
9

10
11

THE ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
VICTORIA H. SMITH, AND VERNON
K. SMITH,
Defendants.

12
13

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for sununary judgment. For the reasons
14
15
16

explained below, the Court will grant Ada County's motion for sununary judgment. The
Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Background and Prior Proceedings

17

1

18

19

David R. Gibson (Gibson) has operated a composting business in Ada County for many
years. From 1988 until 1991, Gibson's composting facility was on property owned by Boise City.

20

In 1991, he moved his composting operation to property located south of the Boise airport at
21

· Gowen Field. This property is owned by Lydia and Timothy Merrill and will be referred to as the
22
23

Merrill property. Gibson continued to operate the composting facility on the Merrill property

24

"'{I\

t

25

1 The

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 1

Court understands that compost is decomposed plant matter and has uses as a fe11ilizer and soil amendment.
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until 2004 when the resolution of legal dispute with the Merrills forced him to relocate his
1

composting operation.2

2

Gibson relocated the composting operation from the Merrill property to property owned

3

4

by Victoria H. Smith, a

5

of her husband, Vernon K. Smith, Sr. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. (Smith)3 is responsible for his

6

woman who became the sole property owner upon the death

mother's assets, including the property at issue here, pursuant to a Durable and Irrevocable

7

Power of Attorney. (Defs.' Mem. 3.) The Smith property is described as a 520 acre parcel of land
8

that is only a short distance from the Merrill property. The Smith property and the Merrill
9

10

property are located in a "Rural Preservation District". 4 The Gibson composting operation is

11

located on about ten (10) acres of the Smith property. From 2004 until the present Gibson has

12

operated the composting facility on the Smith property with full consent of Smith.

13

14
15

Ada County has infonned Gibson on numerous prior occasions that he could not operate
his composting in a Rural Preservation District without a conditional use permit from Ada
County. Gibson was aware of Ada County's position as early as 1991. According to Smith, in

16

1991, Gibson applied to Ada County for a conditional use pennit which Ada County denied.
17

(See August 16, 2010 Affidavit of Tanimy Emmons, Letter Attachment to Exhibit D. 5) Smith
18
19
20
21

2

22

3

23

25

:~;::n~nincorporated area within Ada County is divided, for zoning and use purposes, into various zoning dfsti:icts.
The Rural Preservation District is one of these designated zoning districts. See Ada County Code§ 8-2-1.
5
Exhibit D to the Emmons Affidavit is a copy of letter Smith wrote to Ada County in April, 2008. This letter
attaches a copy ofan earlier letter Smith wrote to Ada County in 2003. Smith makes statements in this letter about
the 1991 application.

26
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Information concerning that dispute is reported in Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840,'87 P.3d 949 (2004) and
Merrill v. Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 132 P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2005).
Vernon K. Smith is an Idaho attorney. Mr. Smith has appeared, and acts as counsel for the defendants in this
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asserts that Gibson filed, but later withdrew, an appeal of the denial of the conditional use permit
1
2

because Gibson concluded that Ada County did.not have the authority to reguire the permit. Id.

3

In January, 2003, Ada County wrote another letter to Gibson stating that Gibson had to have a

4

conditional use permit for the composting operation. Acting as Gibson's attorney, Smith

5

responded in a letter dated February 24, 2003. Id. Smith asserted that Ada County lacked the

6

authority to require a conditional use permit for a composting operation because such a

7

requirement was not permitted under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), Idaho Code§§ 22-4501 et
8

seq., and the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 et seq. Id.
9

10

Since moving the composting operation from the Merrill property to the Smith property,·

11

Ada County has demanded on several more occasions that Gibson and/or Smith obtain a

12

conditional use permit from Ada County. (Emmons Aff., Bxs. A 1 B, C.) In response to the most

13

recent demand, Smith responded by restating his earlier assertions that Ada County's

14

requirement of a conditional use permit was void under the RTFA arid LLUPA. (Emmons Aff.,

15

Ex. D.) Smith stated: "I have no desire to apply for orto secure a conditional use permit for this

16

property, and do respectfully decline your invitation to do so .... " Id.
17

Gibson confirms that he has n.ever obtained a conditional use permit, and has no intention
18
19

to apply to Ada County for approval to conduct his composting business. According to Gibson,

20

Ada County does not have the authority to enforce any requirement for approval for the same

21

reasons asserted by Smith. (See September 30, 2010 Affidavit of David R. Gibson ,r 14). Gibson

22

continues to operate a composting facility on the Smith property without any form of approval

23

from Ada County.

24

25
26
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Gibson acknowledges that thousands of cubic yards of composting material were moved
1
2
3

from the Merrill property to the Smith property and that he has produced thousands more yards
of composting material on the Smith property. (Gibson Aft: ,r 9.)
On February 8, 2010, Ada County filed this action against Smith. On March 15, 2010,

4

5

Smith filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. Smith denies that Ada County has authority to

6

require a conditional use permit. An Amended Complaint was filed on June 8, 2010 which added

7

Victoria H. Smith and the Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Sr. as defendants (along with Vernon K.

8

Smith, Jr., hereinafter "the Defendants'')6. Gibson has not been named as a defendant. Ada
9

County seeks to enjoin the composting operation until Ada County has approved a conditional
10

use permit for the composting operation on the Smith property.
On August 16, 2010, Ada County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a

12

13

Memorandum in Support and affidavits and accompanying exhibits of Tammy Emmons and

14

Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney Heather McCarthy. On September 13, 2010, the

15

Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment along with a Memorandum in

16

Opposition to Ada County's Motion and in Support of Defendants Motion. On September 30,
17
7

2010, the Defendants filed the Affidavits of Gibson and Smith. Ada County filed a Reply
18
19

20

Memorandum in Support of Motion and Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion on October
6, 2010. Also on October 6, Ada County filed a Motion to Strike some portions of both Smith's

21
22
23
6

It does not appear that the Defendants have filed an answer to the Amended Complaint.

24

7 It appears that the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, Opposition Memorandum and supporting affidavits

25

were all filed late in violation ofl.R.C.P. 56(c). As the matters have been fully briefed and argued, as an exercise of
its discretion, the Court will consider the materials, even if filed late.

26
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1

2

3.

and Gibson's affidavits. Counsel for Ada County has stated that the Court can rule on their
Motion for Summary Judgment without deciding the Motion to Strike.
On October 13, 2010, the Court heard oral argument on the cross-motions for summary

4

judgment. Heather M. McCarthy, Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, appeared and
5

argued on behalf of Ada County. Vernon K. Smith appeared and argued on behalf of the
6

7

Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement.
Standard of Review

8
9

10
11

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving

12

party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Farm
13

Bureau Ins. Co. ofIdaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, _ , 234 P.3d 739, 742 (2010) (citing Van v.
14

15

Portneu/Med Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556,212 P.3d 982,986 (2009)). The court must construe the

16

facts in favor of the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.

17

Id Where reasonable minds could reach different factual conclusions, then the.motion must be

18

denied. Id "The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not

19

change the applicable standard of review, and ... [the court] must evaluate each party's motion

20

on its own merits." Id (quoting lntermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. la. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho

21

233,235, 31 P.3d 921,923 (2001).
22

23
24

25
26
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Discussion
1

The Smith property is zoned as a "Rural Preservation District" (RP). The allowed uses

2
3

within a RP District are set forth in ACC § 8-2A-3. A "commercial composting facility''is an

4

allowed "conditional" use in a RP District. Id. at Table 8-2A-1. A "commercial composting

5

facility'' is defined as a: "[ f]acility for the large scale production of compost intended for sale

6

7

and use on premises other than where such compost is produced." ACC § 8-lA-l. However,
because a commercial composting facility is a conditional use, the zoning ordinance requires

8

approval in the form of a conditional use permit to operate a commercial composting facility in a
9

RP District. ACC § 8-2A-3-C. The requirements for a conditional use permit are set forth in
10 ·

11

ACC § 8-5-3-29. 8
There is no dispute that Gibson's composting facility is located within a Rural

12
13

Preservation District. There is also no dispute that the compost product Gibson produces is

14

intended to be sold and used on premises other than where he produces it. (Gibson Aff. at p. 5,

15
16
17
18

8

"COMPOSTING FACILITY, COMMERCIAL:

19

A. The use shall comply with all applicable regulations pertaining to designation, licensing, and maintenance of
commercial composting facilities including, but not limited to, federal, state, and local statutes, rules, and/or
ordinances. .
·

20

B. Grass composting shall only be allowed when the applicant can demonstrate that the use will not cause undue

adverse impacts on surrounding properties.
21
22
23

C. All structures, outdoor storage areas, or any areas where compost is stored shall be located a minimum of one
hundred feet (I 00') from any residential district and shall meet the standards of section 8-5-3-78, "Outdoor
Storage"~ of this chapter.
D. For the purposes of this subsection, compost material shall not be considered a fertilizer, and shall not be
restricted by section 8-4A-16, "Outdoor Storage Of Chemicals And Fertilizers", of this title.

24
25
26

B. The site for the composting facility shall be maintained in an orderly manner so as not to create a public nuisance, (Ord. 389 1
6-14-2000)." ACC § 8-5-3-29.
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9.) Ada County asserts that Gibson's operation is a "large scale production." The Defendants do
1
2

not appear to take issue with that position. Indeed, the Defendants state that Gibson's operation

3

produces thousands of yards of compost product on the Smith property, The Defendants argue

4

that the requirement of a conditional use permit is unenforceable as discussed below.

5

6

A. The Right to Farm Act
"Right-to-farm" laws have been enacted in all states. Neil D. Hamilton, Right to Farm

7

Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances

a
May Be Ineffective, 3 Drake J.. Agric. L. 103, 103-04 (1998). These laws were intended to
9

10

provide legal protection to farmers whose operations were challenged as public or private

11

nuisances by individuals who moved into rural areas and by political subdivisions that expanded

12

into farming areas. Id. See also Whittedv. Canyon County Board ofComm'rs, 137 Idaho 118,

13

124, 44 P.3d 1173, 1179 (2002) ("The Right to Farm Act codified in Idaho Code Title 22,

14

Chapter 45 seeks to reduce the loss of agricultural operations by limiting the circumstances

15

whereby the operations may be deemed a nuisance. I.C. § 22-4501. The Act protects existing

16

agricultural operations from being declared a nuisance so long as the operation is not improper or
17

negligent. I.C. § 22-4503. The Act prevents the adoption of ordinances or resolutions declaring as
18
19

20
21
22
23

a nuisance any agricultural operations operated in accordance with generally recognized
agricultural practices. LC. § 22-4504.").
The policy behind Idaho's RTFA is expressed in Idaho Code§ 22-4501 which includes
the following broad language: "[t]he legislature also finds that the right to farm is a natural right
and is recognized as a permitted use throughout the state ofidaho." Idaho Code § 22-4501. The

24

Defendants emphasize the above language, and argue that it supports their position that the
25

26
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production of compost is encompassed within a "right to fann", and that a composting operation
1
2

is a "natural right" and a "pennitted use." (See Defs.' Mem. 14, 16.)
Idaho's RTFA provides that an agricultural operation shall not be or become a public or

3
4

private nuisance by any changes in the surrounding area. Idaho Code§ 22-4503. 9 Ada County

5

does not allege that the composting operation is a public or private nuisance. Idaho's RTFA also

6

7

provides that no county can declare any agricultural operation a nuisance if that operation follows
generally recognized agricultural practices. Idaho Code § 22-4504. 10 Ada County does not claim

8

that the composting operation is a nuisance.
9

Idaho Code § 22-4504 has a further prohibition which provides as follows:

10

No . . . political subdivision of this
declares any agricultural operation
recognized agricultural practices to
ordinance that forces the closure
adopted.

11

12

13
14
15

state shall adopt any ordinance . . . that
operated in accordance with generally
be a nuisance nor shall any zoning
of any such agricultural operation be

Idaho Code § 22-4504 (emphasis supplied). Under this provision, and separate from any nuisance
issues, Ada County would be prohibited from adoJlting a zoning ordinance that forces the closure

16
17

18

9

25

uNo agricultural operation or an appurtenance to it shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by
any changed conditions in or about the surrounding nonagricultural. activities after the same has been in
operation for more than one (1) year, when the operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began;
provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the improper
or negligent operation of any agricultural operation or an appurtenance to it. In the event of an alleged
nuisance resulting from agricultural operations pursuant to a federal or state environmental permit or caused
by a violation of the pennit(s), terms or conditions, the affected party shall seek enforcement of the terms of
the permit." Idaho Code§ 22-4503.
10
"No city, county, taxing district or other political subdivision of this state shall adopt any ordinance or resolution
that declares any agricultural operation operated in accordance with generally recognized agricultural practices to be
a nuisance nor shall any zoning ordinance that forces the closure of any such agricultural operation be adopted.
Zoning and nuisance ordinances shall not apply to agricultural operations that were established outside the COIJl0rate
limits of a municipality and then were inco!Jlorated into the mnnicipality by annexation. The county planning and
zoning authority may adopt a nuisance waiver procedure to be recorded with the county recorder or appropriate
county recording authority pursuant to residential divisions of property." Idaho Code § 22-4504.

26
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21
22
23

24
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l

2

of an "agricultural operation" being operated in accordance with generally recognized
agricultural practices.

3

The parties disagree as to whether Gibson's composting activities meets the definition of
4

an "agricultural operation." The relevant definition is found in § 22-4502:
5

Definitions. - As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agricultural operation" includes, without limitation, any facility for the
growing, raising or production of agricultural, horticultural and viticultural crops
and vegetable products of the soil, poultry and poultry products, livestock, field
grains, seeds, hay, apiary and dairy products, and the processing for commercial
purposes of livestock or agricultural commodities, including the processing of
such commodities into food commodities.

6

7
8
9

10
11

Idaho Code§ 12-4502(1). Ada County contends that Gibson's composting activities are,not
included as any of the above types of activities that qualify as an "agricultural operation." Ada

12

County argues that the closest compost product comes to fitting in the definition is as
13

"agricultural commodities" which is not defined in the RTFA. However, Ada County points the
14

15

Court to four other statutes where this phrase is defined, Compost is not included in any of those

16

definitions. ll (Pl.'s Reply 5.) Further, Ada County contends that although Gibson's composting

17

product may be a certified soil or plant amendment product, "it is not in and of itself an

18

'agricultural operation' , .. [but] is more akin to the production of a fertilizer than the production

19
20
21
22

11

25

Idaho Code § 22-5005(3) defines "agricultural commodities" as "plant products including any horticultural
product." Idaho Code§ 25-2712(3) defines it as including "whole seed, hay, straw, stover, silage, cobs, husks, and
huils which are adulterated within the meaning of section 25-2702, Idaho Code.'' Idaho Code § 69-202(1) defines it
as "any grain, wheat, barley, oats, com, rye, oilseedsi dry edible beans, peas, lentils and other leguminous seeds and
feeds (not including minerals or seed crops) or any other commodity as determined by the director," Idaho Code§
69-502(1) defines the phrase as "any grain, wheat, barley, oats, com, rye, oilseeds, dry edible beans, peas, lentils and
other leguminous seeds and feeds (not including minerals or seed crops).

26
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of the plant itself." 12 (Pl.'s Reply 7.) Gibson states that the composting product is "organic in
1
2

nature, composed to generate biological nutrients, to benefit all aspects of agriculture,

3

horticulture, viticulture, crops, vegetables, soil prepara\ion, soil amendments, restore depleted

4

soil nutrients and enhance the processing of all agricultural commodities." (Gibson Aff. 1 11.)

5

Ada County contends that Gibson's composting activities, by his own description, is used to

6

enhanc~ agricultural operations, but is not itself an agricultural operation.

7

The Defendants stake out a broader position and argue that the RTFA protects all
8

activities closely related to or in support of an agricultural purpose. The Defendants state, for
9

10

example, that"[c]omposting materials and a composting process is an agricultural pursuit by

11

definition, and would be consistent with an agricultural activity on agricultural lands." (Defs.'

12

Mem.13.)

13

14
15

16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23

24

12

Plant and soil amendments are defined in Idaho Code§ 22-2203:
(30) "Plant amendment" means any natural or synthetic substance applied to plants or seeds which
is intended to improve germination, growth, yield, product quality, reproduction, flavor or other
desirable characteristics of plants except commercial fertilizers soil amendments, limes,
unmanipulated animal manure and vegetable organic waste-derived materials, pesticides, mulch
and other materials which may be exempted by rule.
(34) Soil amendment" means:
(a) Any substance which is intended to improve the physical, chemical, or biological
characteristics of the soil to favor plant growth; or
(b) Any material which is represented as having a primary function of enhancing, changing or
modifying soil microorganism reproduction, activity or population, or material which is
represented as having the primary funcdon of fonning or stabilizing soil aggregates in soil to
which it is to be applied and thereby improving the resistance of the soil to the slaking action of
water, increasing the soil's water and air permeability or infiltration, improving the resistance of
the surface of the soil to crusting, improving ease of cultivation of soil, or otherwise favorably
modifying the structural or physical properties of soil; and
(c) "Soil amendment" does not include commercial fertilizers, plant amendments, limes, gypsum
unmanipulated animal manures and vegetable organic waste-derived materials, pesticides, mulch
and other materials which may be exempted by rule of the department.

25
26
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While the defendants' briefing does not attempt to define Gibson's operations in terms of
1

2

the statutory definition of "agricultural operation," at oral argument the Defendants did assert that

3

the micro organisms involved in composting are equivalent to "livestock" thereby attempting to

4

qualify Gibson's composting activities as an "agricultural operation." Blacks Law Dictionary

5

defines "livestock" as:

6

Domestic animals and fowls that (1) are kept for profit or pleasure, (2) can
normally be confined within boundaries without seriously impairing their utility,
and (3) do not normally intrude on others' land in such a way as to harm the land
or growing crops.

7
8
9

10

Blacks Law Dictionary 952 (8th ed. 2004). In light of the definition, and common sense, the
Defendants' argument that composting is equivalent to the raising of livestock, while creative, is

11

not convincing.
12

The Defendants argue for a broad construction of the RTFA such that any activity related
13
14

15

to agriculture could not be prohibited, much less regulated. Although the term "agriculture" does
seem to be widely encompassing, 13 and the RTFA does express a strong policy statement in favor

16

of agricultural activities, such activities are not without limit. However, the statute specifically

17

refers to an "agriculture operation" not to "any operations related to agriculture". Gibson's

18

composting operations are related to agriculture, but the Court will find that Gibson's

19

composting facility does not constitute an "agriculture operation" as that term is defined in Idaho

20·

Code§ 22-4502. Accordingly, the Court will find that the RTFA does not prohibit Ada County
21
22
23

13

24

raising livestock. Blacks Law dictionary 76 (8 th ed. 2004). Further, "Agriculture is broader in meaning than
'farming'; and while it includes the preparation of soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and

25

all their incidents. it also includes gardening, horticulture, viticulture dairying·, poultry, bee raising, and ranching."
Id. (quoting 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agriculture§ I at 934-35 (1986)).
·

26
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from enforcing its zoning ordinance to require Gibson and/or Smith to have a conditional use
1
2
3

permit to operate the composting facility.
Further, the Court will observe that the quoted portion ofldaho Code § 22-4504 only

4

prohibits a county from adopting a zoning ordinance that would force the closure of an existing

5

agricultural operation. In this case, Ada County is not seeking to enforce its zoning ordinance to

6

close a commercial composting operation. Rather, Ada County seeks to enforce a requirement

7

that Gibson and/or Smith obtain .a conditional use permit. The Court will find that there is
8

nothing within the RTFA that forbids adoption of a zoning:ordinance that requires a conditional
9

10

use permit for a commercial composting facility.

11

B. Local Land Use Planning Act

12

LLUPA was enacted in 1975 to provide cities and counties, as opposed to other units of

13

local government, with broad regulatory authority over planning and zoning. Worley Hwy. Dist.

14

V. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 835-36, 663 P.2.d 1135, 1137-38 (Ct. App. 1983). LLUPA

15

•

'

permits cities and counties to adopt a zoning ordinance which provides for one or more zoning

16

districts, as well as standards which apply uniformly within each zoning district. Idaho Code §
17

67-6511.
18
19
20

21
22
23

LLUPA provides in part;
Applicability to agricultural land - Counties may regulate siting of certain animal
operations and facilities. - (I) No power granted hereby shall be construed to
empower a board of county commissioners to enact any ordinance or resolution
which deprives any owner of full and complete use of agricultural land for
production of any agricultural product. Agricultural land shall be defined by local
ordinance or resolution.

24

25
26
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II
I

Ji

,I

Idaho Code§ 67-6529. The Defendants argue that Ada County's zoning ordinance, by requiring a
1
2

conditional use permit for a connnercial composting facility, violates the above restriction, and

3

cannot be enforced. Ada County contends that Gibson is not producing an 'agricultural product."

4

The Ada County Code defines "agricultural land" as follows: "AGRICULTURAL

5
6

LAND, PRIME: Land that contains class I, II, or III agricultural soils as defined by the natural
resources conservation service." ACC § 8-lA-1. The Ada County Code also defines the term

7

"agricultural industry'' as follows: "AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY: Agricultural industries
8

shall include, but not be limited to, the following: connnercial composting facility, meatpacking
9

10

facility, processing plant for agricultural and dairy products, and slaughterhouse." By having

11

different definitions for "agricultural land" and "agricultural industry'' it appears that Ada County

12

chose to define a commercial composting facility as something other than agricultural land.

13

LLUPA does not provide a definition for "agricultural product". However, this term is

14

defined in Idaho Code § 22-2602(a) as follows: "The term 'agricultural product' shall include

15

horticultural, viticultural, forestry, diary, livestock, poultry, bee and any farm products." "Farm

16

products" is not defined in this section but is defined in Idaho Code§ 22-2005(21), which
17

provides that : '"Farm product' includes, but is not limited to, every agricultural, horticultural,
18
19
20
21

22
23

viticultural, apicultural, floricultural and vegetable product, including honey bees." It does not
appear that compost falls under the definition of"agricultural product."
Idaho Code§ 67-6529 must be construed harmoniously with other provisions ofLLUPA.
Olson v. Ada County, 105 Idaho 18, 20,665 P.2d 717,719 (1983). The purposes ofLLUPA are

set forth in Idaho Code§ 67-6502 which provides as follows:

24
25
26
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The purpose of this act shall be to promote the health, safety, and general welfare
of the people of the state ofldaho as follows:

1

2
3

(a) To protect property rights while making accommodations for other necessary
types of development such as low-cost housing and mobile home parks.

4

(b) To ensure that adequate public facilities and services are provided to the
people at reasonable cost.

5

(c) To ensure that the economy of the state and localities is protected.
6

(d) To ensure that the important environmental features of the state and localities
are protected.

7
8

(e) To encourage the protection of prime agricultural, forestry, and mining lands
for production of food,'fibre, and minerals.

9

10

(f) To encourage urban and urban-type development within incorporated cities.

11

(g) To avoid undue concentration of population and overcrowding of land.

12
13

(h) To ensure that the development on land is commensurate with the physical
characteristics of the land.

14

(i) To protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and disasters.

15

(j) To protect fish, wildlife, and recreation resources.

16

(k) To avoid undue water and air pollution.
17

(1) To allow local school districts to participate in the community planning and
development process so as to address public school needs and impacts on an
ongoing basis.
·

18

19
20

Idaho Code§ 67-6502. Reading these sections together, the Supreme Court concluded, "it is

21

. clear

22

agricultural purposes a carte blanche exemption from all county zoning ordinances." Olson, at

23

21, 665 P .2d at 720. In the same vein, even ifldaho Code § 67-6529 did apply to Gibson's

24

that the legislature did not intend to give agricultural land allegedly being used for

composting operation, the legislature did not intend for Gibson to have a carte blanche

25
26
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exemption from Ada County's zoning ordinance. The Court concludes that there is nothing in
·1

2
3

LLUPA that prohibits Ada County from requiring a conditional use permit for the operation of a
commercial composting facility.

4

C. Estoppel

5

Lastly, the Defendants argue there are equitable reasons that prohibit Ada County from

6

7

requiring a conditional use permit. In their answer, these facts appear to be alleged in support of
defenses of estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or !aches. (Defs.' Answer 9, ,r 6.) The Defendants,

8

however, do not explicitly argue or brief these issues, but instead only point tp some facts (prior
9

10

11
12

unenforcement and subsequent carrying on of the operations) that may give rise to an estoppel
theory.
Ada County cites to two Washington state cases to support the basic proposition that Ada

13

County's alleged failure to enforce its zoning code in the past does not bar it from enforcing it

H

now. (Pl.'s Reply 3.); see Dykstra v. County ofSkagit, 97 Wash. App. 670, 677, 985 P.2d 424,

15

428 (1999) (stating that "(g]overmnental entities are not precluded from enforcing ordinances

16

even though they may have been improperly enforced in the past" and "[t]he govermnental
17

zoning power may not be forfeited by the action of local officers in disregard of the statute and
18

19
20

21
22
23

ordinance"); Miller v. City ofBainbridge Island, 111 Wash. App. 152, 165-66, 43 P.3d 1250,
1256-57 (2002).

In Idaho '" ordinarily the doctrine[ s] oflaches and estoppel may not be invoked against a
municipality on account of the action or inaction or conduct of its public officers. This, however,
is more especially true with reference to their acts and conduct in govermnental and purely

24

municipal affairs."' Harrell v. City ofLewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 248, 506 P.2d 470,475 (1973)
25
26
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(quoting Dalton Highway Dist. ofKootenai County v. Sowder, 88 Idaho 556,561,401 P.2d 813,
1
2

815 (1965)). A municipality acts in its governmental capacity when it enacts and enforces zoning

3

regulations. Id. In Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,200, 207 P.3d 169, 176 (2009), the

4

Supreme Court suggested that estoppel could apply in the context of zoning enforcement if

5

"exigent circumstances" existed.

6

Here, the Court concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the defense of

7

estoppel/laches. Gibson has known of the conditional use permit requirement since at least 1991.
8

He concluded erroneously that the requirement did not apply to his composting operation, and
9

10
11

has decided he will not seek a permit. At best, it appears that Ada County delayed enforcement
for a long period. 14 However, during this same time Ada County has repeatedly informed Gibson

12

that he needed a conditional use permit. Gibson and Smith erroneously concluded that Ada

13

County cannot require a conditional use permit and they have chosen to ignore the zoning

14

ordinance requirement. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gibson and

15

Smith, the Defendants cannot make out a case for estoppel or !aches. By the same token, the

16

Defendants cannot create their own exigent circumstances by ignoring repeated demands to
17

comply with the valid and enforceable requirement to obtain a conditional use permit.
18

Conclusion

19

There is no genuine issue of material fact that: 1) Smith's property is being used for a

20
21

.commercial composting facility; 2) because Smith's property is zoned Rural Preservation, the

22

25

Gibson indicates in his affidavit that Ada County had during this time agreed with his position. (See Gibson Aff. ,r,r
14-17.) However, affidavits must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. I.R.C.P. 56(e). As a
preliminary matter, the Court must determine the admissibility of this portion of Gibson's affidavit. See, e.g., Cates
v. Albertson's Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 1033-34, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226-27 (1995), The Court concludes that this portion
would be inadmissible because it lacks foundation.

26
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Ada County zoning ordinance requires a c.onditional use pennit for a commercial composting
1
2

3

facility; and 3) Ada County has not issued a conditional use pennit for the commercial
composting facility located Smith's property. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary

4

judgment in favor of Ada County and deny summary judgment as requested by the Defendants.

5

Counsel for Ada County is directed to submit an appropriate fonn of judgment.

6

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

~o

day of November 2010.

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23

24
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF

TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CV0C-1503540
)
MEMORANDUM IN
)
)
SUPPORT OF MOTION
)
TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
)
PURSUANT TO IDAHO
)
CODE §39-108(4) AND
)
LC. §22-4502
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION

The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has filed their First
Amended Complaint, to the effect the Agency has the authority, jurisdiction, and power to
regulate the operational activities and site locations of the composting operations on the
property described in the Amended Complaint, being agricultural land upon which these
"composting operations" have been ongoing for many years, where there is only grass
clippings and leaves being processed in this composting activity on the premises for future
use for soil amendment and plant foliar purposes, not as a "waste disposal" site or operation.
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NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY WITH DEQ
DEQ makes reference to such term of "solid waste" on page 4, Par. 13 of their
Amended Complaint that "grass clippings and leaves", are or should be among the
substances within the definition of"solid waste"; whether using the statutory definition or
their IDAPA definition of"solid waste".
DEQ has been familiar with these composting operations conducted by Mr. David
R, Gibson ever since involvement with him that began in 1992. He has been engaged in
the process of generating composted substances and products ever since the early l 970's,
and has been composting in several locations within Ada County since 1974.
He has been located for the past twenty-eight (28) years in the area generally
referred to as the Gowen Field Desert Front property, beginning in 1988 when he first
leased a parcel of property owned by the State of Idaho. This area is south of Gowen
Field, and immediately south of the Boise Municipal Airport, off Pleasant Valley Road,
and currently located half mile west of the Pleasant Valley Road, in that area since 1988.
He has conducted composting operations continuously in that immediate area
effectively since 1988, and continues to do so in the same manner to the present date on
that specific location described in the Amended Complaint since August 2004. He has
conducted that business under the name of Black Diamond Compost Products for many
years, and is registered with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), having
registered his product with them as IDOA requested, and has been under their jurisdiction
and regulation concerning his composting activities and operations.
Mr. Gibson has been familiar with various agencies over the many years,
including the Ada County Developmental Services, DEQ, Fire District agencies, landfill
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agency, Central District Health, IDOA, and the Ada County Code Enforcement
personnel, and in recent years involved with a dispute with Ada County over the
enforcement of the statewide "permitted use" of lands used in conjunction with
agricultural operations and activities, including composting activities, as described in LC.
§22-4501, stating that "The legislature also finds that the right to farm is a natural right
and is recognized as a permitted use throughout the state ofIdaho."
There exists a statewide permitted use for any agricultural activities and
operations recognized under the Right to Farm Act (enacted in 1981) and the Plant and
Soil Amendment Act (enacted in 2001 ), and with respect to those enactments, Mr.
Gibson has been involved in various litigation proceedings over the years regarding
compost sites and composting, and whether he was required to secure a conditional use
permit (CUP) from any county agency for the operations he conducted. These operations
have been protected by the language contained in the Local Land Use Planning Act, as
announced in l.C.§67-6529, which states:
67-6529. APPLICABILITY TO AGRICULTURAL LAND -- COUNTIES MAY
REGULATE SITING OF CERTAIN ANIMAL OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES. (I)
No power granted hereby shall be construed to empower a board of county
commissioners to enact any ordinance or resolution which deprives any owner offull and
complete use of agricultural land for production of any agricultural product. Agricultural
land shall be defined by local ordinance or resolution. (emphasis added)
These operations have most recently been addressed in the controversy with Ada
County over what this statutorily recognized "statewide" grant of a "permitted use" of
land, thereby pre-empting any county attempt to impose any conditional use permit,
involving such agricultural operations, and composting had been declared as specifically
included within the use of land that was zoned for agriculture, and Mr. Gibson's
operations have always been conducted on agricultural land, and was being operated as a
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composting operation and facility on those premises, as well as this specific location as
described in the Amended Complaint.
His operations have been unconditionally defined and declared to be an engaged
agricultural activity in accordance with each of those above Acts; and Ada County
questioned that statewide permitted use in 2009, having a mis-placed perception that
composting activities could be subject to the County's issuance of a conditional use
permit (CUP), which was finally resolved in favor of the pre-emptive effects of the
statutory enactments that allowed statewide permitted use on all such agricultural lands
for such composting purposes. Composting activities have been protected continuously
ever since the Right to Farm Act came into effect in 1981, coupled with the enactment of
the Plant and Soil Amendment Act in 200 I, and the clarification amendment that was
enacted in 2011, and the clarifying effects rendered it retroactive to the initial enactment
in 1981.
The positive aspect of that Statewide permitted use, versus a conditional use,
served to bring forth the clarifying amendment to the Right to Farm Act by the Idaho
Legislature in 2011, undertaken to emphasize and strengthen what was originally meant
and intended for the Act to protect and to have included in its definition of activities, to
always encompass composting activities, and upon that clarifying language to the Right
to Farm Act in 20 I I, it confirmed that protection by the inclusion of additional specific
language consistent ·with what was contained in the legislative enactment ofldaho' s Plant
and Soil Amendment Act in 2001, along with their inter-relationship and correlation with
the Land Use Planning Act in effect in Idaho since 1975.
It was only upon the conclusion of that controversy with Ada County in 2013 that
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Mr. Gibson was contacted by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which
has given rise to this pending controversy over the regulatory authority of DEQ in the
activities of composting facilities, and the limitations of any alleged voilation.
Mr. Gibson had been continually observed by the Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) as his operations have been on-going openly since his
operations begun in 1974, and he had direct contact with that Agency after he located to
the Gowen Field Desert Front area following his locating to that area in 1988.
The DEQ first made contact with Mr. Gibson in 1992, at which time he was told
by DEQ and Central District Health officials he needed their "conditional Use Permit"
issued from DEQ, claiming their Agency could regulate his operations. It was upon that
pretense, in the spirit of cooperation, Mr. Gibson agreed to apply for and immediately
received from DEQ their conditional use permit to conduct his on-going composting
facilities, even though his understanding of the applicable laws suggested otherwise.
Mr. Gibson understood from officials at the Department of Agriculture that he did
not need any DEQ agency permission to conduct any agricultural operations, which
included plant and crop residue composting activities on agricultural land, and what he
was doing had been deemed a "permitted use" statewide under the Right to Farm Act
(RTFA) and the Plant and Soil Amendment Act (PASAA).
This business activity has always been defined as an "agricultural operation", as it
1s specifically defined by I.C.§22-4502(2), which included the clarifying amendment.
None of Mr. Gibson's operations involved any materials intended for disposal at any site,
as the composted materials are specifically produced for use as a soil amendment or plant
humus additive for foliar plant growth in agricultural production.
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Additionally his operations have been regarded to be among "grandfathered"
activities, as all of his operations pre-dated any of DEQ's rule-making processes and
procedures. He has been conducting an agricultural operation under the Right to Farm
Act, (1981) as well as under the Plant and Soil Amendment Act, when taking effect in
2001, each of which remain under the jurisdiction and authority of the Department of
Agriculture (IDOA), and nothing he has undertaken was ever deemed to be hazardous
substances found to be harmful to human or animal health or the environment, and
nothing he had ever com[posted was to be disposed of or placed as a solid waste at any
waste management disposal site, as everything he produced was intended for a
subsequent agricultural application on fields and plants.
Mr. Gibson's operations have never been declared to require involvement from
DEQ or any basis for DEQ intervention. All of Mr. Gibson's registration and operational
activities have been deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Department, as
he has always been so informed by the various personnel with the Agriculture
Department over the years.
Notwithstanding his beliefs and what he was told by the Agriculture Department,
111

1992, Mr. Gibson applied for and secured the conditional use permit from

DEQ/Central District Health, and when it was issued, he was then told their permit was in
perpetuity, and he did not need to re-apply or renew what was given to him by that
Agency.
Thereafter, following 1992, new "rules" were being considered by DEQ, and it
related to what manner that Agency was then intending to regulate and treat solid waste
management at various disposal sites of various substances, which came to be identified in
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their I.D.A.P .A mies concern mg "solid waste", identified as the IDAPA Rules and
Regulations 58.01.06 et seq.
Mr. Gibson then spoke with DEQ officials about the situation and their management

intentions, and Mr. Gibson was specifically told by the personnel he spoke to at DEQ that he
did not need to worry about or attend any of those discussions or meetings, as nothing in
regard to his operation, or the conditional use permit they had before given him would
change in any manner.
Thereafter in the year 1993, DEQ personnel came on site and conducted an
"inspection" of his operation, which was attended by various officials, including two
individuals he personally knew, being Dr. Ronald Baird (Central District Health) and Mr.
Dave Neal (Ada County landfill operations). The third person was a DEQ agent, and
represented himself to be the Agency's representative. That on-site inspection confirmed
that what he was doing did not require any change in what his operations were, or how he
was conducting those operations.
Thereafter, in late 1994 or early 1995, there was another inspection conducted by
DEQ, and that inspection included two of the same individuals, along with others from DEQ
and what was said was they wanted to confirm there was no contamination from the
possibility of other substances that could potentially arrive at the facility, along with the
grass and leaf materials. They confirmed and acknowledged Mr. Gibson was processing
only grass clippings and leaves, brought to him by landscapers, various yard tenders
operating throughout the sununer season, and the annual delivery of leaves delivered to the
premises by ACHD, which leaf materials had been swept from the streets of Boise by
ACHD.
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That on-site inspection confirmed nothing had changed, and DEQ personnel were
satisfied with what they observed. That during that 1994-95 inspection, the DEQ personnel
stated to Mr. Gibson, while in the presence of Mr. Garth Sickles, there would be no further
inspections of those composting operations, as DEQ officials were satisfied the operations
were as they had always been, and Mr. Gibson was processing only grass and leaf materials,
and that type of plant residue was of no concern to them, and acknowledged the materials
were not intended to be disposed at any disposal site, and recognized the substances were to
be used for an agricultural purposes at a future date.
DEQ officials confirmed the materials were not, and would never become, an
environmental concern. Mr. Gibson did not hear from anyone associated with Health &
Welfare, DEQ, or Central District Health until receiving a letter from DEQ on April 2, 2013,
which followed the controversy with Ada County that came to confirm no conditional use
permit (CUP) was required through Ada County to operate a compost site on agricultural
land within Ada County.
The nature and effects of Mr. Gibson's composting operations on any of the
locations operated by Mr. Gibson have not changed in any manner since each of his
operations commenced in 1974. This particular location, as described in the Amended
Complaint, became an expansion operation of his existing composting operations in 2004,
and expansions are authorized by LC. §22-4502(2)(a), and this particular expansion was
located across the access roadway from the prior composting operation commenced by Mr.
Gibson in 1991, which DEQ inspected in 1993 and then 1994-95, as stated above, and the
operation on this current expansion location is identical to the location he commenced in
1991.
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DEQ has been familiar with this current expansion location since it was commenced
in 2004, as it has been perceived to have been an expansion of the 1991 location under the
Right to Fann Act, as cited above. This current composting location is the operation
described in the Amended Complaint, and has been in continuous operation since August,
2004. DEQ was well aware of it for the nine years prior to Mr. Gibson receiving the letter
from DEQ dated April 2, 2013.
The provisions of I. C. §39-108( 4) identifies a specific statute of limitations that is
imposed by the Idaho legislature upon DEQ, with respect to any belated claims whereby
DEQ is asserting any right to impose penalties or fines by the DEQ Agency for any alleged
violations of their regulations. DEQ has been aware of Mr. Gibson's operations in Ada
County no later than 1992, and Mr. Gibson has been located in the Gowen Field Desert
Front area since 1988, and there can be no dispute DEQ has been aware of his operations
since no later than 1992, as DEQ became directly involved in soliciting his participation in
their permitting process in 1992, thereafter in their inspection process in I 993, and then
again in 1994-95. He has never been held to be in violation of anything at any time by DEQ,
and DEQ has continuously known of his operations and activities since no later than 1992,
and they have declined to conduct any other inspections since 1994-95, saying none were
ever again needed to be conducted.
This April 2, 2013 letter from DEQ, received twenty years after the initial operation
were inspected in 1992, referred to their attempt to inspect on March 29, 2013; the DEQ
Amended Complaint states that DEQ "attempted to conduct an inspection" (see Amended
Complaint, P. 3, Par. I 0) and from that "attempted inspection" DEQ alleges: "the
Department staff was able to observe from the public roadway and the driveway prior to any
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gate or fence, large piles and Vvindrows of grass clippings, leaves, and other organic
materials ... "; that nothing in that "observation" from DEQ's "attempted inspection" serves
to identify the presence of any waste disposal activity, or reflect any violation of any solid
waste management rules and regulations that pertain to a composting operation. Nothing has
changed in the nature of the operations since commencing in 1974.
The two year statute of limitations as provided for in I. C. §39-108(4) would have
expired 10 times over, if the alleged violation is claimed to have existed and accrued since
1992, as nothing in the operation has not changed in any manner or fashion whatsoever
since their on-site inspection in 1992. That is confirmed by the subsequent inspections in
1993 and 1994-95.

If the accrual ofDEQ's "alleged" violation is claimed to have accrued on March 29,
2013, in light of the observation from the attempted inspection, they have not identified it as
being anything outside of their own declared exceptions and exemptions to their own
IDAPA Rules and Regulations. If there was any violation taking place on March 29, 2013, it
would have been in existence in 1992, in 1993, and during the last actual "inspection" in
1994-95, as everything is as it was over twenty years ago, as the operation has not changed
or been conducted in any manner inconsistent with the ongoing process that was actually
observed during the 1992, 1993, and the I 994-95 inspections, when they also observed this
operation to be a composting process of grass clippings and leaves, which has been the same
for over four decades. The relevant statute oflimitations states:
39-108. INVESTIGATION -- INSPECTION -- RIGHT OF ENTRY -VIOLATION -- ENFORCEMENT -- PENALTY -- INJUNCTIONS. (1) The director
shall cause investigations to be made upon receipt of information concerning an
alleged violation of this act or of any rule, permit or order promulgated thereunder,
and mav cause to be made such other investigations as the director shall deem
advisable.
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(2) For the purpose of enforcing any prov1S1on of this chapter or any rule
authorized in this chapter, the director or the director's designee shall have the authority
to:
(a) Conduct a program of continuing surveillance and of regular or periodic inspection of
actual or potential environmental hazards, air contamination sources, water pollution
sources and of solid waste disposal sites;
(b) Enter at all reasonable times upon any private or public property, upon presentation
of appropriate credentials, for the purpose of inspecting or investigating to ascertain
possible violations of this act or of rules, permits or orders adopted and promulgated by
the director or the board;
(c) All inspections and investigations conducted under the authority of this chapter
shall be performed in conformity with the prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United States

and section 17, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho. The state shall not,
under the authority granted by this chapter, conduct warrantless searches of private
property in the absence of either consent from the property owner or occupier or
exigent circumstances such as a public health or environmental emergency;

(d) Any district court in and for the county in which the subiect property is located is
authorized to issue a search warrant to the director upon a showing of (i) probable

cause to suspect a violation, or (ii) the existence ofa reasonable program o(inspection.
Anv search warrant issued under the authority oft/tis chapter shall be limited in scope
to the specific purposes for which it is issued and shall state with specificity the manner
and the scope of the search authorized.

(3) Whenever the director determines that any person is in violation of any
provision ofthis act or any rule, permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this
act, the director may commence either of the following:
(a) Administrative enforcement action.
(i) Notice. The director may commence an administrative enforcement action by issuing
a written notice of violation. The notice of violation shall identify the alleged violation
with specificity, shall specify each provision of the act, rule, regulation, permit or order
which has been violated and shall state the amount of civil penalty claimed for each
violation. The notice of violation shall inform the person to whom it is directed of an
opportunity to confer with the director or the director's designee in a compliance
conference concerning the alleged violation. A written response may be required within
fifteen (I 5) days of receipt of the notice of violation by the person to whom it is directed.
(ii) Scheduling compliance conference. If a recipient of a notice of violation contacts the
department within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the notice, the recipient shall be
entitled to a compliance conference. The conference shall be held within twenty (20) days
of the date of receipt of the notice, unless a later date is agreed upon between the parties.
If a compliance conference is not requested, the director may proceed with a civil
enforcement action as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
(iii) Compliance conference. The compliance conference shall provide an opportunity for
the recipient of a notice of violation to explain the circumstances of the alleged violation
and, where appropriate, to present a proposal for remedying damage caused by the
alleged violation and assuring future compliance.
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(iv) Consent order. If the recipient and the director agree on a plan to remedy damage
caused by the alleged violation and to assure future compliance, they may enter into a
consent order formalizing their agreement. The consent order may include a provision
providing for payment of any agreed civil penalty.
(v) Effect of consent order. A consent order shall be effective immediately upon signing
by both parties and shall preclude any civil enforcement action for the same alleged
violation. If a party does not comply with the terms of the consent order, the director may
seek and obtain, in any appropriate district court, specific performance of the consent
order and such other relief as authorized in this chapter.
(vi) Failure to reach consent order. If the parties cannot reach agreement on a consent
order within sixty (60) days after the receipt of the notice of violation or if the recipient
does not request a compliance conference as per paragraph (a)(ii) of this subsection, the
director may commence and prosecute a civil enforcement action in district court, in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this subsection.
(b) Civil enforcement action. The director may initiate a civil enforcement action
through the attorney general as provided in section 39-109, Idaho Code. Civil
enforcement actions shall be commenced and prosecuted in the district court in and for
the county in which the alleged violation occurred and may be brought against any person
who is alleged to have violated any provision of this act or any rule, permit or order
which has become effective pursuant to this act. Such action may be brought to compel
compliance with any provision of this act or with any rule, permit or order promulgated
hereunder and for any relief or remedies authorized in this act. The director shall not be
required to initiate or prosecute an administrative action before initiating a civil
enforcement action.
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover for a
violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of anv rule, permit or order
issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than two (2) years after the
director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge ofthe violation.
(5) Monetary penalties.
(a) Any person determined in a civil enforcement action to have violated any provision
of this act or any rule, pe1mit or order promulgated pursuant to this act shall be liable for
a civil penalty not to exceed the following amounts:
(i) For any violation of any provision of this act, rule, permit or order related to air
quality: ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each separate air violation and day of
continuing air violation, whichever is greater;
(ii) For any violation of any provision of this act, rule, permit or order related to the
Idaho national pollutant elimination system program: ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per
violation or five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each day of a continuing violation,
whichever is greater; or
(iii) For any violation of any provision of this act, rule, permit or order related to any
other regulatory program authorized by this act: ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per
violation or one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each day of a continuing violation,
whichever is greater.
The method of recovery of said penalty shall be by a civil enforcement action in the
district court in and for the county where the violation occurred. All civil penalties
collected under this act shall be paid into the general fund of the state. Parties to an
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administrative enforcement action may agree to a civil penalty as provided in this
subsection.
(b) The imposition or computation of monetary penalties may take into account the
seriousness of the violation, good faith efforts to comply with the law, and an enforceable
commitment by the person against whom the penalty is directed to implement a
supplemental environmental project. For purposes of this section, "supplemental
environmental project" means a project which the person is not otherwise required to
perform and which prevents pollution, reduces the amount of pollutants reaching the
environment, contributes to public awareness of environmental matters or enhances the
quality of the environment. In evaluating a particular supplemental environmental project
proposal, preference may be given to those projects with an environmental benefit that
relate to the violation or the objectives of the underlying statute that was violated or that
enhances the quality of the environment in the general geographic location where the
violation occurred.
(6) In addition to such civil penalties, any person who has been determined to
have violated the provisions of this act or the rules, permits or orders promulgated
thereunder shall be liable for any expense incurred by the state in enforcing the act, or in
enforcing or terminating any nuisance, source of environmental degradation, cause of
sickness or health hazard.
(7) No action taken pursuant to the provisions of this act or of any other
environmental protection law shall relieve any person from any civil action and damages
that may exist for injury or damage resulting from any violation of this act or of the rules,
permits and orders promulgated thereunder.
(8) In addition to, and notwithstanding other provisions of this act, in
circumstances of emergency creating conditions of imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or environment, the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general may
institute a civil action for an immediate injunction to halt any discharge, emission or
other activity in violation of provisions of this act or rules, permits and orders
promulgated thereunder. In such action the court may issue an ex parte restraining order.
(9) In any administrative or civil enforcement proceeding for violation of any
Idaho NPDES program rule, permit, requirement or order, the department shall comply
with the public participation requirements set forth in 40 CFR 123.27(d)(2). (All italic,
black highlighting, and underlining emphasis added).
There has been no actual inspection and no disclosure of any investigation made
upon any receipt of information concerning any alleged violation of the act, or rule,
permit or order, to cause any investigation by the director. If there has been any violation,
it would have been known during the 1992, 1993 and 1994-95 inspections, as they are
identical operations, which have been known to the director, or the director would have
reasonably known o(a violation back in 1992, 1993, and in 1994-95. The statute of
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limitations announced in LC. §39-108(4) has precluded this unfounded violation that
DEQ has alleged in their Amended Complaint, apparently founded in something other
than an actual "inspection" or something other than an actual "investigation".
These "observed" substances (grass clippings and leaves) as adopted and
implement by DEQ in 2003, did not give rise to any basis of any investigation, or give
rise to the basis for any inspection, and more to the point, there has been neither an
inspection or any investigation upon any information of an alleged violation, as those
substances have been specifically excluded since 2002-03 from the regulation by the
following language: These rules do not apply to the following solid waste .. .ii. Manures
and crop (olant/ residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates; and ... iii.
Any agricultural solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted
by the Idaho Department ofAgriculture.

There is a specific reference to the exemptions and exclusions in their "Solid
Waste Management Rules and Regulations" to those exempt and excluded substances
that come under "crop (plant) residue", and Any agricultural solid waste that is
managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture.

An observation of

"grass clippings and leaves", by every definition, are

substances that fall within "crop and plant residue", it has not changed during the past
four decades, and not since the past two decades from the initial inspection in 1992, and
"grass clippings and leaves" remains to be the only material observed by DEQ staff
personnel in this "attempted inspection" and upon what basis can there be any violation
when there is no "inspection" to have taken place to verify any violation.
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Their Amended Complaint, Par. 13, page 4, refers only to "grass clippings and
leaves", commonly understood to be included within the meaning of a crop, or of a plant

residue", and that was the only "solid waste" to have been "observed" on the "property"
in any years, including 2013, just as it has been before, back to DEQ's first inspection in
1992. There has only been these "grass clippings and leaves", as no other "organic
material (such as manure, animal flesh, or animal carcasses) has ever been brought to the
composting operation, or ever contained in the piles or rows of materials observed on the
"property", and what materials DEQ personnel observed in 2013 is the very substances
DEQ specifically excluded and exempted from the "solid Waste Management Rules and
Regulations.
It becomes rather disingenuous for DEQ to claim their Agency conducted an
inspection to find a violation, when no inspection has ever taken place; no information
about any investigation has ever been disclosed, and there has been no demonstration that
the exclusions affecting their "scope of authority" to regulate grass clippings and leaves
has ever _been modified to now allow any "tier" references to the size of the exempted
substances and composting activity of existing operations about which they have had
knowledge for in excess of two decades. The Agency must adhere to their own IDAP A
enactments they chose to enact in 2002-03.
It is without authority that DEQ would allege in their Amended Complaint a

basis to regulate what they speci{icallv excluded, regarding an "inspection" that never
occurred and an "investigation" that has never been based upon any valid information
disclosed to the Director. There has been no search warrant issued, and there has been no
on-site presence to inspect anything, and no basis to allege anything, or even to speculate
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about anything, other than to acknowledge what has been stated in the Amended
Complaint to have been DEQ personnel observing what they know to be exempt from
any form of regulation. Under their ID APA Rules.
What has been observed is consistent with what they saw in 1992, 1993, and
1994-95, and the statutory limitations would preclude any allegation of a violation, absent
something other than grass clippings and leaves.
Mr. Gibson has identified the operation and the past contact in his Affidavit, and
this Agency has been not only curtailed by virtue of their own regulatory authority as to
what they knew does not create any health or environmental hazard to any animals,
humans, or the environment, but now unconditionally precluded by the very provisions of
the statute, as they have known this operation has been grass clippings and leaves from
the inception, dating back forty years, and has not changed over the preceding two
decades that has passed since their actual on-site inspections identified above and
disclosed in the Affidavit of Mr. Gibson.

Mr. Gibson and his composting operations has been infinitely familiar to DEQ
from their historic inspections in 1992-93-94-95, and then said to him that no further
inspections were needed after 1995. (See Gibson Aff.).
Additionally, and as Mr. Gibson has made clear to the DEQ personnel, this grass
and leaf substance is not being "disposed of' like substances at a landfill, but rather
processed as a compost product for later application as a soil amendment, as
contemplated in the Plant and Soil Amendment Act enacted by the Idaho Legislature in
200 I, following the earlier enactment of the Right to Farm Act, enacted in I 981, and
recently clarified to emphasize the inclusion and application to all aspects of composting,
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through the clarifying amendment that went into effect in July, 2011. LC.§ 22-4502(2)(d)
make clear these "agricultural operations" include, without limitation, plant compost, as
declared in the following language:
22-4502. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agricultural facility" includes, without limitation, any land, building,
structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance, machinery or equipment that is
used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation" means an activity or condition that occurs in
connection with the production of agricultural products for food, fiber, fuel and other
lawful uses, and includes, without limitation:
(a) Construction, expansion, use, maintenance and repair of an agricultural facility;
(b) Preparing land for agricultural production;
(c) Applying pesticides, herbicides or other chemicals, compounds or substances labeled
for insects, pests, crops, weeds, water or soil;

(d) Planting. irrigating, growing. fertilizing. harvesting or producing agricultural,
horticultural, floricultural and viticultural crops, fruits and vegetable products, field
grains, seeds, hay. sod and nursery stock, and other plants, plant products, plant
byproducts, plant waste and plant composti
(e) Breeding, hatching, raising, producing, feeding and keeping livestock, dairy animals,
swine, fur-bearing animals, poultry, eggs, fish and other aquatic species, and other
animals, animal products and animal byproducts, animal waste, animal compost, and
bees, bee products and bee byproducts;
(f) Processing and packaging agricultural products, including the processing and
packaging of agricultural products into food and other agricultural commodities;
(g) Manufacturing animal feed;
(h) Transporting agricultural products to or from an agricultural facility;
(i) Noise, odors, dust, fumes, light and other conditions associated with an agricultural
operation or an agricultural facility;
G) Selling agricultural products at a farmers or roadside market;
(k) Participating in a government sponsored agricultural program.
(3) "Nonagricultural activities," for the purposes of this chapter, means
residential, commercial or industrial property development and use not associated with
the production of agricultural products.
(4) "Improper or negligent operation" means that the agricultural operation is not
undertaken in conformity with federal, state and local laws and regulations or permits,
and adversely affects the public health and safety. (Italic, highlight, and underlining
added for emphasis)
This statute was amended several times since its enactment in 1981, starting with
the initial enactment of22-4502, when it was added in 1981, ch. 177, sec. I, p. 311; then
amended in 1997, ch. 341, sec. 1, p. 1025; then amended in 1999, ch. 377, sec. 1, p. 1035;
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and last amended in 201 I, ch. 229, sec. 1, p. 623. The last amendment made in 2011 was
undertaken pursuant to RS20384, therein stating the "Statement of Purpose" to be:
The purpose of this legislation is to strengthen Idaho's Right to
Farm Act by: (I) more comprehensively defining the agricultural activities
to which the protections to the Act apply; (2) providing that the
protections of the Act apply to expansions to agriculture activities; (3)
making it clear that ordinances and resolutions that declare properly
conducted agricultural activates to be nuisances are void; (4) providing
that an agricultural activity shall not be found to be a nuisance if it is not a
nuisance under the Act or is operated in accordance with recognized
agricultural practices or a governmental permit, and (5) providing for
recovery of attorney's fees in nuisance actions. These changes are based
upon provisions to Right to Farm Acts or several other states.
The Legislative findings and intent was previously expressed in I. C. § 224501 to be as follows:
22-4501. LEGISLATIVE
FINDINGS
AND
INTENT. The
legislature finds that agricultural activities conducted on farmland in
urbanizing areas are often subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits
encourage and even force the premature removal of the lands from
agricultural uses, and in some cases prohibit investments in agricultural
improvements. It is the intent of the legislature to reduce the loss to the state
of its agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which
agricultural operations may be deemed to be a nuisance. The legislature also
finds that the right to farm is a natural right and is recognized as a
permitted use throughout the state of Idaho. (Italic, highlight and
underlining added for emphasis)
Each of the statutory enactments (Right to Farm and Plant and Soil Amendment)
were made congruent in relation to these composting activities, operations, and site
facilities, and made clear they come under the control ofidaho Department of Agriculture
(IDOA). That Department has annually registered Mr. Gibson's composted products and
are fully aware of the nature of the composting operation.
DEQ has not contemplated becoming involved with composting activities, as the
fact remains DEQ has had no regard or concern of the Gibson composting operations
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after 1995, and even from the date of their new regulations in 2002-03, for ten years
thereafter they have ignored him entirely (2003-2013).
DEQ personnel have acknowledged and declared what it was they observed, and
what they have identified is not a "solid waste disposal site" but rather a composting
operation of grass clippings and leaves, and in every respect an "agricultural operation"
that involves the mixing and manufacture-production of a composting product derived
from "grass clippings and leaves", which is what they saw, what they claim and what
they alleged in the Amended Complaint.
For DEQ to claim either a violation, now precluded by the statute of limitations,
or a basis to regulate this operation, precluded by their very own IDAP A Rules, would
need to demonstrate what has changed in the law or the operations since the historic
inspections dating back over two decades, and would have to demonstrate how the
IDAPA Rules have been modified to remove the exclusion and exemption they have
expressly allowed by their reference to crop (plant) residue, which substances are
currently excluded from regulation, by the ordinary meaning of the words used, and they
would need to then incorporate language that specifically identify what substances
derived from "crop and plant residue" they want now to regulate within their otherwise
broad definition of "discarded solid materials" slated for disposal, when it is clear these
substances (crop and plant residue materials), such as grass clippings and leaves, are not
intended for "disposal" in a "solid waste disposal site", but rather for plant and soil
amendments in an agricultural application as a soil amendment or a plant foliar.
Not only is "Disposal" not what is occurring in this situation, but the specific
substances pose no harm to human health, as they are plant and soil additives and

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

000581
P. 19

amendments, critical to crop production in the agricultural industry. They have been
recognized as such by the Department of Agricultural to be to that effect, and
strengthened by the two enactments mentioned above.
Should DEQ ever determine they need to regulate what currently is excluded from
that regulatory authority, then every residential homeowner who has elected to compost
their own grass and lawn clippings, tree and shrub plant leaves, and their landscape
trimmings, and conduct a home operated organic composting operation on their
residential property will, by such a general definition, come under DEQ regulation, and
would be only excluded by a size criteria, which does not change the substance in
question.
The legislature's intention when the agency presented their rules and regulations
was not to regulate these substances, as there was no disposal site to regulate in relation
to the operation, as there is no hazardous waste materials declared to be dangerous to
human health in such a composting operation.
DEQ's Amended Complaint fails to set forth any factual basis that is found to be
sufficient to constitute a claim of any violation, or a claim to a right of regulation of these
Defendants for which any relief can be granted, and the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense that precludes any basis to claim either a violation or a right of
regulation, and this matter must be dismissed, as a matter of law.
This Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), I.R.C.P.
for failure to state a claim upon which any relief can be granted. These Defendants are
entitled to the entry of a judgment upon DEQ's own pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c),
I.R.C.P.as well as from the required application of the statute of limitations that precludes
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this baseless claim under the very provisions of I. C.§39-108(4), for the reasons stated
within the Affidavit of David R. Gibson. DEQ has known of the activities and operations of
Mr. Gibson since the very latest of 1991, having inspected his operation in 1992,'93,'94-'95,
and declared his exempt status in prior years, even excluding any need for him to secure any
form of further permitting, as what he original received in 1992 was declared to be a
perpetual permit, and notwithstanding, the Department of Agriculture would have the sole
jurisdiction to monitor his registration and product contents.
DEQ lacks the standing required under Idaho Law to initiate any suit against these
Defendants, and no basis to seek any claimed violation of regulatory provisions of solid
waste materials that has no declared application, as the substances and materials are
specifically excluded and exempted from regulatory enforcement or imposition of the
regulatory rules within their agency, together with the fact the statute oflimitations has
barred this action, as described in detail above.

CONCLUSION
These Defendants contend that all substances located upon the "Property",
identified. in the Amended Complaint, are no different than they were two decades ago, and
remain excluded and exempt from any regulatory authority ofDEQ,
DEQ has been put on actual notice of the existence of the operations, at the very
latest since their initial inspection in 1992, and the composting operations of Mr. Gibson
has been ongoing within and upon the Gowen Field Desert Front since 1988, and DEQ
has made no attempt to regulate or conduct any on-site inspection since 1995, until their
claimed "attempt to inspect" on March 29 2013, eighteen years later, when nothing has
changed to engage in any regulatory involvement in Mr. Gibson's composting
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operations. There has been no attempt to engage in any inspection or seek any
coordination with Mr. Gibson in any fashion since 1995, and the application of the
statute of limitations announced in LC. §39-108(4) should be regarded as also
controlling in this matter, which statutory provision provides as follows:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover
for a violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule,
permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than
two (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have
had knowledge of the violation.
That during the conversation with DEQ personnel in 2013, The DEQ personnel
acknowledged the existence of the pre-emptive and exclusionary effects contained within

their management rules, and as they acknowledged that concept in their discussion,
those officials then chose to represent to Mr. Gibson that it was their belief the
Department of Agriculture had authorized DEQ to now regulate these agricultural solid
waste materials for them. There was no such delegation or sub-delegation of regulatory
authority in existence revealed to Mr. Gibson by IDOA, when that representation was
made, and Mr. Gibson then conferred with the Idaho Department of Agriculture
(IDOA), and told no such sub-delegation ever occurred. Mr. Gibson then confronted
DEQ thereafter, confronting them as to their misstatement of authority with that
misrepresentation, and Mr. Gibson then requested "evidence" of any such delegation, or
sub-delegation or right of authority from IDOA, or the existence of any substitution of
rules for application to his exempted operation, as he unden,iood the 2003 adoption to
exclude, and upon his insistence, the DEQ personnel retracted their statement, and
acknowledged their error, and submitted an email to Mr. Gibson, to confirm their
"mistake" of assumed authority. DEQ thereafter declined to identify any other basis for
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any such claim to regulate his operation, or any basis of a claimed violation, only now
claiming the size of the operation is their concern, when their very exemptions and
limitations are not governed or limited to any size of an exempt operation.
Mr. Gibson specifically notified DEQ personnel about his awareness of the cited

exclusions and exemptions in the regulatory provisions of what had been adopted in
2003, and the effect of that dialogue was thought to have brought closure to the subject,
especially upon receiving the email from DEQ.
On July 31, 2013, DEQ sent Mr. Gibson a certified letter, stating it to be a "notice of
violation", relating to the same ongoing composting operation that had been in
production for over two decades, all of which was known to DEQ, and clearly subject to
the statute of limitations for such attempted action, and Mr. Gibson regarded that Notice
to be either issued in error by DEQ personnel, who were unfamiliar with the exemptions
and exceptions within their rules and regulations, and possibly unaware of the statute of
limitations, or it was otherwise an attempt to bring his operations under their regulation,
despite their past representations and specific exclusions in their lack of regulatory
authority.
Mr. Gibson has relied upon the exemptions, exclusions, exceptions, and limitations

identified in the IDAPA Rules adopted in 2003, specifically pre-empting any regulatory
involvement of DEQ with existing composting operations, as well as his prior
"grandfather" rights that existed to his operations before the initial enactment of the
solid waste management Regulations and Standards that may have been promulgated in
1992, as his operations have existed since the1970's. Mr. Gibson has made clear his
position to the DEQ personnel over the previous years of his operations, becoming an
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issue in 1992, 1993-94 and then finally in 1995, when he was told he was not under their
regulatory authority and no more annual inspections. From 1995 forward, Mr. Gibson
has not had any intrusion from DEQ until the contact that was made in 2013, and Mr.
Gibson has continuously maintained his position he will not surrender his grandfather
rights, his exempt status, or the statute of limitations, and will not waive any exempt
status, and will not voluntarily participate in any further effort to regulate what they have
neither a right or authority to do. Mr. Gibson ceased any further "permitting" procedures
or site inspection procedures back in 1995, and there has been none since, and none to
the present date. Mr. Gibson concluded there was no need for him to engage in any
further discussions or "resolve any conditions" for over two decades.
These Defendants do rely upon the exclusionary provisions of the IDAPA Rules,
and the application of the statute of limitations, I.C.§39-108(4), along with the
"grandfather" rights that have attached to all of Mr. Gibson's operations, all of which
pre-date DEQ's Rules and Regulations, and the ex

effects

of I.C.§22-4502.

Vernon K. Smith, attorney
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 11 th day of November, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:
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Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
( X

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706

(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
E-Filed

m

X

Fax
_-H,nd Delivered
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Electronically Filed
11/11/2016 3:07:43 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

Altorneyfor Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAYID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
)
) MOTION TO DISMISS
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

_________________

)
)
)

COMES NOW The Defendants above named, by and through their attorney of record, Vernon
K. Smith, and do move this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, pursuant to the
provisions of the two year statute of limitations as provided for in I. C. §39-108(4), which therein
provides in accordance with sub-part (4) thereof that no civil or administrative proceeding may be
brought to recover for a violation of any provision of I. C. §39-108, or a violation of any rule,
permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter, more than two (2) years after the
director had knowledge of, or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of, any alleged violation
of that Chapter of the provisions of the Department of Health and Welfare, Department of
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Environmental Quality. This motion is supported by the Memorarlum presented to the Court i
support thereof, together with the Affidavit of David R. Gibson, fi~ p r ~ i h the Court.
I

th

Dated this I I day ofNovember, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 11 th day of November, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
( X

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
E-Filed
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Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

,(,/'
/,( X

)

(

)

)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered

Vernon K. Smith
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Electronically Filed
11/14/2016 11:50:45 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540
)
)
) SECOND AMENDED NOTICE
) OF HEARING
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality, will call its MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, for hearing
before the above-entitled Court on Tuesday, November 29, 2016 at 2 o’clock p.m., or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard.

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
000590

DATED this 14th day of November, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/________________________________
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
_ __ Fax (208) 345-1129
____ eService: vls59@live.com

/s/
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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\/ERi-ON K SMITH

P. 2 02/03
No.
0688 Filed
Electronically
11/14/2016 11:51:22 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON k. SMl:tH
ATTORNEY-AT LAW
1900 VI/est Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
ldano Slat& Baf 'No. 1365
Telephone: . (208) 345-1125
F~:
·... (2-08) 345-1129
· ·IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
. THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR l'HE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVl~~NMEtffAL QUALTTY,
Plaintiff',
,'

v.
DAVID R. diesoN, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS
PROPeRTIES,lLC.
·. · · " . Defendants.

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540

)
)

) STIPULATION TO VACATE AND
) RESETSUMMARYJUDGMENT
l HEARING

)
)
)
)
)

)

----,----------->
· ·· IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by counsel for all parties hereto that the

Summary Judgment Hearing scheduled in the above-entiHed matter for the day of
...

'•',

Noitember
15, 2016, at 2:30 p.m., be vacated and tile same be rescheduled to a
'
·"- ...
later date for the reasons and upon the grounds that Defense counsel ie required to
be In Canyon ColJnty for a jury trial in the matter of the State of Idaho v. Justin
'

'

MGDonaliJ, Cas~ No. CR-2016-8230 on November 15, 2016 and November 16,
20.16..

STIPULATION TO VACATE ANO R!;;SET SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING.
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DATED tlils 14th day of November, 2016.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for the Defendants

DA~Eq this 14th·day of November, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO

ICE OF THE ATTORNl:Y 't"-':~~

c::..__-

--1~H:H=TT

G. EARLY

Deputy Attorney General

.·

..

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I.HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 14th day of November, 2016, a true and

cor~ect.copy·ot'the foregoing STIPULATION TO V~~
JUDGMENT H,EARING was served on the followihg as indi
below:

MARY

DARRELL G. EA~Y, Deputy Attorney General
Department-ofErivironmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton; 2nd Floor
Boise;.Idaho 83?06
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Electronically Filed
11/30/2016 9:53:54 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
Plaintiff,
)
) NOTICE OF HEARING
v.
)
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES, )
LLC
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
YOU AND EACH OF YOU, Will please take Notice that on the 13th day of
December, 2016, at the hour of 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as Court and counsel may be heard,
Vernon K. Smith, will call for Hearing his Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Idaho Code
§39-108 (4) and I.C. §22-4502.
Dated this 30th day of November, 2016

_____/s/__________
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 30th day of November, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses
as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

( x
(
(

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

(
(
(

)
)
)

E-filed
Fax
Hand Delivered

)
x )
)

U.S. Mail
Fax 373-0481
Hand Delivered

_______/s/___________
Vernon K. Smith
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Electronically Filed
12/7/2016 5:30:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540
)
Plaintiff,
)
) MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE
v.
) TO “MOTION TO DISMISS”
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
)
LLC.
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
The Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (Department), through the
Office of the Idaho Attorney General hereby respectfully submits the following Memorandum In
Response To Motion To Dismiss.
INTRODUCTION
The Department filed an Amended Complaint in this matter on December 2, 2015 to
which the Defendant’s answered on February 10, 2016. The Amended Answer pleads
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approximately nine affirmative defenses which when distilled, actually relate to four or five legal
arguments. Notably absent from the Amended Answer is any assertion that the Complaint is
barred by an applicable statute of limitations. On May 16, 2016 this Court entered an “Order
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial” (“Scheduling Order”) setting an October 14, 2016
deadline for the filing of dispositive motions by the Parties.
The Court’s scheduling order provides:
All dispositive motions shall be filed by OCTOBER 14, 2016 so
that they can be ARGUED before the Court. The parties may not
alter this deadline. A failure to file any summary judgment in
compliance with this rule may result in no summary judgment
being scheduled. You must submit your motion and briefs for
the Court to review BEFORE you can receive a hearing date
from the Court’s clerk on any Motion for Summary Judgment.
Notice: DUE TO COURT CALENDAR CONGESTION YOU
SHOULD NOT WAIT UNTIL THE LAST DATE TO FILE
BECAUSE THE COURT MAY NOT BE ABLED TO
ACCOMMODATE YOUR MOTION.
Scheduling Order ¶ 4.B (emphasis original). The Scheduling Order further states:
SANCTIONS: Failure to comply with this Order shall subject a
party or its attorney to appropriate sanctions, including but not
limited to, costs and reasonable attorney fees, the dismissal with
prejudice of Plaintiff’s claim, or the striking of a Defendant’s
defenses. A party may be excused from strict compliance with any
provision of this Order only upon motion showing extraordinary
circumstances.
Scheduling Order ¶ 8. (emphasis added).
In compliance with the Scheduling Order the Department timely filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on all of the affirmative defenses plead by the Defendants in the Amended
Answer. Defendants did not file any dispositive motion on or before October 14, 2016. To date
Defendants have not sought leave to amend their Answer, nor made any effort so show “good
cause” much less “extraordinary circumstances” as to why they should be allowed to deviate
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from the Scheduling Order.
Nonetheless, on Friday November 11, 2016 almost a full month after the deadline set in
the Scheduling Order, the Defendants filed a “Motion to Dismiss.” The motion on its face states
that it is “supported by the Affidavit of David R. Gibson…” and thus must be treated as a motion
for summary judgment per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) giving all parties “a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Despite failing to plead
this defense in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) and 12(b) or otherwise ask
this Court for any affirmative relief in compliance with the scheduling order, the motion asks the
Court to rule that the statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 39-108(4) has run against the
Department’s Complaint. The Defendants make no effort to show good cause or otherwise
explain their flagrant disregard for the Court’s scheduling order. Defendants represented to have
served Plaintiff’s counsel with the Motion and Memorandum by facsimile on November 11,
2016, but as noted to the Court during Oral Argument on November 29, 2016 and as set forth in
the Supplemental Affidavit Darrell G. Early, and the Affidavit of Brian Rayne filed with this
Memorandum, the undersigned counsel did not receive the Motion or Memorandum until
November 29, 2016 and only after calling opposing counsel and specifically requesting.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s Counsel did not receive the Notice of Hearing on the motion which was
certified to have been served by facsimile on November 30, 2016 but which was not actually
received until December 2, 2016 after the undersigned phoned and requested it. 1

1 During oral argument, the Court and counsel discussed the use of iCourt for e-service. Upon investigation the
undersigned has determined that my office had not completed all the steps necessary to designate a “service contact”
in the iCourt™ system now in use in Ada County and associated with this case. Counsel mistakenly believed that
registration with iCourt per the Supreme Court’s order was all that was required and omitted to identify a “service
contact” related to the specific case. Counsel apologizes for this omission. However, this had no effect on the
Defendants ability to properly serve by facsimile as they represented in their certificate of service. The iCourt™
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If this Court deems to consider the merits of Defendants’ Motion, it should be denied
since it fails to demonstrate that the statute of limitations has run on the Department’s Complaint.
However, this Court need not reach the merits since Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is untimely
and should be struck pursuant to the paragraph eight of Court’s Scheduling Order, Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 16(e)(1)(A); 16(e)(2) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). The
Defendants’ Notice of Hearing on the Motion is likewise untimely pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 since Defendants failed to properly serve their Memorandum at least 28 days
prior to the hearing.
ARGUMENT
1. Objection to Notice of Hearing – and Request to file this Memorandum late.
Defendants filed their motion and the accompanying memorandum on November 11,
2016. Despite certifying that they had served the Department by facsimile on that date, the
undersigned did not receive the Motion and Memorandum until after the hearing in this matter on
November 29, 2016. See Affidavit of Brian Rayne; Supplemental Affidavit of Darrell G. Early ¶
2. At the time of filing the motion, Defendants did not file a notice of hearing. Thus as of
November 29, 2016 when Plaintiffs were finally served, there was no deadline for the Plaintiff to
respond. On November 30, 2016, however, the Defendants noticed this matter for a hearing on
December 13, 2016 but once again failed to serve Plaintiffs’ counsel by fax or electronically with
a copy of the notice. See Affidavit of Brian Rayne; Supplemental Affidavit of Darrell G. Early ¶
2. Counsel only obtained the Notice on December 2, 2016 after seeing it entered on the Court

portal instructs that: “If the party you intend to serve is lacking a service contact, contact that party’s attorney to
request that they load a service contact as required by Supreme Court’s Electronic Filing Rule. The Rule also
permits a user to serve the document conventionally if the person being served has failed to designate a service
contact.” http://icourt.idaho.gov/efile-faqs.
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docket, phoning counsel and requesting a copy.
Under Rule 12(d) a motion to dismiss that relies upon matters outside the pleadings must
be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to Rule 56, moving party must serve any
memorandum or affidavits at least 28 days prior to the hearing, and the non-moving party is
required to file a Response Memorandum fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing. Plaintiff’s
counsel was not served with the Motion or Memorandum 28 days prior to the hearing. By
noticing the motion for hearing on November 30, 2016, the Defendants have prevented counsel
from complying with the requirement to file a response at least 15 days prior to the hearing. By
failing to properly serve the motion, memorandum and notice of hearing, the Department was left
with only eleven days to respond. The Department hereby objects to any hearing on the merits of
the motion due to the insufficient notice. Alternatively the Department requests the Court allow
this memorandum to be untimely filed and considered despite the shortened time period.
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is Untimely and Should be Rejected. 2
As noted above, this Court’s Scheduling Order made it clear that dispositive motions
“shall be filed by October 14, 2016” and that failure to comply with this deadline “shall subject a
party or its attorney to sanctions” and that the only justification for deviating from the order was
“extraordinary circumstances.” The original emphasis placed on this language by the Court by
underlining, bolding and italicizing the terms, reinforces the seriousness with which all parties
must consider this provision. This is entirely in keeping with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
16(a)(2)(B) which provides that a scheduling order must address: *** (B) the setting of

2 The Department has previously argued that the Defendants have waived this defense by failing to plead it in
conformity with I.R.C.P. 8(c) and 12(b). The Department reiterates its objection on this basis but for the sake of
time will rely upon briefing previously submitted to this Court on this issue. That portion of Plaintiff’s Reply
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment addressing the waiver of the statute of limitations is
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deadlines for joining other parties and amending the pleadings; for filing and hearing dispositive
motions; for completing discovery; and, for disclosing expert witnesses. I.R.C.P.
16(a)(2)(B)(emphasis added). Rule 16(a)(3) provides:
(3) Modification of Scheduling Order. The dates set by the court
in section (A) above must not be modified except by leave of the
court on a showing of good cause. The dates and deadlines in the
scheduling order pursuant to subdivision (B) above must not be
modified except by leave of the court on a showing of good cause
or by stipulation of all the parties and approval of the court.
I.R.C.P. 16(a)(3) (emphasis added). Finally, Rule 16(e)(1)(A) provides that the court may
sanction “any party or attorney if a party or attorney: (A) fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial
order.” Pursuant to Rule 16(e)(2) the Court has discretion to impose any “such orders as are just,
and may, along with any other sanction, make any of the orders allowed under Rule 37(b)(2)(A).”
Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides the following list of possible sanctions:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other
designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action,
as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination and
initiating contempt proceedings.
In McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 149 P.3d 843 (2006) the Court addressed the District
Court’s decision to sanction the plaintiff for violating the witness disclosure cut-off in the pretrial order by excluding the testimony of a relevant fact witness. In response, the Plaintiff

hereby incorporated by reference.
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claimed to have only recently discovered the witness. The Supreme Court recognized that a
decision to impose sanctions under I.R.C.P. 16 and exclude evidence is vested in the discretion
of the trial court and affirmed the District Court agreeing that it was the failure of counsel to
exercise due diligence in investigating the case that lead to the late discovery. In Cummings v.
Stephens, 157 Idaho 348, 361, 336 P.3d 281, 294 (2014) the District Court’s scheduling order
specifically admonished the parties that witnesses not disclosed would be excluded. On appeal
the Supreme Court noted this and found that the Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
testimony of expert disclosed in violation of scheduling order. See also, Harris Inc. v. Foxhollow
Const. & Trucking, 151 Idaho 761, 771, 264 P.3d 400 (2011) (District Court did not abuse
discretion by refusing to admit exhibit at trial when exhibit had not been disclosed in conformity
with pre-trial order).
Defendants have offered no excuse for not complying with the Court’s Scheduling Order
and in good faith cannot. Idaho Code § 39-108 is cited not less than eight times in the Complaint
and the First Amended Complaint. By simply reading the Complaint and conducting minimal
legal research, Defendants would have been fully aware of the Department’s authority and any
limitations period applicable. Defendants’ attorney had an obligation to research the applicable
law governing this case and be aware of any available defenses prior to filing an answer. Indeed,
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses specifically including the
statute of limitations be pleaded in the answer. Mr. Gibson himself testified in his affidavit “I am
also familiar with the provisions of I.C. § 39-108(4) which identifies a statute of limitations
imposed upon DEQ with respect to belated claims asserting any right to impose penalties or fines
by DEQ for any alleged violations of their regulations.” Gibson Affidavit ¶ 5. Moreover it is
clear that Defendants were aware of the possibility of a statute of limitations defense in late July
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and early August of this year, yet made no effort to amend their answer or to comply with the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the Court’s scheduling order in any way. See Supplemental
Affidavit of Darrell G. Early ¶ 3 Exh. A. It is undisputable that Defendants failed to comply with
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s scheduling order. Defendants’ violations
have prejudiced the Department and cannot be written off on the theory of “no harm no foul.”
Unlike some cases where the statute of limitations defense is a simple question of law applied to
undisputed facts, Idaho Code § 39-108(4) is a “discovery rule” statute predicated on whether the
Department “had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge” of the existence of the
violation. The facts in the present case can thus be distinguished from Cole v. State, 135 Idaho
107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 825 (Ct. App. 2000) and Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d
783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999) which both involved Idaho Code § 19-4902 and from Patterson v.
State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316, 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011) which applied
Idaho Code § 6-2105(2). These cases involved a statute of limitations that runs from a date that
is readily discernable as a matter of fact and law. They do not depend upon the subjective
“knowledge” of an entire agency, or what it “ought reasonably to have had knowledge of.” Had
Defendants properly pleaded the statute as required by Rule 8(c) from the outset, or timely
moved to amend their Answer, the Plaintiffs could have conducted discovery relevant to the issue
of “reasonable knowledge” including deposing Mr. Gibson, Mr. Smith, and the witness cited by
Mr. Gibson in his affidavit; reviewing any documents or other evidence the Defendants may
have; and thoroughly demonstrating the lack of evidence regarding the statute of limitations
defense. Had Defendants properly complied with the Court’s scheduling order and filed a
dispositive motion the Court could have had consolidated hearings on the matter and considered
all the relevant evidence in a “just, speedy and inexpensive manner.” See I.R.C.P. 1(b). Instead,
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Defendants failure to exercise diligence has resulted in this defense being raised less than two
months before trial, long after the close of discovery and without proper service and notice.
Defendants Motion to Dismiss should be summarily rejected and their untimely efforts to assert
the statute of limitations should be barred as an appropriate sanction for their violation of the
Court’s Scheduling Order.
3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Must be Denied.
If the Court determines to reach the merits of the Defendants’ motion, the Court should
deny the requested relief since, as previously argued and incorporated by reference herein, the
Defendants have failed to show a genuine issue of material fact, through admissible evidence that
the Department “had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the violation”
prior to March 29, 2013. 3
Idaho Code § 39-108(4) is a type of “discovery rule” statute of limitations in that it states that
the limitation period only begins to run when the director “had knowledge or ought reasonably to
have had knowledge of the violation.” The Defendants have proffered no evidence to show that
the Department had actual knowledge of the existence of their present facility or that the Solid
Waste Rules applied and were being violated, prior to the inspection on March 29, 2013. At best
Mr. Gibson’s affidavit speculates that some unknown and unnamed individual whom he believes
represented the Department visited him at another location sometime between eight and ten years
before enactment of the current Solid Waste Management Rules at a time when regulation of the
facility required only an approval from one of the local health districts. This cannot be
interpreted to show actual knowledge by the Department of the violations alleged in the

3 The Department incorporates by reference that portion of its Reply Memorandum relating to this issue on the
merits.
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Complaint. In contrast the Department has filed two affidavits from the individuals employed by
the Department responsible for enforcement of the Rules statewide and in this region since
before the current rules became effective. Both have attested they were unaware of the existence
of the Defendants’ facility until the dates alleged in the Complaint. See Supplemental Affidavit
of Dean Ehlert; Affidavit of Jack Gantz.
Having failed to establish actual knowledge, the question becomes whether there is any
evidence that the Department “ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the violation.” Idaho
Code § 39-108(4). As noted previously, IDAPA 58.01.06.012 places the burden of compliance
upon the individual who would operate a facility and requires that they submit documents to the
Department for review and approval. In other-words the Defendants are required by Rule to
place the Department on notice. If an individual determines not to comply, the Department will
have no reason to know of a facility or a violation until such time as they receive a complaint or
otherwise are told of the existence of the facility and conduct an inspection. Defendants
proffered no evidence to show that they informed the Department that they were operating any
facility after the rules became effective in 2003. Defendants have offered no evidence to show
they notified the Department when they constructed their existing facility in approximately 2004
or when they surpassed the 600 cubic yard threshold and were no longer “Below Regulatory
Concern”. This Court can take judicial notice of the decisions in Merrill I and Merrill II 4
showing that Defendant had been evicted from his facility located on the Merrill property prior to
the effective date of the current Solid Waste Management Rules. This Court can further note that
Defendant Gibson argued that at the time of relocating in 2006 he was required to obtain

4 See Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 87 P.3d 949 (2004) (Merrill I) and Merrill v. Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 132
P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2006)(Merrill II).
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approval from government regulators (See Merrill II, 142 Idaho at 695 Fn.1, 132 P.3d at 452 Fn
1) and that later he contended both before Judge Owen and now before this Court his absolute
certainty that no such approval was required. It is undisputed that the Department commenced
this action within two years of first learning of this new facility at a new location was subject to
the rules and had not complied.
Mr. Gibson’s entirely speculative averments about inspections by unknown, unnamed
persons in the early 1990’s do not give rise to any reasonable inference that approximately eight
years later when the Department’s Rules became effective the Department should have had
reasonable knowledge that he had opened a new facility at a new location subject to the Rules.
For this reason, even if the Court were to consider this argument, it is without merit and should
be denied.
CONCLUSION
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to “secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” See I.R.C.P. 1(b). Compliance with
the Rules is how this goal is achieved and should be considered an Attorney’s “stock and trade.”
It appears, however, that some attorneys view the Civil Rules much like the Pirate Barbossa
viewed the “Pirate’s Code” “more what you’d call guidelines than actual rules.” 5 Such disregard
of the Rules and of the Court’s procedural orders, however, should not be tolerated when it
reflects a failure to exercise ordinary care and diligence, prejudices the rights of parties, and
flouts the authority of the Court. This Court should not consider this untimely effort to assert the
statute of limitation, or if it reaches the merits should deny the motion.

5 Walt Disney Studios, “Pirates of the Caribbean” 2003
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DATED this 7th day of December, 2016.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

____/s/________________________________
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

I hereby certify that on the 7th day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
__X__ Fax (208) 345-1129
__X__ eService

/s/
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
12/7/2016 5:30:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Electronic Mail: Darrell.early@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, cl/6/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

_________________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN RAYNE

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
)

BRIAN RAYNE, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states that:
1.

I am currently employed by the Idaho Depaiiment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as the

Senior Infmmation Systems Technician for the State Office ofDEQ and have personal
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lmowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

As part of my job responsibilities I am responsible for maintaining infmmation systems

and records associated with incoming and outgoing facsimile transmissions including those
associated with the Office of the Attorney General, Environmental Quality Section which is
located within the DEQ State Office.
3.

The "AG Ricoh" Printer/Scanner/Fax machine is located in the Attorney General's office,

which is the copy, facsimile and scanning machine located within their office.
4.

The facsimile telephone number associated with AG Ricoh is 208-373-0481.

5.

I have reviewed the electronic records associated with the AG Ricoh fax and certify that

the records indicate that AG Ricoh:
a. Did not receive any faxes on November 11, 2016.
b. Received a 28 page fax from the phone line designated 208-345-1129 on
November 29, 2016 at approximately 4:26 p.m.
c. Did not receive any faxes on November 30, 2016.
d. Received a 3 page fax from the phone line designated 208-345-1129 on
December 2, 2016 at approximately 4:27 p.m ..
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
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6

1~
Dated this ~~_day of December, 2016

J·; 'ft,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me tbis this /(/ - day of December, 2016

Notaiy Public in and for the State o
Residing at: Boise, Idaho
Connnission Expires:

Iv... I1- 7o JD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7

I hereby certify that on the 1:t>day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
c01Tect copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN RAYNE by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
~Fax (208) 345-1129
:/ eService

Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
12/7/2016 5:30:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Electronic Mail: Dan-ell.early@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.

_________________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF DARRELL G. EARLY

)
) ss.
)

I, DARRELL G. EARLY, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states that:
1.

I am a Deputy Attorney General in and for the State ofldaho Office of the Attorney

General and the attorney of record for the Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
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in the above-captioned action and have personal !mowledge of the matters herein.
2.

My office did not receive any fax transmissions from the Defendants' attorney on

November 11, 2016, or November 30, 2016. I received a copy of the Defendants Motion to
Dismiss and Memorandum in Suppo1t on November 29, 2016 and a copy of the Notice of
Hearing on December 2, 2016 after phoning counsel's office.

3.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and c01Tect copy of a letter dated August 1ll, 2016 from

Vernon K Smith, Jr., counsel for Defendants and the Manager of Defendant VHS Properties,

LLC.
4.

Attached as Exhibit Bis a true and conect copy of the 2016 Annual Rep01t Form for

VHS Prope1ties, LLC which was downloaded by the undersigned on December 7, 2016 from the
following website address maintained by the Idaho Secretary of State.
https://www.sos.idaho.gov/xt/?xp=%5C20160523%5CXMLP0RTS Wl 15345 1605231637.xml

Flnther your affiant sayeth naught.

Dated this

1-!:;:'day of December, 2016---=::=:::::::,,-=

)

----Dm'ref!G. Early
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1ik

I hereby certify that on the_::: day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DARRELL G. EARLY by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_2...._ Fax (208) 345-1129
X. eService

Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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2083451129

16:54

VERNON K SMITH

PAGE

01/03

LAW OFfXCE OF VERNON K. SMITB:
1900 West MaJn Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Phone: 208-345-H.25
Fax: 208-345-H.29
August 10, 2016

FAX

To:

baue11 13m:1y ·

li'i:o:i.u; sh ...
.

'

RE: DEQ v Gibson (VHS Properties
Case No:, CV: oc l.503540

J)ocumeit$:-Letter xe: ·.Pxopexty fnspection
•

.' .

•

>'

. . ."'.

l'ages:·2

,• •',

EXHIBIT

I ___.A
. . . . .·.__
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·.

,.

'.

,'
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VERNON K. SMlTH
Attorney At Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bai: No.1365
Telephone (208) 345-1125
Facsimile (208) 345-1129

\'

August IO, 2016
State

of°Idaho · .· . -: . · .

Office ~fthe; AttonieY General
PD,.Box 837iO ..
Boi~e, Idaho ·83720~0099

.

'

.

'

,.

.;s

RE: DEQ Gi]:!so~ 'et al;
Case No, CV-OC-:i503540
.
.

ATTEN: Darrell G:.Barly, Deputy Attomey General
Dear Iv.fJ:. ·Early: ·

t hav:e had .s'e.yeral discussions with Iv.fJ:. Gibson, along with others about this matter, and.
it comes·--back::to: the _fundamental questioii of jurisdiction and lack of standing for the State,
through .D,~.Q.: to initiate this action, limited futtl1er by fb.ei:r own Solid Waste RegulatoryExclusionary Provi.stons. The Statute we spoke about that addresses th<' procurement of search
warrants 'anct ·ini.tiatidn. of civil proceedings, are each premised upon factual demonstratfons that
must first give i-ise to :fb.e jurisdictional basis and factual support to unde.ttake such actions in
eitb.er event bi;. ;,i.dd~tlon to those restxaints, there ls a remaining concem as to the statute of
!imitatlons,.'as Mr. Gibson has been engaged in this activity, on this and adjacent lands in thb
imm.edi~te vi~inuy sirtce the early 1980's, having moved from a property owned by the City of
'.Boise -to t.l).o 20 ac,.e parcel that is now kuow.u as the "Merrill Property", where he operated
continuously from i991 until 2004, whereupOI.l he the11 moved his ope,:ation to this rresent
location it). August, 2~04, whereupo!J. he continued to engage in the same activity as he d1d on
each of tl}es~ .pr,operties for a period now in excess of almost 30 years. His activities have been
known· to. DEQ, and he has been licensed with the State of Idaho, Department of Agriculture,
pursuant ~o their_'staiutbzy provisions, and 1ms existed under the umbrella and the Right to Fatm
Act, in effect.si.n.oe 1978 and clarified under the Plant and Soil Amendment Act, in effect sfo.ce.
2001. Hi~ 11ctivities··ru:e·statutorily declared agdcultural operations ln nature, engaged -under what
is considers;d·a permitted use, statewide, and there is no dispute the $nbstance involved for whioh
he is·liceneyed byfhe State of Idaho, is plant material, c:rop material, and/or plant residue, being
an engaged activ.ity .-9.f. composting grass cli:l)pings, and p1atit and tree leaves, none of which is
subjectto any reguJation by DEQ.
1
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VERNON K SMITH

2083451129
.· .

PAGE
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We have decided there is no facrual basis that would give rise to either the issuance of a
search war.rant·· suppmt any right to file civil suit or engage in any inspection pursuant to
discovery upon_ the·.initiation of a civil action in tb.fo :matter, and the fasuc of standing,
jurisdiction, and· reg]ilatozy authorizatiou is the fundamental controversy that must first be
addr~s~_ed befQre we-proceed further in this matter.
. ..

or.

·I would like to appxoach the case with a determination :from the District Court as to these
regulatory, j1u:isdictional, and standing issues first, and whoever loses in fue District Court shall
then tnke the ·matter· to the Supreme Court for a disposition on
'ts of those specffi,c
matters.

':('hat .cmir~e of action will more effectively resolve ·the m
and get us fi:01 the istrict
Court to-the_A~pellate ·c::ourts when the ultimate issue may be res,01v,~cw:,or statewide!ap_pli ation.
truly,
· Vemon K. Sm1
VI<.S/sh
1

'

••

''
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Annual Repmi for W 115345

No. W 115345

Page 1 of 1

Due no later than Jul 31, 2016

Annual Report Form

Return to:

SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0080

1. Mailing Address: Correct in this box if needed.
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC.
VICTORIA L SMITH
1900 W MAIN ST
BOISE ID 83702

2. Registered Agent and Address

(NO PO BOX)
VERNON K SMITH JR
1900 W MAIN ST
BOISE ID 83702

3. New Registered Agent Signature:*

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE
4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager.
Office Held
Name
Street or PO Address
City .
MEMBER
VICTORIA L SMITH
1900 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE
MANAGER
VERNON K SMITH
1900 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE

State

·······-····.

ID

ID

(9u~tIy
USA
USA

Postal Code
83702
83702

5. Organized Under the Laws of: 6. Annual Report must be signed.*

ID
W 115345
Processed 05/23/2016

Signature: VICTORIA L. SMITH
Name (type or print): VICTORIA L. SMITH

Date: 0S/23/2016
Title: Member

* Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures.

EXHIBIT

i 8
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12/7/2016

Electronically Filed
1/3/2017 4:28:55 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
Plaintiff,
)
) PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM
v.
)
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
)
LLC.
)
Defendants.
)
)

The Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (the Department) by and
through the Office of the Idaho Attorney General hereby submits the following PRETRIAL
MEMORANDUM in accordance with Section 2.c of the Court’s May 16, 2016 “Order
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial.
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities on Issues of Law:
Idaho Code § 39-103(13) defines “Solid Waste” as:
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid material,
including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community
activities but does not included solid or dissolved material in
domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources,
such as silt, dissolved or suspended solids in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved material in irrigation return flows or other
common water pollutants.
(Emphasis added). A material is “discarded” once it has served its original intended purpose and
is no longer useful to its original user. Even when a waste can be reused for a beneficial purpose,
it is nonetheless considered discarded. See American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. E.P.A., 906
F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (waste slag intended for reclamation by a different industry is a
discarded material within the meaning of the definition of solid waste even if valuable materials
can be recovered); Ticonderoga Farms, Inc. v. County of Loudoun, et al., 409 S.E.2d 446, 449
(Va. 1991) (tree pruning’s, leaves, brush, stumps and other organic materials collected and
managed for composting are discarded solid waste even if they will eventually be reused).
Idaho Code § 39-103(14) defines “Solid Waste Disposal” as: “the collection, storage,
treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste.”
IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32 defines a “Processing Facility” as: A facility that uses biological
or chemical decomposition to prepare solid waste for reuse, excluding waste handling at transfer
stations or recycling centers.”
IDAPA 58.01.06.005.05 defines a “Composting Facility” as a “Processing Facility.”
IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03 defines a “Tier II Facility” as a facility that is “a processing
facility or incinerator that has a cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at any one time that is
greater than six hundred (600) cubic yards.”
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IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit documentation to the
Department “demonstrating compliance with the siting requirements and restrictions specified in
subsection 012.01 within the time frames specified in Section 012.”
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.04 provides that a Tier II Facility must submit to the Department an
“…Operating Plan containing that information required by 58.01.012.03 within the time frames
stated in Section 012. An Operating Plan shall include a description of the wastes to be accepted,
the methods for maintaining compliance with each of the applicable general operating
requirement of Subsection 012.03 and complies with any applicable facility specific requirements
found in Subsections 012.09 through 012.11.”
Summary and Elements of the Plaintiff’s Case - Admissions by the Defense:
The Department’s case is simple. The Defendants are operating a Tier II Solid Waste
Processing Facility without having obtained the necessary approvals from the Department for
such a facility. The Defendants have never contested the issue of whether they are processing a
solid waste. Rather, throughout the discussions both before and after the filing, Defendants have
argued that their facility is exempted from the Department’s regulations by virtue of two
regulatory provisions. These provisions are not exclusions from the Definition of “Solid Waste”
but are instead specifically “solid wastes not regulated” by the Department. See IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03. Even when the Department filed a motion for summary judgment, the
defendants did not dispute that the material received at the property is a “solid waste” but rather
conceded for purposes of summary judgment that it was a “solid waste.”
Assuming it could be argued that these substances (grass clippings
and leaves) should initially be included with that range of
definitive language, potentially being regarded as other discarded
solid material or as other discarded material, the IDAPA Rules and
Regulation[sic] regarding the management of solid waste materials
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as adopted and implemented by DEQ in 2003 specifically excludes
the regulation of the following: (quoting IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.ii
& iii).
See Memorandum in Opposition pg. 4. Thus, by implication and by express admission, the
Defendants have conceded that they are composting a solid waste and have otherwise admitted
the facts necessary to establish the prima facie elements of the Complaint. The prima facie
elements and the accompanying admissions of the Defendants are as follows:
1.

Defendant VHS Properties LLC is the owner of the property upon which Black

Diamond Composting operates. Admitted: Amended Answer ¶3, pg. 15; ¶ 8 pg. 18.
2.

Defendant David R. Gibson is the operator of Black Diamond Composting.

Admitted: Amended Answer: ¶3, pg. 15. Gibson Affidavit ¶ 11-12; Smith Affidavit ¶ 7.
3.

Defendant Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Composting is receiving “solid waste” at

the property. Admitted in their Amended Answer as follows:
There is specific reference to the exemptions and exclusions in
their “Solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations”, therein
referring to those exempt and excluded substances that come under
“crop and plant residue”: that “grass clippings and leaves”, by
every definition, are substances that fall within “crop and plant
residue”, and it was “grass clippings and leaves” that were
observed by DEQ staff personnel, as referred to in the Amended
Complaint, Par. 13 page 4; that “grass clippings and leaves” are
commonly understood to be included within the meaning of
“crop and plant residue” that the only “solid waste” observed on
the “property” were “grass clippings and leaves”, as no other
“organic material is contained in the piles or rows of materials
observed on the “property”; that such substances are among the
substances specifically excluded and exempted from the “Solid
Waste Management Rules and Regulations.
Amended Answer: Second Defense pg. 2-3 (Emphasis added).
… then any such DEQ personnel would have observed the material
located on “the property”, and would have been able to confirm
said materials consisted solely of plant residue and/or otherwise
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considered as agricultural solid waste material, and therefore not
subject to any regulatory authority of the State of Idaho Department
of Environmental Quality; that any observation to confirm the
absence of personnel on site would render a clear observation that
all said materials, facility, premises and plant residue/solid waste
agricultural material operation were unconditionally exempt and
excluded from any regulation or inspection by said DEQ personnel.
Amended Answer Ninth Defense ¶ 12, pg. 20 (Emphasis added).
…that notwithstanding said conjecture and speculation, the
“department staff” has purportedly reported to have observed what
they described to be ‘grass clippings, leaves and other organic
material”, comprising what they describe to be the substance and
composition of “solid waste”; that by definition such composition
is plant residue and necessarily an agricultural solid waste
material, and reasonably should be known by DEQ personnel to be
managed and regulated, if at all, pursuant to the rules adopted by
the Idaho Department of Agriculture only.…
Amended Answer Ninth Defense ¶ 15 pg. 21 (Emphasis added).
… and said IDAPA Rules specifically exempt “the property” and
the substances and material located thereon, as it consists solely of
crop and plant residue, and constitutes agricultural solid waste
that is exclusively regulated by the Department of Agriculture, preempting any solid waste management rules…
Amended Answer Tenth Defense ¶ 34 pg. 31 (Emphasis added).
David R. Gibson is involved in a process that relates to the
transition and decomposition of crop and plant residue, into a soil
amendment, resulting in the reintroduction of the material to the
plants and soils, accomplished at agronomic rates, being
comprised solely of agricultural solid waste materials, managed
and regulated, if at all, exclusively pursuant to the rules adopted
by the Idaho Department of Agriculture,...
Amended Answer Tenth Defense ¶ 41 pg. 32 (Emphasis added).
4.

Defendant Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Composting is “processing” solid waste

at the property. Admitted: Amended Answer ¶ 32 pg. 30.
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5.

Defendants are processing solid waste in an amount exceeding at any given time

600 cubic yards. The undisputed evidence submitted during summary judgment and the findings
of Judge Owen in prior cases involving this same site, shows that Defendants are “composting
several thousand more yards of humus product” on the property. See Affidavit of David R.
Gibson ¶ 9 pg. 5 filed in Ada County v. The Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Victoria H. Smith and
Vernon K Smith, Case No.: CVOC-1002298 (Fourth Judicial District, Ada County). This
affidavit was filed in September of 2010 and it is undisputed that Defendants facility has
continued to operate and accumulate more grass clippings and leaves in the years between 2010,
2013 (the time of the inspection) and even today. In 2011, Fourth District Judge Owen held
evidentiary hearings and conducted a site inspection as part of criminal contempt proceedings
regarding this same property. In his December 7, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order re:
Criminal Contempt, Judge Owen documents that Gibson testified under oath: “the composting
process required not less than ten years, and that the compost product would not be useable until
2014.” Gibson further testified “he produced about 2,000 cubic yards per year and that about
15,000 yards of compost material was on the property. See Memorandum Decision and Order
dated December 7, 2012 pg. 8. Ada County v. The Estate of Vernon K. Smith, Victoria H. Smith
and Vernon K Smith, Case No.: CVOC-1002298. During the site inspection Judge Owen found:
…approximately 35 rows of compost material. On the west side of
the property, the rows were about 6’ to 8’ high, about 10’-12’ wide
and about 375’ in length. The rows on the east side were about the
same width and height and about 300’ in length.” *** There were
several deliveries of leafy material from landscaping companies
which occurred during the Court’s site visit. The employees from
the landscaping companies were off loading the leafy material into
one of the rows of material.
During an August 30, 2012 court trial, the Court noted that Gibson further testified:
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that approximately 12,000 yards of compost material was moved
from the Merrill site to the Smith Property. Gibson estimated that
he was using about 15 acres of the Smith parcel for the composting
operation. Gibson estimated that there was approximately twenty
four thousand (24,000) cubic yards of compost material on the
property. Gibson testified that his use of the Smith property for
accumulating and composting activities did not change as a result
of the Court’s judgment in this case.
Id. Pg. 13-14.
Finally Judge Owen took note of the testimony of Ada County Code enforcement Officer Kevin
Horan who testified:
He observed landscaping trucks containing material entering the
parcel, emptying their loads of leafs and other material and leaving
the parcel without those materials. He also testified that he
observed signs indicating the rates for dropping off material and a
log book detailing who had dropped off materials.
Id. Pg. 12.
These findings of fact, including testimony from Gibson himself leave no room for doubt
that defendants have at least 600 cubic yards of material on their property at any given time.
In addition the Defendants have admitted this issue in the Amended Answer. See
Amended Answer Ninth Defense ¶ 14 pg. 21 & Tenth Defense ¶ 35 pg. 32. While
Defendants purported to deny this issue, close examination of the Answer shows that the basis
for their denial of ¶ 14 of the Amended Complaint relates to their inability to affirm the
observations of Department staff and constitutes a denial under I.R.C.P. 8(b)(5) (lack of
sufficient knowledge). They did not expressly deny the fact that greater than 600 cubic yards of
“leaves and grass clippings” was present at the facility. The response to ¶ 14 was thereafter
incorporated as the response to ¶ 35 of the Amended Complaint which is an entirely different
allegation stating affirmatively that “At the time of the March 29, 2013 inspection, Defendants
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had accepted and processed solid waste and had accumulated a volume of such solid waste at its
facility in excess of six hundred (600) cubic yards.” Incorporating the response to ¶ 14 by
reference in response to ¶ 35 did not properly deny the allegations of ¶ 35 in conformity with
I.R.C.P. 8(b)(2) to “fairly respond to the substance of the allegation” and this failure constitutes
an admission under I.R.C.P. 8(b)(6). 1 Defendants’ effort at obfuscation in their answer does not
create a triable issue of fact when prior testimony and undisputed facts show the opposite.
6.

Defendants failed to submit documentation demonstrating compliance with the

siting requirements of IDAPA 58.01.06.012.01 or obtain site approval from the Department for a
Tier II Facility prior to commencing construction of a Tier II Facility. Admitted: Amended
Answer: Tenth Defense ¶ 44, pg. 35.
7.

Defendants failed to submit or obtain Operating Plan approval for the operation of

a Tier II Facility prior to accepting solid waste. Admitted: Amended Answer: ¶ 45, pg. 35.
These admissions establish the prima facie case of the Plaintiff and demonstrate that the Plaintiff
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Contested Facts:
There are no contested factual issues. As set forth above, Defendants have admitted the
prima facie elements of the Plaintiff’s case. The Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on
the prima facie case and on the Affirmative Defenses raised in the answer.

1

It is recognized that Defendants’ Amended Answer stated in the First Defense “Defendants deny each and every
allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, not otherwise specifically admitted herein.”
However, this general denial should not suffice under Rule 8(b)(3) since in this case, the Defendants asserted a
specific denial of ¶ 14 based upon I.R.C.P. 8(b)(5) and ineffectively incorporated that response to ¶ 35.
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To the extent the Court deems it necessary to have a trial regarding the prima facie
elements of the Department’s Complaint, the Department will prove that the “grass clippings and
leaves” received by the Defendants are “discarded material” and that the Defendants annually
receive volumes of such “solid waste” in excess of 600 cubic yards.
To the extent the Court allows Defendants to untimely assert a statute of limitations
defense under Idaho Code § 39-108(4) there may be a need for testimony concerning whether the
Department “ought reasonably to have knowledge of the violations” at the Defendants’ facility
pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-108(4). While it is difficult to predict, it is not expected that there
will be contested facts on this issue. Rather the issue will be resolved on the weight and
sufficiency of evidence to establish this as a matter of law.
Contested Issues of Law: At this time, the issues of law in this matter have been fully
briefed on Summary Judgment to the Court. No further contested issues of law appear to be
present.
Evidentiary Issues:
It is not expected that any complicated evidentiary issues will arise at trial. Depending
upon this Court’s ruling on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs may rely
upon satellite imagery obtained from reliable databases to illustrate the growth of the facility over
time and the volume of materials at the facility should that issue be contested. Plaintiff will offer
expert testimony to authenticate any electronically stored and generated images offered into
evidence pursuant to the Idaho Rule of Evidence 901. Such evidence is not considered hearsay
within the meaning of Rule of Evidence 801 as it is not a “statement of a person.” See United
States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2016). The remaining evidence will consist of
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photographs properly authenticated and admissible in evidence, public records regularly kept
pursuant to statutory authority (I.R.E. 803(8)); the absence of public records (I.R.E. 803(10) and
the lay opinion and expert opinion testimony of witnesses present in court.
Agreed or Stipulated Facts: As noted above, there are no disputed issues of fact
requiring a trial in this matter. However, in an effort to aid the Court in resolving this matter,
Plaintiff’s Counsel attempted to obtain a stipulation from Defendants concerning certain factual
questions asked by the Court during prior hearings. The proposed Stipulation of Facts is attached
as Exhibit A to this Pretrial Memorandum. Defendants refused to stipulate to these facts but
notably did not dispute the truth of the facts. Rather, they merely reiterated their claims that the
Department’s regulatory exclusions and the Right to Farm Act deprived the Department of
authority. The Defendants letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Conclusion:
As framed by the Defendants’ Answer to the Amended Complaint, this matter has always
turned upon the interpretation of the Department’s regulations in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.ii & iii
regarding “wastes not regulated under these rules.” As set forth above and more fully briefed in
the summary judgment briefs in this matter, this matter is ripe for resolution as a matter of law.
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DATED this 3rd day of January, 2017.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/Darrell G. Early_________________________
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of January, 2017, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
__X__ Fax (208) 345-1129
__X__ eService

/s/Christine Riggs
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Christine Riggs
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Darrell Early
Friday, December 16, 2016 11:46 AM
'vkslaw@live.com'
Darrell Early
Draft Stipulation
Stipulation of Fact - CV OC 1503540 David R Gibson dba Black Diamond Compost
Products.docx

Vernon – please see the attached stipulation that I have prepared in hopes of resolving any lingering questions the judge
has about evidence in the record. If we can get this to the judge before he issues his decision perhaps it will take care of
the need for a trial. I have tried to draft this to reflect what I believe to be facts that are not in dispute. Please let me
know your thoughts at your earliest convenience.

Darrell G. Early,
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Idaho Attorney General
Environmental Quality Section
1410 N. Hilton,
Boise, ID 83706
(208) 373‐0494
(208) 373‐0481 (fax)
Darrell.early@deq.idaho.gov
ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION – CONFIDENTIAL –

1
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EXHIBIT
A

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, THE ESTATE OF
VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR, VICTORIA H.
SMITH, and VERNON K. SMITH JUNIOR
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF VERNON K. SMITH SENIOR.

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
)
) STIPULATION OF FACT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
COMES NOW THE PARTIES by and through their counsel and hereby stipulate to the
following facts for the benefit of the Court in resolving the pending Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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1.

The Defendants do not pay any monies to individuals and businesses delivering
grass clippings and leaves to the property for the purpose of composting.

2.

The Defendant David R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Composting collects
money from individuals and businesses delivering grass clippings and leaves to the
property for the purpose of composting.

3.

The primary source of grass clippings and leaves delivered to the property for the
purpose of composting is from landscaping businesses that cut/collect and haul away
said grass clippings and leaves from the properties of others. The landscaping
businesses charge a fee to the owners of the properties for this service.

4.

That each year the Defendants receive from individuals and businesses a volume
of grass clippings and leaves that exceeds 600 cubic yards.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2016.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
____/s/________________________________
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DATED this 16th day of December, 2016.

____/s/________________________________
VERNON K. SMITH
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ___ day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION OF FACT by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
_____ Fax 388-1300

DATED this 16th day of December, 2016.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
__________________________________________
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: 208-345-1125
Fax:
208-345-1129

December I 9, 2016

FAX
To: Darrell:Early ··

From: sh

RE: DEQ v Gibson /VHS Properties
Case No: CV OC 1503540
Docume.nts: Litter ·

Pages: 12
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VERNON K. SMITH
Attorney At Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No.1365
Telephone (208) 345-1125
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
December 19, 2016
Stare of Idaho ' · .
Office of1he; Att<;>rn:ey General

Natural Resource~ Division
Envirom:uental .Quality. Section
141 0 N. Hilton, 2nd 'Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706-1255

RE: D.E.Q. vs B.lack.Diamond Compost, et al
ATTN: D_arrell:G;,~arly
Dear Mi. Early:
· l received yo~ e-mail, !herein containing your reference to the pending DEQ
litigation, and the proposed "Stipulatipn of Fact" that you would request that Mr. Gibson and
I execute; and then be filed in this pending litigation, apparently anticipating, on the offchance, that such affidavit content would somehow prevent the need for a trial on the merits
of the controversy, or at least thereby allow for entry of some form of a resolution of some
of the issues that have been raised, or need to be addressed in this litigation.

to

I -imm~diately made contact with Mr. Gibson, and he agreed to remain in the Boise
Valley this weekend and make his presence available to me, so we could digest this request
you have made of us, ·and to formulate a response, including our own theory of a "stipulation
of Facts'.', that !Illght better serve to bring about a resolution of this case, in keeping with the
history of the ·controversy, the statutes, the agency who has the authority to regulate compost,
composting, and_comp·osted products, and the substances £:-om which it is derived.
· Starting with yciur proposed stipulation: by Paragraph 1, you want Mr. Gibson to .state
the grass .clippings and leaves are "gifted" to him, in as much as you want him to confmn,
he does not pay it)_dividu.als and businesses that deliver those substances to the property; by
Parag:l'aph 2, you want Mr. Gibson to state he charges individuals and businesses for the
delivery of those g~11s~. clippings and leaves; by Pai:agraph 3, you want Mr. Gibson to state
the primary· som:qe of lhe substances from individuals and businesses, and from where they
may acquire the substances, and by Paragraph 4, you want Mr. Gibson to state his opinion
of the annual volume those substances, in cubic yards.

of
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,We di~cussed that concept, and concluded that whether the transaction in rece)ving
the substan~~s is the re~ult of a gift, or something he instead is paid for, or others pay hun to
take the subs.tances, or to express an opinion as to the source of the substances, or the volu1:1e
recdved annually, none of that discussion alters the nature of the substances, or the orgamcbiological-decay-decom.position-recycling (composting) process of substances that are
exempt ftorn DEQ.regu1ation of"soHd W(!Ste" and "solid waste disposal", and the regulatory
jurisdiction and exclusive authority of the Idaho Department of Agriculture (ISDA), under
Title 22, Chapters·22 and 45, Statutes of the State ofldaho, referred to as The Right To Fann
Act (RTFAj and The Soil And Plant Amendment Act (SAP AA). These substances are not
being delivered to a .disposal site; rather to an agricultural facility, conducting and
agricultural operatio:o., as defined and declared by RTFA and SAPM. A natural eve!J.t that
would result in ·an environmental benefit through the development of a product for future
beneficial use in an. agricultural setting.
Yow: proposed _stipulation does not readily relate· to the ID.APA solid waste disposal
site rules and· regulations, or to·the Guidance Pamphlet, or lend any meaning to the reasons
for the exclusions and exceptions contained and identified within the IDAPA Rules and
Regulation regarding tlie management of solid waste materials, as adopted and implemented
by DEQ in 2003, which specifically excludes the regulation of Manures and crop (plant)
residues ultimately returned to 1he soils at agronomic rates, or the regulatory provisions
addressed in.the RTFA and the.SAPAA, wherein it is unxefuted that ... agricultural solid
waste ·is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture, which pertains also to their registration and licensing provisions.
Such substances as grass clippings and leaf materials placed in a compostiii.g
opexation.ar.e·regulatecfand rnanaged by ISPA, under Title 22, Chapters 22 and 45, and are
clearly intended to be what was identified witbin ID.AP A 58.01.06.001, sub-part 03., wherein
it specifically defines wastes not reeulated under these rules, to include certain enumerated
substances, wherein it ·states, under sub-part 03.b.: These rules do not apply to the following
solid waste .. -.ii. Manures and crop (ola11t) residues ultimately returned to the soils at
agronomic rates; aud.~. iii. Anv agricultural solid waste that is ma11qged and regulated
pursuant to .rules adopted /Jy the Idaho J)ep(lrtment of Agriculture.
. There .is no disposal process or disposal site involved, yet, from your perspective,
DEQ IS purportedly asserting that I.C. §39-105(2) authorizes the DEQ Director to regulate
"solid.waste disposal.", but when addressing that authorization, the emphasis must be placed
?n the word "dispos_al", as that is the purpose of the regulation, and it becomes critically
nnportant to understand what the Agency actually says about their regulatory authorization,
and it_ is. pr~qisely •there, contain~d within ,their declarations about their "regulatory
authonzat1on that we find the specific exclusions and exemptions co!J.tained within their
own adop_ted: "solid Waste disposal management rules and regulations", promulgated by
DEQ, and further ~xpressed in their Guidance :Pamphlet.
These ·J)efe:O:dants are !J.ot engaging in the act of "disposing" of any regulated solid
wast~"- 1:he act of '.'solid ".;aste disposal" is ~efined in I.C. §39-103(14), wherein it states:
(14) Sol:d :waste d1sp.osal means the collect10n, storage, treatment, utilization, processing
?' final d1sposal of s~IId waste. The,:e is no "Disposal" occurring in this situation, and just as
importantly, the specific substances pose no h= to human health, as they are plant and soil
P.2
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addi.tives and amendments, critical to crop production in the agricultural industry. They have
been recognized as such by the Department of Agriculture to be to fuat effect, and the
Department has these two significant Chapters as identified above, and that appears to make
your concern· over a payment, non-payment, contribution, source and volumes an irrelevant
matter, as it does not relate to jurisdiction, the regulatory authority, or the multitude of
definitions promulgated by the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (ISDA).
That Department makes it a specific declaration that they have the exclusive authority
to regulate these substances, and they have extensively addressed and identified these
substances in the Right to Fann Act (RTFA) and in the Soil and Plant Amendment Act
(SAPM).
.

Stardng with i:!ie Right to Farm Act (RTFA), Title 22, Chapter 45, including I.C.
§22-4501, itsets forth the Legislative findings and intent, wherein the legislature declared
the right. to
to .be a natural right, and is recognized as a permitted use throughout 11,.e
state of Idaho);. then citing §22-4502(1), wherein it defines "Agricultural facility" to
include, without limitation, auy land, building, structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment,
appurtemuice, ·machinery or equipment th11t is used in an agricultural operation); then §224502(2), declares that '.' Agricultural operation" means an activity or condition that occurs
in co:onection. with the production of agricultural produds for food, fiber, fuel and other
lawful uses, and includes, without limitation:

farm

(a) Consiruction,.expailsion, use, maintenance and repair of an agricultural facility;
(b) Preparing land for agricultural production;
(c) Applying pesticides, herbicides or other chemicals, compounds or substances labeled for
insects,.p,:,sts; crops, 'V\Teeds, water or soil;
(d) Planting, irrigating, growing, fertilizing, harvesting OR PRODUCING agricultural,
horticultural, floricuitilral and viticultural crops, fruits and vegetable products, :field grains,
seeds, hay,. sod !llld nu~sery stock, and other plants, plant products, plant byproducts, PLANT

WAS'f:E AND PLANT COMPOST;
(e) Breeding; hatclung, raising, producing, feeding and keeping livestock, dairy animals,
swine, fur-bear)ng.· anin1als, poultry, eggs, fish and other aquatic species, and other animals,
animal products ·and animal byproducts, animal waste, animal compost, and beoes, bee
products and bee byproducts;
(f) Processing and packaging agricultural products, including the processing and packaging
of agricultural products into food and other agricultural commodities;
(g) Manufacturing at1imal feed;
(h) Transporting agricultural products to or from an agricultural facility;
(i) Noise, odors;: dust, fumes, light and other conditions associated witlt an agricultural
operation or an agricultural facility;
(j) Selling agricultural products at a fa.uners or roadside market;
(k) Participating in a government sponsored agricultural program.

In the Soil and Plant Amendment Act (SAP AA), it identifies the administration and
regulatory authority of.ISDA as well, and with respect to the Soil and Plant Amendment Act
(SAPAA), whe~e it begins with LC. §22-2202, stating the Act ls to be administered and
regulated ·by ISbA;· then §22 2203 (1) declares that it is incorporating the application of
P.3
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natural de.cay. as· . .a· regulatory aspect of its regulatory authority, whereby matetial is
significantly. altered by a natural decay process); then (3), wherein it refers to product
naming-· which Mi:: Gibson's product is identified as "Black Diamond Compost
Products"); then . (6), wherein COMPOST JS DEJ.l'lNED TO MEAN THE
8lOLOGlCALLY STABLE MATERlAL DERIVED FROM THE COMPOSTING
PROCESS; · then ·(7), wherein COMl'OSTING IS DEFINED TO MEAN Tiffi
DECOMPOSITION OF BIOLOGICAL MAl"l'ER, IN A PROCESS TRAT INIUBITS
PATHOGENS, VIA~LE WEED SEEDS AND ODORS; then (9), wherein soil/plant
amendment~ are defined to be prepared to certain specifications); then (11), wherein the
"Department" is defined to mean ISDA [never called DEQ)); then ( 12), wherein the Director
is defined to be the Iiirector of the lSDA [not the DEQ Director]; then (13), wherein
distribution is defined to mean and include manufacture, PRODUCE, COMPOUND, MIX,
BLEND SOIL OR PLANT AMENDMENTS, OR TO OFFER FOR SALE, TO SELL,
BARTER, OR SUPPLY SOIL AND PLANT AMENDMENTS IN IDAHO; then (20),
wherein. Manufacture of SOIL AND PLANT AMENDMENTS as defined); then (22),
wherein· the Minui:nnn percentages are addressed-to be accepted for registration-which
Mr. Gibson, dba BlackDiamond, is so registered and licensed by ISDA; then (24), addressing
the official samples taken by the Director-IS DA was permitted to take samples from Black
Diamond peoducts); then (25), wherein "Organic" is defined; then (26), wherein
"ORGANIC WASTE-DERIVED MATERlAL" is defined to mean GRASS
CLIPPINGS, LEAVES, weeds, bark, plantings, prurrings, AND OTHER VEGETATIVE
WASTES, woo.d ·wastes· frmn logging and milling operations and food wastes; then (30),
is defined to mean ANY NATURAL or synthetic
wherein "Plant ,:amendment"
SUBSTANCE JU>PL,ED TO PLANTS OR SEEDS wmca IS INT:ENOED TO
IMPROVE .· GERMINATION, GROWTH, YIELD, PRODUCT QUALITY,
REPRODlJCTiON, J!'LAVOR Oll OTHER ))ESIRABLE CHARACTERlSTICS OF
PLANTS, except commercial fertilizers, soil amendments, limes, unmanipulated animal
manure and. vegetable .organic waste-derived materials, pesticides, mulch and other materials
which :may he. exempted by rule; then (31), wherein "PROCESSED" is de.tined to mean
DELIBEMTELY TREATED OR MANIPULATED TO MODIFY OR TlUNSFORM
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, OR BIOLOGICAL CHARACTElUSl'lCS OF THE
NATURAL STATE OX<' A SUBSTANCE; then (32), wherein "Raw" is defined to mean in
the natural ·state; and not prepared, modified, processed or manipulated for use; then (33),
wherein "Registrant" 'is defined to mean the person(s) WHO REGISTERS SOIL
· AMENDMENTS .OR PLANT AMENDMENTS UNDER THIS CIIAPTER-wbich
Mr. Gibson has done; then (34), :wherein it defines "SOIL AMENDMENT" to mean:
(a) ANY SUBSTANCE WHICH IS INTENDED TO IMl'ROVE THE l'HYSlCAL,
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL CBARACTElUSTICS OJ!' THE SOIL TO FAVOR
PLANT GROWTH; OR (B) ANY MATERlAL WlllCH IS REPRESENTED AS
HAVING ·A. PRlMARY FUNCTION OF ENHANCING, CIIANGING OR
MODIFYING SOIL MICROORGANISM REPRODUCTION, ACTIVITY OR
· l'OPULATION, OR MATERIAL WHICH IS REPRESENTED AS HAVING TlIE
l'RIMARY FUNCTION OF FORMING OR STABILIZING SOIL AGGREGATES IN
SOIL to WHICH lT IS TO BE Al'PLlED AND THEREBY IMPROVING THE
RESISTANCE .OF THE SOIL TO THE SLAKING ACTION OF WATER,
INCREASING THE SOIL'S WA'.l':ER AND AfR PERMEABILITY OR
P.4
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INFILTRATION, IMPROVING THE RESISTANCE OF TB:E SURFACE OF THE
SOIL TO CRPS'.IJNG, IMPROVING EASE OF CULTIVA'.l'lON OF SOlL, OR
OTBERWISE. l<'AVORABLY MODIFYING THE STRUCTURAL OR PHYSICAL
PROPERTIES. OF SOIL; and (c) "Soil amendment" does not include commercial
fertilizers, plant.mnendments, limes, gypsum, unmanipulated animal manures and vegetable
organic waste-derived... materials, pesticides, mulch and other material which may be
exempted by:rul.e of tJte depa:rtment; then (37), wherein it defines "Waste-derived soil
amendment"· or ":wa.ste-derived plant a11,1eAdment", which is defined to mean ANY
SOIL AMENDMENT OR PLANT AMENDMENT THAT IS DERIVED FROM AN
INDUSTRIAL BYPRODUCT, COPRODUCT OR OTHER MATERIAL THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE JJE DISPOSED OF JF A MARKET FOR REOSE WERE NOT
AN OPTION};
.

Since these ·"grass clippings and leaves" are not disposed of at a disposal site, but
rather taken to an. agricultural facility and agricultural operation because there is a market for
reuse of the substances.as a composted product (an available option), that is the ISSUE to be
considered here, and not who paid or didn't pay in the process of delivery of the substances
to the agricultural composting facility.
Therefore, if we are to take the opportunity to continue the conversation following
the hearing we had in this matter on December 13, 2016, our discussion should focus upon
what is· relevab:t
. to the. .issues to be addi:essed in the controversy,

All of what lliavc cited above is relevant to the controversy, and a stipulation to the
effectthat·the·cqurt should incorporate the statutory provisions of Title 22, Chapters 22 and
45 are relevant to .this discussion, as there lies the regulatory authority of XSDA to oversee
these wastes that are··not disposed of, as there is an available option for their reuse, namely
composted products. . .

ap~iiion

. Afso,
of our discussion related to the awareness and personal knowledge of
your agency (DEQ)iand its agents-representatives, regarding the activity and operations that
have been conducteiover the past decades by Mr. Gibson, in the context of his on-going
composting . operati()ns:
The Memorandum you submitted to the Court in response to our Motion to Dismiss,
relying upon the statute.of limitations identified in LC. §39-108(4), focused extensively upon
the perception that there was a lack of knowledge by any agents of DEQ, as it relates to the
nature
·extent ·of the composting operations on-going by the activities of Mr. Gibson,
apparentlyignori~g awareness of the on-going litigation Mr. Gibson continues to undergo
with Ada· County,· ·and his continual registration-licensing proceedings with the Idaho
Department of Agriculture during those years from 1995 to the present.

and

There has· been almost non-stop contempoxaneous litigation that has continued to
identify "compost" arid "composting" being conducted by Mr. Gibson in those litigation
proceedings· throughout each of these earlier decades, and in an effort to appreciate the
respective positions taken by the parties, in respect to this aspect of "knowledge", I noted
from the content of your various statements contained on numerous pages of your
}'. 5
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Memorandum; that you have chosen to express a rathei: elaborate display of Agency
ignoranc·e, or at least by two identified agents, but you apparently chose not to reveal the
personal knowledge .-of certain authorative representatives of DEQ, who are legal
representatives of the Department, assigned to it from the Attorney General's Office. ln that
aspect of whether there was knowledge of 1vir. Gibson's composting operations for the past
two generations, a petiod of forty-two (42) years (1974-2016), you have chosen to state the
awareness ofthl;l Department in the following mannec
"the Defendants have failed to show a genuine issue of material fact,
through <1dmissible evidence that the Department "had knowledge or
ought.reasonably to have had knowledge qf tlie violation" priQr to
March 29, 2013. 3 "
· "1daho. Code §_ 39-108(4) ....... states that the limitation period only
.begins fq run ·when tlie director "had knqwfedge or qugltt reasonably
to have had knqw[edge ofthe violatiq11." The Defendants have proffered
no evidence. to sltow that the Department had actual knowledge of the
exlstence,o.f.their prese11tfaci/ity or that the Solid Waste Rules applied
and were. being violated, prior tq the inspectfon on March 29, 2013. ''
"At best Mr. "Gibson's affidavit speculates that some unknown and
unnamed individual whom he believes represented the Department visited
him.at ·another location sometime between eight and ten years before
enactment of the current Solid Waste Management Rules at a time when
regulati.on of.the facility required only an approval from one of the local
health.districts. ·This cannot be interpreted to show actual knqw/edge by
the· Cornplaii1t: In contrast the Department has filed two affidavits from
the individual.$ employed by the Department respo11sible for
. enforcement of the Rules statewide and in this region si11ce before the
current rules became effective. Both have attested they were unaware qf
· the existence of the JJefendants' facility until the dates alleged in the
. Complamt·See _Supplemental Affidavit ofDean Ehlert; Affidavit of.lack

Ganti." .
"Having. failed to establish actual knowledge, the question becomes
whether (here is a11y evidence that the Department "qught reasonably to
have hadknowledge.qfthe viqlation. "Idaho Cqde § 39-108(4). As noted
previously, IDAl?A 58.01.06.012 places the burden of compliance upon
the individual ·who would operate a facility and requires that they submit
documents to tµe Department for :review and approval_ In other-words the
Defendants are requited by Rule to place the Department on notice. If an
•individual determines not to comply, the J)epartment will have 110 reasqn
to knrw of ajacility or a violation until such time as they receive a
complabtt
otherwise are told of tile existence of the facility and
cqnducdm inspectio11,"

o~
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"Defendants _!)roffered no evidence to· show that they informed the
1Jepartment that they were operating any facility after the rules became
effective: in 2003. Defendants have offered no evidence to sl,ow they
notified the JJepartment when they constructed their existing facility in
appro:idmatelY,.2004 or when they surpassed the 600 cubic ya1·d threshold
·and were no longer "Below Regulatory Concern", This Court can take
judicial notice of the decisions in Merrill I and Merrill n• showing that
Dej2ndant had been evicted from his facility located on the Merrill
property prior. . to the effective date of the current Solid Waste
Management Rules. This Court can further note that Defendant Gibson
approvitlfrom-government regulators (See Merrill II, 142 ldaho at 695
Jfn,l, IJi P.Jd at 452 Fn 1) and that later he contended both before Judge
Owen. and nr,w before this Court his_absolute certainty that 110 such
approval was requi1'ed. It is undisputed that the Department commenced
this action within two years of first learning of this new facHity at a new
location was subject to the rules and had not complied."
" Mr.· Gibson's entirely speculative averments about inspections by
unknown, unnamed persons in the early 1990's do not give rise to any
reasonahle · inference that approximately eight years later when tlte
Depar.titient's Rules became effective tlte J)epartment should have had
reasonable- knowledge that he had opened a new facility at a new
.. /ocatio11 subject to the Rules. Fol' this reason, even if tlie Court were to
·consiiler·tkis .argument, it is without merit and should be denied."
[all emphasis above is added]
It is curious to· note that DEQ has spent so much• time and effort (oral argument,
briefing, affidavits, etc) attempting to scold Defendant's for perceived untimely filings, when
"simply reviewing the. provisions of Title 22, Chapters 22 and 45, Statutes of the State of
ldaho, and the JDAPA exceptions, exclusions, and !:imitations on the substances to be
regulated tell the begmning of the story, along with the "Processing (Composting) Facility
Guidance And C)le_cklists For Tier II And Tier III Processing Facilities (hereafter referred to
as "Fadlity Guidance") pamphlet and the undisputed awareness that composting operations
have been on-going, including Mr. Gibson's operations, and none of them have ever been
regulated·byDEQ, as there is no logical reason to do so, coupled with the fact these represent
recycled-re-us~b)e substances, not disposed of substances.

are

You
the DEQ agent who filed this Complaint, yet you knew of the statutes, the
IDA.I?A rules and the exclusions, aud most importantly, your own personal knowledge as to
the existence of these. composting operations, starting from 1995. That commences the
"original sin'' in this controversy, and you fully well know there has been no intent to regulate
composting· operations, as Roger Batt and Dan Stenson would be rather familiar witli such
involvement with the Department of Agriculture, and the legislation they undertook in 2011
to clarify· the exclusive ju:risdiction of ISDA in these pmticular aspects of agricultural
operations.
. .
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·Paraphrasing LC. §39-108 (4), it states "no" civil or administrative proceeding may
be "brought:' ....... (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have
had knowledge of the violation. D'.EQ, through your actions, "brought" this civil proceeding
against the Def~ndants, by filing this litigation on behalf of the Director, even though you,
the very "agent"_ who brought the action in behalf of DEQ, has continually possessed direct
persona.I -knowledge ·of Mr. Gibson's composting intentions and operations, and his
continuous litigation over his composting activities. You have a transcript of the proceedings
that related to ·the 2009 litigation, yet you decline to Sllbmit an affidavit that would address
your person.al knowledge of that subject.··we p.arbor no doubt that you have always been aware of the substances in question,
and have been aware of the on-going litigation and Mr. Gibson's continuous registration of
his compost products,. since probably 1995, but cleady for much more than two yearn
preceding the lawsuit yqu filed in 2013. This is the original sin that serves to violate the
statute, jf there 'is any violation to be addressed in this unfortunate situation.
You axil the DEQ agent who wrote the Court of Appeals Decision in 1995; you are
the DEQ agent wh.o wrote the complaint in this lawsuit, and after filing the complaint, you
are the DEQ agent who is prosecuting the complaint, you are not only an agent ofDEQ, but
you, as a deputy. attorney general, representing the Director, and he is charged with your
knowledge, yet you apparently chose to continue withholding your pertinent knowledge and
infonnation about Mr. Gibson's composting intentions and operations from the Director, for
what appears to be the intent to avoid the effects of the statutes, and to obtain a regulatory
right that does not exist, and the Idaho Legislature will not let you, if the Idaho Department
of Agriculture has more to say about it. It required their involvement in 2011, and it may
come again tq require. their involvement in 2017, as you will not be allowed to create a
disposal site out'of.an agricultural composting facility and operation.
DE.Q filed their complaint claiming there were Tier u quantities of material, yet never
offered to present any ·"expert" testimony as to how they came to that conclusion, we assume
you are relying on the 2009 proceedings, or even the earlier proceedings pre-dating 2004, as
you make the passing reference to the Merrill case(s), referencing quantities from many years
earlier, again confirming to us your knowledge of and reliance upon those past events that
were common knowledge to Ada County and the State Agencies during those earlier years
of litigation'.
·
. . Why. DEQ chooses not to address the provisions of Title 22, especially the Right to
farm and S~il and Plant Amendment "Laws", is part of the Cardinal sins being committed,
and froin what is being rwnored, the Legislature, if required, will undertake to declare a
further exemption of compost and composting activities from DEQ regulations (beyond the
IDAPA exemptions alieady contained and mentioned in the Solid waste management rules
and regulation) as it comes to further regard manure and plant residues, should this case be
allowed ·10 .continue. on; and establish a need for their intervention, as what took place in the
senseless .litiga1;ion proceedings pursued by Ada County in the Ada County/Gibson/Smith
case backin 201 i.

Axe .,;e accurate in our regard to you as an agent ofDEQ? More correctly stated, are
you not the . legal counsel assigned by the Idaho Attorney General's Office to represent the
p_ 8
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Director of the Agency? Would it not be appropriate to inquire about your personal
knowledge_ as to Mr. Gibson's composting intentions and operations at the several locations
he has been· operating- for decades, and would it not be correct to say that your personal
knowledge·you have possessed for many years is sufficient and relevant information to
charge the Diroctor with "knowing 01.' reasonably ought to have known" from his agents and
represe11tatives- _as .to _tlie awareness of Mr. Gibso11's composting intentions and operations? I
took the oppo1tunity to again review the Ada County v. David R. Gibson case, cited at 126
Idaho 854,893 P~2d 801 (1995), and I again reviewed the language vou chose to use when
)!OU wrote that opi1tion for Justice Lansing, when you clerked for her while she was a Justice
on. the Idaho Court of Appeals, whel.'ein you wrote:
In -1991, David Gibson acquired rights to a parcel of real property in
Ada County with the apparent purpose of operating a tree and sh:nlb
nursery. [l] The condition of the soil on this parcel is such, however,
that prior to' its use fol.' growing nursery stock large amounts of
· compost must· be added to the soil Toward this e11d1 Gibson has
· accttm'-llatedon the parcel large amounts of organic material Pl
Footnote 2 provides the following;
.

.

.[2] These organic materials include leaves and gl'ass clippings from the
Ada Couniv 1-liglzway J)istrict and private lawn care companies and
aie not at issue in this case.

Thi~. decision ·was written by you in 1995. Since then, there has been virtually a
continuous and on-going disagreement between Ada County and ML Gibson over various
matters, arid that has-fashioned their controversial relationship, and those confrontational
issues served to. solidify his relationship with the Department of Agriculture, as his role
appeared to be. serving the interests of ISDA to address the dispute over the pre-emptive
effects of the sta:te· statµtes, in regard to local land use county zoning intervention, creating a
clear conflict between the age11cies as to what is a "permitted use" already established
statewide, and l'lhat ·:ip.ust be regarded as a "conditional use", to be addressed at a county
level. The dispute was .whether Ada County had authority to require Mr. Gibson to obtain a
conditional use pe;rmit (CUP) to operate what they called his "large commercial composting
operations", as define_d in the Ada County zoning Ordinance, or as lSDA had expressed their
pre-emptive authority, compost operations were agricultural pursuits, were already permitted
uses on agr\cu{tru:al lands, and ISDA had the exclusive statewide authority, as they thought
was adequately addn;ssed through the Right to Farm Act (RTFA) which served to bring into
question the ·pre~mptive effects of the statewide "permitted use" of all agricultural land
utilized in an agric;ultural activity, operations, facilities, or for agricultural pmposes, which
ISDA has declared the Right to Fann Act to have always been intended with regard to any
"compost and composting" activities and operations, and was included within that definitive
language, and because ·of the restrictive interpretation that came to be utilized by Judge
Owen, that litigation-appeal process kad to the "clarification" language that was then added
to the Right to J<arfrr Act (RTFA) by the Idaho legislature in March, 2011, becoming effective
July I, 2011, SQ as to·become congruent with the language specifically expressed in the Plant
P.9
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and soil Amendment Act (PASAA), which clarifying amendment was made retroactive by
its declaration of being a clarifying amendment to express the purpose of the original intent
in the RTFA.enactment.
· Though that litigation focused upon the pre-emptive effects of the state Statute (LC.
§22-4501) with' respect to "statewi_de permitted use" and the application and enforcement of
the Ada CountyOrdinancc, thereby pre-empting any attempt by Ada county to require a CUP
through the language· within the County Ordinance, and of obvious awareness to you, the
Ordinance specifically required proof there was a "large commercial composting operation"
in active operation in the County, and that has provided you with the personal knowledge of
there being , "large amounts of, compost' about which you have known smce 2009, if not
since 1995, as you·s.o stated such in 1995, and to that end, you said Mr. Gibson had
"accumulate_d on (at I,;_ast one such parcel) large. amounts of organic materials''. known to
you to be "leaves and grass clippings".
Since you are the assigned legal counsel for DEQ, it is reasonable to qualify you as
an agent of the Director, acting in his behalf when filing this pending litigation, and being a
deputy attom_ey gener_al. it would certainly be reasonable to conclude your knowledge would
be imputed to·thi:Ageµcy and the Director you represent, and.would serve to be relevant to
the issue whether it be Mr. Gibson's first site, his second, or his third site, you knew Mr.
Gibson has continuously been dealing in substantially large quantities of grass clippings and
leaves, for the. pU1Jiose of converting those substances into composted products, and with that
knowledge, would it not be reasonable to conclude that the Director has, or should reasonably
be charged•with the.knowledge and the awareness of your imputed personal knowledge as to
these potentially large amounts of grass clippings and leaves on parcels of property operated
by Mr. Gibson.in Ada County. and DEQ has known of that fact far in excess of two years
before yo1.dil_ed _tfus civil action?
You· inst¢ad chose to craft two affidavits of employees who claim to be ignorant of
Mr. Gibson's iritentibns and operations, but the fact you wrote the above cited Court of
Appeai' s Decision. -has 'tainted you with some of that original sin, and you have been aware
of this. long standing conti:oversy and on-going litigation in which we have evexy reason to
believe you have maintained your personal knowledge of Mr. Gibson's intentions and
operations, n;twithstap_ding the many conversations Mr. Gibson has personally had with
other agents ;'!lld .i·epresentatives with DEQ in those earlier years, as he identified in his
affidavit, but in all fairness, he did not find the need to memorize thei; names, as they made
it clear to hi;xi thiy would not be involved in hls operations. These large quantities of grass
clippings· and leaves, ..and/or composted materials, is what brought about the "J.?acmty
Guidance'; pamphlet.that Mr. Gibson had previously reviewed in 2013, and neither Mr.
Gibso_n, nor his .intentions or operations, have ever been a stranger or surprise to DEQ.
To that.fact, let me again state there is the existence of the State ofldaho, Department
ofEnvi~omnental Quality, a published pamphlet, about which I had me(ltioned to you before,
as it provides. DEQ's. ''.processmg (composting) facility guidance and checklist for Tier II
and Tier III processing facilities. That packet was created by the Agency in October, 2013,
which came -about after Mr. Gibson had his discussions and on-going communicatfons with
P. 10
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DEQ about Black Diamond in September, 20 l 3. Mr. Gibson was a recipient of the Pamphlet,
and I before took the opportunity to thoroughly read the contents of that packet, and I there
found, _·and I before told you, that it incorporated the p:i:ovision, Part "6", entitled:
"composting waste other than regulated solid waste", and Part 6 provided the following
clause: ·

"Certain composting activities may not be regulated under Idaho's "solid waste
managenient :rules", or may be jointly regulated under other federal/state
_regwatio_n and the "solid waste management rules". To determine whether your
pxoposed. comp'OSting activity is regulated under these rules, please contact
DEQ's regjonal office or local health district office for your area "see section 7
for contact infonnation".
. WithiriPart6, fa the subpart 6.4, regarding soil and plant amendment requirements,
wherein we find the following statement:

"Anyone: commercially producing compost should contact the ISDA to
determine-if the compost should be registered as a soil amendment or plant
amendment as required under the "Rules Pertaining to Idaho Soil and Plant
Amendment Act. of2001" (IDAPA 02.06.41)".
· You are personally acquainted with the fact that Mr. Gibson has always done that,
and that he has been registered and licensed with the ldaho Department of Agriculture, in
accordance with their rules and regulations, and they have confirmed to him several times he
is not regulated by DEQ whatsoever. furthermore, DEQ's own Processing "Facility
Guidance" confirms .that plant residue materials are not "regulated solid waste", as Subpart
6.3 specifically states: ·
''.Agricultural operations that accept regulated solid waste such as grass clipping,
construction and demolition waste, or nonhazardous industrial waste will need to comply
with the "Solid Waste Management Rules" (IDAPA 58.01.06)"; that within those very
ID APA Rules, we _specifically find listed the very exemptions and exclusions that have been
identified witb.m theit (b) (ii) and (iii), which applie:; to all of Mr. Gibson's operations, as
his operations have always been comprised solely of grass clippings and leaves, declared to
be excluded and exempt from regulation, about which you have been personally acquainted,
and about wh1<;h ISDA has always been involved in those substances, and has said that
neither Ada County noi DEQ has any regulatory authority or jurisdiction over composting
activities, facilities operations on agricultural hmd.

or

As the ''Facility Guidance" does so declare, to any extent the agricultural operation
is ever identified to be 'icommercial", and should be deemed to be a commercial production,
then the ·only requifement is to determine if the compost is to be registered as a soil or plant
amendment-under the Idaho Soil and Plant Amendment Act of 2001, wl:uch you personally
know that Mr. Gibson is so registered, has done so aunually, and will continue to do so
perpetually until he dies.
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It is worth repeating that you are, and have been readily aware, that Black Diamond
Compost Products
registered with ISDA as a soil and plant amendment producer.
. . is/are
. .
I, therefore, politely ask you: why do you elect to withhold submitting your affidavit
that would truthfully confirm your personal knowledge of Mr. Gibson's composting
intentions a.ud on~going composting activities and operations within Ada County, starting
back with Y,O\ll'.personal awareness in 1995, about whlch you, and therefore your agency, has
been aware of the large quantiHes of grass clippings/leaves/compost materials, and products
on various property-parcel locations, and those intentions/operations are st.ill in existence,
and that you have .been personally aware of the Merrill litigation, and the Ada County
litigation involving Gibson/Smith/VHS Properties, LLC, that was commenced in 2009, and
those cases made .you infinitely aware and familiar of large q_uantities of grnss
clippings/leaves/compost materials/products derived from grass clippings and leaves
generated· froin the agdocltuml operations conducted by Mr. G:\bson, an event on-going for
·
decades?
Not only does the statute oflimitations apply because of the personal conversations
Mr. Gibson has·had over the years with DEQ Officials/agents/representatives, but these ongoing litigaiion proceedings (beginning with what you had personally written in l 995), and
the registration/licensing procedures reflect public records, establishlng public knowledge
and disclosures of.Black Diamond/Gibson compost product(s), all of which has been within
the public domain through the ISDA records for possibly decades, along with the website
that Mr. Gibson has maintained for many years.

r trust your personal knowledge would allow you, in good conscience, to write a
somewhat different '$tipulation of Fact", or better yet, your agency would be served better
by your preparation of a stipulation for the dismissal of this action. However, if you still
prefer not to, then 'I would state that with the record as it is currently, given your denial of
the Agency's knowledge regarding the phantom "violation", that has established in itself, a
genuine issue of material fact as to the application of the statute of limitations, relative to the
lawful right ofDEQ to ini.tiate this civil action, so nothing we may address, and especially in
your proposed ."stipulation of fact", would produce a decisive event to prevent a trial. I agree
it is preferred we cooperate with each other to develop the approp1fate record for a
meaningful appellate· review, so this matter may be cited for future guidance throughout the
entire State ofidaho, reiprding this controversy.
Until I hear further from you, as always, remain,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC-2015-3540

vs.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.
Defendants David Gibson, doing business as Black Diamond Compost Products, and
VHS Properties, LLC (collectively, “the Defendants”) move to dismiss the complaint in this
matter. Defendants allege in their motion that this action is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations – Idaho Code § 39-108(4). For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss was filed untimely. Therefore, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the complaint is denied.
Idaho Code § 39-108(4) requires that an enforcement action to recover for a violation of
the provisions of the Environmental Protection and Health Act (“EPHA”) be brought within two
(2) years after the director of the Department of Environmental Quality has or reasonably ought
to have knowledge of the violation. I.C. § 18-108(4).
Plaintiff, the Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) filed the complaint in this
action on March 5, 2015. DEQ initially named as defendants, David Gibson, the estate of Vernon
K. Smith Sr., Victoria H. Smith, and Vernon K. Smith Jr., individually and as the representative
of the estate. The complaint alleged that Mr. Gibson operates a solid waste processing facility on
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land owned by the other Defendants. The complaint alleged Mr. Gibson violated several of
DEQ’s regulations in connection with the operation of that facility.
The Defendants filed their answer on April 17, 2015. Rule 8(c) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure requires parties to state affirmative defenses in a responsive pleading.
Defendants raised several affirmative defenses in their answer to DEQ’s complaint. Defendants
failed to state in their answer that this action was barred by I.C. § 39-108(4).
The Defendants subsequently gave Plaintiff written consent to amend the complaint
under Rule 5(a)(2). DEQ filed the First Amended Complaint on October 15, 2015. The
allegations remained the same. However, Plaintiff removed all individual defendants except Mr.
Gibson and now alleges the property on which Mr. Gibson operates his facility is owned by VHS
Properties, LLC. Mr. Gibson and VHS Properties filed their answer to the amended complaint
on February 10, 2016. In their answer, Defendants raised various affirmative defenses, many of
which were based on the language of EPHA. However, Defendants did not raise the statute of
limitations as a defense.
Subsequent to the filing of the First Amended Complaint and the Defendant’s answer,
this Court issued a scheduling order pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16. That order set
deadlines for amendments to the pleadings and for the filing of dispositive motions. The deadline
for filing dispositive motions was October 14, 2016.
Defendants filed their Motion to dismiss on November 11, 2016. The motion to dismiss
states that Defendants “do move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, pursuant
to the provisions of the two year statute of limitations as provide for in I.C. § 39-108(4).”
Application of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. I.R.C.P. 8(c)(1)(Q).
Every defense, in law or in fact, to a claim for relief in a pleading must be asserted in the

2
000648

responsive pleading. I.R.C.P. 12(b). Defendants failed to raise the statute of limitations in either
of their responsive pleadings.
Defendants fail to cite this Court to any rule of procedure they believe applicable to their
motion. Defenses based on application of a statute of limitation involve both questions of fact
and law. In some cases, the facts relevant to that defense are evident from the pleadings and are
undisputed; in other cases, the relevant facts are neither evident in the pleadings nor undisputed.
Here, Defendants supported their motion with an affidavit by Mr. Gibson.1 Therefore,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is, in actuality, a motion for summary judgment. See I.R.C.P.
12(d); I.R.C.P. 56(a). This Court concludes the time requirements in Rule 56(b)(1), rather than
those in Rule 12 or Rule 7(b)(3), apply to the Defendants’ motion.
The Defendants’ motion is clearly untimely under both Rule 56(b)(1) and this Court’s
scheduling order. Rule 56(b)(1) requires motions for summary judgment to be filed at least 90
days before trial. The trial in this matter is set on January 25, 2017. Defendants’ motion was filed
on November 11, 2016 – 76 days before trial (inclusive). As stated above, the Court’s scheduling
order set a deadline of October 14, 2016 for the filing of dispositive motions, including motions
for summary judgment. Defendants have asserted no explanation or justification for their failure
to timely raise this defense in their pleadings or by motion.
Defendants first raised the issue of the statute of limitations in their memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. However, Defendants did not
affirmatively seek dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations until the
filing of their motion to dismiss. Certainly, the Court cannot find good cause under Rule

1

The affidavit of Mr. Gibson was not filed in support of the motion to dismiss. Instead, Defendants base their
motion to dismiss on the affidavit of Mr. Gibson filed in opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
The Defendants raised the issue of the statute of limitations for the first time in opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment.
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16(a)(3) or Rule 56(b)(3) for the failure to timely file that motion. The Court must therefore
consider what sanction, if any, to impose.
The question of sanction raises related but distinct issues: whether the Court should reach
the substantive issue of the statute of limitations in deciding the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(effectively an untimely counter motion for summary judgment) and whether the Court should
permit the Defendants to raise the statute of limitations as a defense at trial. In opposing the
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asks this Court to decline to do either. In other words, DEQ asks this
Court to: 1) not consider the statute of limitations when deciding DEQ’s motion for summary
judgment;2 2) not consider Defendants’ motion to dismiss at all; and 3) not permit Defendants to
assert the statute of limitations as a defense at trial. DEQ argues this Court should not reach the
merits of the statute of limitations defense because the Defendants failed to raise this defense in
their answer to the amended complaint.
The practical effect of a party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense has been the
subject of considerable litigation in the appellate courts. Rule 8(c) states that a party responding
to a pleading “must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: . . .
statute of limitations.” I.R.C.P. 8(c)(1)(Q). While Rule 8 makes this requirement mandatory, the
rule fails to specify the consequences for failure to do so. Rule 12(b) also mandates that “every
defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . . must be asserted in the responsive
pleading if one is required.” I.R.C.P. 12(b). However, except as to a few defenses3 not relevant
here, Rule 12 fails to specify the consequences to a party for failure to assert an affirmative
defense in the party’s pleading.

2

The Court addresses this issue in its memorandum decision regarding DEQ’s motion for summary judgment.
See I.C.R.P. 12(h)(1) stating that a party waives three listed affirmative defenses if not raised in the pleading or by
motion made prior to a responsive pleading.

3
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Although the consequence for failing to assert an affirmative defense in a responsive
pleading is not explicitly set forth in Rule 8 or Rule 12, Idaho’s appellate courts have stated that
the failure to do so normally results in a waiver of the defense.4 Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107,
110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000); Garren v. Butigan, 95 Idaho 355, 357–59, 509 P.2d 340, 342–44
(1973); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 138, 686 P.2d 79, 83 (Ct.App.1984). The
purpose of the rule requiring that affirmative defenses be pleaded is to alert the parties to the
issues of fact that will be tried and to afford them an opportunity to present evidence to meet
those defenses. Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 163–64, n. 1, 559 P.2d 1123, 1131–32, n. 1
(1976). This is why the rules require a party to plead defenses on which the party asserting the
defense has the burden of proof, such as assumption of risk or comparable negligence and in
some cases, like here, the statute of limitations, and defenses which the other party may avoid by
presentation of its own evidence, such as the statute of frauds or tolling of the statute of
limitations. See Id.
However, as with most other general rules, there are exceptions. In Bluestone v.
Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 649 P.2d 1209 (1982), a judge in the magistrate division of the
district court entered summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that the
statute of frauds precluded enforcement of the contract. Plaintiff appealed to the district court
and the judge there reversed, finding that the defendant had waived the statute of frauds as a
defense by failing to include it in the defendant’s responsive pleading. The defendant appealed
and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court and reinstated the magistrate’s dismissal
of the complaint. Id. at 454-455, 649 P.2d at 1210-11. In doing so, the Supreme Court held that
“where the defense was raised before trial and the [opposing party] was given time to present
4

Prior to 1966, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) explicitly stated that the waiver provision applied to all
defenses and objections. Both the federal rule and Idaho’s comparable rule were subsequently amended making that
issue less clear.
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argument in opposition, the defense of statute of frauds can be raised for the first time in the
summary judgment motion.” Id.
In Fuhriman v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the State’s failure to raise an affirmative defense until filing its
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment was not fatal to that defense. Id. at
804, 153 P.3d at 484.
In Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 256 P.3d 718 (2011),
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the State could assert the statute of limitations as a defense by
raising it in the State’s motion for summary judgment, despite having failed to plead that defense
in the responsive pleading. Id. at 316, 256 P.3d at 724. Relying on Fuhriman and Bluestone, the
Court in Patterson determined the State had raised the defense in its motion for summary
judgment and the plaintiff had been given time to respond. Therefore, the state had not waived
this defense. Id.
There are some facts which make Bluestone, Fuhriman, and Patterson similar to each
other and distinguish them from this case. Those cases are similar in at least two important ways:
1) the affirmative defense was raised by the party moving for summary judgment; and 2) each
case involved a claim that was summarily dismissed on the basis of the affirmative defense.
Left unanswered by those decisions is the question – what if the court had denied the
motion for summary judgment? Each opinion uses the language “had not waived” an affirmative
defense. Does that mean, had the trial court declined to grant the motion for summary judgment
due to some disputed issue of fact, the party would have been permitted to assert that defense at
trial, notwithstanding the party’s failure to include it in the party’s pleading? Despite the
comment of Justice Bistline in his concurring opinion in Bluestone that “it [has] been established
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in Idaho jurisprudence that a motion for summary judgment effectively amends the pleadings” in
a case, Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 458, 649 P.2d at 1214, this Court can locate no other authority for
that proposition, including the cases cited by Justice Bistline. Those cases – Cook v. Soltman, 96
Idaho 187, 525 P.2d 969 (1974); Harbaugh v. Myron Harbough Motor, Inc., 100 Idaho 295, 597
P.2d 18 (1979); and Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978) – do not hold that a
motion for summary judgment operates as an effective amendment to a party’s pleading. In
Cook, like Patterson, the Supreme Court held the party moving for summary judgment could
properly assert the statute of limitations as a basis for summary judgment, despite not having
raised that issue in the party’s pleadings. However, none of the cases discuss the party’s
subsequent ability to assert that defense at trial. Indeed, neither Harbaugh nor Trosper ever
indicate whether the party relying on the defense had raised the defense in its pleadings. The
issue of waiver of the defense is not discussed at all.
This Court concludes it is appropriate to consider the different sanctions requested by
DEQ under separate standards. To date, the Defendants have not sought leave to amend their
answer to the First Amended Complaint to allege a defense based on the statute of limitations.
Unless the Defendants seek and are granted permission to do so, the Court would preclude
evidence and argument on that issue from trial as being irrelevant. Motions to amend the
pleadings before trial are properly considered under Rules 15(a)(2) and 16(2)(B). The Court will
not decide that issue now because no motion to amend has been made.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(3), permits the Court to impose sanctions on a party for
failure to comply with the time requirements under that rule. That rule permits the Court to
impose costs, attorney fees, “and sanctions” against a party or a party’s attorney. The rule does
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not further specify what “sanctions” the Court may impose nor limit the Court’s discretion in
deciding what those sanctions may entail.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e)(2) authorizes a Court to impose such sanctions for
failure to obey a scheduling order as are just, including those sanctions permitted under Rule
37(b)(2)(A). Those sanctions include: prohibiting a party from supporting a defense, Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(ii); striking a pleading in whole or in part, Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iii); or, dismissing the
pleading in whole or in part. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v).
In this case, the Court determines it appropriate to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the motion was untimely under Rule 56(b)(1) and under the Court’s scheduling
order. The facts of this case distinguish it from Bluestone and its progeny. In those cases, the
affirmative defenses were presented by the party moving for summary judgment. Thus, the
opposing party had 14 days in which to respond under Rule 56(a)(2). Here, DEQ had only 7 days
in which to reply under that same rule because the defense was raised for the first time in
opposition to DEQ’s motion for summary judgment.
Additionally, the affirmative defenses presented in those cases for decision on summary
judgment did not involve significant issues of fact. In this case, both parties agree the statute of
limitations began to run when the director of DEQ knew or had reason to know of the alleged
violations – an issue that certainly requires more factual inquiry than simply looking to the date
of a pleading. In the Bluestone line of cases, the motions for summary judgment were timely
made and do not appear to have necessitated any delay in the proceedings due to the moving
party’s failure to raise the issue prior to the motion for summary judgment.
This Court is required to construe and administer the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in
such as manner as to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
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proceeding. I.R.C.P. 1(b). Permitting the Defendants to pursue their untimely motion to dismiss
would certainly not be speedy. Given the fact that the Defendants filed the motion so close to the
trial date, the Court would likely have to continue the trial to permit Plaintiff sufficient
opportunity to respond to the motion, and to permit the Court sufficient time to consider the
motion before the trial. This Court believes the most likely way to achieve a just, speedy, and
inexpensive result in every case is to enforce compliance with the deadlines set by the rules of
procedure, absent some showing of good cause. There has been no such showing here.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 1/9/2017 08:30 AM

______________________________
Jonathan Medema
District Judge
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[Afﬁ of
Early, Ex.
5]. Mr.
A, p.

Gibson
trimmings
limited to
his composting
ingredients are
testiﬁed his
composting ingredients
to grasses,
Gibson testified
are limited
and crop
crop trimmings
grasses, leaves,
leaves, and
type
vegetation.
type vegetation.
The
parties have
portion of
their briefing
brieﬁng and
the proper
The parties
signiﬁcant portion
argument to
to the
proper
of their
and argument
have devoted
devoted aa significant
“solid waste”
in various
scope
waste” in
meaning of
the phrase
regulations promulgated
of the
promulgated by
phrase “solid
and meaning
various regulations
scope and
DEQ.
by DEQ.

However,
by regulation,
grant itself
than the
it.
itself more
the legislature
given it.
more authority
legislature has
has given
regulation, grant
authority than
cannot, by
However, DEQ
DEQ cannot,

It may
It
EPHA. I.C.
for enforcing
the EPHA.
enforcing the
those regulations
regulations necessary
feasible for
and feasible
adopt only
I.C. §39§39necessary and
only those
may adopt
Gibson’s activity
105(2).
whether or
this Court
ﬁrst determine
not Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
falls
determine Whether
or not
must first
Court must
Therefore, this
activity falls
105(2). Therefore,
Within
within the
the definition
deﬁnition of
the legislature
the authority
which the
of solid
granted DEQ
to
solid waste
legislature granted
disposal which
waste disposal
authority to
DEQ the

‘solid waste’
waste’ in
in I.C.
regulate.
the definition
deﬁnition of
difference between
As applied
to these
of ‘solid
applied to
these facts
facts any
regulate. As
between the
LG §§
any difference
1
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(44)
39-105(2)
irrelevant anyway.
is irrelevant
anyway.1
and IDAPA
39-105(2) and
58.01.06.005(44) is

“solid
Therefore,
whether or
this Court
not the
the grass
clippings and
must decide
or not
Court must
and leaves
are “solid
grass clippings
decide Whether
leaves are
Therefore, this
waste”
Gibson’s use
waste” under
under I.C.
use of
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
the biological
of the
of
biological process
I.C. §§ 39-103(13)
such that
process of
39-10303) such
“processing of
decomposition
waste.”
into humus
materials into
to turn
turn those
of solid
decomposition to
those materials
humus constitutes
solid waste.”
constitutes “processing
“garbage,
As
waste to
to be:
As discussed
section 39-103(13)
solid waste
Idaho Code
deﬁnes solid
discussed above,
be: “garbage,
Code section
39-10303) defines
above, Idaho

“garbage” and
“refuse”
materials.” Therefore,
it is
refuse,
that “garbage”
other discarded
is evident
evident that
solid materials.”
and other
and “refuse”
discarded solid
Therefore, it
refuse, and

materials.” Because
“discarded solid
limit the
the category
the legislature
not limit
the
are
of the
solid materials.”
legislature did
are subsets
did not
Because the
subsets of
category “discarded

‘all
“other discarded
‘solid waste’
waste’ is
materials,” the
definition of
the definition
category
of ‘solid
is essentially
solid materials,”
discarded solid
essentially ‘all
category “other
1

semi-solid materials.
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(44)
IDAPA
waste to
materials. I.C.
and semi-solid
to include
include liquid,
solid waste
deﬁnes solid
LC. §§ 39-105(2)
liquid, gaseous,
39-105(2)
gaseous, and
58.01.06.005(44) defines
defines
that are
that the
materials that
are solids.
the grass
clippings
there is
to include
Here there
is no
no dispute
grass clippings
include only
solid waste
waste to
those materials
deﬁnes solid
dispute that
solids. Here
only those
and
and leaves
Mr. Gibson
are solids.
leaves Mr.
Gibson composts
composts are
solids.
1
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materials.’ The
a matter
discarded
matter of
The Court
law whether
not the
the
whether or
therefore decide
as a
of law
or not
must therefore
solid materials.’
Court must
discarded solid
decide as

“solid” and
“discarded”
grass
and “discarded”
clippings and
and leaves
Mr. Gibson
admits composting
are both
grass clippings
composting are
both “solid”
leaves Mr.
Gibson admits
material.
material.
Certainly
portions (clippings)
that portions
from
the Court
to conclude
no specific
Court needs
speciﬁc evidence
evidence to
conclude that
needs no
Certainly the
(clippings) from
aa plant
belonging to
plant or
the Poaceae
plants belonging
or plants
to the
of monocotylendous
called Gramineae)
also called
Poaceae (( also
monocotylendous
Gramineae) family
family of
plants (commonly
flowering
including those
known as
ﬂowering plants
those generally
cultivated as
are aa
as grasses,
as turf)
generally cultivated
grasses, including
turf) are
(commonly known
7 gaseous,
solid
phases of
from the
matter –
the other
other accepted
material. (Solid
of matter
being distinguished
distinguished from
solid material.
accepted phases
(Solid being
gaseous,

“solid material.”
material.” The
liquid,
plasma). Similarly
then
The Court
must then
Court must
are obviously
and plasma).
leaves are
Similarly leaves
liquid, and
obviously aa “solid
“discarded.”
in this
simply
whether such
been “discarded.”
this case
materials in
determine whether
such materials
have been
case have
simply determine

“to discard”
“to get
discard” means
unwanted.”
Outside
rid of
or unwanted.”
of aa card
to “to
get rid
of esp.
means to
Outside of
card game,
useless or
esp. as
as useless
game, “to
th
11th
“Discard implies
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
letting go
Merriam-Webster’s
Ed.
throwing
implies the
the letting
or throwing
Collegiate Dictionary
Ed. “Discard
go or
Dictionary 11

away
become useless
that has
not intrinsically
something that
though often
often not
of something
or superfluous
has become
superﬂuous though
useless or
intrinsically
away of
‘to discard’
“cast aside;
discard’ has
clothes].” Id.
valueless [discard
Id. The
been defined
The verb
to “cast
has also
deﬁned as
old clothes].”
also been
verb ‘to
valueless
as to
[discard old
aside;
English Dictionary
reject;
up.” 11 The
New Shorter
The
The New
Shorter Oxford
Oxford English
give up.”
684 (4th
Dictionary 684
abandon; give
ed.1993). The
reject; abandon;
(4th ed.1993).

“the worthless
terms
useless part
similar meanings.
part of
terms garbage
meanings. Refuse
is “the
or useless
of
worthless or
and refuse
have similar
garbage and
refuse have
Refuse is
th
11th
something.” Merriam-Webster’s
“discarded or
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
something.”
Ed.
useless”
is “discarded
or useless”
Collegiate Dictionary
Ed. Garbage
Garbage is
Dictionary 11

material.22 Id.
Id.
material.

Defendants
that Mr.
not disposing
the grass
Mr. Gibson
Defendants have
is not
of the
disposing of
Gibson is
and leaves
grass and
have argued
leaves because
argued that
because
turning them
he
product. However,
them into
into aa useful
the meaning
meaning of
he is
is turning
Defendants arguments
arguments around
of
around the
useful product.
However, Defendants
‘disposal’ are
Plaintiff is
that Defendants
the word
alleging that
the
is only
Defendants own
are misplaced.
misplaced. Plaintiff
own and
and operate
operate aa
word ‘disposal’
only alleging

II” facility
“Tier II”
II processing
that the
Tier II
the volume
the facility
Tier
because of
volume of
of the
of
is aa “Tier
processing facility
and that
facility is
facility because
facility and

22

DEQ
has chosen
garbage more
to define
more restrictively
to include
I.D.A.P.A. 58.01.06.005(15).
include only
deﬁne garbage
chosen to
scraps. See
food scraps.
58.01 .06.005(15).
restrictively to
See I.D.A.P.A.
DEQ has
only food
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waste being
processing solid
The Solid
differentiate processing
Management Rules
being processed.
solid waste
Solid Waste
Rules differentiate
waste
Waste Management
waste
processed. The
from
from disposal
of solid
solid waste.
disposal of
waste.
To
that the
the extent
extent the
the Defendants
the grass
Mr. Gibson
To the
Defendants intended
intended to
to argue
and leaves
Gibson
argue that
grass and
leaves Mr.
composts
because they
be turned
product, this
into aa useful
this Court
not garbage
or refuse
Court
refuse because
are not
can be
turned into
useful product,
composts are
garbage or
they can
in I.C.
concludes
waste in
possessor no
that the
definition of
the definition
materials aa possessor
no
of solid
solid waste
includes materials
concludes that
LG §39-103(13)
§39-103(13) includes

if those
longer
willing to
for and
the possessor
longer has
is Willing
to give
or discard.,
those
give away,
has a
and the
even if
possessor is
a use
use for
abandon, or
discard, even
away, abandon,
3
decomposes3 the
materials
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
the
the fact
materials may
fact that
or use
to another.
another. Therefore,
Gibson decomposes
have value
value or
use to
Therefore, the
may have

grass
produces humus,
useful product,
whether or
not determinative
not the
the
determinative of
is not
of whether
or not
and leaves
and produces
grass and
leaves and
product, is
humus, aa useful
‘solid waste.’
waste.’ The
grass
The determinative
not the
the grass
Whether or
determinative question
is whether
or not
question is
and leaves
are ‘solid
and
grass and
grass and
leaves are
“discarded.”
leaves
been “discarded.”
have been
leaves have

Ninth Circuit
In Safe
In
Air for
for Everyone
Meyer, the
whether
the Ninth
Circuit Court
of Appeals
Court of
Appeals considered
considered Whether
v. Meyer,
Everyone v.
Safe Air
farmers’ fields
in the
the
from Kentucky
left in
the stubble
the farmers’
the farmer
farmer
plants left
after the
straw from
ﬁelds after
and straw
bluegrass plants
stubble and
Kentucky bluegrass

‘solid waste’
waste’ under
has
were ‘solid
the seeds
the federal
federal Resource
under the
has harvested
and
Resource Recovery
harvested the
seeds were
Recovery and
th
(9th
Conservation
Cir.
Act (RCRA).
Cir. 2004).
Conservation Act
F.3d 1035
1035 (9
373 F.3d
2004).
(RCRA). 373

“solid waste”
waste” used
in RCRA
The
used by
by Congress
RCRA is
that
similar to
The definition
deﬁnition of
is substantially
of “solid
to that
Congress in
substantially similar
in I.C.
in I.D.A.P.A.
In
found
the definition
deﬁnition in
identical to
to the
I.D.A.P.A. 58.01.06.005(44).
found in
and identical
LG §§ 39-103(13)
39-10303) and
58.01.06.005(44). In

“any garbage,
treatment
RCRA,
waste as
from aa waste
solid waste
waste treatment
deﬁned solid
Congress defined
sludge from
as “any
garbage, refuse,
refuse, sludge
RCRA, Congress
air pollution
treatment plant,
plant, water
plant, or
and other
pollution control
water supply
other discarded
control facility
or air
discarded material,
plant,
facility and
material,
supply treatment

material resulting
including
from industrial,
resulting from
including solid,
contained gaseous
or contained
industrial,
gaseous material
semisolid, or
liquid, semisolid,
solid, liquid,

activities.” 42
42 U.S.C.
from community
agricultural operations,
and agricultural
and from
commercial,
commercial, mining,
mining, and
operations, and
U.S.C. §§
community activities.”

6903(27).
(emphasis added).
added).
6903(27). (emphasis

33

th
11'h
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Compost
Ed.
material. Merriam-Webster’s
organic material.
Collegiate Dictionary
is defined
as decayed
Compost is
deﬁned as
Ed.
Dictionary 11
decayed organic
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in the
In Safe
that whether
In
Air, the
Ninth Circuit
left in
the fields
the Ninth
the grass
Circuit determined
whether the
determined that
grass residue
ﬁelds
residue left
Safe Air,

‘solid waste’
waste’ under
after
after farmers
RCRA
farmers harvested
not ‘solid
or was
under RCRA
bluegrass seeds
was or
was not
harvested Kentucky
seeds was
Kentucky bluegrass
material.’ 373
‘discarded material.’
at 1041.
depended
After
the grass
1041. After
Whether the
grass residue
was ‘discarded
upon whether
residue was
F.3d at
depended upon
373 F.3d

Ninth Circuit
it was
considering
by other
appropriate to
the Ninth
other circuits,
Circuit determined
determined it
considering decisions
to
decisions by
was appropriate
circuits, the
‘discarded.’
evaluate
been ‘discarded.’
material had
certain material
determining whether
had been
three questions
whether aa certain
evaluate three
when determining
questions when

Those
are:
Those questions
questions are:
“destined for
in aa continuous
material is
(1)
beneficial reuse
the material
for beneﬁcial
whether the
is “destined
or recycling
continuous
reuse or
recycling in
(1) whether
itself;”
process
by
the
generating
industry
itself;”
(2)
whether
the
materials
are
being
actively
materials
generating
the
the
are
whether
being
process by
industry
actively
(2)
reused,
potential of
being reused;
the
the potential
Whether the
Whether they
or whether
have the
of being
reused, or
reused; (3)
merely have
they merely
(3) whether
a
original
materials
being reused
its
original
owner,
as
opposed
to
use
by
a
salvager
or
materials are
are being
its
salvager
as
to
0r
reused by
opposed
use
owner,
by
by
reclaimer.
reclaimer.
373
citations omitted).
at 1043
1043 (internal
F.3d at
373 F.3d
(internal citations
omitted).

‘solid waste’
waste’ under
The
Ninth Circuit
was not
RCRA
that the
The Ninth
the grass
not ‘solid
Circuit concluded
under RCRA
residue was
grass residue
concluded that

because
because

it was
in aa process
it
was actively
process beneﬁcial
beneficial to
original owners,
the original
the farmers,
to
reused by
farmers, in
owners, the
actively reused
by the

them.
Id.
them. Id.
‘discarded’ by
As
by the
that are
original possessor
original
the original
the original
materials that
As to
to materials
or the
are arguably
possessor or
arguably ‘discarded’

consumer
by another,
been
then later
the question
later reused
Whether those
materials have
of whether
question of
those materials
consumer and
and then
have been
reused by
another, the
‘discarded’ and
‘solid waste’
waste’ under
‘discarded’
RCRA appears
the RCRA
the
thus qualify
under the
dependent upon
and thus
upon the
appears very
as ‘solid
qualify as
very dependent
F .Supp.3d
facts.
for example,
Matt Canestrale
Inc., 51
51 F.Supp.3d
facts. See
Citizens Coal
Canestrale Contracting,
Council v.
See for
Coal Council
v. Matt
Contracting, Inc,
example, Citizens

609-611 (W.D.Penn.
in amended
593,
complaint sufficient
sufﬁcient to
allegations in
to raise
raise
amended complaint
(W.D.Penn. 2014)(holding
2014)(holding allegations
593, 609-611

materials’ under
‘discarded materials’
issue
whether coal
under RCRA
RCRA and
of fact
fact as
to Whether
and coal
ash were
and
coal refuse
coal ash
were ‘discarded
issue of
refuse and
as to
that Mr.
discussing
ultimate conclusion
the mere
Mr. Gibson
is aa factual
mere fact
fact that
conclusion is
discussing ultimate
Gibson accepts
factual one).
accepts
Certainly the
one). Certainly

from others
from which
these
insufﬁcient basis
which to
materials from
materials have
others is
is an
an insufficient
to conclude
these materials
those materials
conclude those
have
basis from
‘discarded.’ See
been ‘discarded.’
Fertilizer v.
E.P.A., 350
1268 (D.C.Cir.
and Fertilizer
been
Food and
F.3d 1263,
See Safe
v. E.P.A.,
350 F.3d
(D.C.Cir.
1263, 1268
Safe Food

‘discard’ clearly
in
that while
term ‘discard’
2003)(stating
the term
not include
material reused
while the
or recycled
include material
reused or
does not
clearly does
2003)(stating that
recycled in
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the
that material
the generating
the converse
not true.
The mere
for
material is
generating industry;
is not
mere fact
fact that
is destined
destined for
converse is
true. The
industry; the
‘discarded’).
recycling
by another
been ‘discarded’).
that material
not mean
material has
another does
mean that
has necessarily
does not
necessarily been
recycling by

The
being
little evidence
The record
the source
the grass
clippings and
contains little
to the
of the
record contains
and leaves
evidence as
source of
leaves being
as to
grass clippings
In other
composted
by Mr.
whether the
which
little evidence
from which
the plants
Mr. Gibson.
plants from
other words
there is
is little
Gibson. In
evidence whether
composted by
words there

the
were owned
by someone
than Mr.
the clippings
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
other than
originated were
and leaves
and grown
Gibson
someone other
grown by
owned and
leaves originated

if Mr.
and
that person
Mr. Gibson
his own
or persons,
or if
to
person or
trees to
and discarded
Gibson raises
raises his
own grass
and trees
discarded by
grass and
persons, or
by that
4

compost.4 In
In his
in making
produce the
making his
his affidavit
his compost.
the clippings
clippings and
affidavit dated
and leaves
October 24,
dated October
produce
leaves used
used in
24,

in 1994
2016,
with various
various persons
Mr. Gibson
The
having aa conversation
testiﬁed to
to having
1994 or
or 1995.
conversation with
Gibson testified
persons in
1995. The
2016, Mr.
Gibson’s receipt
topic
that conversation
from
Mr. Gibson’s
clippings and
topic of
of that
receipt of
of grass
conversation was
and leaves
grass clippings
leaves from
was Mr.

landscapers,
District (ACHD),
the city
the Ada
of Boise.
Boise.
and the
Ada County
landscapers, yard
tenders, the
Highway District
County Highway
city of
yard tenders,
(ACHD), and
10-24-16, at
In his
[Aff.
that he
his 2010
Mr. Gibson
of David
at p.
2010 affidavits,
he has
David Gibson,
Gibson avers
has
avers that
p. 6].
afﬁdavits, Mr.
Gibson, 10-24-16,
[Afﬁ of
6]. In
22 years.
continuously
all of
the product
his composting
for 22
of the
he produced
composting operation
operation for
product he
run his
produced
continuously run
However, all
years. However,

prior to
left on
prior
his operation
the land
another property
on another
when he
he moved
operation to
to the
land
to 2004
2004 was
moved his
was apparently
apparently left
property when
now
by VHS
yards he
the owners
the other
other
he claimed
of the
claimed the
now owned
VHS Properties,
owners of
less some
some 5,000
cubic yards
owned by
Properties, less
5,000 cubic
In that
property stole
between 2004
produced
from him.
him. In
that affidavit,
that between
testified that
he testified
2004 and
2010 he
he produced
stole from
and 2010
afﬁdavit, he
property

several
yards of
product on
the property
more yards
of humus
on the
Properties.
humus product
thousand more
now owned
VHS Properties.
several thousand
owned by
property now
by VHS
EX A.
[Aff.
the source
the materials
There is
materials
of David
A. p.
is no
no evidence
to the
or nature
of the
David Early,
nature of
evidence as
source or
as to
p. 5].
[Afﬁ of
Early, Ex
5]. There

he
produce that
that humus
from 2004
From his
his general
he used
to produce
2004 to
to 2010.
general statements
statements about
he
humus from
2010. From
how he
about how
used to
produces compost,
that the
the Court
infers that
the several
material he
of material
he produced
on
Court infers
thousand yards
several thousand
produced on
produces
compost, the
yards of
from the
the composting
the property
the
between 2004
2004 and
2010 came
composting of
of grass
VHS between
and 2010
came from
grass
owned by
property owned
by VHS

4
4

As
1994 Mr.
10-14-16], there
from others
Mr. Gibson
and leaves
David Gibson,
there is
As of
0f1994
receiving grass
grass and
others [aff.
of David
is no
no
Gibson was
was receiving
leaves from
Gibson, 10-14-16],
[afﬁ of
evidence
that was
this dispute.
time period
the case
for the
the time
relevant to
whether that
to this
period relevant
was the
dispute.
evidence whether
case for
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clippings
clippings and
the Court
the grass
is unable
to draw
inferences about
Court is
Where the
and leaves.
unable to
draw any
about where
leaves. However,
grass
However, the
any inferences
clippings
from or
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
them.
or how
and leaves
how Mr.
Gibson acquired
acquired them.
came from
leaves came
In order
In
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
to conclude
admits composting
composting on
on
order to
and leaves
Gibson admits
conclude the
grass clippings
leaves Mr.
VHS’s land
VHS’s
would have
within the
fall within
the Court
the definition
deﬁnition of
to
of solid
land fall
39-103, the
Court would
solid waste
under I.C.
have to
I.C. §§ 39-103,
waste under

infer
infer from
from this
this testimony
from the
The grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
the
that: 1)
and leaves
Gibson received
grass clippings
received from
leaves Mr.
testimony that:
1) The
in 1994
landscapers,
being
the city
or were
of Boise
1994 and
Boise in
and 1995
had been
and the
1995 had
been or
were being
landscapers, yard
tenders, ACHD,
ACHD, and
city of
yard tenders,

discarded
being sold),
that 2)
from 2004
for example,
entities (as
to being
2004 to
to
those entities
and that
discarded by
example, to
opposed, for
sold), and
(as opposed,
2) from
by those
2013
from those
Mr. Gibson
clippings and
2013 Mr.
to receive
or 3)
continued to
those same
Gibson continued
and leaves
receive grass
same sources
leaves from
sources or
grass clippings
3)
that
persons or
from other
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
entities
other sources
other persons
materials from
or entities
those materials
those other
and those
Gibson received
received those
sources and
were discarding
when they
were received
Mr.
materials or
materials when
or had
discarding those
those materials
those materials
had discarded
were
received by
discarded those
they were
by Mr.
Gibson.
unwilling to
The Court
is unwilling
to do
Court is
Gibson. The
do so.
so.
Mr.
business is
Smith property
that the
Mr. Gibson
the Smith
his business
which his
on which
testiﬁed that
is currently
is
Gibson testified
located is
currently located
property on

It is
aa 10
parcel. It
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
not grow
inference that
sufﬁcient amount
10 acre
is aa reasonable
amount
Gibson could
grow aa sufficient
reasonable inference
acre parcel.
could not
him with
of
provide him
that parcel
with the
the necessary
clippings and
of grass
on that
to provide
to
trees on
parcel to
and trees
and leaves
grass and
leaves to
necessary clippings

generate
yards of
between 2004
Mr. Gibson
2004 and
of humus
generate several
humus between
2010. However,
thousand yards
and 2010.
Gibson could
several thousand
could
However, Mr.
In the
certainly
purchase the
from others.
the plants
the clippings
clippings and
the event
plants elsewhere
or purchase
others. In
event
grow the
elsewhere or
and leaves
leaves from
certainly grow

Mr.
purchasing the
would certainly
the clippings
clippings and
not have
Mr. Gibson
is purchasing
and leaves,
Gibson is
have been
been
certainly not
leaves, they
they would
“discarded” by
their seller.
“discarded”
by their
seller.

At oral
him
At
pay him
that Mr.
for DEQ
Mr. Gibson
oral argument,
others to
to pay
requires others
Gibson requires
counsel for
asserted that
argument, counsel
DEQ asserted
their grass
for the
the privilege
clippings and
his property.
for
privilege of
property. While
While
of being
being able
to dump
on his
dump their
and leaves
able to
grass clippings
leaves on
in
that assertion
matter of
the Court
ﬁnd no
that
is likely
of common
common experience,
no evidence
assertion is
Court can
can find
true as
evidence in
as a
a matter
experience, the
likely true
Smith
the record
letter authored
the
unsworn letter
by Vernon
There is
Vernon K.
K. Smith
to support
is an
an unsworn
support such
authored by
conclusion. There
record to
such aa conclusion.

A to
Exhibit A
exhibit to
Jr.
which is
the 2010
Mr. Gibson
an exhibit
to the
2010 affidavit
afﬁdavit of
of Mr.
is attached
to
attached as
attached as
Jr. attached
Gibson which
as an
as Exhibit
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In
in support
the
plaintiff’s motion
judgment. In
ﬁrst affidavit
the first
motion for
for summary
Mr. Early
afﬁdavit of
of Mr.
ﬁled in
of plaintiff’s
support of
summary judgment.
Early filed

April of
that
between 2004
Smith writes
that letter,
that between
Mr. Smith
the date
the letter,
Mr.
of the
of 2008,
writes that
2004 and
and the
date of
letter, Mr.
letter, April
2008, Mr.
Gibson
from the
the Ada
District.
the City
receiving leaves
of Boise
Boise and
and the
Ada County
Gibson has
has been
been receiving
leaves from
Highway District.
County Highway
City of
However,
whether Mr.
for what
the letter
letter does
not specify
Mr. Gibson
entities for
What constitutes
those entities
constitutes
Gibson paid
paid those
does not
However, the
specify Whether
“discarded” them
the
whether those
them by
the raw
his composting
material of
entities “discarded”
of his
composting operation
operation or
or Whether
those entities
raw material
by

him to
giving
by paying
their hands.
giving them
them to
them off
Mr. Gibson
off their
to Mr.
or by
to take
take them
Gibson or
hands.
paying him

In its
in support
In
judgment, the
plaintiff argues
the plaintiff
its memorandum
its motion
motion for
for summary
memorandum in
of its
support of
argues
summary judgment,

Plaintiff then
correctly
that Mr.
then asserts:
Mr. Gibson
clippings and
admits composting
composting grass
Gibson admits
and leaves.
grass clippings
asserts:
leaves. Plaintiff
correctly that
“These materials
owner.” [Mem.
“These
their original
original owner.”
original purpose
the original
materials served
and were
were discarded
discarded by
served their
purpose and
[Mem
by the

In Supp.
Mtn Summ.
In
that is
the most
While that
regarding
Jdgmnt. at
at 10].
is certainly
most likely
supposition regarding
Summ. Jdgmnt.
Supp. Mtn
certainly the
likely supposition
10]. While

It may
it is
how
Mr. Gibson
not the
the only
is not
those materials,
how Mr.
Gibson acquires
possible one.
acquires those
one. It
be
materials, it
reasonably possible
only reasonably
may be
farming grass
that
purpose of
that the
the sale
for the
the sole
of compost
is sufficiently
to make
make farming
of
lucrative to
compost is
sale of
grass for
sole purpose
sufﬁciently lucrative

it into
It may
turning
viable. It
be that
willing to
into compost
that aa composting
turning it
composting operation
operation is
is Willing
to
compost economically
economically Viable.
may be

pay others
unwilling on
judgment motion
for those
The Court
motion to
others for
materials. The
is unwilling
on aa summary
to simply
those materials.
Court is
summary judgment
simply
pay
infer from
infer
from aa complete
that the
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
of evidence
admits
complete absence
and leaves
Gibson admits
evidence that
grass clippings
leaves Mr.
absence of
“discarded” by
receiving
receiving and
composting were
and composting
someone else.
were “discarded”
else.
by someone
in their
Plaintiff argues
First Amended
their answer
Plaintiff
that in
the First
Complaint Defendants
Defendants make
make
to the
Amended Complaint
answer to
argues that

various statements
be interpreted
that should
that the
the grass
clippings and
statements that
interpreted as
should be
and leaves
concession that
various
leaves
as a
a concession
grass clippings
5
waste’ or
waste.5
‘agricultural waste’
‘agricultural solid
that
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
admits composting
composting are
an ‘agricultural
or an
an ‘agricultural
solid waste.
Gibson admits
are an

2 to
for example
the answer
the amended
The Court
See
complaint. The
example pages
to 3
of the
to the
examined
Court has
answer to
has examined
amended complaint.
See for
pages 2
3 of

It mostly
similar to
the 39
the
with care.
of legal
legal arguments
arguments similar
to those
Defendants
those Defendants
consists of
answer with
care. It
39 page
page answer
mostly consists
55

plain statement
Defendants
First Amended
their defenses
Complaint is
the First
and plain
statement of
Defendants answer
short and
answer to
to the
is anything
of their
as
Amended Complaint
but aa short
defenses as
anything but
required
I.R.C.P.
However,
plaintiff
did
not
move
the
Court
to
strike
from
the
answer
insufficient
plaintiff
from
not
the
strike
the
insufﬁcient
Rule 8,
to
answer
required under
under Rule
Court
I.R.C.P.
did
move
However,
8,
defenses
volume of
material. See
large volume
the large
redundant material.
and/or the
of redundant
I.R.C.P. 12(f).
defenses and/or
See I.R.C.P.
12(f).
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in their
have
judgment motion
their opposition
that the
the summary
motion that
the Court
opposition to
to the
to some
Court discusses
have made
made in
some
discusses to
summary judgment

extent
below. The
that the
the grass
clippings and
extent below.
The answer
not contain
contain aa factual
admission that
and leaves
answer does
factual admission
leaves
grass clippings
does not
Mr.
from
Mr. Gibson
other facts
admits receiving
receiving and
composting were
or any
facts from
Gibson admits
and composting
were discarded
discarded by
others, or
any other
by others,
might reasonably
which the
before the
that inference.
the Court
The record
the Court
the
which
make that
inference. The
on the
Court might
Court on
record before
reasonably make

motion
judgment is
from 2004
motion for
for summary
silent as
the source
materials from
is simply
to the
of those
2004 to
to
those materials
source of
as to
summary judgment
simply silent
2013.
2013.
DEQ’s arguments
The
will make
The Court
the definition
deﬁnition of
brief comment
comment on
make aa brief
on one
of DEQ’s
arguments as
to the
of
Court will
one of
as to
“discards” or
“solid waste.”
waste.” DEQ
“solid
possessor “discards”
that solid
the possessor
material the
or gets
solid waste
includes any
gets
waste includes
argues that
DEQ argues
any material

if that
rid
value or
that material
rid of,
material may
or use
to someone
someone else.
have some
some value
even if
else.
use to
of, even
may have
There
with reading
the language
There are
difﬁculties with
reading the
of I.C.
are some
language of
some difficulties
LC. §39-103(13)
as broadly
as
broadly as
§39-103(13) as
Webster’s Collegiate
it should
A fine
in Merriam
DEQ
Merriam Webster’s
ﬁne example
the one
example is
is the
listed in
Collegiate
should be
one listed
argues it
read. A
be read.
DEQ argues

Dictionary:
Clothing which
tired of
which an
of as
fashions change.
or simply
an owner
outgrown or
owner has
change.
has outgrown
as fashions
Dictionary: Clothing
simply tired
6
“garbageé”
English speakers
Normal English
becomes “garbage
” when
when the
clothing becomes
the owner
Normal
the clothing
owner discards
speakers would
discards
agree the
would agree

owner’s trash
it by
it in
in the
it at
it
by depositing
the owner’s
the street
for eventually
trash can
depositing it
at the
street curb
can and
and places
curb for
places it
eventually delivery
delivery

“solid waste”
waste” in
in that
In that
to
that scenario.
that scenario
clothing is
clothing
the local
landfill. The
The clothing
the clothing
to the
is “solid
local landfill.
scenario the
scenario. In
7
everyone.7 However,
if the
it
will remain
useless to
by giving
giving it
Will
clothing by
remain useless
the owner
the clothing
to everyone.
What if
discards the
owner discards
However, what

second-hand clothing
to
clothing
for distribution
the less
the second-hand
the local
distribution to
shelter for
to the
or to
to the
to the
local homeless
homeless shelter
less fortunate,
fortunate, or

“solid waste”
in those
still “solid
store
waste” in
clothing still
for eventually
the clothing
the
Is the
store for
those scenarios?
scenarios? Certainly
resale? Is
Certainly the
eventually resale?

of” itit in
“gotten rid
“discarded” or
in each
original
possessor has
yet most
original possessor
rid of”
the
or “gotten
most speakers
of the
has “discarded”
speakers of
each scenario;
scenario; yet
66

As
that term
in I.D.A.P.A
term is
not as
I.D.A.P.A 58.01.06.005(15).
As that
is normally
as defined
deﬁned in
58.01 .06.005(1 5).
normally understood,
understood, not
This
useful again.
a generalization.
all things
Either because
things are
again. Either
their
This is
generalization. Given
are likely
is a
to become
Given enough
enough time,
become useful
because their
time, all
likely to
composition
use for
which was
previously useless.
that which
for that
The midden
composition changes
changes or
or because
ﬁnds aa new
midden heaps
heaps
new use
was previously
because humanity
useless. The
humanity finds
Court’s comment
a treasure
past are
are a
for the
the archeologist
The Court’s
of
there is
comment simply
archeologist of
is aa
of societies
treasure trove
of today.
recognizes there
trove for
societies past
simply recognizes
today. The
temporal
important to
normal meaning
meaning of
This temporal
temporal component
temporal component
the normal
the word
the
component to
to the
of the
component seemed
to the
waste. This
word waste.
seemed important
waste” and
“processing solid
it decided
that composting
Supreme
was “processing
Virginia when
and not
not
of Virginia
when it
composting tree
tree stumps
Court of
stumps was
solid waste”
Supreme Court
decided that
“recycling” as
“recycling”
Farms, Inc.
Loudon,
409
S.E.2d
in that
that state.
Inc. v.
are defined
terms are
as those
state. See
v. County
those terms
deﬁned in
409
S.E.2d
Ticonderoga Farms,
See Ticonderoga
Loudon,
County of
of
446
446 (Va.
1991).
(Va. 1991).

77
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“waste” or
in the
English
would not
English language
clothing in
not consider
the clothing
the latter
latter two
to be
or
consider the
language would
scenarios to
two scenarios
be “waste”
“garbage.” Is
“garbage.”
part of
intent on
the distinction
matter of
the part
the person
the
distinction simply
Is the
of intent
on the
of the
doing the
person doing
simply aa matter
‘garbage’ because
it intends
discarding?
because the
clothing going
landﬁll ‘garbage’
going to
the landfill
the person
intends
is clothing
to the
discarding it
discarding? I.e,
person discarding
Le, is

it will
that
will never
be used
useless), While
while clothing
that it
clothing headed
remain useless),
the
again by
to the
never be
headed to
used again
anyone (it
(it remain
by anyone
it intends
it to
thrift store
homeless
because the
person discarding
the person
not garbage
intends it
shelter or
to have
or thrift
is not
discarding it
store is
homeless shelter
have
garbage because
in the
in solid
some
waste
the future?
for example,
the Idaho
Youth Ranch
Ranch engaged
another in
to another
Idaho Youth
solid waste
some use
engaged in
future? Is,
use to
example, the
Is, for

“stores” solid
“collects” and
“discarded” by
it “collects”
disposal
because it
by others?
that have
materials that
others?
solid materials
and “stores”
disposal because
have been
been “discarded”

it collects
Is
used sporting
sporting goods
regulation by
to regulation
Is aa used
store similarly
collects and
and
subject to
goods store
because it
similarly subject
DEQ because
by DEQ
might otherwise
in the
stores
balls that
be placed
jacket
that might
the cut
golf balls
the landfill?
landfill? Is
the jacket
or scuffed
Is the
stores the
cut or
otherwise be
scuffed golf
placed in

“waste” when
in the
placed in
still “waste”
item is
from
original owner
the item
the garbage
its original
when the
is removed
dumpster by
owner still
removed from
placed
garbage dumpster
by its

diver” and
“dumpster diver”
the
by aa “dumpster
person? One
would have
that person?
the trash
all
trash by
reworn by
to answer
to all
and reworn
One would
answer yes
have to
yes to
by that
“discarded” to
if one
those
their
that have
definition of
the definition
all items
items that
of “discarded”
to mean
mean all
those questions
questions if
one reads
have served
reads the
served their

In Supp.
their original
purpose and
useful to
Mtn. for
original user.
for Summ.
longer useful
no longer
to their
Summ.
and are
are no
user. See
purpose
See [Mem.
Supp. Mtn.
[Mem In
multi-part test
it is
Ninth circuit
Jdgmnt
understand why
the Ninth
Jdgmnt at
circuit adopted
at 9].
is easy
to understand
test to
to
adopted aa multi-part
Certainly it
easy to
9]. Certainly
why the
similar questions.
determine
determine similar
questions.

This
This Court
not finally
there is
is aa
Court need
those questions.
Under any
questions. Under
resolve those
need not
definition, there
ﬁnally resolve
any definition,
question
prevents this
that prevents
this Court
from concluding
the grass
clippings and
of fact
fact that
concluding the
question of
Court from
and leaves
grass clippings
were
leaves were
“discarded.”
“discarded.”

The
that the
mindful that
The Court
the parties
not appear
the source
the grass
is mindful
parties do
to dispute
of the
Court is
dispute the
appear to
grass
source of
do not
that Mr.
into compost.
clippings
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
The parties
parties appear
to simply
or
turns into
and leaves
Gibson turns
compost. The
appear to
leaves that
assume, or
simply assume,
that Mr.
from others
them
take
who do
Mr. Gibson
not want
items from
take as
others who
want them
these items
Gibson receives
receives these
as a
a given,
do not
given, that

in the
anymore.
parties have
not alleged
the amended
the parties
not
these facts
facts were
alleged in
amended complaint,
were not
have not
complaint, the
However, these
anymore. However,
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in the
stipulated
unable to
the Court
the record
to them,
of those
is unable
to locate
stipulated to
those facts
facts in
Court is
and the
locate any
record
evidence of
them, and
any evidence

before it,
than the
the evidence
other than
before
evidence discussed
discussed above.
above.
it, other
DEQ’s motion
in its
For
judgment in
this reason,
For this
motion seeking
the summary
its favor
seeking the
of judgment
is
favor is
reason, DEQ’s
summary entry
entry of

denied.
denied.
Defendants’ many
The
whether to
next consider
all of
the Defendants’
The Court
or all
of the
to address
must next
Court must
consider Whether
some or
address some
many

plaintiff’ s motion
in opposition
legal
judgment. Defendants
motion for
for summary
the plaintiff’s
legal arguments
opposition to
to the
Defendants argue
arguments in
argue
summary judgment.
Gibson’s composting
Mr.
variety of
for aa variety
Mr. Gibson’s
not subject
of legal
legal
composting operation
operation is
is not
to regulation
regulation by
subject to
DEQ for
by DEQ

DEQ’s regulations
reasons,
from the
stemming from
the state
the language
the language
of the
of DEQ’s
regulations to
to the
state
language of
language of
reasons, stemming

constitution.
that precludes
the Court
there is
of
determined there
is aa factual
constitution. Because
Court has
has determined
factual issue
precludes entry
issue that
Because the
entry of

plaintiff’ s favor,
in the
it is
judgment in
not necessary
for the
the Court
the legal
the plaintiff’s
judgment
is not
to reach
legal defenses
Court to
reach the
defenses
favor, it
necessary for
in deciding
raised
by Defendants
judgment.
the motion
motion for
for summary
Defendants in
deciding the
raised by
summary judgment.
non-moving
Certainly
judgment on
behalf of
the defendants
the non-moving
the Court
enter judgment
on behalf
of the
defendants as
Court could
could enter
as the
Certainly the

“The district
if itit believed
party if
were entitled
judgment. “The
entitled to
district court
to judgment.
court may
believed they
patty
they were
may
non-moving party
if the
grant summary
grant
judgment to
party even
party has
the party
has not
not filed
its own
motion
to aa non-moving
ﬁled its
own motion
even if
summary judgment

court.” Harwood
Harwood v.
with
with the
the court.”
Idaho 672,
136 Idaho
617 (2001)
P.3d 612,
v. Talbert,
39 P.3d
Talbert, 136
(emphasis
612, 617
672, 677,
677, 39
(2001) (emphasis
that the
added).
fact that
limited amount
the Court
the fact
the moving
has aa limited
amount of
moving party
mindful of
is mindful
of the
of
Court is
However, the
added). However,
party has

non-moving party
in aa summary
time
under Rule
judgment
time under
the non-moving
arguments raised
Rule 56
to reply
to arguments
raised by
56 to
summary judgment
party in
reply to
by the
Defendants’ various
that if
if itit rejects
motion.
fact that
legal defenses
The Court
the fact
motion. The
mindful of
is also
also mindful
of the
various legal
Court is
rejects Defendants’
defenses

Plaintiff’s motion
in denying
that decision
in
not reviewable
the Plaintiff’s
motion that
appeal. Garcia
is not
on appeal.
reviewable on
decision is
Garcia v.
v.
denying the
144 Idaho
if the
Windley,
164 P.3d
822 (2007).
the Court
Idaho 539,
Court reaches
reaches
P.3d 819,
even if
Therefore, even
542, 164
819, 822
Windley, 144
539, 542,
(2007). Therefore,

Defendants’ arguments
Defendants’
will necessarily
the Defendants,
the Defendants
arguments now
against the
Defendants Will
now and
and decides
decides against
Defendants, the
necessarily

if one
trial to
raise
preserve those
for appeal,
legal arguments
at trial
to preserve
arguments for
is
raise those
those same
those arguments
arguments at
one is
same legal
appeal, if
necessary.
various legal
For these
the Court
the various
to address
legal defenses
these reasons,
Court declines
declines to
raised by
defenses raised
address the
reasons, the
necessary. For
by
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plaintiff’ s motion
in their
the
judgment, with
their opposition
with two
motion for
for summary
the Defendants
Defendants in
opposition to
to plaintiff’s
two
summary judgment,

,

Defendants’ argument
exceptions
that they
limitations and
the application
the statute
the Defendants’
argument that
application of
of the
of limitations
exceptions – the
and the
statute of
they

in their
are
judgment in
their favor
the pleadings.
entitled to
to summary
on the
favor based
pleadings.
are entitled
based on
summary judgment
in opposition
Defendants
limitations both
the issue
the statute
the
of the
Defendants raised
of limitations
both in
opposition to
to the
raised the
statute of
issue of

plaintiff’s
in their
plaintiff’s motion
judgment and
their own
motion to
The Court
motion for
for summary
to dismiss.
Court
dismiss. The
and in
own motion
summary judgment
in its
addresses
that motion.
its order
the motion
motion to
motion.
to dismiss
dismiss in
order denying
addresses the
denying that

That
brings the
That brings
the Court
the question
not the
the Court
the issue
whether or
to the
of whether
or not
question of
Court to
Court may
consider the
issue
may consider
in the
of
plaintiff’s motion
limitations in
the statute
the context
the plaintiff’s
motion for
for summary
context of
of limitations
of the
of deciding
deciding the
statute of
summary
non-moving party
if
judgment. The
judgment to
party even
grant summary
The district
district court
to aa non-moving
judgment.
court may
even if
summary judgment
may grant

court.” Harwood
with the
Harwood v.
the
not filed
its own
motion With
the court.”
the party
ﬁled its
Idaho 672,
has not
own motion
136 Idaho
v. Talbert,
Talbert, 136
party has
672, 677,
677,

39
Brummett v.
Ediger, 106
P.2d 1271,
1273
Idaho 724,
617 (2001);
106 Idaho
682 P.2d
P.3d 612,
39 P.3d
v. Ediger,
1271, 1273
612, 617
724, 726,
726, 682
(2001); Bmmmett
(1984)
the district
not decide
district court
an issue
court may
I.R.C.P. 56(a),
issue
decide an
(citing I.R.C.P.
However, the
(1984) (citing
may not
56(a), (b),
(d)). However,
(b), (c),
(c), (d)).
party’s motion
in the
not
judgment. Hardwood,
not raised
the moving
motion for
for summary
moving party’s
at 618,
Idaho at
raised in
136 Idaho
39
Hardwood, 136
summary judgment.
618, 39

P.3d
Idaho Ins.
Ins. Agency,
Agency, Inc,
Inc., 126
126 Idaho
at 618
P.2d 1034,
Idaho 527,
618 citing
Thomson v.
P.3d at
1037
citing Thomson
887 P.2d
v. Idaho
1034, 1037
527, 530,
530, 887
non-moving party
by the
(1994)
not required
not raised
the moving
moving
is not
to respond
to issues
required to
respond to
raised by
issues not
(holding non-moving
party is
(1994) (holding
non-moving party
if the
party even
party ultimately
ultimately has
burden of
proof at
the burden
the non-moving
of proof
at trial);
Esser
has the
even if
accord Esser
trial); accord
party

Elec. V.
Lost River
River Ballistics
Inc. 145
145 Idaho
Idaho 912,
188 P.3d
861
P.3d 854,
Elec.
Ballistics Technologies,
V. Lost
Technologies, Inc.
912, 919,
919, 188
854, 861
(2008)(holding
judgment are
by the
the only
the
on summary
those issues
raised by
are those
considered on
issues considered
issues raised
summary judgment
(2008)(holding the
only issues
trial court
pleadings…The
by the
party’s motion
not decide
not raised
the moving
motion for
for
moving party’s
an issue
court may
pleadings.
raised by
issue not
decide an
. .The trial
may not

summary
judgment).
summary judgment).
in its
limitations in
Here
plaintiff unsurprisingly
unsurprisingly did
not raise
the issue
the statute
its
of the
of limitations
Here plaintiff
raise the
did not
statute of
issue of

in their
their pleadings.
that issue
motion
judgment and
by the
motion for
for summary
not raised
the defendants
defendants in
pleadings.
and that
raised by
issue was
was not
summary judgment

ORDER
ORDER -- 16
16

000672

plaintiff’s timely
Therefore,
will not
when deciding
that issue
the plaintiff’s
motion for
for
the Court
not consider
deciding the
Court will
consider that
issue when
Therefore, the
timely motion
summary
judgment.
summary judgment.
DEQ’s motion
in their
in opposition
Defendants
their memorandum
motion for
for summary
Defendants argue
memorandum in
opposition to
to DEQ’s
argue in
summary
in their
judgment that
judgment in
based only
their favor
that they
the entry
the
entitled to
judgment
to the
of judgment
favor based
are entitled
upon the
entry of
they are
only upon

pleadings. Defendants
be
that DEQ
relief may
claim upon
which relief
Defendants argue
failed to
to state
state a
pleadings.
has failed
upon which
argue that
a claim
DEQ has
may be
in its
granted
this Court
its complaint
the complaint
complaint and,
complaint pursuant
granted in
to Rule
Rule
dismiss the
pursuant to
Court should
should dismiss
therefore, this
and, therefore,

“A motion
12(b)(6)
judgment allows
the court
motion for
for summary
the issues
to rule
on the
court to
allows the
and 12(c).
rule on
issues
summary judgment
12(0). “A
12(b)(6) and
it as
placed before
before it
will find
find against
risk that
that the
matter of
the moving
the risk
the court
moving party
against
of law;
court will
runs the
placed
as a
a matter
law; the
party runs

it.” Harwood,
it.”
Harwood, 136
the Court
the
examine the
at 677,
at 617.
is required
to examine
required to
Court is
136 Id.
Id. at
P.3d at
617. Therefore,
39 P.3d
Therefore, the
677, 39

if DEQ
pleadings and
upon which
which this
this Court
grant relief.
claim upon
determine if
pleadings
relief.
Court may
and determine
has alleged
alleged aa claim
DEQ has
may grant
Defendants’ argue
Plaintiff has
Defendants’
upon which
which relief
that Plaintiff
relief may
claim upon
failed to
to state
state aa claim
has failed
argue that
be
may be
in various
granted
briefing. They
their brieﬁng.
that I.D.A.P.A.
forms throughout
throughout their
granted is
is repeated
I.D.A.P.A.
repeated in
various forms
argue that
They argue
“manures and
58.01.06.001(03)
waste “manures
from regulation
regulation as
solid waste
and crop
crop (plant)
residue
excludes from
as solid
58.01.06.001(03) excludes
(plant) residue
rates.” Defendants
ultimately returned
the soils
clippings and
to the
at agronomic
agronomic rates.”
Defendants argue
soils at
returned to
and leaves
leaves
argue grass
grass clippings
ultimately

“crop or
residue” and,
are
plant residue”
from regulation.
or plant
regulation.
are “crop
are excluded
excluded from
therefore, are
and, therefore,

At one
In their
their
At
with the
that issue
the issue
Defendants confuse
of standing.
standing. In
one point,
issue with
issue of
confuse that
point, Defendants
DEQ’s motion
in opposition
memorandum
judgment Defendants
that
motion for
for summary
memorandum filed
ﬁled in
opposition to
to DEQ’s
Defendants argue
argue that
summary judgment

“standing” to
DEQ
bring the
clippings and
the complaint
complaint because
to bring
lacks “standing”
and leaves
are specifically
grass clippings
leaves are
because grass
specifically
DEQ lacks
in I.D.A.P.A.
exempted
from regulation
the exclusionary
regulation by
I.D.A.P.A. 58.01.06.001(03).
exempted from
found in
language found
exclusionary language
58.01.06.001(03).
by the

“standing.” A
Defendants’ argument
A traditional
term “standing.”
the meaning
meaning of
the term
Defendants’
traditional standing
standing
argument conflates
of the
conflates the
the party
the relief
relief and
not on
the issues
the party
analysis
party seeking
party wishes
on the
seeking the
on the
to have
and not
Wishes to
have
issues the
focuses on
analysis focuses
492 (2002).
The
adjudicated.
Lewiston, 137
Thompson v.
Idaho 473,
137 Idaho
P.3d 488,
adjudicated. Thompson
v. City
50 P.3d
ofLewiston,
473, 477,
477, 50
488, 492
(2002). The
City of

in the
legislature
bring civil
the district
the director
district
civil actions
authorized the
director of
of DEQ
to bring
actions in
legislature has
has specifically
speciﬁcally authorized
DEQ to
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court
plaintiff therefore
EPHA. I.C.
the provisions
The plaintiff
the
therefore has
of EPHA.
to enforce
provisions of
enforce the
court to
has the
I.C. §§ 39-108(3)(b).
39-108(3)(b). The
standing
bring this
this action.
standing requisite
requisite to
to bring
action.
Defendants’ argument
Rather
Plaintiff alleges
than an
that Plaintiff
Rather than
an issue
of standing,
is simply
argument is
alleges
issue of
standing, Defendants’
simply that

if grass
that
that Mr.
that even
Mr. Gibson
clippings and
is composting
composting grass
Defendants argue
Gibson is
and leaves.
grass clippings
argue that
even if
grass
leaves. Defendants
in I.C.
clippings
waste as
clippings and
solid waste
has specifically
deﬁned in
and leaves
are solid
leaves are
LG §§ 39-103(13),
as defined
speciﬁcally
39-10303), DEQ
DEQ has
sub-part 3,
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001
chosen,
from the
clippings and
the solid
exempt grass
to exempt
solid
and leaves
grass clippings
58.01.06.001 sub-part
leaves from
chosen, in
3, to

residue.”
waste management
because grass
“cr0p(plant) residue.”
clippings and
management regulations
regulations because
and leaves
are “crop(plant)
grass clippings
waste
leaves are

IDAPA58.006.001(03)(b)(ii)
that the
not apply
the rules
regulating solid
solid waste
specifies that
waste do
rules regulating
do not
IDAPA58.006.001(03)(b)(ii) specifies
apply
rates.”
“manures and
to
the soil
to “manures
to the
soil at
at agronomic
returned to
agronomic rates.”
and crop(plant)
residues ultimately
ultimately returned
cr0p(plant) residues

“Any agricultural
Subsection
which is
exempts “Any
is managed
agricultural solid
solid waste
managed and
and
Subsection (03)(b)(iii)
waste which
similarly exempts
(03)(b)(iii) similarly
Agriculture.” Defendants
regulated
pursuant to
the Idaho
Department of
to rules
of Agriculture.”
Defendants argue
Idaho Department
regulated pursuant
rules adopted
adopted by
argue
by the

that
being composted
by Mr.
both exemptions.
that the
fall under
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
exemptions.
under both
and leaves
Gibson fall
composted by
leaves being
grass clippings
“crop or
residue” and,
Defendants
that grass
plant residue”
clippings and
Defendants argue
or plant
and leaves
are clearly
argue that
grass clippings
leaves are
clearly aa “crop
and,

In their
their briefing
therefore
from regulation.
briefing Defendants
the
exempt from
therefore exempt
Defendants consistently
misquote the
regulation. In
consistently misquote
“crop or
residue;”
language
plant residue;”
not for
for “crop
The exemption
exemption is
or plant
is not
of I.D.A.P.A.
I.D.A.P.A. 58.006.001(03)(b)(ii).
language of
58.006.001(03)(b)(ii). The

‘plant’ in
“crop (plant)
residue.” DEQ
in parentheses
the
word ‘plant’
parentheses is
that the
the exemption
the word
exemption is
is “crop
is and
and
argues that
DEQ argues
(plant) residue.”
‘crop,’ not
adjective
the noun
not to
intended to
to modify
noun ‘crop,’
to stand
stand alone
alone as
noun. DEQ
separate noun.
adjective intended
as a
a separate
argues
modify the
DEQ argues

the
plants from
plant is
that are
from crops
that
the inclusion
the word
differentiate crops
inclusion of
is intended
intended to
to differentiate
of the
are plants
word plant
crops that
crops that
are
plain language
animal
The Court
The plain
the regulation
regulation exempts
animals. The
of the
exempts manure,
an animal
Court agrees.
are animals.
agrees. The
language of
manure, an
product, and
and crop
crop (plant)
residue.
product,
(plant) residue.
“a plant
‘crop’ is
that can
plant or
plant or
One
word ‘crop’
product that
animal or
animal product
deﬁnition of
the word
is “a
or animal
or plant
or animal
of the
can
One definition
<a crop
<an apple
cr0p> <a
proﬁt or
be grown
for profit
or subsistence
grown and
apple crop>
crop
and harvested
subsistence <an
harvested extensively
be
extensively for

of
wool>.”
of W001>.”

th
11th
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
in its
Plaintiff cites
this definition
Merriam-Webster’s
Ed.
deﬁnition in
its briefing.
brieﬁng.
to this
Collegiate Dictionary
cites to
Ed. Plaintiff
Dictionary 11
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in I.D.A.P.A.
The
word crop
The modifier
the word
modifier (plant)
following the
intends
I.D.A.P.A. 58.006.001(03)(b)(iii)
crop in
clearly intends
58.006.001(03)(b)(iii) clearly
(plant) following

to
plants or
that are
from those
that are
animal products
differentiate those
animals or
to differentiate
or animal
or
those crops
those crops
are animals
are plants
products from
crops that
crops that
plant products.
products. The
plant
plant products
from the
that are
The residue
the solid
exempt from
plants or
of crops
or plant
solid
are exempt
are plants
residue of
products are
crops that

if ultimately
waste regulations
ultimately returned
the soil
regulations if
to the
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic rates.
returned to
rates.
waste
“crop.” Does
“residue” of
As
plant this
what is
that
this raises
the issue
As to
to any
of What
is “residue”
of aa “crop.”
speciﬁc plant
raises the
Does that
issue of
any specific
“crop” or
it is
it is
depend
upon Whether
whether it
plant or
whether it
that is
the plant
animal itself
itself that
the “crop”
is the
or animal
is the
or Whether
is aa product
of
product of
depend upon

“crop” is
the
plant or
that is
the plant
animal that
the crop?
For example,
the “crop”
the entire
entire tree
part of
or animal
is the
is apples,
is the
tree part
of
crop? For
example, if the
apples, is
7
“residue”? Or
it only
the
product of
the tree
the crop
the leaves
the product
the tree
of the
tree are
Or is
is it
of the
tree –
are “residue”?
crop and,
leaves of
therefore, the
and, therefore,
only the
7 that
‘residue’ would
the
that constitute
the crop
the only
the stem
the
the apples
constitute the
stem and
crop and,
and the
apples –
would be
be the
therefore, the
and, therefore,
only ‘residue’

‘crop’ such
core?
plant the
that the
the entire
entire plant
the ‘crop’
the roots,
field of
of corn,
is the
to aa field
and
such that
core? Similarly,
as to
stalks, and
roots, stalks,
corn, is
Similarly, as
‘residue’ after
it only
leaves
would constitute
plant itself
the plant
itself would
the ears
the
after the
of the
Or is
is it
constitute ‘residue’
are harvested?
ears are
harvested? Or
leaves of
only the

,

‘crop’ and
product of
plant 7– the
that are
the plant
the ‘crop’
the corn
the husk,
kernals – that
of the
corn kernals
product
are the
and only
and cob
cob
silk, and
husk, silk,
only the
‘crop residue’?
residue“?
would be
be ‘crop
would

‘crop’ is
This
This Court
that the
definition of
the definition
inclined to
is inclined
to conclude
of ‘crop’
is broad
to
Court is
enough to
conclude that
broad enough

might also
in another
if that
encompass
plant even
word might
be used
used in
that word
the entire
entire plant
refer to
another context
context to
to refer
to
also be
encompass the
even if
might refer
only
plant. While
that plant.
that plant
plant or
part of
the
While one
refer to
of that
or aa specific
of that
to the
specific product
product of
one might
speciﬁc part
only aa specific

“crop,” one
year’s “crop,”
bushels of
blackberries harvested
brambles as
just
from aa field
that year’s
of blackberries
ﬁeld of
of brambles
one would
bushels
harvested from
would just
as that

“crop.” Most
as
the row
refer to
to the
of brambles
grown to
to produce
Most speakers
berries as
those berries
brambles grown
row of
speakers
produce those
as easily
as a
a “crop.”
easily refer
mint as
English language
of
the English
refer to
of the
to fields
fields of
of corn,
or mint
being
language would
would refer
as being
potatoes, beets,
Wheat, potatoes,
corn, wheat,
beets, or

“crops,” even
proﬁt or
portion of
used for
“crops,”
for profit
though only
plants are
of those
or subsistence.
those plants
are used
even though
subsistence.
only aa portion
this definition,
from aa particular
Using
particular grass
plant or
not clippings
clippings from
whether or
or leaves
Using this
or not
grass plant
leaves
deﬁnition, whether

“crop residue”
residue” Will
from aa particular
plant do
from
particular plant
not constitute
will depend
upon whether
the
Whether the
or do
constitute “crop
depend upon
do or
do not
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plant from
particular grass
plant from
particular
particular plant
from which
from which
leaf
the clippings
clippings came
the particular
the leaf
which the
which the
grass plant
came or
or the
“can be
subsistence.”
originated
be grown
profit or
originated “can
and harvested
for proﬁt
grown and
or subsistence.”
harvested extensively
extensively for

Certainly,
produce leaves.
that produce
there are
plants that
most
of plants
multitude of
are aa multitude
leaves. Botanically
Botanically speaking,
speaking, most
Certainly, there
“grass clippings”
clippings” likely
“grass
plant, unless
the leaves
the grass
the
shearing the
of the
of the
is shearing
consist largely
unless one
one is
grass plant,
leaves of
likely consist
largely of

in which
plant close
base, in
which case
parts of
plant
the clippings
clippings may
its base,
the stalk
stalk as
to its
of the
include parts
well.
close to
case the
as well.
may include

‘leaf’ from
word ‘leaf’
viewpoint, there
plethora
However,
from aa less
the word
there are
scientiﬁc Viewpoint,
considering the
are aa plethora
even considering
less scientific
However, even

of
plants with
with leaves
that can
proﬁt or
for profit
of plants
grown and
or
can and
and are
are commonly
and harvested
harvested extensively
leaves that
extensively for
commonly grown
mint and
subsistence
– fruit
potato Vines;
vines; grape
nut trees;
fruit trees;
other herbs;
grape vines;
and other
subsistence 7
sugar beets;
trees; nut
trees; potato
Vines; sugar
herbs;
beets; mint

coffee
plants which
produce most
the plants
which produce
most spices,
maple trees;
coffee bushes;
and the
sugar maple
rubber trees;
trees; sugar
trees; and
bushes; rubber
spices,
in the
in the
including
vines in
– are
but aa few
the genus
the family
including trees
trees in
and Vines
are but
few
genus Cinnamomum
Piperaceae 7
Cinnamomum and
family Piperaceae
‘can be
it is
familiar
familiar examples.
plant that
that ‘can
difﬁcult to
is difficult
to image
image aa plant
grown and
examples. Indeed,
and harvested
harvested
be grown
Indeed, it

‘leaf.’ Therefore,
subsistence’ that
extensively
profit or
that does
from these
for proﬁt
not produce
or subsistence’
these
produce aa ‘leaf.’
leaves from
does not
Therefore, leaves
extensively for

plants, whether
year as
that simply
fall off
plant naturally
off the
the plant
during harvesting
Whether removed
or that
harvesting or
removed during
each year
as
naturally each
plants,
simply fall
“crop residue.”
residue.”
part of
part
the growth
of the
growth cycle,
constitute “crop
arguably constitute
cycle, arguably

There
that can
proﬁt or
for profit
There are
grown and
or
cultivated extensively
can be
are also
and cultivated
also many
grasses that
be grown
extensively for
many grasses
‘grass.’ The
subsistence.
wheat,
all cereal
The stalks
grains are
stalks and
of Wheat,
cereal grains
are a
and leaves
subsistence. Botanically
leaves of
a ‘grass.’
Botanically speaking,
speaking, all

‘crop residue.’
residue.’
rye,
barley plants
plants whose
been harvested
and barley
have been
harvested certainly
Whose seeds
seeds have
as ‘crop
certainly qualify
qualify as
rye, and

“turf” grasses
if
However,
familiar “turf”
for profit,
the more
more familiar
can and
and are
are harvested
even the
harvested extensively
grasses can
extensively for
However, even
proﬁt, if
8
subsistence.8 Northern
not
Northern Idaho
with fields
not for
for subsistence.
for the
the
is replete
replete with
of Kentucky
grown for
Idaho is
ﬁelds of
bluegrass grown
Kentucky bluegrass

selling the
the seeds
purpose of
to suburban
home owners
Wish to
to have
green lawns
of selling
owners who
who wish
suburban home
have pretty
lawns
seeds to
purpose
pretty green
farmer’s
in aa farmer’s
their desert
from aa Kentucky
Clippings from
around
bluegrass plant
plant growing
growing in
around their
desert homes.
homes. Clippings
Kentucky bluegrass
88

“grown and
subsistence” those
If one
If
within the
plants grown
the definition
deﬁnition of
the phrase
and harvested
for
phrase “grown
of the
grown for
those plants
includes within
harvested …for
...for subsistence”
one includes
the
which are
then slaughtered
then
the purpose
are then
milked to
for humans,
of being
being fed
to livestock,
slaughtered or
or milked
to provide
sustenance for
fed to
provide sustenance
purpose of
livestock, which
humans, then
“crop” would
the
would include
grazing.
great number
the definition
deﬁnition of
and aa great
for grazing.
of “crop”
corn and
number of
of grasses
as fodder
or for
include feed
grasses grown
fodder or
feed corn
grown as
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in aa suburban
field
bluegrass plant
plant growing
from aa bluegrass
clippings from
growing in
therefore both
both
ﬁeld and
are therefore
and clippings
suburban lawn
lawn are
‘plant that
proﬁt;’ i.e.
clippings
from aa ‘plant
that can
clippings from
for profit;’
grown and
can be
and harvested
i.e. aa crop.
crop.
harvested extensively
be grown
extensively for

‘crop’ cited
in fact
Notably, the
that are
definition of
the definition
not only
plants that
of ‘crop’
to by
fact
cited to
those plants
includes not
are in
Notably,
only those
DEQ includes
by DEQ

being grown
profit or
plant that
that is
for proﬁt
being
or subsistence
is capable
of being
being so
and harvested
but also
subsistence but
grown and
also any
harvested for
capable of
so
any plant
it is
grown
Whether it
is or
or not.
not.
grown and
and harvested,
harvested, whether
‘crop’ than
There
proposed by
than the
the one
deﬁnition of
Other
There is
restrictive definition
is aa more
more restrictive
of ‘crop’
one proposed
DEQ. Other
by DEQ.
“a cultivated
‘crop’ as
sources
plant that
that is
is grown
grown on
on aa large
large scale
deﬁne aa ‘crop’
cultivated plant
scale commercially,
sources define
as “a
commercially,

“a plant
especially
vegetable,” Oxford
plant such
English Living
Living Dictionary,
or vegetable,”
Oxford English
and as
such
as “a
fruit, or
especially aa cereal,
cereal, fruit,
Dictionary, and
farm.” Cambridge
in large
as
fruit grown
or fruit
large amounts
on aa farm.”
amounts on
Cambridge Dictionary.
as a
a grain,
grown in
Dictionary.
vegetable, or
grain, vegetable,
‘crop (plant)
residue’ that
There
that neither
neither party
interpretation of
There is
restrictive interpretation
is also
more restrictive
of ‘crop
also aa more
party
(plant) residue’

has
That interpretation
interpretation is
the common
deﬁnition of
the
the Court
is based
on the
common definition
of the
Court should
has argued
should adopt.
argued the
adopt. That
based on
‘residue.’ Merriam-Webster
“something that
Merriam-Webster defines
word ‘residue.’
part is
that remains
after aa part
remains after
is
defines residue
residue as
word
as “something

Merriam-Webster’s Colliegiate
taken;
process.” Merriam-Webster’s
after completion
completion of
or designated
or after
of aa process.”
Colliegiate
designated or
separated; or
taken; separated;
th
11th
‘crop’ is
If aa ‘crop’
Dictionary
Ed.
plant than
be grown
view
than can
the View
is aa plant
grown and
takes the
can be
Ed. If
and harvested
and one
one takes
harvested and
Dictionary 11

‘residue’ is
that
part that
then the
that ‘residue’
that remains
the
the part
the completion
the process
after the
remains after
completion of
of harvesting,
is the
of the
process of
harvesting, then

in I.D.A.P.A
scope
would be
plants that
that
limited to
the exemption
exemption in
I.D.A.P.A 58.06.001(03)(b)(ii)
of the
to those
those plants
scope of
be limited
58.06.001(03)(b)(ii) would

actually
profit or
be.
than can
for proﬁt
not all
all of
plants than
or subsistence,
of those
those plants
are grown
and are
are harvested
can be.
grown and
harvested for
subsistence, not
actually are
As
which to
this Court
from which
limited evidence
As discussed
to make
make any
inferences or
or draw
Court has
has limited
evidence from
draw
discussed above,
above, this
any inferences
any
plants from
which the
from which
the plants
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
admits
conclusions about
and leaves
Gibson admits
grass clippings
about the
leaves Mr.
any conclusions
light
from the
limited light
The affidavit
Mr. Gibson
the 2010
the limited
composting
composting have
afﬁdavit of
of Mr.
2010 case
Gibson from
have come.
come. The
sheds the
case sheds

it is
that he
from the
the materials
the City
that
materials from
he collects
of Boise,
is a
While it
collects the
and landscapers.
landscapers. While
a
ACHD, and
Boise, ACHD,
City of
from these
that such
from plants
that actually
not come
reasonable
plants that
inference from
materials have
these facts
facts that
reasonable inference
such materials
have not
come from
actually
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it is
have
been harvested
infer these
proﬁt or
from
for profit
materials came
or subsistence,
is quite
quite aa leap
to infer
these materials
leap to
have been
came from
harvested for
subsistence, it

plants that
profit or
that cannot
for proﬁt
plants
cannot be
grown and
or subsistence.
and harvested
subsistence.
harvested for
be grown
‘crop (plant)
residue’ to
Ultimately,
the Court
not decide
deﬁnition of
which definition
of ‘crop
to adopt
Court need
need not
adopt
decide which
Ultimately, the
(plant) residue’

or
whether the
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
not crop
or Whether
is composting
composting are
or are
and leaves
Gibson is
are or
are not
crop (plant)
grass clippings
leaves Mr.
(plant)
residue.
because I.D.A.P.A
The Court
not do
I.D.A.P.A 58.06.001(03)(b)(ii)
contains an
an additional
additional
Court need
residue. The
need not
do so
so because
58.06.001(03)(b)(ii) contains
“ultimately
It explains
qualifier.
that the
that are
the exclusion
explains that
qualiﬁer. It
to those
exclusion applies
applies only
those crop
crop residues
are “ultimately
residues that
only to
rates.” Id.
returned
Id.
the soil
to the
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic rates.”
returned to

Mr.
within the
that the
Mr. Gibson
the humus
the exception
falls within
he produces
exception of
of I.D.A.P.A.
I.D.A.P.A.
humus he
Gibson argues
produces falls
argues that
58.006.001(03)(b)(ii)
because he
that material
the soil
his
material to
intends to
he ultimately
to return
return that
to the
soil of
of his
ultimately intends
58.006.001(03)(b)(ii) because
“applies
attorney’s land
attorney’s
that subsection
improvement additive.
land as
soil improvement
additive. DEQ
subsection (03)(b)(ii)
argues that
as a
a soil
DEQ argues
(03)(b)(ii) “applies
crop99 residue
only
the land
the actual
return of
of agricultural
to the
land as
an agronomic
supplement and
to the
agricultural crop
agronomic supplement
and
residue to
actual return
as an
only to

not
processing of
before-hand.” [Pl.
From the
the affidavit
not to
the processing
material before-hand.”
Mem. at
at 4].
afﬁdavit of
of
to the
of such
such material
[P]. Reply
Reply Mem.
4]. From
“crop (plant)
DEQ’s view,
in DEQ’s
Ehlert the
Mr.
understands this
this argument
Mr. Ehlert
the Court
to be
Court understands
residue
argument to
be that,
that, in
View, “crop
(plant) residue
rates” means
in the
ultimately returned
portions of
plants left
left in
the soil
the
to the
soil at
at agronomic
of harvested
means portions
returned to
agronomic rates”
harvested plants
ultimately

‘crop’ that
field
with the
This argument
that
definition of
the definition
after harvest.
inconsistent with
argument is
ﬁeld after
is somewhat
of ‘crop’
somewhat inconsistent
harvest. This

DEQ
proposed (including
plants that
plants that
that are
that can
not only
has proposed
are harvested,
but also
can be).
also plants
(including not
harvested, but
only plants
DEQ has
be).
in the
This
unavailing because
portions of
left in
This argument
the field
farmer after
plants left
after
argument is
is also
of plants
ﬁeld by
also unavailing
because portions
by aa farmer
material’ and,
‘discarded material’
harvest
then burned
tilled under
not ‘discarded
not subject
or tilled
under are
and then
burned or
are not
are not
harvest and
subject
therefore, are
and, therefore,
th
(9th
to
waste. See
Air, 373
Cir.
There would
regulation as
to regulation
Cir. 2004).
no need
solid waste.
F.3d 1035
1035 (9
need
would be
as solid
See Safe
373 F.3d
be no
2004). There
Safe Air,

99

‘noncrop’ and
‘agricultural crop’
plaintiff believes
an ‘agricultural
The
what plaintiff
The Court
has no
the distinction
and aa ‘nondistinction to
no idea
idea what
to be
Court has
between an
believes the
be between
crop.’
agricultural
plaintiff must
a distinction,
agricultural crop.’ The
The Court
the inclusion
the adjective
inclusion of
must see
of the
otherwise the
Court assumes
adjective would
assumes plaintiff
distinction, otherwise
would
see a
‘Agriculture’ is
“science, art,
be
unnecessary. ‘Agriculture’
cultivating the
the “science,
the soil,
and
practice of
is defined
as the
or practice
of cultivating
producing crops,
deﬁned as
be unnecessary.
art, or
soil, producing
crops, and
th
11'h
Court’s view,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
livestock.” Merriam-Webster’s
raising
Ed.
plants and
In the
raising livestock.”
although many
the Court’s
and
Collegiate Dictionary
Ed. In
Dictionary 11
View, although
many plants
‘crop’ is
animals
that is
an agricultural
animals are
are not
not crops,
deﬁnition an
agricultural one.
is by
is aa ‘crop’
one.
anything that
crops, anything
by definition
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10
regulate10
“solid waste”
for
what “solid
waste” itit is
that
that only
for DEQ
is choosing
to regulate
to adopt
an exclusion
to What
exclusion to
choosing to
adopt an
only
DEQ to

in the
includes
that are
ﬁrst place.
not solid
the first
materials that
solid waste
includes materials
are not
waste in
place.

DEQ’s argument.
in his
Perhaps
Ehlert opines
the Court
Mr. Ehlert
his affidavit
Perhaps the
argument. Mr.
afﬁdavit
Court has
opines in
has misconstrued
misconstrued DEQ’s

in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001(03)(b)(ii)
that
was intended
that the
the exclusion
the application
application of
intended to
to apply
to the
of
exclusion in
58.01 .06.001(03)(b)(ii) was
apply to

crop
vine, and
beet tops
farm field,
the farm
corn stubble,
to the
Wheat stubble,
potato Vine,
crop residue
and beet
tops to
residue such
such as
as corn
so
stubble, wheat
stubble, potato
ﬁeld, so
long
long as
the farmer
farmer chooses
for the
the purpose
benefit
materials for
to apply
of some
agronomic benefit
such materials
some agronomic
chooses to
as the
purpose of
apply such
It is
and
way to
unwanted items.
not simply
difﬁcult to
to dispose
of those
items. It
is difficult
to conceive
of aa
those unwanted
and not
conceive of
dispose of
as a
a way
simply as
material’ under
‘discarded material’
situation
wheat stubble
corn stubble
or Wheat
situation where
Where corn
under
would qualify
stubble would
stubble or
as a
a ‘discarded
qualify as

IDAPA 58.006.005(44)
EPHA and
either
well) or
be
RCRA (and
either RCRA
therefore IDAPA
or EPHA
nevertheless be
and nevertheless
as well)
58.006.005(44) as
(and therefore

if the
in Wheat
applied
planted the
wheat is
the soil
the farmer
farmer who
the field
to the
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic rates.
ﬁeld in
is
applied to
rates. Generally
who planted
Generally if
it would
going
would not
from the
the field,
not be
for the
the purpose
going to
the stubble
of simply
to remove
remove the
stubble from
be for
purpose of
reapplying
ﬁeld, it
simply reapplying

till the
it and
the
will typically
then
The farmer
farmer will
the stubble
the stubble
other field.
to some
burn it
ﬁeld. The
and then
some other
stubble to
stubble under,
under, burn
typically till
it in
in place
till it,
till
plant next
year’s crops
next year’s
different type
or simply
of plant)
and plant
place and
crops (typically
leave it
plant)
simply leave
it, or
(typically aa different
type of
Circuit’s decision
In these
Ninth Circuit’s
in Safe
Air
around
year.11 In
from last
the stubble
the Ninth
last year.11
these cases,
decision in
around the
stubble from
cases, the
Safe Air
‘solid waste’
waste’ at
if DEQ
suggests
the stubble
not constitute
The Court
not clear
at all.
all. The
is not
constitute ‘solid
Court is
clear if
would not
suggests the
stubble would
DEQ

in Safe
if DEQ
disagrees
with the
Ninth Circuit
Air or
that the
the
the holding
holding of
the Ninth
Circuit in
intends to
of the
or if
to argue
disagrees with
argue that
DEQ intends
Safe Air
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001(03)(b)(ii)
exemption
broad enough
beet tops
for example,
exemption in
is broad
to cover,
enough to
tops
58.01 .06.001(03)(b)(ii) is
example, beet
cover, for

discarded
by another
farmer but
his fields
another to
to his
at agronomic
agronomic rates.
applied by
ﬁelds at
Whatever DEQ
one farmer
but applied
rates. Whatever
discarded by
DEQ
by one
“storage and
it does
believes the
processing” such
the exemption
not include
exemption includes,
include “storage
and processing”
such
believes
argues it
does not
includes, DEQ
DEQ argues
the composting
as
composting of
of grass
and leaves.
grass and
leaves.
as the
10
10

“These
Rules”. Subsection
“Wastes not
IDPA 58.01.006.001(03)
then starts:
titled “Wastes
not Regulated
IDPA
starts: “These
is titled
Under these
these Rules”.
Regulated Under
Subsection (b)
58.01 .006.001(03) is
(b) then
waste.”
rules
that follows
list that
not apply
the following
The Court
the list
following solid
to the
on the
follows
solid waste.” The
Court concludes
concludes DEQ
rules do
Views everything
do not
everything on
DEQ views
apply to
“waste.” Of
“solid wastes”
materials” under
“discarded materials”
a “waste.”
all “solid
as
wastes” are
are necessarily
as a
Of course,
under I.C.
I.C. §39-103(13).
necessarily “discarded
course, all
§39-103(13).
11
For
Nebraskatilling options
For aa useful
the different
different tilling
available see
the website
the University
of the
options available
of the
of Nebraskawebsite of
useful summary
see the
University of
summary of
Lincoln
at http://cropwatch.unl.edu/tillage/advdisadv.
Lincoln at
http://cropwatch.unl.edu/tillage/advdisadv.
11
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IDAPA 58.01.06.001(03)(b)(ii)
in the
The
similar to
The language
the
of IDAPA
is similar
to language
found in
language of
language found
58.01.06.001(03)(b)(ii) is

Report
“[m]uch
that “[m]uch
the House
The House
Report of
RCRA. The
Report noted
of the
of Representatives
adopting RCRA.
Representatives adopting
noted that
House of
House Report
part of
industrial
agricultural waste
industrial and
not aa part
the
and is
and agricultural
therefore not
reclaimed or
of the
is therefore
is reclaimed
or put
put to
to new
waste is
new use
use and
12
wastes12
which
discarded
materials disposal
Agricultural wastes
the committee
which
committee addresses.....
problem the
disposal problem
discarded materials
addresses ..... Agricultural

in
are
materials in
fertilizers or
are returned
the soil
are not
not considered
returned to
to the
soil as
as fertilizers
or soil
soil conditioners
conditioners are
discarded materials
considered discarded

legislation.” H.R.Rep.
9471491, 94th
at 3
the
this legislation.”
94th Cong.,
the sense
2d Sess.,
of this
H.R.Rep. No.
reprinted
No. 94–1491,
sense of
3 (1976),
3655., at
Cong, 2d
(1976), reprinted

IDAPA 58.01.06.001(03)(b)(ii)
in
The language
language of
624041. The
in 1976
of IDAPA
is also
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N
also
U.S.C.C.A.N 6238,
6238, 6240–41.
58.01.06.001(03)(b)(ii) is

very similar
similar to
Environmental Protection
the federal
Protection Agency
to regulations
regulations adopted
40
federal Environmental
adopted by
Agency (EPA).
(EPA). 40
very
by the
EPA’s regulations
C.F.R.
waste management
that EPA’s
not
regarding solid
management do
regulations regarding
solid waste
speciﬁes that
CPR. §§ 257.1(c)(1)
do not
257.1(c)(1) specifies

“agricultural wastes,
apply
the soil
including manures
to the
soil as
to “agricultural
manures and
returned to
and crop
crop residues,
as
residues, returned
wastes, including
apply to
conditioners.”
fertilizers
fertilizers or
or soil
soil conditioners.”
’11 for Restoration
In Community
Ass’n
Inc. v.
LLC, the
In
the
Cow Place,
Environment, Inc.
the Environment,
v. Cow
Place, LLC,
Community Ass
for Restoration of
of the

District
by aa
District Court
District of
for the
the Eastern
Eastern District
Whether cow
Washington considered
of Washington
manure stored
Court for
stored by
considered whether
cow manure
dairy’s crop
fertilizer
third parties
dairy
both applied
well as
farm and
the dairy’s
to the
to third
parties as
applied to
ﬁelds as
crop fields
and both
sold to
as well
as sold
as a
a fertilizer
dairy farm

‘solid waste’
waste’ under
if so,
was aa ‘solid
under RCRA
whether the
was nonetheless
from
RCRA and,
the manure
exempt from
manure was
nonetheless exempt
was
and, if
so, Whether

fertilizer.’ 80
‘agricultural waste
F .Supp.3d 1180
regulation
the soil
regulation as
an ‘agricultural
to the
soil as
1180
returned to
waste returned
as an
as fertilizer.’
80 F.Supp.3d
in that
(E.D.Wash.
that case
the
The court
to have
or at
at least
court in
least combined,
have conflated,
appears to
case appears
conﬂated, or
combined, the
(E.D.Wash. 2015).
2015). The

questions
waste, and
whether the
the manure
the
Whether the
therefore aa solid
of whether
manure was
solid waste,
questions of
and therefore
and Whether
was discarded,
discarded, and
it was
manure,
was aa waste,
waste, was
because itit was
from regulation
regulation because
an
assuming it
nevertheless except
except from
was nevertheless
was an
manure, assuming
7 1225.
fertilizer.’ See
‘agricultural waste
1219 –
‘agricultural
waste returned
Id. at
the soil
1225. However,
to the
soil as
at 1219
of
returned to
some of
as fertilizer.’
See Id.
However, some
12
12

material’ as
‘garbage, refuse,
than ‘garbage,
in
mean something
Clearly
waste here
and other
something other
other than
other discarded
here must
must mean
as defined
discarded material’
deﬁned in
Clearly waste
refuse, and
42
would be
waste is
42 U.S.C.
It would
that waste
that has
material that
then to
has been
and then
state that
nonsensical to
to state
is material
to
discarded and
been discarded
U.S.C. §§ 6903(27).
be nonsensical
6903(27). It
that agricultural
that was
material that
clarify
waste, however,
was material
not discarded.
The second
agricultural waste,
appeals
circuit court
of appeals
court of
was not
discarded. The
second circuit
however, was
clarify that
Congress’ proclivity
aptly
use the
in RCRA
in its
in
things in
RCRA to
mean different
laments Congress’
the same
different things
its decision
to use
same word
to mean
decision in
word to
proclivity in
aptly laments
’n v.
’5 Ass
Connecticut
Fisherman’s
Ass’n
Arms Co.
Inc, 989
Remington Arms
v. Remington
F.2d 1035
Connecticut Coastal
Co. Inc,
Coastal Fisherman
1035 (1993).
989 F.2d
(1993).
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court’s reasoning
that
that court’s
the composting
the manure,
the court
reasoning is
is applicable
As to
to the
composting of
of the
here. As
court made
applicable here.
made aa
manure, the

it was
simple
ﬁnding that
into compost,
that while
the
turning manure
the dairy
simple factual
While the
manure into
claimed it
factual finding
was turning
compost, the
dairy claimed
in unlined
manure
used as
Id.
fertilize fields.
left in
pits and
unlined pits
manure was
to fertilize
never actually
and never
compost to
ﬁelds. Id.
was simply
as compost
actually used
simply left

at
where aa potentially
potentially beneﬁcial
beneficial material
1224. The
that where
The court
for its
its
material is
at 1224.
is never
court reasoned
never used
reasoned that
used for
beneficial purpose,
purpose, that
Id. See
Ecological
that material
material is
beneficial
is abandoned
abandoned and,
discarded. Id.
See also
also Ecological
therefore, discarded.
and, therefore,
th

(9th Cir.
Air,
Rights Foundation
Foundation v.
Elec. Co.,
Cir. 2013)
and Elec.
713 F.3d
515 (9
and Safe
F.3d 502,
Rights
v. Pacific
Gas and
C0., 713
2013) and
502, 515
Paciﬁc Gas
Safe Air,

‘discard’ includes
‘abandon’).
373
noting that
1041 (both
that the
term ‘discard’
term ‘abandon’).
the term
the term
at 1041
includes the
F.3d at
373 F.3d
(both noting

in some
The
point of
this discussion
The point
simple this:
this: While
While grass
of this
is simple
and leaves
discussion is
grass and
some
leaves may
may in

circumstances
be crop
not necessarily
the soil
to the
soil at
at agronomic
circumstances be
returned to
agronomic rates,
crop residue
residue returned
need not
necessarily
rates, they
they need
be so.
not is
Whether they
or are
is aa question
question
are or
are not
be
so. Whether
they are

if grass
of
clippings and
of fact.
Even if
fact. Even
and leaves
grass clippings
were
leaves were

it may
once
be returned
be they
the soil
intended to
to be
to the
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic rates,
returned to
crop reside
reside intended
are
once crop
rates, it
they are
may be

nonetheless
been returned
the soil
regulation because
to regulation
to the
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic
nonetheless subject
never been
returned to
have never
subject to
because they
they have
they’ve simply
rates;
been abandoned.
from the
That is
the Court
the
determine from
cannot determine
is aa question
question the
Court cannot
i.e. they’ve
abandoned. That
rates; i.e.
simply been
in which
pleadings alone.
ways in
which grass
clippings and
There are
pleadings
constitute solid
solid
alone. There
are several
and leaves
several ways
grass clippings
leaves may
may constitute

EHPA and
waste under
be subject
by DEQ.
this reason,
For this
not
regulation by
to regulation
Defendants are
under EHPA
and be
are not
waste
subject to
reason, Defendants
DEQ. For

entitled
judgment on
the pleadings
12.
entitled to
to judgment
on the
Rule 12.
pleadings under
under Rule
Plaintiff’ s motion
The
judgment is
The Plaintiff’s
motion for
for summary
is denied.
denied.
summary judgment

IT IS
IT
ORDERED.
IS SO
SO ORDERED.
Signed: 1/9/2017 11:51 AM

_____________________________
MEDEMA
JONATHAN MEDEMA
JONATHAN
District Judge
District
Judge
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IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
IN
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
THE
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN

DEPARTMENT OF
IDAHO
IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY,

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,

CV-OC-2015-3540
Case
No. CV-OC-2015-3540
Case No.

vs.
vs.
DAVID
DAVID R.
BLACK
R. GIBSON,
d/b/a BLACK
GIBSON, d/b/a
DIAMOND COMPOST
DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and
PRODUCTS, and
VHS
VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES, LLC,
LLC,

SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM
DECISION
RECONSIDERING
DECISION RECONSIDERING
PLAINTIFF ’8 MOTION
PLAINTIFF’S
SUMMARY
MOTION FOR
FOR SUMMARY
AND ORDER
PARTIALLY
JUDGMENT
ORDER PARTIALLY
JUDGMENT AND
PLAINTIFF ’8 MOTION
GRANTING
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR
FOR
SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendants.
Plaintiff,
(“DEQ”), brought
this action
Environmental Quality
the Idaho
Department of
brought this
action
of Environmental
Idaho Department
Plaintiff, the
Quality (“DEQ”),
(“EPHA”) seeking
under the
Environmental Protection
Health Act
Act (“EPHA”)
the Idaho
Protection and
seeking to
to compel
compel
under
Idaho Environmental
and Health
Gibson’s compliance
defendant
with the
provisions of
EPHA relating
relating to
the provisions
of EPHA
to aa composting
composting
defendant David
compliance With
David Gibson’s

facility
by defendant
LLC
Mr. Gibson
on land
land owned
defendant VHS
VHS Properties,
alleges Mr.
Gibson operates
operates on
owned by
Properties, LLC
facility DEQ
DEQ alleges
(“VHS”). Defendants
(“VHS”).
various affirmative
in their
their pleading.
afﬁrmative defenses
Defendants answered
pleading.
and raised
raised various
answered and
defenses in
Plaintiff
judgment and
plaintiff’s
In denying
Plaintiff moved
that motion.
for summary
the Court
motion. In
Court denied
and the
denied that
moved for
summary judgment
denying plaintiff’s
judgment on
motion,
it found
granting DEQ
its complaint,
the
of fact
fact precluded
on its
found issues
precluded granting
issues of
because it
complaint, the
motion, because
DEQ judgment
Court
in their
their answer.
the affirmative
the defendants
afﬁrmative defenses
failed to
to address
Court failed
defendants in
raised by
answer.
defenses raised
address the
by the

plaintiff’ s
In
In failing
In essence,
failing to
this Court
the Court
portion of
the plaintiff’s
of the
to do
Court only
Court erred.
erred. In
decided aa portion
do so,
essence, the
only decided
so, this
motion.
party to
judgment as
permits aa party
the summary
claim
motion. Rule
Rule 56,
to seek
of judgment
to any
seek the
as to
I.R.C.P., permits
summary entry
entry of
56, I.R.C.P.,
any claim
or
part of
judgment as
In its
part of
its motion
motion seeking
claim or
or defense
or part
of aa claim
or part
of aa defense.
seeking summary
to
defense or
defense. In
as to
summary judgment
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the
in its
plaintiff argued
it was
judgment on
the claims
its complaint,
the plaintiff
the
entitled to
claims in
to summary
on the
argued it
was entitled
complaint, the
summary judgment
affirmative
both parties
parties briefed
by failing
failing to
The Court
afﬁrmative defenses
to
briefed those
those issues.
Court simply
erred by
and both
defenses and
issues. The
simply erred
address
that
the Court
afﬁrmative defenses.
Pursuant to
to I.R.C.P.
Court now
those affirmative
corrects that
I.R.C.P. 60(a),
now corrects
defenses. Pursuant
address those
60(a), the
oversight
plaintiff’s motion
The Court
the plaintiff’s
motion for
for summary
grants the
oversight and/or
omission. The
Court partially
and/0r omission.
partially grants
summary
defendants’
in favor
judgment. The
will grant
judgment in
plaintiff as
The Court
the plaintiff
grant summary
of the
against defendants’
judgment.
Court will
favor of
as against
summary judgment

Gibson’s
plaintiff’s claim
affirmative
fail for
that defendant
that plaintiff’s
for the
the reason
afﬁrmative defense
claim must
must fail
defendant Gibson’s
reason that
defense that
Agriculture;11 the
activities
that
the Idaho
Department of
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defense
of Agriculture;
activities are
Idaho Department
regulated by
are regulated
defense that
by the

DEQ’s regulations
DEQ’s
waste were
promulgated Without
without adhering
the management
regarding the
adhering
management of
regulations regarding
of solid
solid waste
were promulgated

EPHA and/or
to
that EPHA
the requirements
the affirmative
the Solid
affirmative defense
67-5222; and
requirements of
to the
of I.C.
Solid
and the
and/or the
defense that
LC. §§ 67-5222;

Waste
violate Article
Article III,
the
Management Rules
17 of
of the
thereunder Violate
promulgated by
Section 17
Rules promulgated
Waste Management
111, Section
DEQ thereunder
by DEQ
Idaho
Constitution.
Idaho Constitution.
Defendant’s affirmative
1.
judgment as
Plaintiff is
against Defendant’s
affirmative defense
entitled to
1. Plaintiff
is entitled
to summary
as against
defense
summary judgment
Gibson’s activities
that
that IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.iii
from the
Mr. Gibson’s
the Solid
activities from
exempts Mr.
Solid
58.01.06.001.03.b.iii exempts
Waste
Management Rules.
Waste Management
Rules.

it adopted
When
Environmental Protection
Health Act
Act (EPHA),
the Idaho
the Idaho
Protection and
When it
Idaho
Idaho Environmental
and Health
adopted the
(EPHA), the

it the
Legislature
Environmental Quality
the Idaho
Department of
the authority
of Environmental
Legislature created
Idaho Department
and granted
granted it
created the
authority
Quality and
to
promulgate such
problems related
With problems
to deal
to solid
to promulgate
related to
solid waste
rules as
deal with
such rules
waste
as may
be necessary
necessary to
may be
disposal.
that grant
grant of
the Solid
Pursuant to
to that
of authority,
promulgated the
Solid Waste
disposal. I.C.
I.C. §§ 39-105(2).
Waste
39-105(2). Pursuant
authority, DEQ
DEQ promulgated
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.
forth in
Management
Management Rules
Rules set
set forth
58.01.06.

1

In
pleadings defendants
ways: as
part DEQ
In their
in various
a lack
their pleadings
this defense
lack of
bring
standing on
the part
defendants describe
as a
of standing
on the
to bring
various ways:
defense in
describe this
DEQ to
“jurisdiction” of
this
a failure
a lack
lack of
this action,
failure by
the type
activities involved,
allege aa
of activities
as a
as a
of “jurisdiction”
of DEQ
to allege
over the
action, as
involved, as
DEQ over
DEQ to
type of
by DEQ
in the
an argument
that the
EPHA is
claim for
claim
for relief
relief in
the complaint,
the authority
granted to
the EPHA
argument that
as an
to DEQ
is somehow
somehow
complaint, as
authority granted
DEQ by
by the
preempted by
in the
Right to
Farm Act
Plant and
Department of
granted to
the Department
the Right
Act and
and the
the Plant
and Soil
to the
of Agriculture
Agriculture in
to Farm
Soil
preempted
authority granted
by authority
DEQ’s regulations
Gibson’s activities
an argument
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
Amendment
from DEQ’s
are exempt
the
Amendment Act,
and as
activities are
exempt from
argument that
regulations based
on the
as an
based on
Act, and
DEQ’s motion
language
judgment, the
In their
in opposition
their memorandum
language of
motion for
for summary
the
regulations. In
memorandum in
of those
opposition to
to DEQ’s
those regulations.
summary judgment,
— that
defendants
that the
Mr. Gibson
that DEQ
latter argument
argument –
the activities
are exempt
the latter
exempt
activities of
regulate are
made the
of Mr.
to regulate
defendants only
Gibson that
seeks to
DEQ seeks
only made
from
from such
the language
language of
regulations.
regulations based
on the
of those
those regulations.
such regulations
based on
1

2
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In
In IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.02,
that the
the Solid
Management Rules
Solid Waste
Rules are
specified that
are
Waste Management
58.01.06.02, DEQ
DEQ specified
applicable
waste and
all solid
facilities except,
other things,
management facilities
to all
among other
solid waste
solid waste
applicable to
and solid
waste management
things,
except, among
“[a]ny
waste which
the
which is
is managed
to rules
pursuant to
solid waste
agricultural solid
managed and
and regulated
regulated pursuant
rules adopted
adopted by
“[a]ny agricultural
by the
Agriculture.” IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.iii.
Idaho
Department of
of Agriculture.”
Idaho Department
58.01.06.03.b.iii.
in their
Defendants
their pleading
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
clippings and
admit in
Defendants admit
pleading that
Gibson receives
and leaves
receives grass
leaves
grass clippings

mixing these
and
property owned
by VHS.
them into
into large
Mr. Gibson
large piles
piles on
on property
admits mixing
these
and places
Gibson admits
VHS. Mr.
places them
owned by
th
9th
In its
materials
with water
until those
into humus
its January
materials with
materials biodegrade
or compost.
humus or
water until
those materials
compost. In
biodegrade into
January 9

it finds
Memorandum
why it
the Court
finds there
there is
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
is an
an issue
of fact
fact
articulated Why
Court articulated
and Order,
issue of
Order, the
“solid waste”
regarding
waste” under
under I.C.
the grass
clippings and
regarding whether
whether the
constitute “solid
and leaves
grass clippings
I.C.
leaves constitute

if the
§§ 39-103(13).
that even
the grass
Defendants argue,
and/0r
even if
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
39-10303). Defendants
however, that
leaves, and/or
argue, however,
compost
all necessarily
solid wastes
constitute solid
solid waste,
agricultural solid
managed and
and
compost constitute
are all
wastes managed
necessarily agricultural
waste, they
they are
regulated
pursuant to
the Idaho
Department of
to rules
of Agriculture
Agriculture and,
Idaho Department
regulated pursuant
rules adopted
adopted by
therefore,
and, therefore,
by the
Right to
exempt
than aa general
from the
the Solid
the Right
Other than
exempt from
Management Rules.
to
general reference
to the
reference to
Solid Waste
Rules. Other
Waste Management
Plant and
Farm
fail to
this Court
Farm Act
Amendment Act,
Act and
the Plant
to cite
cite this
Soil Amendment
to any
defendants fail
Court to
and Soil
and the
Act, defendants
any

their argument
authority
that composting
clippings and
for their
composting of
of grass
is an
an activity
argument that
and leaves
grass clippings
regulated
leaves is
authority for
activity regulated
22-4501
in the
by the
provision in
ﬁnd no
the Idaho
Department of
The Court
the I.C.
no provision
of Agriculture.
Agriculture. The
Idaho Department
Court can
can find
LC. §§s
by
§§s 22-4501

,– 4504
“Right to
22-2201 ,
Act”), I.C.
Plant Amendment
– 2226
Farm Act”),
2226 (The
Amendment
4504 (the
to Farm
Soil and
and Plant
LC. §§s
(the “Right
(The Soil
§§s 22-2201
Act),
that support
the regulations
the Idaho
Department of
or the
regulations promulgated
of Agriculture
Agriculture that
promulgated by
Idaho Department
support
Act), or
by the
defendants’ arguments.
Right to
political subdivisions
defendants’
Farm Act
The Right
Act restricts
the ability
restricts the
of
to Farm
of political
subdivisions of
arguments. The
ability of
2
state2 from
zoning ordinances
that
from declaring
the
the state
adopting zoning
declaring agricultural
agricultural operations
operations aa nuisance
ordinances that
nuisance and
and adopting

that
the closure
force
without deciding,
of any
Even assuming,
agricultural operation.
operation. Even
force the
closure of
such agricultural
assuming, without
deciding, that
any such

22

“political subdivision
The
if the
Department of
Environmental Quality
The Court
not decide
the Department
of Environmental
constitute aa “political
of
Court need
subdivision of
need not
would constitute
decide if
Quality would
state” for
the
purposes of
when it
it promulgated
Management Rules.
the state”
for purposes
the Solid
The Court
§22-4504 when
promulgated the
of I.C.
Solid Waste
Waste Management
Court
Rules. The
LC. §22-4504
6-902.
suspects
would not.
See I.C.
it would
not. See
I.C. §§ 6-902.
suspects it
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Gibson’s composting
operation” under
“agricultural operation”
Mr.
22-45020),33 the
Mr. Gibson’s
the
composting operation
operation is
is an
an “agricultural
under I.C.
LC. §§ 22-4502(1),

in no
Solid
zoning ordinances
attempting to
not zoning
Management Rules
is in
no way
to
Solid Waste
Rules are
ordinances and
are not
and DEQ
Waste Management
DEQ is
way attempting
defendants’ activities
defendants’
in the
Right to
declare
Nothing in
Farm Act
Act supports
the Right
activities aa nuisance.
to Farm
nuisance. Nothing
supports defendants’
declare defendants’

Gibson’s composting
argument
that Mr.
from the
Mr. Gibson’s
the Solid
exempt from
argument that
Management
composting operation
operation is
is exempt
Solid Waste
Waste Management

IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.iii.
Rules
under IDAPA
Rules under
58.01 .06.03.b.iii.
defendants’ general
Similarly,
Plant Amendment
Amendment Act
Act is
the Soil
citation to
is
general citation
to the
Soil and
and Plant
Similarly, defendants’

unavailing. The
plant amendment
the Idaho
Department of
the
The soil
amendment act
of Agriculture
Agriculture the
unavailing.
soil and
Idaho Department
and plant
act gives
gives the
authority
promulgate rules
use, handling,
plant
the use,
regarding the
to promulgate
of soil
soil and
and storage
storage of
and plant
rules regarding
handling, and
authority to
amendments.
from the
§22-2204. The
The legislature
the definitions
deﬁnitions of
of
amendments. I.C.
exempted from
legislature specifically
LC. §22-2204.
specifically exempted
“plant amendments”
“soil amendments”
“organic waste-derived
amendments” what
amendments” and
waste-derived
“soil
the legislature
What the
legislature called
called “organic
and “plant
“organic waste-derived
material.” See
material.”
waste-derived
The legislature
legislature defined
and (34)(c).
deﬁned “organic
I.C. §§ 22-2203(30)
See I.C.
22-2203(30) and
(34)(c). The
“grass clippings,
material” to
material”
weeds, bark,
bark, plantings,
plantings, prunings
prunings and
other
to include
include “grass
and other
clippings, leaves,
leaves, weeds,

vegetative wastes.”
wastes.” I.C.
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
vegetative
and leaves
Gibson
I.C. §§ 22-2203(26).
grass clippings
leaves Mr.
22-2203(26). Therefore,
Therefore, the
Plant
admits
plant amendments
under the
not soil
the Soil
admits composting
composting are
soil amendments
amendments or
or plant
amendments under
Soil and
are not
and Plant
defendants’ arguments
in the
Plant Amendment
Amendment
Nothing in
Amendment Act.
the Soil
Amendment Act
Act supports
Act. Nothing
Soil and
arguments
and Plant
supports defendants’

Gibson’s composting
that
that Mr.
from the
Mr. Gibson’s
the Solid
exempt from
Management Rules
composting activities
activities are
Solid Waste
Rules
are exempt
Waste Management

because they
by the
the Department
Department
regulated by
are regulated
because
they are

of
of Agriculture.
Agriculture.

if the
Even
the Idaho
the Idaho
Department of
the
Even if
granted the
of Agriculture
Agriculture the
Idaho legislature
legislature has
Idaho Department
has granted
4
leaves,4 defendants
authority
clippings and
to regulate
failed to
to
those who
defendants have
who compost
compost grass
and leaves,
regulate those
grass clippings
have failed
authority to

this Court
cite
the Department
Department of
regulation showing
cite this
to any
showing the
of Agriculture
Agriculture has
Court to
has actually
exercised
actually exercised
any regulation

Plaintiff submitted
that authority.
that
the affidavit
Mr. Oakley
the Department
Department of
averring the
afﬁdavit of
of Mr.
of
submitted the
authority. Plaintiff
Oakley averring
33

Defendants
this would
argument based
the language
the
Defendants have
have made
made no
no cogent
on the
of I.C
to suggest
cogent argument
language of
based on
suggest this
would be
LC §§ 22-4502(1)
be the
22-45020) to
A plain
plain reading
that definition
case.
reading of
deﬁnition suggests
of that
otherwise.
case. A
suggests otherwise.
4
4
22-1 10(1)
defendants’ failed
While
Plaintiff ethically
in its
that I.C.
this provision,
failed to
its briefing
brieﬁng that
While defendants’
to cite
cite to
to this
I.C. §§ 22-110(1)
conceded in
provision, Plaintiff
ethically conceded
“agricultural composting.”
composting.” The
gives
Department of
the director
the Department
the authority
The
director of
of the
of Agriculture
Agriculture the
to regulate
regulate “agricultural
gives the
authority to
composting.’
‘agricultural composting.’
legislature
not define
legislature did
deﬁne ‘agricultural
did not
4
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Agriculture
The Court
not adopted
the composting
governing the
regulations governing
composting of
of grass
Agriculture has
Court
and leaves.
has not
adopted regulations
leaves. The
grass and
is
find any
regulations as
is unable
to find
well.
unable to
such regulations
as well.
any such
Gibson’s composting
Defendants
that Mr.
the affirmative
Mr. Gibson’s
afﬁrmative defense
Defendants have
composting activities
activities
raised the
defense that
have raised

IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.iii.
are
by DEQ
under IDAPA
from regulation
exempt from
Defendants argue
regulation by
are exempt
argue
58.01 .06.03.b.iii. Defendants
DEQ under
Gibson’s composting
Mr.
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson’s
exempt because
he
composting activities
activities are
and leaves
are exempt
grass clippings
leaves he
because the

composts
pursuant to
the rules
an agricultural
to the
agricultural solid
solid waste
regulated pursuant
are an
managed and
and regulated
composts are
waste managed
rules adopted
adopted by
by
the
that the
the Idaho
Department of
the grass
clippings and
Assuming that
of Agriculture.
Agriculture. Assuming
Idaho Department
and leaves
are aa
grass clippings
leaves are
‘solid waste’
in I.C.
‘solid
waste’ as
that term
term in
the Court
the Legislature
defined that
Court concludes,
Legislature has
has defined
LG §39-103(13),
as
as the
concludes, as
§39-103(13), the
“agricultural solid
aa matter
that grass
clippings and
not an
matter of
which is
is
an “agricultural
of law,
solid waste
and leaves
are not
grass clippings
waste which
leaves are
law, that

Agriculture” under
managed
pursuant to
the Idaho
Department of
to rules
of Agriculture”
Idaho Department
under
regulated pursuant
managed and
and regulated
rules adopted
adopted by
by the

IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.iii.
Plaintiff is
IDAPA
judgment as
this
partial summary
entitled to
is entitled
to partial
against this
58.01.06.03.b.iii. Plaintiff
as against
summary judgment

affirmative
afﬁrmative defense.
defense.
In arguing
in their
in their
In
pleadings and
briefing,
their pleadings
their brieﬁng,
this affirmative
arguing this
afﬁrmative defense,
both in
and in
defense, both

“jurisdiction” to
plaintiff’ s “jurisdiction”
in terms
defendants
this argument
bring this
this type
terms of
argument in
of plaintiff’s
to bring
of suit
suit and
defendants couch
and
couch this
type of
“standing” to
plaintiff’ s “standing”
the
that the
bring this
this type
the
the plaintiff’s
to bring
of suit.
Defendants also
suit. Defendants
also vaguely
argue that
vaguely argue
type of
EPHA are
Right to
Plant and
provisions of
preempted by
Farm Act
Act or
the Plant
the Right
Soil
of EPHA
to Farm
or the
provisions
and Soil
are somehow
somehow preempted
by the

‘jurisdiction’ is
court’s authority
Amendment
used to
term ‘jurisdiction’
Amendment Act.
The term
refer to
Act. The
is generally
to refer
to aa court’s
to
authority to
generally used
court’s authority
subject
person to
its commands
particular person
particular type
or to
to aa court’s
to resolve
to its
commands or
resolve aa particular
subject aa particular
authority to
type

of
jurisdiction either
them
that this
this Court
either over
not contended
of dispute.
Defendants have
Court lacks
lacks jurisdiction
contended that
dispute. Defendants
over them
have not
this type
The doctrine
the courts
personally or
standing is
or over
of controversy.
doctrine of
of standing
is aa creation
creation of
of the
to
courts to
over this
controversy. The
personally
type of
that one
principle that
the common
recognize
bring suit
another to
complain
common sense
cannot bring
suit against
against another
to complain
recognize the
one cannot
sense principle

court’s permitted
If court’s
not like.
about
permitted such
the
like. If
or try
to prevent
prevent activities
activities one
one simply
such suits,
about or
does not
suits, the
simply does
try to

courts
unable to
people would
would be
for fear
function and
having
to function
afraid to
to do
fear of
of having
courts would
and people
would be
be unable
be afraid
do anything
anything for
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to
in court
their actions.
disliking to
the
to defend
when someone
to their
To satisfy
themselves in
court when
takes aa disliking
actions. To
defend themselves
someone takes
satisfy the
“litigants generally
in fact
doctrine
standing “litigants
doctrine of
of standing
must allege
or demonstrate
an injury
fact and
demonstrate an
allege or
and aa
generally must
injury in

injury.”
substantial
judicial relief
will prevent
that the
the judicial
relief requested
the claimed
likelihood that
prevent or
or redress
substantial likelihood
claimed injury.”
redress the
requested Will
Miles v.
Idaho Power
116 Idaho
Power Co.,
P.2d 757,
to alleged
Idaho 635,
alleged
Miles
v. Idaho
778 P.2d
763 (1989).
as to
641, 778
However, as
(1989). However,
635, 641,
757, 763
C0., 116
“standing” to
violations of
the legislature
its
Violations
of EPHA,
given DEQ
to enforce
enforce its
legislature has
has specifically
EPHA, the
speciﬁcally given
DEQ “standing”
Defendants’ argument
in the
regulations
bringing suit
the district
district court.
regulations by
suit in
argument about
court. I.C.
I.C. §§ 39-108(3)(b).
about
39-108(3)(b). Defendants’
by bringing

“standing” is
“standing” because
“standing”
plaintiff lacks
because grass
that plaintiff
clippings and
is essentially
lacks “standing”
and leaves
are
grass clippings
leaves are
essentially that
“crop residue”
residue” and
IDAPA
“crop
waste management
under IDAPA
from the
the solid
exempt from
therefore exempt
management rules
solid waste
and therefore
rules under

58.01.06.03.b.ii
– an
which this
be
this Court
material question
remains to
an issue
to which
of fact
fact remains
to be
question of
Court found
found aa material
58.01 .06.03.b.ii 7
issue as
as to
‘agricultural waste
resolved
– and
trial 7
that grass
clippings and
the
at trial
an ‘agricultural
and that
and leaves
are an
resolved at
regulated by
waste regulated
leaves are
grass clippings
by the

Agriculture’ under
IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.iii
Department
– an
this Court
Department of
of Agriculture’
an argument
argument this
under IDAPA
Court has
has rejected
rejected
58.01 .06.03.b.iii 7
in the
Right to
above.
nothing in
Plant and
Farm Act
Act or
the Plant
the Right
For the
the reasons
Soil
to Farm
or the
and Soil
reasons discussed
discussed above,
above. For
above, nothing

if
Amendment
prevents DEQ
from regulating
Amendment Act
Act prevents
the composting
clippings and
regulating the
composting of
of grass
and leaves,
grass clippings
leaves, if
DEQ from
Plaintiff is
those
judgment as
the
entitled to
materials are
materials. Plaintiff
is entitled
to summary
against the
those materials
are waste
waste materials.
as against
summary judgment
in the
affirmative
plaintiff lacks
jurisdiction to
that plaintiff
bring this
this suit.
the pleading
afﬁrmative defenses
pleading that
to bring
lacks jurisdiction
suit.
raised in
defenses raised
in its
Plaintiff is
Plaintiff
partial summary
judgment in
its favor
the affirmative
entitled to
afﬁrmative defenses
is entitled
to partial
against the
favor as
defenses
as against
summary judgment
in the
plaintiff lacks
forth in
set
pleadings that
jurisdiction to
that plaintiff
bring this
this suit.
the pleadings
standing or
or lacks
to bring
lacks standing
lacks jurisdiction
suit.
set forth
in its
Plaintiff is
Plaintiff
judgment in
the summary
partial judgment
its favor
the defense
entitled to
is entitled
to the
of partial
against the
favor as
defense
as against
summary entry
entry of
Right to
Plant and
that
precluded
that the
Farm Act
the Right
Act or
the Plant
Amendment Act
Act preempts
to Farm
Soil Amendment
preempts or
or precluded
or the
and Soil

enforcement
the Solid
for composting
Management Rules
enforcement of
of the
against defendants
composting grass
Solid Waste
Rules against
defendants for
grass
Waste Management
plaintiff’s motion
clippings
judgment as
clippings and
The Court
motion for
for summary
grants plaintiff’s
against these
Court grants
these
and leaves.
leaves. The
as against
summary judgment
affirmative
afﬁrmative defenses.
defenses.
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Plaintiff
Plaintiff is
in its
that
against the
affirmative defense
the affirmative
its favor
entitled to
favor as
is entitled
to summary
as against
defense that
summarv judgment
iudgment in
the
a claim
fails to
claim upon
complaint fails
the complaint
relief may
which relief
state a
granted.
to state
upon which
be granted.
mav be
in their
IDAPA
For
their argument
similar to
the exemptions
For reasons
argument regarding
regarding the
exemptions under
to those
under IDAPA
those expressed
reasons similar
expressed in

58.01.06.03.b.ii
plaintiff has
that plaintiff
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defense
failed to
to state
defendants raise
raise the
state aa
and iii,
has failed
defense that
58.01.06.03.b.ii and
iii, defendants
claim
that
For the
the reasons
the Court
relief may
claim upon
which relief
granted. For
Court rejects
rejects that
upon which
reasons expressed
expressed above,
be granted.
above, the
may be
argument.
Plaintiff has
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
clippings and
argument. Plaintiff
is accepting
accepting grass
has clearly
alleged that
Gibson is
and leaves
grass clippings
leaves
clearly alleged
and
property owned
by VHS.
Plaintiff alleges
them into
into large
the grass
placing them
large windrows
on property
windrows on
and placing
alleges the
VHS. Plaintiff
grass
owned by
clippings
that defendants
clippings and
failed
Compl. ¶ 13]
defendants have
constitute solid
solid waste
and that
and leaves
have failed
waste [Amend.
leaves constitute
[Amend Compl.
13] and
11

to
with the
the Solid
the collection,
governing the
Management Rules
or
to comply
Solid Waste
Rules governing
Waste Management
collection, storage,
storage, or
comply with
th

9th Memorandum
in its
processing of
For the
the reasons
its January
Memorandum Decision,
of such
processing
reasons expressed
such waste.
expressed in
waste. For
Decision,
January 9

this
this Court
the grass
clippings and
there is
Whether the
is an
an issue
of fact
fact as
to whether
Court has
has concluded
and leaves
concluded there
issue of
leaves
as to
grass clippings
materials.” This
“discarded materials.”
Mr.
This issue
Mr. Gibson
admits receiving
receiving and
composting are
of fact
fact
Gibson admits
and composting
are “discarded
issue of

if the
prevents the
from determining
determining as
matter of
the Court
the grass
clippings and
of law
prevents
Court from
law if
and leaves
are
grass clippings
leaves are
as a
a matter
‘solid waste.’
defendants’ arguments,
‘solid
waste.’ However,
nothing about
clippings
there is
is nothing
to defendants’
grass clippings
about grass
arguments, there
However, contrary
contrary to

and
per se
precludes them
being solid
waste or
that per
them from
from being
that they
or necessarily
requires that
solid waste
and leaves
leaves that
se precludes
necessarily requires
they
‘crop residue.’
residue.’ The
in its
always
plaintiff alleges
from regulation
The plaintiff
its amended
regulation as
exempted from
alleges in
amended
as ‘crop
be exempted
always be

in activities
complaint
by VHS
that involve
that the
the
the land
the defendants
complaint that
activities on
on the
land owned
involve the
defendants are
VHS that
are engage
engage in
owned by

composting
purpose of
public. [Amend.
for the
the purpose
the public.
composting of
of large
large volumes
of solid
of resale
to the
solid waste
resale to
volumes of
waste for
[Amend
Compl.
upon which
which this
this Court
the relief
relief
The amended
complaint states
claim upon
grant the
Court may
Compl. ¶ 13].
states a
amended complaint
a claim
13]. The
may grant
11

in its
Plaintiff is
requested.
judgment in
this
the summary
partial judgment
its favor
entitled to
is entitled
to the
of partial
against this
favor as
requested. Plaintiff
as against
summary entry
entry of
th
9th
In its
this Court
affirmative
Memorandum
its January
afﬁrmative defense.
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
Court concluded
and Order,
defense. In
concluded
Order, this
January 9

that defendants
that
not entitled
the complaint
for failure
entitled to
complaint under
failure
to aa dismissal
of the
dismissal of
defendants were
under I.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P. 12(b)
were not
12(b) for
then erroneously
grant plaintiff’s
to
plaintiff’s motion
judgment as
motion for
for summary
Claim but
to state
failed to
to grant
state aa claim
but then
as
erroneously failed
summary judgment

against
this defense.
against this
defense.
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Plaintiff
Plaintiff is
in its
that
against the
affirmative defense
the affirmative
its favor
entitled to
favor as
is entitled
to summary
as against
defense that
summarv judgment
iudgment in
67-5222.
in contravention
Management Rules
the
were promulgated
the Solid
contravention of
promulgated in
of I.C.
Solid Waste
Waste Management
Rules were
LC. §S 67-5222.
In their
their answer
that the
In
the amended
the defense
the regulations
to the
regulations
defendants raise
raise the
answer to
amended complaint,
defense that
complaint, defendants
Idaho’s Administrative
adopted
waste management
valid under
under Idaho’s
not valid
Administrative
regarding solid
management are
solid waste
are not
adopted by
DEQ regarding
by DEQ
that he
Procedures
was not
the defense
not given
the
Defendant Gibson
given specific
notice of
of the
Act. Defendant
he was
speciﬁc notice
Gibson asserts
Procedures Act.
asserts the
defense that

regulations
were adopted.
Defendants argue
failed to
to
regulations before
Compl. ¶ 10].
before they
adopted. [Amend.
argue DEQ
[Amend Compl.
they were
10]. Defendants
DEQ failed
11

67-5222.
with the
comply
the provisions
of I.C.
provisions of
LC. §§ 67-5222.
comply with
5222 of
that an
Section
the Idaho
Act requires
Administrative Procedures
of the
an agency
seeking
Section 5222
requires that
Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act
agency seeking

“afford all
prior to
the adoption
all interested
to
persons reasonable
to the
of such
interested persons
to adopt
adoption of
reasonable
such rules,
adopt rules,
rules, “afford
rules, prior
in writing.
The agency
opportunity
views, and
shall receive
writing. The
or in
to submit
submit data,
and arguments,
receive
arguments, orally
opportunity to
orally or
data, Views,
agency shall
than twenty-one
for not
not less
the date
the notice
comments
publication of
after the
comments for
of publication
of the
notice of
of
twenty-one (21)
less than
date of
days after
(21) days

bulletin.” Defendants’
Defendants’ argument
in the
that because
rulemaking in
the bulletin.”
not
proposed rulemaking
because they
is that
argument is
did not
proposed
they did
DEQ’s intent
in the
intent to
the Solid
the
individually
Management Rules
notice of
of DEQ’s
to adopt
Solid Waste
Rules in
receive notice
adopt the
Waste Management
individually receive
the Solid
year 2003,
because they
Management Rules
interested parties,
Solid Waste
Rules are
are
and because
are interested
Waste Management
parties, the
2003, and
they are
year
the Idaho
for the
the
Administrative Procedures
invalid
under the
invalid under
Act. Defendants
Defendants cite
cite to
to no
no authority
Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act.
authority for

67-5222 requiring
that the
requiring an
the language
proposition that
provide interested
persons
proposition
of I.C.
an agency
to provide
interested persons
language of
LC. §§ 67-5222
agency to
“reasonable opportunity”
opportunity” to
that the
the agency
“reasonable
provide every
must provide
to submit
submit comments
comments means
means that
agency must
every

Defendants’ argument
merit. Notably,
interested
person actual
without merit.
Notably,
individual notice.
is without
interested person
notice. Defendants’
and individual
argument is
actual and

in his
Mr. Gibson
his affidavit
comment prior
Mr.
was given
prior
affidavit never
he was
given aa reasonable
to comment
never denies
Gibson in
denies he
reasonable opportunity
opportunity to
the Solid
to
Management Rules;
to adoption
of the
he merely
claims he
he was
given actual
adoption of
Solid Waste
never given
Waste Management
actual
was never
Rules; he
merely claims

by the
notice.
From the
the affidavits
the plaintiff,
the Court
there are
no genuine
genuine
afﬁdavits submitted
submitted by
notice. From
Court concludes
are no
concludes there
plaintiff, the
issues
Plaintiff is
this affirmative
The Court
material fact
entitled to
afﬁrmative defense.
of material
fact as
to this
is entitled
to
Court concludes
defense. The
concludes Plaintiff
issues of
as to
Plaintiff’s motion
partial summary
judgment in
in its
this affirmative
partial
its favor
motion for
for
afﬁrmative defense.
against this
favor as
defense. Plaintiff’s
as against
summary judgment
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summary
in part
judgment is
part as
that the
the affirmative
the solid
afﬁrmative defense
is granted
granted in
to the
solid waste
defense that
waste
as to
summary judgment
67-5222.
in contravention
management
the provisions
management rules
contravention to
to the
of I.C.
provisions of
were adopted
rules were
adopted in
LC. §§ 67-5222.

Plaintiff
Plaintiff is
partial judgment
in its
against the
the
the summary
its favor
entitled to
favor as
is entitled
to the
of partial
as against
summarv entry
iudgment in
entrv of
affirmative
that the
afﬁrmative defense
management rules
the solid
are unconstitutional
unconstitutional under
solid waste
waste management
rules are
under
defense that
Article
Article III,
the Idaho
Idaho Constitution.
Constitution.
17 of
of the
Section 17
111, Section

plaintiff’ 5 amended
In their
their answer
that
In
the defense
the plaintiff’s
to the
defendants assert
answer to
assert as
amended complaint,
defense that
as the
complaint, defendants
‘solid waste,’
waste,’ it
it represents
“[n]otwithstanding
phrase ‘solid
“[n]otwithstanding the
the source
the definition
deﬁnition of
the phrase
of the
of the
represents aa
source of
‘technical’ term,
that technical
‘technical’
the Idaho
technical phrase;
technical terms,
to the
or technical
Idaho Constitution,
according to
Constitution,
terms, according
term, or
phrase; that
in the
That
Article 3,
the law,
the Idaho
are
to be
17 of
of the
Constitution. That
Section 17
Idaho Constitution.
are to
declared by
avoided in
be avoided
as declared
law, as
3, Section
by Article
the constitutional
Rules
with the
provisions, or
Regulations are
to comply
constitutional provisions,
or they
Rules and
and Regulations
are to
regarded
be regarded
comply With
they may
may be

void.” [Ans.
unconstitutional, have
no force
or effect,
to Amend.
Amend. Compl.
force or
Compl. pp.
3-4].
rendered void.”
and rendered
have no
unconstitutional,
pp. 3-4].
effect, and
[Ans. to
in its
Plaintiff moved
this Court
this defense.
its favor
Plaintiff
judgment in
enter summary
to enter
against this
Court to
favor as
defense.
moved this
as against
summary judgment
in its
Plaintiff supported
with argument
this
its position
its briefing.
Plaintiff
position with
brieﬁng. Defendants
Defendants failed
failed to
to address
argument in
supported its
address this
in their
in opposition
their briefing
briefing in
the motion
motion for
for summary
all in
argument
judgment.
argument at
opposition to
to the
at all
summary judgment.

‘solid waste’
waste’ used
their argument
fail to
the definition
deﬁnition of
Defendants
argument is
Defendants fail
to make
make clear
is as
to the
of ‘solid
clear if their
as to
used
‘solid waste’
in I.C.
in
the legislature
the narrower
deﬁnition of
by the
waste’ used
used by
by DEQ
or the
narrower definition
of ‘solid
legislature in
LG §§ 39-103(13)
39-10303) or
DEQ in
by

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.44
IDAPA
or both.
both.
58.01.06.005.44 or
“Every act
Article 3,
the Idaho
Article
provides: “Every
joint resolution
17 of
of the
Constitution provides:
or joint
resolution
Section 17
Idaho Constitution
act or
3, Section
terms.” The
the use
The Idaho
far as
shall be
shall
plainly worded,
worded, avoiding
practicable the
use of
technical terms.”
of technical
avoiding so
Idaho
be plainly
so far
as practicable
In addressing
little occasion
interpret this
this provision
the state
courts
provision of
to interpret
of the
constitution. In
state constitution.
courts have
had little
addressing
have had
occasion to
that aa particular
Article 3,
the Idaho
arguments
particular statute
arguments that
17 of
of Article
Section 17
Idaho Supreme
Court has
violates Section
Supreme Court
has
statute violates
3, the

“void for
focused
whether the
the language
the statute
for indefiniteness,
on Whether
of the
and
statute was
language of
focused on
indeﬁniteness, uncertainty,
was “void
uncertainty, and
incompleteness,
judicial interpretation
Vitality.”
it any
that judicial
interpretation cannot
cannot give
to it
or vitality.”
force or
and that
give to
incompleteness, and
any force
Knight v.
Ada County
In Ada
the
Knight
16 Idaho
P. 1060,
Idaho 256,
100 P.
1063 (1909).
v. Trigg,
v. Wright,
Wright, the
Trigg, 16
1060, 1063
256, 267,
267, 100
County v.
(1909). In
“not obnoxious
Idaho
particular statute
that aa particular
to sec.
art. 3,
of
Idaho Supreme
Court concluded
Supreme Court
obnoxious to
statute was
concluded that
was “not
sec. 17,
17, art.
3, of
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“not impossible
constitution” because
construction.”
the
it was
was “not
the provision
the constitution”
provision aa workable
to give
impossible to
workable construction.”
give the
because it

60
92 P.2d
P.2d 134,
Idaho 394,
137 (1939).
60 Idaho
134, 137
394, 403,
403, 92
(1939).
‘solid waste’
waste’ is
in their
Defendants
their pleading
that the
term ‘solid
the term
not assert
is vague
or
pleading that
Defendants do
assert in
vague or
do not

‘solid waste’
waste’ in
in I.C.
indefinite.
not address
the definition
deﬁnition of
the phrase
indeﬁnite. Indeed,
of the
defendants do
phrase ‘solid
address the
LG
do not
Indeed, defendants

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.44
§§ 39-103(19)
that the
the phrase
or IDAPA
at all.
all. Defendants
Defendants merely
phrase
58.01.06.005.44 at
argue that
39-10309) or
merely argue
term” and,
“solid waste”
waste” is
“technical term”
“solid
from using
the legislature
therefore the
is completely
is aa “technical
using
legislature is
barred from
completely barred
and, therefore
in any
such
term in
this interpretation
for this
interpretation of
art. 3.
Defendants cite
cite to
to no
no authority
of
such aa term
sec 17,
3. Defendants
authority for
17, art.
any way
way by
by sec
defendants’ affirmative
In essence,
the
that the
the
the language
afﬁrmative defense
to be
of section
section 17.
17. In
defense appears
appears to
language of
be that
essence, defendants’

it aa
legislature
because the
phrase renders
term or
the act
deﬁning aa term
terms because
define terms
or phrase
of defining
renders it
legislature can
never define
can never
act of
“technical” one,
in Violation
“technical”
violation of
This Court
Article 3.
the
interpret the
of Section
17 of
of Article
to interpret
Section 17
Court declines
declines to
3. This
one, in
in aa way
language
way that
yield such
that would
the constitution
The Court
the
of the
constitution in
an absurd
result. The
Court notes
notes the
such an
would yield
language of
absurd result.
in Section
commandment
not absolute;
terms is
technical terms
commandment in
is not
to avoid
17 to
to avoid
command to
Section 17
avoid
avoid technical
absolute; only
only aa command

‘solid waste,’
the
practicable. Here
used the
waste,’
term ‘solid
the use
the legislature
the term
terms when
technical terms
of technical
when practicable.
Here the
legislature used
use of

arguably
phrase using
using plain
that phrase
plain
the legislature
term. However,
technical term.
legislature specifically
deﬁned that
speciﬁcally defined
However, the
arguably aa technical
in the
words. DEQ
that
not argue
the Solid
Management Rules.
well in
Defendants do
Solid Waste
did so
Rules. Defendants
Waste Management
words.
so as
as well
do not
argue that
DEQ did

“solid waste”
waste” used
the
used are
unconstitutionally vague
vague or
the definitions
definitions of
of “solid
or overbroad.
are unconstitutionally
overbroad. They
merely
They merely
“technical” one.
complain
that the
This Court
the phrase
itself is
complain that
is aa “technical”
phrase itself
Court concludes
and
one. This
I.C. §§ 39-103(13)
concludes I.C.
39-10303) and

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.44
Plaintiff is
IDAPA
not obnoxious
the constitution.
to sec
art. 3,
of the
is
constitution. Plaintiff
are not
obnoxious to
58.01.06.005.44 are
see 17,
17, art.
3, of
in its
entitled
judgment in
this affirmative
the entry,
partial judgment
its favor
entitled to
afﬁrmative
to the
of partial
against this
favor as
as against
summarily, of
entry, summarily,
this affirmative
defense.
plaintiff’ss motion
judgment is
The plaintiff’
motion for
for summary
afﬁrmative defense.
is granted
granted as
to this
defense. The
defense.
as to
summary judgment
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CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
in its
in its
Plaintiff
judgment in
Plaintiff moved
forth in
First
for summary
its favor
the claims
its First
on the
claims set
favor on
set forth
moved for
summary judgment

in their
Amended
upon the
by defendants
their answer.
the affirmative
Complaint and
afﬁrmative defenses
Amended Complaint
defendants in
and upon
raised by
answer.
defenses raised
th
9th
plaintiff’ s
Memorandum
When
the Court
its January
When the
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
Court issued
Order denying
and Order
issued its
denying plaintiff’s
January 9

motion,
plaintiff’ss motion
the Court
motion as
all of
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defenses
to address
to all
of the
Court declined
declined to
defenses
address plaintiff
as to
motion, the
In failing
raised
by defendants.
Plaintiff was
failing to
this Court
entitled to
ruling on
to do
to aa ruling
on
Court erred.
defendants. In
erred. Plaintiff
raised by
do so,
was entitled
so, this

it moved
each
judgment. I.R.C.P.
the
for summary
which it
against which
I.R.C.P. 56(a).
defense as
each defense
moved for
as against
Therefore, the
summary judgment.
56(a). Therefore,

plaintiff’ s motion.
Court
portions of
motion.
of plaintiff’s
Court now
those portions
now decides
decides those
th
9th
Court’s January
Plaintiff’ s motion
The
Order
judgment entirely
The Court’s
motion for
for summary
Order denying
entirely
denying Plaintiff’s
summary judgment
January 9
th
9th
Court’s January
in the
is
vacated. For
Memorandum
forth in
For the
the reasons
the Court’s
Memorandum Decision
Decision and
is hereby
set forth
and
reasons set
January 9
hereby vacated.

in part
for
plaintiff’s motion
judgment is
part and
forth herein,
for the
the reasons
motion for
for summary
is granted
set forth
granted in
and
reasons set
herein, plaintiff’s
summary judgment
in part.
denied
part.
denied in

Plaintiff’s motion
in the
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
First Amended
motion for
for summary
the claims
the First
on the
claims alleged
Amended
alleged in
summary judgment

Complaint
Complaint is
is Denied.
Denied.
Plaintiff’ s motion
defendants’
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
that the
the defendants’
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defense
on the
defense that
summary judgment

IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.ii
activities
under IDAPA
from the
the Solid
exempt from
Management Rules
activities are
Solid Waste
Rules under
are exempt
Waste Management
58.01 .06.03.b.ii
because the
the grass
clippings and
is Denied.
Denied.
and leaves
are crop
crop residue
residue is
leaves are
because
grass clippings
Plaintiff’ s motion
defendants’
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
that defendants’
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defense
on the
defense that
summary judgment

IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.iii
activities
under IDAPA
from the
the Solid
exempt from
Management Rules
activities are
Solid Waste
Rules under
are exempt
58.01.06.03.b.iii
Waste Management
the grass
clippings and
because the
constitute an
an agricultural
agricultural solid
solid waste
and leaves
managed and
and
waste managed
leaves constitute
because
grass clippings
the Idaho
Department of
regulated
by the
of Agriculture
Agriculture is
is Granted.
Idaho Department
Granted.
regulated by

Plaintiff’s motion
plaintiff lacks
that plaintiff
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
afﬁrmative defense
on the
lacks
defense that
summary judgment
this suit
standing
bring this
standing to
to bring
suit is
is Granted.
Granted.
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Plaintiff’s motion
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
plaintiff is
that plaintiff
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defense
on the
is
defense that
summary judgment
Right to
precluded or
Plant Amendment
Farm Act
Amendment
the Idaho
Act and/or
the Soil
Soil and
or preempted
to Farm
preempted by
Idaho Right
and Plant
and/or the
precluded
by the
defendants’ activities
Act
from regulating
Act from
regulating defendants’
activities is
is Granted.
Granted.

Plaintiff’s motion
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
First
that the
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
the First
afﬁrmative defense
on the
defense that
summary judgment

Amended
valid claim
for relief
relief under
Complaint fails
fails to
claim for
to state
is Granted.
Amended Complaint
state aa valid
under I.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P. 12(b)
Granted.
12(b) is
Plaintiff’ s motion
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
that the
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
the Solid
afﬁrmative defense
on the
Solid Waste
defense that
Waste
summary judgment
67-5222 is
in Violation
Management
violation of
Management Rules
of I.C.
is Granted.
Rules were
Granted.
were adopted
adopted in
LC. §§ 67-5222

Plaintiff’ s motion
Plaintiff’s
judgment on
that use
motion for
for summary
the affirmative
the phrase
afﬁrmative defense
on the
of the
phrase
defense that
use of
summary judgment
‘solid waste’
in EPHA
EPHA and/or
‘solid
waste’ in
Article 3,
the Solid
Management Rules
17
Section 17
Solid Waste
Rules violates
violates Article
and/or the
Waste Management
3, Section

of
the Idaho
of the
Constitution is
is Granted.
Idaho Constitution
Granted.
th
9th
In the
In
Memorandum
this Court
ﬁrst sentence
the first
its January
Memorandum Decision,
on page
19 of
of its
Court
sentence on
page 19
Decision, this
January 9

“The modifier
in I.D.A.P.A
wrote: “The
the word
following the
modiﬁer (plant)
I.D.A.P.A 58.06.001(03)(b)(iii).”
wrote:
crop in
word crop
58.06.001(03)(b)(iii).”
(plant) following

IDAPA 58.06.001.03.b.ii.
That
was incorrect.
That citation
That citation
citation was
citation is
incorrect. That
is hereby
to read
corrected to
read IDAPA
58.06.001.03.b.ii.
hereby corrected
th
9th
in its
The
Memorandum
well.
The Court
its January
errors in
Memorandum Decision
Decision as
Court notes
notes typographical
as well.
typographical errors
January 9

if they
The
not
the reader,
not to
the Court,
The Court
to the
to the
Court trusts
these are
and need
trusts these
are obvious
need not
even if
were not
obvious to
reader, even
Court, and
they were
be corrected.
corrected.
be

plaintiff’ s
The
parties for
The Court
the parties
for its
its erroneous
not to
to the
to address
Court apologizes
apologizes to
decision not
erroneous decision
address plaintiff’s
in its
motion
motion in
its entirety.
entirety.

IT
IT is
ORDERED.
is so
so ORDERED.

Signed: 2/9/2017 12:49 PM

______________________________
Jonathan
Jonathan Medema
Medema
District Judge
District
Judge
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IN
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
THE
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN

DEPARTMENT OF
IDAHO
IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY,

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.

CV-OC-2015-3540
Case
No. CV-OC-2015-3540
Case No.

PLAINTIFF’S
ORDER
ORDER SUSTAINING
SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF’S
AND GRANTING
OBJECTIONS
GRANTING
OBJECTIONS AND
PLAINTIFF ’8 MOTION
PLAINTIFF’S
STRIKE
MOTION TO
TO STRIKE
THE AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDAVIT OF
PORTIONS
PORTIONS OF
OF THE
OF
DAVID
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON
GIBSON

DAVID
BLACK
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON,
d/b/a BLACK
GIBSON, d/b/a
DIAMOND COMPOST
DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and
PRODUCTS, and
VHS
VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES, LLC,
LLC,
Defendants.
Defendants.
Plaintiff
judgment. Both
Plaintiff filed
Both parties
motion for
for summary
parties submitted
ﬁled aa motion
memorandums and
submitted memorandums
and
summary judgment.
affidavits
in relation
Plaintiff also
written objection
the motion.
motion to
strike
relation to
motion. Plaintiff
to the
to strike
ﬁled aa written
afﬁdavits in
objection and
and motion
also filed
Gibson’s affidavit.
portions of
Plaintiff had
the affidavit
Mr. David
portions
of the
afﬁdavit of
of Mr.
R. Gibson’s
to
afﬁdavit. Plaintiff
David R.
had various
objections to
various objections
Gibson’s testimony
Mr.
based on
Mr. Gibson’s
the Idaho
on the
of Evidence.
Idaho Rules
Rules of
Evidence.
testimony based

In
judgment, the
In its
it
that it
written decision
the Court
its written
the motion
motion for
for summary
on the
commented that
Court commented
decision on
summary judgment,
Gibson’s affidavit
had
portions of
in making
making its
Mr. Gibson’s
not considered
its decision
struck portions
of Mr.
afﬁdavit and
those in
decision
had struck
and had
had not
considered those

as
judgment. The
written ruling
the motion
motion for
for summary
The Court
enter aa written
ruling
to the
to enter
Court neglected,
as to
neglected, however,
however, to
summary judgment.
on
the objections
The Court
motions to
strike. The
to strike.
on the
Court does
objections and
and motions
now.
does so
so now.
Gibson’s affidavit
Plaintiff’s motion
The
in the
The Plaintiff’s
motion to
strike those
Mr. Gibson’s
the
portions of
identiﬁed in
to strike
of Mr.
afﬁdavit identified
those portions

motion
that testimony.
motion is
The Court
the objections
is granted.
to that
granted. The
Court sustains
sustains the
objections made
made to
testimony.
IT
IT is
ORDERED.
is so
so ORDERED.

Signed: 2/15/2017 11:42 AM

______________________________
Jonathan
Jonathan Medema
Medema
District
District Judge
Judge
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3/9/2017 3:41:55 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
King, Deputy Clerk
By: Amy King,

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J.
J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone:
Telephone: (208)
(208) 373-0494
373-0481
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY’
Plaintiff,
v.
VDAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
VVVVVVVVVVVVV

2015—03540
CASE NO.:
NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

MOTION IN LIMINE TO
PRELUDE EVIDENCE
CONCERNING UNPLEAD
DEFENSES

The Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (Department) through the
office of the Idaho Attorney General respectfully moves this Court in limine to preclude
Defendants from introducing evidence or making inquiries during trial concerning defenses
which have not been affirmatively
Which
afﬁrmatively plead in their Amended Answer, including but not limited to
any
is made pursuant to
any evidence or inquiry concerning Idaho Code §§ 39-108(4). This motion is
this Court’s prior ruling in this case
401 and 403 and is supported
case and Idaho Rules of Evidence 401
MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRELUDE EVIDENCE CONCERNING UNPLEAD
DEF ENSES -- 11
DEFENSES
000698

by
by the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine.
DATED this 6_”‘
6th day
day of March, 2017.

SSTATE
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
O
FFICE OF THE A
TTORNEY G
ENERAL
OFFICE

/s/DARRELL G. EARLY
DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 6_th
6th day
be served aa true and
day of March, 2017, I caused to be
correct copy
copy of the foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRELUDE EVIDENCE
CONCERNING UNPLEAD DEFENSES
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
DEF ENSES by
following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S.
US. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
x Fax (208)
_ __
(208) 345-1129
____ eService
eSerVice
_ﬁ

/s/CHRISTINE RIGGS
/S/CHRISTINE
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Filed
Electronically Filed
3/9/2017 3:41:55 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
King, Deputy Clerk
By: Amy King,

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J.
J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone:
Telephone: (208)
(208) 373-0494
373-0481
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY’
Plaintiff,
v.
V'
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES,
LLC.
Defendants.
Defendants.

))
))
)
);
))
))
)
);
))
))
)
);
))

2015—03540
CASE NO.:
NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION INLIMINE
IN LIMINE TO
PRELUDE EVIDENCE
ggléI£nigéD§£PclijAD
CONCERNING
UNPLEAD
DEFENSES

The Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (Department) through the
office
Office of the Idaho Attorney General respectfully submits the following Memorandum In
Support of Motion In Limine to Preclude Evidence Concerning Unplead Defenses.
Defenses.
Defendants should be
be precluded from introducing evidence or making inquiries during
trial concerning defenses which have not been
been affirmatively
afﬁrmatively plead in their Amended Answer,
including but not limited to any
any evidence or inquiry concerning Idaho Code §§ 39-108(4). Any
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRELUDE EVIDENCE
CONCERNING UNPLEAD DEFENSES -- 11
000700

such evidence is
401 as
is irrelevant pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 401
has previously
as this Court has
recognized.
To date,
date, the Defendants have not sought leave to amend their
answer to the First Amended Complaint to allege aa defense based
based
on the statute of limitations.
limitations. Unless the Defendants seek and are
granted permission to do so,
so. the Court would preclude evidence
and argument on that issue from trial as
as being irrelevant. Motions
to amend the pleadings before trial are
are properly considered under
Rules 15(a)(2)
and
16(2)(B).
The
Court
will not decide that issue
Will
16(2)(B).
15(a)(2)
now because no motion to amend has
has been made.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, dated January 9,
Order on Defendants’
9, 2017, CV-OC-2015-03450 (emphasis

added).
added). Despite this admonition from the Court, the Defendants have not filed any
any motion
seeking to further amend their Answer to assert additional defenses.
defenses. Any such motion at this
date would be untimely under the Court’s scheduling order and would cause prejudice to the
Plaintiff by
by raising issues at trial which have heretofore been irrelevant to the proceedings.
proceedings. Any
effort to introduce such evidence would be
be unfairly prejudicial within the meaning of Idaho Rule
of Evidence 403 to the Department since the Department has
has relied upon the fact that Defendants
have not sought to amend and this Court’s prior ruling in preparing for trial in this case.
case.
For the foregoing reasons,
reasons, the Court should preclude the Defendants from offering
evidence or making inquiry into issues that are not raised in by
speciﬁcally
by the pleadings specifically
including, but not limited to,
to, any
any defenses based upon the statute of limitation found in Idaho
Code §§ 39-108(4).
39-108(4).
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6th day
DATED this 6_”‘
day of March, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE
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6th day
day of March, 2017, I caused to be
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by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
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The Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (the
(the Department) by
by and
through the Office
Ofﬁce of the Idaho Attorney General hereby submits the following AMENDED

1

The Department previously filed
ﬁled aa Pretrial Memorandum on January 3,
23,
3, 2017 in conformity with the January 23,
2017 trial date.
is submitted pursuant to the Court’s Order Resetting Trial to
date. This Amended Pre-trial Memorandum is
April 5,
5, 2017.
1
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PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM in accordance with Section 2.c
2.0 of the Court’s May 16,
16, 2016
“Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial”.
ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S PRIMA FACIE CASE:
CASE:

I.
1.

Defendant VHS Properties LLC is the owner of the property upon which Black Diamond
Composting operates. Admitted: Amended Answer 113,
¶3, pg. 15;
8 pg. 18
15; ¶
11 8

2. Defendant David R. Gibson is the operator of Black Diamond Composting. Admitted:
Admitted:
Amended Answer 113,
¶3, pg. 15.
.

3. Defendants Smith and Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond Composting are composting grass
clippings and leaves at the property. Admitted: Amended Answer.
¶ 32 pg. 30.
Answer. 11
.

4. The grass clippings and leaves received by
by Defendants are aa “discarded material” subject
“solid
to regulation by
waste.”
as
by the Department as
.

5. Composting constitutes “processing solid waste.”
6. Defendants have on site at any
waste in excess
excess of six hundred
any one time aa volume of solid waste
(600)
yards.
(600) cubic yards.
.

7.. Defendants did not submit documentation demonstrating compliance with IDAPA
58.01.06.012.01
11 Facility prior to
58.01 .06.012.01 or obtain site approval from the Department for aa Tier II
commencing construction of aa Tier II
¶ 44,
11 Facility.
Facility. Admitted: Amended Answer 1]
44, pg.
35.
11
8. Defendants did not submit or obtain Operating Plan approval for the operation of aa Tier II
Facility prior to accepting solid waste.
waste. Admitted:
Admitted: Amended Answer ¶
45, pg. 35.
11 45,
.

II.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL ISSUES REMAINING -- PLAINTIFF’S CASE:
CASE:
The Court held in its January 9,
9, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying

for Summary Judgment, that aa factual issue remains concerning whether the
Plaintiffs Motion fbr
grass
by Mr. Gibson were
grass clippings and leaves received at the property and composted by
“discarded materials” so
Within the legal definition
deﬁnition of “Solid Waste.” Id. at 14.
14.
so as
as to fall within
Associated With
with this question, and as
Whether or not the volume
as yet
yet unresolved, is the issues of whether
of grass
grass clippings and leaves received and composted by
by Mr. Gibson exceed the threshold of six
hundred (600)
by IDAPA 58.01.06.009
at any
58.01.06.009 to qualify as
as a
a
yards at
any one time established by
(600) cubic yards
Tier II processing facility. Finally, left unresolved by
Whether composting
is whether
by the Court’s decision is
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constitutes “processing” of aa solid waste.
waste. All other matters necessary
necessary to establish the
Department’s prima facie case
case were admitted in the answer as
as noted above or resolved in the
Court’s decision.
decision.
III.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL ISSUES REMAINING -- AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES:
In its January 9,
Plaintiffs Motion fbr
for
9, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintzfﬁ

Summary Judgment,
Judgment, and its February 9,
9, 2017 Supplemental Memorandum Decision
Plaintzfj‘"s Motion For Summary Judgment and Order Partially Granting
Reconsidering Plaintiff’s
Plaintzfj‘"s Motion For Summary Judgment the Court entered judgment as
Plaintiff’s
as a
a matter of law on all,

save
afﬁrmative defenses raised by
save one,
one, of the affirmative
by the Defendants in this matter. The Court’s
January 9,
for Summary
9, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion fbr
Whether (if discarded) the grass
an issue of fact remained concerning whether
Judgment found that an
grass

clippings and leaves composted by
within the meaning of solid wastes
by the Defendants fell Within
excluded from regulation by
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii as
as “crop (plant) residue ultimately
by IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
returned to the soil at
at agronomic rates.” Attendant to this issue,
issue, however, but left unresolved,
was whether
Whether the Court would grant deference to the Department’s interpretation of IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii and the meaning of “crop residue” under the Idaho Supreme Court’s
Comm’n. 120
decisions in J.R. Simplot Co.
120 Idaho 849,
1206 (1991).
CO. v.
V. Idaho State Tax Comm’n,
849. 820 P.2d 1206

Accordingly, at trial the Department is prepared to offer further evidence and this Pretrial
Memorandum will present additional legal authority regarding the plain meaning, interpretation
and the deference that should be afforded the Department’s interpretation of IDAPA
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii.
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii.
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IV.

PENALTY22
FACTUAL AND LEGAL ISSUE REMAINING FOR TRIAL –— PENALTY

Idaho Code §§ 39-108(5) provides for aa monetary penalty in an
an amount up to $10,000 per
violation or $1,000 per day
Violation
Violations for any
any “person determined in aa civil
day of continuing violations
enforcement action to have violated any
any rule, permit or order
any provision of this act or any

act...” In imposing any
penalty, the Court may take into account
promulgated pursuant to this act…”
any penalty,
the seriousness of the violation,
Violation, good faith efforts to comply with the law, and an enforceable
commitment by
by the person against whom the penalty is directed to implement aa supplemental
environmental project.
The Department’s Amended Complaint seeks
seeks imposition of aa monetary penalty of up to
$10,000 per violation
Violation or $1,000 per day
51
Violations. See
See Amended Compliant ¶ 51
day of continuing violations.
11

& Prayer for Relief ¶ D. In this instance there are two separate regulatory Violations
violations alleged
11

be considered as
violations rather than continuing violations
which may
Violations since
as separate single Violations
may be
each is tied to the failure to submit and receive approval prior to engaging in conduct for the first
ﬁrst
th
(9th
time. See
Cir. 1995).
States v.
See United States
V. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556,
1995). The
556, 557 (9

Violation” and the Defendants’
Defendants’
Department will offer evidence concerning the “seriousness of the violation”

lack of any
any good faith effort to comply with the Department’s regulations justifying imposition of
the full statutory penalty amount.
V.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ON ISSUES OF LAW:
1.
1.

Grass Clippings and Leaves are “yard waste” not “crop residue” and the
Court may still determine this as
as a matter of law prior to trial.

IDAPA 58.01.06.01.03.b.ii excludes from regulation “manures and crop (plant) residue
ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic rates.” It is the Department’s position that the grass

22 The issue
issue of penalty may
be bifurcated from the Trial resolving the question of liability if deemed appropriate by
may be
by
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clippings and leaves received and composted by
by Gibson do not fall Within
within this exclusion because:
because:
1.
1. Grass clippings and leaves are
are “yard waste” not “crop residue” both within the plain meaning
of this term and as
by the Department; and 2. Defendants are
as consistently interpreted and applied by
“processing” the leaves and grass
an
are not “returning” them to the soil at an
grass clippings and are

“agronomic rate.” During summary judgment proceedings, the only argument advanced by
by the
Defendants was to misquote the rule to argue that grass
or plant”
grass clippings and leaves were “crop g
residue and thus exempt under the Rule. At no time did the Defendants argue or present
Defendants’
evidence that grass clippings and leaves were “crops.” The Court in response to the Defendants’

argument ruled:
ruled:
Defendants argue that grass clippings and leaves are clearly aa “crop
or plant residue” and,
and, therefore exempt from regulation. In their
briefing Defendants consistently misquote the language of
brieﬁng
I.D.A.P.A. 58.006.001(03)(b)(ii).
is not for “crop
58.006.001(03)(b)(ii). The exemption is
or plant residue;” the exemption is “crop (plant) residue.” DEQ
‘plant’ in parentheses
argues that the word ‘plant’
parentheses is and adjective
intended to modify the noun ‘crop,’ not to stand alone as
as a
a separate
noun. DEQ argues
is intended to
argues the inclusion of the word plant is
differentiate crops that are
animals. The
are plants from crops that are
are animals.
Court agrees.
agrees. The plain language of the regulation exempts
manure, an
an animal product, and crop (plant) residue.
an issue of fact as
18. The Court found, however, an
Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 18.
as to

“crop” dependent upon the source of the grass
whether grass
grass clippings and leaves might be a
grass
a “crop”

clipping and leaves since arguably the grass clippings and leaves could originate from plants that
19-20. As discussed below, grass
could be grown as
Id. at
at 19-20.
are by
grass clippings and leaves are
as crops. Id.
by

definition
deﬁnition yard waste and thus not “crop residue.” In addition and as
as discussed below, the Court
may yet
by the Court’s prior
yet supplement its prior decision to address an issue left unresolved by
orders to wit:
Wit: Whether the Department’s interpretation is
is entitled to deference under the Idaho

the Court.
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v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 120
Supreme Court’s decision in J.R.
120 Idaho 849,
J .R. Simplot Co.
CO. V.
849, 820
P.2d
1206 (1991). 3
P.2d1206(1991).3
A.

Grass Clippings and Leaves are “Yard Waste” Not “Crop Residue.”

The Solid Waste Management Rules define
deﬁne “Yard waste” as:
grass
as: Weeds,
leaves, grass
Weeds, straw, leaves,
clippings brush,
brush, wood, and other natural, organic materials typically derived from general
4
added).4 The Solid Waste
landscape maintenance activities.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005.52 (emphasis added).

Management Rules clearly apply to processing facilities that process
process wastes “including, but not
limited to,
waste, sheet rock, clean paper products animal
to, untreated or unpainted wood, yard waste,

fats...” IDAPA
manures, plant or crop residues, or garbage Without
without meats or animal fats…”
58.01.06.009.02.b.
will be introduced at trial to show that the material received by
by the
58.01 .06.009.02.b. Evidence Will
Defendants are
clippings... typically derived from general landscape
are “leaves and grass
grass clippings…
maintenance” and thus within the regulatory definition
deﬁnition of “yard waste” the processing of which is
clearly regulated.
regulated. Defendants cannot rely upon the provisions of IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii to
argue that the leaves and grass
by Rule the
are “crop residue” when by
grass clippings they receive are
materials they receive clearly meet the definition
deﬁnition of “yard waste” contained in the Rules.
Administrative rules are
are statutes,
are subject to same principles of construction as
as are
statutes,
Kimbrough V.
v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150
150 Idaho 417, 247 P.3d 644 (2011), beginning with
21 P.3d 903, 908
the literal words of the rule. Mason V.
v. Donnelly
135 Idaho 581, 586, 21
DonnellV Club, 135

(2001).1.
12001

Definitional
used in the statute
Deﬁnitional terms dictate and control the meaning of those words as
as used

Plainliﬂ’s Motion
33 As the Court did in its February 9,
Memorandum Decision Reconsidering Plaintiff’s
9, 2017 Supplemental Memorandum
Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment this Court may
yet
For Summary Judgment and Order Partially Granting Plainliﬂ’s
may yet
a matter of law prior to trial by
resolve this issue as
as a
by determining that the Department’s interpretation is reasonable,
a matter of law. Doing so
consistent and entitled to deference as
as a
so would eliminate this issue from the trial.
4 In its Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, it was pointed out that the Solid Waste
Management Rules regulated the processing of “yard waste” but Counsel omitted citation to the definition
deﬁnition of “yard
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or rule. Mayer
160 Idaho 223, 226-7, 370 P.3d 738 741-2 (2016).
V. TPC Holdings, Inc. 160
Maver v.
Undefined words should be given their plain, obvious and rational meaning, construed in the
context of the rule and statute as
Whole to give effect to the rule and to the statutory language
as a
a whole
the rule is
v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 148
148 Idaho 378,
is meant to supplement. Wheeler V.
378, 384, 223 P.3d
21 P.3d at 908. Where the language of a
761, 766 (Ct. App. 2009); Mason, 135
135 Idaho at 586, 21
a

rule is
unambiguous, courts give effect to the rule as
is plain and unambiguous,
as written, without engaging in
construction; if aa court must engage in construction, then its duty is to ascertain and give effect to
147 Idaho 476, 479, 210 P.3d 584, 479
the intent of the promulgating entity. In re Schroeder, 147

(Ct. App. 2009).
2009 2.
1Ct.

In this case
by Gibson clearly fall
grass clippings composted by
case the leaves and grass

within the definition
be considered part of the undeﬁned
undefined
deﬁnition of “yard waste” and thus should not be
term “crop residue.”
B. The “crop residue” exception applies to wastes
wastes generated on farms.
Should the Court need further evidence or authority to find that the grass clippings and
leaves are
are subject to the Department’s regulatory authority and not within the exception found in
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii for “crop (plant) residue.” The Court may
may consider the following
authorities and the relationship of the Solid Waste Management Rules governing “non-municipal
39-7401 et.
solid waste” to the management of “municipal solid waste” under Idaho Code §§ 39-7401
seq.
et. seq.

Evidence Will
will be offered at trial to show that the Solid Waste Management Rules are an
39-7401 et.
outgrowth of Idaho Code §§ 39-7401
was originally enacted in 1992
1992 in response to
et. seq.
seq. which was

federal mandates found in 42 U.S.C., 6901
6901 and regulations adopted by
by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency found at
at 40 CFR
CF R §§ 258. See
1992
See Idaho Code §
§ 39-7401. In 1992

waste” contained in the rule at IDAPA 58.01.06.005.52. Counsel apologizes for not including this definitional
deﬁnitional
citation in briefing
brieﬁng to the Court during summary judgment arguments.
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the Idaho legislature defined “solid waste” in Idaho Code §§ 39-7403(50) as:
as:
(50)
any garbage or refuse, sludge from aa
(50) “Solid waste” means any
waste water treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air
pollution control facility and other discarded material including
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous
gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations
and from community activities, but does not include solid or
dissolved materials in domestic sewage,
sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows
ﬂows or industrial discharges that are
point sources subject to permit under 33
33 U.S.C. 1342,
1342, or source,
source,
special nuclear, or byproduct material as
deﬁned in the atomic
as defined
1
19541,, as
energy act of 1954
regglations
as amended (68
(68 Stat. 923). These regulations
shall not apply to the following solid wastes:
wastes:
(a)
(a) Overburden, waste dumps and low-grade stockpiles
from mining operations;
(b)
wastes whose
is
Whose discharge or potential discharge is
(b) Liquid wastes
regulated under federal, state or local water pollution
permits;
(c)
as designated in the hazardous waste
(0) Hazardous wastes as
management act,
Code;
act, chapter 44,
44, title 39,
39, Idaho Code;
(d)
used for ornamental, animal bedding,
(d) Wood waste used
mulch and plant bedding and road building purposes;
(e)
(e) Agricultural wastes, limited to manures and crop
residues, returned to the soils at agronomic rates;
(f)
as otherwise
(f) Clean soils and clean dredge spoils as
regulated under section 404 of the federal clean water act
2
95-217)2;;
(PL 95-217)
(g)
by
(g) Septage taken to aa sewage treatment plant permitted by
either the U.S.
US. environmental protection agency or the
department; and
(h)
(h) Wood debris resulting from the harvesting of timber and
the disposal of which is permitted under chapter 1,
38,
1, title 38,
Idaho Code.
Idaho Code §§ 39-7403(50) (emphasis supplied). See
1992 Ch. 331
1.
331 §
See also,
Sess. L. 1992
also, Idaho Sess.
§ 1.
“Agricultural wastes” were in turn defined
deﬁned by
as:
by Idaho Code §§ 39-7403(2) as:

2)
2) “Agricultural wastes” means wastes generated on farms
resulting from the production of agricultural products including,
but not limited to,
carcasses of dead animals weighing
to, manures and carcasses
each or collectively in excess
ﬁfteen (15)
excess of fifteen
(15) pounds but do not
include wastes that are
are classified
classiﬁed as
hazardous.
as hazardous.
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Idaho Code §§ 39-7403(2) (emphasis supplied). IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03
58.01.06.001.03 and its exceptions were
intended to carry forward these legislatively crafted “exceptions” to the regulation as
as solid waste
reflected
reﬂected in Idaho Code 39-7403(50).
39-7403(50). Likewise at the time of the Department’s rulemaking the
term “crop residue” was
was defined
by Idaho Code §§ 22-4802(3)
deﬁned by
as “any vegetative material
22-48026) as
remaining in the field
waterways,
ﬁeld after harvest and shall not include weeds along ditch banks or waterways,
orchard prunings, or forest slash piles.”5
piles.” 5 See
2 (emphasis
1999 Ch. 378 §
See Idaho Sess.
Sess. L. 1999
§ 2
supplied). The Department’s interpretation of IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii. to apply to wastes
wastes
generated on farms and left in the field
used in other
ﬁeld is consistent with how these terms are used
sections of Idaho Code extant at the time it adopted the Solid Waste Management Rules. These
provisions and authorities demonstrate the commonly understood meaning of the term “crop
residue” as
Rules.
as used in the Rules.
C.
C. The Department’s Interpretation is entitled to deference.
Where an agency interprets aa statute or rule, the Court should apply the four-pronged

&

Simplot test to determine the appropriate level of deference to the agency
See J.R.
agency interpretation. See
Simplot Co.
120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206
1206 (1991). The rationales
CO. v.
V. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 120
underlying the rule of deference to an agency’s interpretation of aa statute or rule are:
are: (1)
(1) that aa
practical interpretation of the rule exists; (2)
(2) the presumption of legislative acquiescence; (3)
(3)
reliance on the agency’s expertise in interpretation of the rule which was explained in Simplot as
as
follows:
…because
...because the judiciary in Idaho is intended to apply aa general
background to the law, the expertise of an agency is often useful in
22-4801 et.
a new section governing
55 In 2008 the Idaho Legislature repealed Idaho Code §§ 22-4801
81. seq.
seq. and replaced it with a
39-114. Therein the definition
deﬁnition of “crop residue” remains
crop residue burning currently found at Idaho Code §§ 39-114.
largely the same
same “vegetative material remaining in the field
ﬁeld after harvest or vegetative material produced on
designated conservation reserve program (CRP)
lands.
(CRP)
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technical areas
areas of the law where the risks of failing to understand
all of the implications of aa decision are
are great.
J.R. Simplot Co.,
120 Idaho at
at 859, 820 P.2d at 1216.;
1216.; (4)
C0., 120
repose; and (5)
(4) the rationale of repose;
(5) the
149 Idaho at 3,
interpretation. Duncan, 149
requirement of contemporaneous agency interpretation.
3, 232 P.3d at 324.

‘cogent reasons' justifying the court in adopting aa
If these reasons are absent,
absent, it may
may present ‘cogent

construction which differs from that of the agency.” J.R.
120 Idaho at 862, 820
J .R. Simplot Co.,
C0., 120
P.2d at 1219.
are present, the court must balance the supporting
1219. If only some of the rationales are

“if one or more of the rationales underlying
rationales, as
Id. But, “if
as all are not weighted equally. Id.
‘cogent reason’ exists for denying the agency some deference, the
the rule are present,
present, and no ‘cogent

weight’ to the agency's statutory interpretation.” Id.
‘considerable weight’
court should afford ‘considerable

The Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment briefed and argued that it was entitled
to deference. The Defendants presented no argument or authority to suggest deference was not
appropriate. The Court’s January 9,
9, 2017, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Summary
Whether the Department had met the requirements for
Judgment, however, did not rule on whether

Simplot deference. While it can be
be inferred that perhaps the Court did not grant such deference
Si_m1m
from the following:
From the affidavit
afﬁdavit of Mr. Ehlert the Court understands this
argument to be that, in DEQ’s View,
view, “crop (plant) residue
ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic rates means portions of
harvested plants left in the field
ﬁeld after harvest. This argument is
‘crop’ that DEQ has
deﬁnition of ‘crop’
somewhat inconsistent with the definition
are harvested but also
proposed (including not only plants that are
plants that can be).
is also unavailing because
be). This argument is
by aa farmer after harvest and then
portions of plants left in the field
ﬁeld by
burned or tilled under are not discarded material and therefore are
are
Air. 373 F.3d
not subject to regulation as
waste. See
as solid waste.
See Safe Air.,
th
(9th
1035
Cir. 2004). There would be no need for DEQ to adopt an
1035 (9
exclusion to what
What “solid waste it is
is choosing to regulate that only
includes materials that are
place.
ﬁrst place.
are not solid waste in the first
for Summary Judgment pg.
pg. 22-23 (footnotes
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for
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m.

omitted), there is
ﬁndings on the elements set
is neither express ruling nor findings
set forth in Simplot. Thus it
unresolved.
would appear the issue remains unresolved.
The Department is prepared to present evidence to the Court to further illustrate Why
why
deference to the Department should be granted. For example, evidence will
be offered to explain
Will be
that the 2004 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in SAFE
SAj was not available to the
Department when it negotiated and adopted the present Solid Waste Management Rules in 2002.
The Court has
whether to grant deference to the
has the opportunity prior to trial to rule upon Whether
Department’s interpretation as
judgment. In so
as was requested during summary judgment.
so doing the court
can determine under Simplot
Whether: (1)
is responsible for administration of the rule
agency is
Si_mm whether:
(1) the agency
at issue;
issue; (2)
(2) the agency’s construction is reasonable; (3)
(3) the language of the rule does not
expressly treat the matter at
Whether any
at issue;
issue; and (4)
any of the rationales underlying the rule of
(4) whether
agency
present. Duncan V.
v. State Bd. of Accountancy,
149 Idaho 1,
are present.
Accountancv, 149
1, 232 P.3d 322
agency deference are
120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219.
(2010); Simplot, 120
1219.

In the present case,
case, the Department’s consistent interpretation meets all of these criteria
and is entitled to, deference. First, DEQ is entrusted to administer the rules at issue,
so it is
issue, so
Comm’n,
“impliedly clothed with power to construe” this law. See,
V. Idaho State Tax Comm’n,
CantV v.
See, Canty

138
138 Idaho 178,
See Idaho Code §
178, 183,
183, 59 P.3d 983, 988 (2002). See
Second, DEQ’s
§ 39-105. Second,
“so obscure and doubtful that it is entitled to no weight or consideration.”
interpretation is not “so

J.R. Simplot Co.,
120 Idaho at
1219. The Department’s construction is
at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219.
is a
a
C0., 120
reasonable interpretation of the definition
deﬁnition of “solid waste” and the regulatory exception in
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii,
set forth in IDAPA
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii, especially considering the regulatory framework set
58.01.06.009 that clearly envisions regulating the processing/composting
processing/composting of both yard waste and
crop and plant residue. Third, the language of the rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue

11
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since IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
Whereas
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii does
address the matter of composting, whereas
does not expressly address
IDAPA 58.01.06.009 expressly states
states that aa processing/composting facility managing “yard
waste” and “crop or plant residue” is regulated as
as a
a Tier I or II facility. Fourth, the rationales
underlying the rule of agency
are present. A practical interpretation of the Rules exists.
agency deference are
The processing/composting
processingcomposting of solid waste including “yard waste” and “plant and crop residue”
is
is clearly intended to be regulated under IDAPA 58.01.06.009,
58.01 .06.009, and the plain meaning of the
exception in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii excludes only the actual return of crop residue to the
soil at agronomic rates. The Department has
has specialized expertise in regulating solid waste
management which was
was recognized by
Legislature. See,
See, Idaho Code §
by the Idaho Legislature.
§ 39-102A and
Idaho Code §§ 39-105. Understanding and crafting rules to address possible environmental risks
of solid waste
waste management have clearly been entrusted to the Department.
Department. The rationales of
“repose,” and contemporaneous agency
has
are present because this interpretation has
agency interpretation” are
been consistently applied for aa sufficient
sufﬁcient period of time such that it comports with settled
expectations. See
1220 It is
120 Idaho at 863,
at 1220
is undisputed that the agency
Simplot. 120
See Simplot,
863. 820 P.2d at
agency
has
has consistently applied the Rules to composting facilities such as
as the Defendants’.
Finally, legislative acquiescence is
is present. It is
is undisputed that the Idaho Legislature had
involvement in the drafting of the Rules since the draft rules were considered by
by the “Joint
Legislative Environmental Common Sense Committee.” And after the Department adopted the
Rules in 2002, the 2003 Idaho Legislature affirmatively approved the rules by
by concurrent
resolution.
resolution. See
1035. No changes to the Department’s authority have
See 2003 Idaho Sess.
Sess. L. p. 1035.
been made by
is evidence of legislative acquiescence.
acquiescence.
by the Legislature. This is
The Department is prepared to present evidence to the Court that all four of the
Simplot/Duncan criteria for agency deference are met, including the five
ﬁve rationales for granting
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deference and that the Court should grant deference to the Department’s interpretation.
interpretation.
However, since this matter was
was briefed to the Court at the summary judgment phase,
phase, was not
opposed by
by the Defendants and remains undisputed, the Court can make aa pre-trial ruling that
deference is appropriate obviating the need for trial on this issue.
issue.
2.

The Grass Clippings and Leaves composted by Gibson are Discarded
Materials.

Idaho Code §§ 39-103(13)
deﬁnes “Solid Waste” as:
as:
39-10303) defines
garbage,
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid material,
including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community
activities but does
does not included solid or dissolved material in
domestic sewage or other significant
signiﬁcant pollutants in water resources,
such as
as silt, dissolved or suspended solids in industrial waste water
effluents,
ﬂows or other
efﬂuents, dissolved material in irrigation return flows
common water pollutants.
pollutants.
(Emphasis added).
added). The Court’s January 9,
9, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
for Summary Judgment properly notes that:
Plaintiffs Motion fbr
that the definition of solid waste in I.C.
LG §39-103(13) includes
materials aa possessor
possessor no longer has
is
has a
a use
use for and the possessor is
willing
Willing to give away,
away, abandon, or discard, even if those materials
may
have
value
or use
use to another. Therefore, the fact that Mr.
may
Gibson decomposes the grass and leaves and produces humus, aa
useful product, is not determinative of Whether
whether or not the grass and
leaves are
are ‘solid waste.’ The determinative question is whether or
not the grass
grass and leaves have been “discarded.”
Id. pg.
pg. 8.
with approval the 2004 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Id.
8. And the Court cited With
th
(9th
Appeals in Safe Air For Everyone
Cir 2004) where
Where the
1035 (9
V. Mayer,
Evervone (SAFE) v.
Maver, 373 F.3d 1035

Court found that burning Kentucky Bluegrass stubble in the fields
ﬁelds did not constitute disposal of aa
solid waste because the stubble was (1)
beneﬁcial reuse or recycling in aa
(1) “destined for beneficial
continuous process by
by the generating industry itself;” (2)
reused, rather than
(2) being actively reused,
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merely the potential of being reused;
as opposed to
reused; and (3)
by its original owner, as
(3) being reused by
use by
by aa salvager or reclaimer. 373 F.3d at
at 1043.
1043.
use
SAFE relied in part on the D.C.
EPA.
DC. Circuit’s decision in Am. Min. Cong. v.
V. U.S.
US. E.P.A.
Congress’ intent
(AMC I), 824 F.2d 1177,
where the Court examined Congress’
1186 (D.C.
1177, 1186
1987) Where
(DC. Cir. 1987)

enacting RCRA to address the problems created by
by materials once they had become aa part of the
waste disposal system.
system. AMC I ruled that discarded materials do not include those materials
“destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in aa continuous process by
by the generating industry
v. U.S.
itself.” Id.
Id. Revisiting the issue three years
US.
years later, the court ruled in Am. Min. Cong. V.
E.P.A.
1179 (D.C.
EPA. (AMC II),
1990) that EPA’s conclusion that all sludges from
(DC. Cir. 1990)
11), 907 F.2d 1179
error. The court
wastewater from metal smelting operations were exempt from regulation was in error.

found that just because
because the sludges could, at some time in the future, be
be reclaimed, did not mean
they were not “discarded” and thus regulated as
as “solid waste” under Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act at the time of placement in impoundments.
impoundments.
th
(4th
In Owen Elec. Steel. Co of South Carolina, Inc. v.
Cir.
149 (4
V. Browner, 37
37 F.3d 146,
146, 149

1994)
are furnaces was a
a “discarded” material even
1994! the Court found that slag generated by
by arc
though it was
was processed
processed on site by
by aa third patty
party contractor for use
use as
as aggregate in road bed
I the Court determined that in order to fall
material. Analyzing the case
case law including AMC I,

outside the term “discarded” the material had to be
be “immediately recycled for use
use by
by the same
industry.” Id.
Id. The Court had noted the material lay on bare soil for tempering and weathering,
for approximately 66 months during aa process,
process, known as
as “curing.” The slag was hydrated and
underwent changes where
became
Where its bulk increased volumetrically after which the slag became
a result, amenable for use
a construction aggregate a
a different
dimensionally stable and,
use as
as a
as a
and, as

industry. The Court found this sufficient to hold that the slag was aa solid waste.
waste.

AMENDED PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM -- 14
000716

However, in Association of
Battery Recycler’s,
v. U.S. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1047
Recvcler’s, Inc. V.
1047 (D.
ofBatterV
C.
(D. C.
Cir. 2000),
was not
of “immediate” re-use was
2000), the Court found that aa purely temporal requirement of

w

W

mandated by
by AMC I. Rather the Court interpreted the use of
of the word “immediate” in AMC I to
mean “direct” Id.
Id. at 1051
1051 and ultimately concluded that EPA’s effort to regulate at least some
secondary materials “destined for reuse as
a continuous industrial process” and thus not
as part of a
“abandoned or thrown away” was
was in contravention of Congress’ intent. Id.
Id. at 1056.
1056.
In Safe Food and Fertilizer V.
v. E.P.A., 350 F.3d 1263,
1263, (D.C.
(DC. Cir. 2003) the Court
deﬁnition of “solid waste” to the extent it exempted
addressed aa challenge to EPA’s regulatory definition

materials that were recycled into fertilizer under specified
speciﬁed conditions. The Plaintiffs argued that
EPA lacked discretion to exempt the material because
because it was being sent by
by the generator to aa

M

third party recycler, which they contended violated the first
was not
ﬁrst prong of AMC I since it was

W

used by
was
being used
by the “generating industry itself.” The Court found that its holding in AMC I was
not so
so constrictive “we have never said that RCRA compels the conclusion that material destined
for recycling in another industry is
is necessarily “discarded.” Although ordinary language seems
seems
inconsistent with treating immediate reuse within an industry's ongoing industrial process as
as a
a
“discard,” see
see AMC],
AMC I, 824 F.2d at
Id. at
at 1185,
is not true.” Id.
at 1268.
1268. Applying
1185, the converse is

Chevron discretion to EPA’s interpretation, the Court found it was within
Within EPA’s regulatory
deﬁnition of solid waste upon specified
discretion to exempt aa specific material from the definition
speciﬁed

conditions.
The decision in Safe Food, is distinguishable from the facts in this case.
case. There EPA had
exercised rulemaking authority to exclude aa material that might have otherwise been
been considered
discarded from the full regulatory jurisdiction of RCRA so
was recycled
so long as
as the material was
261 .4(20). The question presented by
CF R §§ 261.4(20).
conditions. See
under very specific conditions.
See 40 CFR
by the case was

AMENDED PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM -- 15
000717

not whether EPA could consider the material discarded, but rather whether it had authority as
as
conditions.66 Those
matter of regulatory discretion to exempt aa material under specific
speciﬁc conditions.

conditions, however, constitute regulations in and of themselves.
themselves. Arguably if the material was
not “discarded” as
a matter of statutory law, EPA had no authority to impose the conditions on
as a
the material in the first
ﬁrst place.
th
(11th
In United States
Cir. 1993),
1131 (11
States v.
V. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126,
1126, 1131
1993), the Court addressed

the recycling of lead acid batteries by
by aa company that purchased depleted batteries from
consumers or battery suppliers for the purpose of reclaiming the lead plates found in the batteries.
The court rejected the arguments by
because of its intent to reclaim the lead,
lead, it had
by ILCO that because
never “discarded” the batteries.
batteries. The Court found that “somebody has
has discarded the batteries in
because aa reclaimer has
which these components are
are found.
found. This fact does
has
does not change just because
ﬁnds value in the components.” Id.
purchased or finds

It is unnecessary
unnecessary to read into the word “discarded” aa congressional
intent that the waste
waste in question must finally
be
ﬁnally and forever be
discarded, as
is perfectly reasonable for
seems to argue. It is
as ILCO seems
EPA to assume Congress meant “discarded once.” Were we to rule
otherwise, waste such as
as these batteries would arguably be exempt
from regulation under RCRA merely because they are potentially
recyclable.
waste, although it may
at
recyclable. Previously discarded solid waste,
may at
some point be recycled, nonetheless remains solid waste.
1132.
Id. at 1132.

In Ecological Rights Foundation V.
v. Pacific
Paciﬁc Gas and Elec.
E160. Co.,
C0., 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir.
2013),
was asked to determine if the chemicals that are
2013 2, the Court was
are used to treat power poles and

a solid or hazardous waste, but
66 Courts have previously found that EPA may exempt aa material from regulation as
as a
that it may still be considered aa statutory “solid waste” for purposes of aa citizen suit under section 7002 of RCRA as
as
Remington
Arms
an imminent and substantial endangerment.
See Connecticut Coastal Fisherman’s Association v.
endangerment. See
V.
nd
12m.. Cir. 1993).
Co.,
1305 (2
1993).
C0., 989 F.2d 1305
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subsequently leach into the soil and water were solid wastes causing an imminent and substantial
endangerment. Examining the legislative intent of RCRA the Court noted:
noted:
Congress enacted RCRA to “eliminate[ ]] the last remaining
loophole in environmental law” by
by regulating the “disposal of
947
discarded materials and hazardous wastes.” H.R.Rep. No.
N0. 94–
1491(I),
6241.
at 4 (1976),
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241.
1491(1), at
(1976), reprinted in 1976
“waste
RCRA was specifically
disposal
speciﬁcally designed to address the
problem,” Am.
Am. Mining Cong.,
Cong, 824 F.2d at 1186,
1186, which was,
was, at
base, the high “volume of waste
waste being generated and the capacity
base,
to dispose of that waste in the traditional manner,” H.R.Rep. No.
94–1491(I),
at 9.
9. Accordingly, RCRA covers “waste by-products of
94714910), at
the nation's manufacturing processes,” as
as well as
as manufactured
products themselves once they have served their intended purposes
and are
are no longer wanted by
by the consumer. For these reasons the
term discarded materials is used
used to identify collectively those
substances often referred to as
as industrial, municipal or postconsumer waste;
waste; refuse, trash, garbage and sludge.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Ecological Rights Foundation,
at 514. The key,
Foundation1 713 F.3d at
key, the Court found, to determining if
something is aa solid waste is whether “it has
has served its intended purpose and is no longer wanted
by the consumer.” Ii.
Id.
by
EnV't, Inc. v.
In Community
F. Supp.
Communitv Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't,
V. Cow Palace,
Supp.
Palace, LLC, 80 F.
1222723 (E.D.
2:13-CV-3016-TOR,
3d 1180,
No. 2:13-CV-3016-TOR,
1180, 1222–23
(ED. Wash. 2015), motion to certify appeal denied, N0.

2015 WL 403178 (E.D.
Whether manure applications
Jan. 28,
(ED. Wash. Jan.
28, 2015) the Court examined whether
to farm fields, the leakage of manure/wastewater from lagoons at farms and the leaching of
materials from the on farm composting of manure constituted the disposal of solid wastes
causing an
endangerment. In this regard the Court addressed two
an imminent and substantial endangerment.
intertwined
inteltwined arguments. First the Court rejected the Defendants argument and found that there is
no “blanket exception” to be found in RCRA for agricultural wastes used
used as
as fertilizer or soil
conditioners.
whether they are
conditioners. Rather, Whether
are excluded is aa factual inquiry that hinges upon whether it

AMENDED PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM -- 17
000719

is
is handled and used in such a
is serving that purpose versus managed in aa manner
a manner that is
that its usefulness as
1220. Only when such materials are
at 1220.
are applied
as a
a fertilizer is eliminated. Id. at
to the soil as
are they not considered “discarded.” The Court then
as fertilizer or soil conditioners are
addressed Whether
whether in aa traditional sense
sense the manures and wastewaters were “discarded.” The
Court found that the application of manure and wastewater to the fields was “done Without
without regard
to crop fertilization needs,
an effort to discard their excess
excess supply,” and thus,
thus, “the
needs, presumably in an
otherwise beneficial purpose of manure as
was eliminated and the manure discarded.”
as fertilizer was
F arms, Inc. V.
See
v. County
See also, Ticonderoga Farms,
1991)
CountV of Loudoun, et al.,
(11., 409 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Va. 1991)

(tree
leaves, brush, stumps and other organic materials collected and managed for
(tree prunings, leaves,
composting are discarded solid waste even if they will
be reused).
Will eventually be
Defendants’ facility does
Evidence Will
will be offered at trial to show that the Defendants’
does not meet the

requirements set forth in SAFE
since it is not part of aa continuous process
process by
SAisince
by the generating
industry; the Defendants are
are not actively reusing the material, but are processing it and storing it
with the mere potential to reuse it; and that the defendants are
are not the original owners, but are
are

admittedly recyclers.
will be offered to show that the materials received by
recyclers. Further evidence Will
by the
Defendants are
by their original owners and/or the generators of such grass
are being “discarded” by
grass
clippings and leaves because they are
are no longer useful to the original owner and are
are being
by the original owners or generators to get rid of them.
provided to the Defendants as
as a
a means by
3.
3.

Composting constitutes “processing” of solid waste.

Idaho Code §§ 39-103(14)
deﬁnes “Solid Waste Disposal” as:
as: “the collection, storage,
39-10304) defines
treatment, utilization, processing or final
ﬁnal disposal of solid waste.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32
58.01 .06.005.32
defines
deﬁnes aa “Processing Facility” as:
as: A facility that uses
uses biological or chemical decomposition to
prepare solid waste for reuse,
reuse, excluding waste handling at transfer stations or recycling centers.”
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IDAPA 58.01.06.005.05
deﬁnes aa “Composting Facility” as
58.01.06.005.05 defines
as a
a “Processing Facility.” During
Summary Judgment the Court ruled that the Department’s authority is not limited to “disposal”
as
deﬁned “solid waste
as that term might ordinarily be used since the legislature had clearly defined
disposal” to include “processing.” The Department presented the affidavit
afﬁdavit testimony of Dean

Ehlert that “Composting uses
uses biological and chemical decomposition to prepare organic material
‘Processing Facility’ in IDAPA
for aa subsequent re-use and thus meets the definition
deﬁnition of aa ‘Processing

58.01.06.003.32.” Ehlert Aff. ¶ 8.
8. Defendants did not offer any
any evidence or legal argument to
11

contradict this, nor did they otherwise argue that if the grass clippings and leaves received by
by
them are
are “discarded material” / “solid waste” that their activities constitute “processing.” The
Court’s January 9,
for
9, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion fbr
Summary Judgment does
issue. Thus, if required the Department
does not expressly rule upon this issue.
will present further evidence and legal authority to show that “composting” is processing within
Will
the meaning of IDAPA 58.01.06.009.
58.01.06.009.
VI.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES:
ISSUES:
It is not expected that any
at trial. Plaintiffs may
any complicated evidentiary issues will arise at
may

rely upon aerial photographs obtained from the United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) Earth
Resource Observation Science center (EROS)
(EROS) to illustrate the growth of the facility over time and
the volume of materials at the facility should that issue be contested. Plaintiff will offer
testimony to authenticate the images offered into evidence pursuant to the Idaho Rule of
Evidence 901. Photographic evidence is not considered hearsay
hearsay within the meaning of Rule of
Evidence 801
801 as
as it is not a
a “statement of a
a person.” See
See United States v.
V. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789
th
19th
F.3d 1107
Cir. 2016).
1107 (9
2016 The remaining evidence will consist of other photographs properly
2.
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authenticated and admissible in evidence, public records regularly kept pursuant to statutory
authority (I.R.E. 803(8);
business records and
803(10), business
803(8); the absence of public records (I.R.E. 803(10),
testimony of witnesses present in court as
as to matters within their personal knowledge.
VII.

AGREED OR STIPULATED FACTS:
As of the date of filing
been able to reach
ﬁling this memorandum, the parties have not been

agreement on the facts remaining in dispute.

th
14th
DATED this 14
day
day of March, 2017.

SSTATE
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
FFICE OF THE A
TTORNEY G
ENERAL
O
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
OFFICE

/s/Darrell G. Early_________________________
Eae

DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th
14th
I hereby certify that on the 14
day
be served aa true and
day of March, 2017, I caused to be
correct copy of the foregoing PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by
by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
following:

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at
at Law
1900
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

_____ U.S.
US. Mail
_____ Overnight Mail
_____ Hand Delivery
__X__ Fax (208)
(208) 345-1129
__X__
eService:
vvs1900@gmail.com
eSerVice:
VVs
1900@gmail.com
_;(_

1_

/s/Christine Riggs
Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
3/17/2017 11:44:30 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

Attorney for Dejimdant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff, ·
v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540

MOTION TO VACATE
TRIAL AND STAY
PROCEEDINGS

)
)
)
)

__________________________ )
COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through Vernon K. Smith, , and does move this Court
to vacate the trial in this matter, currently set tor April 5, 2017, and to stay all proceedings, for the
reasons and upon the grounds that the real property described in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
before titled in the name ofVHS Properties, LLC, has been the subject of a controversy that has been
ongoing between Vernon K. ·smith and his brother, Joseph H. Smith, Ada County Case No. CV IE
2014-15352, entitled In the Matter of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. Therein, Joseph elected to
challenge the Holographic Will of their Mother, Victoria H. Smith, executed by her on February 14,
1990. That matter recently went to trial before the Honorable Cheri Copsey on October 25-26, 2016,
and a Decision was rendered on March 10, 2017, therein setting aside the Will, upon the pretense the
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creation and execution thereof was the product of undue influence of her declared exclusive
beneficiary, Vernon K. Smith. In addition, the Court has entered interlocutory orders to set aside all
transfers of real property to VHS Properties, LLC, including the transfer of the real property at issue
in this matter, and decreed that all current or previous estate property, including the real property at
issue in this case, be returned to the Estate. An appeal will be taken to the District Court and motion
for entry of a stay Order will be sought to be entered, all of which will be pursuant to Rule 83(a)(2)(F)
and the authority set forth in !.C.§ 17-201(2)&(3).
In addition, and pursuant to the Court's Decision, the Court appointed a Special
Administrator, namely Noah Hillen, and Mr. Hillen has selected Randall Peterman as his attorney to
represent the interests of the assigned administrator as to what is now to be the commencement of an
intestate estate. Vernon K. Smith is of the opinion his authority regarding the limited liability company
ownership and right to the management thereof is now entwined in this probate process as currently
under the order of the Court.
Until a stay can be entered, it appears the Special Administrator has the interest to address,
and has selected Mr. Peterman to address the interests of that property within this proposed intestate
estate. Thus, it appears necessary and in the interests of all parties to stay all proceedings in this action,
until it can be determined the ownership interest of the real property, and the right of counsel to
represent the interests of that property ownership and what has been the continuing ownership and
operational decisions to be made by VHS Properties, LLC. A stay will serve the further purpose of
avoiding any potential of irreparable injury or injury to any party, as the uncertainty regarding the
authority of Vernon K. Smith to act further has placed the litigation in jeopardy. It remains the
concern of Vernon K. Smith that and until such time the decision of the Court is either stayed or
reversed, it remains prudent to freeze the proceedings, where it remains a concern whether current
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d after
March 10,2017.
Dated this 16"' day of March, 2017.

Attorney for David Gibson d
attorney for VHS Properties, L

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16"' day of March, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing to be delivered to the following at the following addresses:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

(
(
(

)
)
)

( X

)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
E-Filed

U.S. Mail
Fax: (208) 373-048
Hand Delivered

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

( X

Randall A Peterman
60 I West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I

Fax: (2 8) 388-1300

ernon K. Smith - - - - -
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Electronically Filed
3/20/2017 12:03:41 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC
Defendants.

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 15-03540

)
)
)
)
)
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

DEPARTMENT'S MOTION IN
LIMINE REGARDING THE
EFFECTS OF I.C. §39-108(4), AND
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEEDINGS THAT
PRESERVE ISSUES RAISED
FOR DISPOSITION UPON THE
MERITS IN THE DISPUTE

COMES NOW The Defendant, David R. Gibson, by and through his attorney of record,
Vernon K. Smith, and.recognizing the motion that has been filed with this court to vacate all further
proceedings relating to this case entirely, requesting the matter be placed on the miscellaneous
calendar, for the reasons and upon the grounds as before stated in the Motion to Vacate the Trial tiled
with the Court, does nonetheless, submit, in behalf of David R. Gibson, a response to what has been
raised as an issue to this Court in the Department's Motion in Limine, seeking to preclude evidence
concerning unplead defenses, which subject is also addressed in this Court's recent procedural
(Proposed) "Pretrial Order", filed circa March 14, 2017, therein stating the Department's motion is
RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT'S MOTION IN LIMINE ON ISSUES RAISED IN SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS THAT REMAIN AS AN ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED AT TRIAL
P. 1
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GRANTED, the effect of which is inconsistent with the applicable law on the subject, as set forth
herein, and as it relates to affirmative defenses, specifically a statute of limitation or bar to an action
being filed by the Department. The statute sets forth an absolute bar to any action being filed by the
Department tmder I.C. §39-1 08(4), and as the cited authority contained herein so demonstrates, when
an issue not specifically raised as a defense in a responsive pleading is nonetheless raised, briefed,
affidavits filed in opposition to such defense, and fully argued to the Court at those Summary
Judgment proceedings as conducted before the Court, then such a defense is declared to be adequately
before the court, and becomes and remains a viable issue for disposition by this Court, and for review
upon appeal of any decision regarding the same, and the presentation of facts relating to the merits of
the statutory defense and absolute bar to the civil action and claim brought by the Department is
admissible at the trial, and shall be included in the disposition by the court.
The Department has chosen to argue that Defendants have failed to Raise this absolute bar,
or Affirmative Defense, as it is statutorily established with the specific intent to preclude any civil
actions as identified in I. C. §39-108(4) from being filed and pursued. The statutory absolute bar or
affirmative defense has not been waived or precluded from application in this dispute, as it was raised
and embraced by the Department and argued extensively to the court. That statutory bar appears to
be intended as an absolute preclusion to filing such a civil action, and procedurally may be viewed
more in keeping as a "gatekeeping pre-requisite" to filing the action, rather than in the context of an
affirmative defense, as the statute (I.C. §39-108(4)) specifically states:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding mav be brought to recover for a violation
of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule, permit or order issued or
promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than two (2) years after the director had
knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the violation. (Emphasis
added)
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This statute has preclusionary effects in bringing the action, not in the nature or extent of
recovery, as does traditional affirmative defenses. It serves as a bar that precludes filing the action,
not the right to recovery after the action is filed. Evidence regarding the Department's undisputed
knowledge of Mr. Gibson's activities., operations, and a&'Ticultural pursuits in the many years
preceding the filing of this civil action, are very relevant to the knowledge known to the Department,
especially as it was specifically known to Mr. Early, who personally became familiar with Mr. Gibson
since his involvement in the Supreme Court Opinion rendered in 1995, as well as the extensive
knowledge of the agents/officials that communicated with Mr. Gibson in 1992 through 1997, in their
capacity as agents/officials within the Agency of Environmental Quality, then a Division of the
Department of Health and Welfare, before becoming a Department of the State of Idaho, then to
become known as the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in 2002, and ceased being a
merely a Division of the Department ofH&W until2002. These communications and awareness of
the Department/Division agents/officials is relevant evidence to be included in the application of the
bar to bringing a civil action and claim in this dispute.
The concept of a waiver is addressed initially in Beal v. Griffin, 123 Idaho 445, 849 P.2d 118
(Ct.App. 1993), where the "Failure to specifically raise the matter may constitute a waiver of the
defense. See also Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79 (Ct.App.1984). It was stated
in Griffin that there was a failure to raise the defense in the answer, and the record did not indicate
that it was raised specifically in other pleadings. However, the defense was later asserted at trial and
was specifically addressed with implicit consent by the court, a practice within the court's inherent
powers. See Goodv. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953,719 P.2d 1213 (Ct.App.l986).").
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!nFuhriman v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007) ("[T]his
Court has held that an affirmative defense mav be raised (or the first time on a motion (or summary

judgment. Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,455,649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982)."). See also
Patterson v. State. Dept. ofHealth & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,256 P.3d 718 (2011):
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that "[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively" a statute of limitations defense. This Court has interpreted IRCP
8(c) as requiring affirmative defenses to be plead, but without identifying the consequences for failing
to do so. Fuhriman v. State, Dep 't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, !53 P.3d 480,483-84 (2007).
In Fuhriman, the Court held that the State's failure to raise the affirmative defense of statutory
employer immunity, until filing its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, was
not fatal to that defense. Id. at 804, 153 P.3d at 484. The Court determined that because the State's

memorandum alerted the appellants to the affirmative defense. and the appellants responded to
this argument in reply briefing, as well as in oral argument be(ore the district court, the defense
had not been waived (or {ailing to plead it in the initial answer. Id. See also Bluestone v.
Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,455, 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982)(finding no waiver of a statute of frauds
defense where it was raised "for the first time in the summary judgment motion even though the reply
to the counterclaim has been filed."). Therefore, pursuant to Fuhriman, a party does not waive an
affirmative defense for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised be(ore trial and

the opposing partv has time to respond in briefing and oral argument. Like the State in Fuhriman.
IDHW raised its statute of limitations affirmative defense in its memorandum in support of its

motion (or summary iudgment, and Patterson responded to this defense in her opposition
memorandum. Consequently, IDHW did not waive its statute of limitations defense regarding
Patterson's IPPEA claim.
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!51 Idaho at 316, 256 P.3d at 724. Footnote 3 accompanying the above text distinguishes
between unpleaded "claims" and unpleaded "affirmative defenses," therein declaring as follows:
"Patterson cites Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,443,235 P.3d 387,393 (2010)
for the proposition that unpleaded claims cannot be preserved for appeal. However, Mortensen
clearly addresses claims, rather tban affirmative defenses, and this Court has stated that the Fuhriman
and Bluestone cases speak only to 'when an affirmative defense may be properly raised and thus
provides no basis for a different result' regarding a cause of action not raised in the initial pleadings.
Edmondl'on v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 178-79,75 P.3d 733,739-40 (2003). Thus,

Mortensen is of no consequence to the situation at issue in this case." 151 Idaho at 316 n. 3, 256 P.3d
at 724 n. 3.
See also, Tapadeera, LLCv. Knowlton, 153 Idaho 182, 186 n. I, 280 P.3d 685,689 n. I (2012)

("The Knowltons did not allege as an affmnative defense in their answer to the second amended
complaint that Tapadeera had breached the settlement agreement.

However, in Bluestone v.

Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455, 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982), we held that an unpled affirmative

defense can be considered ifit is raised in connection with a motion {or summary judgment."),
Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,318 P.3d 918 (2014):

Pursuant to IRCP 8(c), "a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute oflimitations ... and
any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." IRCP 8(c). To set forth a statute
of limitations defense, the party must "state generally that the action is barred, and allege with
particularity the Session Law or the section of the Idaho Code upon which the [party] relies." IRCP
9(h). These pleading requirements, however, do not impose sanctions on a party who fails to abide
by them. As the Court explained in Patterson v. Idaho Dep 't ofHealth & Welfare, "This Court has
interpreted IRCP 8(c) as requiring affirmative defenses to be plead, but without identifYing the
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consequences for failing to do so." 151 Idaho 310, 316, 256 PJd 718, 724 (2011)(citing Fuhriman

v. Idaho Dep 'I ofTramp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, 153 P.3d 480, 483-84 (2007)). Because lRCP 8(c)
identifies no consequences for failing to plead an affirmative defense, the Court determined that "a

Id. 155 Idaho at 934-35,318 P.3d at 924-25.
Dated this 20'h day of March, 2017.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for David Gibson and pn
Attorney for VHS Properties, LLC
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
(208) 345-1129
Fax:

Attorney.for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)

) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)

Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC

)
)
)
)
WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST
)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

____________________________ )
COMES NOW The Defendant, David R. Gibson, by and through his attorney of record,
Vernon K. Smith, and recognizing the motion that has been filed with this court to vacate all further
proceedings relating to this this case entirely, requesting the matter be placed on the miscellaneous
calendar, for the reasons and upon the grounds as before stated in the Motion to Vacate the Trial filed
with the Court, does submit, in behalf of David R. Gibson, his proposed wimcss list and exhibit list
proposed to be presented by David R. Gibson, as follows:
WITNESSES:
I. David R. Gibson;
2. Dean Ehlert.

MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL
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EXHIBITS;
I. Permit issued from Division of Environmental Quality, now known as the Department of
Environmental Quality, within the era of 1992 to 1997;
2. Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDA) certifications issued to David R. Gibson, d/b/a
Black Diamond Compost;
3. Declaration of intent relating to the deposited materials;
4

Sign-in sheet on deposited materials, transfe

Products, LLC, owned by David R. Gibson;
Dated this J71h day of March, 2017.

V emon K. Smith
Attorney for David Gibson and
Attorney for VHS Properties, LLC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2"d Floor
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(
(
(

X

)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax: (208) 373-0481
Hand Delivered

Randall A Peterman
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720

(

X

)

Fax: (208) 388-1300
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special Administrator

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,

Case No. CV-OC-2015-3540
MOTION TO
INTERVENE/SUBSTITUTE, DISMISS
DEFENDANT VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
AND VACATE TRIAL

Defendants.

COMES NOW, Noah G. Hillen, Special Administrator of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel of record, and hereby moves this
Court, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and any other applicable rule,
statute, and/or provision, for an Order granting the Estate's motion to intervene in the abovecaptioned matter, dismissing VHS Properties, LLC from the lawsuit, and vacating the trial of this
matter currently scheduled to commence on AprilS, 2017.
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This motion is made on the grounds and reasons set forth in the accompanying
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant VHS Properties,
LLC, and Vacate Trial, which is incorporated by this reference as though restated in full. This
motion is based on the records and files herein and any affidavits, declarations, and/or other
filings submitted in support of this motion.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this 20TH day ofMarch, 2017.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

~

~

-

By
A l e x a n - - - Ofthe Firm
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO INTERVENE/SUBSTITUTE, DISMISS
DEFENDANT VHS PROPERTIES, LLC, AND VACATE TRIAL to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
vls59@live.com
Personal Representative of Estate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) E-mail

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
darrell. earl y@deq .idaho.gov
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) E-mail

Alexander~
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special Administrator

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,

Case No. CV-OC-2015-3540

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO
INTERVENE/SUBSTITUTE, DISMISS
DEFENDANT VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
AND VACATE TRIAL

Defendants.

COMES NOW, Noah G. Hillen, Special Administrator ("Special Administrator")
of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel of record, and
hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss
Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

By this motion, the Special Administrator asks that the Court: (1) permit
intervention and/or substitution of the Special Administrator of the Estate as a Defendant,
(2) dismiss Defendant VHS Properties, LLC ("VHS") from this suit, and (3) reschedule the
current trial setting. The Court should grant the Special Administrator's motion for at least the
following reasons.
First, intervention is appropriate. The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey recently set
aside transfers of property to VHS. The voided transfers include the property at issue in this case,
which Plaintiff Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") alleges is owned by VHS
and is the grounds by which DEQ named VHS as a Defendant. However, because Judge Copsey
declared the foregoing transfers void, VHS has no ownership interest in the underlying realty.
The Special Administrator, on the other hand, has a vested interest in such property as an asset to
be returned to the Estate and/or owned thereby. Intervention or substitution of the Special
Administrator as a Defendant is, therefore, warranted.
Second, VHS should be dismissed from this suit. Since VHS no longer has an
interest in the subject real property, there is no basis for VHS to remain a party.
Finally, given the recentness of Judge Copsey's order, the Special Administrator's
interest in this case, and the impending trial, good cause exists to vacate the current trial setting
and reschedule the same at a time convenient for the Court, counsel, and the parties.

II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff DEQ seeks injunctive relief and damages against David R. Gibson
("Gibson") and VHS. First Amended Complaint at

~

9. DEQ alleges, among other things, that

Gibson runs a composting business under the name Black Diamond Compost Products.
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According to DEQ, Gibson takes in grass clippings and leaves and deposits them at a facility
located on certain real property for the purpose of making compost for eventual sale to the
public. DEQ claims that the facility at issue is subject to certain regulations associated with
management of solid waste and that the facility is in non-compliance with the foregoing
regulations. VHS is named as a Defendant in this matter based on DEQ's belief that VHS is the
proper title-holder of the property on which the facility is located.
That is not the case.
On March 9, 2017, the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in In the Matter ofEstate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
("Probate Action"). The Court declared "null and void" . . . "all property transfers made
pursuant to any power of attorney from 2012 forward or any property transfers or sales of
Victoria H. Smith's estate following her death .... " See Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin
("McLaughlin Declaration"), Ex. A (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) at 1. According
to the Court:
The Court, therefore, orders Vernon K. Smith, Jr., or any entity
(including, but not limited to, VHS Properties L.L.C.) owned,
controlled, or managed by Vernon K. Smith, Jr. or his wife,
Victoria L. Smith, to immediately return all personal and real
property belonging to his mother, Victoria H. Smith, as of July 4,
2012, to his mother's estate ... The Court further orders the Special
Administrator appointed by this Court to locate all such property,
to provide an accounting, to take whatever legal action is necessary
to return all of Victoria H. Smith's property, real and personal, to
her Estate, and to act as temporary personal representative until the
Court appoints a personal representative.
McLaughlin Declaration, Ex. A (Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law) at 2.
The property at issue in this litigation is subject to Judge Copsey's decision.
Counsel for VHS admits the same. See Motion to Vacate Trial at 2 ("[T]he Court has entered
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interlocutory orders to set aside all transfers of real property to VHS Properties, LLC, including
the transfer of the real property at issue in this matter ... ").
In addition to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court also entered
an Order Appointing Special Administrator. McLaughlin Declaration, Ex. B ("Order"). The
Order appoints Noah G. Hillen as the Special Administrator and tasks Mr. Hillen with, among
other things, locating all of the Estate's property and returning it to the Estate. Id., Ex. B at 1.
The Estate currently has no personal representative.
Trial in this case is scheduled to commence on April 5, 2017. Based on Judge
Copsey's decisions, however, VHS is not a proper party in this lawsuit and the Special
Administrator is obligated to intervene to protect the Estate and its interests.
III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Intervention as a Matter of Right or Permission is Warranted in this Case.
Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 24. There are two (2) types of intervention: intervention as a matter of right

and permissive intervention. Intervention as a matter of right is appropriate upon the filing of a
timely application under the following circumstances:
(2)
. . . [w]hen the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Alternatively, permissive intervention is allowed where "an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question oflaw or fact in common." Idaho R. Civ. P.
24(b).
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The decision to permit substitution or intervention is a discretionary decision for
the trial court. Rodriguez v. Oakley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 370, 377, 816 P.2d 326, 333 (1991)
("It is well established that the determination to allow substitution or permissive intervention is

discretionary with the district court.") (citing 7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1917 (3d ed.)). In
exercising its discretion, the Court must take into account the fact that Rule 24 is liberally
construed in favor of intervention. Herzog v. City of Pocatello, 82 Idaho 505, 509, 356 P.2d 54,
55 (1960); see also Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F .3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998) ("In determining
whether intervention is appropriate, we are guided primarily by practical and equitable
considerations. We generally interpret the requirements broadly in favor ofintervention.").

1

Operating in conjunction with Rule 24 is Rule 21 regarding misjoinder of parties.
It states, in relevant part, "[ o ]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms,

add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party." Idaho R. Civ. P. 21.
Here, substitution and/or intervention is appropriate. The Estate has an obvious
and significant interest in the property that is the subject of DEQ's action. Based on Judge
Copsey's ruling, the underlying property either is the property of the Estate or must be returned
to the Estate. Moreover, given the Estate's interest in the realty and the fact that VHS has no
ownership interest in the same, the Special Administrator, as the real party in interest, is in a
position where his ability to protect the Estate, supervise the Estate and its assets, and otherwise
1

Idaho R. Civ. P. 24 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 contain similar language. Idaho appellate
courts routinely defer to federal interpretation of corresponding rules of civil procedure. See e.g.
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005) (relying on
Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2001) in interpreting I.R.C.P. 56(±)); see also
Cambell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 646, 115 P.3d 731, 737 (2005) (relying on Evak Native Viii.
v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 1994) in interpreting Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b)); see also
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 347, 941 P.2d 314, 319 (1997) (relying on federal
jurisprudence in interpreting Idaho R. Civ. P. 4).
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discharge the Special Administrator's duties is significantly impaired unless permitted to join
this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Special Administrator is entitled to intervene as a Defendant in this
case under Idaho R. Civ. P. 24(a).
B.

VHS Should be Dismissed From this Lawsuit.

VHS should be dismissed as a party for the same reason intervention is
appropriate. Again, Judge Copsey set aside the transfer of the real property at issue in this case.
Based on DEQ's pleadings, that is the sole basis for which VHS was named as a Defendant. See
First Amended Complaint at ,-r,-r 10-11. Since VHS has no ownership interest in the property,
there are no grounds for VHS to continue as a party in this suit.
C.

The Court Should Reschedule the Trial Currently Set For AprilS, 2017.

Trial is less than one (1) month away. Given the recent-and significantdevelopments in this case, a reprieve is necessary. First, if intervention is permitted, there is no
way the Special Administrator or subsequent personal representative of the Estate can be
prepared to participate in a trial only a couple of weeks away, despite efforts to get up to speed as
soon as possible.
Second, the current parties will not be prejudiced by amending the trial setting.
VHS has itself moved the Court to vacate the trial. DEQ may be inconvenienced by pushing
things out, but certainly not prejudiced. If anything, a brief delay benefits DEQ by allowing the
litigation to proceed with the proper parties, which, if this case were tried as it is currently
situated, would not be the case.
In sum, Judge Copsey's decision and recent appointment of Mr. Hillen has put
matters, including this case, in flux. A short delay is necessary to make sure the proper parties
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are named in this suit and this Court can adjudicate this action based on a firm sense of where
things stand.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Special Administrator respectfully requests
that this Court grant the motion at bar and enter such further relief as it deems just and equitable.
DATED this 20th day ofMarch, 2017.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By________~~~-------------

Alexande
cLaughlin - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day ofMarch, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
INTERVENE/SUBSTITUTE, DISMISS DEFENDANT VHS PROPERTIES, LLC, AND
VACATE TRIAL to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
vls59@live.com
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) E-mail

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
darrell.early@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) E-mail

Alexan~
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special Administrator

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-OC-2015-3540

DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P.
MCLAUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO
INTERVENE/SUBSTITUTE, DISMISS
DEFENDANT VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
AND VACATE TRIAL

I, ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN, under penalty of perjury, hereby declare
and state as follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for Noah G. Hillen in his capacity as Special

Administrator of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"). I have personal knowledge of
the facts contained herein and make this declaration based upon such personal knowledge.
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2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference is a

true and correct copy of the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the case
captioned In the Matter of the Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference is a

true and correct copy of the Court's Order Appointing Special Administrator entered in the case
captioned In the Matter of the Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by reference is a

true and correct copy of a printout from the Ada County Assessor's website indicating that the
owner ofParcel No. S1505220000 is VHS Properties, LLC.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2016.

Alexan~Laughlin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy ofthe foregoing DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE/SUBSTITUTE, DISMISS DEFENDANT VHS
PROPERTIES, LLC, AND VACATE TRIAL to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
vls59@live.com
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) E-mail

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
darrell.early@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(X) E-mail

Alexa~
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FILED By: _

Deputy Clerk

7
Fourth Jud icia l Oistnct, Ada County
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
Signed: 3/912017 12:00 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Deceased.

APPEARANCES
FOR VERNON K. SMITH, JR.:

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

Attorney at Law

Rory R. Jones
Erika P. Judd

JONES

+ GLEDffiLL + FUHRMAN + GOURLEY, P.A.

FOR JOSEPH H. SMITH:

Allen B. Ellis

ELLIS LAW, PLLC

Christ T. Troupis

TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA

The Court conducted a court trial beginning October 25, 2016, and concluding on October
31,2016.
The parties simultaneously filed closing arguments and proposed findings of fact on
January 20, 2017, and rebuttals by February 3, 2017. The Court took the matter under advisement
on February 6, 2017.
Based on the testimony, the Court's determination of credibility, the record, the argument,
and the law, the Court fmds the following facts were established by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Court further concludes after applying the law to those facts, Victoria H. Smith's
holographic will was the product of undue influence by her son, Vernon K. Smith, Jr., and further
holds the will is invalid. The Court finds, therefore, Victoria H. Smith died intestate.
The Court, therefore, orders that all property transfers made pursuant to any power of
attorney from 2012 forward or any property transfers or sales of Victoria H. Smith's estate
following her death are declared null and void. All of her property as it existed prior to the illegal
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transfers are set aside and are null and void . The Court, therefore, orders Vernon K. Smith, Jr., or
any entity (including, but not limited to, VHS Properties L.L.C.) owned, controlled, or managed
by Vernon K. Smith, Jr. or his wife, Victoria L. Smith, to immediately return all personal and real
property belonging to his mother, Victoria H. Smith, as of July 4, 2012, to his mother's estate,
including:
•

any transfers, sales, gifts, or encumbrances, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. made of his
mother's real or personal property as it existed on July 4, 2012, to his current wife,
Victoria Smith.

•

any transfers, sales, gifts, or encumbrances, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. made of his
mother's property as it existed on July 4, 2012, to any business entity.

•

any transfers, sales, gifts, or encumbrances, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. made of his
mother's property as it existed on July 4, 2012, to any third party.

•

any transfers, sales, gifts, or encumbrances, any business entity made of his
mother's property as it existed on July 4, 2012, to any party, including but not
limited to Vernon K. Smith, Jr.'s wife, Victoria Smith, or any other business entity.

By use of the word transfer, the Court includes, but is not limited to, sales, encumbrances,
gifts and leases of any kind.
The Court further orders the Special Administrator appointed by this Court to locate all
such property, to provide an accounting, to take whatever legal action is necessary to return all of
Victoria H. Smith's property, real and personal, to her Estate, and to act as temporary personal
representative until the Court appoints a personal representative.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2014, Sharon Bergmann, 1 as a creditor, petitioned the probate court for
appointment of special administrator and assignment of powers and duties. Bergmann claimed that
Vernon K. Smith, Jr. possessed Victoria H. Smith's will and she wanted it probated.
On October 3, 2014, Joseph Haver! Smith ("Joseph"), petitioned the court to appoint him
as his mother's personal representative. He asserted that his younger brother, Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
("Vernon"), possessed his mother's original will which Joseph claimed was obtained through his
brother' s undue influence. Joseph asked the court to rule the will invalid and further rule that his
mother died intestate. I.C. § 15-3-404.

1

Bergmann is Vernon K. Smith,Jr. 'sex-wife. She claimed she has an unsatisfied judgment against him.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CASE NO. CV-IE-2014-15352

2

000752

Bergmann withdrew her petition on October 14, 2014, but requested she receive, as an
interested party, notice of all pleadings and other materials filed in this case. The probate
Magistrate granted her request.
On October 24,2014, Vernon also applied for formal probate of his mother's holographic
will and, as sole heir, requested he be appointed the personal representative. I.C. § 15-3-402.
Joseph, his brother, objected and again claimed her will was the product of his brother's "undue
influence, duress, or coercion." However, Joseph did not challenge the will's authenticity.
On November 19, 2014, Joseph objected to Vernon's application for formal probate of
Victoria H. Smith's will and request for formal appointment as her personal representative. He
again claimed the will was obtained by undue influence.
Vernon moved for summary judgment and requested the Magistrate dismiss Joseph's
undue influence claim. On December 14, 2015, the magistrate court denied summary judgment
and found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the holographic will was the
product of the undue influence. The Magistrate revealed he knew one of the potential witnesses
quite well and that the witness had dinner at his home every Sunday. Vernon moved to disqualify
the Magistrate for cause and the magistrate disqualified himself. The Administrative Judge
reassigned the case to this Court.
Joseph requested a jury trial and Vernon objected. The Court heard argument on February
22, 2016, and denied Joseph's motion on March 1, 2016.
On May 2, 2016, Vernon moved to dismiss Joseph's challenge under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
The Court orally denied his motion on July 11, 2016. Joseph filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment asking the Court to rule that his mother's 2008 power of attorney to Vernon did not
include authority to gift her property and, thus, any "gifts" made pursuant to that power of
attorney are null and void. The Court heard argument on July 11, 2016, and initially indicated it
would consider additional argument. However, on July 13, 2016, after reviewing the pleadings
again and completing additional research, the Court gave notice it intended to rule without
additional argument.
On July 19, 2016, the Court granted Joseph's motion and ruled that the 2008 power of
attorney did not empower Vernon to "gift" Victoria's property. Therefore, the Court set aside all
transfers or gifts of her property. The Court further found that all Victoria's property transferred
pursuant to that 2008 power of attorney is part of the estate. The Court further ordered that neither

J

I
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Vernon nor any member of the various limited liability companies, or anyone on behalf of those
companies, take any actions with respect to that property pending a determination of the validity
of Victoria H. Smith's holographic will. Finally, the Court ordered Vernon prepare a complete
accounting for all Victoria H. Smith's property within thirty (30) days. I. C. § 1S-12-114(8).
Vernon moved the Court to reconsider its decision which the Court denied on October 12,
2016.
On October 14, 2016, the Court ruled that Vernon's pleadings and the record created a
rebuttable presumption of undue influence. The Court found that Vernon is a beneficiary (in this
case the sole beneficiary) of Victoria's will and is also her fiduciary. Therefore, Vernon, as the
proponent of the will, bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. See In re Estate of Conway,
152 Idaho 933,938-39,277 P.3d 380, 385-86 (2012).
THE COURT GRANTS VERNON K. SMITH, JR.'S MOTION IN LIMINE IN PART.
Prior to trial, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. filed and argued a motion in limine, asking the Court to
limit the evidence it considered to a specific time frame surrounding the will's execution. The
Court deferred2 its decision until trial. In particular, the Court expressed concern that some
evidence outside a particular time frame may be considered for other purposes and that since this
was a court triaV even if evidence was admitted, the Court would not consider inadmissible or
irrelevant evidence in its decision.

2
When considering a motion in limine, a trial court may "decide that it is inappropriate to rule in advance on the
admissibility of evidence based on a motion in limine" and "may defer [its] ruling until the case unfolds and there is a
better record upon which to make [its] decision." State v. Boehm, 158 Idaho 294, 301--02, 346 P.3d 311, 318-19 (Q.
App. 2015) quoting State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988).
3

The admission of evidence is largely discretionary in a court trial. In Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100
Idaho 647, 603 P.2d 981 (1979), the Supreme Court stated:
Although Idaho has no discernible evidentiary rules applicable in non-jury civil cases, it is clear that
the rules in non-jury cases regarding admission of evidence are more liberal than in jury cases. G.
Bell, HANDBOOK OF EVIDENCE FOR THE IDAHO LAWYER 14 (1972). For example, this Court will not
reverse a trial court in a non-jury case on the basis of an erroneous admission of evidence unless it
appears that the opposing party was misled or surprised in a substantial part of its case, or that the
trial court materially relied on the erroneously admitted evidence. Duthweiler v. Hanson, 54 fdaho
46, 28 P.2d 210 (1933). In trials before the court, it is presumed that the trial court did not consider
incompetent or inadmissible evidence in making its findings. Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304,
581 P.2d 350 (1978); Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252,215 P.2d 991 (1950).

Guillard, 100 Idaho at 650, 603 P.2d at 984.

)
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Detennining whether a will is the product of undue influence often involves highly
circumstantial evidence from which undue influence can be inferred. Idaho has long recognized
that:
It follows from the very nature of the thing that evidence to show undue influence
must be largely, in effect, circumstantial. It is an intangible thing, which only in the
rarest instances is susceptible of what may be termed direct or positive proof. The
difficulty is also enhanced by the fact, universally recognized, that he who seeks to
use undue influence does so in privacy. He seldom uses brute force or open threats
to terrorize his intended victim, and if he does he is careful that no witnesses are
about to take note of and testify to the fact. He observes, too, the same precautions
if he seeks by cajolery, flattery, or other methods to obtain power and control over
the will of another, and direct it improperly to the accomplishment of the purpose
which he desires[.)
In re Estate ofRandall, 60 Idaho 419,429,93 P.2d 1, 5 (1939) quoted with approval in Gmeinerv.
Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 5, 592 P.2d 57, 61 (1979). Because direct evidence rarely exists,

[d]eclarations not confined to the time of the execution of the will, including those
made both before and after, may be received provided they are not too remote to
throw light upon the mental condition of the testator at the time of the execution of
the will. 4 Jones COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE § 1614 (2d ed. 1926), and In re
Lunders' Estate, 74 Idaho 448, 263 P.2d 1002 (1953).
King v. MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272,278-79,410 P.2d 969, 972 (1965).

In detennining whether Vernon exerted undue influence upon his mother when she
executed her will, the Court, sitting as the fact finder, is not limited to the actual time the will was
executed. Thus, the Court may consider facts bearing upon undue influence both before and after
execution so long as those facts tend to show such influence when the will was executed and are
not too remote. In re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 941, 277 P.3d 380, 388 (2012) citing King
v. MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 278-79, 410 P.2d 969, 972 (1965). As the Idaho Supreme Court has

found:
Evidence relevant to the question of undue influence includes:
[T]he age and physical and mental condition of the one alleged to have been
influenced, whether he had independent or disinterested advice in the
transaction, the providence or improvidence of the gift or transaction, delay in
making it known, consideration or lack or inadequacy thereof for any contract
made, necessities and distress of the person alleged to have been influenced, his
predisposition to make the transfer in question, the extent of the transfer in
relation to his whole worth, failure to provide for his own family in the case of a
transfer to a stranger, or failure to provide for all of his children in case of a
transfer to one of them, active solicitations and persuasions by the other party,
and the relationship of the parties.
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Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 7, 592 P.2d at 63 (quoting 25 Am.Jur.2d Duress and Undue
Influence§ 36 at 397 (1966)).
In re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 939, 277 P.3d 380, 386 (2012).
At trial, the Court allowed the parties great latitude in presenting their evidence. After
reviewing the transcript, the law and the parties' arguments, however, some of the evidence is too
remote in time to directly prove the elements of undue influence. Therefore, the Court now grants
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.'s motion in limine in part. For the purposes of determining the existence of
undue influence, the Court only considered competent evidence, and any inferences arising from
that evidence, beginning approximately one year prior to and up to six (6) months after Victoria H.
Smith executed her holographic will on February 14, 1990.
However, that does not mean that later evidence is not relevant for other purposes. Once
competent evidence of undue influence at the time Victoria H. Smith executed her will exists,
even evidence remote in time may in fact corroborate or reinforce the Court's finding that Vernon
K. Smith, Jr. exerted undue influence when the will was made. It may also establish an unbroken
chronology or the continuing nature of their relationship. See e.g., In re Heineman's Estate, 13
N.W.2d 569, 572 (Neb. 1944).
In fact, events occurring after the will's execution may be compelling evidence that the
proponent, Vernon K. Smith, Jr., had continuing control over his mother's thought process for a
period prior to its execution until her death. See Estate of Baker, 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 481, 182
Cal.Rptr. 550, 557 (Ct. App. 1982); In re Estate of Mooney, 453 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (1983); In re

Ferrill, 640 P.2d 489, 497 (N.M. 1981); In re Estate of Jones, 320 N.W.2d 167, 170 (S.D. 1982);
Wilhoit v. Fite, 341 S.W.2d 806, 818 (Mo. 1960) (events taking place subsequent to execution
admissible to show general plan by defendant to obtain all decedent's property and to show the
continuing relationship between testatrix and defendant); Haines v. Hayden, 54 N.W. 911, 914-15
(Mich. 1893) (evidence of events subsequent to execution tended to "fortify antecedent
indications" of fraud and undue influence). For example, many courts find "[e]vidence which
tends to show that the beneficiary acquired control over the testator's mind before the will was
made, and retained such control beyond the period at which the will was executed, is admissible

.... "Estate ofLaitinen, 483 A.2d 265, 267-70 (Vt. 1984).
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes these findings of fact based on the relevant evidence and the Court's
determination of credibility.

1.

Joseph H. Smith, Vernon K. Smith, Jr., and Victoria Ann Smith Converse are
Victoria H. Smith's only children.

Joseph H. Smith, Vernon K. Smith, Jr., and Victoria Ann Smith Converse are siblings, and
Victoria H. Smith and Vernon K. Smith, Sr. are their parents. Victoria Ann Smith Converse did
not challenge the probate and is not a party to the case. Neither party introduced evidence that
Victoria H. Smith had any other children.
2.

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. was not a credible witness.

Based on Vernon's demeanor and the content of his testimony, the Court finds Vernon was
not a credible witness. Although it is not necessary to bolster the Court's credibility determination,
in addition to the Court's in-court physical observations, the following testimonial evidence
directly supports this Court's credibility assessment.
At trial, Vernon proudly testified that during his divorce from Sharon Bergmann, in 1989
or 1990, he asked his brother, Joseph, to act as a "straw man" 4 in a scheme to keep what was
arguably marital property from being considered part of the marital estate.
According to the testimony, prior to their marriage, his future wife, Sharon Bergmann,
owned a house on Raymond Street, called the "Raymond Street house." In the 1980's, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") attached a tax lien to the property for unpaid taxes and scheduled an IRS
auction to foreclose the lien. Vernon quitclaimed the property to Ms. Bergmann and then
requested Joseph to purchase the property for him (Vernon) at the IRS auction using his mother's
(Victoria H. Smith's) money. Joseph refused to take part in Vernon's scheme and credibly
testified that he told his brother he wanted no part of it.
When Joseph refused and indicated he did not want to participate in the scheme, Vernon
called his brother disloyal. He then asked his mother, Victoria, 5 to do it for him. She agreed to this
shady scheme and, in fact, did purchase the property for him using her own money. When the
Court questioned Vernon about why he did not simply purchase the property himself at the

4

According to Webster's Dictionary: "a person set up to serve as a cover for a usually questionable transaction."

5

His mother was present when his brother, Joseph H. Smith, refused to participate in the scheme.
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auction, he smugly explained he was trying to prevent Sharon Bergmann from argumg the
Raymond Street house was community property, thus depriving her of a portion of the property.
This evidence that Vernon is willing to engage in "shady" or blatantly dishonest behavior
to accomplish his ends and to potentially commit a fraud on the court and on his ex-wife supports
the Court's credibility determination.
In order to rationalize what he did, Vernon testified that he specifically requested the IRS
to perform a forensic audit6 of his law business accounts. He did not testify that the IRS did a
forensic audit as part of its tax audit. In fact, this was important to a point he was trying to make as
he attempted to present evidence to the Court that Sharon Bergmann had been stealing from him.
As the Court stated during the trial, it simply does not believe him that outside of a regular tax
audit, the IRS did a forensic audit at his request. His statement was not credible; he presented no
credible evidence that the IRS is in the habit of performing forensic audits for private individuals
at the individual's request.
Additionally, the facts surrounding Vernon's abuse of his mother's powers of attorne/ to
gift all of her earthly possessions, real and personal property, to himself, support this Court's
credibility determination. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. is simply not a credible witness and the Court does
not believe his testimony.
Based on the Court's credibility determination, the Court, for example, does not believe
Vernon's testimony that Joseph or his family knew about the will's existence. The Courl does not
believe his testimony that he did not help prepare the language in Victoria H. Smith's will or give
her advice.
3.

Victoria H. Smith's holographic will.

Victoria H. Smith prepared a holographic will on February 14, 1990. Vernon was the only
person present when she executed her will. She did not receive independent legal or financial

6
A forensic audit is an examination and evaluation of a firm's or individual's financial information for use as
evidence in court. A forensic audit can be conducted in order to prosecute a party for fraud, embezzlement or other
financial claims. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY.
7

Throughout the case, Vernon argues his power of attorney was irrevocable and survived his mother's death. "A
power of attorney terminates once the principal dies. I.C. § 15-12-110(1)(a). Vernon's power of attorney, therefore,
terminated at Victoria's death ... ."Smith by & through Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC, 161 Idaho 107, 383
P.3d 1277, 1279 (2016).
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advice; in fact, no one, other than Vernon, had an opportunity to provide her any advice at all. No
one else even knew about the will.
While Vernon argues that his mother never requested independent advice, that is
irrelevant. Throughout this case, Vernon proudly declares that his mother relied on him Uustifiably
according to him) for legal and business advice and trusted him. Therefore, it follows that she
would have relied on him to explain the ramifications of what she was doing in executing her
holographic will, especially since he was present when she signed it. As explained below, based
on all of the evidence, including his lack of credibility, the Court fmds that Victoria prepared this
will with Vernon's advice.
There is no credible evidence that Victoria or Vernon told anyone about her will or its
contents at or near the time she executed the will. There is no credible evidence that either Victoria
or Vernon told Joseph or her daughter, Victoria Converse, about the will or its contents at any time
prior to her death more than 20 years later. The Court finds Joseph did not learn of her will until
her funeral.
Victoria H. Smith was born

when she hand

wrote her 1990 will. Vernon was the only person present when she signed her holographic will.
The parties agree Victoria was competent at the time she executed the will. They also agree the
will complied with Idaho law.
Victoria's will expressly disinherited two of her children, Joseph and Victoria Converse,
and left all of her earthly assets to Vernon upon her death. The handwritten will read as follows:
In event of my death I give all my property, real and personal, to my son Vernon
with the right to serve as Executor with-out bond.
I have given my son Joseph real and personal property in my life time.
I have given my daughter, Victoria Converse, personal property in my life time.
Holographic Will.
Dated February 14, 1990.
Victoria H. Smith

Ex. 208. The Court fmds that the will's language is unusual for a layperson writing it without any
legal advice. While Vernon testified that she was purely influenced by her husband's 30 year old
holographic will, the Court finds this testimony implausible.
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Both the will's language and its circumstances give rise to an inference that she had some
legal advice in its preparation. Vernon was the only person present and as he repeatedly and
proudly proclaimed throughout this case, she relied heavily on him for legal advice and had done
so since 1971. It makes no sense she would not have relied on him here, especially given the
language, his presence and other circumstances.
Victoria H. Smith was a lifetime housewife and mother. There is no evidence she had any
studies beyond high school. She never even learned to drive and depended on others for
transportation. No one produced any evidence that she was sophisticated in the law.
The differences between her will and her husband's will are significant and do not support
Vernon's argument that she was simply copying her husband's will and received no legal advice.
Vernon K. Smith, Sr. was a well-known lawyer when he died. His holographic will,
prepared nearly 30 years before, read in full as follows:
In event of my death I give all of my property to my wife, Victoria H. Smith with
right to serve as Executrix without bond
Dated Dec. 12, 1960
Vernon Smith

See Ex. 200 [on the side he printed the words "holographic will"]. A paragraph by paragraph

comparison demonstrates just how different the two wills are and why the Court fmds that
Victoria H. Smith had legal advice- Vernon's legal advice. Vernon specifically testified she had
no independent legal or financial advice in preparing her will.
Victoria's will identified Vernon as her "Executor." Her husband's will identified her as
his "Executrix." Laypersons rarely know the difference between the feminine and masculine word.
Victoria also separated her property bequests between real and personal property. Her
husband simply gave Victoria all his property; he did not differentiate between real and personal
property. Again this does not sound like a layperson's language, especially a layperson "copying"
another's will that simply states all property. In fact, a layperson would usually refer to "land,"
instead of real property, or "money," instead of personal property.
Victoria also included language which not only does not appear in Vernon K. Smith, Sr.'s
holographic will, it is language a layperson would not likely use or realize its significance.
Victoria wrote as follows:
•

I have given my son Joseph real and personal property in my life time.
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•

I have given my daughter, Victoria Converse, personal property in my life
time.

Only an attorney would recognize the significance of a testator clearly indicating the failure to
provide for a child was intentional or that the child had been provided for during the testator's life.
Until 1971 in Idaho, unless the will made clear a testator's intent to not provide for all of
his or her children, the "omitted" child could challenge the will and receive an intestate share. 8 In
addition, Victoria again differentiated between personal property and real property. Few
laypersons understand the difference. Significantly, in fact, she had given Joseph both personal
(money) and real property (land) during her lifetime but only personal property (money) to her
daughter.
Finally, as Vernon repeatedly emphasized, he was in fact her attorney at the time and,
according to his testimony and pleadings, she relied heavily on him for legal advice.
The Court finds the language in her will does not mirror Vernon K. Smith, Sr.'s
holographic will language, and the language is not that of a layperson. Based on the evidence,
testimony, Vernon's lack of credibility and the holographic will's language itself, the Court
concludes that, contrary to his testimony, Vernon provided his mother legal advice in drafting and
preparing her will.

4.

Vjctoria H. Smith's powers of attorney and Vernon's transfers to himself

Victoria H. Smith executed two durable Powers of Attorney during her lifetime, making
Vernon her attorney-in-fact. Vernon drafted both powers of attorney. Victoria executed the first
power of attorney, drafted by Vernon, on July 15, 1999, when she was over
Victoria also executed another durable power of attorney, again drafted by Vernon,
on April 11, 2008, when she was nearly

, following her hospitalization for a fall. The

2008 Power of Attorney read as follows:
I, Victoria H. Smith, residing at 5933 Branstetter Street, Boise, Ada County, Idaho,
born
, does herewith
reaffirm and continue the ongoing appointment of my son, Vernon K. Smith Jr.,
born
from the original appointment I made in 1999, and to remain
authorized as my unconditional attorney in fact and agent under this Durable and
Irrevocable Power of Attorney, and he is authorized to exercise all powers and

8

See In re Fell's Estate, 70 Idaho 399, 402-03, 219 P.2d 941, 942-43 (1950); I.C. § 15-3-901(adopted in 1971, only
children born or adopted after the will are protected as pretermitted heirs).
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authority I otherwise possess and could exercise in my own name and on my own
behalf.
·
The power and authority vested in him is unconditional, unlimited and all inclusive,
and he shall have the full and exclusive power and authority to manage and conduct
all of my affairs, and to exercise all of my legal rights and powers, including any
rights and powers I may acquire in the future, and specifically including, but
without any intended limitation, to collect all funds, hold, maintain, improve,
invest, lease, or otherwise dispose of any or all of my real or personal property, or
any interest therein; purchase, sell, mortgage, encumber, grant, option or otherwise
deal in any way in any real property or personal property, tangible or intangible, or
any interest therein; to borrow funds, to execute promissory notes, and to secure
any obligation by mortgage, deed of trust or pledge; to conduct any and all business
and banking needs, of any nature or kind, including the right to sign checks and
draw funds on any and all my accounts, with the same authority as my own
signature, to sign any and all agreements and documents in my behalf, to continue
any corporations, limited liability companies and venture entities I presently have,
and to organize, reorganize, merge, consolidate, capitalize, recapitalize, close,
liquidate, sell, or dissolve any business interest, and to vote all stock, including the
exercise of any stock options and any buy-sell agreements; to receive and to
endorse checks and other negotiable paper, to deposit and to withdraw funds from
any accounts by check or by withdrawal slips or otherwise, a transfer funds from
my account, and to do so from any bank, savings and loan, or any other financial
institution in which I have funds now or in the future; to prepare, sign and file any
and all tax returns and other governmental reports and documents, and to represent
me in all matters before the Internal Revenue Service or State Tax Commission; to
have access to all certificates of deposit, and any safety deposit box registered in
my name, whether alone or with others, and to remove any property or papers
located therein; to act unconditionally with regard to any funds, stocks, bonds,
shares, investments, interests, rights, benefits or entitlements I may now have or
hereafter come to have and hold; to engage in any administrative or legal
proceedings or lawsuits regarding any rights and interests I have on matters therein;
to create trusts and to transfer any interest I may have in property, whether real or
personal, tangible or intangible, to the trustee of any trust, to engage and to dismiss
agents, counsel, and employees, in connection with any matter, and for purposes,
this power and authority vested in my son, Vernon K. Smith Jr., is unlimited,
unconditional and all inclusive, and with the same authority and effect as though I
had caused the action to be undertaken.
This Durable Power of Attorney is irrevocable and shall remain in full force and
effect, having been coupled with adequate consideration, and shall not be affected,
altered or impaired by the event of my death or disability, and shall continue in
effect for all time, as it has been my long-standing intention and desire that my son,
Vernon K. Smith Jr., shall be the sole and exclusive heir of my entire estate, as I
have so declared openly in the past many years, because of his commitment,
dedication, and devotion to my best interests, welfare, and financial well being.
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Dated This ll 1h day of April, 2008.
Victoria H. Smith
Ex. 4. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. signed as a witness.
Four years later, on July 3, 2012, when Victoria H. Smith was nearly

, Vernon

formed a limited liability company, VHS Properties, L.L.C. ("VHS Properties") and made himself
the L.L.C. 's registered agent and manager. He listed its initial members as his mother, Victoria H.
Smith, and himself. There is no credible evidence that his mother had any idea he had created a
limited liability company or made her a member.
The next day, on July 4, 2012, Vernon relied on the 2008 Power of Attorney and, as her
attorney-in-fact, transferred all of Victoria's earthly real and personal property to VHS Properties
in a document drafted by Vernon. Ex. 5. Again, Vernon offered no credible evidence his mother
had any idea that he was transferring all of her earthly possessions effectively to either VHS
Properties or ultimately to himself. That document read as follows:
This transfer, conveyance, and sale of property made and entered into on this 41h
day of July, 2012, by and between Victoria H. Smith, Transferor herein, through
the authority of her son, Vernon, pursuant to his Durable Power(s) of Attorney, as
vested in him, initially in 1999, and thereafter reaffirmed in 2008, and VHS
Properties, LLC, the recipient of the entire transfer, as Transferee herein.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS: Victoria H. Smith had before executed her Last Will and Testament
on February 14, 1990, designating therein her son, Vernon, to her sole and
exclusive Heir, having done so through the formation of her Holographic Will,
written by her own stationary, in her own handwriting, and signed and dated by her,
being done deliberately in that fashion to emphatically to convey her intentions,
and to avoid any appearance of any influence by anyone having chosen to do so in
accordance with the way in which her husband, Vernon K. Smith, Sr., a wellknown attorney in Boise, Idaho, had so executed his Last Will and Testament by
such holographic means, by which Victoria H. Smith acquired his entire inheritance
to the exclusion of anyone else; and,
WHEREAS: Vernon has always been the sole source of all management,
maintenance, financial means, operation and control of all assets of Victoria H.
Smith, beginning after his Father's death, and especially since and after his
becoming an Attorney in 1971, having at all times thereafter dedicated his life to
the preservation of Victoria's assets and providing for her living need and
satisfaction of any obligation; and,
WHEREAS: On July 3, 2012, Vernon did file the Article of Organization for the
establishment of a limited liability company, known as the VHS Properties, LLC,
formed pursuant to and in accordance with the laws of and statutes of the State of

)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CASE NO. CV-IE-2014-15352

13

000763

Idaho, identifying its' [sic] sole members at the time of the organization to be
Vernon and Victoria H. Smith, for tracing purposes by the Internal [R]evenue
Service; and,
WHEREAS: All properties and property interests of Victoria H. Smith, be it real
property, personal property or mixed properties, wherever so situated, including,
but not limited to any and all rights, titles, interests to any and all real property,
personal property, mixed property and wherever so situated in which any interest
now exists or can be claimed to exist, whether it be in the nature of an expectancy,
anticipatory, or a beneficial interest or by any gift or by any future inheritance and
known to include but not limited to all farms, ranches, residential properties, office
buildings, rental facilities, furniture, appliances, farm equipment, tractors, trucks,
trailers, backhoes, ATV's, UTV's front end loaders, commodities, farm products,
stocks in any corporations, bonds, cash deposits, bank accounts, leasehold interests,
rental receipts, jewelry, clothing, personal effects and any other tangible or
intangible interests of any nature or kind, known or unknown, whatsoever, or
wherever so located, shall be and hereby are transferred to VHS Properties, LLC,
undertaken by the powers granted to Vernon, through said Durable and Irrevocable
Power(s) of Attorney, all of which is being undertaken to preserve and protect all
such property interests by the transfer unto said Limited Liability Company, and to
thereby effectively avoid any costs, inconvenience or expense or need to probate
any estate of Victoria H. Smith, and now being able to rely upon the continuing
valuations of said assets pursuant to their actual use and assessed market values, for
tax purposes, as said values are believed to be within the exemption, tax credit or
allowances as provided for under the Internal Revenue Code, as any estate tax and
gift tax have the same treatment, and it remains the belief of these Parties no tax
would be due or owing thereon at the values of their present use and assessed
valuations; and,
WHEREAS: Said transfers or real property have been made to said VHS
Properties, LLC, by execution of appropriate deeds for eventual recordation, as
may be needed for reference by said VHS Properties, LLC, and it is furthermore
deemed appropriate at this time to also secure the transfer of total ownership of the
membership interests of said VHS Properties, LLC, so as to now be exclusively
held by Vernon, and the transfer of said membership interest of Victoria H. Smith
is being executed this day as well, and Vernon shall from this day henceforth have
and hold 100% ownership interest in and to said membership rights of VHS
Properties, LLC.
NOW THEREFORE: For and in consideration of the sum ofTen Dollars ($10.00)
and other good and valuable consideration, said Transferor does hereafter transfer
all assets to said Transferee, VHS Properties, LLC, and this document confirms the
transfer of all said property rights and interests of Victoria H. Smith, to said VHS
Properties, LLC, Transferee herein, and said Limited Liability Company shall have
and hold ownership of and to all assets and property interests of any kind or nature
of Victoria H. Smith, as of July 4, 2012, and Vernon, shall, as of the date of this
conveyance, July 4, 2012, hereafter and henceforth hold 100% membership interest
in said VHS Properties, LLC.

)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CASE NO. CV-IE-2014-15352

14

000764

DATED THIS: 41h Day of July, 2012[.]
Ex. 5. As her attorney-in-fact, Vernon drafted and executed it.
Vernon signed twice- once on his own behalf and once on behalf of his mother, Victoria
H. Smith, as her "attorney-in-fact," relying specifically on the 2008 Power of Attorney. In an
earlier decision, the Court concluded this was an improper and unauthorized gift of her property,
violating the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, because nothing in the power of attorney
specifically or expressly authorized Vernon to gift Victoria's property to anyone, including
himself. Vernon presented no credible evidence that his mother had any idea he was doing this.
That same day, again relying on the 2008 Power of Attorney, Vernon executed the
following document on Victoria H. Smith's behalf, transferring and assigning, all ofher interest in
VHS Properties (and thus any interest in her own property) to Vernon.

Assignment and Transfer of Membership Interest of: Victoria H. Smith in
VHS Properties, LLC to Vernon Confirming him to be the 100% Member
Thereof
This Assignment and Transfer Agreement, made and entered into on this 41h day of
July, 2012, by and between Victoria H. Smith, by and through her son, Vernon K.
Smith, Junior, pursuant to his Durable and Irrevocable Power of Attorney as
granted to him, initially in 1999, and thereafter reaffirmed and confirmed in 2008,
as the Assignor and Transferor herein, and Vernon K. Smith, Junior, as the
Assignee and Transferee herein.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS: Victoria H. Smith did execute her Holographic Last Will and
Testament in 1990, designating therein her sole and exclusive Heir to be her son,
Vernon K. Smith, Junior, and having done so through the formation of that
Holographic Will, pursuant to §15-2-503, Idaho Code, where it is written by her in
her own handwriting, and dated and signed by her, being done deliberately in that
fashion so as to avoid any appearance of influence of any kind from another, and
having done so in accordance with the way in which her husband, Vernon K.
Smith, Senior, a well-known and successful attorney in Boise, Idaho, had so
executed his Last Will and Testament by holographic means of his entire
accumulation of assets to her, to the exclusion of anyone else; and,
WHEREAS: Vernon has been the sole source of all management, maintenance,
operation and control, and financial means and resources for the protection,
preservations and perpetuation of all assets since becoming an Attorney in 1971
and has dedicated his life to preserve and protect his parents' property interests;
and,
WHEREAS: The Assignor and Transferor herein did grant unto Vernon through
both Durable and Irrevocable Powers of Attorney, the authority and right to do that
as he deemed appropriate and necessary to protect, preserve and defend all rights
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and interests of any such assets he otherwise would inherit, including all rights of
sale, transfer, or any of the disposition as provided for therein; and,
WHEREAS: A reaffirmation of his exclusive Rights and Powers of Attorney were
again announced, at Transferor's request in 2008, reaffirming his exclusive right of
ownership either under her Will, or as a transfer under his power and authority, to
again take such action as he may deem appropriate to transfer, protect, preserve and
defend his interests in all such assets of the Assignor and Transferor; and,
WHEREAS: On July 3, 2012, the Limited Liability Company known as VHS
Properties, LLC, was formed by Vernon pursuant to and in accordance with his
authority and under the laws and Statutes ofthe State ofldaho, identifying its' [sic]
members initially as Vernon and Victoria H. Smith for tax tracing and
identification purposes for any gift tax consideration; and,
WHEREAS: Transfers of any and all properties, be it real property, personal
property, mixed and wherever so situated, was transferred by Assignor, through
said Durable and Irrevocable Powers of Attorney, to said VHS Properties, LLC, all
of which was undertaken for purposes of asset protection, to preserve and protect
all such property interests, and to thereby effectively avoid the costs, inconvenience
and expense of any unnecessary probate of said real and personal property assets,
as it is believed the tax credit for gift and estate taxes is within the exemption or tax
credit allowances under the Internal Revenue Code, and no estate or gift tax would
be due or owing thereon in any event in light of the assessed market valuations;
and,
WHEREAS: Said transfers having been made to said VHS Properties, LLC, and
the benefit of asset tracing being completed with one member having been the
Transferor, as well as a member the attorney in fact, being deemed appropriate to
secure the transfer of membership of said VHS Properties, LLC, to become that
exclusively held by said Vernon, it is herewith declared the transfer of membership
interest of Victoria H. Smith is herewith and now transferred to Vernon, who shall
from this day henceforth have and hold 100% ownership interest in and to the
membership of said VHS Properties, LLC.
NOW THEREFORE: For and in consideration of the sum ofTen Dollars and other
good, valuable and lawful consideration, the membership interest of said Victoria
H. Smith, as the Assignor and Transferor herein, is herewith being assigned,
transferred, conveyed and set over unto Vernon, who shall hereafter and henceforth
for all purposes have and hold 100% membership interest in VHS Properties, LLC,
and which said Limited Liability Company does currently have and hold all real
and personal property interests held by Victoria H. Smith, including all those she
inherited and has or ever will receive from her deceased husband, Vernon K. Smith,
Sr., who died May 2, 1966.
DATED THIS: 41h Day of July, 2012
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"Assignment and Transfer of Membership Interest of: Victoria H. Smith in VHS Properties. LLC
to Vernon Confirming him to be the I 00% Member Thereof." The documents make clear they are
linked.
Like the other documents, this document was not signed by Victoria herself. Instead,
Vernon again signed, as her agent, relying on the 2008 Power of Attorney. He also signed on his
own behalf. Like the other transactions, Vernon presented no credible evidence that his mother
had any idea he was doing this. Thus, by the end of the day, July 4, 2012, Vernon admittedly
owned and controlled all of Victoria's property, real and personal, and Victoria no longer had any
property.
In addition, Vernon K. Smith, Sr. died at the

. Vernon K. Smith,

Sr. was Vernon's, Victoria Converse's, and Joseph's father. That probate was never closed.
Vernon was the Attorney of Record for his father's estate continuously since 1976. According to
Vernon, he acted exclusively for Victoria's benefit in managing and preserving all matters of
ownership of all her interests. He claimed that Victoria specifically wanted her husband's estate to
remain open because she liked signing as his "executrix." Thus, Victoria H. Smith's estate
includes Vernon K. Smith, Sr.'s estate and assets.
The Court, following Joseph's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruled Vernon did
not have the legal authority to transfer all of his mother's earthly property to VHS
Properties. The Court set the transfers aside on July 19, 2016, and held Victoria's real and
personal property, as it existed just prior to Vernon's illegal transfer, was part of her
Estate.
Victoria H. Smith died September 11, 2013, at nearly

5.

Factual findings surrounding Victoria H. Smith's holographic will.

By 1990, Vernon was in the middle of a contentious divorce from Sharon Bergmann; he
was trying to keep as much of the marital property from her as possible. During that time, Vernon
persuaded his mother, Victoria, to act as his partner in his efforts to keep as much of the property
out of the community as possible. For example, during his divorce, in order to keep the Raymond
Street out of being part of the community property, he convinced Victoria to act as his "straw
man" and purchase the Raymond Street house with her money at the IRS auction on his behalf.
This made Victoria a party to a very questionable and potentially fraudulent scheme. He also
convinced her to file an affidavit on his behalf in his divorce testifying that significant property at
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issue in the divorce was hers individually, again to keep Sharon Bergmann from contending the
property was part of the community. Ex. 269. Thus, during the relevant time frame before and
after she executed her will, Victoria was easily persuaded by Vernon.
The Court agrees that Victoria trusted Vernon and had relied on him for legal and business
advice since 1971. In fact, Vernon admitted that since 1971 his mother relied on him. In the 2008
transfer of her interest in the L.L.C. he drafted, he wrote in relevant part as follows:
WHEREAS: Vernon has always been the sole source of all management,
maintenance, fmancial means, operation and control of all assets of Victoria H.
Smith, beginning after his Father's death, and especially since and after his
becoming an Attorney in 1971, having at all times thereafter dedicated his life to
the preservation of Victoria's assets and providing for her living need and
satisfaction of any obligation[.]
Ex. 5. The Court finds this is one of the reasons Vernon could easily influence his mother.
Moreover, during the relevant time frame surrounding her execution of her will, Victoria
gave her son, Vernon, substantial financial support. Between August 1989 and November 1990,
Victoria gave Vernon over $40,000 (most of it between December 1989 and March 1990). See Ex.
265. Approximately $10,000 were listed as loans. /d. In addition, she was making some of his
child support payments and paying other of his costs, including office expenses. /d.; Ex. 269.
During that same time frame Victoria gave her other son, Joseph, $23,199 consisting of$13,200 in
loans and $9,999 in a gift. !d. This demonstrates how susceptible Victoria was to Vernon's
requests.
6.

During the year before and six months after Victoria signed her holographic
will, Joseph and bis family had a good relationship with her.

There is no evidence that Joseph and his family were estranged from his mother at the time
she executed her holographic will. In fact, all of the evidence, up until late summer, early fall 1992
(more than two years later), proved that Victoria enjoyed a good and loving relationship with
Joseph and his family. See Exs. 25, 265, 266, 267, 268. She continued participating in family
gatherings and sending cards and gifts. There is no evidence to suggest that some estrangement
between Joseph and his mother had anything to do with her uncommunicated decision to disinherit
him or his family. There was no estrangement during the relevant time frame.
Until late 1992, Joseph and his family continued to transport his mother for shopping,
appointments, and church and to enjoy family gatherings. She continued to give Joseph substantial
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monetary gifts even after she executed her 1990 will. Victoria also continued to give her
grandchildren Christmas gifts and cards until2003 when Victoria advised her granddaughter.
There will be no gifts from you or me since our property taxes have raised [sic]
exorbitantly[.]
Exs. 2-21B.
In fact, until late winter 1991, nearly 2 years after his mother executed the holographic
will, Joseph continued to manage her properties and enjoy his mother's trust. However, in late
1991, Joseph and Vernon apparently disagreed over certain management issues. See e.g., Exs. 219,
220. Beginning in late 1991, Vernon persuaded his mother to reject Joseph's management
decisions. Id. Victoria would agree with Joseph's decisions until she spoke with Vernon and then
would abruptly change her mind, adopting Vernon's approach. By the end of 1992, it was clear
that Joseph's relationship with his mother was becoming strained.
Likewise, prior to late summer and early fall 1992, there was no credible evidence that
Victoria considered her son, Joseph, to be a ''thief and a liar." Furthermore, it is not credible that
Joseph "stealing" a silver dollar when he was

, taking his bedroom dresser with

him on his marriage in the 1960's, or using or keeping his father's tools in anyway influenced his

mother's decision to disinherit Joseph and his family on February 14, 1990. If she had such
animus toward Joseph that she wanted to disinherit him in the 1990 will because she thought him
to be a liar and a thief, she would not have continued to socialize with Joseph and his family or
give Joseph substantial monetary gifts.
Only by 1998, did Victoria begin telling third parties Joseph was a liar and a thief. Warren
Dillworth credibly testified that he was shocked when she told him that in 1998. He was also
shocked when she told him she was leaving her entire estate to Vernon. By this time she was
and the Joseph Smith family no longer enjoyed the same relationship with her.
Dillworth testified that in the early 90's (the relevant time frame) they spoke about her children
often, and she did not talk about Joseph that way. That is why it surprised him so much. Dillworth
was a very credible and disinterested witness.
In early fall 1992, over 2 years after Victoria executed her holographic will, something
drastic happened to the relationship between his mother and Joseph and his family. Based on the
evidence and Vernon's behavior in court, the Court concludes that Vernon actively engaged in
damaging his mother's feelings about Joseph's family. Vernon's negative influence on his mother
resulted in isolation from her family. Nothing else explains why Victoria abruptly decided that

J
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Joseph would no longer manage any of her business affairs and began ceasing contact with
Joseph's family. Nothing else explains why she began thinking of him as a liar and a thief.
The Court concludes from the evidence and testimony, V emon was actively alienating his
mother from Joseph's family in an attempt to isolate her. The Court further concludes that Victoria
did not disinherit Joseph H. Smith because they were estranged when she made the will or that she
thought he was a "thief and a liar."
7.

During the relevant time frame, no facts explain Victoria's decision to
disinherit her only daughter, Victoria Converse.

Victoria Converse, Victoria H. Smith's daughter, is not a party to this contest. However,
because one of the elements of undue influence is that the result is not the natural result of a
testator's uncontrolled will, the Court reviewed the evidence. While the Court finds Victoria, as a
devout Catholic, disapproved of her daughter's decision to become a devout "Born Again
Christian," that disapproval does not explain why she chose to completely disinherit Victoria
Converse on February 14, 1990. In fact, according to Vernon's own evidence, his mother
continued to recognize the Converse children's birthdays and Christmas with checks every year
until at least December 1999, nine years after she allegedly had so much animus toward her
daughter that she disinherited her. See Exs. 265, 266, 267, 268. There was no evidence in the
relevant time frame before and after she executed the will that Victoria had cut off contact with
her daughter. In fact, the evidence suggests contact continued into 1991 and 1992.
Furthermore, more than six months after she executed her will, she again gave her daughter
a $3,000 monetary gift in December 1990, the same amount she gave her the year before. The fact
she gave her daughter less in monetary gifts than she gave her sons also does not explain why she
chose to disinherit her on February 14, 1990. As Victoria's granddaughter, Kate Laxson, testified,
her grandmother favored the boys, well explaining the disproportionate monetary gifts.
Thus, the Court finds there is no evidence within the relevant time frame that Victoria
would naturally intentionally disinherit her daughter or grandchildren.
8.

Father Faucher's testimonv was credible and relevant to the relationship
between Vernon and his mother.

Father Faucher credibly testified at the court trial. He was Victoria's priest for 13 years and
had known the Smith family since 1950. His testimony was not relevant to Victoria's state of mind
on February 14, 1990, more than 20 years before when she executed the will at issue. However,
his testimony described the relationship between Victoria and her son, Vernon. In particular, it
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was relevant to two of the elements of undue influence -- whether Victoria was subject to
Vernon's influence and whether Vernon had a tendency to exercise undue influence over his
mother.
While in her general dealings with most people, Father Faucher testified Victoria was
strong-willed, opinionated and not easily influenced, he also testified she "deeply appreciated
strong men" and had always been subject to influence by "strong men" because she wanted to
please them. The Court finds that Vernon K. Smith, Jr. is a formidable and persuasive man and,
even he concedes, his mother listened to him and followed his advice.
Father Faucher also testified about an incident that happened in 2007 that exposes a lot
about the relationship between Victoria and Vernon, as it persisted through the years. The incident
reinforces lhe Court's finding that Vernon dominated his mother with an intent to appropriate all
of her property to himself. It shows the lengths to which he would go to carry out his design.
Victoria was a devout Catholic, and the Church was an important part of her life. That was
confirmed by her check ledgers. See e.g., Exs. 265-268. For example, she made weekly payments
to the Church and Church auxiliaries and attended church regulady.
In late 2007, following church services, Father Faucher asked her whether she would be
interested in making a large donation to the Church building fund for a memoriam to her husband
and to herself. When she told Father Faucher she would like to make a contribution, he
recommended she first discuss this with Vernon, because Father Faucher knew Vernon handled all
his mother's financial decisions and realized how important he was to her. Following that
discussion, she abruptly stopped attending church and never returned to church. At the time, she
relied on Vernon to drive her. She died in 2013, nearly six years later, without ever attending
church again. In fact, Father Faucher never saw her again.
When she stopped coming to church, Father Faucher began calling her home. The woman
who answered told him Victoria was either not available or ill. He wanted to visit her and if she
was ill, give her the sacrament of the sick. The woman discouraged him from coming to her house.
He began calling Vernon's law office to speak with him. The man who answered said Vernon was
not available. Finally, Father Faucher made an appointment to have coffee with Vernon in the
spring 2008. 9 Vernon met with him and told him there would be no memoriam or gift. When

9

According to earlier testimony, Victoria fell in early 2008 and was hospitalized for a fall. Victoria then executed a
new power of attorney making Vernon her attorney-in-fact. He claimed that this power of attorney was "irrevocable,"
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Father Faucher asked if he could visit his mother and offered to give her the sacrament of the sick,
Vernon would not allow him to visit.
While this incident is too remote in time to be considered to establish undue influence, it
demonstrates the lengths to which Vernon would go to isolate his mother and continue his control
over her and her estate. It clearly corroborates the Court's finding that Vernon acquired control
over his mother's mind before she made her will, and retained such control until she died.
Subsequent to procuring his mother's will in 1990, he clearly retained control over her well
beyond the period when she executed the will. It tends to reinforce the Court's findings.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The sole issue before the Court is whether Victoria's February 14, 1990 holographic will
was the product of Vernon's undue influence.
The Court previously ruled that Vernon's own pleadings created a rebuttable presumption
that he unduly influenced his mother to execute her 1990 will, because he was both a beneficiary
of her will and enjoyed a fiduciary relationship with her. Therefore, at the court trial, Vernon had
the burden of producing a "quantum" of evidence to rebut that presumption.
The Court also previously ruled Vernon improperly transferred all of his mother's earthly
possessions to himself by illegally exercising her "power of attorney." On July 3, 2012, Vernon
created a limited liability company, VHS Properties L.L.C., making his mother a member and
himself the managing member. The following day, on July 4, 2012, Vernon improperly, and
without legal authority, transferred all ofVictoria's real and personal property, to VHS Properties
signing on Victoria's behalf in reliance on her power of attorney. The Court further held that after
improperly transferring all of her earthly possessions to VHS Properties, Vernon then improperly
divested his mother of her membership in VHS Properties that same day exercising that same
power of attorney, effectively gifting all of her assets to himself. Vernon drafted all documents
and signed on her behalf, using her power of attorney. There was no evidence Victoria even knew
her son had transferred all of her property. Therefore, the Court set aside all transfers made
pursuant to Victoria's power of attorney and ruled that all Victoria H. Smith's property, as it
existed on July 3, 2012, was part of her estate. The parties failed to present any evidence at trial to
change the Court's prior ruling.

the Court ruled otherwise. Interestingly, this new more expansive power of attorney follows her discussions with
Father Faucher.
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Joseph argues that Victoria's holographic will should be held invalid and his mother
deemed to have died intestate. While as a general proposition, a testator is entitled to dispose of
property as she sees fit without regard to whether the dispositions specified are appropriate or fair,
where evidence proves the will is the product of undue influence, the Court may rule the will
invalid.
The Idaho Supreme Court early held that in order to establish undue influence it is not
necessary to prove circumstances of either actual domination or coercion. In Estate of Randall, 60
Idaho 419, 93 P.2d I (I939). The "only positive and affirmative proof required is of facts and
circumstances from which undue influence may be reasonably inferred." !d.
Based on the following application of the law to the above facts found to exist by the
Court, the Court holds that the holographic will was the product of Vernon's undue influence and
is therefore invalid. The Court further holds that Victoria H. Smith died intestate. The Court also
appoints a Special Administrator pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-6I4{b) to protect the estate pending
creation of an inventory, formal probate and distribution.

I.

At trial, Vernon was required to come forward with evidence tending to disprove at
least one of the four prima facie elements of undue influence.
The law on undue influence is well developed. A court may declare a will invalid on the

basis of undue influence where the evidence indicates that the testator's free agency was overcome
by another person. The party claiming undue influence (Joseph H. Smith) must prove four
elements: (1) a person is subject to undue influence in general or by a particular person; (2) an
opportunity to exert undue influence; (3) a disposition on the part of the influencer to exert undue
influence; and (4) a result indicating undue influence. Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho I, 7, 592 P.2d
57, 63 (1979). All four elements of an undue influence claim must be met or the claim must be
dismissed. Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 614, 288 P.3d 826, 831 (2012); See also
Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 575, 759 P.2d 77, 81 (Ct. App. 1988) (Discussing rebuttable

presumption and burden shifting in undue influence cases).
Where a beneficiary of the testator's will is also a fiduciary of the testator, there is a
rebuttable presumption of undue influence. 10 In that instance, the will's proponent (Vernon) bears

10

"'Fiduciary relationships are commonly characterized by one party placing property or authority in the hands of
another or being authorized to act on behalf of the other."' Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home Mortgage, 159 Idaho 642, 647,
365 P.3d 398, 403 (2016). '"A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created or detined
in law . . .. " /d. '"A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one individual in
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the burden of rebutting the presumption. In re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 938-39, 277 P.3d
380, 385-86 (2012). Before the court trial, the Court ruled Vernon was both his mother's
beneficiary and enjoyed a fiduciary relationship with his mother citing his own statements found
in his Response and Objection to Petition Appointment of Special Administrator and Assignment
of Powers and Duties, among other pleadings. See Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home Mortg., 159 Idaho
642, 648, 365 P.3d 398,404 (2016). Therefore, the Court ruled there was a rebuttable presumption
of undue influence by V emon and that Vernon must rebut that presumption. Quemada, 153 Idaho
at 614, 288 P .3d at 831. However, this ruling did not actually alter the burden of proof borne by
Joseph, only the burden of initially presenting evidence on the presumed facts.
This principle is consonant with the general rule regarding presumptions
enunciated in I.R.E. 30 I.
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden
of going forward with the evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it
was originally cast.
A Rule 30 l presumption relieves the party in whose favor it operates from
presenting further evidence of the presumed fact until the opposing party introduces
substantial evidence of the nonexistence of the fact. Bongiovi v. Jamison, supra.
Thus, in the present case, if Patricia introduced evidence demonstrating that a
confidential relationship existed and evidence that Arthur was instrumental in
procuring the deed, then the burden would shift to Arthur to come forward with
evidence tending to disprove at least one of the four prima facie elements of undue
influence.

Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 575, 759 P.2d 77, 81 (Ct. App. 1988).
Thus, while V emon had the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the
presumption, Joseph retained the ultimate burden of proof. Vernon needed only to present
substantial evidence to rebut the presumption as to at least one of the elements of undue influence.
If he did that, Joseph must then prove all the elements by a preponderance of the evidence. A clear
understanding of undue influence is critical to the Court's analysis.
'Undue influence' is not a tort but rather a common law doctrine used to avoid and
recover inter vivos and testamentary transfers of property made by vulnerable
donors and testators to persons who connived to obtain such property by various
wrongful means. [footnote omitted]. 'Undue influence' has been defined as the

another ... A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise, and does have and exercise influence over another."'
Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841, 852 (1991).
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exercise of sufficient control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought in
question, to destroy that person's free agency and constrain him or her to do
something he or she would not have done if that control had not been exercised.
[footnote omitted]. In other words, undue influence is influence that deprives one
person of his or her freedom of choice or overcomes his or her will or free agency
[footnote omitted] and substitutes the will of another in its place, [footnote omitted]
precludes the exercise of free and deliberate judgment, [footnote omitted] or
coerces a person into doing something that he or she does not want to do [footnote
omitted] or would not have done except for the influence. [footnote omitted] The
essence of undue influence is that the will of the influencing party so overpowered
the will of the other party that the other party's act essentially became the act of the
influencing party. [footnote omitted].
25 Am. Jur. 2d DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE § 36 (emphasis added). The Court applied these
principles to the facts established at trial.
II.

Vernon failed to produce that "quantum of evidence" necessary to rebut tbe
presumption Victoria H. Smith's will was the product of his undue influence.
Any court analysis must ultimately focus on the "influencer's" conduct - in this case,

Vern on's conduct.
The focus of an undue influence inquiry is on the conduct of the person allegedly
exercising undue influence and whether that person gained an unfair advantage by
devices which reasonable people regard as improper. [footnote omitted]. The
hallmark of undue influence is high pressure that works on mental, moral, or
emotional weakness, and it is sometimes referred to as overpersuasion. [footnote
omitted]. Something must operate upon the mind of a person allegedly unduly
influenced which has a controlling effect sufficient to destroy the person's free
agency and to render the instrument not properly an expression of the person's
wishes but rather the expression of the wishes of another or others; it is the
substitution of the mind of the person exercising the influence for the mind of the
person executing the instrument, causing him or her to make the instrument which
he or she otherwise would not have made. [footnote omitted]. According to the
RESTATEMENT, undue influence is unfair persuasion of a person who is dominated
by the person exercising the persuasion or who, because of the relation between
them, is justified in assumjng that that person wiU not act in a manner inconsistent
with his or her welfare. [footnote omitted]. ...
Undue influence bas been described as a species of duress, [footnote omitted] but it
has also been described as a species of fraud [footnote omitted] or constructive
fraud. [footnote omitted]. However, it is not necessary to prove fraud to prove
undue influence although fraudulent conduct may often be present. [footnote
omitted].
25 Am. Jur. 2d DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE§ 36 (emphasis added).
Evidence of undue influence is rarely overtly evident; it normally involves subtle and
nuanced behavior. "The exertion of undue influence is usually a subtle thing and by its very nature
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usually involves an extended course of dealings and circumstances." Id. In other words, the fact
finder must carefully consider the course of conduct between the testator and the influencer to
inferentially come to a conclusion. An influencer's coercion may not be blatant but may be
indirect and sustained.
Based on the evidence presented at the court trial, the Court finds that Vernon failed to
introduce "that quantum of evidence that tends to show that no undue influence existed."
The Court further finds that even if Vernon had rebutted the presumption with minimal
evidence, Joseph directly or through Vernon's own witnesses and evidence produced a
preponderance of evidence that Victoria's will leaving all her earthly possessions to Vernon was
the product of Vernon's undue influence. Therefore, the Court finds her holographic will is invalid
and Victoria H. Smith died intestate.
In arriving at that conclusion, the Court confined its consideration to evidence, acts,
statements and behaviors at or near the time Victoria executed the will in 1990. Thus, statements
or acts occurring more than a year later are not directly relevant. While the Court allowed some
clearly remote evidence to be introduced at trial, only that evidence reasonably connected in time
before and after the will's execution was relevant to the Court's determination.
However, as specifically acknowledged in the Court's decision, evidence remote to the
will's execution in 1990 may be directly relevant to other issues in the case or may corroborate the
Court's conclusions. 11 More remote evidence may be considered only if the particular element is
already supported by a preponderance of the evidence reasonably connected in time to the will's
execution.

11
"Evidence of conduct of the proponent subsequent to the execution of the will is admissible if it tends to show
influence at the time the will was executed." See Estate of Baker, 131 Cal. App. 3d 471,481, 182 Cal.Rptr. 550,557
(Ct. App. 1982) (events occurring after the execution of will were compelling evidence that proponent had continuing
control over decedent's thought process for period prior to execution until death); In re Estate of Mooney, 453 N.E.2d
1158, 1162 (1983); In re Ferrill, 640 P.2d 489, 497 (N.M. 1981); In re Estate of Jones, 320 N.W.2d 167, 170
(S.D.1982); Wilhoit v. Fite, 341 S.W.2d 806, 818 (Mo.1960) (events taking place subsequent to execution admissible
to show general plan by defendant to obtain all decedent's property and to show the continuing relationship between
testatrix and defendant); Haines v. Hayden, 54 N.W. 911, 914-15 (Mich. 1893) (evidence of events subsequent to
execution tended to ''fortifY antecedent indications" of fraud and undue influence). For example, evidence which tends
to show an ongoing relationship between a testator and a beneficiary occurring before and after execution is relevant
and admissible. In re Ferrill, 640 P.2d at 497. Moreover, "[e]vidence which tends to show that the beneficiary
acquired control over the testator's mind before the will was made, and retained such control beyond the period at
which the will was executed, is admissible .... " Estate ofLaitinen, 483 A.2d 265,267-70 (Vt. 1984).
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A.

Victoria was subject to Vernon's undue influence and Vernon introduced no
evidence to the contrary.

In order to succeed on a claim that a will was procured by undue influence, the party
making the claim [Joseph] must establish that the testator [Victoria] was susceptible to undue
influence by the alleged influencer [Vernon]. Undue influence is defined as "domination by the
guilty party over the testator to such an extent that his free agency is destroyed and the will of
another person substituted for that of the testator." King v. MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 279, 410
P.2d 969, 972 (1965) citing In re Eggan 's Estate, 86 Idaho 328, 386 P.2d 563 (1963).
'Susceptibility, as an element of undue influence, concerns the general state of
mind of the testator: whether he was of a character readily subject to the improper
influence of others ... The court will look closely at transactions where unfair
advantage appears to have been taken of one who is aged, sick or enfeebled.'
Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho I, 7, 592 P.2d 57, 63 (1979). 'It is said in 6 Wigmore,
EVIDENCE§ 1738 (3d ed. 1940), at page 121: 'The existence of undue influence
involves incidentally a consideration of the testator's incapacity to resist pressure
and his susceptibility to deceit, whether in general or by a particular person ...
Undue influence has been defined as domination by the guilty party over the
testator to such an extent that his free agency is destroyed and the will of another
person substituted for that of the testator.'
King v. MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 279,410 P.2d 969,972-73 (1965) (emphasis added).

According to 6 Wigmore,

EVIDENCE§

1738 (3d ed. 1940), at page 121 (cited by the Idaho

Supreme Court in MacDonald), this element may be proven by either showing the testator was
generally subject to influence [i.e., weak minded] or subject to the "influencer's" influence:
'The existence of undue influence or deception involves incidentally a
consideration of the testator's incapacity to resist pressure and his susceptibility to
deceit, whether in general or by a particular person. This requires a consideration
of many circumstances, including his state of affections or dislike for particular
persons, benefited or not benefited by the will; of his inclinations to obey or to
resist these persons; and, in general, of his mental and emotional condition with
reference to its being affected by any of the persons concerned. All utterances and
conduct, therefore. affording any indication of this sort of mental condition. are
admissible, in order that from these the condition at various times (not too remote)
may be used as the basis for inferring his condition at the time in issue.'
MacDonald, 90 Idaho at 279, 410 P.2d at 972 (emphasis added). Moreover, it is not necessary to

prove actual domination. The MacDonald court observed:
'In Estate of Randall, 60 Idaho 419,93 P.2d 1, we held that in order to show undue
influence it is not necessary to prove circumstances of either actual domination or
coercion; that the only positive and affirmative proof required is of facts and
circumstances from which undue influence may be reasonably inferred, for
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instance, that the beneficiary was active in the preparation and execution of the
will. We further held that the mere existence of a confidential relation between a
testator and a beneficiary in his will does not establish undue influence unless it
appears that the beneficiary was active in the preparation and execution of the will.'
In re Lunders' Estate, supra, 74 Idaho at 454, 263 P.2d at 1006. See also
Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692 (1946).
!d. at 280, 410 P.2d at 973. Because the Court already ruled that there was a presumption of undue
influence, Vernon was required to introduce some evidence that his mother was not susceptible to
his domination.
Vernon testified he was the only person present and witnessed his mother sign her
holographic will; he claimed he did not give her advice. However, based on the Court's findings
of fact, Vernon did provide her with advice. Therefore, Vernon was active in the will's preparation
and execution contrary to his testimony.
To rebut the presumption that his mother was overly vulnerable to his influence, the only
evidence Vernon introduced regarding his mother's lack of susceptibility to influence was that his
mother, Victoria, was strong-willed, opinionated, and had a mind of her own. However, while this
evidence may suggest that she was not susceptible to influence generally, it is not evidence that
she was not susceptible to Vernon's specific influence. It is not that "quantum of evidence"
necessary to overcome the presumption that she was susceptible to Vernon's undue influence. He
introduced no credible evidence demonstrating she was immune to his power.
In Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105, 416 P.2d 164 (1966), this court approved a
definition of 'undue influence' as being domination by the guilty party over the
testator to such an extent that his free agency is destroyed and the will of another
person substituted for that of the testator. In order to apply these rules of law to
decide a will contest case, of course, the facts must first be found. The recitation of
the foregoing rules of law concerning will contest cases is made to demonstrate the
necessity of explicit findings of fact in this type of case, especially when it is
appealed from a magistrate court to the district court on the grounds of
insufficiency of the record to sustain an order denying the will to probate.

In re Stibor's Estate, 96 Idaho 162, 165, 525 P.2d 357, 360 (1974). Because, Vernon failed to
rebut the presumption, Joseph did not have to introduce any evidence that she was susceptible to
Vernon's influence. However, Vernon's own trial evidence created the inference that, as strong
willed as she was generally, indeed his mother was unduly susceptible to his influence.
For example, since 1971, Vernon conceded his mother trusted him and relied on his
advice, including legal advice. He even explained why she trusted him and his advice. See e.g.,
Transfer. Conveyance, and Sale of AU Property Interests from Victoria H. Smith to VHS
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Properties L.L.C.. Moreover, the trial evidence he introduced demonstrated that during the
relevant time frame, he could influence her to act on his behalf in a very questionable and
potentially fraudulent scheme. She helped him purchase the Raymond Street property to (in his
own words) avoid the potential implication it was part of the marital property.
This was a devoutly religious woman. Yet, Vernon also influenced her to file an affidavit
on his behalf in his divorce arguing much of the property in the divorce was actually hers. During
the relevant time frame surrounding the will, Victoria also gave Vernon over $40,000 (most of it
between December 1989 and March 1990). See Ex. 265. Approximately $10,000 were listed as
loans. Id. In addition, he even testified she was making some of his child support payments and
paying other costs; the exhibits supported that testimony. /d. During that same time frame Victoria
gave her other son, Joseph, $23,199 consisting of$13,200 in loans and $9,999 in a gift. Id.
The Court finds that not only did he fail to rebut the presumption, but the totality of the
evidence supports the inference that Vernon had the ability to overcome Victoria's will by a
preponderance of the evidence. The first element of undue influence was met.
B.

Vernon bad tbe opportunity to subject Victoria to undue inHucoce.

While Vernon attempts to argue, without actual evidence, that he did not have an
opportunity to subject his mother to undue influence, that argument is specious. According to his
own statements in court and his pleadings, she trusted him above anyone else, relied on his advice,
and sought his help for nearly twenty years prior to the February 14, 1990 will. His law office
resided in her building. She paid his child support and other expenses. She loaned him money.
Where he actually lived did not limit his opportunity to unduly influence her; it is his actual
contact.
Before, during and after the will's execution, Vernon handled Victoria's business and legal
affairs. He frequently visited her and he introduced no evidence that he did not have an
opportunity to unduly influence her. He was also the only person present when she executed her
will.
Thus, he did not rebut the presumption. The Court finds that not only did he fail to rebut
the presumption, but the totality of the evidence supports the inference that Vernon had the
opportunity to influence her by a preponderance of the evidence. The second element of undue
influence was met.

)
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C.

Vernon did not rebut the presumption that he had a disposition to exert undue
influence.

The third element of undue influence centers on the influencer's disposition to exert undue
influence. Here the Court "examines the character and activities of the alleged undue influencer to
determine whether his conduct was designed to take unfair advantage of the testator." Gmeiner,
100 Idaho at 8, 592 P.2d at 64. The Idaho Supreme Court further explained:
'Disposition,' in this sense, must mean more than simply the performance of acts of
kindness accompanied by the hope of material gain. One factor which assumes
critical importance is whether or not the alleged undue influencer took an active
part in preparation and execution of the will or deed. The beneficiary of a grantor's
largesse will be viewed more suspiciously if he has been active in encouraging the
transfer, in contacting the attorney or in preparing and typing the documents. See
McNabb v. Brewster, supra; In re Estate of Randall, supra. While none of the
above factors is per se indicative of undue influence, Mollendorf v. Derry, supra, it
is clear that undue influence is less likely to be found where it can be shown that
the grant was not made at the request, suggestion or direction of the grantee, Dickey
v. Clarke, 65 Idaho 247, 142 P.2d 597 (1943); where the grantee was not active in
the preparation or execution of the documents, Kelley v. Whey land, supra; or where
disinterested advice was sought and third parties were informed of the grantor's
intentions.
Gmeiner, 100 Idaho 1, 8-9, 592 P.2d 57, 64-65 (emphasis added). The evidence clearly

establishes Victoria never sought disinterested advice; Vernon conceded that. The evidence also
clearly establishes that for many years third parties knew nothing of her decision, and that neither
Joseph nor his family was aware of her decision to disinherit them until her death. In addition,
given the circumstances surrounding her will and the will's language itself, the Court finds Vernon
was actively involved in the will's preparation and execution. It is the only explanation for the odd
language. It defies logic that given their close advisory relationship she would prepare the will she
did, ask him to witness it and not ask his advice.
Every case is unique and the facts must be carefully examined. There are no set patterns of
behavior. It is clearly dependent on inferences to be drawn from the individual circumstances.
Finally, there are miscellaneous patterns of behavior which cannot be anticipated
because they vary from case to case. Nonetheless, such behavior may serve to
ground an inference of undue influence or may serve to demonstrate the good faith
and honesty of a given transaction. For example, in the McNabb case, the recipient
of a deed first denied receiving it, later said she didn't remember receiving it, and
then concealed its existence from county authorities in requesting indigent aid for
the grantor. 75 Idaho at 317, 272 P .2d at 300. In the Randall case, the recipients of
the bequest were found to have retyped and altered the testator's will. The original,
which was less favorable to them, was said to have been 'lost.' 60 Idaho at 442, 93

)
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P.2d at 11. Conversely, in the Englesby case, the court was impressed by the fact
that a deed of one's farm to a son rather than to a daughter was in keeping with the
Finnish-American custom that the elderly grantor might have been expected to
follow. 99 Idaho at 22, 576 P.2d at 1056.
In short, the factors which may serve to ground an inference of undue influence and
those which may serve to negate such an inference are as varied as human nature
itself. If a plaintiff shows the existence of circumstances of a sort that would
warrant an inference of undue influence by a reasonable jury then, of course,
defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict. He must shoulder the burden of
coming forward to explain his conduct or run the risk of an adverse jury verdict. If,
after hearing defendant's explanation, followed by plaintiff's rebuttal evidence, the
jury fmds that undue influence has been exercised, then it will find for the plaintiff.

Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 8-9, 592 P.2d at 64--{)5 (emphasis added). Various facts may give rise to an
inference. 12
Another broad area of judicial concern in dealing with the element of 'disposition'
is the alleged influencer's attempts at undermining bequests to the natural heirs.
The court will look closely at situations where the recipient of a deed or bequest
has apparently been responsible for alienating the affections of the testator-grantor
from the other members of his or her family. The situation is further exacerbated if
the grantee has isolated lhe grantor from all contact with family or with
disinterested third parties.
!d. (emphasis added). Because the Court ruled Vernon was both a fiduciary and a beneficiary, at
the outset of the trial, Vernon was presumed to have a disposition to exert undue influence. Thus,
in order to require Joseph to introduce evidence on this element, Vernon first had the burden to
introduce credible evidence that he did not have this disposition.

12

One authority summarized it this way:
Evidence of grasping, over-reaching, and a willingness to do something wrong or unfair are
characteristics that a contestant will need to show to establish the necessary disposition to meet his
burden ofproof. See, e.g., Maller ofDejmal's Estate, 95 Wis. 2d 141,289 N.W.2d 813 (1980); In re
Kamesar's Estate, 81 Wis. 2d 151,259 N.W.2d 733 (1977).

Authority
Cases providing examples of dispositions and means to prove dispositions to exert undue influence:
• grasping, over-reaching, and willingness to do something wrong or unfair-Matter of Dejma/'s Estate,
95 Wis. 2d 141, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980); In re Kamesar's Estate, 81 Wis. 2d 151, 259 N.W.2d 733
(1977)
• conduct on other matters other than preparation of will-In re Will of Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386 (Del.
Ch. 1983)
27 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 469 (Originally published in 2005)(emphasis added).
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Vernon introduced no credible evidence that he did not have a disposition to exert undue
influence or take unfair advantage. Furthermore, during the relevant time frame, where he received
substantial sums of money and asked his mother to purchase the property as a "straw man"
demonstrated that he had the character to take unfair advantage of his mother and others.
Subsequent behaviors corroborated his character to take unfair advantage. For example, a trier of
fact closely examines "situations where the recipient of a deed or bequest has apparently been
responsible for alienating the affections of the testator-grantor from the other members of his or
her own family. The situation is further exacerbated if the grantee has isolated the grantor from all
contact with family or with disinterested third parties." Id. 100 Idaho at 8, 592 P.2d at 64.
In this case, the illegal 2012 transfer of all of his mother's earthly possessions effectively

to himself, his efforts to isolate his mother, his interactions with Father Faucher, and other
evidence, are consistent with his character or disposition to take unfair advantage of his mother (as
well as others) in procuring her will.
The Court finds Vernon failed to rebut the presumption that he intended to take unfair
advantage of his mother. The Court further finds that the totality of the evidence supports the
inference by a preponderance of the evidence that Vernon had both the character and disposition
to overcome Victoria's will and take unfair advantage. The third element of undue influence was
met.
D.

Vernon did not rebut tbc presumption that the result was "unnatural, unjust
or irrational."

The final element in any undue influence case focuses on whether the testamentary bequest
appears suspicious.
[T]he suspiciousness of a particular result sets the tempo throughout. A result is
suspicious if it appears 'unnatural, unjust or irrational.' A property disposition
which departs from the natural and expected is said to raise a 'red flag of warning.'
Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 7, 592 P.2d at 63. Vernon argues the result is not suspicious because his

mother and brother were estranged. He also contends that his mother's will disinheriting his sister
was also not suspicious because they too were estranged.
However, Vernon introduced no credible evidence that this estrangement existed at or
about the time his mother executed her will. Any estrangements began well after the relevant time
period. Moreover, the evidence also supports a finding that Vernon was instrumental in creating
those estrangements.

)
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All of the credible evidence establishes that Victoria and the Joseph H. Smith family
maintained good relationships until over two years after she executed her will. During those two
years, they continued to have happy family gatherings, Joseph continued to manage her property
and they saw each other nearly every day. Victoria continued to give Joseph and his family gifts.
Likewise, while her relationship with her daughter may have been awkward because of
religion, there was no contemporaneous evidence that whatever that may have been, it was
sufficiently strained to cause her to disinherit her daughter and family at the time she executed her
will. She gave her daughter a substantial monetary gift just over six months later and for years
continued to recognize birthdays and Christmas.
In other words, there is no explanation for her decision in 1990 to disinherit her two other
children. Vernon introduced no relevant evidence to rebut this presumption. All of the evidence he
cites is very remote in time.
However, even if he had rebutted the presumption, the evidence overwhelmingly
establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that at the time she executed her holographic will
in 1990, the result was unnatural, unjust and irrational and evidence that her will was overborn by
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

III.

The Court finds Joseph H. Smith is entitled to an award of attorney fees in tbe
amount of $17,500 pursuaotto I.C. § 15-12-116.
Victoria H. Smith executed the durable power of attorney on April 1 I, 2008, following her

hospitalization for a fall, and following her conversation with Father Faucher. Vernon K. Smith,
Jr. admittedly drafted the power of attorney. Four years later, on July 3, 2012, when Victoria H.
Smith was nearly

, Vernon formed a limited liability company, VHS Properties. That

same date, Vernon made himself the L.L.C. 's registered agent and manager. He listed the initial
members as Victoria H. Smith, his mother, and himself, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. There was no
evidence that his mother was even aware he had created this L.L.C.
The next day, on July 4, 2012, Vernon relying on the 2008 Power of Attorney and, as her
attorney in fact, transferred all of Victoria H. Smith's real and personal property as a gift to VHS
Properties. He signed as her attorney in fact and drafted the transfer document. Like the action the
day before, there was no evidence she was aware that he transferred all her property to the L.L.C.
The same date, he transferred her interest in the L.L.C. to himself in another document he drafted.
Like before, there is no evidence she knew he had divested her of her property. He acknowledged

-
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that by the end of the day on July 4, 2012, he effectively owned and controlled all of her earthly
possessions.
Following extensive briefing, the Court held that these 2012 transfers were gifts and
further held that the 2008 Power of Attorney did not permit Vernon to gift her property to anyone,
including himself. The Court set aside his July 4, 2012, gifts of all his mother's earthly property to
VHS Properties. Joseph successfully challenged these transfers under I.C. § 15-12-116 resulting in
them being set aside and made part of his mother's estate.
Joseph moved the Court to reimburse him his attorney's fees and costs incurred in
restoring his mother's estate. Vernon opposed. The Court reserved its decision pending the
outcome of the challenge to the holographic will. Under I.C. § 15-12-116 the Court
unquestionably may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the party who prevailed in any
proceeding under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. I.C. § 15-12-116 (3) provides as follows:
(3) The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party
in a proceeding under this section.
I.C. § 15-12-116 (3). Likewise, I.C. § 15-12-117 clearly establishes an agent's liability for
violating this Act.
An agent that violates this chapter is Liable to the principal or the principal's
successors in interest for the amount required to:
(1) Restore the value of the principal's property to what it would have been
had the violation not occurred; and
(2) Reimburse the principal or the principal's successors in interest for the
attorney's fees and costs, and other professional fees and costs, paid on the
agent's behalf.
I.C. § 15-12-117 (emphasis added). The statute's clear intent is to restore the principal's property13
(Victoria H. Smith's Estate) to what it would have been if the agent had not violated the Uniform
Power of Attorney Act. 14 The Court finds that the statute applies whether the Court finds Joseph
prevailed on all issues in his challenge to her will. This is a separate and distinct issue.

13

In this case, Joseph H. Smith is acting on Victoria H. Smith's behalf in attempting to reconstruct her Estate and is
her successor in interest.
14

.J

This decision is consistent with an unpublished decision : Wisdom v. Mallo, 2009 WL 6811992 (ld. Dist. Ct.) .
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However, Joseph did prevail 15 in challenging the will, and the Court ruled her will was
invalid. Furthermore, he succeeded in getting the Court to order all of his mother's property to her
Estate. Pursuant to I.C. §§ 15-12-116 and 15-12-117, the Court finds he is entitled to fees.
Determining whether the amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the
Court's sound discretion. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324
(Ct. App. 1985). Rule 54 establishes the criteria courts must consider in awarding attorney's fees.
Rule 54(e)(3) provides that the Court should consider the follow factors in determining the amount
of such fees:
(A)

The time and labor required.

(B)

The novelty and difficulty of the questions.

(C)

The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.

(D)

The prevailing charges for like work.

(E)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(F)

The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.

(G)

The amount involved and the results obtained.

(H)

The undesirability of the case.

(I)

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.

(J)

A wards in similar cases.

(K)

The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a
party's case.

(L)

Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.

In arriving at its decision, the Court applied all the required factors to determine whether the
claimed fees were reasonable.
Among other things, the Court finds, having reviewed the attorney's affidavit, the hourly
fees of $250.00 per hour charged are the prevailing fees in this area for similar attorneys and are
reasonable. This case was hard fought and contentious. The Court further finds that the 70 hours
claimed are reasonable; this Court spent this much time and more just preparing its decision.

15

The determination as to which party, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic
Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,545, 272 P.3d 512, 517 (2012); Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787, 874 P.2d
595, 598 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Badelt v. Radell, 122 Idaho 442,450, 835 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct. App. 1992)).
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Therefore, the Court, in an exercise of discretion, having applied the I.R.C.P. 54 factors,
finds $17,500.00 in reasonable attorney fees appropriate under the Uniform Power of Attorney
Act. However, given the fact, this case is likely to be appealed and the case is far from over, the
Court finds an award is premature.
IV. Tbe Court finds an emergency exists requiring tbc Court appoint a Special
Administrator pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-614(b).
I.C. § 15-3-614 (b) specifically empowers the Court to appoint a Special Administrator to
preserve the Estate without notice where it fmds there is an emergency. Given the history and
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.'s egregious behavior transferring all of his mother's assets to himself by
improperly relying on her power of attorney, the Court finds the Estate's assets are in danger of
being dissipated. Because the Court finds that Victoria H. Smith died intestate, Vernon K. Smith,
Jr. is not entitled to be automatically appointed. See I.C. § 15-3-615 (b).
By entering the accompanying Order Appointing Special Administrator, the Court appoints
a Special Administrator and gives the Special Administrator all the powers enjoyed by a general
personal representative, except the power to distribute, dispose of or otherwise encumber Victoria

H. Smith's property. More particularly, the Special Administrator is empowered to maintain legal
actions, if necessary, to recover possession of property held by Vernon K. Smith, Jr., his wife, or
any business entity as a result of the unlawful transfers Vernon K. Smith, Jr. made in July 2012.
Seei.C. § 15-3-709.
The Court further sets a hearing for April 14, 2017, at 10 a.m. to consider appointing a
Personal Representative. Given the issues in this case, the Court does not believe either contestant
is appropriate to be the Personal Representative. If the contestants cannot stipulate to the
appointment of a Personal Representative, the Court will either appoint a professional fiduciary
company, TRESCO of Idaho, or continue the appointment of the Special Administrator as the
Personal Representative to professionally manage Victoria H. Smith's Estate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this _IDb_ day of March 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of March 2017, I served a true and correct copy of
the within instrument to:
VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
VIA EMAIL: vls59@line.com
RORYJONES
ERICAWDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, FUHRMAN P.A.
VIA EMAILS: rjoncs(alidalaw.com; ejudd@ida law.com
ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
VIA EMAIL: ae ll isCii>.ac ll islaw.com
NOAH G. HILLEN, CHTD.
VIA EMAIL: ngh@hill •nlaw.com
TRESCO OF IDAHO
PAUL SEIDEMAN
VIA EMAIL: pau l@ trcscoofidaho.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
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(
FILED By:
/ft ~~- Deputy Clerk
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
S1gned: 319/201712:02 PM

1
2

THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

3

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

4
5
6

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

7
8

CASE NO. CV-IE-2014-15352
ORDER APPOINTING SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR

Deceased.

9
10

On March 9, 2017, the Court held Victoria H. Smith's February 14, 1990 holographic will

11

to be the product of Vernon K. Smith, Jr.'s undue influence. Therefore, the Court ruled the will

12

invalid and further ruled that Victoria H. Smith died intestate.

13

Given the history of this case and the Court's finding

that Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

14

improperly and illegally transferred all of his mother's assets effectively to himself on July 4,

15

2012, the Court finds that an emergency exists requiring her assets be restored to the Estate and

16

be supervised until a personal representative can be appointed.

17

Therefore, the Court appoints the current Court Master, Noah Hillen, as a special

18

administrator pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-614(b). The Court further orders that he have the same

19

authority as a Personal Representative to perform the following particular acts:

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:
1. Once the Special Administrator has located all the Estate's property and returned it to

the Estate., the Special Administrator shall not encumber or otherwise transfer or
distribute any property from the Estate without the Court's approval.
2. The Special Administrator shall hire an appraiser or appraisers to determine the
Estate's value.
3. The Court grants to the Special Administrator all powers and authorities statutorily
granted to a Personal Representative except the power to distribute, dispose of or
otherwise encumber Victoria H. Smith's property. See I.C. § 15-3-701, et. seq. In
addition, the Court more specifically grants the Special Administrator the following
powers and authorities to accomplish the Court's Order:
a. Issue subpoenas, lake depositions, engage in discovery, and hire professionals
to locate, identify, and inventory Victoria H. Smith's property (real and
personal) as it existed on July 3, 2012, and all remaining property of the Estate.

31
I
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1

2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21

b. File appropriate legal documents, to restore all of Victoria H. Smith's property
as it existed on July 3, 2012, to her Estate. This includes but is not limited to
quit claim deeds and lis pendens.
c. Do all other acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of his duties under this Order.
d. Supervise the administration ofthe Estate's assets, as identified, including any
assets in VHS Propetties or other entities. This supervision includes hiring a
property manager or managers, appraisers and such other professional as may
be necessary to properly manage such properties.
e. All profits and rents, etc. shall be placed in a trust account to preserve them for
distribution.
4. The Special Administrator is empowered to maintain legal actions and hire counsel, if
necessary, to recover possession of property held by Vernon K. Smith, Jr., his wife, or
any business entity as a result of the unlawful transfers Vernon K. Smith, Jr. made in
July 2012. See I.C. § 15-3-709.
5. Special Administrator's compensation and reimbursement of expenses shall be subject
to Court approval. Compensation for the Special Administrator shall be at the rate of
$225/hour and $85/hour for any paralegal work. Special Administrator shall also be
entitled to recover all reasonable costs and expenses. Joseph H. Smith and Vernon K.
Smith, Jr. shall equally pay Special Administrator's compensation and costs within
seven days of the approval of such fees and costs by this Court. Should either fail to
timely pay such fees and costs, then such fees and costs shall be payable from the
assets of the Estate and shall reduce the amount of any inheritance the offending party
receives from the Estate.
6. The Special Administrator shall issue monthly reports and a final report to the Court
as the property is located and identified and at such other times as the Court may
request.

25

7. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. and, his surrogate, VHS Properties or any other L.L.C. or
business entity shall surrender to the Special Administrator any recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the Estate and
VHS Properties or any other business entity created by Vernon K. Smith, Jr. Vernon
K. Smith, Jr. and VHS Properties shall cooperate with Special Administrator as
necessary.

26

IT IS SO ORDERED.

27

Dated this 9th day of March 2017.

22

23
24

28
29

30
31
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this Jill!_ day of March 2017, I served a true and correct copy of
the within instrument to:

4
5

6
?
8
9

VERNON K. SMlTH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
VIA EMAIL: vls59@li ve.com
RORY JONES
ERICAJUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN P.A.
VIA EMAIL: riones@idal aw.com; ej udd@idalaw.co m

10
11
12

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
VIA EMAIL: ael lis@aell islaw.com

13
14

NOAH G. HILLEN, CHTD.
E-Mail Address: ngh@hi llcnlaw.cotn

15

16
17

TRESCO OF IDAHO
PAUL SEIDEMAN
VIA EMAIL: paul@trescoofidaho.com

18
19

20

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

21
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23

Deputy Clerk
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30
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::\?

ORDER APPOINTING SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
CASE NO. CV-IE-2014-15352
3

000791

EXHIBIT C

000792

Ada County Assessor

Main Menu
Home
Assessor Main Page
Help Index

.E89.
About Us
Contact Us
Disclaimer
Property Search
~eat!;!l b~ Parcel
Search b~ Address
Sea rch b~ SubdlviiiiOQ
Online Documents

llnteraatlvo Mapl

Page 1 of 1
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Need Help? Email the Appraiser Assigned to this Parcel

!Back to Parcel Search! [Print Viewl
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Tax Districts

Taxes

Characteristics

Sketch

Parcel: S1505220000
Year: 2016
Parcel Status: Active in 2016
Primary Owner:
VHS PROPERTIES LLC
Zone Code: RP
Total Acres: 80.54
Tax Code Area: 233
Instrument Number:
2014087142
Property Description:
W2NW4
SEC 5 2N 2E

I View 2016 Assessment Notice I
Address: 6259 S PLEASANT VALLEY RD BOISE. ID 83705
Subdivision: 2N 2E 05
Land Group Type: SECT
Township/Range/Section: 2N2E05
Contact Us 1 Disclaimer
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Electronically Filed
5/5/2017 5:05:37 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
CLIVE J. STRONG
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Natural Resources Division
DARRELL G. EARLY, ISB #4748
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Telephone: (208) 373-0494
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC., and NOAH HILLEN, in his capacity as
Special Administrator of the ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH.
Defendants/Intervenors.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 2015-03540

STIPULATION FOR
SETTLEMENT AND FOR
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
OF CLAIMS AGAINST NOAH
HILLEN, SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE QF VICTORIA H.
SMITH

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by counsel for the Plaintiff, Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality and counsel for Intervenor/Defendant, Noah Hillen, in his capacity as
Special Administrator of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith as follows:

WHEREAS, Intervenor/Defendant Noah Hillen (Hillen) was appointed Special
Administrator of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith on March 9, 2017 pursuant to an Order
Appointing Special Administrator in, lnThe Matter of Estate of Victoria H. Smith CV-IE-2014-

I.R.E. 408- STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT- 1
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15352.
WHEREAS, according to the Court's March 9, 2017 Findings of Fact and Conclusion of
Law (FOFCL) in In The Matter of Estate of Victoria H. Smith CV-IE-2014-15352, ownership of
the property that is the subject of this action was transfened to VHS Properties, LLC on or about
July 4, 2012 (FOFCL pg.l3.)
WHEREAS, the Court in In The Matter of Estate of Victoria H. Smith CV-IE-201415352 set aside the July 4, 2012 conveyance and declared the same null and void.
WHEREAS, it is likely that Vernon K. Smith Jr. will appeal the decision of the Court in
CV-IE-2014-15352 and there is a possibility that the ownership interest ofVHS Properties, LLC
may be restored to VHS Properties LLC during or after the pendency of this action.
NOW THEREFORE in settlement of any and all claims that the Plaintiff has or might
have against the Intervenor/Defendant, Noah Hillen in his capacity as Special Administrator of
the Estate ofVictoria H. Smith and the Estate of Victoria H. Smith arising from or relating to the
matters alleged in the December 2, 2015 Amended Complaint in this action,
. IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Intervenor/Defendant agrees that, by their terms, the Solid Waste Management Rules,
IDAP A 58.01.06, apply to the composting activities occuning on the Property that is the
subject of this litigation.

2.

Intervenor/Defendant agrees to prospectively comply with the Solid Waste Management
Rules with respect to the composting activities occuning on the Property subject to this
litigation upon a determination by the Court that the Solid Waste Management Rules apply to
such activities and the Rules have been violated. For purposes of this provision, prospective
compliance is achieved when either (1) plans covering the composting operations are

I.R.E. 408- STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT- 2
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submitted in conformity with IDAPA 58.01.06.012 or (2) additional solid waste is no longer
received at the Property and the existing solid waste/substances are not actively managed as a
composting operation. In addition, within two (2) years of entry of final judgment in this
matter (provided that the Court has made a determination that the Solid Waste Management
Ru1es apply to such activities and the Rules have been violated), or the date upon which
Defendant/Intervenor Noah Hillen is fmally empowered to manage the property and act on
behalf of the estate to bind the estate to a compost removal or reuse plan (whichever is later),
Intervenor/Defendant shall submit to the Department a plan for the removal or reuse of the
composted material located on the Prope1ty.
3.

Intervenor/Defendant shall fully cooperate with the Department to effectuate any relief
ordered by the Court against Defendant David R. Gibson and/or VHS Properties, LLC in this
case. Cooperation will include, to the extent Intervenor/Defendant has authority to do so,
exercising the power of eviction in the event Defendant David R. Gibson refuses to comply
with any relief ordered by the Court.

4.

The Plaintiff shall not seek to impose monetary or any other penalties against
Intervenor/Defendant Hillen or the Estate of Victoria H. Smith for any of the claims that are
or could have been asserted in the Amended Complaint or that arise from any use of the
Property as an alleged composting operation.

5.

The Plaintiff shall not seek to recover attorney fees against Intervenor/Defendant Hillen
or the Estate of Victoria H. Smith and shall not attach any judgement liens against any
property of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith that may arise from the Amended Complaint.

6.

Plaintiff reserves all rights and causes of action alleged in the Amended Complaint as
related to Defendants VHS Properties LLC and David R. Gibson d/b/a Black Diamond

I.R.E. 408- STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT- 3
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Compost Products and this Stipulation and Settlement shall have no effect on the rights of
the Plaintiff to further prosecute this matter against the remaining Defendants and to recover
penalties and attorney fees against said Defendants.
7.

The Parties hereby stipulate to the dismissal of any claims asserted in the Amended
Complaint by the Plaintiff against Intervenor/Defendant Hillen and the Estate of Victoria H.
Smith with prejudice and with each party to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs, subject
to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation for Settlement.

DATEDthis

5

dayofMay,2017.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNE

DARRELL G. EARLY
Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN I
Givens Pursley, LLP
Attorneys for Intervenor/Defendant Noah Hillen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.2:~

of May, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on the
the foregoing STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND FOR DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE OF CLAIMS AGAINST NOAH HILLEN, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF VICTORIA H. SMITH by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delive1y
___X_ Fax (208) 345-1129
____:{_ eService: vvsl900@gmail.com

Alexander McLaughlin
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLC
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, lD 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Ovemight Mail
Hand Delivery
~Fax (208) 388-1300
eService:
alexmclaughlin@givenspursley.com

Christine Riggs
Paralegal
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Electronically Filed
7/28/2017 5:23:54 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
(208) 345-1125
Telephone:
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540

MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER
TO INCLUDE THE DEFENSE
OF THE STATUTE OF
) LIMITATIONS, I.C. §39-108(4)
)
)
)
)
)
)

____________________________ )

COMES NOW the Defendants above named, VHS Properties, LLC and David Gibson,
d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products, by and through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith,
pursuant to Rule 15, LR.C.P., and does move this Court to allow Defendants to amend their answer
filed of record to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint filed in this action, to confirm the inclusion
of the absolute bar and defense of the Statute of Limitations as announced in I. C. §39-108(4). The
issue of the Statute of Limitations has been raised previously in the summary proceedings filed with
the Court, addressed in briefing in relation to the Summary arguments, wherein the issue has been
raised sufficiently and early on in these prior summary proceedings to permit an adjudication of its
application as that defense and absolute bar in this case to any claim from being introduced by the
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, I.C. §39-108(4)
PG.l
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State of Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. A Memorandum in support of this motion is
being submitted to the Court, thereby justifYing the inclus"looiiin--;oJifo-thtlii;isi""Sl:atll.tQry bar within the
responsive pleadings, filed in this action. The propose amendedimswer is subrilitte
\
Dated this 28th day of July, 2017

/

erewith.

Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 28th day of July, 2017, I caused a true and correct c py of
the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addres es as ·
follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
(

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2"d Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706

(
(
(
(

X

)
)
)
)

)
)

X

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
Etiled

U.S. Mail
Fax

~D<Ji"Ored
I

/
/

MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, I.C. §39-108(4)

PG.2

000800

VERNON K. SMTTH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900W.MainSt.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)
AMENDED ANSWER TO
)
FIRST AMENDED
)
COMPLAINT
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Defendants above named, by and through their attorney of
record, Vernon K. Smith, and do herewith answer the amended complaint filed by the Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiff's
amended complaint, not otherwise specifically admitted herein.
SECOND DEFENSE
That Plaintiff' has chosen to utilize a definition of "Solid Waste", contained in
§39-103(13), Idaho Code, a definition that is different than is contained in the Solid

AMENDED ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
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P. 1

Waste Management Rules and Regulations adopted by DEQ in their IDAPA definitions.
§39-103(13), Idaho Code, defines "solid waste" to be:
garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded solid materials, including solid
waste materials resulting from industrial, commercial and agricultural operations and
from community activities but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic
sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources, such as silt, dissolved or
suspended solids in industrial waste water effluents, dissolved materials in irrigation
return flows or other common water pollutants. (emphasis added)
The promulgated rules of DEQ, regarding their regulatory definition of "Solid
Waste", is defined within the Idaho Administrative Code, under DEQ's "Solid Waste
Management Rules", wherein "solid waste" is defined in IDAPA 58 .01 .06 005.44. To be:
Solid Waste. Any garbage or refuse, sludge from a waste water treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded
material including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations and from community
activities, but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid
or dissolved material in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point
sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source, special nuclear, or by-product material as defined
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923). (Emphasis ours)
That irrespective of the definition utilized, Plaintiff makes reference to such term
of "solid waste" on page 4, Par. 13 of the Amended Complaint, therein suggesting that
"grass clippings and leaves", are to be regarded as such substances within the definition
of "solid waste"; that using either the statutory definition or the IDAP A definition of
"solid waste", neifher phrase referring to "discarded solid materials" or "materials
resulting from industrial, commercial.. .and agricultural operations" are expanded upon to
identify what is intended to be included in fheir overly broad and sweeping definition(s).
"Grass clippings and leaves" are not addressed (specifically) within the statutory or
IDAPA definition, other than as may be considered in the broad and sweeping context as
to what "discarded solid materials" or "materials resulting from industrial, commercial

AMENDED ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
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and agricultural operations" could potentially be meant to include; that notwithstanding
the lack of specificity and clarity in the definition(s), the DEQ Solid Waste Management
Rules and Regulations, speci{icallv promulgated exemptions and exclusions regarding
DEQ's regulatory authority, in the context of solid waste management. There is specific

reference to the exemptions and exclusions in their "Solid Waste Management Rules
And Regulations", therein referring to those exempt and excluded substances that come
under "crop and plant residue"; that "grass clippings and leaves", by every definition,
are substances that fall within "crop and plant residue", and it was "grass clippings and
leaves" that were observed by DEQ staff personnel, as referred to in the Amended
Complaint, Par. 13, page 4; that "grass clippings and leaves" are commonly understood to
be included within the meaning of "crop and plant residue" that the only "solid waste"
observed on the "property" were "grass clippings and leaves", as no other "organic
material is contained in the piles or rows of materials observed on the "property"; that
such substances are among the substances specifically excluded and exempted from the
"solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations; that it becomes difficult for DEQ to
establish their "scope of authority" to regulate any and all broadlv defined "solid waste" ,
but it becomes impossible for DEQ to regulate that which is speci(icallv excluded from
their regulatory authority, expressly identified in the exclusion of their own IDAP A
Rules. That "crop and plant residue" are not regulated by DEQ, and that is the only
materials located on the "property" identified in the Amended Complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE
That notwithstanding the source of the definition of the phrase "solid waste", it
represents a "technical" term, or a technical phrase; that technical terms, according to the

AMENDED ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
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Idaho Constitution, are to be avoided in the law, as declared by Article 3, Section 17 of
the Idaho Constitution. That Rules and Regulations are to comply with the constitutional
provisions, or they may be regarded to be rendered unconstitutional, have no force or
effect, and rendered void.
FOURTH DEFENSE
That DEQ asserts §39-1 05(2), Idaho Code, authorizes the Director to regulate
"solid waste disposal"; that to invoke such regulatory authorization, the specific
exclusions and exemptions to the solid waste management rules and regulations,
promulgated by DEQ, (as hereafter identified) would have to be repealed, that the very
substance observed on this property, identified to be "grass clippings and leaves", would
need to be specifically included within "discarded solid materials", and demonstrate
Defendants are then engaging in the act of the "disposing of such a regulated solid
waste". That "solid waste disposal" is defined in §39-103(14), Idaho Code, wherein it
states:
(14) "Solid waste disposal" means the collection, storage, treatment, utilization,
processing or final disposal of solid waste.
That such phrase is yet another "technical term", to be avoided under the
constitution, or be rendered in violation of Article 3, Section 17, Idaho Constitution,
rendered unconstitutional and declared void.
FIFTH DEFENSE
That Plaintiffs amended complaint fails to set forth any factual basis sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against these Defendants for which any relief can be granted, as
no such relief requested by said Department of Environmental Quality (hereafter DEQ) can
be granted for the following reasons: I) that DEQ does not have the requisite standing, as a
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matter of law, as the "grass clippings and leaves", referred to as the materials and substances
described within the First Amended Complaint, are specifically exempted from regulation as
"solid waste materials" as defined within §39-1 03(13), Idaho Code or the IDAPA Solid
Waste Management Rules and Regulations, and the real property upon which the described
materials and substances are placed is therefore not a "solid waste disposal facility"; that
irrespective of whether such "crop and plant residue" materials is to be deemed to be
included vvithin the generally broad and sweeping reference to "discarded solid materials",
the exclusions and exemptions specifically expressed within the "Solid Waste Management
Rules and Regulations" preclude any regulation thereof; 2) that neither of the Defendants is
subject to any fine, penalty, or imposition of any regulatory mandate or enforcement of any
DEQ's rules and regulations, as the materials and substances at issue, identified in the

amended complaint itself, specifically address what was observed by DEQ staff personnel to
be "grass clippings and leaves", all of which substances constitutes a material substance that
is derived from crop and plant residue, and specifically excluded and exempted from the
jurisdiction, authority, and definition of the regulatory parameters of DEQ, as such
substances and materials are identified in IDAP A 58.01.06.00 I, regarding the TITLE
AND SCOPE, sub-part 03., wherein it specifically defines wastes not regulated under

these rules , to include certain enumerated substances, wherein it states, under sub-part
03.b.: These rules do not applv to the (ollowing solid waste ... ii. Manures and crop

(plant) residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates; and... iii. Any
agricultural solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the
Idaho Department of Agriculture. That "grass clippings and leaves are derived from crop
and plant residue, and are not to be regarded as "solid waste materials" for regulatory
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purposes, as the same was not regarded to constitute a "waste" for permanent disposal, and
the said materials and substances are re-incorporated into the soil for plant growth and
foliation, and excluded and exempted from the enforcement of regulations of "solid waste
materials" and substances under the jurisdiction of DEQ; 3) that neither of these Defendants
arc subject to any regulations or the effects of any enforcement of DEQ rules promulgated
under their regulatory authority, as this substance and material composition consists only of
plant and/or crop residue substances, and as such, the same is excluded by the promulgated

rules and regulatory provisions of DEQ, 4) that the substances and materials consisting of
plant and/or crop residue does not pose a regulatory need, as said substances and materials
do not pose a hazard to human health or the environment, being the mission and purpose for
the creation and existence ofDEQ, as the legislative purpose and intent has been so declared
by the enactment of §39-1 02 and 102A, Idaho Code, and consequently the jurisdiction for
the disposal, management, operation, facility, site location and processing activity of any
such materials derived from plant and crop residue substances is both exempted and
specifically excluded from any regulatory authority under the Solid Waste Management
Rules of DEQ, as well is any other materials and products identified within

§22-

103(3),(4),(9),(10), and (27),/daho Code, and otherwise managed (§22-110(1),/daho Code)
by the Idaho Department of Agricultural, as may be located upon any real property in the
State of Idaho; that if agricultural materials and substances come under and within the
jurisdiction of any Agency, it would fall within and under the provisions of The Right to
Farm Act, as well as The Plant and Soil Amendment Act, as enacted by the Legislature of
the State of Idaho; that said DEQ, being another legislatively created agency of the State of
Idaho, has no jurisdiction or authority to regulate those specifically defined materials and
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substances or assume, by delegation or sub-delegation, any such regulatory authority that is
identified in those Acts, assuming such Acts have any application, and notwithstanding the
above enactments, such plant and crop residue material substances are specifically exempted
from the regulatory capacity and authority of the DEQ Rules as specifically promulgated by
said DEQ as set forth hereinabove and hereinafter, in accordance with the provisions of the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act; that consequently, as a matter of Idaho law, said DEQ
does not have the fundamental standing to assert a claim of regulatory capability to manage
and control said materials and substances (plant and crop residue materials) at issue in this
First Amended Complaint, as said Agency cannot regulate said materials and substances
within this State; that absent the requisite standing requirement, said DEQ cannot secure any
fmm of relief from this court upon this amended complaint, and said amended complaint is
subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), LR.C.P. for failure to state a claim upon
which any relief can be granted; that said Defendants are furthermore entitled to the entry of
a judgment upon the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), I.R.C.P.; that Defendants are entitled
to a dismissal of this action upon the grounds Plaintitf lacks the standing required under
Idaho Law to initiate any suit against said Defendants in any effort to redress any claimed
violation of any regulatory provisions of solid waste materials, as said substances and
materials are specifically excluded and exempted from regulatory enforcement or imposition
of such rules within their agency; that the State of Idaho, Department of Environmental
Quality, has no jurisdiction over the subject matter identified and described in their First
Amended Complaint.
SIXTH DEFENSE
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As and for an affirmative defense, these Defendants would assert that all substances
located upon "the Property", as identified in the amended complaint, are excluded and
exempt from any regulatory authority of DEQ; that there docs exist a statutory definition of
"solid waste", contained in Title 39, concerning Health and Safety, Chapter 1, concerning
environmental quality-Health, specifically identified in §39-1 03(13), Idaho Code, wherein
that definition provides:

"(13) "Solid waste" means garbage, refuse, radionuclides and

other discarded solid materials, including solid waste materials resulting from industrial,
commercial and agricultural operations and from community activities but does not
include solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage or other significant pollutants in
water resources, such as silt, dissolved or suspended solids in industrial waste water
effluents, dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or other common water
pollutants.";(Emphasis ours)
That "solid waste'' , by such broad definition, does include "agricultural operations" within
the scope of solid waste substances; that the promulgated rules of DEQ, regarding their
regulatory definition of "solid waste", contained and defined within the Idaho
Administrative Code, under DEQ's "Solid Waste Management Rules", specifically defines
"solid waste", under IDAPA 58 .01 .06 005. 44. To be:

Solid Waste. Any garbage or

refuse, sludge from a waste water treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air
pollution control facility and other discarded material including solid, liquid, semi-solid,
or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations and from community activities, but does not include solid or

dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved material in irrigation return
flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under Section
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402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source,
special nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (68 Stat 923). (Emphasis ours)
That the phrase '"agricultural operations" is again contained within that broad
scope of solid waste substances addressed, and the use of such a broad definition created
the need to specifically address what substances were not to be regulated, and to
accomplish that, it was then defined within the "Solid Waste Management Rules" of
DEQ, specifically identified substances to be excluded to what was broadly defined as
"solid waste", and were delineated as wastes not regulated by DEQ under their rules ,
and that gave rise to the creation of those specitic exclusions and exemptions, created
within IDAPA 58.01.06., which are identified in IDAPA 58.01.06.001, regarding the
TITLE AND SCOPE, sub-part 03., wherein it specifically defines wastes not regulated
under these rules , to include certain enumerated substances, wherein it states, under subpart 03.b.: These rules do not apply to the [ollowing solid waste .. .ii. Manures and crop
(plant) residues ultimately returned to the soils at agronomic rates; and ... iii. Any
agricultural solid waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the
Idaho Department of Agriculture. Furthermore, within that Idaho Administrative Code,
as it regards "APPLICABILITY", under 58.01.06.004, it specifically states:
These rules apply to all solid waste unless excluded by Subsection 001.03.
That by definition, and specific exclusion and exemption, DEQ does not regulate
certain identified substances, as provided for under their Solid Waste Management Rules
adopted and promulgated within the Idaho Administrative Code for the regulatory
enforcement of regulated solid wastes, as those DEQ "Solid Waste Management Rules",
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have specifically exempted and excluded those substances composed of grass clippings

and leaves, as they constitute plant and/or crop residue, and/or may otherwise be
regulated by rules that may be adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
That as a further affirmative defense regarding the creation, adoption, and
enactment of the "Solid Waste Management Rules by DEQ, these Defendants would
raise, as an affirmative defense to all allegations set forth in this amended complaint, that
neither Defendant herein was ever notified by the Department of Environmental Quality,
or any other agency, as to the proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of any "solid
waste management rules" that purportedly was undertaken in 2003; that such notification
is required under Idaho law as it relates to any rule to be promulgated in accordance with
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act; that said requirement is mandated by Title 67,
Chapter 52, Statutes of the State of Idaho, specifically §67-5222, Idaho Code, wherein it
provides that notification must be provided by the agency or agencies to all interested
persons, to afford any interested person (which these Defendants consider themselves to

be) the reasonable opportunity to submit their views, data, and arguments regarding any
such proposal(s) relating to any such rule(s), and the agency shall receive comments from
such interested persons for not less than twenty-one (21) days after the date of publication
of the notice of any proposed rulemaking; that no form of notification, either through
bulletin publication or direct mailing to these Defendants, has ever been received or
confirmed to have been sent or published, from which to allow any expression of views
to the agency prior to any proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of same.
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EIGHTH DEFENSE
That as a further affirmative defense, these Defendants would assert that there
exists certain constitutional requirements, to the effect that all "Acts" that are to be
promulgated are to be plainly worded, and shall avoid, whenever possible, the use of
technical terms; that because of, and by virtue of, Article Ill, Section 17, Idaho
Constitution, it appears to have become necessary for this IDAPA Rule, identified as the
"Solid Waste Management Rules", to establish specific exceptions and exclusions in
order to avoid corifusion by the uncertain use of complex and technical terms, and was
provided for in their IDAPA solid waste rule criteria, so as to avoid that which could be
considered a complex, convoluted and potentially inconsistent enactment regarding the
intended broad range and scope of "solid waste", and the intended regulatory authority of
DEQ regarding substances and solid waste materials, and to avoid such potential
ambiguity in relation to what is to be regulated as a "solid waste" substance under their
rules; that the formation of specific exemptions and exclusions was essential to prevent
any subjective interpretation of the waste management rules, as it may relate to certain
common composted materials, posing no harm or danger to human health or
environmental quality.
NmETH DEFENSE
That as a further affirmative defense, these Defendants would assert the
application of Title 39, Chapter 1, I. C. §39-108(4), which therein provides to the effect
that no civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover for any alleged
violation of any provision of the environmental quality statutes, Idaho Environmental
Protection and Health Act, identified in Chapter I, Title 39, Statutes of the State of Idaho,
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or any alleged violation of any rule, permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to
Chapter 1, Title 39, more than two (2) years after the Director had knowledge or ought
reasonably to have had knowledge of any alleged violation; that said defense is an
absolute bar to this action brought by the Department of Environmental Quality, as the
Department Director, through its agents and representatives, did know, or should have
known as to and of the presence, activities, and operations of David R. Gibson, doing
business as Black Diamond Compost Products, as these operations and activities have
continuously been in operation and active on this very location and premises since
August, 2004, when Gibson moved his operation from the adjacent operation located less
than 600 feet away from this current operation, where Gibson had his active ongoing
composting operation continuously engaged on the adjacent 20 acre parcel located in the
immediate area from this current location in this Gowen Field Desert Front property, and
the Department of Environmental Quality, as well as its previous Agency activity under
the Department of Health and Welfare, division of environmental quality, were well
aware of Gibson's business activities and operations, as it was continuously in existence
and operating as a composting/processing operation/activity at that location since 1991,
and prior to that location, was in active operation on other properties proximately located
in the same vicinity and area on property owned by the City of Boise, since 1988, and has
been engaged in, and continuously operating a composting business/activity/operations
within the same general vicinity since 1974.
TENTH DEFENSE
As and for an Answer to the allegations set forth and contained in Plaintiff's
amended complaint, these Defendants do respond and allege as follows:
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I.

In response to paragraph I thereof, referenced the Nature of Action, Defendants

would state said allegations constitute a matter or conclusion of law, with respect to the
application the Idaho Environmental Protection and Health Act, as set forth and contained in
§39-IOiet seq, Idaho Code; that the dispute over what has been identified to be grass
clippings and leaves, the materials and substances referred to in the amended complaint,
about which this litigation has identified the only subject matter "observed" upon "the
property" comes under the criteria of either I) crop and plant residue, or 2) an agricultural
solid waste; that none of those materials and substances come within the purview or
jurisdiction of DEQ, as the subject matter about which this dispute seeks to address is
specifically exempted and excluded from any regulatory enforcement or requirements
regarding DEQ jurisdiction or authority under the Idaho Environmental Protection Agency
Act, or that of the Department of Environmental Quality, as delineated in IDAPA 58, Title
01, Chapter 06, 001. 03. (b), (b) ii and (b) iii; 001. 04 (a), 004.; that no hazards are presented
by any "solid waste management activities" purportedly occurring on "the property"
"owned and operated by the Defendants" (owned by and titled to VHS Properties, LLC)
which property is located in Ada County; That Defendants would deny said DEQ has any
jurisdiction or authority to seek any form of civil penalties in any amount, concerning any
activities or presence of said described and identified materials and substances located upon
"the property" described herein, that any such "solid waste" activities are exempt and
excluded from the jurisdiction, authority, and enforcement of any regulatory rules of said
Department of Environmental Quality ( DEQ) and any request for imposition of any such
civil penalties is being made without foundation in fact or in law, and violates the
exclusionary and exempted provisions from said Agency's own rules, as existing through
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the authority under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, under the Idaho
Administrative Code, IDAP A 58, Title I, Ch. 6, wherein it docs provide the specific
exceptions announced in subsections 001.03 and 001.04, setting forth those exceptions,
exemptions, exclusions, and limitations as to those rules and requirements applicable to
"solid waste" and "solid waste management facilities" in Idaho, identifying specifically the
following solid wastes that are not regulated:
.00 I 03. b. ii. manures and crop (plant) residues ultimately returned to the soil at agronomic
rates .
.001 03. b. iii. any agricultural solid waste which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules
adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture .
.001 04. Solid Waste Management Facilities Not Regulated Under These Rules. These
Rules do not apply to the following solid waste management facilities:
.001 04. a. Solid waste management facilities accepting only solid waste excluded by
subsection 001.03.
004. APPLICABILITY. These rules apply to all solid waste, unless excluded by subsection
001.03. (emphasis added to draw attention to the exclusion of the application of Rules)
That any allegations contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response
set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
2.

In response to paragraph 2 thereof, alleging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction,

these Defendants would state that such an allegation of "subject matter jurisdiction" is an
aspect of law, presenting a question of law about which these Parties in this litigation can
neither corifer jurisdiction by their pleadings or by any admissions, nor can the parties waive
jurisdiction, by stipulation or otherwise,

and consequently, any jurisdictional issues

constitute an aspect of law to be determined by the Court, and Defendants contend their
response to the allegation of jurisdiction of the Court would constitute a legal opinion only,
and would neither confer, waive, nor impact any such allegation regarding the question of
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this Court's jurisdiction; that notwithstanding the above statement, these Defendants would
state, based upon information and belief, this Court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction
to render a disposition upon the applicable efiects of the Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act and those IDAPA Rules cited above; that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the
issue whether DEQ does, or does not, have jurisdiction, authority, and regulatory
enforcement capacity over the materials, substances, and such subject matter solid waste
materials and facilities relating to crop and plant residues, ultimately to be returned to the
soil at agronomic rates, and any agricultural solid waste materials and facilities which are
managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture;
that this Court has the jurisdiction to determine the conclusion of law that DEQ lacks the
regulatory capacity and authority to address the solid waste materials, substances, and
facilities as was observed to constitute the subject matter as was identified within the
allegations of this amended complaint; that this Court has the jurisdiction to detennine that
DEQ has no standing or foundation in fact or law from which to initiate this suit, and the
Court would have the subject matter jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of law, DEQ did
not have authority to proceed with this amended complaint upon the merits of the action, as
filed by the party Plaintiff that did not have the requisite standing and required authority to
exercise any regulatory authority; that the District Court has the inherent authority to dismiss
the action as a result of Plaintiff's lack of standing to seek any regulatory enforcement of
provisions regarding certain materials, substances, and facilities that are specifically

exempted and excluded from application thereof, as delineated within the IDAPA Rules as
were promulgated by DEQ, the effects of which precludes and pre-empts the Agency from
engaging in or any attempted engagement in the regulatory enforcement of DEQ Rules
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regarding such described materials, substances, facilities, persons, and real property upon
which the same is located, as it has been so identified and described within Plaintiff's
amended complaint; that said Court has the jurisdiction and authority to determine such
attempted regulation is not within the purview ofDEQ'sjurisdiction or authority to regulate
such subject matter as identified and described in this action, and that said amended
complaint is subject to dismissal as a result thereof. That any allegation contained within
said paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
3.

In response to paragraph 3 thereof, regarding further matters of jurisdiction of the

court, Defendants would state this allegation is a question of law as well, as was the
preceding allegation; that Defendants reserve their response to relate to questions and
allegations of fact, not as to matters law; that said Defendants are (theoretically) not
qualified to render a legal opinion as to such allegations of law; however, Defendants would
state that David R. Gibson is an individual, residing in Boise, Ada County Idaho; that at
times he did, or still does, refer to one of his business entity or entities to be that of Black
Diamond Compost Products; that said Gibson has historically been engaged in the
production, analysis, utilization and development of crop and plant residues for eventual use
as a humus material and substance for return to the soil, and has engaged in the production
of same through an aging and decomposition process, with the intent to ultimately return
said materials and substances to the soils, at agronomic rates; that the real property upon
which the subject matter of said crop and plant residue, and any agricultural solid waste is
located, is that real property owned by VHS Properties, LLC, referred to as "the property" in
the amended complaint; that to any extent any individual Defendant is, has, or are
transacting any business within the State ofldaho, it has not given rise to any wrongful acts
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or omissions from which to establish any cause of action from the subject matter as
identified and alleged by DEQ in its amended complaint, and no wrongful or unlawful acts
or omissions have occUlTed 'lvithin the State of Idaho. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
4.

In response to paragraph 4 thereof, regarding the issue of venue of the court,

Defendants would state the subject of venue is a question of Jaw, based upon the existence
of certain factors; that Def(mdants would admit "the property" identified in the amended
complaint, upon which the crop and plant residue materials and alleged activity has taken
place, is located in Ada County, Idaho; that said individually named Defendant, David R.
Gibson is a resident of Ada County, Idaho; that Defendants would deny any violations, any
acts, or any omissions have occurred that would give rise to any action to be taken by DEQ
that would be within its jurisdiction or regulatory authority to initiate this action against the
named Defendants.
5.

In response to paragraph 5 thereof, regarding parties to the action, these Defendants,

through their counsel, are aware of certain aspects relating to the establishment of, and the
authorization regarding the Idaho Environmental Protection Health Act, various departments
and agencies relating thereto, and those certain Rules and Regulations regarding the
enforcement of certain duties and obligations within the jurisdiction thereof; that although
these Defendants are not required to render legal opinions as to matters relating to questions
of Jaw in their response, said Defendants would state, through their counsel, that the
Department of Environmental Quality is an executive agency of the State of idaho, to whom
it has been granted certain powers and authority relating to the regulation of certain aspects
of specifically described solid waste, and matters relating to its treatment, not otherwise
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exempted or excluded therefrom, and to the extent so authorized, to establish solid waste

management rules and regulations in relation thereto; that said authority to regulate same is
subject to various limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions, as expressed and as
contained within the rules specifically relating to the Department of Environmental Quality,
as expressed in IDAPA 58.01.06 "Solid Waste Management Rules", which therein
establishes requirements applicable to solid waste and solid waste management facilities in
Idaho, excepting therefrom those specifically exempted by the exclusionary effects of its
subsections 001.03 and 001.04, which exemptions specifically identify manure and crop and
plant residues, ultimately intended for return to the soils at agronomic rates and all
agricultural solid waste materials and substances, which management and regulation is left

to the enforcement of those rules as may be adopted and may be enforced by the Idaho
Department of Agriculture, all of which has before been brought to the attention of DEQ
personnel by previous letter correspondence; that said DEQ has no authority or regulatory
capacity regarding any activity ongoing on "the property" where such plant residue and
agricultural solid waste materials are managed and regulated pursuant to any rules that may
be adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture; that DEQ has no authority to recover
any agency costs, expenses, or attorney fees as may be incurred as a result of this action
against these Defendants, or any activity or business operations involving said exempt crop
residue and/or agricultural solid waste materials. That any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
6.

In response to paragraph 6 thereof, regarding parties, Defendants admit David R.

Gibson does reside in Ada County, Idaho.
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7.

In response to paragraph 7 thereof, regarding parties, Defendants would state David

R. Gibson does have a business known generally as Black Diamond Compost Products; that
said Defendant has been engaged in composting plant residue materials in Ada County since
1974, and has utilized such plant residues located on "the property" since 2004, in
association with his composting activities, which has continuously taken place in this
general area referred to as the Gowen Field Desert Front area, since 1988.
8.

In response to paragraph 8 thereof, regarding parties, Defendants would state that

VHS Properties, LLC , is a limited liability company, formed under and pursuant to the laws
of the state of Idaho, doing business in Ada County, and is the deeded and titled owner of
"the property" identified in the amended complaint, and has its principal business address at
1900 W. Main Street, Boise, Idaho, 83702; that it is "the property" upon which the
identified and referred substances and materials described in the amended complaint were
;;observed", and which property is exclusively owned by VHS Properties, LLC. That any
allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with this response as set forth
hereinabove is herewith denied.
9.

In response to paragraph 9 thereof, regarding parties, these Defendants would state

that §39-1 03(9), Idaho Code, has no reference to the definition of ;;persons", as that code
section subpart refers to ;;laboratory", which has no relevance herein; that subpart (II) of
that code section refers to ;;persons", and would appear to include these named Defendants
as within that definition; that these Defendants, however, are not qualified to render legal
opinions, and since the correct subpart was not alleged in the amended complaint, these
Defendants would re-state the response as set forth in paragraph 8 hereinabove, as though
said response was set forth in full herein.
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I 0.

In response to paragraph I 0 thereof, regarding the facts as being alleged, these

Defendants possess no personal knowledge regarding any attempt made by DEQ personnel
to inspect any "facility" located on a portion of "the property" as so described to be parcel
number S 1505220000, located in Boise, Idaho, and referred to in the amended complaint as
being "the property"; that the Ada County Assessor's Office does identiJY various parcels of
real property, for their records and convenience, with a tax parcel reference number for tax
assessment purposes; that tax parcel number S1505220000 is a tax reference only, not a
legal description; that the further reference, as contained in the amended complaint, to a
parcel described to be the NWI/4 of Sec. 5, T. 2N, R. 2E, Boise Meridian, would serve to
identiry a parcel of property that consists of one hundred sixty (160) acres in size; that VHS
Properties, LLC, does own that described parcel of land, and such described acreage is
contained within yet additionally described parcels of real property, all of which is owned
by said VHS Properties, LLC, which description is contained within that deed dated July 4,
2012, and subsequently recorded in the Ada County recorder's office; that Defendants
would further respOnd by stating that if any attempted inspection was undertaken on March
29, 2013, the DEQ personnel involved in such an attempted inspection would have observed
materials located thereon that were comprised solely of plant residue and/or otherwise
considered to be agricultural solid waste materials, none of which come under the purview
of any DEQ Rules for regulatory authority, as such materials are specifically exempted and
excluded from their jurisdiction of regulated enforcement; that said materials are subject

on! y to the rules adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, and not within any
authority allowing DEQ to inspect or impose any regulatory compliance mandates
concerning the existence or management thereof; that pursuant to IDAPA Rules of the
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Department of Environmental Quality, as contained in IDAPA 58.01.06 entitled "Solid
Waste Management Rules" the above cited exceptions, exemptions, limitations, and
exclusions are specifically set forth therein, and are restated by these Defendants to be part
of this response.
11.

In response to paragraph II thereof, these Defendants admit same; that the

ownership of "the property" as identified in the amended complaint, has been owned by
VHS Properties, LLC, since July 4, 2012, and Vernon K. Smith, Jr. has been the managing
agent of said entity.
12.

In response to paragraph 12 thereof, these Defendants possess no knowledge from

which to formulate a factual response, and therefore must respectively deny same. That
notv.ithstanding said lack of knowledge, these Defendants would state that ifthere were any
attempted inspection of "the property" conducted by DEQ personnel, to the extent they
were at a location, and in such close proximity to "the property", so as to determine that no
persons were present at or on "the property", then any such DEQ personnel would have
observed the materials located on "the property", and would have been able to confirm said
materials consisted solely of plant residue and/or otherwise considered as agricultural solid
waste materials, a11d therefore not subject to any regulatory authority of the State of Idaho,
Department of Environmental Quality; that any observation to confirm the absence of
personnel on site would render a clear observation that all said materials, facility, premises,
and plant residue/solid waste agricultural materials operation, were unconditionally exempt
and excluded from any regulation or inspection by said DEQ personnel.
13.

In response to paragraph 13 thereof, these Defendants would state, given the

allegation that said DEQ personnel did observe "large piles and windrows o[ grass
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cliPPings, and leaves" located upon "the property", they would have had a sufficient factual
basis from which to conclude their "solid waste management rules" did not apply, as they
contain specific exemptions of regulation and enforcement, to which effect they have been
previously so infonned and advised by Mr. Gibson, and any materials they observed were
only plant residue materials, none of which is subject to regulation by DEQ, and
specifically outside the scope of any regulatory authorization of DEQ, as so defined and
contained within their solid waste management rules.
14.

In responseto paragraph 14 thereof, these Defendants have no infonnation from

which to fonnulate an opinion as to the extent of the observation alleged to have taken place
by the Department staff personnel, and absent the establishment of any measurements
conducted by any mechanical, photographic, or physical process, undertaken to determine
any quantities, volumes, or amounts of the accumulated grass clippings, leaves, and any
other alleged organic materials purportedly observed, it would require speculation and
conjecture for these Defendants to respond, and therefore Defendants would respectfully
deny same.
15.

In response to paragraph 15 thereof, Defendants would state the allegations

contained therein are conjecture, not allegations of fact; that if no one was present on "the
property", the observation from which conjecture is being expressed as to any "activity" to
that of "consisting of composting", or of "large volumes of solid waste", or for "resale" to
the "public" as "compost or humus" is speculation and conjecture only, and is herewith
denied; that notwithstanding said conjecture and speculation, the "department staff' has
purportedly reported to have observed what they described to be "grass clippings, leaves and
other organic material", comprising what they describe to be the substance and composition
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of "solid waste"; that by definition, such composition is plant residue and necessarily an
agricultural solid waste material, and reasonably should be known by DEQ personnel to be
managed and regulated, if at all, pursuant to the rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture only; that DEQ, in any event, does not have anv iurisdiction or authority to
regulate "large volumes ofsolid waste for the purpose ofresale to the public as compost or
humus" and by definition, under their own established rules, they have no right of inspection

or enforcement, as said materials are unconditionally exempted and excluded from their
jurisdiction and right of regulatory enforcement. Any allegation contained within said
paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
16.

In response to paragraph 16, these Defendants deny same: that David R. Gibson has

a business and an activity associated with ventures that engage in composting activities of
crop and plant residue materials, and he does utilize his business name, at times, as referred
to in the amended complaint. That by prior discussions, the plant residue materials located
on "the property" were intended for eventual return to soils on the surrounding 520 acres
owned by VHS Properties, LLC, being the contiguous parcel to "the property", which is a
portion thereof, that the use of said materials and substances will be applied in conjunction
with that intended agricultural pursuit. Any allegation contained within said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
17.

In response to paragraph 17 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson

did file of record with the Secretary of State, State of Idaho, an assumed business name in
years past, regarding certain other activities located on other properties, identifYing one of
his business activities as being that of Black Diamond Compost Products; that in what
fashion the "Department staff became aware the facility was operated" under that name is
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an assumption and conjecture, as DEQ had not identified in their allegations the source of
that awareness from which that assertion is based, and absent a factual allegation to that
effect, Defendants cannot engage in speculation, assumption and conjecture, and Defendants
respectfully must deny same.
18.

In response to paragraph 18 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson,

in his personal capacity, received a letter from DEQ, the content of which letter speaks for
itself; that the letter made reference to "solid waste" and to DEQ regulations; however the
letter failed to correctly cite any jurisdiction or authority from which said agency was
empowered to regulate such materials located on "the property"; that DEQ has no authority,
jurisdiction or regulatory capacity to seek to impose any regulatory compliance upon any
property, premises or facility regarding the plant residue or any agricultural solid waste
materials that are to be regulated only pursuant to any rules adopted by the Department of
Agricultural. That David R. Gibson is registered and is licensed with the Department of
Agriculture, regarding any management, operation, or production of any plant residue and
agricultural solid waste materials for return to the soils, and such materials, as located on
"the property", and as described in the amended complaint, is unconditionally exempted and
excluded from any regulatory efforts or objectives undertaken by said DEQ. Defendants
deny any allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with this response.
19.

In response to paragraph 19 thereof, Defendants would state that on April 10,2013,

DEQ personnel met with David R. Gibson, during which discussion Mr. Gibson reminded
DEQ as to the specific exemptions and exclusions to their regulatory capacity, and were
thereupon put on notice DEQ had no regulatory authority to engage in any activities to
require any inspection or coordination with them, or compliance with any DEQ rules and
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regulations. That during the conversation, DEQ personnel acknowledged the pre-emptive
and exclusionary effects contained within their own rules, but then chose to falsely represent

to Mr. Gibson that it was their belie( the Department of Agriculture had authorized DEQ to
regulate such agricultural solid waste materials for them; that such a representation was
utterly false at the time it was made, and constitute a fraudulent and complete fabrication at
the time it was made, as no such delegation or sub-delegation of regulation had ever taken
place at that time, or even shortly thereafter, and if not a grossly careless and reckless
statement, was a blatant fabrication as to the state of the regulatory authority regarding such
materials and substances; that Mr. Gibson immediately confronted their callous
misstatement of authority when told of such misrepresentation, and Mr. Gibson demanded
evidence of any such transfer, delegation, or sub-delegation of authority or any substitution
of rules of application; that the DEQ personnel retracted their false statement, and
acknowledged their error, and then submitted an email to Mr. Gibson, at his request, to
confirm their "mistake" of assumed authority, despite the lack of any legal basis for any
delegation or sub-delegation by any agency, regarding their statutorily created authority, to
be undertaken by another agency, either for creation of or the enforcement of that agency's
regulatory authority.
20.

In response to paragraph 20 thereof, these Defendants would state that David R.

Gibson notified DEQ personnel as to their lack of authority and specifically cited the
exclusions and exemptions in the regulatory provisions to them, citing the Department's
own regulations promulgated under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, and the solid
waste management rules and regulations, the effect of which was deemed to constitute
closure of the subject, upon the email being the concluding discourse between them. That
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any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth
hereinabove is herewith denied.
21.

In response to paragraph 21 thereof, these Defendants would state a letter of May 8,

2013, was written to and received by Mr. Gibson, the content of which speaks for itself; that
no further response was perceived by Mr. Gibson to be required, as the Department's lack of
authority and regulatory capacity had become self-evident by the discussions and
communications conducted with DEQ personnel prior to that, all of which was made known
to the Department personnel who had engaged in the discussions with Mr. Gibson initially;
that the matter was deemed closed. That any allegation contained in said paragraph,
inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
22.

In response to paragraph 22 thereof, these Defendants would state the letter of July

31, 2013, sent by DEQ to David R. Gibson by certified mail, the contents of which does
speak for itself, contains reference to "notice of violation", the entire substance of which
exceeded the jurisdiction and authority of DEQ, and was regarded as meaningless, an
abusive and a willful disregard of DEQ's own limitations and exclusionary provisions
within their Rules, and the letter was regarded as erroneous and void, of no force or effect,
as there was a complete lack of any enforceable capacity or lawful issuance, and was
believed to be issued either in error, as a result of what was assumed to be the involvement
of uninformed DEQ personnel, unfamiliar with their own exemptions and exceptions within
their rules and regulations and the limitations set forth therein, or was a malicious effort to
assume regulatory authority that would never be given to them by the Department of
Agriculture, and if ever given would not be a constitutional sub-delegation of authority by
one agency to another, and would not, in any event, alter the clear exemption referring to
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plant and crop residue materials. Any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent
with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
23.

In response to paragraph 23 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson

did receive the certified mail as identified above, and he deemed it to be erroneous, void,
and unenforceable, in excess of any authority or jurisdiction of DEQ, and was issued in
error, out of ignorance, or a malicious attempt at a "power grab", an event that should be
chastised in any judicial review; that Mr. Gibson deemed the matter closed and declined to
participate in any further discussions or conference gatherings, which to him would only
result in a need to reiterate the exemptions and exclusions that he before brought to the
attention of other DEQ personnel in previous discussions, and no recognition of any
regulatory authority would ever be acknowledged; that Gibson would not consent to any
waiver to any of the exclusionary provisions and qualification of the exempt status of the
materials and substances located on "the property" and DEQ's complete lack of jurisdiction
or authority to proceed further, or in the first instance.
24.

In response to paragraph 24 thereof, these Defendants would state David R. Gibson

relied upon the exemptions, exclusions, exceptions and limitations identified in the IDAPA
Rules that specifically pre-empted the involvement of DEQ; that Gibson made clear his
position to the DEQ personnel to whom he spoke to previously, and he before expressed no
desire to waive any exempt status, and declined to participate in any further discussions with
any DEQ officials trying to usurp authority from another State Agency; that there was no
basis in fact or any foundation in law to support any application of the DEQ solid waste
management Rules, as they were specifically excluded from regulation, both as to
Agricultural solid waste materials and as to crop and plant residues, and no basis in fact or
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law existed to support any claim to a right of regulatory enforcement or to claim any
violation existed, and in the absence of any right of application or regulatory enforcement,
there existed no need to discuss or to "resolve any conditions" over which DEQ had no
authority, and the matter was deemed close for all purposes. That any allegation contained
within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith
denied.
TENTH DEFENSE
As and for answer to the allegations set forth and contained in Count One of
Plaintiffs amended complaint, alleging a violation of IDAPA 58.01.06.012, Defendants do
herewith respond and allege as follows:
25.

In answer to paragraph 25 thereof, these Defendants would restate their responses to

the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs, therein alleged to be paragraphs "127 of this Complaint", but actually paragraph 25 means to allege paragraphs "1- 24 of this
Complaint" as the proper sequencing would suggest, and those responses are herewith
incorporated herein as though set forth and alleged in full herein.
26.

In answer to paragraph 26 thereof, these Defendants would state such allegation is a

reference to a matter of law and not an allegation of fact; that these Defendants are not
required to render opinions in the nature of legal conclusions, but in a good faith attempt to
respond to such matters of law, Defendants would state, through their counsel, that § 39105(2) Idaho Code, is a statute contained within Title 39, Chapter 1, Statutes of the State of
Idaho, regarding environmental quality and health; that §39-1 05,I.C. relates to powers and
duties of the director; that §39-1 05 (2),I.C. relates to the formulation and recommendation
by the director to the board as to the implementation of rules necessary to deal with
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problems relating to water and air pollution, solid waste management and disposal,
licensure, and certification requirements, and confirming therein such rules may be limited
as to times, places, circumstances, or conditions; that said statute was enacted by the
legislature of the State of Idaho to authorize ±be promulgation of rules by the director,
relating to ±be subject of solid waste, its management and its disposal; that said director did
recommend such promulgation of Solid Waste Management Rules, which were
implemented pursuant to and in accordance wifb ±be Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IDAP A) and as previously set forth above, said Rules are specifically and expressly subject
to those limitations, exceptions, exemptions and exclusions identified within those
promulgated rules,. and as referenced hereinabove in this responsive pleading, which are
herewith included in this response as though set forth and alleged in full herein.
27.

In answer to paragraph 27 thereof, fbese Defendants would state said allegation

seeks another opinion as to a matter of law, and does not assert an allegation of fact; that
these Defendants are not required to render legal opinions in ±be nature of legal conclusions,
but in a good faith attempt to respond to such matters of law, Defendants would state,
through fbeir counsel, ±bat§ 39-103(14) Idaho Code, is a statutory provision relating to
specific definitions of certain specified terms, the purpose being to establish ±be meaning to
be applied to the terms used and contained within Chapter I, Title 39, as set forth above;
that said statute contains those various definitions of various terms ±bat pertain to that Act;
that said statutory provision does define solid waste disposal to mean the collection, storage,
treatment, utilization, processing or final disposal of solid waste, as it is set forth therein;
±bat such definition is among the other various definitions as arc contained within it, and ±be
terms, such as solid waste, solid waste management, and solid waste disposal, are subject to
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the Solid Waste Management Rules, as promulgated in accordance with IDAPA, and said
Rules specifically relate to solid waste, its disposal, its management and its collection, and
included therein is identified those specific and certain limitations, exceptions, exemptions,
and exclusions, and therein specifically excludes any crop and plant residue materials and
agricultural solid waste, which is to be specifically regulated, if at all, by the Department of

Agriculture; that the materials located on "the property" are subject only, if ever, to the
regulation, licensure and rules of the Department of Agriculture, and not DEQ. That any
allegations contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth
hereinabove, is herewith denied.
28.

In answer to paragraph 28 thereof, these Defendants would restate the response as

set forth and contained in paragraph 27 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in
full herein.
29.

In answer to paragraph 29 thereof, these Defendants would admit same.

30.

In answer to paragraph 30 thereof, these Defendants would state certain IDAPA

Rules exist, as proposed, recommended, and promulgated; that there exists Solid Waste
Management Rules, about which DEQ has made reference; that these Rules contain certain
definitions, and most importantly, do specifically address certain express limitations,
exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions regarding the jurisdiction or right of regulatory
enforcement, as identified therein, and said IDAP A Rules do specifically pre-empt any
regulatory enforcement and regulatory authority of DEQ with respect to the exercise of any
activity, control or enforcement of those rules in regard to those exempt and excluded
materials and substances as have been addressed herein, and as to the location thereof on
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"the property". That any allegations contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the
response as set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
31.

In answer to paragraph 31 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response as

set forth in paragraph 30 hereinabove, as though said response was set forth in full herein.
32.

In answer to paragraph 32 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

appears to be a "scientific conclusion", as opposed to an allegation of fact; that David R.
Gibson is likely qualified to render a scientific opinion, given his knowledge of the subject
and the process regarding these crop and plant residue materials, but the other Defendant
nan1ed in the amended complaint may not be as qualified to render such an opinion beyond
a general understanding as it relates to the "composting process" of plant residue materials
and/or agricultural materials; that upon information, belief, and the general knowledge and
experience as to such a biological process, as such information is made available from both
technical and traditional subject matter research, these Defendants would state, in general
terms, and upon the unique knowledge of David R. Gibson, that "composting" is a
biological, and typically, a natural occurring process, whereupon certain bacteria,
temperatures, moistures, elements, nutrients, enzymes, and microorganisms engage in a
process within a combination of natural environmental conditions that, over a period of
time, may result in a decomposition process of various organic substances and materials,
some or all of which may then be reintroduced into the soil, as a soil amendment for plant
growth, or onto plant foliage, applied as a plant foliar, utilized to enhance plant foliage
production and bloom development.

That any allegation contained in said paragraph,

inconsistent with the response as set forth hereinabove is herewith denied.
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33.

In answer to paragraph 33 thereof, these Defendants would state there are certain

rules and regulations apparently promulgated regarding various solid waste management
practices, including those certain identified facilities, the content of which speaks for itself,
but these "solid waste management rules" being the basis of their regulatory authority, have
no application to any of those materials, substances and their location on "the property",
given the "observation" from which the facts and circumstances are being identified and
alleged in the amended complaint; that the DEQ staff personnel claim an "observation" to
be that of "grass clippings and leaves", clearly materials comprised of crop and plant
residue, and the "observed" location being that as situated on "the property", provide no
basis for the imposition of any such rules or regulatory enforcements, as a matter of Idaho
law, due, including but not limited to, the pre-emptive effects of the limitations, exceptions,
exemptions, and exclusions contained within said promulgated rules and regulations. Any
allegation contained within said paragraph, inconsistent with the response as set forth
hereinabove, is herewith denied.
34.

In answer to paragraph 34 thereof, these Defendants would state said IDAPA Rules

contain certain definitions, as do the statutory provisions; that the content of these IDAPA
Rules include not only definitions, but also identify certain limitations, exceptions,
exemptions and exclusions, thereby impacting the application of any such regulatory
enforcement of the rules or definitions set forth therein, and said IDAPA Rules specifically
exempt "the property" and the substances and materials located thereon, as it consists solely
of crop and plant residue, and constitutes agricultural solid waste that is exclusively
regulated by the Department of Agriculture, pre-empting any solid waste management rules,
such as those relating to garbage from household refuse and hazardous waste materials
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within IDAPA, and any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with the
response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith denied.
35.

In answer to paragraph 35 thereof, these Defendants would restate their response as

set forth and contained in paragraph 14 above, as though said response were set forth and
alleged in full herein.
36.

In answer to paragraph 36 thereof, these Defendants would state this allegation

invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, which Defendants are not
required to render opinions on such matters; that in a good faith attempt to address such a
matter of statutory interpretation, these Defendants would state, through counsel, that any
"classification" of a category or "tier" reference to a solid waste site, facility, or operation or
disposal process, regardless of the reference to a "Tier II" processing facility, the right of
regulatory eriforcement remains subject to the limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and

exclusions as contained within the IDAPA Rules, as it has been so identified within several
of the responses hereinabove set forth, and any such reference, whether or not it is deemed
to be an invitation to render a legal conclusion, the allegation remains irrelevant to what is
the issue of the materials, substances, and their location on "the property" referred to in this
amended complaint, and Defendants therefore must respectfully deny same.
37.

In answer to paragraph 37 thereof, these Defendants would deny any relevancy or

application of!DAPA Rule 58.01. 06.012 to any aspect of the materials, substances, and the
location reference to "the property" as previously identified herein, and any such "facility"
that processes crop and plant residue waste, is exempted, and any agricultural solid waste is
to be regulated, if at all, exclusively by the Department of Agriculnrre, and is also
unconditionally exempted from application of DEQ's regulatory provisions, and the
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enforceability or applicability of any such rules or "requirements", as they have been preempted, as a matter oflaw, and such allegation, inviting an opinion as to such a question of
law, or the interpretation and application of such a "Tier II" requirement, is irrelevant to the
issue and subject matter of this Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny
same.
38.

In answer to paragraph 38 thereof, these Defendants understand the IDAPA

provision referred to in this paragraph has a definition regarding "owner" of a "facility", and
these Defendants would therefore restate their response as it is generally contained in
paragraph 3 7 above, and to be of the same effect as the above denial, since the IDAPA
provisions, whether· it be that of the definition of "facility" or that of a definition of an
"owner" of a facility, the application is irrelevant to the issue and subject matter of this
amended complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
39.

In answer to paragraph 39 thereof: these Defendants understand the IDAPA

provision referred to in this paragraph has a definition regarding "operator" of a "facility",
and these Defendants would therefore restate their response as it is generally contained in
paragraphs 3 7 and 38 above, and to be of the same effect as the above denials, since the
IDAP A provisions, whether it be of the definition of "facility", or "owner", or that of a
definition of an "operator" of a facility, the application is irrelevant to the issue and subject
matter of this Complaint, and these Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
40.

In answer to paragraph 40 thereot: Defendants deny same.

41.

In answer to paragraph 41 thereof, these Defi:mdants would state David R. Gibson is

involved in a process that relates to the transition and decomposition of crop and plant
residues, into a soil amendment, resulting in the reintroduction of the materials back to the
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plants and soils, accomplished at agronomic rates, being comprised solely of agricultural
solid waste materials, managed and regulated, if at all, exclusively pursuant to the rules
adopted by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, none of which comes under the
jurisdiction, control, supervision, or regulation of DEQ jurisdiction. That any allegation
contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with response as set forth hereinabove, is herewith
denied.
42.

In answer to paragraph 42 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, which Defendants are not
required to render opinions on such matters; that in a good faith attempt to address such an
IDAPA provision and its application, and to the issue of whether Defendants need to submit
any documentation to demonstrate compliance to be received by the Department,
concerning a facility alleged to be in operation on "the property", these Defendants would
state, through cow1Sel, that the IDAPA provisions, relating to "Tier II" solid waste facilities,
are not applicable to these Defendants, or to the materials, or to the substances, or to the
location described to be "the property", as said IDAPA Rules and provisions relating to the
requirements of documentation and compliance have been pre-empted by the specific
limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions within the solid waste management rules
pertaining to solid waste facilities, treatments, disposal, and management, when the subject
matter of which involves crop and plant residue, and/or agricultural solid waste materials, as
the Department of Agriculture has the exclusive jurisdiction and right of regulation and
enforcement thereof as it regards any agricultural solid waste materials, as identified and set
forth above, and Defendants therefore respectfully deny same.
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43.

In answer to paragraph 43 thereof, these Defendants would state said allegation

again invites a response to a matter that pertains to a question of law, as previously
requested above, regarding variously identified documentation required to demonstrate
compliance in certain waste matter environments, and in this instance the reference made is
to that of an "operating Plan" as being among the documentation to contain certain
information, also to be received by the Department, each of which concern aspects referring
to "Tier II" facilities; that these Defendants would therefore restate their response as
contained in paragraph 42 above, as it is understood the allegations similarly are addressing
"forms of documentation" required in relation to "Tier II" solid waste facilities, subject to
the regulatory authority of DEQ, which subject matter is irrelevant to the substance of the
Complaint herein, as set forth in Defendants' response to paragraph 42 above.
44.

In answer to paragraph 44 thereof, these Defendants would state they have no

obligation to submit any documentation regarding or concerning any IDAPA regulatory
compliance provisions or rules; that Defendants are not subject to any regulatory
enforcement by DEQ requirements or approvals regarding any agricultural solid waste
facilities comprised of crop and plant residue materials whatsoever, as those previously
identified Rules relating to solid waste management of solid waste facilities contains
specific limitations, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions set forth within the IDAP A
Rules, and/or are also pre-empted by the exclusive authority of the Department of
Agriculture, relating to solid waste management and facilities with respect to agricultural
solid waste substances, as set forth above.
45.

In answer to paragraph 45 thereof, Defendants would state they have not submitted

any "operating plan" for approval, and will not submit any plan to any unauthorized agency,
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as it relates to an operation of an exempt processing facility on "'the property"; that
Defendants have no obligation to do; that Gibson has been engaged in the process of crop
and plant residue . decomposition, development of soil amendments, and plant foliar
materials, since his involvement in that agricultural activity and operation(s) starting in the
1970's, and is extensively familiar with the exempt status, or otherwise the exclusive
regulation vested in the Department of Agriculture, as it regards agricultural solid waste
substances, materials and locations of processing and decomposition of same, and he is well
versed as to the pre-emptive effects in the subsequently enacted and promulgated DEQ solid
waste management rules and all IDAPA provisions regarding such solid waste facilities,
treatment, disposal and management thereof, and the specific exclusions, exceptions,
exemptions, and limitations that are identified and expressly set forth therein and cited
above, and Defendants deny any allegation contained in said paragraph, inconsistent with
the response as set forth hereinabove.
46.

In answer to paragraph 46 thereat; Defendants deny same.

47.

In answer to paraf,'faph 47 thereof, Defendants deny same.

48.

In answer to paragraph 48 thereof, Defendants deny same.

49.

In answer 1,P paragraph 49 thereof, Defendants deny that DEQ has incurred any

costs, expenses, or attorney fees to which they are entitled to recover; that the prosecution of
this action is not a valid pursuit of any regulatory right vested in DEQ under the IDAPA
Rules and Regulations, or founded in any fact or law, as said processes, facilities, activities,
and operations have been pre-empted and are exempt from the imposition of any DEQ
regulations whatsoever, and the action identified in their Complaint is being pursued by the
Department without any foundation or basis in fact or in law, and said Department could not
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be the prevailing party in this action, and is not entitled to recover any of its expenses, costs,
or attorney fees, if any are incurred by them, as said amended complaint is subject to
dismissal by the Court, as identified hereinabove, and as contained in the prayer for relief as
set forth below.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
That said Defendants do allege, as an affirmative defense, the application of each,
any, every, and all exclusions, exceptions, exemptions, and limitations set forth and
identified in the IDAPA Rules and provisions pertaining to the solid waste facilities,
treatment, disposal and management regulations thereof, specifically including reference as
it is made in IDAP A 58, Title 0 I, Ch. 06, regarding such reference to such solid waste and
the application of those exclusionary effects that crop and plant residue and agricultural
solid waste is excluded from and not regulated under these rules, being 001. 03. b. ii and
iii, which specifically exempts any right of regulatory authority of DEQ regarding the
subject of solid waste comprised of crop and plant residue and/or any agricultural solid
waste materials, subject to being managed and regulated pursuant to those rules adopted by
the Idaho Department of Agriculture.
That any materials found and located upon "the property", and identified in said
amended complaint, is a material and substance consisting and comprised solely of a crop
and plant residue, intended for return to soil as a soil amendment, at agronomic rates, being
the decomposition of grass clippings and leaves, and is specifically excluded from any
enforcement of any regulatory provisions of the Department of Environmental Quality.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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Wherefore, Defendants, having answered the allegations set forth and contained in
Plaintiffs amended complaint, or otherwise having generally denied same, and having set
forth their exempt status from any regulatory enforcement by the Department of
Environmental Quality, do herewith pray for relief and entry ofjudgment as follows:
l. That Plaintiff recover nothing whatsoever by their amended complaint, and that
Plaintiffs amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice, as said Department
has no authority to engage in any regulatory activity concerning the subject
matter materials identified in the amended complaint, or as being located on "the
property", as identified in the amended complaint.
2. That Plaintiffs amended complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
I.R.C.P., as a result of Plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action for which any
relief can be granted, as Plaintiff has no standing to allege a violation of any
IDAPA Rules.
3. That Plaintiffs amended complaint be dismissed as a result of Plaintiffs failure
to establish lawful standing as required under Idaho's established case authority.
4. That Defendants recover all costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in this
matter, pursuant to statute, including, but not limited to §12-117, 12-120, 12121, Idaho Code. and as authorized by Rule 54 I.R.C.P.
5. That these Defendants, or either of them, reserve the right to file a counterclaim
against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), for such causes of
action as may be found to be just and proper under Idaho and/or Federal law.
6. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem to be just and proper in
the premises.
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Dated this!OTH day of February, 2016.

V emon K. Smitb, attorney
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY.CERTIFY That on tbe 10tl' day of February, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of tbe above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

(

(

(

)
)
X

)

)
X

(

)

)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered

V emon K. Smitb
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Electronically Filed
7/28/2017 5:23:54 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintili,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 15-03540

MEMORASNDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO AMMEND
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO
ALLEGE THE APPLICATION
AND EFFECTS OF I.C. §39108(4), TO PRESERVE ISSUES
RAISED FOR DISPOSITION
UPON THE MERITS IN THIS
DISPUTE

COMES NOW The Defendants above named, by and through his attorney of record, Vernon

K. Smith, and do submit this Memorandum in support of the motion filed by Defendants to amend
their answer to Plaintiff's first amended complaint to include the application and effects of the barring
provisions of I. C. §39-1 08(4 ), the efiect of which does bar the Department of Environmental Quality
from bringing this action in the first place, requiring the dismissal of the action.
Amendments to pleadings are to be freely allowed, to provide for all allegations and defenses
that allow justice to be served upon the merits of the case. Rule 15(a)(2), IRCP provides:

(a)

Amendments Before Trial.
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(2)
Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.
Additionally, Rule 15(b)(l)&(2) and (c) IRCP, provides:

(b)

Amendments During and After Trial.

(I)
Based on an Objection at Trial. If, at trial, a party objects that evidence
is not within the issues raised in the pleadings, the court may permit the
pleadings to be amended. The court should freely permit an amendment when
doing so will aid in presenting the merits and the objecting party fails to satisfy
the court that the evidence would prejudice that party's action or defense on the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet
the evidence.

For Issues Tried by Consent. When an issue not raised by the pleadings
(2)
is tried by the parties' express or implied consent, it must be treated in all
respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move, at any time, even after
judgment, to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise
an unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of that issue.
(c)

Relation Back of Amendments.

(I)
When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading
relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A)
back;

the law that provides the applicable statute oflimitations allows relation

(B)
the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out, or attempted to be set out, in the original
pleading; or ....
The issue of the defense and the application of the statutory limitations and barring effects of
the provisions of!. C. §39-108(4) have already and extensively been addressed in this case, as it was
addressed by both parties in the course of their briefing and arguments presented to the court as it
related to the barring effects of that statute in the summary proceedings that were presented and argued
before this court. It was again addressed in Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, to which Defendants ·
responded in detail as to the right to have that defense of!. C. §39-108(4) be an issue in this case. A·
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response to what was before raised as an issue to this Court in the Department's Motion in Limine,
seeking to preclude evidence concerning unplead defenses, confirmed the defense had been
significantly and timely made the subject of application in this case, despite the Court's recent
procedural (Proposed) "Pretrial Order", filed circa March 14, 2017, therein stating the Department's
motion (in limine) is GRANTED, the effect of which is wholly inconsistent with the applicable law
on the subject, as set forth I more detail herein, and as it relates to affirmative defenses, specifically a
statute of limitation and an absolute bar to an action to be brought and tiled by the Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ). The statute is specifically designed to preclude the very filing of
actions for alleged violations, and is an absolute bar to any action that is improperly being filed by
DEQ under I.C. §39-108(4), and as the cited authority contained herein so demonstrates, when an
issue not specifically raised as a defense in a responsive pleading, nonetheless is raised, briefed, with
afiidavits tiled in opposition to such defense, and fully briefed and argued to the Court during
Summary Judgment proceedings that had been brought by DEQ and heard and conducted before the
Court, then such a defense is declared, as a matter of law, to be adequately before the court, and
becomes and remains a viable issue for disposition by this Court, and for review upon appeal of any
decision regarding the same, and the presentation of facts relating to the merits of the statutory defense
and absolute bar to the .civil action and claim brought by DEQ is admissible at the trial, and shall be
included in any disposition by the court.
The Department has chosen to argue that Defendants failed to Raise this absolute bar, or
Affirmative Defense, when the statutory provision was specifically established by the Idaho
Legislature with the specific intent to preclude any civil actions as identified in I.C. §39-1 08(4)
from being filed and pursued. The statutory absolute bar has not been waived or precluded from

application in this dispute, as it was raised and embraced by the Department and argued extensively
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to the court, and during those proceedings, DEQ filed aftidavits from some of their agents who ·
professed ignorance as to the operations of David R. Gibson, despite the fact he has been a very visible
composting activity/operation in the Boise Valley since 1974, and has continuously operated in the
current area of his operations since 1988. That statutory bar was intended as an absolute preclusion
to the filing such a civil action, and procedurally may be viewed more in keeping as a "gatekeeping
pre-requisite" to filing the action, rather than in the context of an affirmative defense, as the statute

(I. C. §39-108(4)) specifically states:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding mav he brought to recover tor a
violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule, permit or
order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than two (2) years
after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge
of the violation. (Emphasis added)

More than an affirmative defense to an action that states a lawful claim, this statute is designed
to announce a preclusionary effect to even the right to file and allege such a violation, and not in the
nature or to the extent of barring recovery, as does traditional affirmative defenses, but in the nature
of precluding the initiation of the action in the first place. It does not just bar an alleged recovery or
relief, it prevents the very assertion of such an allegation. It serves as a bar to preclude even the filing
of the action, not a defense to the right of relief or recovery after the action is filed.
Evidence regarding. the Department's undisputed knowledge of Mr. Gibson's activities.,
operations, and agricultural pursuits in the many years preceding the filing of this civil action are very
relevant to the knowledge known to the Department, both as to when it was but a division of the
Department of Health and Welfare, and since it became an independent Agency under Title 39 ofthe
Idabo Code. Mr. Gibson's operations were specitically and especially known to Mr. Early, an agent
of the current Department (DEQ), as he was personally familiar with Mr. Gibson since his
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involvement in the Supreme Court Opinion that was rendered back in 1995, as well as the extensive
knowledge of the agents/officials that communicated with Mr. Gibson in 1992 through 1997, in their
capacity as agents/officials within the Agency of the division of Environmental Quality, then a .
Division of the Department of Health and Welfare, before becoming a Department of the State of
Idaho, then to become known as the Department ofEnvironmental Quality (DEQ) in2002, and ceased
being merely a Division of the Department of H&W after 2002. Mr. Gibson was operating his
composting activities, as he was before and as he is currently doing, in the immediate area since 1988
on property owned by a municipality, then from 1991 on the 20 acres currently owned by the Merrills
until2004, and since 2004 on this property now identified in the pleadings in this wrongfully initiated
action by DEQ.

These operations and the subsequent communications and awareness of the

Department/Division agents/officials is relevant evidence to be included in the application of this
absolute bar to DEQ's right to even bring this civil action and claim of violation in this dispute.
The concept of a waiver of a defense is initially identified and addressed in Beal v. Griffin.
123 Idaho 445,849 P.2d 118 (Ct.App. 1993), where the "Failure to specifically raise a matter may
constitute a waiver of the defense. See also Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, I 07 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79
(Ct.App.1984). It was stated in Griffin that there was a failure to raise the defense in the answer, and.
the record did not indicate that it was raised specifically in other pleadings. However, the defense
was later asserted at trial and was specifically addressed with implicit consent by the court, a practice
within the court's inherent powers.

See Good v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213

(Ct.App.1986).").
In Fuhriman v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007) ("[T]his
Court has held that an affirmative defense may be raised for the first time on a motion for
summary judgment. Bluestone v. MathewsonL 103 Idaho 453,455,649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982).").
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See also Pa/ferson v. State, Dept. q[Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,256 P.3d 718 (2011) which
states:
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that "[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively" a statute oflimitations defense. This Court has interpreted IRCP
8(c) as requiring affirmative defenses to be plead, but without identifYing the consequences for
failing to do so. Fuhriman v. State, Dep 't of Tramp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, !53 P.3d 480, 483-84
(2007). In Fuhriman, the Court held that the State's failure to raise the affirmative defense of statutory
employer immunity, until filing its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, was
not fatal to that defense. Id. at 804, !53 P.3d at 484. The Court determined that because the
State's memorandum alerted the appellants to the affirmative defense, and the appellants
responded to this argument in reply briefing, as well as in oral argument before the district
court, the defense had not been waived for failing to plead it in the initial answer._Td. See also
Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,455,649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982) (finding no waiver of a
statute offmuds defense where it was raised "for the first time in the summary judgment motion even
though the reply to the counterclaim has been filed.").
Therefore, pursuant to Fuhriman, a party does not waive an affirmative defense for failing to
raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial and the opposing parry has time to
respond in briefing and oral argument. Like it was stated in Fuhriman, IDHW raised its statute of
limitations affirmative defense in its memorandum in support ofity motion (or summary judgment,
and Patterson responded to this defense in her opposition memorandum. Consequently, IDHW
did not waive iLY statute of limitations defense regarding Patterson's IPPEA claim.
!51 Idaho at 316,256 P.3d at 724. Footnote 3 accompanying the above text distinguishes
between unpleaded "claims" and unpleaded "affirmative defenses," therein declaring as follows:
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"Patterson cites Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,443,235 P.3d 387,393 (2010)
for the proposition that unpleaded claims cannot be preserved for appeal. However, Mortensen
clearly addresses claims, rather than affirmative defenses, and this Court has stated that the Fuhriman
and Bluestone cases speak only to 'when an affirmative defense may be properly raised and thus
provides no basis for a different result' regarding a cause of action not raised in the initial pleadings.
Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 178-79, 75 P.3d 733, 739-40 (2003). Thus,

Mortensen is of no consequence to the situation at issue in this case." !51 Idaho at 316n. 3, 256 P .3d
at 724 n. 3.
See also, Tapadeera, LLCv. Knowlton, !53 Idaho 182, !86 n. I, 280 P.3d 685,689 n. I (2012)

("The Knowltons did not allege an affirmative defense in their answer to the second amended
complaint that Tapadeera breached the settlement agreement. However, in Bluestone v. Mathewson,
103 Idaho 453, 455, 649 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1982), we held that an unpled affirmative defense can be
considered i(it is raised in connection with a motion (or summary judgment. ").

In Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,318 PJd 918 (2014), the court stated:
Pursuant to IRCP 8(c), "a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute oflimitations ... and
any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." IRCP 8(c). To set forth a statute
of limitations defense, the party must "state generally that the action is barred, and allege with
particularity the Session Law or the section of the Idaho Code upon wlrich the [party] relies." IRCP
9(h). These pleading requirements, however, do not impose sanctions on a party who fails to abide
by them. As the Court explained in Patterson v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, "Tiris Court has
interpreted IRCP 8(c) as requiring affirmative defenses to be plead, but without identifYing the ·
consequences for failing to do so." 151 Idaho 310, 316, 256 P.3d 718, 724 (2011)(citing Fuhriman
v. Idaho Dep'l ofTramp., 143 Idaho 800,803-04, !53 P.3d480, 483-84 (2007)). Because IRCP 8(c)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEMD ANSWER TO INCLUDE
P. 7
THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ANNOUNCED IN I. C. §39-108(4)

000847

identifies no consequences for failing to plead an affirmative defense, the Court determined that "a

party does not waive an affirmative defense (or (ailing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it
is raised be(ore trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument."
Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934-35, 318 P.3d 918, 924-25 (2014). That case recited the
applicable law that permits the application of such defenses when they are raised and briefed in
summary proceedings, which in this case would be the statutory bar identified in I. C. §39-l 08(4).
The court in the Guzman analysis stated:
Pursuant to IRCP 8(c), "a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations
... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." IRCP 8(c).
To set forth a statute of limitations defense, the party must "state generally that the
action is barred, and allege with particularity the Session Law or the section of the
Idaho Code upon which the [party] relies." IRCP 9(h). These pleading requirements,
however, do not impose sanctions on a party who fails to abide by them. As the Court
explained in Patterson v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, "This Court has
interpreted IRCP 8(c) as requiring affirmative defenses to be plead, but without
identifYing the consequences for failing to do so." !51 Idaho 310,316,256 P.3d 718,
724 (2011) (citing Fuhriman v. Idaho Dep'l of Tramp .. 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, 153
P .3d 480, 483-84 (2007)). Because IRCP 8(c) identifies no consequences for failing
to plead an affirmative defense, the Court determined that "a party does not waive
an affirmative defense (or failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is
raised be(ore trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral
argument." !d. (Emphasis added)
In Fuhriman, supra, 143 Idaho 800,804, !53 P.3d 480,484 (2007), the court determined there
was no waiver of affirmative defense, though it was not raised in the answer, because the Defendant
had alerted the Plaintiffto the defense in the motion for summary judgment that was argued, and
Plaintiff had adequate time to respond and present opposing arguments.
In this case, that is precisely what happened, as the matter was brought to the attention of the court
and DEQ regarding Defendants' belief as to the application and controlling effects of §39-1 08(4) that
was a complete bar to the filing of the action in this case. The statutory bar identified in §39-1 08( 4)
was raised and addressed fully in those summary proceedings conducted on or about November 29,
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2016, during the hearing held at 2:00 p. m. on that date. Defendants' Memorandum filed in Opposition
to Deq's Motion for Summary Judgment made specific and detailed reference to the application and
controlling effects of §39-108(4); it not only was specifically raised in Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to DEQ's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated and filed October 24, 2016, but was
briefed by DEQ in their Reply Memorandum, and furthermore filed responsive affidavits, asserting
that certain of the DEQ agents were not aware of the operation and activity that served as the basis
for the alleged violation being committed by the Defendants. Within Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to DEQ's Motion for Summary Judgment, the specific nature and substance of the subject
matter was addressed as follows:
"To any extent there is to be any regulation, that should be left to the Idaho Department
of Agricultute, all of which before was brought to the attention of DEQ personnel by
previous correspondence, after DEQ personnel observed "large piles and windrows of
grass clippings, and leaves" located upon "the property" in 2013, which had been there
for ten years before, giving rise to the application of I. C. §39-108(4), and in 2013, Mr.
Gibson told them their specific exemptions of regulation had not been changed, and they
had not said one word to him in almost two decades.
It is correct that DEQ personnel did meet with David R. Gibson on April10, 2013,
during which discussion Mr. Gibson reiterated the specific exemptions and exclusions to
their regulatory capacity that had been promulgated (from what he was told) back in 2002.
Mr. Gibson informed DEQ that he was told by past DEQ personnel that he was not under
their jurisdiction to regulate, and that he no longer needed to participate in any annual
inspections or submit to any further permitting process that he participated in back in the
early 1990's, and he was told there would be no more annual inspections back in 1995.
He has never engaged in any permitting, site operation study, or any annual inspections
with DEQ since 1995. DEQ has been put or actual notice of the existence of the operation,
at the very latest, since 1991, and the composting operations of Mr. Gibson has been
ongoing within and upon the Gowen Field Desert Front since 1988, and DEQ has made
no attempt after 1995, until 2013, to engage in any regulatory involvement in Mr.
Gibson's composting operation. There has been no attempt to engage in any inspection or
seek any coordination with Mr. Gibson in any fashion since 1995, and the application of
the statute oflimitations announced in LC. §39-1 08(4) is controlling in this matter, which
statutory provision provides as follows:

(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover for
a violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule, permit
or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than two (2)
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years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had
knowledge of the violation.
That during the conversation with DEQ personnel in 2013, the DEQ personnel
acknowledged the existence of the pre-emptive and exclusionary effects contained within
their management rules, and as they acknowledged that concept in their discussion, those
officials then chose to represent to Mr. Gibson that it was their belief the Department of
Agriculture had authorized DEQ to now regulate these agricultural solid waste materials
for them. There was no such delegation or sub-delegation of regulatory authority in
existence revealed to Mr. Gibson by IDOA, when that representation was made, and Mr.
Gibson then conferred with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), and told no
such sub-delegation ever occurred. Mr. Gibson then confronted DEQ thereafter,
confronting them as to their misstatement of authority with that misrepresentation, and
Mr. Gibson then r~quested "evidence" of any such delegation, or sub-delegation or right
of authority from IDOA, or the existence of any substitution of rules for application to his
exempted operation, as he understood the 2003 adoption to exclude, and upon his
insistence, the DEQ personnel retracted their statement, and acknowledged their error,
and submitted an email to Mr. Gibson, to confirm their "mistake" of assumed authority.
DEQ thereafter declined to identifY any other basis for any such claim to regulate his
operation, and none was ever thereafter forthcoming.
Mr. Gibson specifically notified DEQ personnel about his awareness of the cited
exclusions and exemptions in the regulatory provisions of what had been adopted in 2003,
and the effect of that dialogue was thought to have brought closure to the subject,
especially upon receiving the email from DEQ.

On July 31, 2013, DEQ sent Mr. Gibson a certified letter, stating it to be a "notice of
violation", relating to the same ongoing composting operation that had been in production
for over two decades, all of which was known to DEQ, and clearly subject to the statute
of! imitations for such attempted action, and Mr. Gibson regarded that Notice to be either
issued in error by DEQ personnel, who were unfamiliar with the exemptions and
exceptions within their rules and regulations, and possibly unaware of the statute of
limitations, or it was otherwise an attempt to bring his operations under their regulation,
despite their past representations and specific exclusions in their lack of regulatory
authority.
Mr. Gibson has relied upon the exemptions, exclusions, exceptions, and limitations
identified in the JDAPA Rules adopted in 2003, specifically pre-empting any regulatory
involvement of DEQ with existing composting operations, as well as his prior
"grandfather" rights that existed to his operations before the initial enactment of the solid
waste management Regulations and Standards that may have been promulgated in 1992,
as his operations have existed since the 1970's. Mr. Gibson has made clear his position to
the DEQ personnel over the previous years of his operations, becoming an issue in 1992,
1993-94 and then finally in 1995, when he was told he was not under their regulatory
authority and no more annual inspections. From 1995 forward, Mr. Gibson has not had
any intrusion from DEQ until the contact that was made in 2013, and Mr. Gibson has
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continuously maintained his position he will not surrender his grandfather rights, his
exempt status, or the statute oflimitations, and will not waive any exempt status, and will
not voluntarily participate in any further effort to regulate what they have neither a right
or authority to do. Mr. Gibson ceased any further "permitting" procedures or site
inspection procedures back in 1995, and there has been none since, and none to the present
date. Mr. Gibson concluded there was no need for him to engage in any further discussions
or "resolve any conditions" for over two decades.
These Defendants do rely upon the exclusionary provisions and the application of the
statute of limitations, and rely upon the "grandfather" rights that have attached to this
operation that pre-dates their Rules and Regulations and the continuing application of the
statute oflimitations.
Respectfully submitted this 241h day of October, 2016." (pgs. 16-20 of Det(mdants'
Memorandum in Opposition to DEQ's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated and filed
October 24, 2016.
The case authority set forth in Fuhriman v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800,
803-04, 153 P.3d 480,483-84 (2007), and Patterson v. Idaho Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 151
Idaho 310, 316, 256 PJd 718, 724 (2011), that the provisions of §39-108(4) have been raised
in this case, that the absolute bar provided for in §39-1 08(4) has NOT been waived, and the

must be granted, in the interests of justice and the controlling case authori

on the subject.

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of July, 2017.

Attorney for David R. Gibso
VHS Properties, LLC

d

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 28th day of July, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses
as follows:
Clerk of the Court

(

)

U.S. Mail

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEMD ANSWER TO INCLUDE
THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ANNOUNCED IN I. C. §39-108(4)
P. II

000851

Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Fax
Hand Delivered
E-File

Darrell G. Early
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEMD ANSWER TO INCLUDE
THE APPLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ANNOUNCED IN I. C. §39-108(4)
P. 12

000852

Filed
Electronically Filed
8/10/2017 3:26:05 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Heiskari, Deputy Clerk
By: Lusina Heiskari,

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
Chief of Civil
CiVil Litigation
C
YNTHIA Y
EE-WALLACE, ISB #6793
CYNTHIA
YEE-WALLACE,
M
ARK C
ECCHINI-BEAVER, ISB #9297
MARK
CECCHINI-BEAVER,
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson Street,
Street, 2nd Floor
P.O.
PO. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone:
(208)
(208) 334-2400
Facsimile:
(208)
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8073
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.20V
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS
PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.
Defendants.

))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))
))

Case
Case No. CV-OC-2015-03540
NOTICE OF HEARING:
PLAINTIFF ’8 MOTION IN LIMINE
PLAINTIFF’S
TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE
CONCERNING UNPLED
DEFENSES

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Tuesday, August 22, 2017, at 1:30 p.m., Plaintiff

Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, through its counsel of record, will present
“Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence Concerning Unpled Defenses” for hearing
at the Ada County Courthouse, located at
at 200 W.
before the Honorable Judge Jonathan Medema, at

Front Street, Boise, ID 83702.

NOTICE OF HEARING -- 11

000853

DATED August 10,
10, 2017.
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
SSTATE
O
FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE

By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that August 10,
ﬁled the foregoing electronically through the
10, 2017, I filed
iCourt E-File system,
be served by
system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be
by electronic
means,
s
more
fully
reflected
on
the
Notification
of
Service:
Notiﬁcation
reﬂected
s
means,
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

US. Mail
D U.S.

|:| Hand Delivery
IXI ICourt E-File
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 345-1129

D

/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General

NOTICE OF HEARING -- 22
000854

Filed
Electronically Filed
8/10/2017 3:15:21
3:15:21 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Heiskari, Deputy Clerk
By: Lusina Heiskari,

VERNON
SMITH
VERNON K.
K. SMITH
AT LAW
ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY AT
LAW
1900
Main Street
Street
1900 W.
W. Main
Boise,
Idaho 83702
83702
Boise, Idaho
Idaho
No. 1365
Bar No.
Idaho State
State Bar
1365
345-1125
Telephone:
(208)
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
345-1129
Fax:
(208)
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
A
Attorney
for Defendant
Defendant
ttorneyfbr

IN
IN THE
THE DISTRICT
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF
OF ADA
IDAHO, IN
IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF
IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY’

)
) CASE
CASE NO.:
1503540
NO.: CV
CV OC
OC 1503540
)
Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
)
) NOTICE
HEARING
NOTICE OF
OF HEARING
v.
V
)
)
DAVID
DIAMOND
BLACK DIAMOND
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON,
d/b/a BLACK
GIBSON, d/b/a
)
COMPOST
COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS
VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES,
PRODUCTS, and
)
LLC
LLC
)
)
Defendants.
Defendants.
)
)
)
VVVVVVVVVVVVVV

nd
22nd
AND EACH
Will please
EACH OF
that on
the 22
YOU
day
OF YOU,
take Notice
Notice that
on the
of August,
YOU AND
please take
August,
YOU, Will
day of

the hour
thereafter as
2017,
be heard,
Vernon K.
K.
at the
hour of
of 1:30
or as
and counsel
1:30 p.m.,
soon thereafter
counsel may
as soon
as Court
Court and
heard, Vernon
2017, at
may be
pm, or

Defendants’ Answer.
for Hearing
Hearing his
his Motion
Motion to
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS
PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case
Case No. CV-OC-2015-03540

PLAINTIFF ’S OPPOSITION
PLAINTIFF’S
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DEFENDANTS’
TO AMEND ANSWER
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This memorandum is submitted by
by Plaintiff, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
Defendants’ pending Motion to Amend Answer to Include the
(“DEQ”), in opposition to Defendants’

Defense of the Statute of Limitations, I.C. §39-108(4) (“motion to amend”).
I. INTRODUCTION
After more than two years
years have passed
passed since this case
ﬁrst filed, and on the eve of
case was first
trial, Defendants move to amend their answer to include aa fact-intensive statute of limitations
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defense under Idaho Code §§ 39-108(4). Their motion to amend has
has been noticed for hearing less
less
than 25 days
been vacated and reset.
has already been
case, which trial has
days prior to the trial in this case,
Defendants have had ample time and opportunity to seek leave of the Court to amend their
answer to include aa statute of limitations defense,
so. They have thus
defense, and they failed to do so.
based upon undue delay,
Will
is not timely, is
is based
waived the defense. The motion to amend is
delay, and will
cause
be denied.
cause prejudice to DEQ and another delay in the trial. The motion should therefore be
II. STANDARD
“The grant or denial of
been filed
of leave to amend after aa responsive pleading has
ﬁled is
is aa
has been

matter that is
is within the discretion of the trial court and is
is subject to reversal on appeal only for
an
an abuse
156 Idaho 749,
331
Guar. Co.,
abuse of that discretion.” DAFCO LLC v.
v. Stewart Title Guar.
749, 755,
755, 331
Ca, 156
P.3d 491, 497 (2014) (citation omitted). Under Idaho Rule of Civil
CiVil Procedure 15,
15, the
Defendants in this case
21 days
case can only have amended their answer within 21
days after serving it on
DEQ,
DEQ, or with DEQ’s consent, or upon receiving court approval to file the amendment. (Idaho R.
Civ.
be presented in aa party’s pleading.
Afﬁrmative defenses must be
P. 15(a)(1)(A)
pleading.
CiV. P.
15(a)(2).) Affirmative
15(a)(1)(A) and 15(a)(2).)
(Idaho R. Civ.
Afﬁrmative defenses must be pled in order to “alert the parties concerning
P. 8).
CiV. P.
8). Affirmative
the issues
issues of fact to be tried and to afford them the opportunity to meet those defenses.” Primary
Network, Inc.
Inc. v.
Dep’t’t of
Admin., 137
Health Network,
137 Idaho 663,
v. State,
State, Dep
0fAdmin.,
663, 669,
669, 52 P.3d 307,
307, 313 (2002)
(2002)
(citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Leave to amend should only be
be “freely give[n]” if the moving party has
has not engaged in:
by amendment
deﬁciencies by
undue delay,
delay, bad faith, aa dilatory motive, aa repeated failure to cure deficiencies
Will be undue prejudice to the opposing party by
Virtue of
previously allowed, or when there will
by virtue

allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment, etc.
156 Idaho at 755,
331
etc. DAFCO LLC, 156
755, 331
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P.3d at 497 (citation omitted); Idaho R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2).
is not aa
CiV. P.
15(a)(2). Although timeliness alone is
sufficient
sufﬁcient reason to deny
amend, timeliness can justify the denial of aa motion to
deny aa motion to amend,
amend when undue delay,
156 Idaho
are also at play. Id. 156
delay, bad faith, or prejudice to the opponent are
at 756,
where the proposed amendment is
is not
331 P.3d at 498 (citation omitted). Similarly, Where
756, 331
timely and would delay upcoming hearings or trial, or comes after court-imposed deadlines have
passed, or following substantial work that has
been completed, the Court may
has been
passed,
deny aa motion to
may deny
amend.
at 498-99 (citations omitted).
amend. Id. 156
156 Idaho at 756-57, 331
331 P.3d at
omitted).
A. Defendants have waived any statute of limitations defense and the motion to
amend is untimely and based upon undue delay.
Defendants’ motion to amend is clearly untimely.
Defendants’
untimely. This case
been pending well over
has been
case has

two years,
years, since March 5,
an
ﬁled. Defendants filed an
5, 2015, when the original complaint was filed.
answer to the original complaint on April 17,
a statute of limitations
17, 2015, and failed to raise a
defense in that pleading, as
ﬁled its First Amended
as required by
by Rule 8(c)(1)(Q).
8(c)(1)(Q). DEQ then filed
Complaint on December 2,
10, 2016.
2, 2015, which Defendants answered on February 10,
Defendants again failed to plead aa statute of limitations defense in February of 2016. The courtimposed deadline to file
ﬁle motions to amend was April 30,
30,
30, 2016. At no time prior to April 30,
2016 did Defendants seek leave to amend their answer to add aa statute of limitations defense.
Instead, Defendants raised the defense for the first
ﬁrst time in October of 2016 when it
responded to DEQ’s motion for summary judgment. And, Defendants filed
ﬁled an
an untimely motion
to dismiss the Amended Complaint in November of 2016, asserting aa statute of limitations
defense under Idaho Code §§ 39-108(4), in direct contravention of the Idaho Rules of
of Civil
Procedure and the Court’s scheduling order. On January 9,
Courtidenying that
9, 2017, the Court—denying
motion to dismiss—noted
dismissinoted that:
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To date,
date, the Defendants have not sought leave to amend their answer to the First
Amended Complaint to allege aa defense based
based on the statute of limitations.
Unless Defendants seek and are
are granted permission to do so,
so, the Court would
irrelevant.
preclude evidence and argument on that issue from trial as
as being irrelevant.
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 7.)
(Order on Defs.’
same reason,
reason, the Court also declined to consider
7.) For the same

the defense in response to DEQ’s motion for summary judgment.
judgment. (See
Mem. Decision and
(See Mem.
Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
J. at 17.)
17.) Following the Court’s rulings on the motion to
dismiss and DEQ’s motion for summary judgment, Defendants still did not attempt to amend
their answer to add aa statute of limitations defense.
On March 9,
ﬁled aa motion in limine to exclude “any evidence or inquiry
9, 2017, DEQ filed
concerning Idaho Code §§ 39-108(4).” (Mot.
(Mot. in Limine to Pre[c]lude Evidence Concerning
Unplead Defenses at 1).
is
ﬁve months later, about one month and aa half before the trial is
1). Almost five
set
set to begin in this case,
case, Defendants ask this Court for leave to add that defense. The motion to
amend is set
set for hearing on the date of the pretrial conference in this case,
case, on August 22,
22, 2017
(less
justification for waiting this
is no reasonable justiﬁcation
(less than 25 days
days from the date of trial). There is
long to seek leave of Court to amend their answer. The time period for filing aa motion to amend
the pleadings has
has passed.
are instead focused on preparing this matter for trial. The
passed. The parties are
Court can dismiss the motion to amend solely because
because the request is untimely, is
is based upon
undue delay,
case.
delay, and violates the scheduling order in this case.
B. The motion to amend, if granted, will prejudice DEQ and likely result in another
delay of the trial.
In addition to being untimely and followed by
delay, the motion to amend
by undue delay,
prejudices DEQ and will likely delay the trial for aa second time. This case
was originally set
set for
case was
trial on January 25,
has already been vacated once and reset to September 13,
25, 2017. The trial has
13,
2017, less
Will be heard. The issues
less than 25 days
issues left for trial have
days after the motion to amend will
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been sufficiently narrowed by
been
by way of the Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Plaintiff’ 5 Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Supplemental Memorandum Decision
Plaintiff’s

Reconsidering Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Partially Granting Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. DEQ’s case
case consists of proving:
…Defendants
an
...Defendants Gibson and VHS Properties are
are the operator and owner respectively of an
area that uses
uses biological decomposition to prepare grass,
leaves, and other organic
grass, leaves,
material for reuse as
as humus or compost; that the grass,
leaves, and other organic material
grass, leaves,
‘solid waste’
are
waste’ as
are ‘solid
as defined in I.C.
LG §39-103(13); that on March 29,
29, 2013 the area had
more than 600 cubic yards
as of
leaves, and other organic material; and that as
grass, leaves,
yards of grass,
March 29,
29, 2013 neither Defendant had submitted to DEQ the siting plan or operating
plan required under IDAPA 58.01.06.012.
(Mem. Decision and Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
J. at 5.)
5.) Following conclusion of
Defendants’ affirmative defenses.
DEQ’s motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed Defendants’

(Supp.
J. and Order Partially Granting Pl.’s
(Supp. Mem. Decision Reconsidering Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
Mot. for Sum. J.)
been steadfastly preparing for trial based upon the issues
be
has been
issues left to be
J.) DEQ has
tried, including the elements noted by
whether the materials at
been
at issue have been
by the Court and Whether
“discarded.” (Mem. Decision and Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
J. at 14.)
14.)

Allowing

Defendants to assert aa defense under Idaho Code §§ 39-108(4) would require discovery into the
issue,
issue, at the expense of preparing for trial and to the prejudice of DEQ.
DEQ.
The Court noted that aa statute of
of limitations defense “certainly requires more factual
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 8.)
inquiry than simply looking to the date of aa pleading.” (Order on Defs.’
8.)

This is
is because under Idaho Code §
is two years
years “after the
§ 39-108(4), the limitations period is
Violation.” Idaho Code
Director had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of aa violation.”

§§ 39-108(4) (emphasis added).
does not know: (1)
defense, DEQ does
added). Among other things about this defense,
(1)
how Defendants intend to prove that the Director knew or reasonably ought to have known of aa
violation; (2)
What evidence Defendants
Violation;
defense; (3)
(2) who Defendants intend to call to prove this defense;
(3) what
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have to support this defense; (4)
what facts they base
base this defense upon; and (5)
what witnesses
Witnesses
(4) What
(5) What
support this defense. In order to respond to the defense,
defense, DEQ would need to take discovery to
find
ﬁnd out this information and then have adequate time to meet the defense, since the issue has
has not
been on the table and is
is still not formally pled. Requiring DEQ to prepare to meet this defense,
been
defense,
while it is
While
is in the process of preparing for trial, is
is prejudicial to DEQ.
is
DEQ. Counsel for DEQ is
preparing: to call and question numerous witnesses,
Witnesses, the introduction of numerous exhibits;
issuing and following up on numerous subpoenas;
subpoenas; and opening and closing remarks to this
Court. With less
sufﬁcient time to also conduct
is simply not sufficient
less than one month before trial, there is
discovery on aa newly pled, fact-intensive defense,
defense, and still be prepared for trial on September 13,
13,
2017. Thus, if allowed to amend their answer, the trial date in this case
be
case would need to be
is prejudicial to DEQ because it has
has expended a
postponed again, which is
a substantial amount of

time getting ready to try this matter as
be
is currently pled.
pled. The motion to amend should be
as it is
denied.
DATED August 15,
15, 2017.
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
SSTATE
O
FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE

By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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their attorney
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
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VS.
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
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Defendants.
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Case
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Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, will call the following
witnesses at the trial
Witnesses
who
WhO

of this matter. Plaintiff reserves the right to call any
witnesses
any additional Witnesses

may be needed for rebuttal purposes and reserves the right to supplement, amend and/or edit

this list in advance of the trial.
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1.
1.

David R. Gibson, Defendant
Black Diamond Compost Company
5120 W. Overland Drive
PMB #102
Boise, ID 83705

2.
2.

John Glenn Hall
John Glenn Hall Company
rd
23ml
Street
1017
1017 N. 23
Boise, ID 83702

3.
3.

Sara M. Strachan, Ph.D.
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
GIS Analyst
1410
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706

4.
4.

Mike Reno
Central District Health Department
Water and Wastewater Program Manager
707 N. Armstrong Place
Boise, ID 83704

5.
5.

Kevin Horan
Ada County Sheriff’s Office
Ofﬁce
Code Enforcement Officer
Ofﬁcer
7200 Barrister Drive
Boise, ID 83704

6.
6.

Susan Hamlin Nygard
Office of the Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General, Natural Resources Division
P.
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

7.
7.

Dean M. Ehlert
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
Assessment and Compliance Unit Manager
1410
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706

8.
8.

Scott Frisbie
Ada County Highway Department
Cloverdale Maintenance Division Superintendent
440 N. Cloverdale Road
Boise, ID 83713
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9.

Mike Woodward
City of Boise Parks and Recreation Department
Horticulture Division Manager
104
104 Royal Boulevard
Boise, ID 83706

10.
10.

Jack Gantz, P.E.
Former Technical Engineer, Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality
3715 S.
S. Yorktown Way
Way
Boise, ID 83706

11.
11.

Barry Burnell
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
Water Quality Division Administrator
1410
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706

12.
12.

Orville Green
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
[former Waste/Remediation Div.
DiV. Adm.]
Adm]
1410
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706

13.
13.

Paula Wilson
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
Administrative Rules Coordinator
1410
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706

14.
14.

Eric Glover
Legislative Services Office
Ofﬁce
Legislative Librarian
700 West Jefferson Street,
Street, Room C114
Boise, ID 83702

15.
15.

Ted Hutchinson
Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll
Deputy Director
10300
10300 Seaman’s Gulch Road
Boise, ID 83714
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DATED August 22,
22, 2017.
SSTATE
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
O
OFFICE

By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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electronic means,
Notification of Service:
reﬂected on the Notiﬁcation
Service:
as more fully reflected
means, as
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

US. Mail
E U.S.

D Hand Delivery
[XI ICourt E-File
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 345-1129

D

Yee- Wallace
/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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Filed
Electronically Filed
8/22/2017 4:57 PM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
TEVEN L. O
LSEN
SSTEVEN
OLSEN
Chief of Civil
CiVil Litigation

C
YNTHIA L. Y
EE-WALLACE, ISB #6793
CYNTHIA
YEE-WALLACE,
M
ARK C
ECCHINI-BEAVER, ISB #9297
MARK
CECCHINI-BEAVER,
Deputy Attorneys General
nd
Floor
954 W. Jefferson Street, 22‘ml
P.
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208)
(208) 334-2400
Facsimile:
(208)
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8073
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.20V
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS
PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case
Case No. CV-OC-2015-03540

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT LIST

VVVVVVVVVVVV

Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, submits the following list of
exhibits to be
be offered at the trial of this matter. Plaintiff reserves the right to offer any
any exhibits
which may
may be needed for rebuttal purposes at trial. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement,

amend and/or edit this list in advance of trial. Plaintiff puts Defendants on notice and reserves
the right to use any
case as
as evidence at trial. The property
ﬁling, or submission in this case
any pleading, filing,
at issue in this lawsuit is described as
as the West Half of the Northwest Quarter, Section 5,
5,

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT LIST -- 1
PLAINTIFF’S
1

000870

Township 22 North, Range 22 East of
of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, upon which
Defendant Gibson operates. Hereafter, this property is
is referred to as
as the “Smith Property.”
No.

Offer

Description

Stip

Object

Decline

Admit

1.
1. Letter dated April 2,
2, 2013, from Jack Gantz to
Dave Gibson, with attachment (map)
(map)
2.
2. Letter dated April 17,
17, 2015, from Vernon K. Smith
to DAG Darrell G. Early, with attachment
(Answer to Complaint, Affirmative
Afﬁrmative Defenses and
Counterclaim dated April 17,
17, 2015)
3.
3. Letter dated May 8,
8, 2013, from Jack Gantz to
Dave Gibson ,, with attachment (emails)
4.
4. Certified mailing receipt dated May 13,
13, 2013
5.
5. Memorandum dated July 26,
26, 2013, from Orville
Green, DEQ,
and
DAG
Susan
Hamlin to Curt
DEQ,
Fransen,
F ransen, DEQ Director, with attachment (Notice
of Violation issued to David Robert Gibson dated
and signed July 30,
30, 2013)
6.
6. Letter dated July 31,
31, 2013, from Michael
McCurdy, DEQ,
DEQ, to David Gibson, with attachment
(Notice of Violation issued to David Robert
Gibson dated and signed July 30,
30, 2013)
7.
7. Letter dated August 19,
19, 2013, from David Gibson
to Dean Ehlert, DEQ
8.
8. Letter dated September 10,
10, 2013, from DAG
Susan Hamlin to David Gibson
9.
9. Letter dated September 24,
24, 2013, from David
Gibson to DAG Susan Hamlin
10.
2011 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
10. 2011
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with
With the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP
GEOTIFF 20110617

,

11.
11. 2013 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with
With the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP

,
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GEOTIFF 20130830
12.
12. 2015 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP
With
GEOTIFF 20150613

,

13.
13. 2017 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property
14. 2017 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
14.
Property

15.
15. Photographs of Smith Property
Propeny dated April 4,
4, 2012
15.1
15.1
15.2
15.2
15.3
15.3
15.4
15.4
15.5
15.5
15.6
15.6
15.7
15.7
15.8
15.8
15.9
15.9
15.10
15.10
15.11
15.11
15.12
15.12
15.13
15.13
15.14
15.14
15.15
15.15
15.16
15.16
15.17
15.17
15.18
15.18
15.19
15.19
15.20
15.20

signage/shed2
signage/shedZ -- 09:01
7 09:07
signage/shed2
signage/shedZ –
signage/“portals”/shed2 7
signage/“portals”/shed2
– 9:02
signage/“portals”/shed2
– 9:07
signage “portals”/shed2 7
field/equipment
ﬁeld/ equipment – 8:54
compost rows/equipment
– 9:08
rows/ equipment 7
equipment –7 9:01
equipment/mixer – 9:01
site from road 7– 9:57
access
site/ZSMPH – 8:52
access road to site/25MPH
signage/“n0 branches” 7
signage/“no
– 8:55
signage/“open other end” 7
– 8:50
site/debris – 9:09
site/debris –7 9:09
compost rows 7– 9:01
compost rows 7– 8:54
road/tire – 8:51
road/sign down
– 8:50
downim
road/gate down –7 8:50
gate post 7– 9:01

m
,m M
m
m,
m
m ,
m
Em
7%
m
m
*E m
m

m

16.
16. Photographs of Smith Property
Propeny dated February 22,
22,
2017
16.1
16.1
16.2
16.2
16.3
16.3
16.4
16.4
16.5
16.5
16.6
16.6
16.7
16.7

signage/shed1
signage/shedl
signage/”fees”/shed1
signage/”fees”/shed1
shed1
shedl from road
signage/”fees”/shed1
signage/”fees”/shed1
signage/”follow arrow”
signage/arrow/piles
compost rows
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16.8
16.8
16.9
16.9
16.10
16.10
16.11
16.1 1
16.12
16.12
16.13
16.13

compost rows
compost rows
road to site
compost rows
compost rows
compost rows

17.
17. Photographs of Smith Property taken on August
14,
201 7
14, 2017
17.1
17.1
17.2
17.2
17.3
17.3
17.4
17.4
17.5
17.5
17.6
17.6
17.7
17.7
17.8
17.8
17.9
17.9
17.10
17.10
17.11
17.1 1
17.12
17.12
17.13
17.13
17.14
17.14
17.15
17.15
17.16
17.16
17.17
17.17
17.18
1 7. 1 8
17.19
17.19
17.20
17.20
17.21
17.21
17.22
17.22
17.23
17.23
17.24
17 .24
17.25
17 .25
17.26
17 .26
17.27
17.27
17.28
1 7 .28
17.29
17 .29
17.30
1 7.3 0
17.31
17.3 1

signage/“open” and shed1
shedl
signage/shed1/sign
signage/shedl/sign in & fees
fees
signage/shed1.all
here”/shed1
signage/“sign in here”/shed1
“notice”/shed1
signage/“fees” and “notice”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1
entry1/no
branches/open/arrow
open/ arrow
entry 1 /no branches/
signage/follow
signage/ follow arrow
compost rows
compost rows/space
rows/ space
compost rows/spaces
rows/ spaces
shed/GMC truck/shed2
truck/shedZ
signage/“fees”/shed2
signage/“fees”/shed2
signage/“n0 branches”/shed2
signage/“no
branches”/shed2
signage/“portals”/shed2
signage/“notice”/shed2
signage/“notice”/shed2
row/GMC truck/no
truck/n0 branches
tank
compost row
equipment/conveyor belt
equipment/conveyor belt
equipment/green
equipment/ green boxes
equipment/boxes and tank
equipment/screener
equipment/red
equipment/ red truck
equipment/white truck
mobile structure
loader
equipment/screener
tank
equipment/red trailer

18.
18. Video of Smith Property taken on August 14,
14, 2017
19.
19. Printout of Black Diamond Compost Company
website details (www.blackdiamondcompost.com)
(wwwblackdiamondcompost.com)
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printed March 29,
29, 2013
20. Printout of Black Diamond Compost Company
website details (www.blackdiamondcompost.com)
(wwwblackdiamondcompost.com)
printed March 4,
4, 2015 and copy
copy of Black Diamond
Compost Company brochure
21. Ada County Highway District Annual Report
Information FY:
21.1
21.1
21.2
21.3
21.4
21.5
21.6
21.7
21.8
21.9
21.10
21.11
21.11

FY 2004-2005
FY 2005-2006
FY 2006-2007
FY 2007-2008
FY 2008-2009
FY 2009-2010
2010-2011
FY 2010-2011
FY 2011-2012
FY 2013
FY 2014
FY 2015

22. Boise City receipt for payment to Dave Gibson
23. Boise City receipt for payment to Dave Gibson
24. Letter dated January 5,
5, 2009 from Toni Hardesty
to Honorable Del Raybould re Bio-Environmental
Recovery International-LLC (BERRI) operation in
Idaho
25. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
July 20,
1995
20, 1995
26. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
November 6,
1995
6, 1995
27. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
June 6,
1996
1996
6,
28. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
July 31,
1996
31, 1996
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29. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
October 1,
1996
1, 1996
30. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
December 17,
1996
17, 1996
31. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
May 13,
1997
13, 1997
32. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
December 16,
1997
16, 1997
33. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
July 28,
1998
28, 1998
34. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
September 29,
1998
29, 1998
35. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
May 10,
1999
10, 1999
36. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
December 6,
2001
6, 2001
37.
37. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
January
January 28,
28, 2002
38. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
April 8,
8, 2002
39. Legislative Services Office
Ofﬁce Idaho Legislature
Certificate
Certiﬁcate of Documents dated March 16,
16, 2017
40. Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll Cost Fee
Fee Schedule
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Landﬁll Cost Fee Schedule
41. Ada County Landfill

42. Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll Costs Fee Schedule
43. Photographs that include Smith Property
Propelty
44. Certificate
ﬁled
Certiﬁcate of Assumed Business Name filed
November 29,
29, 2006, for Black Diamond Compost
Products
45. Order on Motion Under Rule 70(b)
70(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil
CiVil Procedure, Vesting All Real and
Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal
Representative dated June 2,
2, 2017, in In the
the
Estate
of
Victoria
H. Smith,
Matter of
Victoria
H.
Smith, Fourth
of
of
Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case No. CVIE-2014-15352
46. Judgment on Motion Under Rule 70(b)
70(b) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil
CiVil Procedure, Vesting All Real
and Personal Property
Propeny of the Estate in the Personal
Representative,
Representative, dated June 2,
2, 2017, in In the
H. Smith,
Matter of
Victoria H.
Smith, Fourth
of the Estate of
of Victoria
Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case No. CVIE-2014-15352
47. Quit Claim Deed conveying the real property
which is the subject of this matter to VHS
Properties, LLC, recorded October 24,
24, 2014
48. Affidavit of David R. Gibson filed September 30,
30,
2010, in Ada County v.
Vernon
K.
Smith,
Vernon
K.
v. Estate of
Smith,
of
et al.,
011., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County,
Case
Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
49. Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith filed September 30,
30,
2010, in Ada County v.
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
Smith,
of Vernon
et al.,
011., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County,
County,
Case
Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
50. Memorandum Decision and Order filed
ﬁled December
1,
K.
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
1, 2010, in Ada County v.
of Vernon
Smith,
et
al.,
Fourth
Judicial
District
Court,
Ada
Smith,
011.,
County, Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
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51. Transcript of Hearing dated November 7,
7, 2011, in
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
Ada County v.
v. Estate of
Smith, et al.,
011.,
of Vernon
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
No. CV-OC-2010-02298
52. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Criminal
Contempt Charges filed
ﬁled December 10,
10, 2012, in
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
Ada County v.
v. Estate of
Smith, et al.,
011.,
of Vernon
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
No. CV-OC-2010-02298
53.
53. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
7 Solid Waste
06 (Idaho Admin.
Admin. Code 58.01.06 –
Management Rules),
Rules), 2017
54. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
7 Solid Waste
Admin. Code 58.01.06 –
06 (Idaho Admin.
Management Rules), 2013
55. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
7
06 (Idaho Admin.
Admin. Code 58.01.06 – Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2014
56.
56. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
7
06 (Idaho Admin.
Admin. Code 58.01.06 – Solid Waste
Management Rules),
Rules), 2015

DATED August 22,
22, 2017.
SSTATE
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
OFFICE
FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
O

By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that August 22,
ﬁled the foregoing electronically through the
22, 2017, I filed
iCourt E-File system,
be served by
system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be
by electronic
means,
reﬂected on the Notification of Service:
as more fully reflected
means, as
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

US. Mail
D U.S.

|:| Hand Delivery
IXI ICourt E-File
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 345-1129

D

/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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Filed
Electronically Filed
9/7/2017 9:53 AM
Fourth
Judicial District,
Fourth Judicial
District, Ada County
D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
Christopher D.
By:
Heiskari, Deputy Clerk
By: Lusina Heiskari,

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
TEVEN L. O
LSEN
SSTEVEN
OLSEN
Chief of Civil
CiVil Litigation

C
YNTHIA L. Y
EE-WALLACE, ISB #6793
CYNTHIA
YEE-WALLACE,
M
ARK C
ECCHINI-BEAVER, ISB #9297
MARK
CECCHINI-BEAVER,
Deputy Attorneys General
nd
Floor
954 W. Jefferson Street, 22‘ml
P.
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208)
(208) 334-2400
Facsimile:
(208)
Facsimile:
(208) 854-8073
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.20V
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
DAVID R.
R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS
PROPERTIES, LLC,

Case
Case No. CV-OC-2015-03540

PLAINTIFF ’S FIRST AMENDED
PLAINTIFF’S
EXHIBIT LIST

VVVVVVVVVVVV

Defendants.
Defendants.

Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, submits the following list of
exhibits to be
be offered at the trial of this matter. Plaintiff reserves the right to offer any
any exhibits
which may
may be needed for rebuttal purposes at trial. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement,

amend and/or edit this list in advance of trial. Plaintiff puts Defendants on notice and reserves
the right to use any
case as
as evidence at trial. The property
ﬁling, or submission in this case
any pleading, filing,
at issue in this lawsuit is described as
as the West Half of the Northwest Quarter, Section 5,
5,

71
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PLAINTIFF’S
1
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Township 22 North, Range 22 East of
of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, upon which
Defendant Gibson operates. Hereafter, this property is
is referred to as
as the “Smith Property.”
No.

Offer

Description

Stip

Object

Decline

Admit

1.
1. Letter dated April 2,
2, 2013, from Jack Gantz to
Dave Gibson, with
With attachment (map)
(map)
2. Letter dated April 17,
17, 2015, from Vernon K. Smith
to DAG Darrell G. Early, with attachment
(Answer to Complaint, Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim dated April 17,
17, 2015)
3. Letter dated May 8,
8, 2013, from Jack Gantz to
Dave Gibson ,, with
With attachment (emails)
4. Certified
Certiﬁed mailing receipt dated May 13,
13, 2013
5. Memorandum dated July 26,
26, 2013, from Orville
Green, DEQ, and DAG Susan Hamlin to Curt
F ransen, DEQ Director, with attachment (Notice
Fransen,
of Violation issued to David Robert Gibson dated
and signed July 30,
30, 2013)
6. Letter dated July 31,
31, 2013, from Michael
McCurdy, DEQ,
DEQ, to David Gibson, with attachment
(Notice of Violation issued to David Robert
Gibson dated and signed July 30,
30, 2013)
7. Letter dated August 19,
19, 2013, from David Gibson
to Dean Ehlert, DEQ
8. Letter dated September 10,
10, 2013, from DAG
Susan
Susan Hamlin to David Gibson
9. Letter dated September 24,
24, 2013, from David
Gibson to DAG Susan Hamlin
10.
2011 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
10. 2011
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with
With the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP
GEOTIFF 20110617

,

11.
11. 2013 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with
With the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP

,
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GEOTIFF 20130830
12.
12. 2015 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with
With the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP
GEOTIFF 20150613

,

13.
13. 2017 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property
14.
14. 2017 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property
15.
15. Photographs of Smith Property dated April 4,
4, 2012
15.1
15.1
15.2
15.2
15.3
15.3
15.4
15.4
15.5
15.5
15.6
15.6
15.7
15.7
15.8
15.8
15.9
15.9
15.10
15.10
15.11
15.11
15.12
15.12
15.13
15.13
15.14
15.14
15.15
15.15
15.16
15.16
15.17
15.17
15.18
15.18
15.19
15.19
15.20
15.20

M

signage/shed2
signage/shedZ -- 09:01
7 09:07
signage/shed2
signage/shedZ –
92312
signage/“portals”/shed2 7
signage/“portals”/shed2
– 232
9:02
signage/“portals”/shed2
– 2311
9:07
signage “p0rtals”/shed2 7
field/equipment – 8:54
compost rows/equipment
– 9:08
rows/ equipment 7
equipment –7 9:01
equipment/mixer – 9:01
site from road 7– 2&2
9:57
access
site/ZSMPH – 8:52
access road to site/25MPH
signage/“n0 branches” 7
signage/“no
– 8:55
7 8:50
signage/“open other end” –
site/debris –72:32
9:09
site/debris –72:32
9:09
compost rows 7– ZSLI
9:01
compost rows 7– 8:54
road/tire – 8:51
road/sign down
– 8:50
downim
road/gate down –7 8:50
gate post –7 ZSLI
9:01

,m

m,

m

m

,m

m
m

iﬁil m
m

16.
16. Photographs of Smith Property dated February 22,
22,
2017
201 7
16.1
16.1
16.2
16.2
16.3
16.3
16.4
16.4
16.5
16.5
16.6
16.6
16.7
16.7

signage/shed1
signage/shedl
signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1
shed1
shedl from road
signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“follow arrow”
signage/arrow/piles
signage/arrOW/piles
compost rows
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16.8
16.8
16.9
16.9
16.10
16.10
16.11
16.11
16.12
16.12
16.13
16.13

compost rows
compost rows
road to site
compost rows
compost rows
compost rows

17.
17. Photographs of Smith Property taken on August
14,
14, 2017
17.1
17.1
17.2
17.2
17.3
17.3
17.4
17.4
17.5
17.5
17.6
17.6
17.7
17.7
17.8
17.8
17.9
17.9
17.10
17.10
17.11
17.11
17.12
17.12
17.13
17.13
17.14
17.14
17.15
17.15
17.16
17.16
17.17
17.17
17.18
17.18
17.19
17.19
17.20
17.20
17.21
17.21
17.22
17.22
17.23
17.23
17.24
17.24
17.25
17.25
17.26
17.26
17.27
17.27
17.28
17.28
17.29
17.29
17.30
17.30
17.31
17.31

signage/“open” and shed1
shedl
signage/shed1/sign
in
signage/shedl/sign & fees
fees
signage/shed1.all
here”/shed1
signage/“sign in here”/shed1
“notice”/shed1
signage/“fees” and “notice”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1
entry1/no
branches/open/ arrow
entryl/no branches/open/arrow
signage/follow
signage/ follow arrow
compost rows
compost rows/space
rows/ space
compost rows/spaces
rows/ spaces
shed/GMC truck/shed2
signage/“fees”/shed2
signage/“no
signage/ “no branches”/shed2
signage/“p0rtals”/shed2
signage/“portals”/shed2
signage/“notice”/shed2
signage/“notice”/shed2
row/GMC truck/no
branches
truck/n0 branches
tank
compost row
equipment/conveyor belt
equipment/conveyor belt
equipment/green
equipment/ green boxes
equipment/boxes and tank
equipment/screener
equipment/red truck
equipment/white truck
mobile structure
loader
equipment/screener
tank
equipment/red trailer

18.
18. Video of Smith Property taken on August 14,
14, 2017
19.
19. Printout of Black Diamond Compost Company
website details (www.blackdiamondcompost.com)
(wwwblackdiamondcompost.com)
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printed March 29,
29, 2013
20. Printout of Black Diamond Compost Company
website details (www.blackdiamondcompost.com)
(wwwblackdiamondcompost.com)
printed March 4,
4, 2015 and copy
copy of Black Diamond
Compost Company brochure
21. Ada County Highway District Annual Report
Information FY:
21.1
21.1
21.2
21.3
21.4
21.5
21.6
21.7
21.8
21.9
21.10
21.11
21.11

FY 2004-2005
FY 2005-2006
FY 2006-2007
FY 2007-2008
FY 2008-2009
FY 2009-2010
2010-2011
FY 2010-2011
FY 2011-2012
FY 2013
FY 2014
FY
2015
FY2015

22. Boise City receipt for payment to Dave Gibson
23. Boise City receipt for payment to Dave Gibson
24. Letter dated January
January 5,
5, 2009 from Toni Hardesty
to Honorable Del Raybould re Bio-Environmental
Recovery International-LLC (BERRI) operation in
Idaho
25. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
July 20,
1995
20, 1995
26. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
November 6,
1995
6, 1995
27. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
June 6,
1996
6, 1996
28. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
July 31,
1996
31, 1996
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29. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
October 1,
1996
1996
1,
30. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
December 17,
1996
17, 1996
31.
31. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
May 13,
1997
13, 1997
32. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
December 16,
1997
16, 1997
33.
33. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
July 28,
1998
28, 1998
34. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
September 29,
1998
29, 1998
35. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
May 10,
1999
10, 1999
36. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
December 6,
2001
6, 2001
37.
37. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense Initiative dated
January 28,
28, 2002
38.
38. Minutes of Joint Legislative Task Force on
Environmental Common Sense
Sense Initiative dated
April 8,
8, 2002
39. Legislative Services Office Idaho Legislature
Certificate
Certiﬁcate of Documents dated March 16,
16, 2017
40. Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll Cost Fee Schedule
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41. Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll Cost Fee Schedule
42. Ada County Landfill Costs Fee Schedule
43. Photographs that include Smith Property
44. Certificate
ﬁled
Certiﬁcate of Assumed Business Name filed
November 29,
29, 2006, for Black Diamond Compost
Products
45. Order on Motion Under Rule 70(b)
70(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil
CiVil Procedure, Vesting All Real and
Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal
Representative dated June 2,
2, 2017, in In the
of‘the
the Estate of
Victoria
H.
Matter of
Victoria
H. Smith,
Smith, Fourth
of
Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case No.
No. CVIE-2014-15352
46. Judgment on Motion Under Rule 70(b)
70(b) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil
CiVil Procedure, Vesting All Real
and Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal
Representative,
Representative, dated June 2,
2, 2017, in In the
of‘the
the Estate of
Matter of
Victoria H.
H. Smith,
Smith, Fourth
of Victoria
Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case No.
No. CVIE-2014-15352
47. Quit Claim Deed conveying the real property
which is the subject of this matter to VHS
Properties, LLC, recorded October 24,
24, 2014
48. Affidavit of David R. Gibson filed
ﬁled September 30,
30,
2010, in Ada County v.
Vernon
K.
Smith,
Vernon
K.
v. Estate of
Smith,
of
et al.,
(11., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County,
County,
Case
Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
49. Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith filed September 30,
30,
2010, in Ada County v.
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
Smith,
of Vernon
et al.,
(11., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County,
Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
50.
ﬁled December
50. Memorandum Decision and Order filed
1,
K.
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
1, 2010, in Ada County v.
of Vernon
Smith,
et
al.,
Fourth
Judicial
District
Court,
Ada
Smith,
(11.,
County, Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
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51. Transcript of Hearing dated November 7,
7, 2011, in
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
Ada County v.
v. Estate of
Smith, et al.,
011.,
of Vernon
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case
No.
N0. CV-OC-2010-02298
52. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Criminal
Contempt Charges filed
ﬁled December 10,
10, 2012, in
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
Ada County v.
v. Estate of
Smith, et al.,
011.,
of Vernon
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case
No.
N0. CV-OC-2010-02298
53. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 7– Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2017
54.
54. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 7– Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2013
55. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
7
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 – Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2014
56. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
7
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 – Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2015
57. Processing (Composting) Facility Guidance and
Checklists for Tier II and Tier III Processing
Facilities, State of Idaho, Department of
Environmental Quality, October 2013

DATED: September 7,
7, 2017.
SSTATE
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
FFICE
OF
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
O
OFFICE

By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that September 7,
7, 2017, I filed the foregoing electronically through the
iCourt E-File system,
be served by
system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be
by electronic
means,
reﬂected on the Notification of Service:
as more fully reflected
means, as
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

US. Mail
D U.S.

|:| Hand Delivery
IXI ICourt E-File
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 345-1129

D

/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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Electronically Filed
9/12/2017 11:18 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
(208) 345-1129
Fax:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH illDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM
)
TO SUPPORT MOTION
)
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
)
UPON THE CONCLUSION
)
OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT
)
TO RULE 50(a) IRCP
)
)
)

)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
This matter will proceed to trial upon the Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) First Amended Complaint, therein alleging that Agency has jurisdiction, and
authority to regulate what they have described to be composting operational activities and
site locations on agricultural lands, despite existing and ongoing under the supervision of
David R. Gibson in Ada County since 1974, and on this specific location since August 2004.
The agricultural activities have been an open and well known operation to the general
public, to Ada County officials, specifically including the Ada County Developmental
Services (ACDS), the Ada County Commissioners, the Ada County Civil Division, the
Officials with the State of Idaho, Department of Agriculture (IDOA, also called ISDA), the
State of Idaho, Department of Central District Health (ICDH), the Ada County Highway

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM TO SUPPORT MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

000888
P. 1

District (ACHD), the former State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, Division of
Environmental Quality (H&W/DEQ), and throughout the transition into the new
department, the State ofidaho, Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as established
by legislation after 2002.
There has been grass clippings and leaves processed by Mr. Gibson, in this
composting activity, on various sites in Ada County since 1974, and the operations have
been declared to be agricultural operations and activities by IDOA. These composted
substances become humus enriched "soil" or "dirt" substances, intended and designed for
application back onto agricultural soils, as a soil amendment and plant foliar application for
growth enhancement and development purposes, intended for usc on this 520 acres of
agricultural land, and has never been referred to as a "waste", "waste product", or as a
"waste disposal" site, or ever considered "abandoned" or "discarded" material substances as
these substances are soil substances and applied in upon agricultural operations.

NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY WITH DEQ

DEQ repeatedly makes reference to these grass clippings and leaves as
constituting a "solid waste", as referenced on page 4, Par. 13 of their Amended
Complaint, stating. "grass clippings and leaves", are or should be among substances
within the definition of "solid waste"; whether using the statutory definition or their
IDAPA definition of"solid waste".
Defendants have consistently recognized leaves and grass clippings, though
typically solid, as opposed to gaseous or a liquid state, may be regarded as a "Solid" plant
residue substance, but not to be addressed in the context such activity is dealing with a
"waste", "discarded" or abandoned" material, and is not a substance that is intended for
placement in a disposal site, as otherwise it would be delivered to a landfill site for final
disposal. This is not a waste substance, but rather a humus and nutrient enriched soil
substance, used in agricultural operations and farming activities.
DEQ, when acting as a Division, and thereafter as a Department, has been
familiar with these historic composting operations conducted by Mr. David R, Gibson,
having before established a "documented paper relationship" that

included former

inspections and permits dating back into the early 1990's, then pertaining to his
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operations located on land immediately north and west of this property, (as identified in
aerial photography, being the former twenty acre site currently owned by Lydia and
Orson Merrill. In those prior years, the Central District Health Division worked in
conjunction with the Department of Health and Welfare, "Division" of Environmental
Quality, as Mr. Gibson was then generating composted substances and soil amendment
products since the early 1970's, and has been composting in several locations within Ada
County since 1974.
During the past twenty-eight (28) years, Mr. Gibson has been operating in this
Gowen Field Desert Front Area, beginning in 1988 when leasing a parcel of property
owned by the State of Idaho along Pleasant Valley Road. This area is south of Gowen
Field, and the Boise Municipal Airport, off Pleasant Valley Road, and less than a mile
west of Pleasant Valley Road along the Lake Hazel Extension. He has remained in that
area since I 988, and continues to do so in the same manner to the present date at the
location described in the Amended Complaint since August 2004.
He has maintained his registered business name, Black Diamond Compost
Products, with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), having registered various
humus products with them as requested, and has been under their jurisdiction and
regulation concerning composting activities and operations through the Right to Farm
Act (enacted in !981) and thereafter in accordance with the Soil and Plant Amendment
Act (enacted 200 !), each of which Act is regulated under the jurisdiction of IDOA.
Mr. Gibson has been very familiar with various agencies over the many years,
including the Ada County Developmental Services, DEQ, Fire District agencies, Ada
County landfill agency, Central District Health, IDOA, and the Ada County Code
Enforcement personneL and in recent years, directly involved in a controversy with Ada
County over the pre-emptive effects of the statewide "permitted use" of agricultural lands
that are used in conjunction with agricultural composting operations and activities, which
brought about the. statutory clarification in their legislation on July I, 2011 to clarify the
fact composting activities, are included in both the Right to Farm and Soil and Plant
Amendment Acts, and their operations and activities qualify under the statewide
permitted use as described in I. C. §22-4501, wherein it is stated "The legislature also
finds that the right to farm is a natural right and is recognized as a permitted use
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throughout the state of Idaho". The Legislature clarified their intentions in the Right to
Farm Act in 2011 to specifically include composting activities within that Act, similar to
the way it was addressed by the legislature in the Soil and Plant Amendment Act when
enacted in 200 I. That clarification, passed March, 20 II and incorporated into the Act
July I, 2011, was the direct result of the Ada County litigation involving this very
property, which confirmed the pre-emption of the State statute to any County Ordinance,
as Ada County had sought to impose the requirement of a conditional use permit to
engage in composting activity on agricultural land, and that was unenforceable, as the use
was already permitted statewide under the legislative enactments defined above.
There exists a statewide permitted use for all such agricultural activities and
operations, which specifically includes all composting operations and activities, and they
are not waste disposal sites, as a matter of legislative enactment, recognized to be
agricultural activities and operations under the Right to Farm Act (enacted in 1981 as Ch.
45) and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act (enacted in 2001 as Ch. 22), and no
conditional use permit (CUP) is required to engage in that agricultural activity, in any
quantity, from any county or state agency, division or department. These operations have
also been protected by the language contained in the Local Land Use Planning Act, as
announced in I.C. §67-6529, which states:
TO
AGRICULTURAL
LAND
67-6529. APPLICABILITY
COUNTIES MAY REGULATE SITING OF CERTAIN ANIMAL
OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES. (I) No power granted hereby shall be
construed to empower a board of county commissioners to enact any
ordinance or resolution which deprives any owner of full and complete use
of agricultural land for production of any agricultural product.
Agricultural land shall be defined by local ordinance or resolution.
(Emphasis added)
The Right to Farm Act, enacted in 1981, and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act,
enacted in 200 I, have specifically declared com posting activity included within the use
of land zoned tor agriculture, and Mr. Gibson's operations have always been conducted
on agricultural land, operated as a composting operation and facility on those premises.
His operations have engaged in an agricultural activity in accordance with each of
those above Acts: and Ada County questioned that statewide permitted use in 2009,
having a mis-placed perception composting activities could be subject to issuance of a
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conditional use permit (CUP), but the statewide permitted use pre-empted that misguided
perception, and composting activities have been protected continuously ever since the
Right to Farm Act came into effect in 1981, and re-enforced with the enactment of the
Soil and Plant Amendment Act in 2001, and clarified by the amendment enacted July I,
2011.
The Right to Farm Act of 1981, along with Idaho's Soil and Plant Amendment
Act in 2001, helped in defining the inter-relationship and correlation within the State of
Idaho as it pertained to the Land Use Planning Act that was enacted in 1975, and
established the right to regulate these agricultural activities, to any extent necessary,
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture.
It was only upon the conclusion of that controversy with Ada County in 2013 that

Mr. Gibson was then abruptly contacted by DEQ, after ten years of utter silence, and has
given rise to this pending controversy over a determination as to the regulatory authority
of DEQ, as it pertains to the composting activities and facilities, and whether DEQ has
any jurisdiction to claim any alleged violation of its Solid Waste Landfill Regulations.
Compost substances have never before been regarded as "waste" by these
Agencies, and no one ever took the position that the grass clippings and leaves were ever
being "discarded or abandoned" when delivered to a composting location, as these
materials were not intended to be discarded or abandoned, as these substances reveal their
humus-soil characteristics when processed into compost, as the substances are a "soil" or
"dirt" composition when processed from either plant residue or animal manure, and
become plant and soil amendment for future agronomic use, as it is applied to the soil at
specific agronomic rates, either directly to the soil, or to the plant, as a foliar.
Mr. Gibson .had been historically observed by DEQ, flrst when a Division and
then as a Department, as his operations have been on-going openly in their plain view
since his operatio11s began in 1974, and Mr. Gibson has had direct contact with many
officials from each of these various Agencies, Divisions, or Departments, especially after
establishing his locations to the Gowen Field Desert Front area in 1988. The first concern
related to the Airport, as the agencies were inquiring if birds would be attracted to the
substances, like takes place at a landfill, and they confirmed no such attraction existed at
com posting facilities, and no threat to human health, safety, or the environment existed.
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In this Court's Disposition on the Summary Judgment proceedings that had been
initiated by DEQ and challenged by Defendants, this court grappled with terms and
meaning of various word(s), such as

"waste~',

"crop", "grass", "leaves'\ "plant",

"residue", "discard", "disposal", "abandon", "abandonment", and then to what extent the
regulatory definitions and exceptions arc to be analyzed in light of the decision reached
by the 9th Circuit Court's analysis of "grasses", as addressed in a similar matter in
relation to the substance of "grass residue" addressed in the matter of Safe Air For

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.J'd I 035 (2004), concerning North Idaho blue grasses, and their
residues after harvesting grass seed, and the subject of grass residue in the context as to
whether it was a "solid waste" at all, as defined under the federal Resource Recovery and
Conservation Act (RCRA). The Federal Court concluded "grass residue" was not a
"waste", and in a similar manner, no crop residue (whether a grass/tree-shrub leaf
residue), would ever constitute a waste, as that residue is eventually returned to the soil in
a natural decomposition process, exhibiting a humus-soil enriched composition that
restores with nutrient enriched quantities, and are not a "solid waste" by virtue of their
intended application in soil and plant development, never abandoned or discarded, but
processed and applied in a future agricultural use. Those substances were not intended to
be within the scope of the DEQ Regulations at all, as the declared exemptions were so
created to accomplish, as these residues, being "grass clippings and leaf materials" if ever
deemed to be within the meaning of a "solid waste", a declaration was made to confirm
the regulatory rules did not apply to those substances, setting forth the express exemption
and exclusion in the IDAPA Rules, declaring that the "rules do not apply" to those "solid
wastes", as they are specifically excluded from the definition of what may be regulated
under any definition of a "solid waste", and excluded from what is being "regulated.
The court grappled with the various terms that are used within the IDAP A Solid
Waste Management Rules, each of which must be considered in any regulatory
application, and though the court found genuine issues of material fact with respect to the
meaning, use, and application of various words, including "waste", "crop", "plant",
"residue'',

~'discar~-~~,

'"disposal", ''abandon", "abandonn1ent", ''o"WTier". "possessor" and

the intended objectives of the very composting operation itself, the court has yet to
determine the e.ventual

application of the

exemptions

set forth

in IDAP A

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM TO SUPPORT MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

000893
P. 6

58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), as enumerated within the exclusions that the rules do not
apply to certain "solid waste", under the IDAPA provisions ("these rules do not apply to
the following solid waste ... "), which exclusions include manure, crop (plant) residue, and
agricultural solid waste as excluded by IDAPA Rule 58 .01.06 (Solid Waste Management
Rules), subpart .001 (Title and Scope),

subpart (.03) (Wastes Not Regulated Under

These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to the following solid wastes ... ) (b)(ii)
and (b)(iii), (the effect of which expressly excludes from the definition of "solid waste"
those material substances consisting of manure and crop (plant) residues ultimately
returned to the soil at agronomic rates, and agricultural solid waste that is to be managed
and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by IDOA).
The court found sufficient material issues of fact from which to deny DEQ's
motion, as the words themselves created genuine issues of material fact with respect to
their definition and exclusionary intentions, aspects and application, raising questions as
to the application of the words relating to waste, discard, abandon, abandonment,
disposal, crop, plant, plant parts, residue, and operation and site intentions of the land
owner/operator.
The Court elected to refrain from addressing any of the legal defenses raised by
Defendants, as there were other factual issues that prevented summary judgment, and
therefore the court withheld disposition upon Defendant's' legal issues, such as those
addressed in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, to and including the fact DEQ is believed to
lack the required ''standing" to file the action in the first place, by virtue of not only their
regulatory exceptions/exclusions stemming from the very language contained within
DEQ's "solid waste regulations", given the common meaning and understanding that
"grass clippings" and "leaves" are a "plant residue", or a "crop (plant) residue" by any
ordinary use of the words to define the substances, but as importantly there exists a lack
of required standing by virtue of the preliminary barring effects announced through
application of their statutory authority that prevents filing any action, if the facts exist as
set forth in !.C.

§39~108(4),

which arguments Defendants continue to raise and maintain

throughout these proceedings has barred the filing of the action from the inception.
This court has stated in its Memorandum Decision and Order, identified on p. 17,
the following commentary:
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"At one point, Defendants confuse that issue [failing to state a cause of
action because of the exclusions from regulation under IDAPA Rule
58.01,06.001 (03)(b)(ii)&(iii)] with the issue of standing.... A traditional
standing analysis focuses on the party seeking the relief and not on the
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated."
These Defendants are of the belief that the criteria identified in I. C. §39-108(4)
has embraced the enforcement as a "statute of repose" as opposed to a "statute of
limitation, and that brings in the applicable law with respect to the "standing" to be
entitled to seek any relieffor any alleged regulatory violation.
Under the rules of pleading, as identified in Rule 8(a)(l) I.R.C.P., a pleading shall
contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction

depends, when the court be of a limited jurisdiction; and shall state a short and plain
statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief(a standing requirement);
and a demand for judgment for the reliefto which he deems himself entitled.
These Defendants maintain their position they are entitled to the dismissal of this
Amended Complaintthat has been filed by DEQ, under Rule 12(b)(6) I.R.C.P, as the
Department has persisted in their failure to allege a cause of action against Defendants for
which they are entitled to any relief of a nature that can be granted by a court, both as a
factual failure under the IDAPA Rules, and in light of I. C. §39-108(4), which is
perceived to be a statute of repose. Based upon these two specific factors; lack of an
allegation that demonstrates the Department has the required standing under the law,
whereby the Department must allege, as a matter of fact, that the civil proceeding upon
which the Department has alleged a violation of any rule, permit, or order, was not
known to them more than two (2) from when the director had knowledge or ought
reasonably to have had knowledge of the alleged or perceived rule violation.
It should not be looked upon merely as a "statute of limitation"; rather it should

be seen to be a "condition precedent", not just a defense, as the statute says the
Department carrnot bring the civil action under a certain circumstance, and that would
appear to be in the nature of a statute of repose, a "jurisdictional pre-requisite" or precondition to bringing the action, by virtue of the language used in the enactment.
A statute of repose (sometimes called a nonclaim statute), is like a statute of
limitation, but in essence it is a statute that cuts off certain legal rights if they are not
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acted on by a certain deadline. Most courts hold that statutes of repose are distinct from
statutes of limitation. While a statute of limitations sets a lawsuit-filing time limit based
on when the potential plaintiff suffered a harm, a statute of repose sets a deadline based
on the mere passage of time or the occurrence of a certain event that doesn't itself cause
harm or give rise to the potential lawsuit.
Statutes of repose arc historically and traditionally distinct from statutes of
limitation, though their effects are very similar. Deadlines imposed by statutes of repose
are enforced more strictly than those of statutes of limitations. In contrast to a statute of
limitations, a statute of repose "is designed to bar actions after a specified period of time
has run from the occurrence of some event other than the injury which gave rise to the

claim.
•

A statute of limitations focuses on requiring timeliness of action from an injured
party, and thus may potentially be extended where a delay in commencing a legal
action is not the party's fault. The operation of statutes of limitation can be
avoided or tolled by a number of equitable factors, such as minoritv of the injured
party, or attempts by a tortfeasor to conceal evidence of responsibility. Some
statutes of limitation begin to run only after the injured party discovers or
reasonably should have discovered the injury.

•

A statute of repose focuses on immunizing the alleged injuring party from longterm liability, and may be based on elapsed time from an event, even if the
potential cause of action should otherwise exist.

A statute of limitations may start to run at a date other than when a wrongful act or
omission allegedly occurred, or may be extended based upon factors that delay the
reasonable discovery of an injury or the plaintiff's ability to take action, while a statute of
repose is triggered by the completion of an act and is not subject to extension or
exception, unless created in the context as a rebuttable presumption. A typical example,
exists in construction law that when a construction project is "substantially completed," a
statute of repose starts to run for claims relating to defective design or construction.
Although statutes of limitation and statutes of repose are different, sometimes the two
concepts are occasionally confused, sometimes even by legislatures in their enactment of
statutes.
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While the term "statute of limitations" has acquired a precise meaning, distinct
from "statute of repose," and while that is its primary meaning, it must be acknowledged
that the term "statute of limitations" is sometimes used in a less formal way. In that sense,
it can refer to any provision restricting the time in which a plaintiff must bring suit. ...
Congress has used the term "statute of limitations" when enacting statutes of repose. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) (2012 ed.) (creating a statute of repose and
placing it in a provision entitled "Statute of limitations"); 42 U.S.C. § 2278. In many
cases, both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose will apply to the same case, and
a statute of repose may cut off liability even if the statute of limitations has not run. For
example, a defect in an airplane might cause a crash twelve years after the date of initial
sale, with the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim commencing on the date of
the crash, but where a ten year statute of repose on product liability claims will have
already expired. The earlier expiration of the statute of repose will prevent the personal
injury claim even before the statute oflimitations starts to run.
The concept of a statute of repose was discussed and specifically addressed in
Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990), the court stated:

"The provisions of I.C. §6-1403 constitute a statute of repose
limiting recovery for which there would otherwise be liability under the
product liability statutes. I.C. § 6-1403 is not a statute of limitations,
although subsection (3) of the statute does provide a two-year statute of
limitations barr-ing any claim which is filed more than two years from the
time the cause of action accrued. The statute of limitation portion of I. C. §
6-1403 is not involved in this action." ...... .
"Idaho's statute of repose advances a policy of finality in legal
relationships and thus furthers the objective of the legislature by providing
for "the maximum length of time products sellers are subject to liability."
The classification established by LC. § 6-1403 bears a rational relation to
the legislative objective. The statute of repose falls within the "rational
basis" test which is generally appropriate to use when reviewing statutes
which impact social or economic areas and the classification advances
legitimate goals in a rational fashion. Le/hfeld v. Johnson. 104 Idaho 357,
659P.2d 111 (1983) ..... .
"The role of the judiciary is limited when encountering a limitation when
considering legislation, including a statute of repose. The words of former
Chief Justice Donaldson in Leliefeld wan-ant repeating: So long as the
statute is constitutional, we have no intrinsic ability to review its inherent
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wisdom or, if it seems unwise, the power to change it. Whenever lines are
drawn by legislation, some may seem unwise, but the responsibility for
drawing these lines rests with the legislature and judicial review is
limited."
Some jurisdictions have determined that the power to enact statutes of
repose that preclude a cause of action is implicit in the legislature's
power to abolish rights that have not yet vested. Rosenberg v. Town of N.
Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Dague v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 275 Ind. 520,418 N.E.2d 207 (1981). In Rosenberg, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey explained that a cause of action does not accrue until
a careless act results in injury or damage, and observed that the statute in
question, ... does not bar a cause of action; its effect, rather, is to prevent
what might otherwise be a cause of action, from ever arising. Thus injury
occurring more than ten years after the negligent act allegedly responsible
for the harm,forms no basis for recovery. The injured party literally has
no cause of action.... The function of the statute is thus rather to define
substantive rights than to alter or modify a remedy. The Legislature is
entirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no
vested rightis disturbed.
In West v. El Paso Products Co., 122 Idaho 133, 832 P.2d 306 (1992) the court
there stated:
"The appellants filed suit against El Paso on May 16, 1986, within two
years of the accident, but more than twenty years after the reverse switch had
been installed by El Paso. The complaint alleged several causes of action.
Respondent filed its answer on December 4, 1987, alleging fifteen affirmative
defenses, not including the I.C. § 5-241 statute of repose defense which
eventually prevailed. The district court set the case for trial on October II, 1989.
It also set July 7, 1989, as the discovery cut-oil' date. On May 16, 1989, El Paso
filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion did not assert the I.C. § 5-241
defense. The motion for summary judgment was heard on July 31, 1989.
According to the appellants: "[a]fter the discovery cutoff, El Paso filed its Reply
Brief on the eve of the summary judgment hearing, asserting for the first time that
summary judgment was appropriate on the basis of I.C. § 5-241.. .. During the
summary judgmenthcaring, appellants urged the District Court not to consider El
Paso's argument based upon I. C. § 5-241 since El Paso had not pleaded the statute
as an affirmative defense." The matter was taken under advisement by the district
court. Before the court issued its ruling on the motion, El Paso filed a Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Answer in order to assert the I. C. § 5-241 defense.
Appellants opposed the motion. The court granted both the motion to amend and
the motion for summary judgment."
"The summary judgment motion was granted solely on the basis that the
suit was barred by I. C. § 5-241. Appellants then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
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Judgment. They argued that I. C. § 5-241 did not apply and alternatively asked the
court to reopen discovery. The court held that the installation of the switch was an
improvement to property as a matter of law and that I. C. § 5-241 was applicable
to the case. Judgment was entered against the appellants and this appeal timely
followed. The appellants contend that the motion for summary judgment was
improperly granted because I) the district court erred in permitting the defense to
file an amended answer alleging the new affirmative defense, 2) that I.C. § 5-241
is not applicable to this case, and alternatively 3) that I.C. § 5-241, if applied in
this case, would violate the Idaho and United States Constitutions. We are not
persuaded by any of those three grounds taken singly or collectively, and
accordingly affirm the dismissal awarded by Judge Winmill."
A civil action, subject to a statute of repose, may be brought only upon those
limiting factors within the statute. As this statute states: "no civil action may be brought"
and therefore, given the language utilized by the Legislature, the right of action, subject
to the provisions of the repose, may properly be viewed in the context of constituting an
element of standing to bring the action for relief, as there is a period of deadline imposed
as a repose, not to be viewed merely as an "affirmative defense" to an action that has

been otherwise lawfully initiated, but then subject to being estopped for some defensible
reason. This statutory enactment created a "condition precedent" in the form of a statute
of repose, precluding the right to file the action if the Department Dirertor knew or ought
to have known, as there is this condition precedent to the right to file, viewed as a prerequisite to filing the action, as the specific language in I.C.§39-1 08(4) states:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover
for a violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule,
permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than
two (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to
have had knowledge ofthe violation. (Emphasis added).
To allow the Department to tile a "civil proceeding" without declaring, as a
factual allegation, the Director did not have knowledge of or reasonably could have
known of the purported violation for the two years preceding filing the action, that
"condition precedent'' has then been emasculated from remaining a statute of repose, and
deteats that which is intended by the statutory language, and lets DEQ avoid the statutory
pre-requisite entirely, and that factual pre-requisite is not then put at issue from which the
Defendant is entitled to admit or deny the allegation, and thereby prevents that factual
allegation from becoming an issue of fact that must be established at trial.
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Nowhere within Title 39, Ch. I, is that pre-requisite made to be addressed as an
affirmative defense in the nature of a statute oflimitation through Ru1e 8( c), IRCP; rather
it appears to be a jurisdictional condition to the right to file the civil proceeding. It would
similarly appear that the application of the regulatory exemptions of any non-included
"solid" or "solid waste" must be affirmatively alleged not to be the subject of the alleged
violation, as substances in the nature of grass clippings and leaves, being crop (plant)
residue, are expressly declared excluded from rules that apply to what is to be regulated
as a "solid waste" for disposal purposes, as the regulatory rules have been precluded from
application to these composting substances that are subject to regulation by IDOA.
Subject matter jurisdiction must be factually pled, and that is precisely why a
statement as to the grounds ofjurisdiction must be identified in a Pleading, so the issue
of jurisdiction is properly presented to allow the court and the defending parties to
ascertain whether the court has jurisdiction and authority, since jurisdiction can neither be
conferred by agreement or stipulation, and cannot be waived, and is an issue that can be
raisedfvr the first time on appeal. See for example, In re City of Shelley, 151 Idaho 289,
294, 255 P .3d 1175, 1180 (20 II); Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291, 221 P .3d 81,
89 (2009); McClure Engineering, Inc., v. Channel 5KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, !55 P.3d
1189, 1192 (2006); Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012);
Wvodv. Wood, IOO!daho 387,389,597 P.2d 1077,1079 (1979).
As important is the issue of subject matter jurisdiction becomes to the court, the
jimdamental issue that must first be addressed by the Court, is DEQ's lack of standing to
assert an alleged violation as standing is critical to the validity and survivability of any
claim, separate and apart from the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
Most evident from DEQ's Amended Complaint, DEQ has failed to allege the elements
announced under l.C.§39-108(4), to establish the required standing as to their lack of
knowledge of the operation's existence prior to two years before bringing the action.
In the case of Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105,44 P.3d 1157,
1159-1160, (2002) the Court noted the significance and fUndamental importance of
standing:
It is a fundamental tenet of American Jurisprudence that a person
wishing to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing. Standing is a
preliminary question to be determined by this court bejiJre reaching the
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merits of .the case. The doctrine of standing is a subcategory to
justiciability. As this court has previously noted, the doctrine is imprecise
and difficult to apply. Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not
on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. To satisfy the case or
controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate
an injury .in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury. This requires a showing of a distinct
palpable [perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent,
distinct, manifest] injury and fairly traceable casual connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. (Emphasis added)
See also Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011), where
standing was again addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court and reiterated in 20 II.

Our Appellate Courts undertook to emphasize this fundamental issue the
following year, in McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 283 P.3d 742
(2012), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental need for a litigant to
establish and demonstrate standing, before a claim can proceed. It stated:

"In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioner must allege
or demonstrate a distinct palpable injury in fact, [a regulatory violation]
that the injury [violation] is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and
that there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury [regulatory violation]". (Bracketed
reference added)
DEQ personnel (during their Division status with the Dept. of Health and
Welfare), made contact with Mr. Gibson in 1992, at which time he was told by DEQ and
Central District Health officials he needed their "conditional Use Permit" from the
Department of H&W, Division of Environmental Quality, later to become the State
Department, known as DEQ, believing their Agency regulated his operations. It was upon
that pretense, in the spirit of cooperation, Mr. Gibson complied and was immediately
issued their conditional use permit to conduct his on-going composting facilities, even
though he was told by IDOA he was under their exclusive authority.
Mr. Gibson understood from officials at the Department of Agriculture that he did
not need any DEQ agency permission to conduct his agricultural operations, which
included plant and/or crop residues, used in his composting activities on agricultural land,
and what he was doing had been deemed to be a "permitted use" statewide under the
Right to Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act (SAPAA).
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Notwithstanding what he was consistently told, he elected to cooperate with DEQ.
This composting activity has been defined to be an "agricultural operation" as a
matter of state law, as it has been specifically defined by I.C.§22-4502(2), which later
came to include the clarifYing amendment referred to above. None of Mr. Gibson's
operations involved any materials intended for discard or disposal at any disposal site, as
the composted materials are enriched soil and dirt substances in the final analysis,
specifically produced for use as a soil amendment or plant humus additive for foliar plant
growth in agricultural production operations.
His operations, of interest, pre-dated any of DEQ's rule-making processes and
procedures. He has been conducting an agricultural operation even before the enactment
of the Right to Farm Act, (1981) as well as under the Soil and Plant Amendment Act,
when taking effect in 200 I, each of which remain under the jurisdiction and authority of
the Department of Agriculture (IDOA), and nothing he engaged in was ever deemed to be
hazardous substances found to be harmful to humans, animals, their health or the their
envirorunent, and nothing composted is ever discarded or disposed of, or placed as a solid
"waste" at any waste management disposal site.

Mr. Gibson's operations have never been declared to require involvement from
DEQ or any basis for DEQ intervention. All of Mr. Gibson's registration and operational
activities have been deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Department, as
he has always been so informed by the various personnel with the Agriculture
Department over the years.
Notwithstanding the exclusive right of regulation by the Agriculture Department,
m 1992, Mr. Gibson secured the conditional use permit from DEQ/Central District
Health, and when it was issued, he was then told their permit was in perpetuity, and he
did not need to re-apply or renew what was given to him by that Agency.
Thereafter, following 1992, in or around 2002-03, new "rules" were being
considered by the ·Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), becoming a state
department rather than an agency division. DEQ received the records and related documents
evidencing those permitting matters, as the Division documents became the Department
documents. The new DEQ was familiar with the former Agency Division, and the
Director(s) are charged with the knowledge of their files and records.

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM TO SUPPORT MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

P. 15
000902

Mr. Gibson had the occasion to speak with DEQ officials about the newly enacted
IDAPA Regulations in 2003, discussing their management intentions, and Mr. Gibson was
specifically told by the personnel he spoke with at DEQ that he did not need to worry about
or attend any of those discussions or meetings, as nothing in regard to his operation, or the
conditional use perrtlit they had before been given to him, would change in any manner as it
pertained to his existing operations and their knowledge of his composting activities, and no
qualifYing "solid waste" was involved in what his operation entailed.
Historically, back in the year 1993, DEQ (Division of Environmental Quality)
personnel came on site and conducted their "inspection" of his operation to make their
determination as to what his operations involved, which was attended by various officials,
including two individuals he personally knew, Dr. Ronald Baird (Central District Health)
and Mr. Dave Neal (Ada County operations). The third person was a DEQ agent, and
represented himself as an Agency representative. That on-site inspection confirmed that
what he was doing did not require any change in what his operations were, or how he was
conducting those operations, as he was a plant based compost operation.
In late 1994 or early 1995, there was a further inspection conducted by DEQ, and
that inspection included two of the same individuals, along with others from DEQ, and what
was said was they wanted to confirm there was no contamination from the possibility of
other substances that could potentially arrive at the facility, along with any of the grass and
leaf materials. They confirmed and acknowledged Mr. Gibson was processing only grass
clippings and leaves, acquired by him from landscapers, various yard tenders operating
throughout the suminer season, and the annual delivery of leaves delivered to the premises
by ACHD, which leaf materials had been swept from the streets of Boise by ACHD.
That on-site inspection confirmed nothing had changed, and DEQ personnel were
satisfied from whai they observed. That during that 1994-95 inspection, the DEQ personnel
stated to Mr. Gibson, while in the presence of Mr. Garth Sickles, there was no need for any
further inspections ·of those composting operations, as DEQ officials were satisfied the
operations were as they had been, and Mr. Gibson was processing only grass and leaf
materials, and that type of plant residue was of no concern to them, and acknowledged the
materials were not being disposed of at a disposal site, and recognized the substances were
to be used for an agricultural purposes at a future elate.
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DEQ officials later confirmed to Mr. Gibson the materials were not, and would
never become, an environmental concern after 2003, when new regulations were being
processed for waste management, and Mr. Gibson did not hear from anyone further, whether
they be associated with Health & Welfare, DEQ (as either a Division or Department), or
Central District Health, after the discussions in 2003, and not until ten years later, upon
receiving the letter from DEQ on April 2, 2013, following the confirmed statewide
permitted use determination with Ada County that established no conditional use permit
(CUP) was to be required through Ada County to operate a compost site on agricultural land
within Ada County, given the clarifYing legislation enacted on July I, 2011.
The activities of Mr. Gibson's composting operations, on any locations operated by
him, have not changed in the nature of the substances since his operations commenced in
1974. The location, as described in the Amended Complaint, was an expansion to the
operation of his composting operations in 2004, authorized by !.C. §22-4502(2)(a), and this
particular expansion was across the road from the operation commenced in 1991, which
DEQ officials inspected in 1993 and again in 1994-95, as stated above, and the operation on
this current expansion has been identical to that operation commenced in 1991.
DEQ has always been familiar with this current expansion location that commenced
in 2004, as it is perceived by IDOA as an expansion of the 1991 location across the road,
operating under the Right to Farm Act, as cited above. This operation described in the
Amended Complaint, and has been in continuous operation since August, 2004. DEQ was
well aware of it for the almost nine years prior to Mr. Gibson receiving the letter from DEQ
dated April2, 2013.
The provisions of I. C. §39-1 08(4) declares the specific pre-requisite to filing a
complaint (Standing), which DEQ has failed to allege, and these Defendants have been
forced to treat tlus pre-requisite to filing a complaint as though it were instead to be treated
and regarded as a statute of limitations, which Defendants stand by the proposition this
language contained in LC §39-108(4) is more correctly to be applied as a "standing" and
"jurisdictional" issue to be alleged in the pleading, and not to instead be treated as an
aftirmative defense; the manner in which this court appears to require the Defendants to
incorporate the statute to be applied. DEQ cannot assert any right to impose penalties or
fines for any alleged violation of their regulations, if the director knew or ought to have
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known of what is being the alleged violation. DEQ personnel. which the director is charged
with knowing, has been infinitely aware of Mr. Gibson's operations in Ada County, had he
become familiar with their historic files, back in 1992, and aware of the operations in 199495; aware of the further discussions about his operations in 2003; aware of the litigation
from 2009 through 2013; and ought to have been aware Mr. Gibson has been located in the
Gowen Field Desert Front area since 1988, and there can be no dispute DEQ has been aware
of his operations throughout the past quarter century, as DEQ became directly involved in
soliciting his participation in their permitting process in 1992, thereafter participated in the
inspection process in 1993, then again in 1994-95, and had discussions in 2003, and he has
never been held to be in violation of anything at any time by DEQ, and DEQ is estopped
from t.1king any position they were not familiar with his operations and activities.
This April 2, 2013 letter from DEQ, received over twenty years after the initial
inspection in 1992, referred to their "attempted" inspection on March 29, 2013, as DEQ's
Amended Complaint states DEQ "attempted to conduct an inspection" (see Amended
Complaint, P. 3, Par. 10) and from that "attempted inspection": "the Department stafT was
able to observe from the public roadway and the driveway prior to any gate or fence, large
piles and windrows of grass clippings, leaves, and other organic materials ... "; however,
nothing in that "observation" of an "attempted inspection" could identifY any "waste
disposal" material, or any violation of a "solid waste" management rule, as nothing was
being discarded or abandoned in the form of a "solid waste". What could only have been
seen from the road was rows of"soil substance", and no other specific material.
The two year statutory bar to bring an action as precluded in I. C. §39-1 08(4), had
expired five times over, if not 10 times over, if the "alleged" violation is claimed existed
since 1992, as nothing in the operation changed in any manner since their on-site inspection
in 1992. That is confirmed by the subsequent inspections in 1993 and 1994-95, and the tina!
discussions that took place in 2003.
If DEQ's ''alleged" violation became known from the on-site inspection on March
29, 2013, that woilld be another of their inaccurate statements, as they had aerial
photographs in their department files, showing county wide activity in prior years, and as
recently as 2012, preceding the two year statutory bar. Additionally, DEQ has not identified
anything present on the property within the regulatory provisions of their own rules, as their
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claimed "observation" is exempt within their IDAPA Rules and Regulations. If they claim a
"violation" irom the inspection of March 29, 2013, it could only be based upon what was
seen in photographs taken years before, as those photographs prompted the inspection,
following a twenty year lapse of any inspection since 1994-95, and a ten year lapse in any
further discussion, following the 2003 exchange with Mr. Gibson, and the operation has not
changed or been conducted in any manner inconsistent with the ongoing process that was
observed in 1992, 1993, and 1994-95 inspections, and aerial photographs, including those
taken as recently as 2012, confirmed this operation to be what it has always been for over
four decades. The relevant portion of this statute of repose, (4) being a bar to filing the
complaint, is contained within the statutory language, identified in the excerpts cited below:
39-108. INVESTIGATION -- INSPECTION -- RIGHT OF ENTRY -VIOLATION-- ENFORCEMENT-- PENALTY-- INJUNCTIONS. (l) The director
shall cause investigations to be made upon receipt of in(ormation
concerning an alleged violation of this act or of anv rule, permit or
order promulgated thereunder, and mav cause to be made such other
investigations as the director shall deem advisable. ....

(c) All inspections and investigations conducted under the

authority of this chapter shall be per(ormed in con(ormity with the
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in
the [ourth' amendment to the constitution of the United States and
section 17, article I, o(the constitution ofthe state of Idaho. The state
shall not, under the authority granted by this chapter, conduct
warrantless searches ofprivate property in the absence of either consent
from the property owner or occupier or exigent circumstances such as a
public health or environmental emergency;
(d) Any district court in and (or the county in which the subject
property is located is authorized to issue a search warrant to the director
upon a showing of (i) probable cause to suspect a violation, or (iii the
existence of a reasonable program of inspection. Any search warrant
issued under the authority ofthis chapter shall be limited in scope to the
specific purposes (or which it is issued and shall state with specificity the
manner and the scope ofthe search authorized.
(31 Whenever the director determines that anv person is in
violation of any provision o(this act or any rule, permit or order issued
or promulgated pursuant to this act, the director may commence either
ofthe (ollowing: ...... .
(b) Civil enforcement action. The director may initiate a civil
enforcement action through the attorney general as provided in section 39109, Idaho Code. Civil enforcement actions shall be commenced and
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prosecuted in the district court in and for the county in which the alleged
violation occurred and may be brought against any person who is alleged
to have violated any provision of this act or any rule, permit or order
which has .become effective pursuant to this act. Such action may be
brought to compel compliance with any provision of this act or with any
rule, permit or order promulgated hereunder and for any relief or remedies
authorized in this act. The director shall not be required to initiate or
prosecute an administrative action before initiating a civil enforcement
action.

(4!

No civil or administrative proceeding may he

brought to recover (or a violation o(any provision ofthis chapter or a
violation of any rule, permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to
this chapter more than two (2) years a(ter the director had knowledge or
ougllt reasonablv to have had knowledge o[the violation.
There has been no actual inspection and no disclosure of any investigation made
upon any receipt of information concerning any alleged violation of the act, or rule,
permit or order, to cause any investigation by the director. If there has been any violation,
it would have been known during the 1992, 1993 and 1994-95 inspections, and addressed
in the 2003 discussions, as they are identical operations, which have been known to the

director, or the director would have reasonably known of a violation back in 1992,
1993, and in 1994-95, as well as from the 2003 discussions and/or any aerial
photographs over the years, taken as recently as 2012, preceding the on-site inspection.
The statutory pre-requisite announced in I.C. §39-108(4) has precluded this
unfounded violation that DEQ has alleged in their Amended Complaint, founded upon
something other than an actual "inspection" or an actual "investigation".
These allegedly "observed" substances (grass clippings and leaves) as adopted
and implement by DEQ in 2003, did not give rise to any basis of any investigation, or
give rise to the basis for any inspection, and more to the point, there has been neither an
inspection or any investigation upon any information of an "alleged violation", as those
substances remain specifically excluded since enacting the 2002-03 regulations, as
confirmed to Mr. Gibson in 2003, and still maintained by the following language: These

rules do 11ot apply to the (o/lowing solid waste .. .ii. Manures and crop (olant) residues
ultimately retumed to the soils at agronomic rates; and ... iii. Anv agricultural solid
waste that is ma11aged and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho
Department ofAgriculture.
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There is a specific reference to the exemptions and exclusions in their '"Solid
Waste Management Rules and Regulations" to those exempt and excluded substances
that come under "crop (plant) residue", and Anv agricultural solid waste that is

managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted bv the Idaho Department of
Agriculture.
An observation of

"grass clippings and leaves", by every definition, are

substances that fall within "crop and plant residue", it has not changed during the past
four decades, and not since the past two decades from the initial inspection in 1992, and
"grass clippings and leaves" remains to be the only material observed by DEQ stati
personnel in this "attempted inspection" and upon what basis can there be any violation
when there is no "inspection" to have taken place to verify any violation.
Their Amended Complaint, Par. 13, page 4, refers only to "grass clippings and

leaves", commonly understood to be included within the meaning of a crop, or of a plant
residue", and that was the only "substances" to have been "observed" on the "property"
in any years, whether by aerial photograph in 2012, or the inspection in 2013, just as it
has been before, back to DEQ's first inspection in 1992. There has only been these "grass
clippings and leaves", as no other "organic material (such as manure, animal flesh, or
animal carcasses) ever brought to the com posting operation, or ever contained in the piles
or rows of materials observed on the "property", and what materials DEQ personnel
observed in 2013 is the very substances DEQ specifically excluded and exempted from
the "solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations.
It becomes rather disingenuous for DEQ to claim their Agency conducted an

inspection to find a violation, when no actual inspection has ever taken place; just
observation of aerial photography and looking from a road into the area of the operation,
no information about any investigation has ever been disclosed, and there has been no
demonstration that. the exclusions affecting their "scope of authority" to regulate grass
clippings and leaves has ever been modified, let alone alleged not to be a qualifying
criteria to the exclusion under the rules.
Any "tier" references to the size of the exempted substances and composting
activity of existing operations about which they have had knowledge for in excess of
decades is not controlling as to the application of the statutory "standing" bar, and the
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definition of solids to which the rules do not apply. The Agency must adhere to their own
statutory bar, and the provisions and IDAPA enactments as intended in 2002-03.
Additionally, and as Mr. Gibson has made clear to the DEQ personnel, this grass
and leaf substance is not being "disposed of' like substances at a landfill, but rather
processed as a compost product for later application as a soil amendment, as
contemplated in the. Soil and Plant Amendment Act enacted by the Idaho Legislature in
200 I, following the earlier enactment of the Right to Farm Act, enacted in 1981, and
recently clarified to emphasize the inclusion and application to all aspects of composting,
through the clarifying amendment that went into effect in July, 2011. I. C.§ 22-4502(2)(d)
confirm these "agricultural operations" include, "plant compost", as declared in the
following language:
22-4502. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
(I) "Agricultural facility" includes, without limitation, any land, building,
structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance, machinery or equipment that is
used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation" means an activity or condition that occurs in
connection with the production of agricultural products for food, fiber, fuel and other
lawful uses, and includes, without limitation:
(a) Construction, expansion, use, maintenance and repair of an agricultural facility;
(b) Preparing land for agricultural production;
(c) Applying pesticides, herbicides or other chemicals, compounds or substances labeled
for insects, pests, crops, weeds, water or soil;
@ Planting, irrigating, growing, fertilizing, harvesting or producing agricultural,
horticultural, floricultural and viticultural crops, fruits and vegetable products, field
grains, seeds, hay, sod and nursery stock, and other plants, plant products, plant
byproducts, plant waste and plant compost; ....
This statute was amended several times since its enactment in 1981, starting with
the initial enactment of 22-4502, when it was added in 1981, ch. 177, sec. 1, p. 311; then
amended in 1997, ch. 341, sec. 1, p. 1025; then amended in 1999, ch. 377, sec. 1, p. 1035;
and last an1ended in 2011, ch. 229, sec. 1, p. 623. The last amendment made in 2011 was
undertaken pursuant to RS20384, therein stating the "Statement of Purpose" to be:
The purpose of this legislation is to strengthen Idallo's Right to
Farm Act by: (1) more comprehensively defining the agricultural activities
to which the protections to the Act apply; (2) providing that the
protections of the Act apply to expansions to agriculture activities; ....
These changes are based upon provisions to Right to Farm Acts of several
other states.
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The Legislative findings and intent was previously expressed in I. C. § 22450 l to be as follows:
22-4501. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT........ The
legivlature also finds that the right to (arm is a natural right and is
recognized as a permitted use throughout the state of Idaho. (Italic,
highlight and underlining added for emphasis)
Each of the statutory enactments (Right to Farm and Soil and Plant Amendment
Acts) were made congruent with respect to composting activities, operations, and site
facilities, confirmed the authority of IDOA, and that Department has armually registered
Mr. Gibson's composted products and continuously aware of his composting operation.
DEQ never before contemplated becoming involved with composting activities,
confirmed by theirdiscussions in 2003, and have ignored him entirely since 2003, until
2013. That during the conversation with DEQ personnel in 2003, DEQ personnel
acknowledged the existence of the pre-emptive and exclusionary effects contained within

their management rules, and as they acknowledged that concept in their discussion. Those
discu.ssions confirmed the 2003 adoption had specifically exempted composting of plant
substances. Mr. Gibson specifically discussed the exclusions and exemptions in the
regulatory provisions when the regulations were adopted in 2003, and the effect of that
dialogue was thought to have brought closure to the subject of his operations.
For DEQ to claim Mr. Gibson is now in violation, knowing their statutory bar has
precluded this lawsuit by virtue of I. C. §39-l 08( 4), and further precluded by their very
owu IDAP A Rules, they would need to demonstrate what changed in the law or his
operations since the historic inspections in 1993, 1994-95, and the representations made
by DEQ in 2003, and demonstrate how the IDAPA Rules have been modified to remove
the exclusion and .exemption discussed in 2003, when officials acknowledged grass
clippings/leaves are a crop (plant) residue substance, and composting such substances
were excluded from regulation. Not only is ''Disposal" not what is occurring in this
situation, but the substances pose no harm to human or animal health or the environment,
as they consist of the same substance found to be soil and typical dirt, with concentrated
nutrients, to be tised as plant and soil additives and amendments, critical to crop
production in the agricultural industry. The Department of Agricultural even addressed
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the subject and strengthened that as being an agricultural activity by the two enactments
mentioned above, and confirmed to be under the jurisdiction of IDOA.
If DEQ is granted authority to regulate what currently the IDAP A rules has
excluded from their regulatory authority, and pursue every homeowner who elects to
make enriched soil from their composted grass clippings, tree and shrub plants, leaves,
and landscape trimmings, their alleged liability would be subject to exclusion only upon
an arbitrary reference to size criteria, and that becomes an impossibility of enforcement
because the substance is in the process of going from plant residue to dirt and soil
composition, never a waste substance or material, and never discarded, as the sole
intention will be to incorporate the material back into the ground surface as an enriching
humus

soil additive substance, never classified by any homeowner as a waste for

disposal, as there is no hazardous substance or material declared to be dangerous to
human health in any such operation or activity.

CONCLUSION
DEQ lacks any "relief' standing under Idaho Law to initiate this suit against these
Defendants as:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to
recover for a violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any
rule, permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more
than two (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to
have had knowledge of the violation;
Furthermore, there exists no basis to seek any claim of a violation of regulatory
provisions of solid waste materials, when these substances are not waste, and declared
exempt from waste disposal materials, never intended to regulate substances that constitute
enhanced "soil substances".
These Defendants rely upon the exclusionary provisions of the IDAPA Rules, and
the barring effects of I.C.§39-108(4), along with the fact these materials are merely a
composition of soil substances, not waste of any kind, and never contemplated to be
discarded or abandoned" material in the context of a "solid waste" deposited at a
disposal site that would be subject to the DEQ Regulations, and the explicit language
and nullifying effects of Title 22, Chapters 22 and 45, Statutes of the State of Idaho,
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including LC.§22-4502(1)(2)(d)(producin
exclusive authority and jurisdiction ofiD A.
Respectfully submitted this ll'h day of

tember,

V emon K. Smith, attorney
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 11th day of September, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at
following addresses as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax

Cynthia Y ee-Wallace
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2"d Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 702
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Defendants.
Defendants.

Plaintiff Idaho Department of Environmental Quality submits the following third
amended list of exhibits to be offered at the trial in this matter. Plaintiff reserves the right to offer
any
any exhibits which may be needed for rebuttal purposes at trial. Plaintiff reserves the right to
supplement, amend and/or
and/0r edit this list in advance of trial. Plaintiff puts Defendants on notice
and reserves the right to use any
at trial.
case as
as evidence at
any pleading, filing, or submission in this case
The property at
at issue in this lawsuit is described as
as the West Half of the Northwest Quarter,
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Section 5,
2 North, Range 2
2 East of the Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho, upon
5, Township 2
which Defendant Gibson operates. Hereafter, this property is
is referred to as
as the “Smith
Property.”
No.

Description

Offer

Stip

Object

Decline

Admit

1.
1. Letter dated April 2,
2, 2013, from Jack Gantz to
Dave Gibson, with attachment (map)
(map)
2.
2. Letter dated April 17,
17, 2015, from Vernon K. Smith
to DAG Darrell G. Early, with attachment
(Answer to Complaint, Affirmative
Afﬁrmative Defenses and
Counterclaim dated April 17,
17, 2015)
3.
3. Letter dated May 8,
8, 2013, from Jack Gantz to
Dave Gibson ,, with attachment (emails)
4.
4. Certified mailing receipt dated May 13,
13, 2013
5.
5. Memorandum dated July 26,
26, 2013, from Orville
Green, DEQ,
DEQ, and DAG Susan Hamlin to Curt
Fransen,
F ransen, DEQ Director, with attachment (Notice
of Violation issued to David Robert Gibson dated
and signed July 30,
30, 2013)
6.
6. Letter dated July 31,
31, 2013, from Michael
McCurdy, DEQ,
DEQ, to David Gibson, with attachment
(Notice of Violation issued to David Robert
Gibson dated and signed July 30,
30, 2013)
7.
7. Letter dated August 19,
19, 2013, from David Gibson
to Dean Ehlert, DEQ
8.
8. Letter dated September 10,
10, 2013, from DAG
Susan Hamlin to David Gibson

9.
9. Letter dated September 24,
24, 2013, from David
Gibson to DAG Susan Hamlin
10.
10. [Reserved]
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11. 2013 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
11.
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
With
with the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP
GEOTIFF 20130830

,

12.
12. 2015 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property, with Authenticity of Digital Imagery
with the USGS Archive and metadata – NAIP
With
GEOTIFF 20150613

,

13.
13. 2017 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
Property
14. 2017 Aerial Photograph that includes Smith
14.
Property

15.
15. [Reserved]
16.
16. Photographs of Smith Property
Propeny dated February 22,
22,
2017
16.1
16.1

signage/shed1
signage/shedl

16.2
16.2

signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1

16.3
16.3

shed1
shedl from road

16.4
16.4

signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“fees”/shed1

16.5
16.5

signage/“follow arrow”

16.6
16.6

signage/arrow/piles

16.7
16.7

compost rows

16.8
16.8

compost rows

16.9
16.9

compost rows

16.10
16.10 road to site
16.11 compost rows
16.11

16.12
16.12 compost rows
16.13
16.13 compost rows
17.
17. Photographs of Smith Property taken on August
201 7
14,
14, 2017
17.1
17.1

signage/“open” and shed1
shedl

17.2
17.2

signage/shed1/sign
signage/shedl/sign in & fees
fees
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17.3
17.3

signage/shed1.all

17.4
17.4

here”/shed1
signage/“sign in here”/shed1

17.5
17.5

“notice”/shed1
signage/“fees” and “notice”/shed1

17.6
17.6

signage/“fees”/shed1
signage/“
fees”/shed1

17.7
17.7

entry1/no
branches/open/arrow
arrow
entryl/no branches/open/

17.8
17.8

signage/follow arrow

17.9
17.9

compost rows

17.10
17.10 compost rows/space
17.11
17.11 compost rows/spaces
17.12 shed/GMC truck/shed2
17.12
truck/shedZ

signage/“fees”/shed2
17.13
17.13 signage/“fees”/shed2

17.14
branches”/shed2
17.14 signage/“no
signage “no branches”/shed2
17.15
17.15 signage/“portals”/shed2
signage/“notice”/shed2
17.16
17.16 signage/“notice”/shed2

17.17
17.17 row/GMC truck/no
truck/n0 branches
17.18
17.18 tank
17.19
17.19 compost row
17.20
17.20 equipment/conveyor belt
17.21
17.21 equipment/conveyor belt
17.22
17.22 equipment/green
equipment/ green boxes
17.23
17.23 equipment/boxes and tank
17.24
17.24 equipment/screener
17.25
17.25 equipment/red truck
17.26
17.26 equipment/white truck
17.27
17.27 mobile structure
17.28
17.28 loader
17.29
17.29 equipment/screener
17.30
17.30 tank
17.31
17.31 equipment/red trailer
18.
18. Video of Smith Property taken on August 14,
14, 2017
19.
19. Printout of Black Diamond Compost Company
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website details (www.blackdiamondcompost.com)
(wwwblackdiamondcompost.com)
printed March 29,
29, 2013
20. Printout of Black Diamond Compost Company
website details (www.blackdiamondcompost.com)
(wwwblackdiamondcompost.com)
printed March 4,
4, 2015 and copy
copy of Black Diamond
Compost Company brochure
21. Ada County Highway District Annual Report
Information FY:
21.1
21.1

FY 2004-2005

21.2

FY 2005-2006

21.3

FY 2006-2007

21.4

FY 2007-2008

21.5

FY 2008-2009

21.6

FY 2009-2010

21.7

2010-2011
FY 2010-2011

21.8

FY 2011-2012

21.9

FY 2013

21.10 FY 2014
21.11
21.11 FY 2015
22. Boise City receipt for payment to Dave Gibson
23. Boise City receipt for payment to Dave Gibson
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
31.
32.
33.
34.
34.
35.
36.
37.
37.

[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
[Reserved]
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38. [Reserved]
39. [Reserved]
40. Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll Cost Fee Schedule
41. Ada County Landfill
Landﬁll Cost Fee Schedule
Landﬁll Costs Fee Schedule
42. Ada County Landfill

43. Photographs that include Smith Property
Propelty
44. Certificate
ﬁled
Certiﬁcate of Assumed Business Name filed
November 29,
29, 2006, for Black Diamond Compost
Products
45. Order on Motion Under Rule 70(b)
70(b) of the Idaho
CiVil Procedure, Vesting All Real and
Rules of Civil
Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal
Representative dated June 2,
2, 2017, in In the
the
Estate
of
Victoria
H. Smith,
Matter of
Victoria
H.
Smith, Fourth
of
of
Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case No. CVIE-2014-15352
46. Judgment on Motion Under Rule 70(b)
70(b) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil
CiVil Procedure, Vesting All Real
and Personal Property of the Estate in the
Personal Representative, dated June 2,
2, 2017, in
In the Matter of
H. Smith,
Victoria H.
Smith,
of the Estate of
of Victoria
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case
No. CV- IE-2014-15352
47. Quit Claim Deed conveying the real
property
is the subject of this matter
propeny which is
to VHS Properties, LLC, recorded October
24,
24, 2014
48. Affidavit of David R. Gibson filed September
30,
K.
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
30, 2010, in Ada County v.
of Vernon
Smith,
Smith, et al.,
011., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada
County, Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
49. Affidavit
Afﬁdavit of Vernon K. Smith filed
ﬁled September
30,
K.
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
30, 2010, in Ada County v.
of Vernon
Smith,
Smith, et al.,
011., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada
CV-OC-2010-02298
County, Case
Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
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50. Memorandum Decision and Order filed
ﬁled December
1,
K.
Vernon K.
v. Estate of
1, 2010, in Ada County v.
of Vernon
Smith,
Smith, et al.,
011., Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada
County, Case No. CV-OC-2010-02298
51. Transcript of Hearing dated November 7,
7, 2011, in
Vernon
K.
Smith,
et al.,
Vernon
Ada County v.
v. Estate of
K.
Smith,
011.,
of
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case
No. CV-OC-2010-02298
52. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Criminal
Contempt Charges filed
ﬁled December 10,
10, 2012, in
K. Smith,
Vernon K.
Ada County v.
v. Estate of
Smith, et al.,
011.,
of Vernon
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Case
Case
No. CV-OC-2010-02298
53. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 –7 Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2017
54. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 –7 Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2013
55.
55. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 –7 Solid Waste
Management Rules),
Rules), 2014
56. Idaho Administrative Code 58,
01, Chapter
58, Title 01,
06 (Idaho Admin. Code 58.01.06 –7 Solid Waste
Management Rules), 2015
57. Processing (Composting) Facility Guidance
and Checklists for Tier II and Tier III
Processing Facilities, State of Idaho,
Department of Environmental Quality, October
2013
58.
58. Google Earth printout of Gibson’s operation
58.1
58.1
58.2
58.3

April 2013 Google Earth printout of
Gibson’s operation
August 2013 Google Earth printout
of Gibson’s operation
2017 Google Earth printout of
Gibson’s operation
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59. [Reserved]
DATED September 12,
12, 2017.
SSTATE
TATE OF IIDAHO
DAHO
O
FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE

By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that September 12,
12, 2017, I filed the foregoing electronically through
the iCourt E-File system,
be served by
by
system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be
electronic means, as
Notification of Service:
reﬂected on the Notiﬁcation
Service:
as more fully reflected
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

US. Mail
E U.S.
|X| Hand Delivery
IXI ICourt E-File
Facsimile:
Facsimile: (208)
(208) 345-1129
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/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Attorney General
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208)345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) CaseNo. CVOC-1503540
)
MEMORANDUM IN
)
SUPPORT OF MOTION
)
TO STRIKE TESTIMONY
)
OF DEAN ELHERT FOR
)
VIOLATION OF I.C. §39)
108(2)( c)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
This matter went to trial, commencing September 13, 2017, upon the civil lawsuit filed by
the Depru1ment of EriVironmental Quality (DEQ), wherein the Department has alleged a
violation of the Solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations that had been adopted by DEQ
in or around 2003. The fi!'St witness that was called to testify by DEQ was Mr. David R. Gibson,
called by the Department as an adverse witness, being one of the named Defendants in the civil
lawsuit. The second witness then called by the Department was Mr. Dean Elhert, an agent and
Official with the Department of Environmental Quality.
Mr. Elhert confinned he and another DEQ Official went out to inspect Mr. Gibson's
composting facility and operation located off of Pleasant Valley Road, south of Boise, Idaho, in
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an area accessed by proceeding west on what is refened to as the Lake Hazel Extension, which
allows access to tins agricultural property, consisting of 520 acres, where there is located this
agricultural facility and operation, consisting of approximately I 0 acres located on the corner of
the larger acreage, consisting of 520 acres.
Mr. Elbert testified as to the occasion from which certain information had been relayed to
him, through Jack Gantz, another DEQ Official, who had obtained certain information as a result
of a discussion in the course of a conversation that Mr. Gantz previously had with a Mr. Devon
Downs, who is the owrier of Tree Top Recycling, Inc., another composting facility located in
south Ada County. The substance of the information from Mr. Gantz included reference to a
comment purportedly made by Mr. Downs to another Official, to the effect that if you want to
talk about ;;odor", go check out the operations of "Diamond Street" or "Black Diamond
Composting" operations, as those composting activities may have an odor that may be of interest
or concem to DEQ.
There was no written Report made of tllls conversation with Mr. Downs, and Mr. Elhert
never took the occasion to investigate the basis for any such statement, or even if it had been
made, or to determine the nature of events that may have given rise to make any such a comment,
as was purportedly conveyed by Mr. Downs. Mr. Elhert never undertook even the opportunity to
call or engage in a direct contact with Mr. Downs, as if a "complaint" was being lodged, there
was need to t11en investigate the basis for the complaint, not just a ;;passing comment", and to
determine if the comment had actually been expressed, as suggested by Mr. Gantz, and to then
detetmine what may have been the reason for such a comment, and most inlportantly, to
determine if that statement, if actually made in the specific context to be of a ;;complaining
concern", had a sufficient basis for the Department to lodge an ;;official complaint" with DEQ,
hom which an official investigation may then be opened and an inspection pursued.
None of that pn)cess or procedure took place, and instead, the testimony adduced at trial
detem1ined no written complaint was ever filed or lodged by Mr. Downs, and no written
reference to disclose the course of events ever reflected any "official" investigation and
inspection of the Gibson operation and facility took place for that purpose on March 29, 2013.
As important as it should be to docwnent official activity of SEQ, there has never been any
written Report of any ;"official" investigation of the Gibson facility, which ostensibly occuned,
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based upon the hearsay statement communicated to Mr. Elhert that there was a comment about
an "odor", despite the fact no such odor was found to be of any concern to DEQ.

It is to be noted that DEQ, though having initially disclosed Mr. Gantz as a witness that
was to testifY in this case, once disclosed through cross-examination of Mr. Elbert the
provisions ofi.C. §39'1 08(2)(c) has been callously violated, the Department declined to call Mr.
Gantz as a witness, well knowing he too would be cross-examined, starting with the "odor"
issue and the pwportcd comment as being portrayed by Mr. Elhert, as the Department elected
to leave the testimony of Mr. Elhert in the context of a "hearsay statement", and not taken for
the truth of the matter stated.
Consequently, the trial record in this case has no live testimony of Mr. Jack Gantz, from
which the opportunity to confirm the fact there was never any such a statement or "complaint"
made by Mr. Downs,. and had it come to pass that Mr. Gantz were of the mind to suggest
otherwise, Mr. Downs would have been called as a rebuttal witness to establish the fact no such
statement, comment or complaint was ever made to DEQ Officials, from which any lawful basis
even existed to conduct any "inspection" or "investigation" of the Gibson facility in the first
instance. There was no issue of an "odor" to investigate, as no odor was emanating from the
lawful agricultural operations of Mr. Gibson, regulated by the Department of Agriculture.
THE ILLEGAL ENTRY AND SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF IDAHO LAW
On March 29, 2013, Messrs. Elbert and Gantz went onto the site of the composting
facility operated by Mr. Gibson, referred to at times as the "Black Diamond Composting
Facility", a composting facility located south of Boise, off of Pleasant Valley Road, along Lake
Hazel Extension, in the Gowen Field Desert Front Area, where Mr. Gibson conducts an
"agricultural operation and agricultural facility" (see I.C.§22-4502(1 )&(2)(d)&(f)) on
agricultural lands as detined by the Planning and Zoning Department of Ada County, Idaho.
On this .property, Mr. Gibson is operating a composting facility that has been in existence
and ongoing under his supervision since August, 2004. These agricultural activities has
established an agricultural facility has been an open and well known composting operation to
the general public, to Ada County officials, specifically including the Ada County
Developmental Services (ACDS), the Ada County Commissioners, the Ada County Civil
Division, the Officials with the Stale of Idaho, Department of Agriculture (IDOA, also called
ISDA), the State of Idaho, Department of Central District Health (ICDH), the Ada County
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Highway District (ACHD), the former State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare,
Division of Environmental Quality (H&W/DEQ), ever since 1992, and thereafter throughout the
transition of the new Department, identified as the State ofidaho, Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) enacted by the Idaho Legislature and established in 2000.
At this facility there has been the historic and on-going composting of grass
clippings and leaves that are processed by Mr. Gibson, which he commenced in that area in

1988, and continuously thereafter, resulting in the expansion onto this property in 2004, as an
expansion of other operations that have been on-going since 1974 on various sites in Ada
County. These operations and facilities have been declared to be agricultural operations and
activities by the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), and Mr. Gibson has been registered
with the Agricultural pepartment for many years, pursuant to the Soil and Plant Amendment
Act (SAP AA) that was enacted by the Idaho Legislature back in 2001.
The comp 0sted substances located on this premises are humus enriched "soil" and
"dirt" substances, all of which has been processed solely to be applied back onto these
agricultural lands, into the soil at an agronomic rate, as a soil amendment and as a plant foliar
application for growth enhancement and development purposes of nursey, tree and agricultural
crops, imended for application and use on this entire 520 acres of agricultural land owned by
VHS Properties, LLC (title to which has recently been placed in

litigation and currently

pending appeal).
There has never been any complaint lodged by any person, entity, or agency, with
Central District Health, or either the Division of, or the Department of, Enviromnental Quality,
concerning "odor", until this "undocumented" issue over "odor" carne about in the spring, 2013,
that resulted in what has been confirmed at these trial proceedings to have been an illegal and
w1lawful "inspection" of this property and premises, where Mr. Elbert claims he was informed
by Mr. Gantz there was an "odor" emanating from Gibson's operation, despite the fact their
presence on the property and premises confirmed no odor was present to concern them, as no
envirollillental issue of an "odor" exists, as these composting facilities, as Mr. Gibson does not
incorporate any animal substances or offensive odor releasing substances (such as manure or
animal carcasses, each, of which are deemed agricultural products and referred to as animal
wastes). Mr. Gibson has conducted and processed soil amendments generated from the use of
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grass clippings and leaves only, from which no offensive odor or air quality control issues are
created in the decomposition process of these plant residues.
There has never been any alleged environmental or health hazard issue, or even any
"odor" issues raised from any of these composting operations in all these years of operation at
any facility operated and supervised by Mr. David R. Gibson from 1974 to the present date.
The testimony elicited from Mr. Elhert on September 13, 2017 has confirmed no Official
associated with the Department of Environmental Quality had secured any permission or
consent from the property owner, the facility operator, or undertook to secure a search warrant
from the disttict court, from which any right to enter onto and upon the property and premises
was allowed. Messrs. Elhert and Gantz engaged in any inspection of the site, property, and
premises, knowingly in violation of the statute, I. C. §39-1 08(2)(c).
There was no legal or factual basis for any entry, and the statutory requirements
pertaining to the authority of the Department of Environmental Quality Officials was known to
them, which specifically limits and restricts any lawful basis to enter onto and upon any such
properties and premises, for the purpose of conducting an inspection and investigation in
relation to its condition, operation and activity, conducted under the exclusive statutory
authority and source of authorization established under Idaho law.
Notwithstanding the restraints established by the statutory mandates that controls that
exclusively means to authorize any such inspections and investigations, these two DEQ
Officials. Messrs. Elbert and Gantz, in the absence of permission, consent or an issued search
warrant, entered upon the property and premises to conduct an inspection and investigation in
relation to what was purportedly represented to be an alleged "odor" violation of a health and
environmental air quality matter, purportedly stemming from an "undocumented" complaint;
that these Oftlcials were acting upon the unverified comment purportedly made, and upon a
statement of a certain "hearsay" nature, the substar1ce of which gave rise to what they perceived
to have been meant to alert them as to an air quality concem, which thereafter, without any
factual basis or complaint, not only went onto and upon the property and premises that
detem1ined no such odor existed, but then undertook to expand their inspection and
investigation, also in complete absence of any complaint or former surveillance activities, to
consider "inquiry'' intb the possibility of a violation pertaining to IDAPA Rules and Regulations
pertaining to Solid Waste Management disposal sites, erroneously perceiving this
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operation and facility was a "disposal" site, notwithstanding the fact the facility was not a
disposal site, and the. regulation of composting facilities rested with the Department of
Agriculture, which agency had the jurisdictional and statutory authority over such agricultural
operations, activities and facilities, and such "agricultural facilities" and "agricultural
operations", are defined in LC.§22-4502(d)&(f), under the exclusive jurisdiction, regulation, and
control of the Idaho Depmtment of Agriculture, with whom all of Gibson's operations,
processed products, and activities are registered with IDOA under the Soil and Plant
Amendment Act that was adopted by the Idaho Legislature in 200 I.
That all inspections and investigations conducted by DEQ Officials, pursuant to their
statutory authority, are subject to, and unconditionally restrained by those statutory restrictions
contained in LC.§39-1 08(2)(c), specifically stating:
39-108. Investigation -- Inspection-- Right of entry -- Violation-- Enforcement -- Penalty
-- Injunctions. (1) The director shall cause investigations to be made upon receipt of
information concerning an alleged violation of this act or of any rule, permit or order
promulgated thereunder, and may cause to be made such other investigations as the
director shall deem advisable.
(2) For the purpose of enforcing any provision of this chapter or any rule authorized in this
chapter, the director br the director's designee shall have the authority to:
(a) Conduct a progrmn of continuing surveillance and of regular or periodic inspection
of actual or potential environmental hazards, air contamination sources, water
pollution sources and of solid waste disposal sites;
(b) Enter at all reasonable times upon any private or public property, upon presentation of
appropriate credentials, for the purpose of inspecting or investigating to ascertain possible
violations of this act or of rules, permits or orders adopted and promulgated by the director
or the board;
•
(c) All inspections and investigations conducted under the authority ofthis chapter shall
be performed in cim(ormity with the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the constitution o(the United States and
section 17, article I, oftl1e constitution ofthe state ofldalw. The state shall not, under
the autlwritv granted bv this chapter, conduct warrantless searches of private property
in the absence of either consent (rom the property owner or occupier or exigent
circumstances such as a public health or environmental emergency;
(d) Any district court in and for the county in which the subject property is located is
authorized to issue a search warrant to the director upon a showing of (i) probable cause
to suspect a violation, or (ii) the existence of a reasonable program of inspection. Any
search warrant issued under the authoritv ofthis chapter shall be limited in scope to the
specific purposes (or which it is issued and shall state with specificity the manner and
the scope ofthe search authorized.
(3) Whenever the director determines that any person is in violation of any provision of
this act or any rule, pem1it or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this act, the director
may commence either of the following:
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At the completion of this trial, the Court addressed the Motion to Strike the testimony of
Mr. Dean Elhert, stemming from the revelation adduced during the presentation of testimony by
Mr. Elbert, and Defendants' motion to strike his testimony, as it was only on court it was
represented for the first time by any DEQ Officials that the provisions of!. C. §39-l08(2)(c) had
been violated, and by agreement of the court and counsel, the matter was to be further briefed by
the parties, and a further hearing was scheduled on the matter for October 10, 2017.
During that soliloquy with the court, the court made reference to the case of United States v.
Janis, 428 US. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976), inquiring as to the effect and

impact, if any, to the issue then facing this court in relation to Defendants' Motion to Strike the
testimony of Mr. Elhert.
The Janis case was decided by the United States Supreme Court two years before the
Barlow case, entitled Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305

(1978). Janis came from the ninth circuit, out of California, and Barlow came from the ninth
circuit, out of Idaho, each addressing aspects of unlawful search and seizure by governmental
agencies, but neither case presenting an issue involving a controlling statute that mandates the
method of any inspections and investigations conducted by the Officials on private property and
commercial business premises. The Idaho statute, I. C. §39-1 08(2)(c), directly and specifically
controls the conduct. of the state actor (DEQ Officials), dictating how and w1der what
circumstances. the official may enter upon property to conduct an inspection/investigation, and
declares the application of Federal and State constitutional provisions against unlawful searches
and seizures, and makes clear no warrantless searches, absent consent or exigent circmnstances,
shall be conducted, and imposes the Exclusionary Rule for any violation. However the Janis and
Barlow cases are addressed in detail in this Memorandum.

In Janis, a police officer, pursuant to a search warrant, seized $4,940 in cash and wagering
(bookie) records from Jams, and the officer then advised the IRS that Janis had been arrested for
bookmaking activity. The IRS chose to assess Janis with an excise tax based exclusively upon
the evidence obtained by the officer, and the IRS made the assessment for wagering taxes, rmder
§4401 ofthe Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §4401, in the swn of $89,026.09, plus
interest. The amormt of the assessment was computed by first determining the average daily
gross proceeds for the five-day period covered by the seized material and analyzed by the agent,
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and then multiplied the resulting figure by 77, the period of the police surveillance of Janis'
activities. The assessment, once made, allowed IRS to exercise its statutory authority under 26
U.S.C. § 6331, and from that assessment, levied upon the cash.
ln the criminal proceeding filed against Janis by the State of California, the affidavit
supporting the issuance of the search warrant was declared defective, and because of that, the
warrant was quashed in State court, and pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the seized evidence
(with the exception of the cash) was returned to Janis, who then filed suit against the IRS for a
refund of his cash, Claiming the assessment was derived from evidence (records) that had been
wrongfully seized, and consistent with that position, Janis filed his motion to suppress the
evidence and quash the assessment levied by the IRS. The Court determined Janis was correct
because the assessment (at least in part) was based upon illegally procured evidence (records)
seized by the State Officer, whose conduct was in violation of Janis' 41h Amendment rights to be
free trom unreasonable. searches and seizures. Janis was then relieved of any burden to prove
any basis to support his claim for the refund, and the assessment was quashed, IRS counterclaim
dismissed, ;md the appeal taken by IRS to the ninth circuit, was affirmed. The US Supreme
Court, however, reversed the decision, stating the following:
Held: The judicially created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the
use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign (here the Federal Government) of evidence
illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign (here the state
government), since the likelihood of deterring law enforcement conduct through such a rule
is not sufficient to outweigh the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. Pp. 443-460. (a)
The prime, i[notthe sole, purpose o[the exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful
police conduct. " · Whether the exclusionary rule is a deterrent has not yet been
demonstrated. Assuming, however, that it is a deterrent, then its use in situations where it is
now applied must be deemed to suffice to accomplish its purpose, because the local law
enforcement official is already "punished" by the exclusion of the evidence in both the state
and the federal criminal trials. The additional marginal deterrence provided by its extension
in cases like this one does not outweigh the societal costs of excluding concededly relevant
evidence. (Emphasis added).
The Court then incorporated reference to the burden of proof in tax matters:
Some initial observations about the procedural posture of the case in the District Court
are indicated. If there is to be no limit to the burden of proof the respondent, as "taxpayer,"
must carry, then, even though he were to obtain a favorable decision on the inadmissibility
of evidence issue, the respondent on this record could not possibly defeat the Government's
counterclaim. The Govenunent notes, properly, we think, that the litigation is composed of
two separate elements: the refund suit instituted by the respondent, and the collection suit
instituted by the United States through its counterclaim. In a refund suit, the taxpayer bears

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY

P. 8
000928

the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover. Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281
(1932). It is not enough for him to demonstrate that the assessment of the tax for which
refund is sought was erroneous in some respects.
This Court has not spoken with respect to the burden of proof in a tax collection suit. The
Govemment mgues here that the presumption of correctness that attaches to the assessment
in a refund suit must also apply in a civil collection suit instituted by the United States under
the authority granted by§§ 7401 and 7403 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 and 7403. Thus,
it is said, the defendant in a collection suit has the same burden of proving that he paid the
correct amount of his tax liability.
The policy behind the presumption of correctness and the burden of proof, see Bull v.
United States, 295. U.S. 247, 259-260 (1935), would appear to be applicable in each
situation. It accords, furthermore, with the burden of proof rule which prevails in the usual
pre-assessment proceeding in the United States Tax Court. Lucas v. Structural Steel Co.,
281 U.S. 264, 271 (1930); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill, 115 (1933); Rule 142(a) of the
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court (1973). In any event, for
purposes of this case, we assume that this is so and that the burden of proof may be said
technically to rest with respondent Janis.
Respondent, however, submitted no evidence tending either to demonstrate that the
assessment was incorrect or to show the correct amount of wagering tax liability, if any, on
his part. In the usual situation, one might well mgue, as the Govemment does, that the
District Court then could not properly grant judgment for the respondent on either aspect of
the suit. But the present case may well not be the usual situation. What we have is a "naked"
assessment, without any foundation whatsoever if what was seized by the Los Angeles
police cannot be used in the formulation of the assessment. The determination of tax due
then may be one "without rational foundation and excessive," and not properly subject to the
usual rule with respect to the burden of proof in tax cases. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S.
507,514-515 (1935).[8] See 9 J. Mertens, Law ofFederal Income Taxation§ 50.65 (1971).
There appears, indeed, to be some debate an1ong the Federal Courts of Appeals, in
different factual contexts, as to the effect upon the burden of proof in a tax case when there
is positive evidence that an assessment is incorrect. Some courts indicate that the burden of
showing the amount of the deficiency then shifts to the Commissioner. Others hold that the
burden of showing the correct amount of the tax remains with the taxpayer.[IO] However
that may be, the debate does not extend to the situation where the assessment is shown to be
naked and without any foundation. The courts then appem to apply the rule of the Taylor
case. See United S1tites v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16-17, n. 3 (CAl), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1039 (1973); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986
(1969); Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 814-815 (1972). But cf. Compton v. United
States, 334 F.2d 212,216 (CA4 1964).
Certainly, proof that an assessment is utterly without foundation is proof that it is
arbitrary and erroneous. For purposes of this case, we need not go so far as to accept the
Govemment's argw11ent that the exclusion of the evidence in issue here is insufficient to
require judgment for the respondent or even to shift the burden to the Govemment. We are
wi \ling to assume that, if the District Court was correct in ruling that the evidence seized by
the Los Angeles police may not be used in formulating the assessment (on which both the
levy and the cow1terclaim were based), then the District Court was also correct in granting
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judgment for Janis in both aspects of the present suit. This assumption takes us, then, to the
primary issue.
The Court then went directly into the history of the Exclusionary Rule and the rationale for
its application, stating within the following excerpts:
This Court early pronounced a rule that the Fifth Amendment's command that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' renders evidence
falling within the Amendment's prohibition inadmissible. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). It was not nntill914, however, that tl1e Court held that the Fourth Amendment
alone may be the basis for excluding from a federal criminal trial evidence seized by a
federal officer in violation solely of that Amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383.
This comparatively late judicial creation of a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not
particularly surprising. In contrast to the Fifth Amendment's direct command against the
admission of compelled testimony, the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is determined after, and apart from, the violation. In
Weeks, it was held, however, that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to state officers, and,
therefore, that material seized nnconstitutionally by a state officer could be admitted in a
federal criminal proceeding. This was the "silver platter" doctrine.
In Wolf v. Colm~ado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court determined that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reflected the Fourth Amendment to the extent of
providing those protections against intrusions that are "'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' !d. at 27. Nonetheless, the Court, in not applying the Weeks doctrine in a state trial
to the product of a state search, held:
"Granting that, in practice, the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring
unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal
standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if
consistently enforced, would be equally effective. 338 U.S. at 31."
Not long thereafter, the Court rule that means used by a State to procure evidence could be
sufficiently offensive to the concept of ordered liberty as to make admission of the evidence
so procw·ed a violation of the Due Process Clause, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), but that such a violation would exist only in the most extreme case, Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954),
Thus, as matters then stood, the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States, but a
State could allow an official to engage in a violation thereof with no judicial sanction except
in the most extreme case. In addition, federal authorities, if they happened upon a State so
inclined, could profit from the State's action by receiving on a silver platter evidence
unconstitutionally obtained. The federal authorities, profiting thereby, had no judicially
created reason to discourage unconstitutional searches by a State, and the States, having no
judicially mandated controls, were free to engage in such searches. Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, was decided in 1960. Invoking its "supervisory power over the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts," id. at 216, the Court held that evidence obtained by
state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated
the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, is inadmissible over the defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial.
!d. at 223.
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The rule thus announced apparently served two purposes. First, it assured that a State,
which could admii the evidence in its own proceedings if it so chose, nevertheless would
suffer some deterrence in that its federal counterparts would be unable to use the evidence in
federal criminal proceedings. Second, the rule discouraged federal authorities from using a
state ofticial to circumvent the restrictions of Weeks. Only one year later, however, the
exclusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal trials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). The Court ruled: Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government.
The debate within the Court on the exclusionary mle has always been a warm one. It has
been unaided, unhappily, by any convincing empirical evidence on the effects of the mle.
The Court, however, has established that the "prime purpose" ofthe rule, if not the sole
one, "is to deter future unlawful police conduct." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347 (1974). See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-539 (1975). Thus, [i[n sum, the
rule is a judicially created remedv designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
In tl1e present case; we are asked to create judicially a deterrent sanction by holding that
evidence obtained by a state criminal law enforcement offlcer in good faith reliance on a
warrant that later proved to be defective shall be inadmissible in a federal civil tax
proceeding. Clearly, the enforcement of admittedly valid laws would be hampered by so
extending fue exclusionary rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, concededly
relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered urmvailable.
The Court tl1en went on to announce their decision to the effect that the exclusionary rule
developed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S Constitution, which applied
in a state criminal cases, would not exclude the evidence in a federal civil tax case, stating the
following:
In evaluating the need for a deterrent sanction, one must first identifY those who are to
be dcterred.Jn this case, it is the state o([icer who is the primary object ofthe sanction. It
is I! is conduct that is to be controlled. Two factors suggest that a sanction in addition to
those tlmt presently exist is unnecessary. First, the local law enforcement official is already
"punished" by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial. That, necessarily, is
of substantial concern to him. Second, the evidence is also excludable in the federal
criminal trial, Elkins v. United States, supra, so that the entire criminal enforcement
process, which is the concern and duty of these officers, is frustrated.
Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary mle imposes a
substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what
concededly is relevant evidence. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 429 (1974)_ And alternatives that would be less
costly to societal interests have been the subject of extensive discussion and exploration.
Equally important, . alfuough scholars have attempted to determine whether the
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exclusionary rule in fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical study on the
subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed. It would not be appropriate to fault those
who have attempted empirical studies for their lack of convincing data. The number of
variables is substantial, and many cannot be measured or subjected to effective controls.
Recordkeeping before Mapp was spotty at best, a fact which thus severely hampers beforeand-after studies .. Since Mapp, of course, all possibility of broad-scale controlled or even
semi-controlled comparison studies has been eliminated. "Response" studies are hampered
by the presence of the respondents' interests. And extrapolation studies are rendered highly
inconclusive by the changes in legal doctrines and police-citizen relationships that have
taken place in the 15 years since Mapp was decided.
We fmd ourselves, therefore, in no better position than the Court was in 1960 when it
said: Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which
follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do those of
states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since, as a practical matter, it is never
easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be
assembled. For much the same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated that
enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less effective under either rule. Elldns v.
United States, 364 U.S. at 218.
If the exclusionary rule is the "strong medicine" that its proponents claim it to be, then
its use in the situations in which it is now applied (resulting, for example, in tllis case in
frustration of the Los Angeles police officers' good faith duties as enforcers of the criminal
laws) must be assumed to be a substantial and efficient deterrent. Assuming this efficacy,
the additional marginal deterrence provided by forbidding a different sovereign from
using the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of
extending the rule to that situation. If, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule does not
result in appreciabk deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted.
Under either assumption, therefore, the extension of the rule is unjustified.
In short, we .conclude that exclusion (rom (ederal civil proceedings of evidence
unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct o[the state police so that it outweighs the
societal costv imposed by the exclusion. This Court, therefore, is not iustitied in so
extending the exclusionary rule.

The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve
"intra-sovereign" violations, a situation we need not consider here. In some cases, the
courts have refused to create an exclusionary rule for either inter-sovereign or intrasovereign violations in proceedings other than strictly criminal prosecutions. See United
States ex rei. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (CA2 1970) (intra-sovereign/parole
revocation); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1971) (inter-sovereign/sentencing). And in Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 215216 (1964), a case remarkably like this one, the Fourth Circuit held that the presumption of
correctness given a tax assessment was not affected by the fact that the assessment was
based upon evidence unconstitutionally seized by state criminal law enforcement officers.
Only one case cited by the respondent squarely holds that there must be an exclusionary
rule barring use in a civil proceeding by one sovereign of material seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by an officer of another sovereign. In Suarez v. Commissioner, 58
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T.C. 792 (1972) (reviewed by the court, with two judges dissenting), the Tax Court
determined that the exclusionary rule should be applied in a situation similar to the one that
confronts us here. The court concluded that any competing consideration based upon the
need for effective enforcement of civil tax liabilities (compare Elkins v. United States ... )
must give way to the higher goal of protection of the individual and the necessity for
preserving confidence in, rather than encouraging contempt for, the processes of
Government. ........ .
We disagree with the broad implications of this statement of the Tax Court for two
reasons. To the extent that the court did not focus on the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule; the law has since been clarified. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Moreover, the court did not
distinguish between inter-sovereign and intra-sovereign uses of unconstitutionally seized
material. Working, as we must, with the absence of convincing empirical data, common
sense dictates thatthe deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly
attenuated when the "punishment" imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement
officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign.
In Elkins. the Court indicated that the assumed interest of criminal law enforcement
officers in the criminal proceedings of another sovereign counterbalanced this attenuation
sufficiently to justify an exclusionary rule. Here, however, the attenuation is further
augmented bv the (act that the proceeding is one to enforce onlv the civil law of the
other sovereign.
This attenuation, coupled with the existing deterrence effected by the denial of use of
the evidence by either sovereign in the criminal trials with which the searching officer is
concerned, creates a situation in which the imposition of the exclusionary rule sought in
this case is unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence. It
falls outside the offending officer's zone of primary interest. The extension of the
exclusionary rule, in our view, would be an unjustifiably drastic action by the courts in the
pursuit of what is <m undesired and undesirable supervisory role over police officers.[35]
See Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
We therefore hold that the judicially created exclusionary rule should not be extended
to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized bv a criminal
law enforcement agent of another sovereign. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion It is
so ordered. (Emphasis added)

Of interest, the Janis Decision was delivered by Justice Blackmun, to which Justices
Burger, White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined, with Justice Stevens taking no part in the
decision, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart dissenting, rendering this to be a 5/3
Decision.
This case, as fascinating and as convincing as the rationale presented through the analysis
of the dissent, nonetheless, at least in 1976, held for the proposition that has limited the
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application of the Exclusionary Rule when there was cross-sovereign inter-relationships
concerning "exclusion of evidence" under the Exclusionary Rule, when applied to a criminal

case in a state sovereign, given the constitutional violation under the 4th and 14'h Amendments
to the United States Constitution, and then seeking to carry that forward in an effort to require
the same exclusion of the very same evidence intended in a civil (tax) litigation of a different
sovereign, a Federal sovereign.
The Janis Decision was later exposed to negative treatment relating to the analysis
undetiaken regarding the Government's burden of proof in these tax controversies, as
announced in the holdings of Thompson v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (Ala. 2007)
(where it was suspended because of a re-allocation of the burden of proof under 26 USC
§7491), and in United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1990 (where the burden was
criticized).
In our DEQ case, we are NOT dealing with a criminal charge in a state system and a civil
case in a federal system; we are dealing with one case, a civil case in a state court, one State
Actor, a .State Department, unconditionally bound to the very statutory Title that created the
Department, wherein provisions of that Statute expressly govern all aspects of any
investigations and inspections undertaken by that Department; a statute that created the
inspection and investigation process, and expressly controlled that process entirely and applied
specifically to every proceeding the State Actor elects to engage an inspection and investigation,
to further engage in an administrative proceeding or civil action.
This DEQ case does not present the issue of an exclusion of evidence in a civil Federal case
that arises out of evidence excluded in a State criminal case; there is no cross-sovereignty issues
presented by this statute; there is no evidence excluded in a State sovereign case being sought to
be used in a Federal sovereign case. Instead we have one sovereign entity, the State of Idaho;
instead we have one State Actor, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ); instead we
have a single civil case, filed under Title 39, Chapter I, wherein there is specifically identified I.
C. §39-1 08(3)(b), that creates the right to file of a civil action to assert any claim regarding the
DEQ Solid Waste Management Disposal Site rules, the right to which filing is specifically
bound by statutory parameters restricting the Department in the process of an investigation and
any inspection of a suspect premises, expressly prohibiting the search for and seizure of any
evidence in the process of such an investigation and inspection that may be conducted by DEQ
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Officials, restricted and limited by the specific language within the provisions of I. C. §39108(2)(c), having no crossover-sovereign issues, no civil-criminal cross-over issues, and a state
statute that specifically, unconditionally, and exclusively applies to this state civil action
undertaken by a state actor, engaged in its inspection-investigation process.
This DEQ case, being a single jurisdiction case without any cross-over sovereign issues,
appears to have more in common with the general perception that was applied in the Barlow
case, a matter entitled.Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U,S, 307, 98 S, Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305
(1978), where there was conducted a warrantless inspection of a business premises by OSHA
under a Federal system pursuant to §8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), which empowered agents of the Secretary of Labor to search the work area of any
employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction for safety hazards and violations of OSHA
regulations. !n that case, a three-judge District Court ruled in Barlow's favor, concluding, upon
their reliance on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529, and See v. Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 543, that the U.S. Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the type of search
involved, and that the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional.
The Decision was delivered by Justice White, in which Justices Burger, Stewart, Marshall
and Powell, joined, with Justice Brennan taking no part in the decision, and Justices Stevens,
Blaclanun, and Rehnquist dissenting, rendering this also a 5/3 Decision.
The case was an intense issue back in 1978, as the Secretary of Labor was vehemently
arguing that warrantless inspections were an essential component to the proper enforcement of
OSHA regulations because they afforded the Secretary the opportunity to inspect a suspected
premises without prior notice, and to do so would serve to preserve the advantages they felt they
had through the element of surprise. The Secretary took the position that while dangerous
conditions outlawed by the OSHA Act did include structural defects that could not

b~

quickly

hidden or remedied, the Act, however, empowered the Secretary to also regulate a myriad of
safety details that may. be amenable to a speedy alteration or disguise, if there was the
oppmiunity of advanced·notice of the inspection. The concern of the Secretary then turned upon
the occasion that could allow corrections to take place during the interval between an inspector's
initial request to search a plant and his procuring a warrant following the owner's refusal of
pem1ission, as the Secretary was concerned that violations of this latter type could then be
corrected, and thus escape the inspector's notice of any violation that had before existed. To the
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suggestion that warrants may be issued ex parte and executed without delay and without prior
notice, thereby preserving the element of surprise, the Secretary expressed concern tbere would
be an administrative strain that would be experienced by the inspection system, and by the
courts should ex parte warrants issued in advance become standard practice.
The Supreme CoUJt declared tbat they were unconvinced that requiring warrants to inspect
would impose any serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, and would not prevent
the type of inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or serve to make the inspection process
and the responsibilities of the Secretary of Labor less effective. In the first place, it was thought
a majority of businessmen would likely consent to inspection without warrant, and in that
regard, the Secretary. had not shown any widespread pattern of refusal was in any way
hampering their efforts. The Secretary again argued that if an owner did insist on a warrant then
the Secretary was concerned that inspection efficiency would be impeded by tbe advance notice
and delay. The Supreme Court noted that the Act's penalty provisions did address giving
advance notice of a search, 29 U.S.C. § 666(f), and notwitbstanding the contemplation of any
surprise search activity, the Secretary's own regulations, 29 CFR § 1903.6 (1977), had
promulgated a regulation that specifically provided that, upon refusal to permit an inspector to
enter the property or

to complete his inspection, the inspector was to attempt to ascertain the

reasons for the refusal, and was then to report those reasons to his superior, who shall "promptly
take appropriate action, including the potential of a compulsory process, if necessary." 29 CFR §
1903.4 (1977). The regulation represented a choice to proceed by process where entry was
refused; and, on the basis of evidence available from present practice, the Act's effectiveness has
not been crippled by providing those owners who wish to refuse an initial requested entry with a
time lapse while the inspector obtains tbe necessary process. The Supreme Court noted the kind
of process sought by the Barlow behavior was apparently anticipated by the regulations that
served to provide such notice to tbe business operator.
The Supreme Court expressed the opinion that if that safeguard had endangered tbe efficient
administration of OSHA, the Secretary should never have adopted tbat regulation, particularly
when tl1e Act itself did not specifically require it. Nor was it immediately apparent why tbe
advantage of surprise would be lost if, after being refused entry, procedures were then available
for the Secretary to seek an ex parte warrant that would allow the Secretary to reappear at the
premises without further notice to the establishment being inspected. The Supreme Court held
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that Barlow was entitled to a declaratory judgment upon his challenge to the Secretary's
unlawful search of the premises without a warrant, and the Supreme Court concluded the Act
was unconstitutional insofar as it was then perceived to purport to authorize inspections without
a waJTant (in the face of a no consent or permission to enter), and the Court enjoined the Act's
enforcement to that extent, and the Decision of the District Court was affi=ed.
It is to be noted that the Barlow case was distinguished in a subsequent case decided in

1981, tlu·ee years later, in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262
(I 981) in relation to the enforcement of§ I 03 of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977

(FMHSA), a diiferent regulatory scheme that is also enforced under the Department of Labor,
pertaining to underground and surface mine inspections, and the requirement that FMSHA
conduct at least quarterly mine inspections of underground mining operations. The Supreme
Court did not alter the aspects as it related to warrantless search as envisioned in relation to the
enforcement of the OSHA provisions as addressed in Barlow, but it did call into direct
consideration, and thereby distinguish Barlow, in that the restraints established in the Barlow
case would not serve as a basis to also declare § 103 of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 to be declared

an unconstitutional regulatory provision, as the challenge made to the

mine inspection requirement established under §I 03 of FMSHA was structured in a manner
suftlcient to be considered constitutionally adequate and did constitute a reasonable substitute
for a waJTant.
That case analysis addressed in Donovan is worthy of further discussion and elaboration in
this Memorandum, as it must be recognized that the Idaho Legislature had all these cases before
it when it undertook to make DEQ a separate and independent Department/Agency of the State
of Idaho, and in adopting the detail contained in Title 39, Statutes of the State of Idaho, which
created the Agency and incorporated into that legislation, the specific and well-articulated
restraints announced.in I. C. §39-108(2)(c), wherein the Idaho Legislature brought into the wellarticulated restrictions by the careful structuring of such words, phrases and the careful
attenuation of such concepts as consent, permission, Federal Constitution, the 4th Amendment,
State Constitution, Article I, Sec. 17, and specifically prohibiting warrantless searches.
In Donovan, the Supreme Court analyzed §103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977 (FMSHA) (the pronunciation of the acronym is "fern-shaw'') which requires federal
mine inspectors to inspect underground mines at least four times a year and surface mines at
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least twice a year, so as to ensure compliance with health and safety standards. The Act allows
follow-up inspections to determine whether previously discovered violations had been
coJTected. §103 grants inspectors the right of entry to any coal or other mine, and provides there
is no requirement for advance notice of an inspection, and such advance notice need not be
given. If a mine operator chooses to refuse to allow a waiTantless inspection under§ 103(a), the
Secretary of Labor was then authorized to bring a civil action for injunctive or other relief. In

Donovan, a federal inspector attempted a follow-up inspection of the company's stone qUaiTies,
and a company officer refused to allow the inspection to continue. The Secretary of Labor then
filed suit in Federal District Court seeking to enjoin the company from refusing to permit their
waiTantless search of the mining facility.
Using the logic employed in the Barlow case a short period before, The Federal District
Court in Wisconsin granted Donovan a summary judgment on the ground the 4th Amendment
prohibited the waiTantless searches that was being authorized by § 103(a) of FMSHA. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the WaiTantless inspections required by § 103(a) did not
violate the 4th Amendment, but instead was viewed to be reasonable within the meaning of that
Amendment. Unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to
a waJTant in order to be reasonable under the 4th Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing
wanantless administrative searches of certain types of commercial property did not necessarily
violate that Constitutional Amendment. A WaiTant may not be constitutionally required when
Congress has reasonably determined a waiTantless search is necessary to further a regulatory
scheme, and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined so that
the owner of those certain types of commercial property would be made aware such property
was specifically subject to those periodic inspections that were then armounced in FMSHA. It
was determined there was a substantial federal interest to improve the health and safety
conditions in mines, and it was noted that the mining industry is among the most hazardous,
which was well known to Congress, and the industry's poor health and safety record has
significant deleterious effects on interstate commerce, such that Congress could reasonably
determine a reasonable system of waiTantless inspections was deemed to be necessary "if the
law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective." United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311, 316. Pp. 602-603.
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The Supreme Court determined the statute's inspection program, in terms of certainty and
regularity of application, had adequately provided a constitutionally adequate substitute to that
for any need for a warrant, citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, which it then
unde1took to discuss and distinguished The Supreme Court expressed the view that although
stone quarries, as opposed to underground mines, do not have a long tradition of Government
regulation, such absence of regulation did not necessarily mean warrantless inspections of stone
quarries would violaie the 4th Amendment. It was determined by the Supreme Court that it was
the very pervasiveness and regularity of the required federal inspections that had been created
by Congress with the regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant would be de.emed
necessary to render an inspection program reasonable under the 4th Amendment. If the length of
regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur which the 4th Amendment's
concept of reasonableness would then be called into play to decide if they were not to be
tolerated. The Court concluded ihe statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and
regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, citing
their earlier decision in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, and pronounced the manner in
which it was there being its distinguished, stating, within various excerpts of the decision, ihat
this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory
schemes authorizing warrantless inspections, and "subject to close supervision and inspection,"
Congress has enjoyed "broad power to design such powers of inspection . . . as it deems
necessary to meet the evils at hand." 397 U.S. at 76-77.
Similarly, the Comt.made reference to its prior decision in United States v. Biswell, wherein
the Court had before concluded the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S. C. 921 et seq., had
provided a sufficiently comprehensive and predictable inspection scheme that the warrantless
inspections mandated under the statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment. After describing
ihe strong federal interest in conducting unannounced, warrantless inspections, the court then
noted: It is also plain that inspections for compliance wiih the Gun Control Act pose only
limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses to
engage in this pervasively regulated business ... , he does so with the knowledge ihat his
records, t!reaJms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection.... The dealer is not
left to wonder about the purposes oftbe inspector or the limits of his task. These decisions make
clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably
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determined .that wammtless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the
federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of
commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic
inspections undertaken for specific purposes.
The Supreme Court then re-emphasized its posture in relation to this exception to the
warrant requirement by again addressing its recent decision in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
wherein the court held;· absent consent, a warrant was constitutionally required in order to
conduct administrative inspections under §8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a). That statute imposes health and safety standards on all businesses
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce that have employees, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5), and
authorizes representatives of the Secretary to conduct inspections to ensure compliance with the
Act. 29 U.S. C. § 657(ir). However, the Court went on to emphasize in their further discussion,
the Act fails to tailor ihe scope and frequency of such administrative inspections to the particular
health and safety concerns posed by the numerous and varied businesses regulated by the
statute. Instead, the Act flatly authorizes administrative inspections of any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace, or environment where work is
perfonned by an employee of an employer, and empowers inspectors conducting such searches
to investigate any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines,
apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such
employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee. Similarly, the Act does not provide any
standards to guide inspectors either in their selection of establishments to be searched or in the
exercise of their authority to search. The statute instead simply provides that such searches must
be perfmmed "at . . . reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner." In assessing this regulatory scheme, this Court found that the provision authorizing
administrative searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative
officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search. Accordingly,
and for those reasons, the Supreme Court had to conclude that a warrant was constitutionally
required to assure a nonconsenting owner, who may have little real expectation that his business
will be subject to inspection, that the contemplated search was "authorized by statute, and ...
pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria." The Supreme Court then
emphasized their position that they had expressly limited the Barlow holding to the inspection
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provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, noting that the reasonableness of a
warrantless search ... will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees
of each statute" and that some statutes "apply only to a single industry, where 452 U.S. 602
regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant
requirement could apply.
Aspects of the Barlow case were thereafter also analyzed in the matter of One 1995 Corvette
Vin # 1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 724 A. 2d 680, 353 Md.

114 (1999), wherein the Maryland court brought Barlow into their discussion, declaring that the
Exclusionary Rule dis specifically apply in civil forfeiture cases. In that Maryland Supreme
Cou11 Decision, there had been a petition filed for writ of certiorari which the Court granted to
address a decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that had reversed the decision of
the Circuit Court, which had suppressed the evidence in a civil forfeiture case brought by the
State's Attorney to seize Petitioner's automobile. The issue presented was "[w]hether the
Exclusionary Rule, based on the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applied
in a civil forfeiture case in Maryland, seeking the forfeiture of an automobile allegedly used in
the drug trade."

It is a lengthy case, rather fascinating to read, and the court made reference to both Barlow
and Janis, each of which came in the following manner:
Contrary to the Court of Special Appeals' opinion, Plymouth Sedan remains applicable.
As recently as 1994, the Supreme Court cited the case as authority for the proposition that
the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings. United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 49, 114 S. Ct. 492, 499, 126 L.Ed.2d 490
(1993) ("The Fourth Amendment does place restrictions on seizures conducted for
purposes of civil forfeiture, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
696, 85 S .Ct. 1246, 1248, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (holding that the exclusionary rule
applies to civil forfeiture), but it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment is the sole
constitutional provision in question when the Government seizes property subject to
forfeiture."). Although the Court of Special Appeals opined that United States v. Ursery,
518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), impliedly overruled Plymouth
Sedan, that argument is inaccurate for two reasons: (I) Ursery dealt exclusively with the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, see infra, and (2) Ursery never discussed or cited
Plymouth Sedan in the majority opinion. [4] Similarly, respondent relies on the Court of
Special Appeals' quotation of United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, 96 S. Ct. 3021,
3029. 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), to argue Plymouth Sedan does not control this case. The
quotation from Janis states that "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the
[exclusionaryJ rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil
proceeding, federal or state." That particular sentence, however, is followed by footnote
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seventeen of that opinion, which states: "[T]he Court has applied the exclusionary rule in
a proceeding for forfeiture of an article used in violation of the criminal law." Id. at 44 7
n. 17, 96 S. Ct. at3D29 n. 17,49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (citing Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. 693, 85
S. Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170).
Eleven of the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals have interpreted Plymouth
Sedan to stand for the proposition that the exclusionary rule applies to civil in rem
forfeitures. Additionally, courts in thirty-four states have interpreted Plymouth Sedan to
stand for the same proposition. [Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. $34,000 US.
Currenq, 121 Idaho 211,214, 824 P.2d 142, 145 (Idaho App.1991)].
We note that in many of these federal and state cases, the various courts refer to
Plymouth Sedan primarily in dicta Nevertheless, the cases consistently accept the
interpretation of Plymouth Sedan as applying the exclusionary rule to civil in rem
fmfeiture proceedings. Our examination of the cases has revealed no court that
completely rejects that interpretation, as the Court of Special Appeals did in the case
below......
Some administrative proceedings, although civil in nature, also can involve
evidence that an administrative agency has searched for and seized while inspecting
private property. Several Maryland statutes grant administrative agencies the right to seek
search warrants to inspect private property. See Md. Code (1992, 1998 Rep!. Vol.),§ 3205 of the Business Regulation Article (amusement attractions); Md. Code (1982, 1996
Repl.Vol.), § 7-256.1-ofthe Environment Article (controlled hazardous substances); Md.
Code (1991, 1998 Cum. Supp.), § 5.5-113 of the Labor & Employment Article (railroad
safety and health conditions);§ 6-105 of the Labor & Employment Article (high voltage
power lines); Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 294 (controlled dangerous
substances); Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repi.Vol., ), Art. 38A, § 8A (State Fire Marshal);
Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 89, § 2A (miscellaneous health and safety
inspections by the Division of Labor and Industry). This Court, relying on Marshall v.
Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), held that search
wan·ants sought pursuant to then Art. 89, section 2A were constitutionally valid only
when based on "probable cause." Fred W Allnutt, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor &
Industry, 289 Md. 35, 50-51,421 A.2d 1360, 1368 (1980). [8] That holding presumably
applies to all statutorily authorized administrative search warrants. Although we realize
that "probable cause" has somewhat different meanings in criminal and administrative
contexts, see id . at 48-49, 421 A.2d at 1366-67, that Fourth Amendment protections
apply to some administrative search warrants nonetheless demonstrates that the Fourth
Amendment extends beyond traditional criminal cases.
The Fourth Amendment is not limited by its language or its history to the context
of criminal trials. Its goal is to insure freedom from =easonable governmental searches
and seizures of any nature. By contrast, the goal of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to
prevent multiple punishments and prosecutions (textually and historically criminal
punishments and prosecutions), Ursery, 518 U.S. at 273, 116 S. Ct. at 2139-40, 135
L.Ed.2d 549, and the goal of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause is to prevent
excessive punishments in the form of payments extracted by the government. See
generally Bajalwjicm, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314; Austin, 509 U.S.
602, 113 S .Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488. After Austin, therefore, a determination of
whether a forfeiture statute is "punitive" in nature is only necessary when a double
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jeopardy or Eighth Amendment violation is alleged or when some other "protections
associated with criminal cases" other than Fourth Amendment protections, are involved.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n. 4, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-05 n. 4, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (citing Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 100 S: Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742; Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.
Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 724 A.2d 689 644). Fourth Amendment protections, therefore, apply
regardless of the criminality of the conduct of the owner of the property or the use to
which the property is put.
As for other constitutional protections, a reviewing court should concern itself
with whether the particular protection was intended to apply to the particular case before
it. Often, this decision will be based on whether the particular constitutional protection
was intended to be limited to criminal or civil matters. Thus, as noted in Austin, 509 U.S.
at 608 n. 4, 113 S. Ct. at 2804 n. 4, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, and the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, generally limited to criminal causes,
do not apply to civil forfeitures. As noted, the Fourth Amendment lacks any such textual
limitations. The Fourth Amendment applies, regardless of context, in cases in which the
government allegedly has committed an "unreasonable" search or seizure or both.
It was upon this entire history of case development and constitution analysis that
formed the backdrop upon which our Legislature reviewed this wealth of well-developed
history that struggled within the arena of governmental and agency involvement in various
fonns of regulatory proceedings by administrative agencies as they sought to formulate their

was upon all of that available history we come to find the Idaho Legislature engaged in their
earnest effort to crea..te both the Department of the DEQ Agency, and to then forge the right and
limitations with respect to how, and in what manner, their officials and agents would be
allowed to conduct their inspections and investigations.
The Idalia Legislature took a great level of comfort and support from these historic
Congressional, Legislative and Judicial proceedings, as they embarked on their journey to
create the Department of Environmental Quality and carefully craft the mandates in relation to
government intrusion into the affairs of its citizens and the limitations that would be imposed
upon the Agency's authority to conduct inspections of these premises, and our Idaho
Legislature then undertook to carefully consider the need for the incorporation of both the
Federal and the Idaho State Constitutions, and to specifically prohibit the commission of any
warrantless searches, in the absence of consent and exigent circumstances, as the subject was
then identified and intensely digested in each of the prior decisions that had been formulated
over the years, all of which formed the focus upon which to guide their considerations and
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analysis when they chose to create the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and then
provide for. the occasion and the process for inspections and investigations of private properties
and business premises, from which the Legislature created the Agency, DEQ, and specifically
developed the framework from which any inspections would take place under such authority
and within their regulations and restrictions, and by which the Department must specifically
comply within the parameters of what the Legislature had incorporated into their Title 39,
Statutes of the Stateofidaho, I. C. §39-108(2(c), which contained the specific restraint:
(c) All inspections and investigations conducted under the authority of this chapter
shall be performed in confonnity with the prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the constitution of the
United States and section 17, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho. The
state shall not, under the authority granted by this chapter, conduct warrantless
se:wches of private property in the absence of either consent from the property
owner or occupier or exigent circumstances such as a public health or
environmental emergency;
(d) Any district court in and for the county in which the subject property is located is
authorized to issue a search warrant to the director upon a showing of (i) probable
cause to suspect a violation, or (ii) the existence of a reasonable program of
inspection. Any search warrant issued under the authority of this chapter shall be
limited in scope to the specific purposes for which it is issued and shall state with
specificity the manner and the scope of the search authorized.
In this case there bas been no consent sought or given; there has been no permission sought
or given; and there has.been no warrant sought or issued by the District Court, rendering every
aspect of this investigation subject to the Exclusionary Rule, as mandated by the Statute; the
unauthorized "inspection" was undertaken upon the pretense of an "odor" at the "Black
Diamond Composting facility", and the "inspection" conducted by these State Agents, Dean
Elhert and Jack Gantz for that specific purpose on March 29, 2013 violated the statute, and
there was no other reason or basis to be out there or to go onto the premises.
CONCLUSION
By virtue of this controlling statute, I. C. §39-1 08(2(c), this inspection was illegal and
unlawful, being the result of a warrantless search, undisputed to be in violation of the
mandatory and prohibitive restraints declared in Idaho law under the provisions of I. C. §39108(2)(c); the consequence of which and the result thereof is that any evidence purportedly
observed and seized upon, either from observation, or through the preservation of such
evidence resulting from the unlawful search and seizure, in the form of any records,
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memoranda, notes, t!lm, video, pictnres of anything to illustrate what either of them saw or
claim to have seen while on that site, including what they claim to have seen, or smelled, or
photographed, or me\].sured, or analyzed or anything else they may have chosen to express an
opinion or conjecture or speculation as to what were their observations, or their perceptions, or
their opinions impressions or expressions as to any odors, substances, quantities, compositions,
and any opinion as to whether the Gibson composting facility is perceived to be a "disposal"
site or a "discard" site, all such observations, impressions, expressions, and any sworn
them in the
form of an aft!davitor in the form of sworn live test' ony in court, the entirety thereo · to be
absolutely and uncOiiditionally

stricken and re oved from t · record, pursu

to the

. § 9-

Exclusionary requirements under the Federal and State
l 08(2)(c).

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of September, 2017.
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matter, Defendants
day of
DEQ’s fourth
testimony
witness, former
This
Ehlert. This
fourth Witness,
former Solid
Program Manager
of DEQ’s
Manager Dean
Dean Ehlert.
Solid Waste
Waste Program
testimony of
“everything [Ehlert]
motionicovering “everything
objection
unlawful,
that [alleged]
relative to
to that
objection and
and motion—covering
said relative
[Ehlert] said
[alleged] unlawful,

2013”7came during
Defendants’ crosscrosswarrantless search
March 29,
during Defendants’
on March
warrantless
search [Ehlert]
conducted on
[Ehlert] conducted
29, 2013”—came
2017.)11 Earlier
examination
in the
292:8713, Sept.
Ehlert. (Trial
Earlier in
Mr. Ehlert.
Tr. 292:8–13,
the day,
examination of
of Mr.
Sept. 13,
(Trial Tr.
13, 15,
15, 20,
20, 2017.)
day,

however,
not all,
the challenged
for DEQ
elicited some,
of the
on direct.
challenged testimony
direct.
had elicited
counsel for
testimony on
however, counsel
some, if not
all, of
DEQ had
(See
20012724212.)
id. 200:12–242:12.)
(See id.
While
Ehlert testified
length regarding
his observations
While on
regarding his
Defendant
on direct,
testiﬁed at
at length
of Defendant
observations of
direct, Ehlert
Gibson’s solid
Gibson’s
waste processing
processing facility
21 1 :177242: 12.) This
This testimony
March 29,
on March
solid waste
2013. (Id.
testimony
facility on
(Id. 211:17–242:12.)
29, 2013.

included
property
Ehlert and
that Ehlert
the fact
the property
another DEQ
fact that
onto the
entered onto
included the
and another
Jack Gantz,
ofﬁcial, Jack
Gantz, entered
DEQ official,
Gibson’s composting
where Gibson’s
composting
Where

facility
looking for
for aa representative.
is located
representative. (Id.
23510723615.)
located looking
facility is
(Id. 235:10–236:15.)

But,
in support
Ehlert detailed
their
the exact
Defendants now
cite in
of their
exact circumstances
support of
circumstances Defendants
detailed the
now cite
even as
as Ehlert
But, even
Ehlert’s
motion
in aid
motion to
not object,
Mr. Ehlert’s
to strike,
Defendants did
or ask
of objection,
to Mr.
questions in
did not
ask questions
aid of
strike, Defendants
objection, to
object, or

testimony
violated. Only
that §§ 39-108(2)(c)
the grounds
after additional
on the
additional lengthy
grounds that
and
was violated.
testimony on
lengthy and
39-108(2)(c) was
Only after
Defendants’ counsel
largely
irrelevant cross-examination,
cross-examination, did
an objection
to
objection to
did Defendants’
counsel finally
voice an
finally voice
largely irrelevant

Ehlert’s testimony
Ehlert’s
it from
from the
the record.
The Court
strike it
informed
292:8716.) The
to strike
Court informed
and move
record. (Id.
move to
testimony and
(Id. 292:8–16.)
Defendants’ counsel
Defendants’
that the
the objection
strike
earlier and
to strike
objection should
should have
raised earlier
and refused
counsel that
have been
been raised
refused to

Ehlert’s testimony.
Ehlert’s
292:17719.)
testimony. (Id.
(Id. 292:17–19.)

1

Excerpts
trial transcript
in this
Mark Cecchini-Beaver
Cecchini-Beaver filed
transcript cited
this response
Declaration of
the trial
are attached
the Declaration
attached to
of the
to the
of Mark
ﬁled
Excerpts of
cited in
response are
contemporaneously
with this
this response.
response.
contemporaneously with
1
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At
written motion
At the
the end
the Court
ﬁle aa written
motion to
of trial,
Defendants to
to file
to exclude
Court allowed
end of
allowed Defendants
exclude
trial, the
Ehlert’s testimony.
Ehlert’s
briefing on
The Court
the applicability
the
on the
of the
Court specifically
requested briefing
applicability of
testimony. The
speciﬁcally requested

exclusionary
where the
party. Defendants
the government
ciVil cases
government is
to civil
is aa patty.
Defendants filed
ﬁled aa
rule to
cases Where
exclusionary rule
memorandum
in support
their objection
motion on
memorandum in
of their
on September
support of
2017.
objection and
September 28,
and motion
28, 2017.
II.

LEGAL
LEGAL STANDARDS
STANDARDS

A
A trial
trial court
trial. Karlson
admit or
discretion to
to admit
or exclude
at trial.
offered at
court has
has broad
exclude testimony
broad discretion
testimony offered
v.
admit testimony
will be
140 Idaho
431 (2004).
The decision
Idaho 561,
to admit
decision to
P.3d 428,
v. Harris, 140
97 P.3d
be
testimony will
428, 431
561, 564,
564, 97
(2004). The

“only when
discretion.” Id. There
reversed
appeal “only
has been
there has
clear abuse
There is
on appeal
when there
of discretion.”
is no
no abuse
reversed on
been aa clear
abuse
abuse of
of
perceives the
trial court
within
the trial
the issue
as discretionary,
of discretion
discretion when
when the
acts within
court (1)
issue as
correctly perceives
discretionary, (2)
(1) correctly
(2) acts
the
within the
legal standards,
the boundaries
its discretion
and consistent
the applicable
and (3)
applicable legal
of its
discretion and
consistent within
boundaries of
standards, and
(3)
reaches
Ins.
an exercise
through an
of reason.
reason. Sprinkler Irrigation Co.
reaches aa decision
decision through
exercise of
Co. v.
v. John Deere Ins.
Co.,
Idaho 691,
139 Idaho
672 (2004).
P.3d 667,
85 P.3d
691, 696,
696, 85
667, 672
Ca, 139
(2004).
III.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

There
basis for
proceeding
this Court
from the
this civil
for this
the record
There is
ciVil proceeding
is no
no basis
to exclude
of this
Court to
record of
exclude from
Ehlert’s relevant,
Ehlert’s
there was
no
admissible testimony.
and otherwise
otherwise admissible
was no
relevant, highly
testimony. First,
probative, and
First, there
highly probative,

violation of
it incorporates.
the constitutional
the
prohibitions it
Violation
of §§ 39-108(2)(c)
or the
constitutional prohibitions
incorporates. Second,
Second, the
39-108(2)(c) or
Defendants’ motion
exclusionary
this civil
not apply
not only
motion
ciVil case.
to this
is Defendants’
rule does
does not
case. Lastly,
exclusionary rule
only is
Lastly, not
apply to

Ehlert’s testimony
unworkably overbroad,
their objection
For all
all of
to Ehlert’s
of these
late. For
these
objection to
was fatally
testimony was
unworkably
overbroad, their
fatally late.
Defendants’ objection
reasons,
be overruled
be denied.
their motion
motion to
strike must
must be
to strike
must be
objection must
and their
denied.
overruled and
reasons, Defendants’

A.
A.

There
was no
violation of
There was
Idaho Code
no violation
of Idaho
Code §
39-108(2)(c).
§ 39-108(2)(c).

motionia violation
Defendants
basis for
their motion—a
the only
for their
Violation
Defendants have
failed to
to establish
establish the
have failed
asserted basis
only asserted
of
which provides:
of Idaho
Idaho Code
provides:
Code §§ 39-108(2)(c),
39-108(2)(c), which
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All
under the
All inspections
this chapter
the authority
investigations conducted
inspections and
of this
Chapter
and investigations
conducted under
authority of
shall
be performed
with the
prohibitions against
in conformity
the prohibitions
shall be
performed in
against unreasonable
unreasonable
conformity with
searches
in the
the fourth
fourth amendment
the constitution
the
constitution of
amendment to
to the
of the
contained in
seizures contained
and seizures
searches and
United
the constitution
the state
article I,
United States
of the
constitution of
of the
of Idaho.
section 17,
state of
States and
and section
Idaho.
17, article
I, of
The
under the
by this
this chapter,
The state
the authority
shall not,
granted by
state shall
conduct
authority granted
chapter, conduct
not, under
warrantless searches
in the
from the
the absence
either consent
the
of private
private property
of either
warrantless
consent from
searches of
absence of
property in
property owner
exigent circumstances
health or
or occupier
or exigent
or
public health
circumstances such
occupier or
such as
owner or
as a
a public
property
environmental
environmental emergency[.]
emergency[.]
Defendants’ arguments
Defendants’
well-established principle
fail to
principle of
of
arguments about
to recognize
recognize aa well-established
about §§ 39-108(2)(c)
39-108(2)(c) fail

Fourth
jurisprudence: Governmental
Fourth Amendment
Amendment and
investigations
Governmental inspections
inspections or
or investigations
related State
State jurisprudence:
and related
“searches” in
sense.22 Dow Chem.
of
private property
property are
in the
not inevitably
the constitutional
of private
constitutional sense.
are not
Chem. Co.
Co. v.
v.
inevitably “searches”

United States,
aerial photography
of 2,000-acre
chemical
2,000-acre chemical
476 U.S.
239 (1986)
US. 227,
(holding aerial
photography of
States, 476
227, 239
(1986) (holding
plant “not aa search”);
search”); State v.
(“Merely
plant
P.2d 969,
Idaho 707,
518 P.2d
v. Pontier, 95
95 Idaho
976 (1974)
714, 518
969, 976
707, 714,
(1974) (“Merely

law”). This
observing
plain View
view is
prohibited by
by any
in plain
that which
This
not aa search
which is
is in
is not
of law.”).
observing that
search prohibited
rule of
any rule
analytical
warrant or
that DEQ
officials needed
misstep leads
Defendants to
to argue
or express
express
argue that
leads Defendants
needed aa warrant
analytical misstep
DEQ officials
permission to
waste processing
11 solid
in an
Tier II
left
enter aa Tier
permission
to enter
an open
ﬁeld and
solid waste
processing facility
open field
and left
situated in
facility situated
Defendants’ argument
unattended but
but open
public access.
it
not only
argument not
to public
unattended
misreads §§ 39-108(2)(c),
open to
access. Defendants’
only misreads
39-108(2)(c), it

ignores
body of
controlling precedent,
the vast
the contrary.
the controlling
ignores the
of caselaw
to the
Under the
vast body
caselaw directly
precedent,
contrary. Under
directly to
government
without aa warrant,
warrant, inspect
premises situated
in an
field
government officials
officials may,
an open
inspect business
open field
business premises
situated in
may, Without
or
public. There
privacy in
in such
left open
the public.
There is
or otherwise
to the
is no
no reasonable
expectation of
of privacy
otherwise left
open to
reasonable expectation
such
premises, and
visual observation
premises is
not aa search
therefore mere
no
mere Visual
of such
is not
observation of
search and
and raises
raises no
and therefore
such premises
premises,
constitutional
constitutional concern.
concern.
1.
1.

DEQ
with the
against
the constitutional
constitutional prohibitions
prohibitions against
ofﬁcials complied
complied with
DEC officials
unreasonable
and seizures.
unreasonable searches
searches and
seizures.

Both
Both the
Article I,
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment
Amendment to
the Constitution
the United
to the
Constitution of
of the
United States
States and
and Article
1,
“protect Idaho
citizens’ reasonable
section
privacy
the Idaho
17 of
of the
Constitution “protect
expectation of
of privacy
section 17
Idaho Constitution
Idaho citizens’
reasonable expectation

22

State
in 1986.
this principle
principle when
and federal
had recognized
the Idaho
State and
federal courts
when the
Legislature enacted
recognized this
enacted §§ 39-108(2)(c)
Idaho Legislature
courts had
1986.
39-108(2)(c) in
See
Idaho Sess.
172.
1986 Idaho
Sess. 172.
See 1986
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intrusion.” State v.
against
131 Idaho
governmental intrusion.”
P.2d
against arbitrary
Idaho 143,
v. Christensen, 131
953 P.2d
arbitrary governmental
143, 146,
146, 953

583,
intrusion
governmental intrusion
to challenge
challenge aa governmental
When aa party
seeks to
586 (1998)
(citation omitted).
omitted). When
583, 586
patty seeks
(1998) (citation
onto
private property,
property, the
privacy analysis
in Katz v.
forth in
the reasonable
onto private
expectation of
of privacy
set forth
reasonable expectation
United
v. United
analysis set
States,
whether the
The test
the person
the
is dispositive.
test asks
to the
objecting to
person objecting
dispositive. The
347 (1967),
asks Whether
389 U.S.
US. 347
States, 389
(1967), is
intrusion
whether that
it is
that expectation
intrusion subjectively
expectation was
is
and Whether
reasonable because
expected privacy
was reasonable
because it
subjectively expected
privacy and
“rooted in
“rooted
understandings that
permitted by
by society….”
in understandings
that are
recognized and
are recognized
and permitted
v. Olson,
society. ..” Minnesota v.
.

495
The party
challenging the
the
marks omitted).
quotation marks
495 U.S.
100 (1990)
US. 91,
(internal quotation
omitted). The
91, 100
party challenging
(1990) (internal
governmental
burden of
his expectation
the burden
proving his
intrusion has
governmental intrusion
of proving
expectation of
of privacy
has the
was objectively
objectively
privacy was
reasonable
under the
442 U.S.
the circumstances.
circumstances. Smith v.
740 (1979);
reasonable under
v. Maryland, 442
US. 735,
v.
735, 740
(1979); State v.
Wilkins,
125 Idaho
Idaho 215,
P.2d 1231,
1238 (1994).
868 P.2d
Wilkins, 125
1231, 1238
222, 868
215, 222,
(1994).
“means more
A
A reasonable
than aa subjective
not
expectation of
of privacy
more than
expectation of
of not
reasonable expectation
subjective expectation
privacy “means

discovered.” State v.
being discovered.”
101 Idaho
611 P.2d
being
P.2d 1050,
1051 (1980).
Idaho 265,
v. Jennings, 101
1050, 1051
265, 266,
266, 611
(1980).

Accordingly,
in what
the courts
What is
is
to recognize
recognize aa reasonable
expectation of
of privacy
declined to
courts have
reasonable expectation
have declined
Accordingly, the
privacy in
knowingly
public. Katz, 389
the public.
to the
at 351;
at 711,
P.2d at
at
Idaho at
518 P.2d
exposed to
389 U.S.
US. at
95 Idaho
knowingly exposed
711, 518
351; Pontier, 95
“open fields”—i.e.,
“any
fields”ii.e., “any
973.
that “open
For example,
the United
long held
United States
held that
Court has
States Supreme
Supreme Court
has long
973. For
example, the

curtilage” of
unoccupied or
the curtilage”
or undeveloped
of aa home,
466
outside the
area outside
unoccupied
undeveloped area
United States,
v. United
home, Oliver v.
States, 466

U.S.
because they
n.11 (1984)—are
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment
Amendment because
not
not protected
protected by
180 n.11
US. 170,
(1984)iare not
170, 180
they “do not
by the
provide the
intimate activities
that the
from
the Amendment
Amendment is
the setting
setting for
for those
shelter from
activities that
is intended
intended to
to shelter
those intimate
provide
surveillance.” id.,
government
The Idaho
interference or
government interference
or surveillance.”
at 179.
Idaho Supreme
Court
466 U.S.
Supreme Court
179. The
US. at
id, 466

“a police
officer’s observations
likewise
that “a
from aa location
the rule
the
location open
to the
likewise follows
made from
follows the
police officer’s
open to
observations made
rule that
“one cannot
search” because
public do
because “one
not constitute
cannot have
expectation of
constitute aa search”
have aa reasonable
reasonable expectation
of privacy
public
do not
privacy

View.” Christensen, 131
in
public view.”
in what
what is
131 Idaho
is knowingly
to public
at 146,
P.2d at
at 586.
Idaho at
exposed to
953 P.2d
586.
knowingly exposed
146, 953
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In
In addition,
that the
an asserted
the courts
the reasonableness
expectation
have recognized
of an
recognized that
reasonableness of
asserted expectation
courts have
addition, the
4“
of
privacy varies
portion of
in question.
The “‘presence
the property
which portion
of aa
of privacy
varies depending
on which
of the
is in
depending on
question. The
presence of
property is

intrusion.”’
police officer
facto, result
unconstitutional intrusion.’”
in an
an unconstitutional
Within the
the curtilage
curtilage does
result in
ofﬁcer within
police
does not,
not, ipso
ipsoﬁzcto,
at 147,
at 587
124 Idaho
131 Idaho
Idaho at
Idaho 308,
P.2d 344,
P.3d at
953 P.3d
587 (quoting
v. Clark, 124
859 P.2d
(quoting State v.
147, 953
344,
Id., 131
313, 859
308, 313,

349
public access—such
accessisuch as
parking areas,
areas impliedly
App. 1993)).
to public
as parking
349 (Ct.
open to
areas,
impliedly open
Thus, areas
(Ct. App.
1993)). Thus,
driveways,
entryiare not
not subject
expectation of
0r pathways
to entry—are
to aa reasonable
reasonable expectation
of
subject to
sidewalks, or
pathways to
driveways, sidewalks,
privacy even
private residence.
E.g.,
adjacent to
when adjacent
to aa private
818 F.3d
residence. E.
even when
F.3d 988,
United States v.
v. Carloss, 818
privacy
988,
g, United
995
124 Idaho
231 (2016);
Cir. 2016),
at 313,
P.2d at
at
Idaho at
137 S.
Ct. 231
cert. denied, 137
995 (10th
S. Ct.
859 P.2d
(10th Cir.
313, 859
2016), cert.
(2016); Clark, 124
“greater latitude,”
latitude,” as
349.
premises are
the
the government
government enjoys
when business
are involved,
349. And,
business premises
as the
involved, the
And, when
enjoys “greater

“interest of
inspections.”
“interest
being free
in being
from any
not one
the owner
of the
of commercial
commercial property
is not
free from
one in
owner of
propeny is
any inspections.”
598799 (1981);
Dewey, 452
452 U.S.
Donovan v.
Idaho 637,
156 Idaho
329
v. Dewey,
US. 594,
v. Hiebert, 156
64142, 329
594, 598–99
637, 641–42,
(1981); State v.
1089790 (Ct.
P.3d
App. 2014).
P.3d 1085,
2014).
1085, 1089–90
(Ct. App.

This
portions of
without
This does
that government
not mean
all portions
enter all
government officials
mean that
ofﬁcials may
of aa business
business Without
does not
may enter
aa warrant,
warrant may
be necessary
A warrant
enter
government inspectors
to enter
when government
inspectors desire
desire to
however. A
warrant, however.
necessary when
may be
areas
business hidden
public View
view and
from public
of aa business
hidden from
to employees.
and only
areas of
accessible to
v.
employees. Marshall v.
only accessible
’S, Inc,
(“Dow
Barlow’s,
Inc., 436
Barlow
at 236
436 U.S.
315 (1978);
476 U.S.
236 (“Dow
see also Dow Chem.
Chem. Co.,
US. 307,
US. at
307, 315
Ca, 476
(1978); see

plainly has
privacy within
within the
interior of
the interior
its
expectation of
of privacy
of its
has a
and objective
objective expectation
a reasonable,
legitimate, and
reasonable, legitimate,
plainly
covered
prepared to
observe.”).
it is
that expectation
is equally
expectation is
is one
is prepared
to observe.”).
clear that
one society
and it
covered buildings,
buildings, and
equally clear
society is
But
business owner
warrant or
it is
But it
for aa business
the government
claim the
government must
is unreasonable
to claim
must have
or
owner to
unreasonable for
have aa warrant
express
left open
the business
the public.
enter or
portions of
to enter
or to
to view
of the
to the
consent to
express consent
open to
public. Dow Chem.
View portions
business left
Chem.
“What an
237738. The
Co.,
visitor to
business
in such
The question
the business
to the
at 237–38.
is “what
an ordinary
question in
476 U.S.
such cases
US. at
cases is
ordinary Visitor
Ca, 476

property,
would have
perceived as
intent of
not knowing
knowing the
the subjective
the owner,
of the
have objectively
subjective intent
as
objectively perceived
owner, would
property, not
conduct.” Hiebert, 156
reasonable
at 642,
at 1090.
Idaho at
156 Idaho
329 P.3d
reasonable conduct.”
P.3d at
1090.
642, 329
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DEQ’s observations
Gibson’s facility
DEQ’s
with the
the
March 29,
on March
2013 complied
of Gibson’s
complied with
observations of
facility on
29, 2013

constitutional
unreasonable searches
trial
the evidence
prohibitions against
constitutional prohibitions
against unreasonable
at trial
and seizures.
seizures. First,
searches and
evidence at
First, the
Gibson’s
establishes
Ehlert to
that each
for Ehlert
to categorize
categorize Gibson’s
establishes that
and every
observation necessary
each and
necessary for
every observation

composting
waste processing
processing facility
was made
11 solid
Tier II
from the
the public
composting facility
solid waste
public access
made from
as a
a Tier
access
facility as
facility was

roadia lawful
featuresi the
road—a
vantage point.
All of
Tr. 373:6–374:22.)
the distinguishing
distinguishing features—
the
point. (Trial
of the
373:6737422.) All
lawful vantage
(Trial Tr.
“open 24/7”
24/7” and
82:237
signs
property “open
public to
inviting the
the property
the public
signs declaring
declaring the
to discard
and inviting
discard yard
waste (id.
yard waste
(id. 82:23–

401:11402:2;P1.’s
83:14,
Pl.’s Exs.
213:127214z7, 233:4–15,
233:4715, 401:11–402:2;
the numerous
Exs. 17.1,
numerous
83:14, 213:12–214:7,
17.15, 18);
17.1, 17.5,
17.5, 17.15,
18); the

piles
waste and/or
in various
214:18724,
Tr. 214:18–24,
piles of
of yard
of decomposition
decomposition (Trial
and/0r yard
various stages
waste in
stages of
(Trial Tr.
yard waste
yard waste
Pl.’s Ex.
373:6–13;
EX. 17.10,
the telltale
telltale signs
373:6713; Pl.’s
signs of
of biological
to
biological decomposition
decomposition to
17.17 );
17.11, 17.17
17.10, 17.11,
); the
Pl.’s Ex.
prepare the
yard waste
waste for
22625722721, 373:23–374:10;
the yard
for reuse
Tr. 226:25–227:21,
EX.
37323737410; Pl.’s
prepare
compost (Trial
reuse as
as compost
(Trial Tr.
240:187
18);
waste well
yards (Trial
in excess
Tr. 240:18–
an accumulation
of solid
well in
of 600
accumulation of
solid waste
and an
cubic yards
excess of
600 cubic
(Trial Tr.
18); and

242:1,
public access
from the
the public
the
413:3414z7)7were observable,
leading to
to the
and observed,
road leading
access road
242:1, 413:3–414:7)—were
observable, and
observed, from
facility.
be heard
their operations
from public
Having failed
failed to
to shield
shield their
Defendants cannot
cannot be
operations from
public view,
heard
facility. Having
View, Defendants
to
was seen.
complain about
to complain
What was
about what
seen.
Gibson’s facility
Moreover,
Ehlert testified
length concerning
the various
concerning the
of Gibson’s
testiﬁed at
at length
features of
various features
Moreover, Ehlert
facility

visible
using an
from the
ﬁrst describing
from memory
the access
his observations
later using
an
describing his
Visible from
and later
observations from
access road,
memory and
road, first
Pl.’s Ex.
August
211:177215z5, 218:10–235:9;
the testimony.
EX. 18.)
2181072359; Pl.’s
illustrate the
2017 video
to illustrate
August 2017
Video to
testimony. (Id.
(Id. 211:17–215:5,
18.)

He
between March
the changes
the property
March 2013
2013 and
He also
he noticed
on the
noticed on
August
changes he
and August
also described
described the
propeny between
20177most notably,
2017—most
entrance and
an entirely
of composting
composting windrows
on
section of
Windrows on
and an
new section
second entrance
entirely new
notably, aa second

the
ground-based and
Tr. 236:2–15.)
The ground-based
the east
the property.
236:2715.) The
of the
aerial photography
and aerial
east side
side of
(Trial Tr.
photography
propeny. (Trial
admitted
wide open
in aa field,
into evidence
that the
the facility
conﬁrms that
likewise confirms
admitted into
is situated
to
open to
evidence likewise
situated in
facility is
ﬁeld, Wide
(Pl.’s Exs.
public inspection.
that DEQ
There is
inspection. (Pl.’s
Exs. 11,
is no
no evidence
suggesting that
public
violated
evidence suggesting
11, 12,
12, 17,
18.) There
17, 18.)
DEQ violated

the
with respect
the prohibitions
prohibitions against
against unreasonable
to these
these observations.
seizures with
unreasonable searches
and seizures
respect to
searches and
observations.
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“search” (discussed
DEQ’s entry
Similarly,
was not
Smith property
the Smith
not aa “search”
further
onto the
(discussed further
Similarly, DEQ’s
entry onto
propeny was

below)
because Gibson
in the
the portions
his facility
portions of
no reasonable
expectation of
of privacy
of his
Gibson had
had no
reasonable expectation
facility
below) because
privacy in
Gibson’s composting
left
public. It
was
It is
left open
that Gibson’s
the public.
to the
is undisputed
composting facility
open and
and exposed
undisputed that
exposed to
facility was

unattended and
public when
when DEQ
premises on
the public
the premises
March 29,
to the
ofﬁcials entered
on March
entered the
unattended
2013.
and open
open to
DEQ officials
29, 2013.
“open” signs,
Gibson
premises are
posted with
that the
with various
the premises
sign
including aa sign
testified that
Gibson testified
are now
now posted
various “open”
signs, including
Pl.’s Exs.
indicating
indicating his
his facility
Tr. 75:15–76:9,
is open
822378323; Pl.’s
Exs. 17,
75:15776z9, 82:23–83:23;
open “24-7.” (Trial
facility is
(Trial Tr.
18.)
17, 18.)

Ehlert
was present
Ehlert confirmed
that the
236:10715;
the same
Tr. 236:10–15;
March 29,
conﬁrmed that
present on
on March
signage was
2013. (Trial
same signage
(Trial Tr.
29, 2013.
401:11–402:2.)
purpose for
Ehlert described
401 :1 14022.) Further,
his entry
the property
his purpose
for doing
onto the
doing
and his
described his
Further, Ehlert
entry onto
propeny and
so:
so:
YEE-WALLACE: Mr.
Q.
when you
you visited
property
BY MS.
Smith property
the Smith
Mr. Ehlert,
Visited the
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Ehlert, when
Q. BY
Gibson’s composting
and
you
Mr. Gibson’s
March 29,
at Mr.
composting operations
on March
operations on
and looked
looked at
did you
2013, did
29, 2013,
actually
property?
Smith property?
the Smith
on to
to the
go on
actually go
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
andiand Where
Q.
And—and
what you
where you
you went.
went.
did and—and
describe What
you did
Q. Andiand describe
enterediat that
A.
but currently
would be
be
it was
that time
time it
that would
the only
A. We
We entered—at
was the
entrance, but
currently that
only entrance,
the
the west
the center
looking to
ﬁnd aa
center aisle;
to find
entrance. We
west entrance.
down the
were looking
proceeded down
We proceeded
we were
aisle; we
site
we could
with. We
that we
attendant or
site attendant
or somebody
on site
site that
speak with.
could speak
We observed
observed
somebody on
compost
various stages
in various
of decomposition.
decomposition.
compost rows
rows in
stages of
Q.
was you
that was
And when
when you
and?
we, that
you say
say we,
you and?
Q. And
A.
A. Jack
Gantz.
Jack Gantz.
Court’s leave
(Id.
this testimony
this Court’s
not object
for
235:10725.) Defendants
Defendants did
to this
or seek
did not
seek this
object to
leave for
testimony or
(Id. 235:10–25.)

questions
proceed and
in aid
elicit the
the following
following testimony
of an
an objection.
to proceed
instead chose
questions in
aid of
objection. They
and elicit
chose to
testimony
They instead
on
on cross:
cross:
Q.
Now, help
understand Why
why you
you would
All right.
right. Now,
MR. SMITH:]
help me
me understand
would
SMITH:] All
[BY MR.
Q. [BY
choose
property to
it was
this property
knowing it
inspection knowing
to go
on to
to this
to conduct
an inspection
conduct an
choose to
go on
was aa
warrantless search;
why?
tell me
me why?
warrantless
search; tell
A.
we arrived
property, there
was the
we were
were
the property,
the open
And we
there was
A. When
When we
at the
sign. And
arrived at
open sign.
attempting
permission to
attempting to
them permission
the facility
to contact
of the
to ask
to
representative of
contact aa representative
ask them
facility to
enter
property.
the property.
enter the
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“warrantless
(Id.
property with
with aa “warrantless
the above
the propeny
275:7714.) While
While the
onto the
question conflates
conﬂates entry
above question
entry onto
(Id. 275:7–14.)

“open” sign,
search,” Ehlert
search,”
proceeded onto
Ehlert is
that DEQ
the
after observing
is clear
an “open”
onto the
clear that
observing an
officials, after
sign, proceeded
DEQ officials,

property
permission.
finding aa representative
limited purpose
for the
the limited
obtaining permission.
of finding
representative and
and obtaining
purpose of
property for
Ehlert’s observations
There
was nothing
limited-purpose
nothing unreasonable
his limited-purpose
There was
during his
unreasonable about
observations during
about Ehlert’s
“open 2424Gibson’s composting
entry
visitor to
business posted
Like any
to aa business
onto Gibson’s
composting facility.
posted “open
facility. Like
ordinary Visitor
entry onto
any ordinary

7,” Ehlert
7,”
Ehlert and
After passing
find an
the premises.
Gantz reasonably
attendant on
to find
an attendant
on the
passing
premises. After
and Gantz
expected to
reasonably expected

through
between large
Ehlert and
through the
the only
Gantz proceeded
large mounds
of discarded
and Gantz
mounds of
grass
discarded grass
proceeded between
entrance, Ehlert
only entrance,
clippings
via the
clippings and
the center
center aisle,
an obvious
public access
and leaves
route.
leaves Via
obvious public
access route.
aisle, an
OSHA’s unconstitutional
DEQ’s entry
While
was like
unconstitutional effort
like OSHA’s
effort to
While Defendants
claim DEQ’s
Defendants claim
to conduct
conduct
entry was

aa warrantless
in Marshall, there
In Marshall, OSHA
there are
administrative search
OSHA
warrantless administrative
differences. In
clear differences.
search in
are clear
sought
the nonpublic working
working areas
after
enter and
Without aa warrant
warrant the
to enter
sought to
and search
search without
business after
areas inside a
a business
the
by contrast,
Ehlert and
the proprietor
proprietor explicitly
Gantz
at 309.
436 U.S.
and Gantz
refused access.
access. 436
US. at
309. Here,
explicitly refused
contrast, Ehlert
Here, by
out-of-doors and
entered
an open
composting facility
along aa marked
marked public
entered an
public
open composting
and moved
located out-of-doors
moved along
facility located

access
not told
no building;
no samples;
told to
to leave;
entered no
route. They
collected no
were not
access route.
building; they
samples; they
leave;
They entered
they collected
they were
and,
which was
was plainly
plainly visible
that which
from
looking for
for an
While looking
an attendant,
Visible from
Viewed that
attendant, they
merely viewed
and, while
they merely
“appropriate credentials”
credentials” under
outside
under Idaho
the facility.
the requirement
requirement to
to present
present “appropriate
Considering the
Idaho
outside the
facility. Considering

Code
within the
Ehlert and
inquire within
the facility
Gantz reasonably
to inquire
instead
and Gantz
decided to
Code §
reasonably decided
facility instead
39-108(2)(b), Ehlert
§ 39-108(2)(b),
of
waiting at
initial entry
into the
the
The same
the open,
of waiting
at the
of limited,
entrance. The
ungated entrance.
same type
limited, initial
entry into
open, ungated
type of
customer
yet it
in Marshall, yet
it raised
of aa business
no constitutional
constitutional question.
customer service
question.
raised no
area of
business occurred
occurred in
service area
“What is
436
by the
public is
without aa warrant,
warrant, by
by the
the
the public
at 309.
is observable
is observable,
436 U.S.
observable by
US. at
309. “What
observable, Without

Government
well.”3 Id. at
Government inspector
inspector as
at 315.
315.
as well.”3

33

Defendants’ memorandum
Defendants’
from and
and discussion
contains lengthy
memorandum contains
quotations from
of United
United States
States Supreme
Court cases
Supreme Court
discussion of
cases
lengthy quotations
addressing
warrantless administrative
under various
administrative searches
various federal
federal statutes.
searches under
statutes. See
436 U.S.
addressing warrantless
See Marshall, 436
US. 307
307 (OSHA);
(OSHA);
States v.
452 U.S.
311 (1972)
Act of
Control Act
v. Biswell, 406
of 1968).
None
594 (FMSHA);
United States
406 U.S.
US. 594
US. 311
Donovan, 452
1968). None
(FMSHA); United
(Gun Control
(1972) (Gun
all involved
that
of
governmental activity
involved governmental
Idaho Code
of these
More fundamentally,
these cases
cases address
address Idaho
Code §§ 39-108(2)(c).
activity that
fundamentally, they
they all
39-108(2)(c). More
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Ehlert
Ehlert and
Gantz found
sufficient objective
indicators of
of an
an explicit,
or at
at least
found sufficient
least implied,
and Gantz
objective indicators
explicit, or
implied,
invitation
when an
with “stop,”
invitation to
the composting
enter the
to enter
composting facility.
Even when
an open
is posted
open business
business is
posted with
facility. Even
trespassing” signs—none
trafﬁc,” and
signsinone of
“no thru
the Gibson
which were
thru traffic,”
of which
at the
and “no trespassing”
Gibson facility
were observed
observed at
facility

20137“th0se signs
on
legitimate
cannot reasonably
March 29,
interpreted to
on March
signs cannot
to exclude
exclude normal,
be interpreted
normal, legitimate
reasonably be
29, 2013—“those

inquiries
police officers,
their movements
inquiries or
including police
restrict their
or visits
Visits by
movements
who restrict
individuals, including
officers, who
ordinary individuals,
by ordinary
Visitor.” Hiebert, 156
to
by aa reasonable
at 642,
at 1090.
the areas
areas normally
Idaho at
to the
reasonable visitor.”
156 Idaho
329 P.3d
P.3d at
1090.
used by
normally used
642, 329

Because
in the
neither aa
the composting
expectation of
of privacy
composting facility,
Gibson lacked
lacked aa reasonable
reasonable expectation
Because Gibson
privacy in
facility, neither
Gibson’s express
warrant nor
was necessary
nor Gibson’s
warrant
to enter.
enter. See
consent was
express verbal
verbal consent
See id.;
see also United
necessary to
id; see
*3 (D.
CR-OS-OZ-E-BLW, 2008
States v.
No. CR-08-02-E-BLW,
WL 2746034,
at *3
Idaho July
2008 WL
v. King, N0.
2746034, at
2008)
11, 2008)
July 11,
(D. Idaho

“open fields”),
(finding
privately owned
aﬂ’d, 660
ﬁelds”), conviction aff’d,
for entry
warrant needed
no warrant
of privately
needed for
owned “open
660
(finding no
entry of
Ehlert’s observations
F.3d
were fully
the facility
1071 (9th
Cir. 2011).
of the
F.3d 1071
observations of
Therefore, Ehlert’s
facility were
2011). Therefore,
fully “in
(9th Cir.

conformity
in the
with the
the
the prohibitions
prohibitions against
against unreasonable
contained in
seizures contained
unreasonable searches
and seizures
searches and
conformity with
fourth
the United
fourth amendment
the constitution
the
constitution of
article I,
amendment to
of the
United States
to the
of the
section 17,
States and
and section
17, article
I, of
Idaho.” Idaho
constitution
the state
constitution of
of the
of Idaho.”
state of
Idaho Code
Code §§ 39-108(2)(c).
39-108(2)(c).

2.
2.

ofﬁcials’ entry
DEQ
was not
the composting
not aa “search.”
of the
composting facility
facilitv was
entrv of
DEC officials’

Because
when government
that which
there is
which is
constitutional violation
Violation when
government officials
is no
no constitutional
ofﬁcials view
is
View that
Because there
search” for
39“warrantless search”
left
was no
purposes of
left open
the public,
for purposes
there was
to the
no “warrantless
of §§ 39Visible to
open and
and visible
public, there

108(2)(c).
Both the
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment
Amendment of
the United
the
article I,
of the
United States
Constitution and
17 of
of the
States Constitution
and article
I, §§ 17
108(2)(c). Both
effects” from
searches.”
“persons, houses,
“unreasonable searches.”
Idaho
from “unreasonable
Constitution protect
protect “persons,
Idaho Constitution
and effects”
houses, papers,
papers, and

But
that an
But the
the United
not aa person,
United States
held that
an open
ﬁeld is
is not
Court has
States Supreme
Supreme Court
has repeatedly
open field
repeatedly held
person,
searches” because
“warrantless searches”
rose
investigate
the level
the federal
level of
agents sought
areas to
federal agents
to the
of “warrantless
to nonpublic
nonpublic areas
to investigate
sought access
rose to
access to
because the
potential violations
at 309
potential
violations without
implied consent.
without express
or implied
work areas);
consent. See
express or
436 U.S.
See Marshall, 436
US. at
309 (nonpublic
(nonpublic work
areas);
at 597
at 312
In addition,
Donovan, 452
452 U.S.
312 (locked
gun storeroom).
406 U.S.
(privately-owned quarries);
addition,
US. at
597 (privately-owned
US. at
storeroom). In
(locked gun
quarries); Biswell, 406
in the
Taken
both
upheld the
warrantless searches
and Biswell upheld
the warrantless
the face
Fourth Amendment
Amendment challenges.
face of
of Fourth
both Donovan and
challenges. Taken
searches in
together,
proposition that
that warrantless
administrative searches
violate the
for the
the proposition
not violate
the Fourth
Fourth
warrantless administrative
stand for
these cases
searches do
cases stand
together, these
do not
in certain
in answering
Amendment
certain circumstances.
Amendment in
But these
are no
help in
the basic
answering the
no help
raised by
circumstances. But
these cases
basic questions
questions raised
cases are
by
search”?
Defendants’ motion
“warrantless search”?
Defendants’
motion to
Did DEQ
strike: Did
to strike:
conduct aa “warrantless
DEQ conduct
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“the government’s
government’s intrusion
house,
paper, or
that “the
the open
not one
intrusion upon
or effect,
is not
of
ﬁelds is
upon the
open fields
one of
such that
effect, such
house, paper,
searches’ proscribed
Amendment.” United States
‘unreasonable searches’
those
by the
text of
the text
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment.”
of the
those ‘unreasonable
proscribed by

303704 (1987)
v.
at 177).
Idaho courts
480 U.S.
466 U.S.
courts have
have
v. Dunn, 480
US. 294,
US. at
(quoting Oliver, 466
294, 303–04
177). Idaho
(1987) (quoting

“Under the
ofﬁcer’s observations
likewise
view doctrine,
this principle:
the open
principle: “Under
likewise recognized
recognized this
police officer’s
open View
observations
doctrine, aa police
search.” Christensen, 131
made
public do
from aa location
the public
not constitute
131 Idaho
location open
to the
at
constitute aa search.”
Idaho at
open to
made from
do not

146,
P.2d at
at 586.
953 P.2d
586.
146, 953
Court’s decision
Amply
Doe, 131
in State v.
this point
point is
illustrating this
131
is Idaho
Idaho Supreme
decision in
Supreme Court’s
v. Doe,
Amply illustrating

Idaho
Doe, police
In Doe,
in aa
minor in
implicating aa minor
P.2d 816
Idaho 851,
police obtained
obtained evidence
816 (1998).
evidence implicating
965 P.2d
851, 965
(1998). In
parents’ house.
burglary,
went to
minor at
the minor
his parents’
to question
at his
no one
ofﬁcers went
question the
and two
one
When no
house. When
two officers
burglary, and

answered
the home
the door,
the officers
through the
the open
near the
home and,
ofﬁcers approached
shop near
open shop
shop
answered the
approached aa shop
door, the
and, through
doors,
used in
in the
matching the
the description
the vehicle
the burglary
description of
of the
shotgun
vehicle used
truck matching
and shotgun
observed aa truck
doors, observed
burglary and
ofﬁcers’ initial
shells
initial observations
matching the
the officers’
the burglarized
shells matching
burglarized goods.
constituted
claimed the
Doe claimed
observations constituted
goods. Doe

an
illegal search
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment
Amendment and
the
an illegal
art. I,
to suppress
under the
search under
and moved
and art.
moved to
suppress the
17, and
I, §§ 17,
evidence
into the
the officers
the shop.
after the
officers looked
obtained after
looked into
shop.
evidence obtained
The
that
The magistrate,
the district
the Idaho
all held
district court,
held that
Idaho Supreme
Court all
and ultimately
Supreme Court
magistrate, the
ultimately the
court, and
“open view”
View” doctrine.
the
under the
Doe, 131
the officers
the evidence
the “open
131 Idaho
officers legally
at
doctrine. Doe,
Idaho at
evidence under
discovered the
legally discovered
819720. Each
854–55,
it reasonable
854755, 965
for the
the officers
the
enter onto
P.2d at
at 819–20.
Each court
to enter
onto the
ofﬁcers to
court found
found it
reasonable for
965 P.2d

“ordinary visitors
property
places where
in places
their suspect
for their
without aa warrant
warrant and
100k for
Visitors could
Where “ordinary
and look
could be
suspect in
be
property without

expected
131 Idaho
the Idaho
to go.” Id., 131
at 854,
P.2d at
at 819
Idaho at
Idaho
819 (quotation
expected to
965 P.2d
Further, the
(quotation omitted).
omitted). Further,
854, 965
purpose” and
“legitimate societal
Supreme
were pursuing
pursuing aa “legitimate
that the
the officers
emphasized that
ofﬁcers were
Court emphasized
societal purpose”
and
Supreme Court
“vantage points
reasonably
points . . . not
by the
their observations
from “vantage
not covered
the Fourth
Fourth
observations from
made their
covered by
reasonably made
.

.

.

Amendment.” Id. (quotation
Amendment.”
were within
Within the
the officers
the curtilage
though the
Even though
officers were
curtilage of
of
(quotation omitted).
omitted). Even
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Doe’s home,
Doe’s
that no
the court
implicated and
constraints were
held that
no constitutional
constitutional constraints
no search
court held
and no
search
were implicated
home, the
818719.
occurred.
853754, 965
131 Idaho
at 853–54,
P.2d at
at 818–19.
Idaho at
occurred. Id. 131
965 P.2d

Doe, Ehlert
in several
in Doe,
Ehlert and
this case
Like the
the officers
Gantz
parallels this
officers in
Doe parallels
and Gantz
several key
respects. Like
case in
key respects.
citizen’s complaint
were pursuing
the legitimate
legitimate societal
investigating aa citizen’s
complaint about
pursuing the
of investigating
societal purpose
were
purpose of
about odors
odors
Gibson’s composting
emanating
IDAPA 58.01.06.010.01.b.iii,
from Gibson’s
emanating from
composting facility.
See IDAPA
58.01.06.010.01.b.iii, 011.01.b.iii,
011.01.b.iii,
facility. See
gases” at
“malodorous gases”
012.03.i.iii,
waste management
all solid
control of
management
of “malodorous
at all
013.03.i.iii (requiring
solid waste
012.03.i.iii, 013.03.i.iii
(requiring control

facilities).
11 solid
in
Tier II
entering the
the facility,
Before entering
solid waste
processing facility
waste processing
observed aa Tier
facilities). Before
facility in
facility, they
they observed
open
permission
triggering aa legitimate
legitimate and
effort to
ﬁnd an
attendant and
to find
an attendant
open view,
and reasonable
and seek
reasonable effort
seek permission
View, triggering
Ehlert’s reasonable
for
the signage
the facility
for further
further inspection.
belief he
he
inspection. As
As noted,
at the
signage at
reasonable belief
supported Ehlert’s
facility supported
noted, the

“open” facility
could
within—just like
it was
like it
ﬁnd someone
working Withinijust
for
the “open”
enter the
to find
reasonable for
someone working
could enter
was reasonable
facility to

the
Doe, 131
in the
the officers
the curtilage
the Doe
for Doe
the shop.
131
enter the
officers to
to enter
curtilage of
of the
look for
Doe residence
residence and
and look
Doe in
shop. Doe,
Idaho
between this
important difference
this case
that
an important
difference between
is that
at 854,
P.2d at
at 819.
Idaho at
and Doe is
819. Indeed,
965 P.2d
case and
Indeed, an
854, 965
Ehlert
publicly accessible
whereas the
Ehlert and
the officers
the
Gantz entered
an open,
officers entered
entered an
entered the
and Gantz
accessible business,
business, Whereas
open, publicly
officers’ intrusion
curtilage
was not
into that
that constitutionally
The officers’
not aa
intrusion into
curtilage of
of aa home.
sensitive area
home. The
area was
constitutionally sensitive

search,
in the
that aa search
the open
there is
is even
to conclude
ﬁeld at
at issue
and there
reason to
search occurred
open field
even less
less reason
conclude that
occurred in
issue
search, and
here.
here.
Nevertheless, Defendants
premise their
their motion
motion to
strike on
the unsupportable
Defendants premise
to strike
on the
assumption
unsupportable assumption
Nevertheless,
search” occurred
“warrantless search”
that
in violation
that aa “warrantless
Violation Idaho
Defendants may
Idaho Code
occurred in
Code §§ 39-108(2)(c).
39-108(2)(c). Defendants
may

point out
where Ehlert
Ehlert answered
point
to leading
leading questions
instances where
questions about
out instances
answered affirmatively
about aa
afﬁrmatively to
Court.44
“warrantless search,”
search,” but
“warrantless
but that
this Court.
that testimony
not resolve
the legal
legal question
question before
before this
resolve the
does not
testimony does

“mere Visual
counsel’s mischaracterizations
Defense
visual observation
not
mischaracterizations notwithstanding,
Defense counsel’s
observation does
notwithstanding, “mere
does not

4
4

an expert
if itit consists
Witness
witness, is
properly disregarded
from an
legal conclusions.
expert witness,
even from
is properly
of legal
Witness testimony,
disregarded if
consists of
conclusions. Ballard
testimony, even
Defendants’
v.
Ehlert is
legal expert,
484 (2016).
not aa legal
and his
his responses
Idaho 674,
v. Kerr, 160
is not
to Defendants’
160 Idaho
P.3d 464,
responses to
378 P.3d
expert, and
464, 484
674, 694,
694, 378
(2016). Ehlert
search”—in the
“warrantless search”—in
counsel’s leading
that aa “warrantless
counsel’s
not be
the specialized
leading questions
agreement that
specialized
as agreement
regarded as
questions should
should not
be regarded
term—had occurred.
legal
See id.
legal sense
the term—had
of the
occurred. See
sense of
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7117
search.” U.S.
constitute
Jones, 565
412 (2012)
at 711–
constitute aa search.”
Idaho at
US. v.
v. Jones,
565 U.S.
US. 400,
95 Idaho
400, 412
(2012) accord Pontier, 95
973776. Therefore,
14,
violated.
not violated.
P.2d at
at 973–76.
518 P.2d
was not
Therefore, §§ 39-108(2)(c)
14, 518
39-108(2)(c) was

B.
B.

search” occurred,
“warrantless search”
that aa “warrantless
Even
the Court
the exclusionary
Even if the
ﬁnds that
rule
Court finds
exclusionary rule
occurred, the
does
this case.
not apply
to this
case.
does not
apply to

There
In Idaho,
this case.
for applying
the exclusionary
the rule
There is
is no
no basis
rule to
to this
is
rule is
basis for
case. In
exclusionary rule
Idaho, the
applying the
generally
with
in part,
in the
interfering with
the civil
ciVil context
context due,
inapplicable in
to concerns
concerns over
over interfering
generally inapplicable
part, to
due, in
1127
“overwhelming” state
“overwhelming”
Dep’t’t of
Health & Welfare
Doe, 150
interests. Idaho Dep
state interests.
Idaho 103,
150 Idaho
v. Doe,
ofHealth
Welfare v.
103, 112–

“issue of
impression” and
256757 (Ct.
13,
244 P.3d
ﬁrst impression”
declining to
App. 2010)
of first
to
and declining
P.3d 247,
(noting “issue
247, 256–57
2010) (noting
(Ct. App.
13, 244

extend
proceedings). In
In aa criminal
criminal case,
the exclusionary
the
child abuse
extend the
to child
neglect proceedings).
and neglect
rule to
abuse and
exclusionary rule
case, the
exclusionary
through an
unconstitutional search
to evidence
an unconstitutional
or seizure
seizure
applies to
obtained through
search or
rule applies
evidence obtained
exclusionary rule
1296797 (1986).
only.
Johnson, 110
in
524725, 716
110 Idaho
P.2d 1288,
Idaho 516,
716 P.2d
even in
v. Johnson,
1288, 1296–97
And, even
only. State v.
516, 524–25,
(1986). And,

that
particular case…
in aa particular
“[w]hether the
that context,
the exclusionary
sanction is
is appropriately
imposed in
case...
context, “[w]hether
appropriately imposed
exclusionary sanction
is
rights of
from the
the party
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment
Amendment rights
the question
whether the
of the
seeking
is an
an issue
question whether
separate from
issue separate
party seeking
conduct.” United
to
by police
police conduct.”
Leon, 468
the rule
to invoke
invoke the
rule were
violated by
468 U.S.
were violated
United States v.
v. Leon,
US. 897,
906
897, 906

(1984)
criminal case,
This is
not aa criminal
let alone
there was
quotation omitted).
is not
no search
alone
and there
search let
was no
(internal quotation
omitted). This
case, and
(1984) (internal
aa constitutional
whether
this case
not raise
the subsidiary
constitutional violation.
Violation. Accordingly,
of Whether
raise the
issue of
case does
does not
subsidiary issue
Accordingly, this
the
the
the exclusionary
there was
application of
rule applies.
live issue,
of the
applies. But,
assuming there
even assuming
was aa live
exclusionary rule
issue, application
But, even
39exclusionary
proceeding would
unwarranted under
under both
both the
in this
this civil
text of
the text
ciVil proceeding
of §§ 39rule in
would be
be unwarranted
exclusionary rule

108(2)(c)
in United States
forth in
the balancing
428 U.S.
balancing test
test set
and the
set forth
433 (1976).
States v.
v. Janis, 428
US. 433
(1976).
108(2)(c) and
1.
1.

Idaho
an exclusionary
not provide
Idaho Code
provide an
exclusionarv remedy.
does not
Code §
remedv.
39-108(2)(c) does
8 39-108(2)(c)

“imposes the
Defendants
that §§ 39-108(2)(c)
the Exclusionary
for any
Defendants assume
Rule for
assume that
Exclusionary Rule
39-108(2)(c) “imposes
any
statute’s plain
(Defs’ Mem.
Violation.”
violation.” (Defs’
plain
this assumption
the statute’s
Mem. at
at 7.)
is unsupported
assumption is
unsupported by
However, this
7.) However,
by the

“must be
effect.” State v.
and
be given
v. Leary, 160
160 Idaho
which “must
Idaho 349,
given effect.”
and unambiguous
unambiguous language,
349, 352,
352,
language, which

372
In fact,
mention the
the statute
407 (2016).
The statute
not mention
the exclusionary
372 P.3d
P.3d 404,
statute
statute does
rule. In
does not
exclusionary rule.
404, 407
fact, the
(2016). The
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is
quasi-criminal context
silent as
the remedy
for aa violation.
the quasi-criminal
context of
is completely
to the
Violation. Outside
of the
of
Outside of
as to
completely silent
remedy for
civil
in aa civil
that the
the exclusionary
ciVil asset
ciVil
no reported
held that
reported Idaho
Idaho case
applies in
has held
rule applies
asset forfeiture,
case has
forfeiture, no
exclusionary rule
case.
judicial precedent
their
not addressed
for their
utter lack
Defendants have
lack of
of statutory
precedent for
and judicial
have not
basis and
addressed utter
case. Defendants
statutory basis
position.
position.
The
precedent is
unsurprising. “The exclusionary
that evidence
The lack
lack of
of precedent
is unsurprising.
states that
rule states
evidence
exclusionary rule
obtained
in the
trial of
illegal search
the criminal trial
or seizure
is inadmissible
inadmissible in
of aa
result of
of an
an illegal
obtained as
search or
seizure is
as a
a result
defendant.” Johnson,
defendant.”
Johnson, 110
judge110 Idaho
The rule
at 524,
P.2d at
at 1296
1296 (emphasis
is aa judgeIdaho at
716 P.2d
rule is
(emphasis added).
524, 716
added). The

made
justified as
be free
right to
from unreasonable
the right
of the
to be
free from
and justified
unreasonable
made remedy
safeguard of
conceived and
as a
a safeguard
remedy conceived
search
It is
Fourth Amendment
Amendment violations,
deterrent of
is intended
intended as
general deterrent
of Fourth
seizure. Id. It
search and
and seizure.
as a
a general
Violations,
“rather than
aggrieved.” United States v.
“rather
right of
than aa personal
the party
constitutional right
of the
personal constitutional
v. Calandra,
patty aggrieved.”
“the exclusionary
414
been interpreted
414 U.S.
interpreted to
to
never been
348 (1974).
has never
rule has
US. 338,
exclusionary rule
Accordingly, “the
338, 348
(1974). Accordingly,

proscribe
persons.” Id. The
in all
the use
The
all proceedings
all persons.”
of illegally
or against
against all
proscribe the
seized evidence
proceedings or
evidence in
use of
illegally seized
rule
in the
the absence
of aa constitutional
constitutional violation,
to several
never applies
applies in
several exceptions,
rule never
absence of
due to
Violation, and,
exceptions,
and, due
may
in aa criminal
criminal case
not apply
Violation has
when aa constitutional
constitutional violation
has occurred.
even when
occurred. See
case even
See Davis v.
v.
may not
apply in
rule’s necessary
United States,
consequenceiignoring admissible
229 (2011).
The rule’s
admissible
564 U.S.
US. 229
necessary consequence—ignoring
States, 564
(2011). The

“bitter pill” that
evidence
windfall to
defendantiis aa “bitter
that must
the defendant—is
to the
must be
awarding aa Windfall
and thereby
evidence and
be
thereby awarding

administered
administered cautiously.
at 237.
237.
cautiously. Id. at
Caution
warranted here.
for an
extension of
is warranted
As noted,
Defendants argue
an unprecedented
of
Caution is
here. As
unprecedented extension
argue for
noted, Defendants
the
profound misreading
thinnest of
the thinnest
the exclusionary
misreading of
on aa profound
of §§ 39-108(2)(c)
of
and the
based on
exclusionary rule,
rule, based
39-108(2)(c) and
constitutional
that the
the Idaho
constitutional arguments.
no evidence
arguments. Moreover,
Idaho Legislature,
presented no
have presented
evidence that
Legislature,
Moreover, they
they have
despite
omitting aa remedy
from the
the statute,
the exclusionary
intended the
to apply
nevertheless intended
despite omitting
rule to
exclusionary rule
statute, nevertheless
remedy from
apply
in
in the
that “our
the event
ofﬁcials violated
Defendants are
correct that
event DEQ
violated §§ 39-108(2)(c).
are correct
39-108(2)(c). If Defendants
DEQ officials
“entire history
reviewed” the
analysis” when
Legislature
when it
it
the “entire
of case
constitution analysis”
development and
Legislature reviewed”
and constitution
case development
history of
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(Defs’ Mem.
enacted
it is
telling that
that the
all the
the more
the Legislature
Mem. at
at 23),
is all
more telling
Legislature provided
enacted §
provided
39-108(2)(C) (Defs’
23), it
§ 39-108(2)(c)

no
was aa legislative
in the
if the
the statute.
But if
the lack
no remedy
lack of
of aa statutory
legislative oversight,
statute. But
oversight,
statutory remedy
remedy in
remedy was
error,”
Defendants’ arguments
legislature’s error,”
accepting
would “penaliz[e]
“penaliz[e] the
the officer
for the
the legislature’s
officer for
arguments would
accepting Defendants’
“cannot logically
which “cannot
violations.” Davis,
the deterrence
Fourth Amendment
Amendment Violations.”
which
contribute to
to the
of Fourth
deterrence of
logically contribute

564
241 (internal
marks omitted).
at 241
quotation marks
564 U.S.
US. at
(internal quotation
omitted).
2.
2.

Defendants
cannot justify
the cost
the exclusionary
Defendants cannot
of applying
rule here.
here.
cost of
exclusionary rule
applying the
iustifv the

Suppressing
illegal conduct
of illegal
substantial societal
carries substantial
admissible evidence
societal costs;
Suppressing admissible
conduct carries
evidence of
costs;
“unwarranted” when
“appreciable deterrence.”
deterrence.” Janis,
therefore,
it will
Will not
not achieve
is “unwarranted”
when it
exclusion is
achieve “appreciable
therefore, exclusion

“discriminating” deterrence-oriented
428
deterrence-oriented approach
with its
428 U.S.
its increasingly
at 454.
454. Consistent
Consistent with
approach
US. at
increasingly “discriminating”

to
in the
criminal context,
the exclusionary
the criminal
the United
to the
rule in
at 237,
United States
564 U.S.
States
US. at
context, Davis, 564
exclusionary rule
237, the
quasiSupreme
the exclusionary
the quasiciVil case
held the
to aa civil
Court has
never held
applies to
Supreme Court
has never
outside the
rule applies
case outside
exclusionary rule

criminal
because the
criminal context
That is
the Court
the deterrent
civil asset
context of
deterrent
of civil
is because
forfeiture. That
Court has
never found
found the
has never
asset forfeiture.
“substantial cost
value,
in the
the rule
the civil
the “substantial
the
ciVil context
context outweighs
of applying
on the
rule in
outweighs the
cost on
value, if any,
applying the
any, of
evidence.”
societal
by its
proscription of
what concededly
in law
its proscription
interest in
enforcement by
of What
is relevant
relevant evidence.”
societal interest
law enforcement
concededly is

“intersovereign”
Janis, the
in Janis,
428 U.S.
the Court
the rule
to apply
at 448–49.
44849. Thus,
to “intersovereign”
Court refused
rule to
refused to
US. at
Thus, in
Janis, 428
apply the

civil
by state
under aa
ciVil cases,
authorities sought
authorities under
to use
federal authorities
sought to
state authorities
seized by
evidence seized
use evidence
whereby federal
cases, whereby
459760.
warrant
later declared
warrant later
invalid. Id. at
at 459–60.
declared invalid.

As
be applied
the exclusionary
ciVil asset
As noted,
to in rem civil
forfeiture
applied to
rule may
asset forfeiture
exclusionary rule
noted, the
may be
proceedings
both federal
in both
federal and
Idaho courts.
proceedings in
and Idaho
courts. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
v. Pennsylvania, 380
380
697798 (1965);
U.S.
Dep’t’t of
Law Enf’t ex
rel. Richardson v.
US. 693,
ex rel.
v. $34,000
US. Currency,
ofLaw
693, 697–98
$34, 000 U.S.
(1965); Idaho Dep

121
121 Idaho
in
that is
824 P.2d
145 (Ct.
the case
P.2d 142,
App. 1991).
Defendants note
note that
is also
Idaho 211,
also the
case in
211, 214,
214, 824
142, 145
1991). Defendants
(Ct. App.
(Defs’ Mem.
Maryland.
21723.) This
This line
line of
that
the understanding
Mem. at
at 21–23.)
of authority
is grounded
on the
understanding that
grounded on
Maryland. (Defs’
authority is

in rem forfeiture
usually
quasi-criminal and
in substance
forfeiture proceedings,
while nominally
and usually
are in
substance quasi-criminal
nominally civil,
proceedings, while
civil, are
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accompany
would be
be anomalous
criminal proceedings.
to
under these
these circumstances,
anomalous indeed,
proceedings. “It would
circumstances, to
indeed, under
accompany criminal
hold
while in
in the
in the
that in
criminal proceeding
the illegally
the
the criminal
is excludable,
hold that
proceeding the
seized evidence
evidence is
excludable, While
illegally seized
forfeiture
proceeding, requiring
been violated,
violated, the
that the
criminal law
requiring the
the determination
the criminal
the
determination that
forfeiture proceeding,
law has
has been
admissible.” Plymouth Sedan,
same
would be
be admissible.”
risk of
There is
at 701.
is no
no risk
of
701. There
same evidence
evidence would
380 U.S.
US. at
Sedan, 380

similar
with aa
similar inconsistency
NOT dealing
here because,
Defendants emphasize,
dealing with
are NOT
as Defendants
inconsistency here
emphasize, “we are
because, as
criminal
in aa state
in aa federal
criminal charge
with one
ciVil case
dealing with
federal system;
charge in
state system
and aa civil
are dealing
one
case in
we are
system and
system; we
.” (Defs’
(Defs’ Mem.
case,
in state
that reason,
For that
the
ciVil case
Mem. at
at 14.)
state court
court . . . .”
case in
cases applying
reason, cases
applying the
case, aa civil
14.) For
.

.

.

exclusionary
before this
this Court.
the issues
ciVil asset
forfeiture are
irrelevant to
to civil
to the
are irrelevant
Court.
rule to
asset forfeiture
issues before
exclusionary rule
“intrasovereign” character
While
this case,
fail to
the “intrasovereign”
While Defendants
Defendants emphasize
emphasize the
of this
to
character of
case, they
they fail
Ehlert’s testimony
explain
will
the entirety
explain how
other evidence)
excluding the
of Ehlert’s
perhaps other
how excluding
testimony (and
entirety of
evidence) Will
(and perhaps

appreciably
Janis did
possibility of
the possibility
the
constitutional violations.
of the
Violations. Jam's
deter future
future constitutional
did leave
open the
leave open
appreciably deter

casesia possibility
Court
possibility that
in the
that has
not materialized
the four
the rule
materialized in
intrasovereign cases—a
four
to intrasovereign
Court applying
has not
rule to
applying the
decades
was decided.
Janis held
it was
that the
But Jam's
the rule
civil
intersovereign civil
held that
to intersovereign
since it
applies to
rule never applies
decided. But
decades since
cases,
based on
proof that
that deterrence
the rule
indicating any
compelling proof
extension of
of the
must be
on compelling
of
deterrence of
rule must
be based
cases, indicating
any extension
constitutional
the countervailing
sufﬁcient to
to outweigh
to occur,
constitutional violations
Violations is
is needed,
countervailing
and sufficient
outweigh the
likely to
needed, likely
occur, and
costs.
justifying the
the costs
The requirement
for those
requirement of
of justifying
of exclusion
exclusion presents
presents aa “high obstacle
those
obstacle for
costs of
costs. The
rule.” Penn.
364765
urging application
Prob. & Parole v.
urging
the rule.”
524 U.S.
Penn. Bd.
application of
of the
Bd. of
v. Scott,
US. 357,
Scott, 524
357, 364–65
of Prob.

(1998).
justification for
their motion
deterrence-based justiﬁcation
fall short.
for their
motion and
offer no
Defendants offer
no deterrence-based
thus fall
short.
and thus
(1998). Defendants
In
In fact,
claiming the
not claiming
the rule
Defendants are
is needed
to deter
deter future
are not
and likely
rule is
needed and
future
likely to
fact, Defendants
39constitutional
the rule
Violation of
constitutional violations.
is needed
to remedy
an alleged
of §§ 39Violations. They
alleged violation
assert the
rule is
needed to
remedy an
They assert

108(2)(c).
provides no
But the
the statute
not even
let alone
no such
Defendants do
alone
and Defendants
statute provides
such remedy,
even assert,
do not
assert, let
remedy, and
108(2)(c). But
present evidence,
granting such
That is
that granting
present
is likely
to deter
is because
deter anything.
such aa remedy
because
anything. That
evidence, that
likely to
remedy is
Defendants
the exclusionary
not seek
the general
general deterrence
intended to
to provide.
Defendants do
deterrence the
provide.
rule was
seek the
was intended
do not
exclusionary rule
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beia personal
They
personal right,
it was
claiming the
the rule
something it
is something
intended to
to be—a
instead claiming
never intended
are instead
rule is
was never
see
right, see
They are
3487in aa transparent
Calandra, 414
414 U.S.
with regulations
attempt to
transparent attempt
at 348—in
to avoid
regulations
avoid complying
US. at
complying with
designed
protect human
the
health and
the environment.
human health
environment. See
to protect
Idaho Code
and the
designed to
See Idaho
Code §§ 39-105(2)
(granting the
39-105(2) (granting
“prevention, control,
Director
waste for
for solid
for the
the “prevention,
Director authority
to adopt
or abatement
of
abatement of
solid waste
adopt rules
rules for
control, or
authority to
health”). This
environmental
upholds the
This neither
neither upholds
the
pollution or
environmental pollution
risks to
or degradation
to public
degradation … risks
public health”).

rule’s lofty
exclusionary
purpose nor
justifies the
with extending
that would
nor justiﬁes
the heavy
the
extending the
cost that
come with
would come
exclusionary rule’s
lofty purpose
heavy cost

DEQ’s regulations.
rule
ciVil enforcement
enforcement of
to civil
of DEQ’s
regulations.
rule to

There
judicial concern
for the
the societal
the exclusionary
There is
of applying
is no
no shortage
of judicial
shortage of
concern for
societal costs
costs of
exclusionary
applying the
rule
in the
criminal context.
that the
For example,
the United
the criminal
the
context. For
United States
lamented that
Court has
States Supreme
Supreme Court
has lamented
rule in
example, the
“undeniably detracts
rule
from the
truthfinding process
the truthfinding
and allows
detracts from
allows many
who would
otherwise
rule “undeniably
would otherwise
process and
many who

be incarcerated
the consequences
incarcerated to
to escape
escape the
consequences
be

actions.” Plymouth Sedan,
of
at 364.
their actions.”
524 U.S.
of their
364.
US. at
Sedan, 524

“reasonable and
And
undesirable potential
And there
potential to
there is
is real
real and
to discourage
proper investigative
investigative
and undesirable
and proper
discourage “reasonable

actions” through
actions”
through indiscriminate
the rule.
462 U.S.
indiscriminate application
application of
of the
258
rule. Illinois v.
v. Gates,
US. 213,
Gates, 462
213, 258

“The rule
(1983)
public
in undermining
undermining public
also exacts
exacts aa heavy
price in
rule also
J. concurring).
concurring). “The
heavy price
(White, J.
(1983) (White,
system.” Id.
confidence
justice system.”
in the
that govern
criminal justice
the reasonableness
the standards
the criminal
standards that
of the
reasonableness of
govern the
conﬁdence in

All
where, as
All of
maximized Where,
the defendant
of
of these
defendant seeks
exclusion of
these concerns
concerns are
are maximized
seeks exclusion
as here,
here, the
visual observations
public View.
view. If,
illegal activity
Defendants argue,
as Defendants
to public
of illegal
Visual
observations of
exposed to
knowingly exposed
argue,
activity knowingly
If, as
the
property without
the exclusionary
and observe
private property
ofﬁcials enter
applies when
enter and
without aa
rule applies
when DEQ
observe private
exclusionary rule
DEQ officials
DEQ’s reasonable
warrant,
legitimate efforts
and legitimate
exigent circumstances,
efforts to
reasonable and
to
or exigent
warrant, consent,
circumstances, DEQ’s
consent, or

expeditiously
be crippled.
and address
Violations would
compliance and
crippled.
address obvious
seek voluntary
rule violations
would be
obvious rule
expeditiously seek
voluntary compliance
Ehlert’s observations
Worse,
protective and
thwart the
the protective
and remedial
remedial objectives
of
suppressing Ehlert’s
observations would
objectives of
would thwart
Worse, suppressing
39-102. Just
the
Health Act.
Environmental Protection
the Idaho
and Health
the
Idaho Environmental
Protection and
Idaho Code
Act. See
as the
Just as
See Idaho
Code §
§ 39-102.

“overwhelming” interest
State’s “overwhelming”
State’s
justified the
Dep’t’t of
Doe,
in Idaho Dep
the result
interest justiﬁed
result in
v. Doe,
Welfare v.
of Health and Welfare
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150
underlying the
112713, 244
244 P.3d
Environmental
256757, the
the interests
the Idaho
Idaho Environmental
interests underlying
at 112–13,
at 256–57,
Idaho at
150 Idaho
P.3d at
DEQ’s
Protection
Health Act
against extending
the exclusionary
and Health
Act likewise
extending the
Protection and
rule to
to DEQ’s
likewise counsel
counsel against
exclusionary rule

civil
civil enforcement
enforcement proceedings.
proceedings.
C.
C.

Defendants’ motion
Defendants’
motion should
and overbroad.
as untimely
should be
denied as
overbroad.
be denied
untimely and
Defendants’ motion
Not
it is
Not only
motion without
Without merit,
is Defendants’
is also
defective. First,
also procedurally
merit, it
First,
procedurally defective.
only is

Defendants’ motion
Defendants’ objection
Defendants’
untimely and
motion to
strike is
therefore waived.
to strike
is
is untimely
objection is
and therefore
waived. Second,
Second, Defendants’

fatally
provides an
for denying
Each of
of these
an additional,
independent basis
these defects
defects provides
overbroad. Each
basis for
additional, independent
fatally overbroad.
denying
Defendants’ motion.
Defendants’
motion.

1.
1.

Ehlert’s testimony
Defendants’ objection
Defendants’
t0 Ehlert’s
is untimely.
testimony is
untimely.
obiection to

“Normally,
“Normally, aa party
failing to
the admission
an objection
to the
of evidence
to object
admission of
objection to
evidence by
object
waives an
party waives
by failing
admission.” State v.
at
time of
the time
its admission.”
151 Idaho
at the
of its
Idaho 53,
253 P.3d
P.3d 727,
738
v. Ellington, 151
727, 738
64, 253
53, 64,

(2011).
point at
time of
the evidence
the time
the point
which
is live
live witness
of admission
is the
at which
admission is
Witness testimony,
When the
evidence is
testimony, the
(2011). When
the
why “an objection
be made
That is
the witness
ﬁnishes answering
answering aa question.
is Why
witness finishes
question. That
objection should
should be
made as
soon as
as soon
as
asked.” State v.
the
1201 (1975).
With
the question
is asked.”
P.2d 1193,
question is
Idaho 548,
531 P.2d
v. O'Bryan,
96 Idaho
0731320111, 96
1193, 1201
548, 556,
556, 531
(1975). With

aa motion
which “is essentially
motion to
the usual
governing
to strike,
rule governing
usual rule
essentially aa delayed
strike, which
objection,. .. the
delayed objection,…
applies.” Id. For
timeliness
in denying
that reason,
For that
motion to
strike testimony
timeliness applies.”
there is
error in
is no
no error
to strike
testimony
reason, there
denying aa motion

elicited
elicited hours
earlier. Id.
hours earlier.
Ehlert’s testimony
Here,
the objection
to Ehlert’s
He was
on direct
direct to
to
hours too
late. He
objection to
too late.
came hours
asked on
was asked
testimony came
Here, the

describe
his observations
the composting
Without objection
of the
composting facility
he answered
objection
and entry
and he
describe his
observations and
answered without
facility and
entry of
from
21 1 :177242: 12.) Despite
from Defendants.
pretrial discovery
Tr. 211:17–242:12.)
having conducted
Despite having
no pretrial
on
Defendants. (Trial
conducted no
(Trial Tr.
discovery on
39the
were clearly
cross-examine Ehlert
Ehlert on
the issue,
the requirements
requirements of
Defendants were
to cross-examine
on the
of §§ 39prepared to
clearly prepared
issue, Defendants

Ehlert’s entry
108(2)(c).
their objection
the composting
no reason
to delay
to Ehlert’s
of the
composting
objection to
had no
reason to
So they
entry of
delay their
they had
108(2)(c). So

facility.
very least,
At the
in aid
that objection,
the very
Defendants could
of that
questions in
aid of
have asked
could have
asked questions
as they
facility. At
objection, as
least, Defendants
they
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Ehlert’s direct
did
trial including
including during
other occasions
during trial
during Ehlert’s
examination. (Id.
on several
direct examination.
did on
several other
occasions during
(Id.

“The rule
126:3–4,
been announced
in several
this
448:475.) “The
181 :677, 207:6–7,
207:677, 448:4–5.)
of this
has been
announced in
decisions of
several decisions
rule has
12634, 181:6–7,

court
party to
that aa patty
the testimony
the adverse
to aa suit
suit cannot
cannot speculate
on the
to be
court that
introduced by
speculate on
adverse
be introduced
testimony to
by the
party, and,
the introduction
strike on
the
after the
introduction of
Without objection,
of such
to strike
on the
such testimony
move to
testimony without
objection, move
and, after
palty,
incompetent.” Hall v.
ground
Payette Lumber Co.,
that such
125 P.2d
is incompetent.”
P.2d 311,
ground that
such testimony
v. Boise Fayette
testimony is
311,
Ca, 125

314
was waived
waived and
was too
this record,
the objection
the motion
motion to
strike was
314 (1942).
to strike
Given this
late.
objection was
and the
too late.
record, the
(1942). Given
Defendants’ motion
There
why Defendants’
be deemed
untimely.
motion should
There is
is an
an additional
additional reason
reason Why
should be
deemed untimely.

When,
in the
the middle
strike
cross-examination, Defendants
middle of
of cross-examination,
Defendants finally
to strike
and moved
moved to
objected and
finally objected
When, in
Ehlert’s testimony
“Well,
Ehlert’s
basis that
that he
this Court
the basis
he had
on the
Court observed:
violated §§ 39-108(2)(c),
had violated
observed: “Well,
testimony on
39-108(2)(c), this

now.” (Trial
Mr.
you needed
before now.”
that type
that before
Mr. Smith,
Tr.
of motion,
to raise
raise that
had that
needed to
motion, you
Smith, if you
(Trial Tr.
you had
type of
“Objection to
292:17–18.)
The Court
the use
292:17718.) The
is correct.
to the
of evidence
to have
claimed to
Court is
correct. “Objection
evidence claimed
have been
been
use of

illegally
40
obtained. .must be
be timely
v. Dawson, 40
illegally obtained…must
timely made,
made, which means before the trial.” State v.
.

“the first
Idaho
when “the
ﬁrst
This rule
P. 326,
relaxed when
Idaho 495,
327 (1925)
235 P.
rule may
be relaxed
(emphasis added).
added). This
326, 327
495, 235
(1925) (emphasis
may be

notice
rights is
the trial,
his rights
the course
the accused
during the
Violation of
is during
of the
or
of his
notice to
to the
of aa possible
possible violation
course of
accused of
trial, or
denied.” State v.
where aa proper
been made
trial and
motion had
proper motion
46 Idaho
Where
Idaho 20,
had been
before trial
and denied.”
made before
v. Wansgaard,
Wansgaard, 46
20,

265
purposes of
criminal proceedings
for purposes
holdings have
P. 671,
of criminal
These holdings
codified for
672 (1928).
265 P.
proceedings
have been
been codified
671, 672
(1928). These
in
in Idaho
Criminal Procedure
this case
12. But
But there
for this
there are
no comparable
Rule of
of Criminal
Idaho Rule
are no
comparable rules
Procedure 12.
rules for
case because
because
the
the exclusionary
not apply
ciVil proceedings.
to civil
proceedings.
rule generally
does not
exclusionary rule
generally does
apply to
In
both the
In both
criminal and
pretrial discovery
the criminal
the appropriate
civil contexts,
is the
appropriate
and civil
contexts, however,
however, pretrial
discovery is
vehicle for
uncovering the
A
for uncovering
the factual
for aa motion
motion to
to exclude
vehicle
obtained evidence.
exclude illegally
factual basis
evidence. A
basis for
illegally obtained
party who
who fails
utilize the
claiming undue
the discovery
his disposal
for claiming
fails to
to utilize
at his
no grounds
tools at
has no
grounds for
disposal has
undue
discovery tools
patty
surprise
borrow the
Criminal
trial. Such
the words
or aa lack
lack of
of notice
notice at
at trial.
of Idaho
Rule of
of Criminal
to borrow
Idaho Rule
surprise or
Such aa failure,
words of
failure, to
“good cause”
cause” nor
neglect.” In
“excusable neglect.”
Procedure
yet another
In yet
neither “good
nor “excusable
another
to neither
amounts to
Procedure 12(d),
12(d), amounts
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example
in this
this case,
not offered
recurring theme
theme in
explanation
example of
of aa recurring
Defendants have
an adequate
offered an
have not
adequate explanation
case, Defendants
for
their delay,
for their
nor could
Defendants conducted
no discovery,
Since Defendants
have
conducted no
could they.
they. Since
discovery, they
they only
only have
delay, nor
“surprise” at
themselves
for any
trial.
to blame
at trial.
themselves to
blame for
alleged “surprise”
any alleged

2.
2.

Ehlert’s testimony
Defendants’ objection
Defendants’
to Ehlert’s
is overbroad.
overbroad.
testimonv is
obiection to

Defendants’ motion
“everything [Ehlert]
Defendants’
strikeiwhich, by
motion to
to strike—which,
relative to
to
covering “everything
said relative
[Ehlert] said
by covering

2013” (Trial
that
unlawful, warrantless
that [alleged]
Tr.
March 29,
on March
warrantless search
search [Ehlert]
conducted on
(Trial Tr.
[Ehlert] conducted
[alleged] unlawful,
29, 2013”

trialihas now
292:12–13),
was already
point where
the point
292: 12713), was
at trial—has
to the
Where one
too broad
now expanded
one can
can only
expanded to
broad at
already too
only
(Defs’ Mem.
guess
24725.) While
trial and
its scope.
the motion
motion at
the caption
Mem. at
at 24–25.)
at trial
caption of
of
at its
While the
and the
guess at
scope. (Defs’

Ehlert,” the
Defendant’s memorandum
memorandum’s
“Testimony of
Defendant’s
the memorandum’s
refer to
memorandum refer
to only
of Dean
Dean Ehlert,”
only “Testimony
them.”
“either of
concluding
variety of
by “either
lists aa wide
of perceptions
of them.”
documentation by
concluding sentence
perceptions and
sentence lists
and documentation
Wide variety

(Id.)
their original
original motion
motion and
Defendants have
exclusion
and apparently
now seek
expanded their
have expanded
seek exclusion
apparently now
Thus, Defendants
(Id.) Thus,
of
by Jack
well as
not testify
of statements
statements by
at trial,
unspeciﬁed documentary
WhO did
did not
Jack Gantz,
as well
as unspecified
trial, as
documentary
Gantz, who
testify at
and/or
been offered
that may
not have
trial.
or may
or admitted
admitted at
at trial.
offered or
and/0r sensory
evidence that
have been
sensory evidence
may or
may not
This
part (c)
which
This calls
Criminal Procedure
for another
another analogy
to Idaho
Rule of
of Criminal
of which
calls for
Idaho Rule
Procedure 12,
analogy to
12, part
(c) of

“A motion
provides: “A
motion to
the evidence
to suppress
must describe
to be
sought to
provides:
evidence must
describe the
evidence sought
suppress evidence
suppressed
be suppressed
and
basis for
party reasonable
the legal
for its
its suppression
the opposing
notice of
of
legal basis
to give
opposing party
and the
suppression sufficiently
give the
reasonable notice
sufﬁciently to
issues.” While
the
this rule
that aa motion
not concede
motion to
the issues.”
While DEQ
rule applies
or that
to suppress
is
applies or
suppress is
concede this
does not
DEQ does

available
where suppression
in aa civil
it is
in proceedings
ciVil case,
motions are
is notable
notable that,
available in
proceedings Where
suppression motions
are allowed,
allowed,
that, in
case, it
Defendants’ motion
reasonable
both counts,
motion is
lacking on
far
is lacking
on both
notice is
is required.
required. Defendants’
and notice
reasonable specificity
specificity and
counts, far

denied.” Idaho Farm Dev.
broad,” and
“properly denied.”
“too broad,”
Dev. Co.
44 Idaho
therefore “properly
Idaho 272,
and therefore
Co. v.
v. Brackett, 44
272,

275,
P. 35,
257 P.
38 (1927).
275, 257
(1927).
35, 38
Further,
within the
their
the capacious
insofar as
Defendants argue
of their
argue everything
capacious scope
as Defendants
scope of
Further, insofar
everything Within
motion
In
fruit of
that argument
motion is
the fruit
matter of
argument is,
is the
of some
of fact,
wrong. In
some poisonous
poisonous tree,
as a
a matter
fact, simply
tree, that
simply wrong.
is, as
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cases
where the
the exclusionary
through an
illegal search,
of evidence
an illegal
admission of
obtained through
rule bars
bars admission
evidence obtained
cases Where
exclusionary rule
search,
tree” refers
“by exploitation
illegality”i
the
the “fruit of
the poisonous
exploitation of
of the
refers to
to evidence
of that illegality”—
obtained “by
poisonous tree”
evidence obtained

police.” State
“simply because
not
it would
light but
not “simply
not have
for illegal
illegal actions
the police.”
to light
of the
actions of
but for
have come
come to
would not
because it

v.
Lusby, 146
146 Idaho
App. 2008)
quotation omitted)
Idaho 506,
198 P.3d
P.3d 735,
v. Lusby,
737 (Ct.
(internal quotation
omitted)
2008) (internal
506, 508,
508, 198
735, 737
(Ct. App.
“This query
(emphasis
through examination
the
examination of
three factors:
is answered
of three
factors: (1)
answered through
(emphasis added).
added). “This
query is
(1) the

temporal
proximity of
the illegality
the acquisition
the evidence;
there are
temporal proximity
Whether there
of the
acquisition of
of the
and the
are
illegality and
evidence; (2)
(2) whether
intervening
between the
the illegality
the acquisition
the evidence;
the
intervening circumstances
acquisition of
of the
circumstances between
and the
and (3)
illegality and
evidence; and
(3) the
misconduct.” Id.
purpose and
the official
ofﬁcial misconduct.”
of the
and flagrancy
purpose
ﬂagrancy of
Defendants’ motion
While
it seems
motion remains
matter of
the precise
While the
remains aa matter
of Defendants’
of conjecture,
precise scope
seems
scope of
conjecture, it

Ehlert’s damaging
they
wish to
from the
the record
all of
his
stricken from
at least
to have
of Ehlert’s
damaging testimony
least Wish
record all
have stricken
about his
testimony about
they at
Ehlert’s testimony
March
visit. This,
far too
March 29,
2013 site
site Visit.
is far
As noted
noted above,
too broad.
about
broad. As
testimony about
This, again,
again, is
above, Ehlert’s
29, 2013
Gibson’s
the
entering Gibson’s
the site
not exclusively,
his observations
Visit is
site visit
is largely,
on his
observations before entering
based on
exclusively, based
largely, if not

composting
was nothing
nothing illegal
the legality
the entry,
illegal about
there was
composting facility.
of the
of the
Regardless of
about
facility. Regardless
legality of
entry, there
Ehlert’s observations
Ehlert’s
point of
from the
the public
the entirely
lawful vantage
of the
public access
vantage point
observations from
road. Because
Because
access road.
entirely lawful

those
were not
not obtained
through the
the exploitation
the alleged
illegal entry,
exploitation of
of the
those observations
obtained through
alleged illegal
observations were
they
entry, they
would not
be subject
This illustrates
the exclusionary
the
not be
illustrates the
to suppression
suppression even
applied. This
even if the
rule applied.
would
subject to
exclusionary rule

ofiand waste
byiDefendants’ ill-founded
frivolity
waste of
judicial resources
ill-founded
of State
State and
and judicial
resources occasioned
occasioned by—Defendants’
frivolity of—and
motion
motion to
strike.
to strike.
IV.
CONCLUSION
IV. CONCLUSION
For
forth above,
this Court
For the
the reasons
Court overrule
set forth
reasons set
requests this
overrule
respectfully requests
above, DEQ
DEQ respectfully
Ehlert’s trial
Defendants’ objection
Defendants’
trial testimony
their motion
motion to
strike.
to strike.
to Dean
Dean Ehlert’s
objection to
and deny
testimony and
deny their
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CVOC7201570354O Idaho
Environmental Quality vs.
CVOC-2015-03540
a1
Idaho Dept of Environmental
vs. David R.Gibson,
R.Gibson, et al

73
73
1
2
3

i

Q.
Q.

4
5

Q.
Q.

6

A.
A.

7

Q.
Q.

8
9

Okay.
Okay.
W at them.
-them.

44

tell
me. You make objections
tell you,
you, you keep confusing me.

55

I'm looking
looking for?
Is
Is there
for?
there anything specific
specific I'm
I'm going to ask you is
So,
is
the question I'm
So, the

66

I'm not
there's no question pending,
when there's
not sure
sure what
what
pending, and I'm
in deciding that
I'm supposed
objection. If you
that objection.
supposed to do in

11

look -A.
A.

\oooxlmwbmmH

33

74
74
I require
I
first be laid before we
foundation first
reqjire a foundation
we speculate
speculate
doesn't know
as to content when he doesn't
know the date.
date.
W I
THE
THE COURT:
I have
Mr. Smith,
COURT: Mr.
have to
Smith, you
you con --

not.
not.
W take a
Okay.
look at
Go ahead and take
take a look
at -Okay. Go

whether or not you recognize what
in these
is depicted in
what is
documents.
documents.

2
2

77
88
99

If

want
is asked,
want to object when a question is
but
asked, go ahead,
ahead, but
there's no question
right now there's
cpestion asked.
asked. She simply
simply asked if
what's depicted and he said.
he recognized what's
said.

if

10

A.
A.

Okay.
Okay.

10
10

11

Q.
Q.

So,
is
recognize what
what is
is, do you recognize
So, my
my question is,

11
11

MR.
I objected,
in that
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: To which I
objected, in
there's no date
there's
date as to when the reflection of the

12
12

illustration or depiction in
in those pictures is for
for him to

13
13
14
14

testify from.
my object.
I maintain my
from. So,
object.
So, I
it's premature
will then make
If it's
make it when
premture II will

15
15

the question
raises that issue,
cpestion then comes
ccmes out that raises
issue,

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes.
Yes.
W
MR.
SMITH:
-to which,
I will
will tender
MR. SMITH:
which, Judge,
Judge, I
an objection
objection on this
have
basis. None of those
this basis.
those pictures have

16
16
17
17

there's no date on the pictures.
I stand
Judge,
stand
pictures. So,
that there's
Judge, that
So, I
by my
objection
at
such
point
in
time
that
it
feels
in
feels
point
time that
my

18
18

appropriate,
it.
appropriate, I'll renew it.

reflected within or withon [verbatim]
date to
[verbatim] them a date
indicate
in fact
indicate what
fact what
what year,
what century
decade, in
year, or what decade,
they have
taken.
have been taken.

19
19

12
13
14

shown or depicted in
in the
stack of documents
documents that
the stack
that you have
have
before you,
17.1 through 17.31?
17.31?
you, 17.1
A.
A.

15
16
17
I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘

wmHowmqmmmHo

18
19
20
21

Do II recognize?
recognize?
W
MR.
T -MR. SMITH:
SMITH: To

20
21
21

it

If

it

I'll

THE COURT:
right.
COURT: All right.

don't think a date
Well,
is necessary
Well, II don't
date is
what's in
in the
simply to ask him whether he recognizes
recognizes what's
photographs.
photographs. If that
that -- if the objection was to that

i ifIf

If

22

Mr.
in composting
Mr. Gibson has been involved in

22
22

23

since
1974. So,
since 1974.
before II want
want him to start
start testifying
So, before

23

24

from pictures that could have
have spanned
spanned a period of at
least 22
22 years at this location
location or the adjacent
adjacent property,
property,

24
24

it's overruled.
question,
overruled. If the
the objection is to
question, it's
something that you think will
will happen in
in the future,
future, you

25

can make it then.
then.

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Go
Go ahead.
ahead.

11

A.
A.

YEEWACE: So,
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Gibson,
Gibson, looking
So, Mr.

25

it

75
75
1

76
76
Yes.
Yes.

2
2

Q.
Q.

And a shed at one of your entrances?
entrances?

at
Exhibit 17.1,
this photo?
photo?
at Exhibit
17.1, do you recognize this
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

33

A.
A.

And it says
what?
says what?

44

Q.
Q.

A shed?
shed?

And is
is this a true
true and correct view of your
composting operations on the Smith property?
property?
I object,
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: To which I
object, Judge,
Judge, pending

55

A.
A.

don't think II understood your
I don't
Say again,
again, I

66

question.
question.
Q.
Q.

88

10

he's been out
a determination
detennination as to the date because
because he's
out
there for at
22 years.
least 22
at least
years.
THE COURT:
right. I'll sustain
sustain that
COURT: All right.

10
10

11

objection.
objection.

11
11

2
3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9

Q.
Q.

Q.
Q.

I'll

in
Ms.
might change
Ms. Yee,
change in
Yee, certainly this might

12
13
14
15
16
17
I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘
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18
19

appearance over time.
time.
MS.
YEEiWAIlACE: Okay.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
Q.
Q.

99

Do you have an open sign at one of your

Q.
Q.
A.
A.
Q.
Q.

16
16
17
17

18
18
19
19

And you recognize
piles on
recognize the
the compost piles

Exhibit
17.1?
Exhibit 17.1?

13
13
15
15

You have
shed at one of the
the entrances,
have a shed
entrances,

that's depicted on 17.1?
17.1?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

12
12

14
14

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
17.1 an
YEEWACE: So,
Exhibit 17.1
is Exhibit
So, is

accurate
in 2017,
current state,
accurate depiction of the
the current
2017, of your
state, in
composting operations on the
the Smith property?
property?
A.
II can't be sure
A.
sure of that.
that.
Q.
Q.

77

it

II recognize the piles
piles of dirt there,
there, yes.
yes.
Okay.
So,
can
you
say
whether
or
not
this
is
this is
Okay. So,
say

it

a picture
in
picture of your composting operations
operations as it exists in
2017
2017 on the
the Smith property?
property?

there's much of an operation
A.
II don't think there's
A.
that's the entrance,
going on there,
but that's
entrance, yes.
there, but
yes.
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

I'd move
YEEiWAIlACE: Your Honor,
for
MS.
move for
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I'd

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

21
21

22

Q.
Q.

Does
sign look like the open sign
Does your open sign

22
22

23

on Exhibit
Exhibit 17.1?
17.1?

23

24

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

24
24

the admission of 17.1.
17.1.
THE
Mr. Smith.
THE COURT:
COURT: Mr.
Smith.
I'd object on the basis
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
basis of
Judge, I'd
foundation.
know when the
foundation. II think we're entitled to know
I have
photograph was taken and by whom.
whcm. I
that
have not heard that

25

Q.
Q.

And you have
have barrels on your property?
property?

25

in any foundation,
I object
foundation, so
so I
object on the basis of

20
21

entrances?
entrances?

20
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81
81
1
2

property,
shed on the
the Smith property?
property?
property, on the shed
A.
As far
know it is.
A.
far as II know
is.

it

3
4
5

11

Q.
Q.

2
2

And does
does this photograph accurately depict

82
82
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And, Mr.
Mr. Gibson,
whose
And,
Gibson, whose
handwriting
is on the signage,
is that
handwriting?
handwriting is
that your handwriting?
signage, is
Q.
Q.

33

A.
A.

No.
No.

44

Q.
Q

Whose
is it?
Whose handwriting is
it?

55

A.
A.

II would say
yes.
say yes.

66

Q.
Q

Various
Various people
people have
have painted those.
those.
Okay.
righthand side,
Sign on the
the right-hand
side,
Okay. The sign

Okay.
Okay.

77

I'd move
MS.
move for
YEIBWALLACE: Your Honor,
for
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I'd

88

the signs
signs that are on that shed
shed on the Smith property
presently?
presently?

woodmanybwmw

6

A.
A.

7

Q.
Q.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

though,
number?
has your name
name and phone number?
though, has
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

I would tender the
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: And I
the same
same
There's no foundation
objection,
foundation as to time,
Judge. There's
objection, Judge.
time, as
W
to which period of time this may
may reflect that
that very --

11
11

in fact,
And these signs
signs have,
this
fact, been on this
have, in
shed on the
is that
since 2013;
the Smith property since
2013; is
that true?
true?
A.
II can't be sure
A.
signs have been,
sure those
those signs
but
been, but

12
12

something
scmething similar,
similar, yes.
yes.

13
13

in that location over the
that particular signage
last
signage in
the last
22
22 years.
years.

14
14

Q.
Okay.
And, in
in fact,
you've been asking for
for
fact, you've
Okay. And,
Q.
don't
fees,
folks sign
folks don't
Sign in,
load if folks
$100 if folks
in, $100
fees, $5
$5 per load
sign
is that true?
since 2013;
Sign in,
2013; is
true?
in, since

the admission of 17.5.
17.5.
THE COURT:
Mr. Smith?
COURT: Mr.
Smith?

99
10
10

15
15

THE COURT:
right.
COURT: All right.

Q.
Q.

if

if

16
16

A.
A.

that's not true.
No,
true.
No, that's

That objection is overruled.
Mr. Gibson has
overruled. Mr.
testified that this is
is substantially
far as
as far
substantially accurate,
accurate, as

17
17

Q.
Q.

I'm sorry,
Or,
donations?
Or, I'm
sorry, what you called donations?
That's donations and that's
that's not true of that.
That's
that.

19
19

21

he knows,
signs that
that are there
there
knows, depiction of the signs
there's no evidence
presently.
evidence about how long
presently. Certainly,
Certainly, there's
they've been there,
they're there
they've
but they're
there presently.
presently. So,
there, but
So,

22

I'll admit 17.5.
17.5.

22
22

A.
A.

23

Q.
Q.

16
NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

17
18
wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

19
20

I'll

23

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
No. 17.5 admitted.)
admitted.)

24

18
18
20
20
21
21

24
24

25

83
83
Q.
Q.

What
is it?
it?
What is

11

2

A.
A.

More
More signage.
signage.

2
2

4
5

Q.
Q.

it

Okay.
more signage
signage on the
the Smith
Okay. Is it more
property at
one of the entrances to your composting
at one
corrposting
operations?
operations?
Q.
Q.

33
44
55

Okay.
Sign says
the sign
fees,
Okay. So,
So, even though the
says fees,

you consider them donations?
donations?
They are
donations.
are donations.
Okay.
Mr. Gibson;
recognize
17.7, Mr.
Gibson; do you recognize
Okay. 17.7,

in Exhibit
what's in
17.7?
Exhibit 17.7?

25

1
3

A.
A.

That's not correct.
correct.

A.
A.

Yes,
I do.
do.
Yes, I

84
84
I'd continue
MR.
my
MR. SMITH:
continue with my
SMITH: And I'd
objection,
was taken,
Judge. No foundation as to when it was
objection, Judge.
taken,
to depict what era,
may
what year these may
era, or what period of what

it

reflect in
in this
227year
this particular picture,
picture, as covering a 22-year
span.
spam.

woodmanybmmw

6
7

A.
A.

8

Q.
Q.

9

A.
A.

10

Q.
Q.

11

A.
A.

12
13
14
15
16
NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

17
wawmwowmqmwawmwo

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

it

it

Part of it is
is on the
the property,
part of it is
property, part

not.
not.
Okay.
is not on the
sign is
the property?
property?
Okay. The open sign
Correct.
Correct.
Okay.
is your sign?
sign is
Sign?
Okay. But that open sign
Yes.
Yes.

77

THE COURT:
limited to
COURT: Well,
Well, the
the question was limited
W is
this -is this
this how it looks
looks today.
today. So,
So, as to that

88

it's overruled.
objection,
17.7 is
is admitted.
overruled. 17.7
admitted.
objection, it's

66

99
11
11
12
12

that's here,
II don't see
see that
that on the signage that's
here,
don't see
but -- that
24/7 thing that you just
that 24/7
just said,
see
said, II don't
that on here,
but...
here, but...

17
17

,,

Q.
Q.

Okay.
17.7 accurately depict
Does photograph 17.7
Okay. Does

it

the Smith property as it presently exists?
exists?
A.
As to the part of the
A.
the signage
signage that's on that
property,
property, yes.
yes.

I'd move
YEEiWALlACI-D: Your Honor,
for
MS.
move for
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I'd
the admission of 17.7.
17.7.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
17.7 admitted.)
Exhibit 17.7
admitted.)

10
10

Q.
Okay.
indicating that
that your operations
Okay. And indicating
Q.
are
24/7?
are open 24/7?
A.
We
A.
We are open 24/7,
24/7, yes.
yes.
Q.
Okay.
Okay. And does this photograph accurately
Q.
W
depict the
the signage
signage and barrels on the Smith property -A.
A.

it

YEEiWALlACI-D: Thank you,
MS.
Honor.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
you, Your Honor.

13
13
14
14

Q.
Q.

YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Let's look
look at
at 17.10,
17.10,

15
15

please,
17.11 together.
MC. Gibson.
Gibson. And 17.11
together.
please, Mr.
I'm sorry,
THE COURT:
first
COURT: I'm
sorry, II missed the first

16
16

one.
one.

18
18

I'm sorry;
YEEiWALlACI-D: I'm
MS.
first one is
is
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
sorry; the first
17.10.
17.10.

19
19

11?
THE COURT:
10 and 11?
COURT: 10

20
20

YEEiWALlACI-D: Yes.
MS.
Yes.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

21
21

THE
THE COURT:
COURT: Thank you.
you.
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Okay.
Okay.

22
22

23
24
24

25

Q.
Q.

what's
YEEJWALLACE? Do
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE?
Do you recognize what's

in Exhibit
17.11?
17.10 and 17.11?
depicted in
Exhibit 17.10
A.
A.

it

I
II don't know
know where
where it was
was taken,
taken, but yes,
yes, I
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125
125

126
126

1

the scale?
scale?

11

2

2
2

4

A.
The scale
in the
A.
scale is determined automatically
autcmatically in
it's tied
software.
geoirectified, it's
is geo-rectified,
software. Because the image
image is
will
to the
zoom in,
globe. And so,
the globe.
in, it will
so, if you zoom

5

automatically re-scale.
reiscale.

55

3

if

it

it's automatically
I just inserted and it's
So,
autcrratically
So, I

6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7

done.
done.

8

And how do you orient
orient the compass
rose that
that
ccmpass rose
you inserted?
inserted?
W the software
A.
All the -A.
orients
software automatically
autcmatically orients
it's
to the
insert the north arrow,
north. So,
the north.
arrow, it's
So, when you insert

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Q.
Q.

always pointing in
in the right
right direction.
direction.
Q.
So,
in area depicted in
in
the title,
title, the zoomed in
Q.
So, the
this photograph,
scale are
the compass
are the
the
photograph, the
ccmpass rose and the scale
W
only elements
Exhibit 11,
elements you added to Exhibit
11, or altered --

16

A.
A.

17

Q.
Q.

Yes.
Yes.
W with respect to Exhibit
-11?
Exhibit 11?
You didn't make any other alterations
alterations to

I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

2
3

different publication dates.
is 2103,
dates. One
One is
21;
2103, November 21;
then you have
a
calendar
date
on
page
two
of
that
have
date
that

99
10
10
12
12

image that you refer to in
in Exhibit
11 reflects
Exhibit 11
reflects what
what

13
13

period of time?
time?

14
14

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes.
Yes. On page
page two,
two, towards the
bottom,
content and then it gives
time period of content
bottom, it says
says time

15
15

11
12

it

22
22

is the publication date.
date. And it says
11/21, and
2013, 11/21,
says 2013,
that is
is under the section of lineage,
information,
lineage, source
source information,
source
citation. So,
source citation.
were
So, this is when the data were

21
21

25

So,
first the photo was taken,
taken, and then it
So, first
was
processed
and
then
published.
published.
was

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Okay.
Okay.

11

I have
With that,
have no objection to the
that, Judge,
Judge, I

2
2

11 admitted.)
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
No. 11
admitted.)

Q.
Q.

BY MR.
MR. CECCHINI-BEAVER:
Ms. Strachan,
CECCHINIiBEAVER: Ms.
Strachan, can
you please turn your attention to Plaintiff's
Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
Exhibit 12,
12,

it

and review it and let me
me know
know when you're finished.
finished.
A.
Okay.
A.
Okay.
Q.
Q

14

A.
A.

Plaintiff's Exhibit
Do you recognize Plaintiff's
12?
Exhibit 12?
Yes,
I do.
do.
Yes, I

15

Q.
Q.

What
is it?
it?
What is

17

it

MR.
MR. CECCHINI-BEAVER:
CECIZHINPBEAVEIR: Your Honor,
Honor, at this

13

16

i

the date that
taken.
that the photo was taken.
W let
The other date -me find it in
in here
let me
here --

that's why there's
there's a different
published.
different date.
published. So,
date.
So, that's

8
10

it

24
24

6

9

it

a calendar date
wrrentness
date of 2013,
2013, 08/30,
08/30, and then a currentness
reference ground condition.
So,
that
indicates
condition. So,
indicates that
that was

23

\oooxlmwbmmH

7

W the
So,
me when exactly the -tell me
the
So, can you tell

Yes.
Yes.

THE
THE COURT:
11 is admitted.
COURT: 11
admitted.
You may continue.
continue.

5

metadata that
that says
30.
2013, August 30.
says 2013,

11
11

20

introduction of Exhibit
11.
Exhibit 11.

4

it

88

127
127
1

MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: Sarah,
Sarah, on your data,
data, your

what appears
metadata material,
material, it has what
appears to be two

19
19

Aside from
from the alterations
alterations you just
just
described,
11 accurately depict the data you
Exhibit 11
does Exhibit
described, does
downloaded from
from the Earth Explorer website?
website?

MR.
May II ask a question,
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: May
question, Judge,
Judge, in
aid of a possible objection.
objection.
THE COURT:
sir. Go
COURT: Yes,
Go ahead.
ahead.
Yes, sir.

77

18
18

No.
No.

THE COURT:
Mr. Smith?
COURT: Mr.
Smith?

66

17
17

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

44

16
16

Exhibit
11?
Exhibit 11?
A.
A.

33

Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
11.
point,
move to admit
Exhibit 11.
admit Plaintiff's
point, we would move

128
128
described for
for Exhibit
Exhibit 11,
11, generally,
generally, to obtain the data
Exhibit 12?
12?
in Exhibit

33

A.
A.

Yes,
I did.
did.
Yes, I

44

Q.
Q.

Did you
visit the same
same Earth Explorer
you visit

55

website?
website?
Yes,
I did.
did.
Yes, I

66

A.
A.

77

Q.
Q.

And did you zoom
location?
zocm to the same location?

88

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

99
10
10

W was there
And was
in the
difference in
there any difference
was -process you used?
used?
Q.
Q.

11
11

A.
A.

No.
No.

12
12

Q.
Q.

W
Did you specify
fo -different date for
specify a different

13
13

A.
A.

14
14

Q.
Q.

Yes.
Yes.
W the imagery?
-imagery?

15
15

A.
A.

II did specify
different date
title
date on the
the title
specify a different

The first
first page contains an Authenticity of
Digital
Digital Imagery
USGS Archive,
that explains how
Archive, that
Imagery with the USGS

16
16

aerial imagery
is collected,
collected, processed,
archived, and
processed, archived,
imagery is
obtained.
obtained.

18
18

A.
A

it

17
17

of the
the image.
image.
Q.
But
But that
that was an alteration you made
made after you
Q.
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18
19

The second
contains a copy of a digital
second page contains

20
21
22
23
24
25

19
19

20

image I
I obtained of the
the Gibson facility.
facility. The photo was
W
taken on 66 -- on June 13,
2015.
13, 2015.

21
21

And the remainder
remainder of the
contains the
the exhibit contains
aerial image.
metadata that
that accompanied
image.
acccmpanied the aerial

23

Q.
Q.

And did you use the same process
process you just

22
22

24
24

25

downloaded the information?
infomation?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes .
W what is the
Q.
And what
is -what is
the -- the numbers in
Q.
the title
what
is
that
what
is
information?
title that you added,
that information?
added,
A.
2015,
A.
2015.
June 13,
2015, 06/13,
06/13, June
13, 2015.

i

Q.
Q.

Did you make
make any other alterations to

12?
Exhibit
Exhibit 12?

A.
A.

II added the
scale bar.
the north arrow and the scale
bar.
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181
for181
I'd move
YEE7WAILACE: Your Honor,
MS.
move for
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I'd

1
2

the admission of Exhibit
Exhibit No.
No. 57.
57.

3

I did not use it.
WITNESS: I
THE WITNESS:

2
2

4* I
I'd move
MR.
move to -I would
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
Judge, I'd

THE
Mr. Smith?
THE COURT:
Smith?
COURT: Mr.
You're offering 57?
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: You're
57?

33

4
5

YEEiWAllACE: Yes.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Yes.

55

6

I might
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
MR.
might ask a question
Judge, if I

\oooxlmwbmmH

7

,,

in aid of -- aid of objection.
objection.

8
9
10

44

if

THE
THE COURT:
COURT: Go
ahead.
Go ahead.
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Dean,
that particular
Dean, on that
document
in front
front of you?
docuwent -- do you have it in
you?

,,

it

object to the introduction
move that it be
stricken
introduction and move
he stricken
from the record.
reconi

66

I'm not going to strike
THE COURT:
strike the
COURT: I'm
the
4* Ms.
what's the
from the record,
exhibit
Ms. -- what's
exhibit from
just -record, just

77

objection?
objection?

88

it's
MR.
My objection is,
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: My
Judge, it's
is, Judge,
irrelevant.
irrelevant. There's no adequate foundation
foundation to

99

it

182
182

it.

11

,,

,,

it

10
10

demonstrate
util -- utilized document
demonstrate that
that it was a util
document any

11

WITNESS: Yes.
THE WITNESS:
Yes.

11
11

4* either an investigation
in any -time
tine involved in
investigation or an

12

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: And is
is that a document
docunent that
that was

13
14
15
16
17
I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘
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18

12
12

inspection of this premises,
premises, or the alleged Gibson

ultimately
for the first
first time
tine October
2013?
Cbtober of 2013?
ultinately published for
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes.
Yes.

13
13
14
14

operation in
in March
Nbrch or April of 2013.
2013.
4* has no relevance
It's -It's
relative to
relevance to us
us relative

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Did you distribute
distribute any aspects,
aspects,
or elements,
portions of that
that prior to that
that to anyone
elements, or portions
anyone

15
15

a -- a theory of a violation for
for an operation.
operatiam

at
2013?
the DEQ
before October,
at the
BBQ before
October, 2013?
WITNESS: Yes.
THE WITNESS:
Yes.

17
17

,,

18
18

,,

THE COURT:
Ms. Yee,
this appears
COURT: Ms.
appears to be a -Yee, this

16
16

a document talking about different
different ways that compost
compost is
Department's view on how their
generated,
generated, and the Department's

reference to the Gibson
Gibson operations?
operations?
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: No.
No.

20

that's
regulations
regulations apply.
educationally» that's
suppose, educationally,
apply. II suppose,
useful
in some
useful to the Court in
But does it tend to
some ways.
ways. But

21
21

make an
make

22
22

be true?
true?

24

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Has any aspect
that particular
aspect of that
in the analysis,
October,
2013, publication been utilized in
October, 2013,
analysis,
or investigation,
inspection of the so
investigation, or inspection
so -- the

,,

24
24

4* and we can go through -- it goes
because
shows -because it shows

25

so-called
in April of 2013?
scvcalled Gibson operation in
2013?

25

through the
in this
siting requirements
requiIEﬂents that
the siting
that are at issue in

in
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: And would that
have been in
that have

19
20
21
22
23

it ,,

2

it's basically DEQ's
EEQ'S position of the
case,
case, and it -- it's
including
regulations
regulations apply to processing facilities,
facilities, including

3

composting
facilities.
cxxmoosting facilities.

4
5

1

19
19

it

in this
issue
this case more
HIKE or less likely to
fact in
issue of fact
YEEiWAllACE: It
MS.
It does,
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor,
does, Your Honor,

23

,, it

it

183
183

184
184
11

Solid Waste
landfill rules.
rules.
aagEﬁent landfill
Waste Management

I'm going to sustain
THE COURT:
Ms. Yee,
COURT: Ms.
sustain the
Yee, I'm

2
2

33

objection.
objection.

it's published on their website,
And it's
is
website, it is
their current
current position on how those
regulations are
those regulations

44

The Department's legal
legal view of the
the
application of its
is certainly something
sanething
its regulations is

6

applied.
applied.

66

7

THE COURT:
me to accept this as
COURT: So,
So, you want HE
Department's legal
the Department's
legal interpretation
interpretation of its
its own

77
99
10
10

11

regulations?
regulations?
YEEiWAllACE: Well,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
its guidance to
Well, its
facilities,
conposting facilities,
facilities, and composting
facilities, about
about how to

12

comply with the regulations.
regulations.

12
12

Department's legal position is rel -treatise about the Department's
tends to prove
prove that
is more
more
that a fact
fact at issue
issue in this case is

13

MR.
me expand upon my
my
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
let HE
Judge, let
objection to include
have existing
include the
the fact
fact that
that we do have

13
13

or less
less likely
true.
likely to be true.

15

IDAPA
Solid Waste
Management rules and regulations under IDAPA
Waste PEHEKﬁHEHt

15
15

16

58.
may have
in October of 2013
have in
2013 is
is
58. Whatever else he may
irrelevant to this issue.
issue.

16
16

\oooxlmwbmmH

8
9
10

14

17

it

55

88

11
11

that the Court will
many circumstances,
will consider.
In many
consider. In
circumstances,
give deference
Courts
deference to the
the Department
Courts give
IE$artnent and how the
Department
Deparunent interprets
interprets its own regulations,
regulations, but that's an
issue
issue of law,
issue of fact.
fact.
law, not an issue
I don't think that
And so,
that this kind of
so, I

,,

I'll

14
14

17
17

Q.
Q.

,,

investigation in
in this case -A.
A.
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They may
come up with some
sane
may be trying to come

18
19
20

guidance.
MOU with
before said,
guidance. And as they before
said, they had an MOU
the Department
Department of Agriculture,
found not to be
Agriculture, which was found

it

So,
relevance objection.
sustain the relevance
objectial
So, I'll sustain
let's talk about the
YEE4WH11KE: So,
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
So, let's
Yes.
Yes.

,,

,,

19
19

-- and how DEQ
applies -- as part
part of your
DEQ applies
job as
the Solid Waste
Waste Program Manager,
as the
Manager, how you applied

20

Idaho Code
IDAPA; okay?
Code and IDAPA;
okay?

18
18

Q.
Q.

21
21

23

the case.
I find
find it to be irrelevant,
irrelevant, and also to
case. So,
So, I
this particular
particular issue
issue and aspect
aspect of the Gibson operation,
operation,
as it may
may be something
something subsequent
chose to figure
subsequent they chose

24

out some
were not
seening to be
not seeming
guidance because
sane guidance
people were
he
because people

24
24

alleged violation under Idaho
397108, or the Solid
Idaho Code
Code 39-108,
Waste
Management Rules,
what authority does
the director
Waste Management
does the
Rules, what

25

on board with the idea of compost
compost being regulated by the

25

of DEQ
have?
DBQ have?

21
22

it

22
22

23

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

Q.
Q.

So,
information about
receives information
EEQ receives
about an
So, when DEQ
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1

197
197
in the
crop under that
Waste Management
that exemption in
the Solid Waste
Management

11

2

Rules?
Rules?

2
2

3

W
A crop would be a plant that is
is grown for
fo -MR.
me object,
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Now,
let me
Judge.
Now, let
object, Judge.

A.
A.

4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

speculation by someone
is
someone else or their interpretation is
irrelevant.
irrelevant.
W and that may be part
And -the problem
part of the
we're having here
I would object
here in this
this case.
case. So,
object to
So, I

77

any testimony
matters may
may be
what these matters
spewlating what
testimany speculating
understood to be,
be, or thought to be,
be, or wished they were
to be.
be.

I object
So,
opinion.
object to his opinion.
So, I
it's certainly not
THE COURT:
not
COURT: Well,
Well, it's

i

determinative
determinative of -- as a matter of fact
fact of the
the questions
at
issue
here.
I
think
Ms.
Yee
is
simply
trying
to
I
is
at issue here.
Ms.

it
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44
55

15
17

33

There's no foundation
There's
give this testimony.
foundation for him to give
testimony.
It's either contained in IDAPA
it's not.
IDAPA or it's
It's
not. And any

14
16

198
198

66
88
99

13
13
14
14

15
15
16
16
17
17

explain how the Department
where it was contacting
Department got to where

18
18
19
19

22
23

testimony
Mr. Gibson may or may
may not
not have
about statements
statements Mr.
have
testimany about
made that are relative
relative to the
made
the language
these rules.
rules.
language of these
And so,
this point,
at this
point, it appears
appears to be potentially
so, at

it

it

20
21
21

22
22
23

24

I'm going to conditionally admit it on that
relevant.
relevant. I'm
that

24
24

25

basis.
basis.

25

1
2
3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9

199
199
they're
they're investigating
investigating violations
violations and folks
folks try to claim
an exemption,
DEQ applies that
exemption, we need to know how DEQ

it

11
2
2

exemption and how specifically he applied it as the Solid
Waste
Manager, which he was
Waste Program Manager,
was during the
the time
time of

33

this violation,
violation, to understand why this Notice
Notice of
still going forward,
Violation is
is still
forward, why they did not accept
his exemption.
exemption.

55

I'm laying
I'm
about how those
those
laying foundation about
exemptions
exemptions are applied in his job
job at
at DEQ.
BBQ.

88

if

Q.
Q.

44
66
77
99

And is
is that also how you applied that
that term

when you were
IDAPA as the Solid Waste
Waste Program
were applying IDAPA
Manager?
Manager?
Q.
Q.

Mr. Gibson.
Mr.
Gibson.

21

So,
plant that is raised
$0, a crop would be a plant
for profit
profit or for food.
food.

A.
A.

12
12

Okay.
Okay.

A.
A.

11
11

19

I'm assuming that
there's going to be
I'm
that there's
be some
some

Q.
Q.

10
10

18
20

I'm sorry,
YEEWACE: I'm
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
sorry, did you
finish your answer to that question?
question?
A.
No.
A.
No.
Q.
Q.

Correct.
Correct.
And how does
is a
determine if something
scmething is
does DEQ
DEQ determine

if

crop residue
Waste
residue under that
that exemption of the Solid Waste
Management Rules?
Rules?
Management
A.
So,
A.
left over
the crop residue would be the
the left
$0, the
plant material after harvesting a crop.
crop.
Q.
Q.

Okay.
example?
Okay. Can you give example?
So,
for
example,
corn.
$0, for example, corn.
W let
MR. SMITH:
MR.
me -SMITH: Now,
let me
let me
me again,
again,
Now, let
Judge,
for the record,
object to giving examples when we
record, object
Judge, for
A.
A.

don't find
Again,
in IDAPA
IDAPA or the statute.
find any of this in
statute. Again,
it's speculative
we're just
it's
from their perspective,
speculative from
just
perspective, and we're
going down this
hole on conjectures.
this rabbit hole
conjectures.
THE COURT:
Ms. Yee,
going?
where are
COURT: Ms.
are you going?
Yee, where
YEEiWAIlACE: Your Honor,
MS.
Honor, so
so DEQ
DEQ has to
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

there's violations.
determine whether or not
violations. And when
not there's

200
definition,
definition, rule,
regulation. And II would also note,
rule, or regulation.
note,
W at
Judge,
sowalled meeting they had,
at the so-called
had, they
Judge, at the -acknowledged he was
will come
in
was exempt,
ccme in
exempt, but that will
testimony
Mr. Gibson.
Gibson.
testimany from Mr.
THE COURT:
right. Well,
COURT: All right.
Well, that
that
didn't understand the question
objection's
objection's overruled.
overruled. II didn't
to be whether or not Mr.
Mr. Ehlert
Ehlert had an opinion
Opinion about
about
wasn't being returned in
whether it was or wasn't
in agronomic

it

rates.
rates. He
He was simply
Department
simply explaining why the Department
Gibson's
decided to take
MC. Gibson's
take the
the position it took as to Mr.

it

W
THE COURT:
right. Well,
COURT: All right.
Well, maybe
maybe if you -you want
want to start
start asking questions
questions that
that are specific to
MC. Gibson is doing.
whatever Mr.
doing.

10
10

13
13

14

Gibson's
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Gibson's
YEEWACE: Does
Does Mr.
W
composting
fall withunder -- within that
that
composting operations fall

15

exemption?
exemption?

15
15

A.
Through an inspection by an Air Quality
A.
Inspector at
at a nearby facility.
facility. He was informed of
Mr. Gibson's compost
Mr.
facility.
compost facility.

10
11
12
13

Q.
Q.

11
11
12
12

14
14

operation,
so.
operation, so.
Mr. Ehlert,
YEEWACE: And,
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And, Mr.
Ehlert, how did
Q.
Gibson's operations
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
operations come
come to the attention of DEQ?
DEQ?

16

A.
A.

No.
No.

16
16

17

Q.
Q.

And why not?
not?

17
17

Q.
Q.

Based on the
saw at his
materials we
the materials
we saw
facility,
not appear that he was managing
managing crop
facility, it did not

18
18

A.
A.

Okay.
speaking?
are you speaking?
Okay. And of whom are
Tom Krinke.
Krinke.

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Krinke. Can you describe
describe in a
Okay. So,
So, Tom Krinke.

residues
soil at
residues that would ultimately be returned to the soil
agronomic
agroncmic rates.
rates.

20
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18
19
20
21
22

A.
A.

it

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

19
19
21
21
22
22

I'll

little
more detail
little bit more
detail what
what he
he was doing and then how DEQ
DEQ
learned of Mr.
Mr. Gibson's operations?
operations?
A.
A.

So,
Krinke was inspecting Treetop
$0, Tom Krinke

23

24

MR.
move that
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: To which,
which, Judge,
that
Judge, I'll move
it's based upon his
his
that be
be stricken,
stricken, in that
that it's

24
24

Recycling in
in response
complaint. And during his
response to a complaint.
conversation with Devin Downs,
the Treetop Recycling
Downs, the

25

IDAPA
speculation,
his conjecture,
not based upon an IDAPA
conjecture, not
speculation, his

25

owner,
Mr. Downs
Downs informed
informed him that
owner, Mr.
that if he was concerned

23

if
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201
201
1
2

about odor,
look at
should look
we should
at Diamond Street
Street
odor, then we
Recycling and Black Diamond Composing.
Composing.

11

202
202
Compost.
me like an assertion of
Compost. That doesn't sound to me
fact.
fact.

33

A.
A.
Q.
Q.

And now,
is Tom
Tcm Krinke's position with
now, what is

55

MR.
me -MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Let me
THE COURT:
Is there something
else in the
sorrething else
COURT: Is
testimony
missed?
testimany that II missed?
I -- II hear what
you're
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: No.
No. I
what you're

Q.
Q.

4
5

44

6

DEQ?
BBQ?

7

He's in
He's
in our Boise
Boise regional office as an Air
Quality Inspector.
Inspector.

77

And when did Mr.
Mr. Krinke go out and
investigate
investigate Treetop?
Treetop?

99

\oooxlmwbmmH

8
9
10

66
A.
A.

Q.
Q.

11

i
i

2
2

Which was Gibson's
Gibson's operations?
operations?
Correct.
Correct.

3

A.
A.

88
10
10

March 28,
2013.
28, 2013.

11
11

I'll

saying.
I understand what
you're saying.
It was an
what you're
saying. I
saying. It
wasn't necessarily given for
opinion given and wasn't
for the truth
of the
matter,
it
was
just
a
comment.
ccnment.
the matter,
was

it

But
I will
will still
still stand
But I
stand by my
objection, II
my objection,
it's speculation
it's hearsay and it's
believe,
speculation on
believe, because it's
what
know when it was
odor. And we don't know
what is meant by odor.

it

12
12

14

MR.
And, Judge,
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: And,
at this time
time I'll
Judge, at
to strike
strike that
that testimony that
that he just gave as to the
discussion with Tom
Mr. Downing
Tcm and the reference
reference to Mr.
Downn as

15

that's hearsay.
have no way of verifying any of that,
We have
hearsay. We
that,

15
15

16

and II move
move that
stricken.
that it be
be stricken.

16
16

well as hearsay.
hearsay.

17

THE COURT:
fact
assertion of fact
COURT: What
What was the
the assertion
that you believe
believe constitutes
constitutes a hearsay statement?
statement?

17
17
18
18

THE COURT:
COURT: Ms.
Ms. Yee,
are you offering this
Yee, are
W
to -- as evidence that there
there was
was some
some odor at
at

19
19

Mr. Gibson's facility?
Mr.
facility?

20

MR.
in fact,
they're saying that
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: If,
If, in
fact, they're
W they're
it -they're not offering it for
for the truth,
truth, then II would

21

have
objection.
have no objection.

21
21

22
24

W it didn't
didn't seem to
THE COURT:
COURT: Well,
Well, II -to be an assertion of fact.
As II understood,
fact. As
understood, it was
statement
statement by the owner of some
some other company that
that if

25

want
look at Black Diamond
Diamand
want to be concerned about odor,
odor, go look

12
13
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18
19

23

move
move

it

it

it

it

it

13
13
14
14

if it

don't know
said.
We don't
know if it was wintertime,
said. We
wintertime, spring,
we
spring, we
have
idea.
have no idea.
I'm going to object to no foundation,
So,
foundation, as
So, I'm

20

MS.
YEEiWAIlACE: No,
Honor. We're
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
No, Your Honor.

it

offering it not for
for the
the truth of the
the matter asserted,
asserted, but
the effect
effect that
that it had on DEQ
IEQ personnel as they moved
W
in the investigation
forward in
investigation --

it

me
me

22
22

a

23

if you

24
24

THE COURT:
All right.
right.
COURT: All

25

MS.
Mr. Gibson's
YEEiWAIlACE: -- of Mr.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

*

203
1

operations.
operations.

W
that's what II -YEEiWAIlACE: Well,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Well, that's
W I
I -I was forwarded
WITNESS: So,
THE WITNESS:
forwarded an
So, I

11

2

Objection's overruled.
THE COURT:
COURT: Objection's
overruled.

2
2

3

Go
(30 ahead.
ahead.

33

e-mail
frcm Jack Gantz
email from
Gantz that he received from Tom Krinke,
Krinke,
describing
Mr. Krinke's conversation with Devin Downs.
Downs.
describing Mr.
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEWACE: What
next with
What happened next
Q.

44

6

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Krinke had the
YEEWACE: After Mr.
conversation with the
the owner of Treetop Recycling on
following that
March 28,
what he did following
2013, do you know what
28, 2013,

7

meeting?
meeting?

77

Gibson's operations?
respect
Mr. Gibson's
investigating Mr.
operations?
respect to investigating
I went
A.
Jack Gantz
A.
site on
Gantz and I
went out to the site

88

2013.
March 29,
29, 2013.

4
5
\oooxlmwbmmH

8
9

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

W
When he returned to -W hang on just
THE
Mr. Ehlert,
THE COURT:
COURT: Mr.
Ehlert, just -just

55
66

99

204
204

Okay.
what do you
site, what
Okay. And when you say the site,
that?
that?
Gibson's compost
A.
Mr.
Mr. Gibson's
A.
operation.
ccmpost operation.
Q.
Okay.
where those compost
describe where
compost
Okay. And describe
Q.
Q.
Q.

10

I apologize.
a second.
second. I
apologize.

10
10

11

11
11

14

Ms.
Mr. Ehlert
Ehlert is
is competent
Ms. Yee,
ccmpetent to give
Yee, Mr.
testimony
of .
things that he has person knowledge
knowledge of.
about things
testimany about
he's made,
that's observations
Generally that's
made, things
things he's
observations he's
You're asking him lots of
seen,
things he's heard.
heard. You're
seen, things

14
14

operations
operations are.
are.
W or on an access road west
A.
It
A.
It is
is west -west of

15

questions about
else did.
someone else
about what
what someone
did.

15
15

Pleasant
Pleasant Valley Road.
Road.

16

II have no idea
idea whether he
present during
he was present
any of those
something that
those things,
that
things, if he's relying on something

16
16

someone
I see
him. So,
else has
someone else
has told him.
we can cut
wt off what
what I
see
So, we
W
as a lengthy series
series of likely
likely objections if you -7 my
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
My -my question was,
YEEWACE: My
was,
Q.

18
18

Q.
Okay.
Mr. Gibson's
before you
went to Mr.
Okay. And before
Q.
you went
operations
operations on March 29,
2013, did you do any other
29, 2013,
W of the
W Mr.
research before
Mr. Gibson's operations?
operations?
before -the --

21
21

24

do you
Mr. Krinke did next.
know what
what Mr.
next.
you know
A.
He spoke
A.
spoke with Jack Gantz regarding the
complaint.
complaint.
W how does Mr.
know
Mr. Ehlert
THE COURT:
Ehlert know
COURT: How --

25

what
Mr. Krinke
Krinke did?
what Mr.
did?

25

12
13

17

if

12
12

13
13

17
17
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18
19
20
21
22
23

if

19
19

mean by
mean

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

22
22

What
What did you
do?
you do?
We
We got on Google Earth and looked
looked at a Google
Google
Earth image
Internet
image of the facility,
facility, and also did an Internet

23

search for
for Black Diamond Compost.
Compost.

20

24
24

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

Q.
Q.

Okay.
else, other
Okay. And did you do anything else,

than those two things?
things?
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1
2
3

A.
A.

application of the Solid Waste
Rules.
Waste Rules.
Q.
Q.

4
5

205
them5
Just Jack and II had a discussion about the

11
2
2

Okay.
Okay.

33

YEEiWAllACE: And,
MS.
have
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And, actually,
actually, do you have

44

Exhibits 11
11 and 12?
12?

206
WITNESS: Thank you.
THE WITNESS:
you.
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Ehlert,
YEE4WHJJKE: So,
Ehlert, do you
Q.
So, Mr.
what's depicted in
recognize what's
in Exhibits
Exhibits 58.1,
58.1, 58.2,
58.2, and
58.3?
58.3?

55

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

66

Q.
Q.

77

A.
A.

Okay.
that?
58.1, what is that?
Okay. And starting with 58.1,
Gibson's
It
Mr. Gibson's
It is
is an Google
inage of Mr.
Google Earth image

88

compost
compost facility.
facility.

99

Okay.
is this Google
Google Earth
Okay. And what exactly is
picture
showing?
picture showing?

woodmanybwmw

6

(Plaintiff's Exhibits No.
(Plaintiff's
11 and 12
12
No. 11

7
8

provided to the
the witness.)
witness.)

9
10

I'll ask you,
II guess
guess I'll
so
you, so

Q.
Q.

YEEAWAILACE:
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Q.
what's been marked Exhibit
11 and 12.
Exhibit 11
12.
you've been handed what's

10
10

11

11
11

A.
A.

showing the numerous
It
windrows.
It is
is showing
nuwerous compost
omnpost windrows.

12

Gibson's
Did you look
Mr. Gibson's
look at
photos of Mr.
at any aerial photos

12
12

Q.
Q.

Okay.
is this the
inage
the Google
Coogle Earth image
Okay. And is

13

operations
investigation
operations at any time during the
the -- DEQ's investigation
of his
his composting?
conposting?

14

,,

13
13
14
14

that you looked
investigation?
looked at as part of your investigation?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

A.
A.

Yes.
ﬁnages.
Yes. The Google Earth images.

15
15

16

Q.
Q.

16
16

Gibson's operations
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
operations -- actually,
actually, when -- what -- when

17

A.
A.

Just the
Earth?
the Google
Coogle Earth?
Correct.
Correct.

17
17

18

Q.
Q.

is this
this picture
picture taken,
was this picture
picture -- what
taken, or when was
time
tine period does
depict?
does this depict?

NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

Q.
Q.

it

15

Okay.
Okay. And does it accurately depict

,,

,,

,,

,,

Okay.
Okay.

18
18

19

MR.
Is
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
Is that 11,
Cynthia?
11, Cynthia?

19
19

A.
A.

2013.
2013.

20

YEEiWAllACE: 58.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
58.

20
20

Q.
Q.

21

MR.
58?
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
58?

21
21

A.
A.

Okay.
know that?
that?
Okay. And how do you know
there's a historical per -On Google
Google Earth there's

22

YEEiWAllACE: Yeah,
MS.
Earth.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Google Earth.
Yeah, the Google

22
22

wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

23
24
25

1
2
3

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
No. 58
58 provided to
the witness.)
witness .)

perspective.
in time
tine and view a -- a
perspective. You can go back in
will provide certain dates
particular area,
dates on
area, and it will

24
24

when that photo was
inage was
was taken or that
was taken.
taken.
that image

for demonstrative
58.1
denonstrative purposes.
58.1 purely for
purposes.

4
5

THE COURT:
COURT: -- objection?
objection?

55

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:

66

,,
,,
,, let me
-me ask a question in
in aid

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

of objection.
objection.

I then would object,
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
MR.
So,
object, Judge,
Judge
So, I

44

it's irrelevant
to the admission of Exhibit
in that it's
Exhibit 58.1,
irrelevant
58.1, in
to the subject
inquiring as to what
what he
she was
was inquiring
subject matter she
went
went to before he undertook a physical
inspection on
physical inspection
March 29,
Nbrch
2013.
29, 2013.
YEEiWAllACE: Your Honor,
I can rephrase,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I
rephrase,

77

,,

it

Exhibit
1 and 2?
Exhibit 58
2?
58 -- Cynthia,
Cynthia, was it 1
YEEiWAllACE: Just
MS.
1.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Just 1.
MR.
Just
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
1? Do you have
have that in
Just 1?
front of you now,
Dean?
now, Dean?

88

I
I can seek additional
additional foundation
foundation as to this document.
docuwent.

99

THE
THE COURT:
in -- admitted
It -- you have
have in
COURT: It
in 2013.
into evidence a satellite
ﬁnage of this property in
2013.
satellite image

10
10
11
11

WITNESS: Yes.
THE WITNESS:
Yes.

12
12

MR.
58.1,
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
58.1, what specific date was
shown that it was
was photographed?
photographed?

it

Okay.
Okay.

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: No.
No.

2
2

,,

woodmanybmmw

Q.
Q.

208
208

33

7

it

11

THE COURT:
COURT: Any -MR.
Judge
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
Judge --

6

,,

23
25

207
207
YEE7WAILACE: Your Honor,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, we would offer

,,

13
13

,,

,,

If

If you want
want to use that
illustrate some
observations
that to illustrate
sane observations
that he
he made
the site
nade when he went to the
site -- as II assume
assuwe
4* some
we're going -can't use
where we're
some reason you can't
that one?
one?
use that

,,

YEEiWAllACE: This one is
MS.
is just
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
just a better

14
14

,,

15

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: It
It showed
showed a date
4/20/13.
date of 4/20/13.

15
15

photo.
But -photo. But

16

MR.
4/20/13
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
2013?
4/20/13 would be
he April 20,
20, 2013?
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Correct.
Correct.

16
16

THE
THE COURT:
right. I'll overrule
overrule the
COURT: All right.
the
It's not
objection.
prove that the
not being offered to prove
objection. It's

NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

17
wawmwowmqmwawmwo

18
19
20
21

17
17

I'll

MR.
I believe
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
And I
believe your testimony
was
testinrny was
that you went
went to Google
inspect the -- it before
Coogle Earth to inspect

18
18

you went
went out to inspect
prenises on March 29,
inspect the premises
29, which
would be 3/29
-3/29

20
20

facility looked a particular way on a particular date.
date.
This witness
This
is apparently going to simply
witness is
use it to
shﬁply use
illustrate whatever testimony
give. I'll
intends to give.
testrnony he intends

21
21

admit it for that purpose
purpose only.
only.

,, it

,,

22

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Correct.
Correct.

23

didn't have
MR.
-- 13?
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
have that
13? So,
So, you didn't

19
19

it

I'll

it

22
22

,,

23

24

in front
document
front of you at the
tine you went
went to Google
the time
docuwent in
Google

24
24

25

Earth prior to NBICh
March 29,
2013, did you?
29, 2013,
you?

25

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
No. 58.1
58.1 admitted
for illustrative
illustrative purposes
purposes only.)
onlyJ
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209
1
2

in
YEEWACE: So,
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Ehlert,
Ehlert, in
So, Mr.
W
looking at
Exhibit 58.2,
is 58.2?
58.2?
at Exhibit
what is
58.2, when -- what
Q.
Q.

3

A.
A.

4

Q.
Q.

5

A.
A.

6

Q.
Q.

7

A.
A.

8

Q.
Q.

\oooxlmwbmmH

9

11
2
2

It
It is
is a Google
image.
Google Earth image.
Okay.
image of what?
what?
Okay. And a Google Earth image

33

Gibson's compost
Mr.
Mr. Gibson's
operation.
ccmpost operation.
As of which date?
date?

55

Of August,
August, 2013.
2013.
And this
is a Google Earth image
this is
image that
that you

77

Correct.
Correct.
W the Google
Okay.
have -Google Earth image
image
Okay. Did you have
58.3,
print that?
that?
58.3, when did you print
A.
Yesterday.
A.
Yesterday.
Q.
Okay.
image for
Okay. And that was a Google Earth image
Q.

88

what
what date?
date?

pulled?
pulled?

44
66

99

10

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

10
10

11

Q.
Q.

And when did you pull
pull this Google
Google Earth

11
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
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18
19
20
21
22

image?
image?

12
12
A.
A.

Yesterday.
Yesterday.
Okay.
is the significance
significance between
Okay. And what is
58.1
58.1 and 58.2?
58.2?
W
Th -A.
The
A.

13
13

Q.
Q.

14
14

we're getting into
MR.
MR. SMITH:
into
SMITH: Well,
Well, now we're
W
for
testify from
from -- from
frcm documents
speak for
documents that otherwise speak

17
17

themselves.
his testimony regarding
let me
themselves. So,
me object
object to his
So, let
that,
Honor.
that, Your Honor.

19
19

THE COURT:
right. I'll sustain
sustain the
COURT: All right.
objection to that question.
question.

21
21

I'll

If

If you want to ask him about differences
differences in

23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9
10

210
W
YEEWACE: Did you have
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
similar -have similar
so,
this yesterday?
just printed this
yesterday?
so, you just
Q.
Q.

it's admitted.
let's do that after it's
the pictures,
admitted.
pictures, let's
MS.
YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
YEEiWAIlACE:
MS.
Okay.

211
211
irrelevant to anything thereafter without first
first
establishing,
establishing, as a matter of law,
that there had been a
law, that

15
15
16
16

A.
A.
Q.
Q.

A.
A.

For 2017.
2017.

Q.
Q.

Okay.
purpose for
Okay. And so,
so, what was the purpose

printing these Google
images?
Google Earth images?
A.
A.

windrows
2017.
2013 and 2017.
windrows that were
were on the facility
facility between 2013
Q.
And when you say
facility, you're
Q.
say the facility,
referring to?
to?
Gibson's composting operation.
A.
Gibson's
A.
operation.
Q.
Q.

18
18
20
22
22
23
24
24
25

W or
To observe
observe additional
additional composting row --

Okay.
Okay.
YEEiWAIlACE: Your Honor,
MS.
move
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, we would move

for the
for
58.1 through 58.3 purely for
the admission of 58.1
demonstrative
demonstrative purposes.
purposes.

I will
will object
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Which I
object as being
irrelevant.
in time subsequent
all is
It all
is at a point
irrelevant. It
point in
subsequent to
his purpose
what
what supposedly triggered his
epose of an inspection
and/or investigation
2013.
investigation that
that occurred in March of 2013.
It
irrelevant
to
that,
and
it
appears
It appears
appears
appears
that,

it

212
212
11
2
2

or the windrows
windrows appeared to have grass
leaves
grass and leaves
deposited at the end of a pile.
pile.
we're clear about
Q.
And just
just so
so that we're
about the
Q.

violation of any of the
IDAPA rules concerning the Solid
the IDAPA
Waste
Management Rules in
in March 29,
2013.
Waste Management
29, 2013.

33

It
It appears
irrelevant.
be irrelevant.
appears otherwise to be
THE COURT:
right. Well,
illustrative
COURT: All right.
Well, illustrative
they're not
exhibits are
irrelevant because they're
are always
always irrelevant

55
77

location,
tell the
location, can you tell
the Court
Court how you arrived at what
what
we're calling Gibson's operations;
how
do
you
get
there?
operations;
there?
A.
We
A.
We -W how did you get there
Q.
How did you -there on
Q.

admitted to prove
prove some
fact. They are admitted to
some fact.
illustrate testimony.
testimony.
W 58.1
I've already admitted 55 -I've
58.1 for that

88

W 29th.
29th.
March 20 --

99

A.
We
A.
We drove
drove down or south
swth on Orchard,
drove on
Orchard, drove
Gowen
Valley, and then
(Bowen Road,
south on Pleasant Valley,
Road, turned south
turned west
into the Gibson
west on the access
access road into
composting.
composting.

44
66

10
10

,,

I'm going to deny the motion to admit 58.2
purpose.
58.2 and
purpose. I'm
58.3 because they appear to be different
different than 58.1.
58.1. And

11
11
13
13

14

haven't heard anything about
so far
far II haven't
about when this witness,
witness,
or if this witness,
has ever gone
gone to the facility,
witness, has
facility, and

14
14

Okay.
for the
describe for
the Court
Court what
what
then, describe
Okay. And then,
you observed,
were driving down the
observed, for example,
example, when you
you were

15

why one
might be
one or the other of the pictures might

15
15

access road approaching Mr.
Mr. Gibson's operations.
operations.

16

illustrative
his testimony.
illustrative of his
testimony.
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Ehlert,
YEEWACE: So,
Ehlert, you did
So, Mr.
Q.

16
16

18

Gibson's facility
testify that
Mr. Gibson's
went to Mr.
that you and Jack went
facility

18
18

19

on March 29,
2013?
29, 2013?

19
19

A.
Well,
in the
A.
Well, as you
the facility,
at that
facility, at
you turn in
W there
W there was no signage
time
time there
there was no -there -signage
indicating
indicating that
that there
there was a composting
facility back
corrposting facility
there.
sides it was
there. As you drove in,
was primarily
in, on both sides

20

rangeland.
rangeland.

21
21

As we
we got closer to the Gibson composting
ccmposting
facility,
windrows.
be windrows.
facility, we could see what appeared to be

11
12
13

17

if

12
12

17
17
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20
22

Correct.
Correct.
Q.
Okay.
Okay. And
Q.
W at Mr.
at
Mr.
loca -at that
that loca

23

visit.
visit.

21

24
25

A.
A.

W
describe
describe what
what you observed at -Gibson's operations
operations on that site

22
22

in various
We
We observed numerous windrows
windrows in
various

W
stages of decomposition.
One of the ends,
decomposition. One
corrpost -ends, the compost

it

24
24

When we
several of the piles
we got
got closer,
see several
closer, we could see
in various
along the road that appeared to be
various stages
be in
stages of

25

decomposition.
decomposition.

23
A.
A.

Q.
Q.
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*

2
3
4
5

213

THE COURT:
Mr. Ehlert
Ehlert -COURT: Mr.
W
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: There was --

1

214
214

if

11

in,
load contains
contains branches or
the load
in, and a thousand if the

2
2

construction material.
There was other signage
said
material. There
that said
signage that
open.
open.

W hang on just
THE
me
THE COURT:
COURT: -second. Let me
just a second.
ask you a clarifying question.
cpestion. You said,
said, when you turned

33

in,
signage. Were you referencing the turn
in, there was no signage.
of off Pleasant
Pleasant Valley Road,
Road, or were you referencing a

55

turn off the access
into the
itself?
access road into
the facility
facility itself?
It's the turn off from Pleasant
THE
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: It's
Valley Road onto the
road.
the access road.

77

44

Within the facility,
signs
were signs
facility, there were
pointing to directions where
where we
we assumed people
people depositing

10

THE COURT:
sir.
COURT: Thank you,
you, sir.

10
10

material there
material
drive and drop off their
there were
were to drive
materials.
materials.
Q.
Okay.
in
windrows in
saw windrows
said you saw
Okay. And when you said
Q.
various
of
decomposition,
let
me
ask
you,
did
you
various stages
stages
me
decomposition,
you,
have
in various
various stages
experience with windrows in
have experience
stages of

11

Go
Go ahead.
ahead.

11
11

decomposition?
decomposition?

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
I think you were
YEEWACE: So,
were
So, I

12
12

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

describing
2013 on the
describing what
what you
29, 2013
you observed on March 29,
Smith property for Gibson's operations.
operations.

13
13

Q.
Q.

And describe
in that
is in
describe what
what your experience is

14
14

6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9

12
13
14

Q.
Q.

17
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3

88
99

15
15

regard.
regard.
A.
A.

And II think you just described the
windrows.
the windrows.
A.
Correct.
As
we
got
to
the
point
where
A.
point where the
Correct. As we
the
W
fencing around the Gibson
fence started -- well,
saw fencing
well, we saw
W or I'm
I'm sorry
compost
facility on the
the south
south and -sorry -- the
compost facility

16
16

inspected different composting
facilities that
that compost a
ccmposting facilities

17
17

wide
materials, including grass
wide variety of materials,
grass and leaves.
leaves.
Q.
And how could you tell
tell that the windrows
windrows on
Q.

east
side. And as we
east and north side.
we got closer to the
the
entrance,
indicating no branches.
branches.
there was signage
signage indicating
entrance, there

20

When we
we got
got to the entrance,
we observed a
entrance, we
small structure
it. There
several signs
signs on it.
There was
was
structure that
that had several

22
22

what
fee structure,
what appeared to be a fee
structure, basically saying
saying $5
$5
W per load
for -if
you
sign
in,
$100
if
you
do
not
sign
not sign
load
in, $100

24
24

15
16

66

A.
A.

Correct.
Correct.

Q.
Q.

i

if

18
18
19
19
21
21

if

215
how tall
tall and how wide
wide those windrows
windrows approximately were?
were?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.
W did you agree
Q.
Do you -agree with his testimony?
testimony?
Q

23

II have attended different
different trainings,
trainings, II have
have

Gibson's composting operations
the Smith property at
Mr. Gibson's
operations
at Mr.
were
various stages
were in various
stages of decomposition?
decorrposition?
A.
As II stated,
A.
saw one that at the
the end had
bad
stated, we saw

grass and leaves.
make
There are
leaves. There
are others where you could make
out pieces
pieces of grass or pieces
pieces of leaves.
leaves. And then,
then, there
are
material.
looked like it was
are others
others that
that looked
was of compost
ccmpost material.

it

25

Q.
Q.

And did you hear Mr.
Mr. Gibson's testimony about

11

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

216
THE COURT:
Ms. Yee,
is a video without
this is
COURT: Ms.
Yee, this

2
2

33

sound?
sound?

4

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

44

That's right.
MS.
YEEiWAIlACE: That's
right.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

5

Q.
Q

we're going to play Exhibit
Okay.
Exhibit 18.
18.
Okay. So,
So, we're
So,
me ask you this before
let me
before we
we play
So, let

55

I'm happy to let
THE COURT:
let you publish it.
it.
COURT: I'm
I'm not
kind of have
permit the witness
not going to permit
witness to kind
have a
W
running narrative
narrative because --

6
\oooxlmwbmmH

66

7

long did that
Exhibit
visit last?
Exhibit 18,
site visit
that site
last?
18, how long

77

8

Approximately 15
minutes.
15 to 20 minutes.
W the
Q.
And then,
have you been to mister -then, have
Q.
Gibson's composting
Smith property and Mr.
MC. Gibson's
operations
ccmposting operations

88

9
10
11
12
13

A.
A.

since
since March 29,
2013?
29, 2013?
I've been on the access road adjacent
A.
I've
A.
adjacent to
Gibson's composting facility?
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
facility?

14

Q.
Q.

15

A.
A.

16
17

i

When was
was that?
that?
February 26,
August 14,
2013 -- or
2017, then August
14, 2013
26, 2017,

2017.
2017.

99
10
10
11
11
12
12

13
13
14
14

Q.
Q.

Okay.
present with John Glenn
Okay. So,
So, were you present

20

A.
A.

Yes,
I was.
was.
Yes, I

about what
what we've seen
seen to that
point.
that point.

21
21
23

24

you were
were standing in relation to John Glenn Hall and what
you,
this
experience at DEQ,
what you believe this
DEQ, what
you, based on experience

25

video is purporting to show.
show.

25

22
23

I'll

YEEiWAIlACE: Yeah.
MS.
Yeah. I'll do that,
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
that,

20

Okay.
Okay. So,
So, we're going to go ahead and play
Exhibit
while we
Exhibit 18.
where
18. And while
narrate where
we do that,
that, can you narrate

21

if

19
19

17
17

wmHowmqmmmHo

19

it

about while
while the video's playing unless
unless you're going to
reference the time counter continuously.
continuously.

18
18

16
16

Hall when he took the videos
videos and the footage
footage on
2017?
August 14,
14, 2017?

W I
I won't be able
THE COURT:
able to match the
COURT: -the
narrative with the video,
one reading the
video, and no one
he's talking
will be able to tell
transcript
tell what
what it is he's
transcript will

So,
please
want to ask him question,
question, please
So, if you want
W
pause the video -YEEiWAIlACE: Okay.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
W feel free
THE COURT:
free to ask him questions
COURT: --

15
15
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18

YEEiWAIlACE: Okay.
MS.
I can ask him
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay. I

7
some
some --

Q.
Q.

22
22

24
24

Your Honor.
Honor.
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: And before
before we go further,
further, Judge,
Judge,
let me
continuing objection
once again,
me have
have a continuing
obj ection that
that here,
here, once
again,
W August 14,
we're dealing with an Aug -2017, video,
video, and
14, 2017,
we haven't even established a violation.
violation. It
It appears
appears to
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217

to be irrelevant
irrelevant and immaterial
immaterial to this
this case.
case.

1

me
me

2

there's no foundation
And there's
foundation that
relates to the
that relates
7 the allegation in
charges -in this
want a
this complaint.
complaint. II want
standing objection to the
the admission of this display.
display.

3
4

THE COURT:
right.
COURT: All right.

5
woodmanybwmw

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

11
2
2

33
44

218
218
form of publication?
that governs
publication?
governs the form
W the
W the -W what
Th -MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: No.
No. The
th -I'm referring to is
my continuing
continuing objection.
is my
were
objection. You were
W
inquiring as how
ho --

55

i

Well,
introduction into
Well, your objection to the introduction
evidence of Exhibit
Exhibit No.
18 was
No. 18
was noted.
noted. I'm not sure
sure --

66

I'm not
mean with a continuing objection;
not sure
what you mean
sure what
objection;
I think you mean.
here's what
mean.
what I

88

To the extent
interpose the
extent that you want to interpose
Ehlert's testimony
same objection to Mr.
Mr. Ehlert's
what he
about what
he
testimany about
saw on August 14,
irrelevant, I'll note
2017, as being irrelevant,
14, 2017,

10
10

77
99

I'll

it

11
11

THE COURT:
Right.
COURT: Right.
W I
I was
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: -was how characterizing it.
it.

I'm referring to.
That's what
That's
what I'm
to.
That's noted.
THE
THE COURT:
right. That's
COURT: All right.
noted. Thank
you.
you.
Q.
Q.

YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
Okay. So,
So, we're going

to start
video.
start the
the video.

12
12

(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

that continuing
for the
for
continuing objection
objection for
overrule it for
the record,
record, overrule
I did the video.
the same
video.
reasons as
same reasons
as I
MR.
well as the
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: With that,
that, Judge,
Judge, as well

13
13

it,

16
16

17

they're going to play it, stop it,
fact they're
it, play it,
it, stop it,
it,
it's a continuing objection to that
so it's
series
or
sequence
that series
sequence

18

of events.
events.

18
18

shown up to this point?
point?
in is
A.
The vehicle that we were
is entering
A.
were in

19
19

Gowen
(Bowen Road.
Road.

13
14
15
16
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wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

19

THE COURT:
COURT: On
basis?
On what basis?
MR.
I understand that
they're
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: That
That I
that they're

20
21
22
23
24

it

it

7 is
THE
THE COURT:
is there
Right. Is -H.119
COURT: Right.
there some
scme Rule

17
17

YEEiWALlACI-D: Okay,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
sure.
Okay, sure.

2
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

3
4

it

YEEiWALlACI-D: Stop it right here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

woodmanybmmw

6
7
8
9
10

YEEJWALLACE:
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
minute
Okay. And then a minute
Q.
W 16
66 seconds
16 seconds
seconds -seconds we stopped the video;
video; can you
explain what's happening at this
this point.
point.

A.
A.

We
We were
(Bowen Road,
were turning off of Gowen
Road, turning

south onto Pleasant Valley Road.
Road.
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

13

it

14
15
16
NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

17

Q.
Q.

YEEiWALlACI-D: Okay.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay. Stop it right here.
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
minute
at a minute
Okay. So,
So, at

i

Okay.
Okay.

if

24
24

earlier,
earlier, II need you to reference the
the time
time counter on the

25

video.
video.

11

220
220
a check in,
44 seconds,
minute and 44
seconds, what is this a
in, at a minute

2
2

depiction of?
of?

33
55

A.
A.

It
It is
is an image
image of us
us continuing to travel

west
in the general
looking in
general direction
west on the
the access road,
road, looking
of Gibson composting.
composting.

66

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

77
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

88
99

it

12
12

YEEiWALlACI-D: Okay,
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay, stop it here.
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.
Okay. So,
So, checking in
W what is
at
minutes 49
49 seconds,
is -is this image
what is
at 22 minutes
seconds, what
image

13
13

depicting?
depicting?

14
14

A.
It
A.
It is
is an image
image of us continuing to travel
west
west on the
horizon,
road. What
the access road.
What you see
see on the
the horizon,

11
11

12

YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
So,
this video
has this
So, what has

THE COURT:
Ms. Yee,
COURT: Ms.
Yee, if you -YEEiWALlACI-D: Yeah?
MS.
Yeah?
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
W for the reasons I
I stated
THE COURT:
COURT: -stated

23

10
10

11

Q.
Q.

22
22

44

5

Q.
Q.

21
21

219
1

it

YEEiWALlACI-D: Can you just
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
just stop
stop it here.

15
15

20
20

going to stop this and then he's going to testify from
from it
as to an event of August
August 14,
continue to
2017, and then continue
14, 2017,
for a period of time,
run it again for
it. He's
stop it.
time, then stop
W
going to explain what
what that --

25

14
14

15
15

and 14
14 seconds,
describe for the Court what has
seconds, can you describe
been happening.
happening.

16
16

A.
We
A.
We have
Pleasant
have been traveling south on Pleasant
were just
just coming up onto the access road
Valley Road,
Road, we were

18
18

Gibson's composting operation.
into Gibson's
operation.
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

20
20

17
17

Q.
Q.

that darker material,
windrows on the Gibson
material, is the windrows
compost
facility.
compost facility.
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18
19
20
21

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)
there's a laser
THE COURT:
Mr. Ehlert,
laser
COURT: Mr.
Ehlert, there's

22
22

(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

23
24
Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

21
21

22

25

Q.
Q.

19
19

YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And just so that
that we have
have

if

24
24

pointer on the desk in
in front
front of you,
want to use
you, if you want
that to point
sir. There you
point things out.
out. To your right,
right, sir.

25

go.
go.
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1

222
222

11

2

WITNESS: Thank you.
THE WITNESS:
you.
You're welcome.
THE COURT:
welcone.
COURT: You're

3

YEEiWAllACE: Thank you.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
you.

33

2
2

it

44

6

Let's stop
Okay.
here.
stop it here.
Okay. Let's
4* at 3
YEEAWAIIACE: Can you -Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
minutes
3 minutes
Q.
you've
for the Court
5
point out for
what you've
Court what
5 seconds,
seconds, can you point

7

been referring to as Mr.
Mr. Gibson's compositing operations
operations

77

8

from this view.
view.
A.
Yes.
right here is the
A.
the
Yes. So,
So, this dark area right

88

4
5
woodmanybwmw

9
10
11

windrows
windrows on the Gibson compost
compost facility.
facility.
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

12

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

14
14
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Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Stop it right
MS.
right here.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
W
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And at view 55 --

18

3
minutes and 56
what is
is this image
ﬁnage depicting?
depicting?
3 minutes
56 seconds,
seconds, what

19

This
This is
is a close up -- or closer image
image of one
of the
windrows on Gibson compost
the windrows
compost facility.
facility.
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

,,

A.
A.

22

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

24
YEEiWAllACE: Keep going.
MS.
going. Okay,
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay, right

25

223
that's on the property -- or on the
entrance,
entrance, and a truck that's
Gibson compost
compost facility.
facility.

,,

3

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

4

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

woodmanybmmw

8
10

Q.
Q.

24
24

A.
This
This image
A.
inage is
is of the
the west
west entrance,
entrance, with a
similar
with
similar
signage
as the
shnilar structure,
shnilar
signage
the east
east
structure,

25

224
224
YEEiWAllACE: Again,
MS.
for a
here just
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Again, stop
stop here
just for

11
2
2

in.
check in.

33

YEEJWALLACE:
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
55 minutes,
minutes, 51
51 seconds,
seconds,
Q.
4* view?
what
view?
what direction is
is this pointing --

This
This direction is
from the access road,
is again from
road,
looking northeast.
northeast.
A.
A.

77

Q.
Q.

in the
And what
what is
is that in
the background?
background?

YEEAWAIIACE: So,
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
what has
has just
just
So, what

88

A.
A.

That is
is a control
control tower at the Boise
airport.
Boise airport.

99

Q.
Q.

it

13

Q.
Q

Okay.
Okay.

13
13

YEEiWAllACE: Go
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
ahead.
Go ahead.

14
14

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
playaiJ

12
12

15

it

15
15
(Plaintiff's
(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

16
16

17

17
17

it
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18
19

Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Go
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Go ahead and stop
stop it here.
4* what
YEE4WHJJKE: What is -BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
what

direction is
View taken from?
fnmn?
is this view

21

A.
A.

This
This view
View is looking
looking north,
north, from the access
access

road.
road.
Okay.
Okay.

24

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Stop it right
MS.
right here.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And what's happening at

4* 66 minutes
66 second
minutes 8
second -seconds?
8 seconds?
A.
So,
from the
A.
have a view from
the
again, we're -- we have
So, again,

,,

19
19

access road.
looking southeast,
road. And this is looking
southeast, back towards
windrows on the
the Gibson
are windrows
Gibson compost
compost facility.
facility. These are

20
20

Gibson compost
compost facility.
facility.

18
18

Q.
Q.

Okay.
conﬁng back the
the other
Okay. So,
So, basically coming

23

A.
A.

24
24

Q.
Q.

Correct.
Omﬂect
-- down the access road?
road?

21
21
22
22

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okiﬁ
YEEiWAllACE: Keep going.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
goim;

10
10
11
11
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YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
4 minutes
And at 4
minutes

21 seconds,
21
what does this image
inage depict?
depict?
seconds, what

And did it dead-end
point?
deackend at that point?
Yes.
Yes.

25

YEEiWAllACE: Stop right here.
MS.
hens
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

Q.
Q.

23

A.
A.

23

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
playaiJ

21
21

Q.
Q

16

Okay.
Okay.

YEEiWAllACE: Okay,
right here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
stop right
Okay, stop

happened at
minutes 7
7 second?
second?
at 55 minutes
A.
We
A.
We reached the west end of the access
road.
access road.

14

This
more compost
This image
inage is
is depicting
depicting more
compost or

20
20

12

22

Q.
Q.

19
19

11

20

A.
A.

windrows
windrows on the Gibson compost
compost facility.
facility.

18
18

66

7

i

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
EEWAE: And what
what are
are -- at
4 minutes
14 seconds,
4
minutes 14
is this
this image
inage depicting?
depicting?
seconds, what is
Q.
Q.

17
17

55

6

9

16
16

44

5

Okay.
Okiﬁ

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
playedJ

22
22

23

2

Q.
Q.

15
15

it

17

1

,,

entrance,
This no sign says no
signage. This
entrance, with the signage.
branches.
hmanches.

99

13
13

16

21

east
into the Gibson compost
We can
entrance into
east entrance
facility. We
cxmyxast facility.
Here's the -- the structure
see
sign. Here's
structure at the
see an open sign.

12
12

15

20

66

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
4 minutes
YEE4WHJJKE: And at 4
nﬁnutes and

,,

11
11

13
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55

Q.
Q.

5
what is
is this image
image depicting?
depicting?
5 seconds,
seconds, what
A.
This
This image
A.
inage depicts the entrance
entrance -- or the

10
10

YEEiWAIlACE: Keep going.
MS.
going.
NE. YEE-WALLACE:

14

here.
here.

,,
way
wa --

,,

25
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

1

11

2

2
2

3
4
5
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6
7
8

YEEiWALlACI-D: Stop here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEJWALLACE:
in at
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
So,
just checking in
So, just

33

99 minutes
minutes 28
28 seconds,
is this
this view depicting?
depicting?
seconds, what is
This is
looking
A.
This
A.
is a view from
from the access road,
road, looking

55

east
Pleasant Valley Road.
Road.
east of Pleasant
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

77

Q.
Q.

9

44
66
88

YEEiWALlACI-D: Okay.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.

99

10
12
W let's
let's -let's
YEEiWALlACI-D: Okay.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay. So let's

13

i

it

A.
This
This is,
A.
again, a pan of Gibson compost
compost
is, again,
W or
facility
from the access
road. Close
Close up view -facility from
access road.
closer up view of some of the windrows.
windrcms.
long the
Q.
Did you estimate
windrows went
went
estimate how long
the windrows
Q.
down from
from the access
road?
access road?
I'm sorry.
A.
I'm
A.
question?
repeat that
that question?
sorry. Can you repeat
W
W
Q.
Can
you
access
how
-did
you
estimate
how -estimate
Q.

11
11

how long
long the windrows went
went from
from the vantage
point of the
vantage point
W what
long -access road,
windrcms
what the
length of the windrows
the length
road, how long

12
12

were?
were?

10
10
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

11

I'm going to object
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: To which I'm
object to

13
13

if

14
14

any speculation.
incpire if he measured
speculation. She
She can inquire

15

stop it here.
here.
YEEJWALLACE:
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
From what view is
is -- at
Q.

15
15

16

99 minutes
minutes 53
is this pan taken?
what view is
taken?
53 seconds,
seconds, what

16
16

17

This
This is
is a view from
from the access
access road,
lookn
road, looking
southwest.
It was a pan of the eastern side of Gibson
southwest. It
W
compost
throu -facility, with the compost
compost rows through
compost facility,

17
17

don't want
anything,
spewlation.
want speculation.
anything, but II don't
THE COURT:
for an estimation;
COURT: She asked for
estimation;
that's overruled.
overruled.

through here.
here.
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

20
20

14
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A.
A.
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6
7
8
9
10
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12
13
14
15
16
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18
19

it

227
227
12
12 minutes
40 seconds,
minutes 40
what has the footage
footage shown us from
seconds, what
the last
last stop?
stop?

25

Q.
Q.

YEEiWALlACI-D: Stop it there.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
there.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEJWALLACE:
in at
And just
just checking in
at

11

Q.
Q.

228
228
W what
W what
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And what
what
what -what --

2
2

looking at at 13:53?
are
13:53?
are we looking

So,
what the
showed was a view from the
the video showed
So, what
access road,
close up of a windrow on the northeast
road, a close
side of the
is of the
shot here is
the facility.
facility. And the last shot
the

33

east
entrance.
east entrance,
structure at the entrance.
entrance, with the wooden structure
Q.
Okay.
piles that
different piles
that
those different
Okay. And were those
Q.

66

A.
So,
from the access
A.
is a view from
this is
access road,
road,
So, this
W again,
looking at the east
entrance. You can see
east entrance.
see the
the -again,
in
the wooden
with
the
sign
that
says
sign
in
Sign
Sign
wooden structure,
structure,
says
Here's the fee
here.
fee signage.
sign basically
here. Here's
signage. This sign

77

it's an adhesion contract.
states by using this
this facility,
contract.
facility, it's

the video showed,
mounds?
different mounds?
showed, different
A.
Correct.
A.
Correct.
W when you said
Q.
Okay.
tell -Okay. And could you tell
Q.

88

And then,
Sign says
branches.
then, this sign
says no branches.

A.
A.

that those are various
is that
various stages
stages of decomposition,
decomposition, is
what
what you were
were testifying about?
about?
A.
A.

44
55

99

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

10
10
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

11
11
12
12

it

Correct.
Correct.
W okay.
Q.
And -How can you
tell from
from those
okay. How
Q.
you tell
in various
they're in
piles that they're
various stages
stages of decomposition?
deccmposition?

13
13
15
15

15
15 minutes,
what did the
show us up to this point
point
footage show
minutes, what
the footage

A.
Some
A.
Some you
observe woody debris,
debris, or
you could observe
straw,
materials that have
have not been broken
straw, other organic materials
down yet.
more consistent
were more
consistent of a
yet. And other piles were
darker brown or black color.
color.

16
16

from our last
last stop?
stop?
A.
It
A.
It showed
additional windrows,
showed additional
windrows, and other

14
14

17
17

18
18
19
19

Q.
Q.

That's consistent
That's
with?
consistent with?

20
20

21

A.
A.

Compost.
Compost.

21
21

22

22
22

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

24
25

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

23

20

23

approximately 200
long.
200 to 300
feet long.
300 feet
Q.
Okay.
Okay.
Q.

24
24
YEEiWALlACI-D: Stop right there.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
there.

25

2

19
19

22
22

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

24

1

WITNESS: We
THE WITNESS:
We estimated the windrows to be

18
18

21
21

22
23

226

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
EEWACE: Is this a -- at
W what
W what
10
10 minutes
is -is -is this?
minutes 38
this?
what is
what is
38 seconds
seconds is
Q.
Q.

23

Q.
Q.

YEEiWALlACI-D: Stop it there.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
there.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Just checking in
YEEJWALLACE:
in at

pieces
pieces of materials on the site.
site.
looking at
Q.
What
here?
What are
are we looking
at here?
Q.
W
W the west
A.
This
This is
A.
is the
west entrance,
the -entrance, with a -the wooden
similar to
additional signage
signage similar
wooden structure,
structure, with additional
the east
entrance.
east entrance.
Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

24
24

it

YEEiWALlACI-D: Stop it there.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
there.

25

(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)
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1
2
3
4

Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Stop here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
W 15
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
With -minutes
15 minutes

2
2

47
47 seconds,
describe the decomposition
deoanaasition
seconds, how would you describe
process
windrow?
particular windrow?
process of the -- this particular

44

it

55

6

It's -- this
It's
like it has
this pile looks
looks like
has
progressed somewhat,
somewhat, but it does no appear to be a

7

finished compost
pile.
ounpost pile.

77

5
woodmanybwmw

A.
A.

it

8

Q.
Q.

9

A.
A.

10

66

Why
that?
Why do you say
say that?
II can observe
kind of woody materials or
observe kind

88
99

pieces
in the pile.
naterial in
pile.
pieces of uncomposted organic material

10
10

11

11
11

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

12

12
12

Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Stop it here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEE4WHJJKE: What
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
What entrance
is this
entrance is

structure
structure located at?
at?
This would be the east entrance
A.
This
A.
entrance to the Gibson
compost
compost facility.
facility.
we're at
Q.
And we're
minutes 57
17 minutes
57 seconds?
seconds?
at 17
Q.
A.
Correct.
A.
Correct
Q.
And can you read the
signage on the
the signage
the
Q.
rightihand side,
right-hand
notice?
side, the notice?
rightihand side
A.
The right-hand
A.
side says,
notice, admission
says, notice,

YEEiWAllACE: Stop here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

14
14

to this
following
this property is
is allowed only under the following
conditions.
conditions. You may deposit
deposit grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
leaves, or

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
minutes 37
YEE4WHJJKE: 16
16 minutes
37 seconds,
seconds,

13

13
13

14

it

33

,,

,,

230
230

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

11

15
15

soft,
vegetation. No branches,
branches, limbs,
lﬂnbs, construction
soft, green vegetation.

16

what
what does this -- what does this depict?
depict?

16
16

in with all
waste,
all correct
chemicals. Sign in
trash. No chemicals.
waste, or trash.

17

17
17

18

This
This video shows
several compost
shows the
the ends
ends of several
compost
kind of
windrows,
grass or kind
windrows, with what appears
apyears to be grass

2477 for
information before
for the
before proceeding.
proceeding. Open
the
(Ken 24-7
lawn care
convenience
convenience of lawn
professionals.
care professionals.

19

there's also straw
similar
material. Here,
shnilar organic naterial.
straw and
Here, there's

19
19

20

what
what appears
row.
grass at the end of this row.
appears to be grass
Q.
Can you point
individual windrows?
windrows?
point to the
the individual
Q.

20
20
22
22

23

This
This would be one windrow;
windrow; this would be
windraﬂ
another windrow;
windrow; and then this would be another windrow

24

here.
here.

24
24

15
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wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

21
22

Q.
Q.

,,

A.
A.

18
18

21
21

A.
A.

Okay.
Okay.

Q.
Q.

1

or David?
David?

2

A.
A.

I'm sorry.
I'm
It says Dave Gibson.
Gibson.
sorry. It

2
2

3

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

33

11

4

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

woodmanybmmw

6
YEE4WHJJKE: What
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
showing?
What is
is 19:53
19:53 showing?

77

8

A.
A.

This
from the access road,
This is
looking
is a view from
road, looking

88

southeast
Pleasant Valley Road.
Road.
southeast towards Pleasant
Q.
Okay.
that a -- was that shot
shot a close-up
closeﬁno
Okay. Is that
Q.
shot;
know?
shot; do you know?

,,

A.
A.

closeiup shot.
Yes.
It was a close-up
Yes. It
shot.
(Plaintiff's
(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

15
NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

20
21
22

Q.
Q.

it

YEEiWAllACE: Stop it here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

4* which entrance is
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEE4WHJJKE: Is -is

10
10

A.
A.

This
This is
is the
into the
the west entrance into
the Gibson

11
11

compost
compost facility.
facility.

99

this?
this?

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okiﬁ
(Plaintiff's
(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
playadJ

14
14

YEEiWAllACE: Stop here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEAWAILACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Do you recognize any of

17
17

18
18

A.
Some
A.
materials appear to be the same
Some of these
sane
these materials
that were
back
in
2013.
in
were on the Gibson compost
2013.
compost
Q.
Which -- which -- which pieces
equipnent?
pieces of equipment?
Q.

20
2O

,,

,,

A.
A.

24

Q.
Q.

,,

,,

Mainly the -- the pallets.
pallets.
Okay.
recognize what that -- what
Okay. Do you recognize

,,

leftihand corner at
that is in
in the upper,
nﬁnute 21:01?
21:01?
at minute
upper, left-hand

it

16
16

the equipment
minute 21,
what any of this equipment
equipment at
equipnent
at minute
21, what
looks
looks -- appears
appears to be?
be?

23
25

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
playaiJ

15
15

16

19

Okay.
Okay

13
13

14

wawmwowmqmwawmwo

Q.
Q.

Q.
Q.

12
12

13

18

232
232
It
like some
It looks
looks like
some type
type of poly tank with a
metal cage
metal
it.
cage around it.

66
Q.
Q.

17

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Did that
YEEJWALLACE:
sign say
that sign
Dave
say Dave

A.
A.

55

7

12

Q.
Q.

44

5

11

Okay.
Okiﬁ

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
playaiJ

25

231
231

9

Q.
Q.

23

25

10

No scavenging
scavenging allowed.
is a contract
allowed. This is
contract of
adhesion.
34474968.
adhesion. Thanks,
Thanks, David Gibson,
Gibson, 344-4968.

19
19

Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Stop it here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEAWAIIACE: What
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
22:15 depicting?
What is
is 22:15
depicting?

A.
This
This looks
like a pile that contains
A.
looks like
like grass or other
discarded sod.
sod. And then,
then, this looks like
similar
shnilar organic material.
naterial.

23

Is
Is this a windrow at
22:15?
at 22:15?
A.
Honestly,
material in there,
A.
there, II
Honestly, with the material
wouldn't be able
wouldn't
tell whether it was an actual
able to tell
actual windrow

24
24

or not.
not

21
21
22
22

25

Q.
Q.

it

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okiﬁ
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287*7690
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233

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

1
2

2
2

it

3
4
5

234
234

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

11

Q.
Q.

YEEiWAllACE: Stop it here.
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEAWAILACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
What is
24:19 a picture
is 24:19
picture

A.
A.

This is
This
is a picture
picture of a sign on the
the west
west

of?
of?

33
44

Q.
Q.

55

A.
A.

66

Q.
Q.

woodmanybwmw

6

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEE4MHJJKE: And what
what is
is this a

picture
picture of at 25:45?
25:45?
This
This is
is a picture
tire loader.
picture of a rubber tire
loader.
And are loaders
loaders typically used on composting

7

entrance
entrance structure.
structure.

77

8

Was
sign also on the property when you
this sign
Was this
went
March 29,
went there on Nbrch
2013?
29, 2013?

88

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

99

Q.
Q.

For what?
what?

A.
A.

They can be used for
for several
different
several different

9

Q.
Q.

it

10

A.
A.

Yes,
was.
Yes, it was.

10
10

11

Q.
Q.

sign says?
Okay.
what the sign
Okay. Can you read what
says?

11
11

14

A.
Through these
A.
portals pass
Host
these portals
pass the most
intelligent
in Boise.
lawn care professionals in
intelligent lawn
It takes
Boise. It
I -- honestly,
four minutes
minutes to get to Treetop and I
honestly, after

15

can't read it.
that,
that, II can't

12
13

16
NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

,,

it.

Q.
Q.

13
13
14
14

16
16
17
17

(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff's
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

18
wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

18
18

19

19
19

it

20
21

Q.
Q.

22

at
25:16?
at 25:16?

23

A.
A.

things.
things. They can be used to assemble
assenble windrows,
windrows, they can
be
windrows. They can be
load
he used to turn windrows.
he used to load
compost
into screeners,
compost into
compost
screeners, they can be used to load compost
into dump
for all
all hauling on site.
dunp trucks
trucks for
site.
So,
for
ounpost site,
he used for
site, they can be
So, on a compost

15
15

Okay.
Okay.

17

24

12
12

operation?
operation?

YEEiWAllACE: And stop
MS.
here.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
stop it here.
YEEAWAILACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
What
What is
is this picture
picture of

So,
this piece of equipment
screener,
equiant is a screener,
So, this

used to screen
screen compost.
compost.

25

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

1

A.
A.

2

Q.
Q.

Based on that
weight estimate,
that weight
estimate, yes.
yes.
Okay.
Okay.

many
many

different purposes.
purposes.
Q.
Q.

Gibson's testimony
Did you hear Mr.
Mr. Gibson's
about a
testinony about
cubic yard of compost,
moisture, could
the moisture,
compost, depending on the
weight
I believe
weight between 1,200
believe it was 2,000
pounds?
1,200 and I
2,000 pounds?

it

20
20

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

21
21

Q.
Q.

Do you agree with that
that statement?
statement?

22
22

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

23

Q.
Q.

in that instance,
And in
instance, would you need

24
24

equipment
equipnent such
loader to be able to turn or move
such as this loader

25

compost
piles?
compost piles?

235

236
11
2
2

3

33
(Plaintiff's
(Plaintiff's Exhibit
Exhibit No.
18 played.)
No. 18
played.)

4

44

5

55

Q.
Q.

Jack Gantz.
Gantz.

from your
And how had the property changed from
site visit
March 29,
visit on Nbrch
until August 14,
2017?
14, 2017?
29, 2013 until
A.
Well,
A.
differences that II noticed was
Well, the main differences
the addition of the east entrance,
section
entrance, and then a new section

woodmanybmmw

6
7

Q.
Q.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

YEEiWAllACE: Okay.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay.

66

W
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
So,
So, mist --

77

YEEiWAllACE: And so,
MS.
is over
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
so, the video is

88

at
minutes and 17
17 second.
second.
at 26 minutes
YEE4MHJJKE: Mr.
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Mr. Ehlert,
Ehlert, when you
Q.

99
10
10

visited the
Mr. Gibson's
the Smith property and looked at Mr.
composting operations
Nbrch 29,
operations on March
2013, did you actually
29, 2013,

11
11

go on to the
the Smith property?
property?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

13
13

12
12

14
14

,,

,,

And -- and describe
amd
describe what you did and -- and

15

Q.
Q.

16

where you went.
went.

17

We
tine it was the
We entered -- at
the only
that time
at that
entrance,
entrance.
west entrance.
entrance, but currently that would be the west
We
We proceeded down the
were looking to
the center aisle;
aisle; we were

17
17

find a site
site attendant
site that
that we could
attendant or somebody
sonebody on site
speak with.
with.

20
20

NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

wawmwowmqmwawmwo

18
19
20
21

A.
A.

23
24
25

16
16

,,

it

in various
We
We observed compost rows
rows in
various stages
stages of

22

decomposition.
decomposition.
Q.
And when you say
was you and?
and?
we, that was
Q.
say we,
A.
A.

15
15

Jack Gantz.
Gantz.

18
18
19
19
21
21
22
22

23

of composting
windrows on the east side of the
conposting windrows
the property.
property.
Q.
Anything
else?
Anything else?
Q.
A.
A.

,,

There was additional
equipnent that
additional equipment
that II did --

did not
in 2013.
2013.
not see
see back in
Q.
Was
signage on the
entrance the
Was the
the signage
the west
the same
sane
west entrance
Q.
as the
August 14,
2017?
signage that
the signage
saw on August
that you saw
14, 2017?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

,,

Okay.
meant the signage
I meant
signage on
o -Okay. And by that I
on March
Nbrch 29,
2017?
sane as on August 14,
2013, the same
14, 2017?
29, 2013,
Q.
Q.

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

Okay.
what
the site
site visit,
visit, what
then, after the
Okay. And then,
did you and Jack do next?
next?
Q.
Q.

A.
We
A.
We returned to the office.
office. And based on our
estimation
height and width of the
estination of the height
the piles,
piles, and then
using measurewents
measurements from
fron Google
the
Google Earth,
Earth, we estimated the
volume in
in the piles.
piles.
Q.
Q.

What
What did you estimate
voluwe in the
the piles
estinate the volume

to be on Nbrch
March 29,
2013?
29, 2013?

,,

24
24

MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
MR.
Which --

25

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: We
We estimated
estrnated --

,,
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28777690
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237
Judge,237
I'm going to object,
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: -- I'm
MR.
object, Judge,

11

238
2??
he's distinguished any
there's been no indication
there's
indication that he's
an --

firstly
what particular substance
substance are they
firstly as to what
There's been no indication
estimated.
indication it was
was grass,
estinated. There's
grass, or

2
2

any particular volume.
voluwe.

33

in some decomposition
leaves,
deoanposition
same compost
conpost in
leaves, or soil,
soil, or some
stage.
stage.

44

So,
I object
foundation and any
object to any foundation
So, I
speculation
voluwetrics of any substances
speculation as to any volumetrics
that
substances that

,,

1
2
3
4
5

it

So,
unless he can verify that
that as a
So, unless

6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
10

66

I'm going to object
foundation,
estination of any
foundation, I'm
object to any estimation
quantities of soil
in fact,
soil or dirt,
is.
dirt, as the case,
fact, is.
case, in
THE COURT:
is what
what legal
legal
COURT: Your objection
ohdection is

9

55

basis?
basis?

he cannot
cannot identify
identify accurately.
accurately.
THE COURT:
Ms. Yee,
interpret that as
COURT: Ms.
Yee, I'll interpret

I'll

88

an objection
give the
foundation to his ability to give
ohdection to foundation
I'm ask you to be somewhat
estimate.
in how
more precise
sonewhat more
precise in
estinate. I'm

99

the estimation
what the
of
estination was reached and what
the estimate
esthnate is of.

77

10
10

11

MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Pardon me,
MR.
Judge?
me, Judge?

YEEiWAllACE: Sure.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Sure.

11
11

,,

Q.
Q.

YEE4WH11KE: So,
windrows that
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
that
So, the windrows

13

it's easier for
THE COURT:
for
COURT: Well,
Well, II just
just -- it's
me to rule
HE
rule one objections
objection under
objections if you state
state an objection

13
13

you observed on the
March 29,
in
the Smith property on Nbrch
2013, in
29, 2013,
connection with Mr.
Mr. Gibson's composting
conposting facility,
facility, did you

14

the terms
terns of the Rules of Evidence,
Evidence, so.
so.

14
14

estimate
material in those windrows
windrows on
voluwe of the material
the volume
estinate the

15

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: He
He would be speculating
speculating as to
he's measuring.
what
what it was
measuring. He
was he is trying to estimate
estinate he's

15
15

that date?
date?

12

16

if

it

,,

if

12
12

16
16
17
17

18

it's dirt
doesn't know
doesn't
know if it's
dirt or
o -wasn't asked specifically
THE COURT:
COURT: He wasn't
specifically to

19

give an estimate
He was
estinate of any particular substance.
substance. He

19
19

20

just asked to estimate,
what he saw
say
esthnate, as II understood it,
it, what
at
the facility.
at the
facility.

20

MR.
fnmn
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: But the clear objective
objective is,
is, from
the question asked,
that the assumed answer is going to
aSkEKL that

22
22

23
24

they're going to try
relate to volumetrics
voluwetrics of a substance they're

24
24

25

to claim
cLahn is
is compost.
compost. There have been no test
test shown,
shown,

25

17
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21
22

1
2

239
truck,
10 cubic yard dump bed.
truckq that's 10
there would
bed. So,
So, there
be 10
10 cubic yards in a dump bed.
bed.

18
18

21
21

A.
A.

2
2

it

And as part of your job
job at DEQ,
EEQ, is it part of
your job to estimate
voluwe of solid
solid waste?
estinate volume
waste?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.
Q.
Q.

And have
have you done
throughout the
the course
done that
that throughout
course

of your career?
career?
A.
Yes,
I have.
A.
have
Yes, I

23

11

Yes.
Yes.

Q.
Q.

Q.
Q.

,,

in lay
For example,
is -example, in
terns, how much is
lay terms,

what
what is a comparison
comparison to a cubic yard of solid waste?
waste?
A.
Well,
if
you
take
an
average
size
dump
A.
size
average
take
Well,

if

240
it's conjecture.
it's
move that
that it be stricken and he
conjecture. And II nrwe
not be allowed to give any further
further speculation
speculation testimony.
testinony.

it

Q.
Okay.
NBrch 29,
2013, how did you
Okay. And on March
29, 2013,
Q.
ya;
estimate
windrows on the
material was in the windrows
estinate how much material
Gibson's composting
Smith property
Mr. Gibson's
prryerty in connection with Mr.

33

operations?
operations?
A.
We
height of the
A.
We estimated
the width and the height
esthnated the

66

7

77

THE COURT:
will not
right. Well,
COURT: All right.
Well, II will
consider the
Mr. Ehlert,
what
the testimony
Ehlert, other than what
testinony of Mr.
he's already given.
an
opinion
about
given. He's already stated
stated
what
windrows. But as
what was in the windrows.
this particular
as to this
he's
question,
what it is
is that
that he's
question, he's simply
sinpiy referring to what

8

compost
estinated
windrows, and then using Good Earth we estimated
compost windrows,

88

estimating.
estinating. II think II understand what he means.
means.

9

the length
length of the -- of the windrows.
windrows. And from that,
that, we
calculated an estimated
vohmne.
esthnated volume.

99

I'm not going to accept that answer as
I'm
further opinion about
what constitutes
rows. He's
those rows.
constitutes those
about what

3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

10

,,

11

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

55

10
10
11
11

,,

12

44

MR. SMITH:
SMITH: And -MR.

12
12

it

it

just trying to tell
me what it is
tell me
is he
he estimated
voluwe
the volume
esthnated the
of.
of.

I'll ,,

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEWACE: And when --

13
13

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH:

,,
,,
-- with that,
I move that
that, Judge,
Judge, I

14
14

15

that answer be stricken
stricken on the basis that
that he referred to

15
15

16

There's nothing in
it specifically
in
conpost. There's
specifically as being compost.
in fact,
this record to demonstrate that that is,
what he
fact, what
is, in

it

16
16

There's been no foundation
saw in
in those
windrows. There's
foundation of any
those windrows.
there's been no showing
wasn't, in
in fact,
showing that
tests,
that it wasn't,
fact,
tests, there's

18
18
19
19

4* when you estimated
was
weight of -was -esthnated the height and weight

soil or dirt
dirt as
District Court has
has before
as the a Fourth District
declared it to be.
be.

20

height and width of the
windrows piles
piles on the Smith
the windrows

21
21

property,
observation?
pmoperty, was that based on your visual observation?
A.
Yes,
A.
was.
Yes, it was.

13

Q.
Q.

14

17

17
17

I'm
So,
Mr. Smith,
I suppose,
in part I'm
Smith, in
suppose, Mr.
So, I'll -- I
I'm
sustaining your objection.
strike his
objection. I'm not going to strike
won't admit it for
I simply
use of that
for proof that
word. I
that word.
shnply won't

it

it

it was,
in fact,
his earlier testimony
despite his
compost, despite
fact, compost,
was, in
testhnmmy
to that
regani
that regard.
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

it

it

All right.
THE COURT:
right.
COURT: All

,,
Well --

22
22

it

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: His attempt to categorize
categorize it as
compost
this volumetric measurement
is both
measurement concept is
boﬂn
compost by this
it's speculation
without
therefore it's
without foundation,
speculation and
foundation, and therefore

Q.
Q.

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEE4WH11KE: So,
2013,
29, 2013,
So, on March 29,

,,

it

24
24

And was
things? I'm
was that
that also based on other things?
specifically talking about the height and width of the
the

25

windrows
windrows piles.
piles.

23

Q.
Q.
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1

A.
A.

2
3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

Q.
Q.

241
241
II guess II don't understand your question.
question.
W was -W was it
I'm just
I'm
just trying to say,
say, did --

it

based on anything other than your visual observation?
observation?
A.
No.
A.
No.

2
2
33
44

it

Q.
Q.

11

Okay.
volume, it
then, you estimated the volume,
Okay. And then,
7
sounds,
is that correct
correct -the length;
length; is
sounds, the

55
66

present?
present?
A.
A.

77

Q.
Q.

99

7

A.
A.

8

Q.
Q.

Correct.
Correct.
W of the piles?
-piles?

10

A.
A.

And you did that
Earth?
that using Google Earth?
Correct.
Correct.

10
10

11

Q.
Q.

And how did you go about
about determining the

11
11

12

length?
length?
A.
A.

9

88

12
12

There's a tool on Google Earth that
that allows
in feet,
you to measure distances in
miles, yards.
meters, miles,
feet, meters,
yards.
So,
feet measurement feature
tool.
feature on that tool.
we used the feet
So, we

13
13

in
Is
Is that a feature
feature that
that you use frequently
frequently in
your work at DEQ
to
measure
volume
of
solid
waste?
solid waste?
measure volume
DEQ
A.
Well,
measure
A.
feature to measure
Well, we use
use that
that feature

16
16

distance.
distance. And then,
we use the distance
distance as a way to get
then, we
volume.
volume.

19
19
21
21

23

Q.
Okay.
volume
estimate the volume
Okay. And what did you estimate
Q.
of material
in the windrows
windrows to be on the Smith property
material in
in connection with Mr.
Mr. Gibson's composting operations
operations on

24

2013?
March 29,
29, 2013?

24
24

25

A.
A.

13
14
15
16
17
I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘
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18
19
20
21
22

Q.
Q.

We
We estimated that
that the
the volume on the property

243
issue
solid waste.
issue of solid
waste. He's defined this to be nothing
other than plant
plant or crop residue.
residue. He's referred to it as

242
242
was
was over 600
600 cubic yards.
yards.
Q.
And have
volume of the
have you estimated the volume
Q.
windrow material
in connection with
material on the
the Smith property in
W
Gibson's composting operations
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
operations through today
toda --

14
14

15
15
17
17
18
18
20
22
22
23
25

No.
No.

Okay.
have you
observations, have
Okay. Based on your observations,
done
determine whether or not the volume
done anything to determine
volume
remains
2017?
terrains over 600
600 cubic yards as of August 14,
14, 2017?
A.
Based on our initial
initial estimation,
A.
estimation, and then the
addition of other windrows,
is
windrows, it would appear that it is

it

it

still
still over 600
600 cubic yards.
yards.
W your site
Q.
Okay.
vit -visit on
site visit
Okay. After your vit
Q.
make any conclusions
conclusions about
March 29,
about
2013, did you make
29, 2013,
whether or not the material
in the windrows
material in
windrows on the Smith
W solid
property constituted solid
is
solid -solid waste,
as that
that is
waste, as
defined under the Solid Waste
Waste Management
Rules?
Management Rules?
W
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: Judge
Judge -THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes.
Yes.
W I'm going to object
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: -object to any
opinion relative
solid waste
without
relative to the definition of solid
waste without
W
There's no -reference to the IDAPA
IDAPA rules.
rules. There's
THE COURT:
Sustained.
COURT: Sustained.
W indication that
W crop
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: -that plant -and/or plant
residue
is
specifically
exempt
from
the
is
plant residue
specifically exempt from

2
2

244
244
Okay.
Okay. Did you make any conclusion after your
site visit
visit on March 29,
not
as to whether or not
2013, as
29, 2013,

33

Gibson's operations
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
operations were a processing facility,
as
facility, as

4

grass clippings,
clippings, or straw,
leaves.
straw, or leaves.
We're kind
THE
THE COURT:
kind of getting into
COURT: Okay.
Okay. We're

44

5

closing argument
again.
argument again.

55

that term is defined under the Solid Waste
Waste Management
Management
Rules?
Rules?

1
2
3

it

Ms.
for
Ms. Yee,
Yee, could you rephrase the question for

6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7

me?
me?

8
9
10
11

YEEiWAIlACE: Yes.
MS.
Yes.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
make any
YEEWACE: So,
So, did you make
conclusions
conclusions about
Waste
about whether or not the
the Solid Waste
W
Management Rules applied to Mr.
Mr. Gibson's operations
Management
operations -Q.
Q.

12

A.
A.

13

Q.
Q

14

A.
A.

15

Q.
Q.

16
17

A.
A

11

Q.
Q.

66

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

77

Q.
Q.

88

A.
A.

And what
conclusion?
what was your conclusion?
That it was a processing facility
facility as defined

99
10
10
11
11

it

under the Solid Waste
Management Rules.
Waste Management
Rules.
Q.
And what
on?
what did you base
base that
that on?
Q.
A.
Based on the
A.
processing
the definition of processing
in the Rules.
facility
facility in
Rules.
Q.
And what
Mr. Gibson's operations
led
what about Mr.
operations led
Q.

Yes.
Yes.
W on the Smith property in 2013?
-2013?
Yes.
Yes.

12
12

Okay.
conclusions?
Okay. And what was your conclusions?
That the
Management Rules
Waste Management
Rules did
the Solid Waste

15
15

you to the
conclusion that it was
processing facility?
the conclusion
was a processing
facility?
A.
That he was using biological
A.
biological decomposition to

16
16

manage
manage

apply.
apply.

13
13
14
14

17
17

it

solid
refuse.
for re-use.
solid waste for
Q.
Q.

And how could you tell
tell he was
was doing that on

I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘

wmHowmqmmmHo

18
19
20
21

Okay.
conclusions about
Okay. And did you make any conclusions
W on the Smith
whether or not the material on Mr.
Mr. Gib's --

18
18

property in
Mr. Gibson's operations
in connection with Mr.
operations were,
were,
in fact,
solid
waste?
waste?
fact,

20

Q.
Q.

19
19
21
21

22

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

22
22

23

Q.
Q.

And what
on?
what did you
base that
that on?
you base

23

24

A.
A.

That there was grass
grass and leaves
leaves on the

24
24

25

property.
property.

25

2013?
March 29,
29, 2013?

A.
A.

in
By taking grass clippings that
that are
are high in

nitrogen and leaves
in carbon,
leaves that
that are high in
carbon, mixing them
into a pile
pile and allowing decomposition to occur.
occur.
Q.
Q.

Okay.
conclusions about
Okay. Did you make any conclusions

whether or not Mr.
Mr. Gibson was
was composting on
March 29,
2013, on the Smith property?
property?
29, 2013,
A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

* (208)
28777690
Sue Heronemus,
Heronemus, RPR,
RPR, CRS *
(208) 287-7690

000986

CVOC7201570354O Idaho
Environmental Quality vs.
CVOC-2015-03540
Idaho Dept of Environmental
vs. David R.Gibson,
R.Gibson, et al

273
1
2

Idaho Statute Title 39,
1?
39, Chapter 1?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

55

A
A.

Yes.
Yes.

66

All inspections
investigations conducted
inspections and investigations
in
under the authority of this chapter shall
shall be performed in

Q.
Q.

And that
relates to
that particular statute
statute relates

77

conformity
prohibitions against
the prohibitions
against unreasonable
unreasonable
confonnity with the

88

searches and seizures
Amendment
in the Fourth Anendnent
seizures contained in
to the Constitution of the
and
Section
17,
the United States
States
17,

44

it

inspections,
not?
inspections, does it not?
A.
Correct.
A.
Correct.
Q.
Q.

99

Now,
Btuxﬂn 29,
tell me,
call
2013, did you call
Now, tell
NE, on March
29, 2013,

10
10

11

up David Gibson to ask for his permission
pennission to go out to

11
11

12

the premises?
premises?

12
12

13

A.
A.

No.
No.

14

Q.
Q.

So,
fair to say
So, it would be fair
say that you did not

15

13
13

it

have
Mr. Gibson's consent?
have Mr.
consent?

16

A.
A.

NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

14
14

15
15

Correct.
Correct.

16
16
17
17

18

All right.
right. Now,
eliminate consent,
consent,
Now, once we eliminate
Dean,
warrant, does
statute says
dues
team, that statute
says you have to have a warrant,

19

it not?
not?

it

19
19

17
wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

20
21
22
23
24
25

if ,, if

You're very aware
You're
aware of it,
it, aren't you?
you?

woodmanybwmw

10

I want
Now,
want to read to you the statute,
Now, I
statute,

Q.
Q.

5

9

Q.
Q.

39-108.2,
me if -- if
I want
397108.2, subpart
want you to tell
tell HE
suhyart 3,
3, and I
I've read it correctly.
I've
correctly.

A.
A.

4

8

Yes.
Yes.

33

Q.
Q

7

2
2

A.
A.

And are
familiar with 39-108.2(C)?
397108.2(C)?
are you familiar
W I'm aware
I'm -I'm
it.
aware of it.

3

6

274
274

11

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

it

Article 11 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.
Idaho.
Do you remember
renEnker those words in the
the statute?
statute?
A.
A.

It
shall not under
It goes
goes on to say,
say, the State shall
the authority granted by this chapter conduct warrantless
warrantiess
searches
in the absence
private property in
searches of private
absence of either
consent
from the property owner or exigent
exigent circumstances.
consent from
circumstances.
Have
I
read
that
correctly?
I
Have
correctly?

18
18

A.
A.

in your possession
Now,
have in
possession on
Now, did you have
March 29,
Nbrch
warrant?
2013, a warrant?
29, 2013,

21
21

22
22

A.
A.

No.
No.

23

Q.
Q.

But
But absent
consent
fact you had neither consent
absent the fact

24
24

nor a warrant,
warrant, you undertook to go on to the property?
property?

II would have
have to review that.
that.
MR.
Let's have
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
have him review that.
that.

20
20

Q.
Q.

Yes.
Yes.

Q.
Q.

Q.
Q.

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: What I'm going to hand to you,
you,

Dean,
is a copy of the Idaho
Idaho Statute 39-108.2(C),
397108.2(C), and
Dean, is
I'll have
have you review its
have
its content to make sure
sure that
that II have

I'll

not misspoken
my citation of the
nﬁsspoken as to my
the contents
contents of that
warrant
warrant requirement.
requirewent.

25

275
(Document
(Docuwent provided to the witness.)
witness.)

1
2

2
2

3
4
5
woodmanybmmw

6
7
8
9
10

276
11

Q.
Q.

THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes.
Yes.

33

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
me that I
I
SMITH: Do you
you concur with me

44

it

have
have read it accurately?
accurately?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

55

All right.
All
me understand why you
right. Now,
Now, help me
ya;
would choose
choose to go on to this property to conduct an

77

66

Q.
Q.

it

inspection knowing
knowing it was
tell me
NE
warrantiess search;
was a warrantless
search; tell
why?
why?

99
10
10
11
11

12
13

representative
pennission to
repmesentative of the facility to ask them permission

13
13

14

enter the property.
property.
I
Q.
Let me have
have that
that document
document back,
back, if I
Q.

14
14

15
16

might, please.
please.
night,

16
16

NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

A.
A.

if

17

No.
No.

Q.
Q.

In fact,
In
were there as a representative
repmesentative
fact, you were

of the State
were you not?
not?
State of Idaho,
Idaho, were
A.
Correct.
A.
Correct.
And this
shall not
this statute
not
statute says
State shall
says the State
under the authority granted by this chapter conduct
conduct
warrantless
private property.
warrantiess searches
searches of private
property.
Q.
Q.

Now,
Now, being familiar with that,
that, why did you

88

When we
we arrived at the property,
there was
property, there
the open sign.
sign. And we were
were attempting
attempting to contact
contact a

11

A.
A.

12
12

15
15
17
17

then go on to the property when you know
know that
that you were a
representative
without
repmesentative of the State and you cannot
cannot go on without
a warrant?
warrant?
A.
A.

in our inspections,
As a typical
process in
inspections, when
typical process

we visit
will enter the premise
visit a business,
we will
premise to try and
business, we
contact
inspect
contact a facility
facility owner to ask for permission to inspect
the facility.
facility.
Q.
Q.

You saw
saw a phone number,
the
nuwker, did you not,
not, at the

signage?
siguxﬁ?

wawmwowmqmwawmwo

(Document
Mr. Smith.)
(Docuwent returned to Mr.
Smith.)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.
Q.

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
me, Dean,
SMITH: Now,
tell HE,
were you
team, were
Now, tell

there with a load
clippings or leaves
leaves to
load of grass
grass clippings
deposit?
deposit?
A.
A.
Q.
Q.

No,
I was
was not.
not.
No, I
Were you there
more intelligent
intelligent
there as one
one of the HIKE

lawn care individuals
sign referred to?
individuals the sign
to?

18
18

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

19
19

Q.
Q.

And that
nuwker -- did you take the
that phone number

20
20
21
21
22
22

23
24
24

25

,,

,,

,,
it

chance -- by -- by chance
call it to get permission?
pennission?
chance to call
A.
No.
A.
No.
Q.
Q.

So,
me, Dean,
that you
team, that
So, would you agree with HE,

went
went on to this
this property without a warrant,
warrant, without
permission?
permission?
A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.
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THE COURT:
right. Go
COURT: All right.
Go ahead.
ahead.

1

289

2

Q.
Q.

3

with Mr.
Mr. Gibson?
Gibson?

4

A.
A.

II did not.
not.

44

5

Q.
Q.

55

6

A.
A.

Only Jack did?
did?
Correct.
Correct.

\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Did you ever have
have a meeting

the meeting?
meeting?
A.
Both Jack and II do do inspections.
A.
inspections.

77
88

if

it

And in
in those
indicate that
those minutes,
minutes, does
does it indicate

Jack told David that
is only an odor issue?
issue?
that this is
W
don't
A.
I
-no.
I
don't
believe
so.
I
I
A.
no.
believe so.
Q.
Q.

Environmental
Environmental Quality,
Quality, that you claim received a
complaint,
that you claim you went out to make
make an
complaint, that

13
13
14
14

15
15
17
17
18
18

20

I'm going to object to the
MS.
YEEiWAIlACE: I'm
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
W and as to relevance.
form of the
relevance.
the question,
question, and -I'm not sure II understand the
THE COURT:
COURT: I'm
the
W
question,
question, and I'll --

20

I'll

I'll

W
MR.
MR. SMITH:
right. I'll -SMITH: All right.
W
W
THE
-sustain
the
objection
-THE COURT:
COURT:

24
25

it

12
12

19
19

23

investigation and an inspection,
went
inspection, that
that you claim you went
for that purpose.
purpose.

I want
Now,
want you to comment,
Now, I
comment, was there an odor
issue
operation?
issue on the
the Gibson operation?
W
THE COURT:
Mr. Smith -COURT: Mr.
W
YEEiWAIlACE: Your Honor
MS.
Homo -MS. YEE-WALLACE:
W
7
THE
THE COURT:
COURT: -- are you
you -W
he's -YEEiWAIlACE: -- he's
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

*

21
21

22
22
23

if

W asking if he smelled something
THE COURT:
something
COURT: -W whatever
in March?
on March -March?
whatever the
the date
date was in

MR.
MR. SMITH:
We can certainly start
SMITH: We
start with that,
that,

24
24
25

He's talking about I
Your Honor.
I went
Honor. He's
went out
out there
there because
because

291
291
1

of an odor.
odor.

2

W I'll simply
THE COURT:
Mr. Smith,
COURT: Mr.
Smith, I'll -simply
ask you to ask precise
precise questions,
questions, not a lengthy
explanation of why you want him to answer something.
scmething.

2
2

Just ask him,
smell something on a particular
him, did he smell
date.
date.

55

3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Q.
Q.

II did smell
smell an odor,
odor, yes.
yes.
Did that
issue to the Department of
that become
become an issue
Environmental
Environmental Quality?
Quality?

20

33
44
66
77
99

A.
A.

10
10
11
11
12
12

A.
A.

No.
No.

13
13

Q.
Q.

Because you found
found no violation of any odor;
odor;

14
14

fair
fair enough?
enough?
A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

Q.
Q.

Now that,
should have brought
brought an end to
that, Dean,
Dean, should

it

the investigation,
should it not have?
investigation, should
have?
A.
No.
A.
No.
Q.
Q.

i

17
17

20

23
24

observed.
observed.

24
24

25

Q.
Q.

22

Now,
you've been so
honest with
so honest
Now, Dean,
Dean, because you've

object.
for a legal
conclusion.
legal conclusion.
object. He's asking for
THE COURT:
Sustained.
COURT: Sustained.
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: And so,
that you have
so, being that
testified as you have,
consent
relative to no consent
honestly, relative
have, honestly,
I
and no warrant,
wrantless search,
warrant, and you conducted a warrantless
search, I
am,
strike
at this
this time,
Court to strike
time, going to move this Court
am, at
everything you said relative
relative to that
that unlawful,
unlawful,
warrantless
2013.
warrantiess search
search you conducted on March 29,
29, 2013.
I've
And II want that objection
raised and
objection
that motion to strike
for the Court to make
strike on the
the record for

19
19

it

referring to is
is subject
suppression?
subject to suppression?
I'm going to
YEEiWAIlACE: Your Honor,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I'm

a determination.
determination.
THE COURT:
Mr. Smith,
COURT: Well,
that
Well, Mr.
Smith, if you had that
type
motion, you needed to raise
now.
raise that
that before now.
type of a motion,

21
21

A.
A.

it's a warrantless
in essence
did you have
wrantless
essence it's
have a warrant,
warrant, in
search,
may be
found that you may
that means
means everything you found
search, that

16
16

When we
we do an -- an inspection,
inspection, it may
may be in
regards
site or when we
regards to one issue,
we get
get on site
issue, but when we
do the
violations that are
the inspection,
there may
inspection, there
may be other violations

21

292
292
earlier and told me
me that you had neither consent nor

15
15

18
18

And tell
tell us why not.
not.

me
me

88

Q.
Q.

wmHowmqmmmHo

19

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: How about
smell
about that,
that, did you smell

any odor out there that would be
for the
issue for
be an issue
Department of Environmental
Environmental Quality?
Quality?

I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘

18

11

I'll I'll

let's try to comment
Well,
it.
comment on it.
Well, let's
The reason II want
from you is
is
comment on it from
want a comment

you are
are with the State of Idaho,
the Department
Idaho, the
Department of

didn't it?
it?

22

Q.
Q.

16
16

Somewhere
Somewhere in the process,
the odor got lost,
process, the
lost,

All right.
All
It was not addressed because
right. It

11
11

19
21

Q.
Q.

isn't that true?
there was no odor,
true?
odor, Dean,
Dean, isn't
W II can't
can't comment
A.
II -A.
ccmment on that.
that.

10
10

Q.
Well,
minutes of
know if there are
Well, do you know
are any minutes
Q.
the meetings
Mr. Gibson?
meetings that Jack had with Mr.
Gibson?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

wmHowmqmmmHo

it

99
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18

Q.
BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: In this investigation,
investigation, the
Q.
issue
not?
issue of odor got completely
eliminated, did it not?
ccmpletely eliminated,
A.
It
A.
It was not addressed,
no.
addressed, no.

66

So,
individual that
that does the
So, you're the individual
inspection and the investigation,
tell the
investigation, you tell
the person to
don't
in
come and meet with you,
but
yet
you
don't
participate
in
you,
Q.
Q.

Q.
Q.

2
2
33

290

W rephrase it.
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: -it.
W
THE COURT:
form.
COURT: -- as to form.

11

if

I'm not
not going to strike
strike the testimony on this basis.
basis.
W
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Then I'll --

I'll

THE
THE COURT:
COURT: Go
Go ahead.
ahead.
W
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: -- then I'll inquire
inquire further
further on,
on,

I'll

22
22

23
25

Judge.
Judge. Thank you on that.
that.
Q.
Q.

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Dean,
Dean, did you ever notify

in any writing that
anyone in
wrantless
that you conducted a warrantless
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373
373

,,

374
374

1

Q.
Q.

-- on Google
Earth?
Google Earth?

11

2

A.
A.

Correct.
Correct.

2
2

3

Q.
Q.

33

A.
A.

And you can't give me
me the date?
date?
II do not
renanber the date
not remember
that was on there,
date that
there,

Q.
Q.

All right.
All
right. Well,
Well, when you say
got
say you got

4
5

no.
no.

44

dirt?
dirt?
A.
A.

7
8
9

600
what is
is that 600
600 cubic yards,
600 cubic yards?
least, what
yards?
yards, at least,
that's in the
A.
It
A.
It would be
the compost
be material that's
rows,
deconposed.
rows, being composted or being biologically decomposed.

55

A.
A.

66

Q.
Q.

10

Q.
Q.

11

A.
A.

12
13
14

Now,
that?
Now, how do you know that?
When we
we went
went to the site,
site, on the road we

77
88
99
10
10

could see rows that
in variation
variation stages
were in
that were
stages of
decomposition.
decomposition.
Q.
Did you take
samples?
take any samples?
Q.

12
12

that particular
row?
particular row?

13
13
14
14

No.
No.

15
15

16

Q.
Q.
A.
A.

Did you conduct any form of any test?
test?
No.
No.

16
16

17

17
17

Q.
Can you state
that
state there today,
oath, that
Q.
today» under oath,
4* what
this -in fact,
fron the road,
what you saw,
ItEKL in
fact,
saw, as you say
say from

18
18

19
20

was
soil or dirt?
dirt?
was only soil

20
20

18

A.
Well,
A.
grass and
Well, there was one row that had grass
leaves that
in one end of the
were being combined
canbined in
the row.
ram
that were
And there were other rows that
there was partially
that there
decomposed leaves
leaves and grass.
grass
kind of
Q.
And did you take any tests
tests of any kind
Q.

A.
A.

wammwogoooqmwpwmwo

II could see
leaves.
grass and leaves.
see grass
Where did you see
leaves?
see grass and leaves?

11
11

15
NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

,,

Okay.
my question,
question, how
Okay. Then -- then we go to my
do you know
know that?
that?

woodmanybwmw

6

Yes.
Yes.

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

No.
No.

So,
here today and testify under
sit here
So, as you sit
oath,
the absence of any tests,
able to say,
oath, are you able
tests,
say, in the
that there was 600
grass and leaves,
600 yards
leaves, as opposed
yards of grass
to soil
soil or dirt?
dirt?
Q.
Q.

A.
A.

I saw,
Based on what
what I
saw, yes.
yes.

21

A.
A.

Can you repeat the question?
question?

21
21

it's your opinion.
So,
opinion.
So, it's
Based on my
13 years of experience
inspecting
experience inspecting
my 13
composting
management
facilities and other solid
solid waste
composting facilities
waste nanagewent

22

Q.
Q.

Yes.
Yes.

22
22

facilities,
facilities, yes.
yes.

19
19

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

It's that
It's
that same
sane 13 years of experience that
that we

23

24

As you sit
here today,
sit here
oath,
today» testifying under oath,
can you say
saw from the road,
that anything
anything you saw
ItEKL that
say that

24
24

don't have
have a written complaint,
inspection
conplaint, or a written inspection

25

observed rows,
were anything other than soil
soil or
that they were
rows, that

25

report,
awareness of the
the Google
Google Earth imagery,
report, or your awareness
hnagerm

23

1
2

,,

3
4

Q.
Q.

,,

BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
fair
SMITH: -- would that
that be a fair

statement?
statanent?

I'll

woodmanybmmw

7

of the
the question.
question.
compound.
compound.

9
10
11
12

It's been asked and answered;
it's also
It's
answered; it's

it's argumentative.
THE COURT:
arguwentative.
COURT: And it's

8

11
2
2

33
44

4* I'll object to the form
YEEiWAllACE: -MS.
fonn
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

5
6

375
375

,,

the year that you used to make this analysis -I'm going to object -YEEiWAllACE: I'm
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

Sustained.
Sustained.
Q.
BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Now,
Phrch 29,
were
2013, were
Now, on March
29, 2013,
Q.
you able
the color of some
able to describe
describe the
sane of that
that substance
substance
to be that
dirt or soil?
soil?
that of the color of dirt

55

Q.
Q.

376
376
Did you go to speak
Mr. Gibson,
speak to Mr.
Gibson, to get his
opinion on quantities?
quantities?
Q.
Q.

,, well,
A.
When
when we met with him -Mr. Gantz
A.
Gantz
well, when Mr.
met with him later,
net
that.
later, II believe they discussed that.
weren't there?
Q.
But
But you weren't
there?
Q.

66

A.
A.

77

Q.
Q.

88
99
10
10

No,
I was
was not.
not.
No, I
Now,
remEmter last week that we had
Now, do you remember

in your direct
some discussion
direct testimony,
discussion by you,
about a
testinony, about
you, in
publication
publication you put together concerning a guidance
guidance on
composting?
composting?

11
11

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

12
12

Q.
Q.

all since
Have
Have you reviewed that
since it was
was
that at
at all

it

A.
A.

The term
tern soil
soil is
is pretty broad,
broad, and it -colors can vary.
vary.

it ,,

13
13
14
14

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

15

Q.
Q.

Do you want me
me to rephrase
rephrase the question?
question?

15
15

Q.
Q.

Have
all relative
Have you reviewed that
relative to any
that at
at all

16

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

16
16

13
14

NMNNNNb—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘b—‘H

17
wawmwowmqmwawmwo

18
19

Q.
When you were
Nbrch 29,
were out there on March
2013,
29, 2013,
Q.
did you see
material, substances,
the color of
that had the
see naterial,
substances, that
dirt
dirt or soil?
soil?

17
17

published?
published?

aspect of this case?
case?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

18
18
19
19

it

Q.
Q.

Do you happen to have a copy of it with you

in my
II -- II may
may in
briefcase.
my briefcase.
You've got a copy in
in your briefcase.
briefcase. All

today?
today?

20

A.
A.

The color?
color? Yes.
Yes.

20
20

A.
A.

21

Q.
Q.

Now,
texture
Now, did you go and conduct any texture

21
21

Q.
Q.

,,

,,

23

A.
A.

No.
No.

23

24

Q.
Q.

Did you go and touch any of the
material?
the naterial?

24
24

right.
me
right. Let
well. Let me
here as well.
Let me -- I've got a copy here
first
first show
show it to your Counsel,
sure that
that they can
Counsel, to make sure
I'nxgoing
appreciate
going to show you.
what I'm
appmeciate what
ymj

25

A.
A.

No.
No.

25

MR.
Then I'll ask that
MR. SMITH:
SMETH:
that we hand to the

22

tests?
tests?

22
22

it

I'll
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401
401
YEEiWAIlACE: I
I can rephrase the
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
the

1
2

question.
question.

3
4

Q.
Q.

11
2
2

THE
THE COURT:
COURT: Go
Go ahead.
ahead.

33

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEWACE: Why
Why did you go on to

44

5

Gibson's property on March 29,
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
2013?
29, 2013?

55

6

MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: Objection,
Objection, Judge;
Judge; asked and
answered in
in direct examination.
examination.
W I'll sustain that.
That's been -THE
THE COURT:
COURT: That's
that.
W he's
it's been -he's explained why he went there on
I think it's
I

66

\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8

I'll

402
402
a sign
24/7. There
There was
sign on the building that said
said open 24/7.
was no
gate,
alone a locked gate.
gate.
gate, let alone
Q.
And from
frcm 2013
2013 through the present,
present, did
Q.
VHS Properties,
siting
VHS
Properties, LLC ever comply
ccmply with the siting
requirements
II facilities
facilities under the Solid
requirements under Tier II
Waste
Management Rules?
Waste Management
@193?

77

A.
A.

88

Q.
Q.

No.
No.

10

multiple occasions.
occasions.

10
10

And from
frcm 2013
2013 through the present,
present, has
VHS
Properties,
LLC
ever
complied
with
the
Operating
VHS Properties,
the operating
requirements for
II facility under the
for a Tier II
Waste
the Solid Waste

11

YEEWACE: Was
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Was there anything about
Gibson's facility
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
facility on March 29,
that contributed
2013, that
29, 2013,

11
11

Management Rules?
Rules?
Management

13
13

object.
in direct
object. This has
has been asked and answered in
direct

14

to why you
went on the property?
property?
you went
I object once
MR.
MR. SMITH:
for
SMITH: To which I
once again for

14
14

15

the same
reason.
same reason.

15
15

examination,
crossiexamination.
examination, and not covered in my
my cross-examination.
THE COURT:
COURT: Well,
Well, if it was
was asked and

9

12
13

Q.
Q.

99

16

YEEiWAIlACE: That
MS.
not been
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
That question has
has not

16
16

17

It's in
answered or asked.
in direct rebuttal,
asked. It's
Honor,
rebuttal, Your Honor,
to testimony elicited on cross.
cross.

17
17

I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘

wmHowmqmmmHo

18

I'll

19
20

THE COURT:
give you some
COURT: I'll give
scme leeway,
leeway,
Ms. Wallace.
Wallace.
Ms.

21

I'm going to
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
Judge, to which I'm

12
12

18
18

if it

I'll

19
19

Overruled.
Overruled.
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Yes.
Yes.

20

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEWACE: And tell
tell me
me what that

22
22

21
21

it

in
answered on direct,
chance to cover it in
direct, you had a chance
don't
cross.
I
don't
recall
the
question.
I'll
overrule
I
recall the question.
overrule the
cross.
the
objection.
objection.
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: No.
No.
Q.
Q.

BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEWACE: On
crossiexamination,
On cross-examination,
you indicated
indicated that Google
technicpes
Google Earth was one of the
the techniques

23

was?
was?

23

that you used after March 29,
29, 2013 to determine the
Mr. Gibson's facility;
volume of material
material on Mr.
is that
facility; is

24

A.
There was an open sign
A.
sign at
at the entrance,
entrance, with
arrows
directing
the
public
into
the
facility.
into
arrows
the facility. There was

24
24

right?
right?

22

25

Q.
Q.

403
403
What
What other techniques did you use to estimate
estimate
the volume on Mr.
Mr. Gibson's facility
2013?
facility as
as of March 29,
29, 2013?

25

A.
A.

Correct.
Correct.

i

2
2

404
404
how the
able to estimate
defendant was
volume
the defendant
was able
estimate the -- the volume
of material
Mr. Gibson's facility
material on Mr.
facility and what that

33

material was.
was.

4

We
visit and the size
We used our site
size of the
site visit
the
piles we observed to estimate
volume of material
material on
estimate the
the volume

44

W
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
Judge, now wait --

5

Gibson's facility.
Mr. Gibson's
Mr.
facility.

55

I -THE COURT:
COURT: I
W
MR.
minute.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: -- wait a minute.
W I
I recall that being as to his
THE COURT:
COURT: --

1
2
3

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

6

Q.
Q.

\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9
10

W
And did you estimate
volume -estimate the volume

66

I'm going to
MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: Please,
Please, Judge,
Judge, I'm

77

object once again.
in
This has been asked and answered in
again. This
W in the
direct,
not been addressed in the -has not
the
direct, and has
cross.
cross.

88
99
10
10

11
12

11

Q.
Q.

THE COURT:
finish the question.
cpestion.
COURT: Let her finish
YEEWACE: Did you estimate the
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

12
12

13
13

14
15

facility?
facility?

15
15

16

MR.
I object,
MR. SMITH:
It was
SMITH: To which I
mdge. It
object, Judge.
in cross;
not covered in
outside the
the scope.
cross; outside
scope.

16
16

17

14
14

17
17

I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘

wmHowmqmmmHo

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.
Q.

THE COURT:
right. Sustained.
Sustained.
COURT: All right.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
YEEWACE: Did you estimate
estimate the

18
18
19
19

volume at any time
2013?
time after 2013?
A.
Yes.
A.
Yes.

20

I object.
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: I
object. Once again,
again, not
covered in
in cross.
cross.

22
22

21
21

YEEiWAIlACE: It
in cross.
MS.
It was
cross.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
was covered in

There were
volumetrics and
were specifically
specifically questions about
about volumetrics

don't recall
use of the
in 2013.
I don't
2013. I
the Google
image in
Google earth image
any cross-examination
crossexamination about
about his testimony regarding the
the
video.
video.

11
11

volume as of August 14,
2017, the
the day that
that the video was
was
14, 2017,
taken,
Gibson's
Mt. Gibson's
volume was on Mr.
about how much volume
taken, about

13

i

23

YEEiWAIlACE: Oh,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
okay.
Oh, okay.

Q.
Q.

YEEWACE: Irrespective
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Irrespective of the

video,
estimate the volume of
video, did you,
time, estimate
you, at any other time,
material on Mr.
Gibson's property after 2013?
Mr. Gibson's
2013?
material
A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

MR.
Again, not
I object.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: To which I
object. Again,
in cross;
covered in
crossexamination.
outside the scope
cross; outside
scope of cross-examination.
W it was
YEEiWAIlACE: It
MS.
in
It -MS. YEE-WALLACE:
was covered in

it

cross,
Honor. There
There was
diswssion about
was discussion
about
cross, Your Honor.
volumetrics
Mr. Gibson estimated the volume
volumetrics and how Mr.
volume of
material
on
Mr.
Gibson's
property.
Gibson's
Mr.
material
property.
MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Now,
Now, that's a misstatement of

24
24

what
crossiexamination was.
crossiexamination
was. The cross-examination
what the cross-examination
his statement
went
went to the
issue of his
statement that
the issue
that there was
was at

25

least 600
2013 analysis
600 cubic yards,
analysis
what, the 2013
yards, based upon what,
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413
413
1

yards?
yards?

11

414
th:%4
know that
that you did not go on the premises,
we know
premises, how do we

2

A.
A

No.
No.

2
2

3

Q.
Q

33

what
what you saw was
soil and dirt?
dirt?
was merely soil
A.
Well,
I saw,
from what
A.
what I
Well, again,
again, from
saw, it appeared

4

A.
A.

What
opinion?
What is
is your opinion?
That it increased
from 2013 to 2017.
2017.
increased from

44

that those piles
piles were
were not
soil.
not soil.

5

Q.
Q

Q.
Q.

A
A.

don't know
But
much?
know by how much?
But you don't
in 2013
We
made the -- we made
We made
the estimate
made the
estinate in

55

6

66

A.
A.

\oooxlmwbmmH

it

,,

it

it

And what
what did they appear to be?
be?
in various
A Hﬁxture
mixture of grass
various
leaves in
grass and leaves

7

that it was over 600.
600.

77

stages of decomposition.
decompositimm

8

Tell
Tell me
HE what
what process
cane up with
process you used to come
in 2017
this estimation
2017 that
estination in
there was
was 10,000
that there
10,000 cubic

88

Q.
And did you put any of this
this so-called
scrcalled
Q.
in any official
observation in
official report with the Department of
Environmental
Environmental Quality?
Quality?

9
10
11
12
13
14

Q.
Q.

yards.
yards.

99
10
10

A.
A.

Taking the estimated
estinated width and height,
height,

divided by two,
length of the piles.
tines the length
piles.
two, times
Q.
And as II understand it,
it, you did not go on the
Q.
it's not based upon a measurement?
property,
measurement?
so it's
property, so

11
11

12
12
13
13
14
14

A.
A.

No.
No.

Has any aspect,
into
inquiry into
then, of this inquiry
aspect, then,
the Gibson operation,
2013 to 2017,
operation, in 2013
2017, has any of it
gotten into
into a written report?
report?
Q.
Q.

it

15

A.
A.

Correct.
Correct.

15
15

A.
A.

It
It was in the
Violatimm
the Notice of Violation.

16

Q.
Q.

It's based upon an opinion?
It's
opinion?

16
16

Q.
Q.

Other than the Notice
went
Notice of Violation that
that went

17

A.
A.

17
17

out April
April 22 of 2013,
in any written
is there
there anything in
2013, is
report?
report?

18

Q.
Q.

An estimation.
esthnation.
Based upon an opinion?
opinion?

19

A.
A.

An estimation.
estjlration.

19
19

A.
A.

Not to my
my knowledge.
knowledge.

20

Q.
Q.

20

Q.
Q.

So,
files and no documents
has no files
docuwents
DBQ has
So, DEQ

21

A.
A.

Your estimation
opinion?
is based upon your opinion?
estination is
Yes.
Yes.

21
21

concerning any aspect
investigation?
aspect of this supposed
supposed investigation?

22

Q.
Q.

It's not
It's
dhnalsional
not based upon any dimensional

22
22

23

determinations?
determinations?

23

I'm going to object to the
YEEiWAllACE: I'm
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
it's been asked and answered,
form of the
the question;
question; it's
answered, and

24

A.
A.

24
24

misstates prior testimony.
Hisstates
testhnmmw

25

Q.
Q.

I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)I\)>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘>—‘
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1
2
3
4
5
6
\oooxlmwbmmH

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

it

MR.
I don't know
Well now,
know that
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Well
that it
rmww I

25

11
2
2

416
416
and his composting
all -ounposting facility and operation,
are you all
operation, are
meaning to say
are
there are
are no documents,
are you also meaning
docunents,
say there

,,

enough II certainly understood that
records at
that he had no records
at
all.
I'll
sustain
that
objection.
all. So,
sustain
objection.
So,

33

you've got
BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
As you indicate,
SMITH: As
indicate, you've
got no
records at
in DEQ
all. Do
Do we have
have any documentation
docuwentation in
at all.
BBQ in
in writing
which you have
have either recorded or documented
docuwented in

55
77

object to that question because that misstates
misstates prior
there's zero
testimony.
zero records
recnrds about
ahcut
testinony. Now he's saying
saying there's

your estimation
estination of 10,000
10,000 cubic yards?
yards?
A.
No.
A.
No.

88

Mr. Gibson,
pmior question was
Mr.
the prior
was
Gibson, period,
period, when the

99

specifically about
estimation of cubic yards.
about his estimation
yards.
I understood this question to be
THE COURT:
COURT: I

I'll

Q.
Q.

if

44
66

I go to DEQ
So,
DEQ today and ask the DEQ
BBQ
So, if I
officials to give to me
HE to review the David Gibson

10
10

will find
find no cubic yard
composting facility
facility operation,
operation, II will
reference in any files
files they have
have --

12
12

Q.
Q.

,,

Q.
Q.

16
17

We
measure, no.
We did not measure,
no.
Now,
when
you
say
10,000
Now,
yards, and
say 10,000 cubic yards,

415
415
has.
2017 now.
We got into
into 2017
now.
has. We
THE COURT:
were broad
COURT: Your earlier questions
questions were

14
15

18
18

,,
I'm going to -MS.
YEE7WAHACE: I'm
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
,,
BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: -- is
is that a correct
correct statement?
statement?
4* I'm
I'm going to object
YEEiWAllACE: -MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
object as

11
11

records,
files that pertain to any volumetric
voluwetric
records, or files
estimates,
600 yards or 10,000
estinates, be 600
10,000 yards?
yards?
I'noing
YEEiWAllACE: Your Honor,
MS.
going to
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, I'm

specific to the
estimation.
the estimation.
YEEiWAllACE: He
MS.
Mr. Gibson
He said
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
said about
about Mr.

15
15

period.
misstates prior testimony.
That Hisstates
period. That
testhnmjw
THE
THE COURT:
COURT: Overruled.
Overruled.
I suppose
Q.
BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
me to
SMITH: And I
want HE
suppose you want
Q.

16
16

restate,
restate, don't you?
you?

13
13
14
14

If

hhn to speculate
to foundation.
all
foundation. He's asking him
speculate about
about all

17
17

A.
A.

If you would,
please.
would, please.

DEQ
may or may
may not find.
find.
officials and what
what they may
DEQ officials
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Judge,
MR.
he ought
ought to know,
know, he's
Judge, he
That's why he's here.
their man.
man. That's
here.

18
18

Q.
Q.

Okay,
I understand.
understami
Okay, and I
If II went to DEQ
the
DBQ today and asked the

he's already said
there's
THE
THE COURT:
COURT: Well,
said there's
Well, he's
no record or document
his estimation.
CDntaining his
estination. And so.
docuwsnt containing
so.

21
21

officials to produce
me the records
for HE
records concerning
produce for
I'm
David Gibson's composting operation and facility,
facility, and I'm

22
22

looking specifically
specifically to find either a 600
600 cubic yards or

23

a 10,000
will II find
find that anywhere
esthnation, will
10,000 cubic yard estimation,
in those records?
records?
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18
19
20
21
22

I'll

23
24
25

Q.
Q.

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: Well,
it.
Well, then I'll clarify it.
there's no
SMITH: When you say
BY MR.
MR. SMITH:
say there's

documents
docuwents or records whatsoever regarding David Gibson

If

19
19
20

24
24

25

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.
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445
445

,,

446
446

1

THE COURT:
COURT: How can it cover --

11

2

W
THE WITNESS:
kind of -WITNESS: Well,
Well, we got
got kind
W
THE
THE COURT:
COURT: -- October through September of
the same
same year?
year?
YEEiWALlACI-D: Oh,
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
sorry.
Oh, sorry.

2
2

3
4
5
woodmanybwmw

it

44
55

A.
A.

Yes.
Yes.

88

9

Q.
Q.

So,
is the 2013 data?
this is
data?
So, this
7
'13
This
This -- this
this is
is '13 data,
data, September would be

99

A.
A.

12

Q.
Q.

13

A.
A.

14

yes.
yes.

15

THE COURT:
COURT: Thank you.
you.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.
A.

Q.
Q.
A.
A.

describing
describing as Gibson's facility?
facility?

can notice on there.
detail crews,
have grade
there. We
We have
grade crews,
crews, detail
crews,
it's a combined summary
sweeper crews.
crews. And it's
summary of the
W of what
year-end
what they had done
done through the
report of -yearﬁnd report
year.
year.

20
20

Q.
Does
Exhibit 21.9
21.9 reflect the
volume of
Does Exhibit
the volume
Q.
leaves
were
taken
out
to
Mr.
Gibson's
facility
Gibson's
MC.
leaves that
facility by
that were

24
24

18
18
19
19
21
21

22
22
23
25

Q.
Q.

A.
A.

11

2
3

YEEiWALlACE: 10.
MS.
10.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:

33

4

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: 10;
one.
10; the next one.
YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Do you recognize

44

Q.
Q.

woodmanybmmw

6

Plaintiff's Exhibit
Plaintiff's
Exhibit 21.10.
21.10.

2
2

55

that's correct.
Yes;
correct.
Yes; that's

Okay.
And, again,
again, this 5,003
5,003 cubic yards of
Okay. And,
Gibson's facility
MC. Gibson's
leaves that
were taken to Mr.
that were
facility in 2013,
2013,
Q.
Q.

that was
was obtained from the data that
that the crews
crews reported
to the
chief?
the crew chief?
A.
A.

that's correct.
Yes;
correct.
Yes; that's

Okay.
have
5,003 cubic yards
Okay. And that 5,003
yards would have
reflected the total
volume yards
total volume
that Ada County hauled
yards that
Gibson's facility?
to Mr.
Mr. Gibson's
facility?
Q.
Q.

A.
A.

447
447
Okay.
Exhibit 21.10,
please.
21.10, please.
then, Exhibit
Okay. And then,
21 point what?
MR. SMITH:
MR.
what?
SMITH: 21

5

I am.
Yes,
am.
Yes, I

15
15
17
17

Q.
Q.

Okay.
looking at
at page
page two of the
Okay. And are you looking

Exhibit
Exhibit 21.9?
21.9?
Okay.
And, again,
again, the reference to
Okay. And,
Pleasant
is referring to what
Pleasant Valley,
that is
what we've been
Valley, that

for example,
various sections
sections are for this
example, the -- the various
report.
report.
W it's
It's -it's several
A.
Okay.
A.
several crews that you
Okay. It's

1

it

I've got to find it on the
Okay.
dowment
the document
Okay. I've

14
14

13
13

16
16

Q.
Q.
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12
12

YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
And so,
tell us what,
what,
so, tell

16
17

10
10
11
11

I see.
Oh,
see.
Oh, I
W fiscal
-fiscal year for September through 2013,
2013,

i

Okay.
second page,
we had
Okay. So,
So, on the second
page, we
5,003 cubic yards of leaves
leaves that
were hauled to
that were
Pleasant
Pleasant Valley.
Valley.

would be?
be?

8

,,

That's correct.
That's
correct.

Q.
And can you tell
tell us what that volume
volume was,
was, and
Q.
W where
that's found
how you -where -- where
where that's
found on this document?
document?

77

7

like --

A.
A.

first
first here.
here.

Q.
Q.

11

in 2013?
2013?

66

6

10

YEEJWALLACE:
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
For previous
previous year it

33

ACHD
ACHD

That's correct.
That's
correct.

448
448
YEEiWALlACI-D: Your Honor,
MS.
move
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Honor, we would move
for the
21.10.
the admission of 21.10.
THE COURT:
Mr. Smith?
COURT: Mr.
Smith?

If

MR.
I might
MR. SMITH:
might ask,
SMITH: If I
ask, Judge,
Judge, a question
in aid of an objection?
objection?

66

THE COURT:
COURT: Go
Go ahead.
ahead.

7

A.
A.

I do.
Yes,
do.
Yes, I

77

MR. SMITH:
MR.
SMITH: Thank you.
you.

8

Q.
Q.

What
is it?
it?
What is

88

9

A.
A.

It's our annual
It's
for fiscal
fiscal
infomtion for
annual report
report information

99

10

10
10

12

year 2014.
2014.
that's kept
Q.
And is
Exhibit No.
is Exhibit
10 a document
No. 10
docment that's
kept
Q.
in the ordinary course
and maintained in
course of business at

13

ACHD?
ACHD?

13
13

11

On
Exhibit 21.10,
is there any reference
reference to
On Exhibit
21.10, is
leaves in
in the year 2014
2014 delivered to Pleasant
Pleasant Valley?
Valley?
THE WITNESS:
WITNESS: Can you restate that?
that?
THE COURT:
COURT: Second line from the bottom,
bottcm,

11
11
12
12

Mr.
Mr. Smith.
Smith.

14

A.
A.

Yes,
is.
Yes, it is.

14
14

MR.
MR. SMITH:
SMITH: The Judge
question.
Judge answered my
my question.
I've
Judge,
got no objection.
objection.
Judge,

15

Q.
Q.

in the Maintenance
Is
Maintenance
Is this also kept
kept in

15
15

THE COURT:
COURT: Thank you.
you.

16
16

21.10
21.10 is
is admitted.
admitted.

16
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17

Department?
Department?
A.
A.

wawmwowmqmwawmwo

18
19
20
21
22
23

it

Q.
Q.

It's kept
It's
Maintenance Department.
Department.
kept in the Maintenance
And did you obtain this
from the ACHD
ACHD
this record from

Maintenance Department?
Maintenance
Department?
A.
A.

YEEiWALlACI-D: Okay.
MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
Okay. So,
So, we're going to

20
20

And is
21.10 a true and correct
is Exhibit
Exhibit 21.10
correct copy
ACHD'S
of the
Maintenance
from ACHD's Maintenance
document that
the document
that you obtained from
Department?
Department?

it

(Plaintiff's
21.10 admitted.)
Exhibit No.
(Plaintiff '5 Exhibit
No. 21.10
admitted.)

18
18
19
19

II sure
sure did,
did, yes.
yes.

Q.
Q.

17
17

21
21
22
22

23

24

A.
A.

Yes,
is.
Yes, it is.

24
24

25

Q.
Q.

Okay.
Okay.

25

it

if

that's okay.
go ahead and publish it on the screen,
screen, if that's
okay.
YEEJWALLACE:
Q.
BY MS.
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
So,
again, going through
So, again,
Q.

it's the Ada County Highway District
Exhibit
Exhibit 21.10,
21.10, it's
right?
annual
is that right?
annual report;
report; is
A.
A.

Yes;
correct.
Yes; that's correct.
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
)
SUPPORT DEFENDANTS'
)
MOTION TO STRIKE
)
)
TESTIMONY OF DEAN
ELHERT FOR VIOLATION
)
OF !.C. §39-108(2)(c)
)

)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has filed their response to
Defendants' motion to strike the testimony of Dean Elbert, setting forth their fundamental
assertion and underlying hypothesis, stating that Defendants' are objecting to:

"damaging eye-witness testimony about their illegal Tier II solid waste
processing facility, Defendants claim Idaho Code§ 39-108(2)(c) requires an
unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to this civil case. It
does not--chiefly because § 39-108(2)(c) was not violated and the
exclusionary rule would not apply in any event." (Response p. 1-2)
(Emphasis added)
This assertion is developed into DEQ's conclusions that further contend:
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"There is no basis for this Court to exclude from the record of this civil
proceeding Elhert's relevant, highly probative, and otherwise admissible
testimony. First, there was no violation of §39-108(2)(c) or the
constitutional prohibitions it incorporates. Second, the exclusionary rule
does not apply to this civil case. Lastly, not only is Defendants' motion
unworkably overbroad, their objection to Elbert's testimony was fatally
late. " (Response, p.3) (Emphasis added)
These assertions and conclusions set forth by the Department are of interest to all
Idaho citizens, as most assuredly, with the current attitude of the Department set forth in
their Response, there will be other unannounced occasions with warrantless entries onto
private business premises to conduct inspections, whenever this Department believes these
business activities and facilities are subject to their rules and regulations.
It is because of these unannounced and warrantless inspections we are confronted
with the issue as to the validity and legality of these inspections, each of which is being
conducted by the Department upon the apparent belief as to the "right" and their perceived
"authority" to enter upon these business premises to conduct these disputed inspections.
These very expressions within their Response to this court are very much indicative
of the "attitude" that comes out of this Department's administration, and serves to
demonstrate the pervasive nature of that very attitude towards business ventures that operate
within Idaho.
If the attitude now being advanced by this Department is to the effect they
essentially have "unlimited authority" to conduct inspections, and that they believe the very
statute (I.C. §39-108(2)(c)), which defines their powers and authority given to the
Department to conduct inspections, now does not apply to civil cases at all, then this
pervasive attitude within this Department must be given guidance for the future activity they
undertake, or let the legislature know that the Department they created by the enactment of
Title 39, Chapter I, on July I, 2000, and the legislative authority it granted to that
Department within Chapter I, is either irrelevant or otherwise unconstitutional or
unworkable in the real world, so all citizens, the Department, and the Idaho Legislature can
all be on the same footing when it comes to the exercise of this Department's legislative
authority to conduct their inspections, as it currently does not appear that the statute allows
what the Department perceives to be their authority regarding inspections, and how they
engage in their investigations under their statutory authority.
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This attitude would leave one to believe this Department and their Officials believe
they possess "unbridled authority" to go onto private property, and then conduct inspections
within and upon that private property, telling us they can go onto property when it appears
to be an open field, or appears to be in plain and open view, or that a warrantless entry is
allowed onto property when it appears to be open to the public, and most concerning of all is
their belief the establishment of the exclusionary rule does not applv in civil cases, and in
every sense of the word, this Department is telling us they have chosen to disregard the very
language within this statute (I.C. §39-108(2)(c)), despite being the only statutory basis upon
which this Department has been vested with the limited statutory authority to conduct any
inspections in the first place.
This attitude of the Department is viewed by some Idaho citizens to be pure
arrogance, but notwithstanding how the attitude is perceived by others, the judiciary must
now have the opportunity to inform the Idaho Legislature and its citizens as to what manner
the authority granted to this Department can be exercised, given what was thought to be the
statutorily created limitations placed upon the Department when conducting inspections.
In Reply to this disturbing proposition and conclusion of the Department, it becomes
incumbent for this court to recognize the Departments exists only by virtue of the statutory
enactment and the authority upon which the Department was vested, and the specific
statutory limitations that were imposed upon their authorization to engage in and conduct
any inspections of any premises (private or public).
It is undisputed that Dean Elhert is an agent of DEQ; that DEQ is the governmental
Agency created and limited by the provisions of Title 39, Chapter 1, and the inspection
conducted by Messrs. Elhert and Gantz was conducted only upon the authorization and
limited authority announced in Chapter I of Title 39, Laws of the State of Idaho. The
relevant provisions of this statutorily created "Idaho Environmental Protection and Health
Act" are reflected in the following:
39-101. Short title. Sections 39-101 through 39-130, Idaho Code, may be known and
cited as the "Idaho Environmental Protection and Health Act."
39-l02A. Legislative intent in creating department of environmental quality.
The legislature finds and declares that:
( 1) 1be creation and establishment of the department of environmental quality to protect
human health and the environment as its sole mission is in the public's interest;
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(2) That all existing, but no new rights, powers, duties, budgets, funds, contracts,
rulemaking proceedings, administrative proceedings, contested cases, civil actions, and
other matters relating to environmental protection as described in this chapter,
vested in the director of the department of health and welfare and the board of
health and welfare on January 1, 2000, shall be transferred to the board of
environmental quality, the department of environmental quality and its director as
described herein effective July 1, 2000;
39-104. Department of environmental quality-- Creation. (1) There is created
and established in the state government a department of environmental quality which
shall for the purposes of section 20, article IV, of the constitution of the state of Idallo be
an executive department of the state government. The executive and administrative
power of this department shall be vested in the director of the department who shall be
appointed and serve at the pleasure of the governor, with the advice and consent of the
senate.
39-108. Investigation -- Inspection -- Right of entry -- Violation -- Enforcement -Penalty -- Injunctions. (1) The director shall cause investigations to be made upon
receipt of information concerning an alleged violation of this act or of any rule, permit
or order promulgated thereunder, and may cause to be made such other investigations as
the qirector shall deem advisable.
(2) For the purpose of enforcing any provision of this chapter or any rule authorized in
this chapter, the director or the director's designee shall have the authority to:
(b) Enter at all reasonable times upon any private or public property, upon presentation
of appropriate credentials, for the purpose of inspecting or investigating to ascertain
possible violations of this act or of rules, permits or orders adopted and promulgated by
the director or the board;
(c) AU inspections and investigations conducted under the authority of this chapter
shall be performed in conformity with the prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United
States and section 17, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho. THE STATE
SHALL NOT, UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THIS CHAPTER,
CONDUCT WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE
ABSENCE OF EITHER CONSENT FROM THE PROPERTY OWNER OR
OCCUPIER OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES such as a public health or
environmental emergency. (All emphasis added)
This Department exists only through the above statutorily cited enactment, and
presents the only source of its limited statutory authority to conduct inspections. The
inspection conducted by agents Elhert and Gantz on March 29, 2013, could be pursued only
within that limited authority announced in I.C. §39-108(2)(c), as that statutory provision
has two very specific sentences that convey their announcements.

The first sentence declares:
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All inspections and investigations conducted under the authority of this
chapter shall be performed in conformity with the prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the fourth amendment to the
constitution of the United States and section 17, article I, of the constitution
of the state ofldaho.
The second sentence emphatically makes patently clear:

THE STATE SHALL NOT, UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED
BY
THIS CHAPTER, CONDUCT WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN THE ABSENCE OF EITHER
CONSENT FROM THE
PROPERTY OWNER OR OCCUPIER
OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
such as a public health or
environmental emergency. (All emphasis added).
Should this Court become inclined to avail itself of the opportunity to first review in
what manner statutory interpretation and legislative enactments are to be analyzed by the
courts, these Defendants provide the Court the following cases that provide the latest
expressions as to the manner in which legislative enactments are to be viewed, analyzed and
interpreted by the courts.
It may come down to the issue that this Court may come to believe this controversy

must first be analyzed in the context of ascertaining the legislative intent, and in doing so,
to review what is the intended limitation expressed within the statute, as that limitation is
expressed within the second sentence of the statute, LC. §39-108(2)(c), which specifically
limits any entry onto private property to conduct an inspection undertaken through the
Department of Environmental Quality. The standard used by the appellate courts to
analyze legislative intent and statutory interpretation is one of free review, as they view
the matter as a question of law, as most recently stated and summarized in Hoffer v.

Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 380 P.3d 681 (2016):
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
legislative intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183,
1187 (2007). "When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the
literal words of the statute .... " Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151
Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011). "If the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
given effect. . . ." Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization, !57 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke's Reg' I Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of
Comm 's of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)).
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This Court does not have the authority to modifY an unambiguous
legislative enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84
Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)). 160 Idaho at 882,380 P.3d
at 695.
See also Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (2013) which states:
" ... we are not at liberty to depart from the plain meaning of a statute for
policy reasons. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr., 151 Idaho
889, 896, 265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011). See generally John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387,2388 (2003)".
" ... If the Legislature wishes to limit the time for EFJA filings, it may do
so. But, it is not our province to ignore the relevant statues as presently
written."

The "general rule" with respect to "amendatory" acts of the legislature is that
amendments of existing statutes are presumed to change the law.

lA Sutherland

Statutory Construction § 22:30 Construction of amendatory acts - Presumption of

Change. See e.g., St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho
84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015) ("When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the
legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the
amendment." (citations omitted)).
· Another recent case is State v.Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471. 163 P.3d 1183 (2007),
involving a statutory construction to determine the intended scope of the "litigation
exception" as it relates to calling executive sessions authorized under the open
meeting law established through I. C. § 67-2345(l)(f). That court there stated:
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
legislative intent. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207. 210. 76
P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative intent is
the words of the statute itself," the interpretation of a statute must
begin with the literal words of the statute. In re Permir No. 36-7200,
121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992); accord McLean v.
Maverik Country Stores, inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759
(2006). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the Court does
not construe it but simply follows the law as written. McLean, 142
Idaho at 813, 135 P.3d at 759. The plain meaning of a statute therefore
will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or
unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump. 140
Idaho 264,266,92 P.3d 514,516 (2004). In determining its ordinary
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meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if
possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."
State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006)
(quoting In re Winton Lumber Company. 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d
664,666 (1936))." (All emphasis added).

The court went on to say:
"If the language of the statute is capable of more than one
reasonable construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch.
Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 PJd 655, 658 (2006). An
ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended
it to mean. Id. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only
the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed
interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.
Id."
The court then said:
"Ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present
differing interpretations to the court. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho
at 823-24, 828 P.2d at 852-53. If the language of the statute is reasonably
susceptible of only one interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there
is no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute. See Id. at 822-24, 828
P.2d at 851-53; Carrier, 142 Idaho at 807, 134 PJd at 658. The first step
is to examine the literal words of the statute to determine whether they
support the parties' differing interpretations."
The second sentence contained within in I.C. §39-108(2)(c) specifically restricts
entry upon private property, and allows the Department to conduct an inspection, only
upon limited circumstances, and specifically restricts entry by stating: absent any
warrant, there must have been consent from the owner, occupier, or the existence of
an exigent circumstance. Nothing else is allowed under that statutory right of entry to

conduct an inspection.
These agents chose to enter upon this private property without the procurement of
any warrant, and did so without any consent, permission, or presentation of appropriate
credentials, and there was no exigent circumstance. Without consent or the existence of an
exigent circumstance, the only way DEQ agents may enter upon private property is with the
issuance of a search warrant, issued pursuant to the requirements of the fourth
amendment to the constitution of the United States and section 17, article I, of the
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constitution of the state of Idaho, which means the warrant is to be issued upon the
presentation of probable cause.
The issuance of a search warrant is a requirement that is made within this direct

statutory limitation placed upon DEQ agents under that specific statutory language
that establishes that limitation, as the only exception allowed by statute is "consent" or
any "exigent circumstance". As the statute specifically states: "the state shall not, under
the authority granted by this chapter, conduct warrantless searches of private
propertv in the absence of either consent from the propertv owner or occupier or
exigent circumstances such as a public health or environmental emergency.
There is no dispute these agents had no consent from the property owner, or from
any occupier of the premises, as Mr. Elhert admitted that to be fact in his testimony.
Additionally, there was no implied permission to enter upon the premises, as suggested
by the Department, as such access to the property was expressly limited by the signage on
the property, identified in the photograph contained in Exhibit 17.5, and also identified in
the film footage that Mr. Elhert testified from as well.
There has been no proposition raised or factual basis shown to establish any
exigent circumstance existed, either to public health or creating an environmental
emergency, as no air quality violation can be created from composting just grass
clippings and leaves. To emphasize that fact, these agents went to the Facility only to
determine if an ODOR was emanating from the Gibson Facility. These agents went out to
this known location to determine to their satisfaction whether or not other substances
were being composted at the Gibson Facility to cause any "odor" to emanate from the
premises, purportedly based upon this unverified "comment" made to another DEQ agent
by Devin Downs.

It is nowhere found or ever suggested that any smell or odor at a grass clipping
and leaf composting facility ever created or constituted an air quality issue of a "public
health" or "environmental" emergency, so as to "bypass" the statutory obligation to

secure a search warrant before entering upon private property. The Department has
completely "shied away" from ever suggesting such an unavailing proposition to
embellish their "odor" theory in this controversy, as none could exist, and instead this
Department has chosen to advance an equally disturbing proposition that the
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exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases, when the very statutory enactment that

creates the Department of Environmental Quality has promulgated that very prohibition
in relation to any Department inspections, declaring there must be a search warrant in
the absence of consent or an exigent circumstance. What a position to advance, when

confronted with the very legislation that created the Department, and then enacted the
limiting statutory authority that required a search warrant must be obtained by the
Department, in the absence of consent or an environmental emergency, before you can go
onto private property!!!
It is important for this court to realize why this Department stayed away from ever

suggesting an "odor" created an exigent circumstance, and has instead chosen to advance
their theory of open spaces, open fields, open to the public, plain view, and that the
limitation promulgated within the enactment does not apply to civil cases, despite the
entire dialogue within I.C.§39-108 is about inspections, investigations, administrative
proceedings and civil actions, and within that context is this limiting statutory authority.
There has never been any DEQ file documenting any complaint that any air
quality violation can exist from grass clippings and leaf composting operations only. It is
to be noted that even this purported "comment" purportedly made by Devin Downs has
remained undocumented, unverified, unwritten, and non-reported, as the Department
knows no "air quality violation" could ever exist at a facility where the only substance
being composted is leaves and grass clippings, and never can you create a public health
or environmental emergency from such an operation, since it remains to be a "natural"
impossibility. Throughout the many years DEQ has operated as a "Division" and then as
a "Department" they are aware ofthat fact, if it only became known to them through their
knowledge and involvement with the Gibson facilities over the many decades.
This Department has essentially decided to avoid the prohibition within the statute
entirely, taking the position the "exclusionary Rule" does not apply to civil cases. We can
understand they would like to avoid the statutory violation, but it took place, and it is now
before the court to determine what that violation means, as it was only from a result of
their entry that they are now asserting their position that the presence of these substances
of grass clippings and leaves they saw on the property, during their inspection process,
that the Facility may be subject to their Tier II aspects of solid waste disposal
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management rules and regulations, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the exclusions and exemptions within their own IDAPA
Rules.
The Department, in direct examination, wanted to remain silent to the fact they
knew there was no air quality violation to exist on the Gibson Facility, but they went out
there to see if Mr. Gibson was still composting just grass clippings and leaves, and they
confirmed that was all he was composting when they entered onto the property and
inspected the premises. Even before they entered onto the property, they knew there was
no violation, as they could "smell the air around them" from the access road before even
entering the property, so for the Department to admit they detected no violation before
entry, presents two very relevant factors: 1) they knew there was no factual basis to
conduct any inspection of the Gibson operation in the first place, before they made entry,
and 2) they knew there could be no air quality violation if it was grass clippings and
leaves only, given their long and documented history and awareness of the Gibson's
composting operations. They had to have a specific scope and purpose identified in the
warrant, as defined within the statute, which states in I.C.§39-108(2)(d) as follows:
(d) Any district court in and for the county in which the subject
property is located is authorized to issue a search warrant to the director
upon a showing of (i) probable cause to suspect a violation, or (ii) the
existence of a reasonable program of inspection. Any search warrant
issued under the authority of this chapter shall be limited in scope to
the specific purposes for which it is issued and shall state with
specificity the manner and the scope of the search authorized.
(Emphasis added)
They appeared reluctant to suggest either way whether any exigent circumstance
existed at trial with regard to this subject of an "odor", as that would cause them to I) be
without any factual basis to conduct any form of an entry upon an inspection of the
property, and that would serve to 2) fall within the very effects of the statute of repose,
identified in I. C. §39-1 08( 4), a statutorily created limitation that prohibits the initiation of
civil actions when they had prior knowledge of the operation and found no violation
relating to their regulatory authority in any years past.
Consequently, the Department tried to stay away from that pitfall, despite it being
revealed during cross-examination that Mr. Elbert then admitted they were aware there
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was no air-quality violation found to exist even before entering the property.
These agents went to the Gibson facility for the sole purpose to see if Mr. Gibson
was now composting substances other than grass clippings and leaves.

It must be

remembered that the Devin Downs operation did have "odors" of some nature, as "Tree
Top Recycling" conducts a recycling operation that uses numerous substances, "grinding
up" different wood substances, including dimensional lumber products, scrap wood,
pall~ts,

chipped tree branches and stump grindings, along with animal wastes in that

"recycling" process, significantly different from just leaves and grass clippings as is
processed at the Gibson Facility.
It was interesting to note this Department, in their disclosure of exhibits, had

identified Exhibit No. I 0 in their initial Exhibit List to be introduced into evidence, only
to be removed and identified as "reserved" after receiving Defendant's Pre-trial
Memorandum filed prior to trial, supporting the Motion for Defendants' directed verdict.
Those documents within Exhibit I 0 were among the aerial photographs maintained in the
Department's ftl.es and records, specifically identifying the Gibson Facility taken back in
20 II, showing the many rows of materials on the premises at that time, all of which has
been maintained and contained within the DEQ files for years, having prior knowledge of
the &ize of Gibson's operation.
The Department realized that to place those DEQ documents into the record of
this case would only serve to confirm they have long known of the many rows and
quantity of the substances in the rows located on the property of this Facility, and that
that knowledge was clearly existing for years preceding this unauthorized inspection that
proved to be a false alarm in search of an odor that proved to be non-existent for any air
quality concern over an "odor" that did not exist (remember, the only reason given for
going out to this Facility in the first place was to investigate an "odor". Once arriving at
the property, the "inspection" for an "odor" evaporated, and the only reason know was to
instead see what substances were being composted, and to explore the idea of this "Tier
II" quantity matter, despite the fact since 2003, this composting Facility was deemed by
DEQ agents to be excepted from their IDAPA regulatory authority, and was to be
regulated solely by the Department of Agriculture.
Obviously, this Department was not only concerned about the application of the
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statute of repose (I.C. §39-108(4)), but now concerned about the manner and means of
private property inspections. This Court will appreciate that such behavior by first
wanting to conceal the Department's knowledge as to the size of Gibson's operation at
this Facility in 2011 (and before), as their file documents confirm they knew in 2011 by
virtue of their file contents, and the withdrawal of that Exhibit now demonstrates a
deliberate attempt by this Department (a governmental agency) to conceal the fact they
were aware of the size of the Gibson operation at a period of time well preceding the two
year statute of repose prohibiting a civil action being filed against the operation, and that
is now being further compounded with the Department's attitude relating to their own
statutory limitations, claiming this civil action is not limited by the effects of the
prohibition placed upon the Department's right to enter upon private property for
the specific purpose of conducting an inspection, initiated without a warrant,
without consent, and in the absence of an exigent circumstance.
As Mr. Elhert testified (in his opinion) the quantities of materials he saw while
inspecting the Facility in 2013 had exceeded 6oo yards, based upon the observation made
while on this private property, his opinion of what was shown by the 2013 aerial
photographs, if compared the 20 II aerial photographs produced in their Exhibit List,
would demonstrate the same quantities of materials were there on the premises in 20 II,
as these materials continue to shrink as they are composted into soil, so what would be
added in the two years after 2011 only maintained the physical appearance of the original
quantity that was present in 2011. This agency wanted to conceal that fact, as otherwise
they admit knowledge of the size of the operation and the civil action was barred by their
own statutory limitations.
The importance of that fact is that if there were to be any alleged violation of a
now claimed Tier II concern, that same fact existed in 20 II, and that fact confirms the
Director knew or ought to have known of any possible claim of any Tier II assertions,
because of the known size of the operation in those prior years. The truth is they have
aerial photography for every year, and the Department has access to that information
every year, so the statute of repose does absolutely apply to prohibit even the filing of
this civil action, not just because it is barred, but also because there is no violation of the
IDAPA regulatory authority, as this composting Facility is excepted from the regulations.
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As though those aerial photographs taken annually and maintained in the records
of the Department were not sufficient evidence in themselves to compel the application
of the statute of repose, and to prevent the unlawful search that was conducted in
violation of the statute (not limited to the Constitution, but prohibited by the Idaho statute
itself), Mr. Elhert confirmed in his testimony that the Department had files and records
that dated back to 1992, and it has never been proposed in that quarter century there has
ever been created a "public health" or "environmental" emergency from such composting
activities, and they have been aware of the size ofthe operation since at least 1992.
It remains important to remember this inspection was limited to an "odor" issue,

and it was all based upon an undocumented, unwritten, non-reported, unverified,
unconfirmed hearsay comment about which no admissible evidence could confirm the
statement was ever actually made. Notwithstanding a lack of a valid basis to inspect, the
sole reason revealed in trial was that they went to the Facilitv to determine i{thev could
detect any odor emanating from the substances located on the premises.
They knew this facility was there, as they reviewed their files to determine where
the facility was; they knew it was being operated by Mr. Gibson, as they had to make the
association with Mr. Gibson and one of his earlier entity names, Black Diamond
Compost, and it would be naive to think these agents did not know the entire history of
Mr. Gibson, just as they knew the history on Tree Top Recycling, Diamond Street
Recycling, Qualitree Inc. and others recycling material/manure based sites located
throughout Idaho.
As in any investigation, the agents rev1ew their agency files to become
familiarized with the background of the operation before going out to investigate the site.
Mr. Gibson has long been known to Environmental Quality personnel (both when a
Division and after becoming an independent Department) for decades, and the agency
had established a "documented paper relationship" with Mr. Gibson at the latest in 1992
(Mr. Elhert confirmed he reviewed those DEQ files in his testimony), revealing prior
permits issued in 1992 regarding Gibson's composting operations on land immediately
north of this site, onto to which Mr. Gibson had expanded his operation to this premises
in 2004.
It remains undisputed Mr. Gibson has been composting grass and leaf substances
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for soil amendments since the early 1970's, composting at several locations within Ada
County, and with regard to leaves, that was independently confinned by the testimony
from Scott Frisbie, a supervising agent for the Ada County Highway District (ACHD),
who directed his personnel that the leaves swept from the streets of the City of Boise
were to be delivered to the Gibson composting Facility south of Gowen Field, routinely
perfonned for many years before 2013, and also previously and independently confinned
by the statements of Mr. Darrell Early, during hearings conducted in this case, being the
fonner counsel representing the Department, who was the drafting source for the
Department's pleadings in this case, now promoted within the agency as a continuing
employee-agent ofDEQ.
As this court will recall, Mr. Early stated to this Court that he was involved (as a
law Clerk) in relation to an environmental exchange that Mr. Gibson had with a county
governmental agency in years prior, referring to Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854,
893 P. 2d 801 (1995), wherein it had then become public knowledge as to the on-going
composting activities conducted by Mr. Gibson, dating back to 1991, wherein it states
within that Decision precisely what Mr. Early had referred to:
In 1991, David Gibson acquired rights to a parcel of real property in Ada
County with the apparent purpose of operating a tree and shrub nursery. [I]
The condition of the soil on this parcel is such, however, that prior to its use
for growing nursery stock large amounts of compost must be added to the
soil. Toward this end, Gibson bas accumulated on the parcel large
amounts of organic material. [2]
[Footnote [2]] These organic materials include leaves and grass clippings
from the Ada County Highway District and private lawn care companies and
are not at issue in this case.
This present Facility is located within a stone's throw of that property referred to
above, and this Facility and the surrounding property (520 acres) has the same soil
condition that needs the large amounts of compost that must be added to the soil, and
DEQ has repeatedly makes reference to these grass clippings and leaves within this
controversy, calling these substances a "solid waste", and believing such substances mav
be regulated by DEQ, as found from their reference on page 4, Par. 13 in their Amended
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Complaint, stating "grass clippings and leaves", are or should be among substances
within the definition of "solid waste".
The statutory definition of "solid waste", and the statutory defmition of "Solid
waste Disposal", as defined in I. C. §39-103(13)&(14), are different than the "solid waste"
definition being used in IDAPA, but notwithstanding those differences, it is undisputed
DEQ has always. been aware of Gibson's composting operations, and these
"materials/substances have repeatedly been referred to by state and local officials as
"soil" or "dirt" substances, even by some witnesses testifying in this case, and DEQ, as a
Division and later as a Department, has been aware of the Ada County/Gibson decision,
(cited above), which became public knowledge in 1995, and had been personally known
to Mr. Early (he apparently assisted in writing the Decision) and others within DEQ's
legal Division/Department are charged with that public and common knowledge back to
1991, well over25 years ago.
The point being is twofold; Firstly, there has never been a complaint about "odor"
in all those years relating to any of Gibson's operations, or any other composting
operation using grass clippings and leaves, so there could never be argued there existed
any exigent circumstance that created any emergency relating to public health or the
environment from which to authorize DEQ agents to go onto private property to "smell"
the materials located on the premises. Secondly, the Department has always been aware
of the size of the Facilities, and were aware of the quantities of soil/dirt materials located
at the Facilities, having been composed solely from grass clippings and leaves.
The only plausible reason for entry onto the property was identification of the
substances being composted, and from that, it then went from being an "odor" issue, to a
"Tier II" issue, the conversion for which has created yet the further violation of a
mandate that is controlled by the statutory authorization contained within this Chapter 1
of Title 39. This conversion of "scope" and "purpose" is yet another violation of the
statutory limitations placed upon the authorization to inspect, and is to be strictly
complied with before entering upon private property, and this factor is another example
of what these Defendants see to be more of the "bad faith" acts committed by this
Department. The statute specifically requires in I.C. §39-1 08(2)(d) the following
limitation in the scope and purpose:
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(d) Any district court in and for the county in which the subject
property is located is authorized to issue a search warrant to the director
upon a showing of (i) probable cause to suspect a violation, or (ii) the
existence of a reasonable program of inspection. Any search warrant
issued under the authority of this chapter shall be limited in scope to
the specific purposes for which it is issued and shall state with
specificity the manner and the scope of the search authorized.
There was no search warrant issued at all in this matter as required, as there
existed no reasonable and articulable basis to make any application to any district court to
issue a search warrant, and if a basis did exist, it would be logical to assume these agents
would have complied with the statute.
These agents had no reasonable, articulable, factual basis to make any
presentation to a court to show probable cause to cause issuance of a search warrant. and
instead, "bypassing" the requirement to secure a warrant with the required probable cause
required under the Constitutional mandates, these agents elected go out to and onto the
property without any authority to enter upon the premises, but nonetheless did so to
determine what the nature of the materials were that were then located on the property,
wondering what might possibly give rise to any comment about "odor", as none is caused
from composting grass clippings and leaves.
Because of the nature of the developing testimony presented by Mr. Elbert during
trial, his statements came to suggest rather directly that Mr. Elbert had to have actually
gone onto the property, to inspect the materials, not just engaged in an "attempted
inspection" from the access road as repeatedly alleged in the pleadings by Mr. Darrell
Early, as to know the substances as being grass clippings and leaves, he has to either
guess that to be the substance, or he had to go onto the property and inspect the materials
to make that determination.
It began to appear from Mr. Elbert's testimony that in order for him to have

formulated the basis for his statements about the nature of the substances at the Facility,
he clearly had to enter and gone onto the property. For that very reason, it became of
interest to inquire of Mr. Elbert if he had, indeed, gone onto the property, contrary to the
allegations in the pleadings. When asked, Mr. Elbert admitted he had done so. It was then
of interest to determine if he was even aware of the statute that controlled any entry onto
private property, and that too he was asked during cross-examination, and he confirmed
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he was indeed aware of the statute.
It was confirmed to have been an actual "on-site inspection", and through cross-

examination revealed the truth it had never been an "attempted inspection" at all, but in
truth, was a penetration onto private property to conduct an inspection of the Facility in
disregard of the mandates of the statute, which Mr. Elhert confirmed he was aware of the
statute and familiar with its contents.
This served to demonstrate that the drafter of the pleadings had sought to
conceal the truth from the inception, and that Mr. Early, who drafted the pleadings, had
deliberately, knowingly, and artfully concealed the truth, in an attempt, for the benefit of
the Department, to avoid the consequences of this illegal search conducted upon this
private property, in violation of the provisions that are statutorily limited by the very
statutory language that created the Department of Environmental Quality in the first
place.

Messrs. Elbert and Gantz chose to disregard the statutory requirement imposed
upon Department agents that required them to get consent from the owner/occupier, or
secure a warrant, and knowing Mr. Gibson had a judicial history of exercising his
constitutional rights and liberty interests, he was never predisposed to grant any voluntary
consent, and knowing they had no probable cause to secure a warrant, they elected to go
onto the property without complying with the statutory limitations for any statutory basis
to enter onto and upon private property.
No doubt these agents had revealed to the Department what they had done, and
that remains why the Department went to such a great length in their pleadings to hide
what they knew, and to deceive and perpetually lie to these Defendants (and to this
court), with their artful display of falsehoods, concealing the unlawful search with their
most articulate attempt to cover up this illegal search by declaring it to have been an
"attempted inspection" undertaken by Messrs. Elbert and Gantz, and stating that to be a
fact (our times within the pleadings.
Had Mr. Elhret been aware of these Department deceptions, he might have been
instructed to avoid such testimony, but logic suggests the Department was made aware
from these agents they had conducted a search of the premises without consent or a
warrant, and that revelation resulted in allegations in the Department pleadings (almost
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two years later) to conceal that fact, instead presenting a false and fraudulent
representation of fact within their pleadings by alleging it was only an "attempted
inspection". The known illegality of the search was the very reason this "inspection" of
the property was converted to "an attempted inspection", which confirms that the
Department has again chosen to speak out of both sides of their mouth; first they say
there was no inspection made on private property, and now they want to say the statute
does not apply to unlawful inspections in civil cases.
If the Department really and honestly thought this search on private property
conducted by their agents' did not create need for what they argue to be "An
unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to this civil case", or their claim"§
39-108(2)(c) was not violated and the exclusionary rule would not apply in any
event", and that "the exclusionary rule does not apply to this civil case" then why did
the Department go to the trouble to lie about what took place on March 29, 2013, if the
statute did not apply to this very civil action, (which the very statute itself so declares and
mandates!!!)? Why did the Department undertake such a deceptive effort to conceal the
truth and lie at least four times about the search being described as an "attempted
inspection" rather than the truth it was an entry and a completed inspection, if there was
no application of this statute to this civil case? What were they thinking when drafting
their Pleadings, if it was not to conceal that which they knew would cause their case to be
thrown out of court?
These Defendants do believe that Mr. Elbert was not a participant in this coverup, as had that been the case, it would be unlikely he would have so willingly revealed
the truth about the entry and inspection that they had done, and admit straightforward and
without hesitation that he and Mr. Gantz entered onto the property, and acknowledged the
contradiction of the statutory mandates.
There would have been no need for the legal department of DEQ to fabricate and
lie to these Defendants and to this court with the false perception that it was merely an
"attempted inspection" rather than an illegal search of private property, as it has now
been confirmed to have been. The legal department of DEQ knew these agents had
committed a violation of the statute, and what has become rather disturbing from their
deceitful and unacceptable act is that this court is confronted with what must be seen as a
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deliberate, pre-mediated, and undisputed "cover-up" pursued by this Department,
confirmed by their pleadings filed in this action. Here's what they said in both the
Complaint and the Amended Complaint:
10.
On March 29, 2013, the Department attempted to conduct an
inspection of a facility located on a portion of property located off of
Pleasant Valley Road, southwest of the intersection of West Gowen Road
and Pleasant Valley Road described as the Northwest Y. of Section 5,
Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada
County Assessor's Office as Parcel Number S1505220000, (hereinafter
"the property").
11.
Upon information and belief the Property on which the facility is
located is owned by VHS Properties LLC.
12.
At the time of the inspection attempt no persons were present at
the Property.
13.
At the time of the inspection attempt, the Department staff was
able to observe from the public roadway and the driveway prior to
any gate or fence, large piles and windrows of grass clippings, leaves
and other organic material constituting solid waste.
14.
At the time of the inspection attempt the Department staff
observed amounts of solid waste in excess of six hundred (600) cubic
yards.
15.
Upon information and belief activities at the site include the
composing of large volumes of solid waste for the purpose of resale to
the public as compost or humus.
(See Fist Amended Complaint, pages 3-4) (All emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
DEQ agents went onto private property, without a warrant, without consent, and in
the absence of any exigent circumstance, contrary to the statute and in derogation of what
they knew to be the limitations placed upon that agency to conduct inspections of private
property in the course of any investigation. For those reasons, the statute has been violated
by this Department, and all testimony of Dean Elbert is subject to exclusion from the record
in this case. I. C. §39-108(2)(c) makes emphatically clear:
"The state shall not, under the authority granted by this chapter, conduct
warrantless searches of private property in the absence of either consent from
the property owner or occupier or exigent circumstances such as a public
health or environmental emergency;"
There is no other authority regarding such inspections, and the only applicable
exceptions to going onto private property, without a warrant, is consent and exigent
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circumstance, neither of which exist here, and the warrant was no secured. There basis to
claim a violation of the Tier II regulatory provisions of solid waste materials, are premised
upon this entry onto this property, and from that entry, the
these substances were not being processed as "w
substance, not a waste to be disposed of in

· also aware that

', but rather constituted soil

y disposal site, and declared exempt fr

waste disposal materials, never intended to

titute enhanc

"soil substances".
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of October, 20
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the Court
Constitution. For
17 of
of the
explained below,
Section 17
Idaho Constitution.
Court
reasons explained
below, the
1, Section
Defendant’s motion
denies
the Defendant’s
motion to
strike.
to strike.
denies the
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I.
I.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

(“DEQ”), filed
Plaintiff,
Environmental Quality
the Idaho
Department of
of Environmental
ﬁled aa
Idaho Department
Plaintiff, the
Quality (“DEQ”),

complaint
under the
that Defendant
alleging that
the name
complaint alleging
Black Diamond
Diamond
Defendant David
name of
of Black
David Gibson,
Gibson, under
Compost
by Defendant
Defendant VHS
composting facility
on property
Compost Products,
VHS
operates aa composting
owned by
Products, operates
facility on
property owned
(“VHS”). The
Gibson’s facility
Properties,
that Mr.
LLC (“VHS”).
The DEQ
Mr. Gibson’s
the legal
legal
meets the
alleges that
Properties, LLC
facility meets
DEQ alleges
definition
11 Solid
Tier II
that neither
neither Mr.
deﬁnition of
Mr. Gibson
nor VHS
of aa Tier
Processing facility
Solid Waste
and that
Gibson nor
VHS
Waste Processing
facility and
has
with the
in regulations
forth in
the requirements
the DEQ
regarding
requirements set
regulations adopted
complied with
has complied
set forth
adopted by
DEQ regarding
by the
the management
the
waste processing
processing facilities.
management of
facilities.
of solid
solid waste

A court
in this
A
trial in
this matter
matter was
the
held on
on September
On the
court trial
2017. On
September 13,
and 20,
was held
13, 15,
15, and
20, 2017.
cross-examination of
first
ﬁrst day
the trial,
former Solid
Program Manager
during cross-examination
of the
of former
Manager
Solid Waste
Waste Program
trial, during
day of

Dean
portions of
for Defendants
strike large
Mr.
Dean Ehlert,
Defendants objected
to and
to strike
large portions
of Mr.
and moved
counsel for
moved to
objected to
Ehlert, counsel
Ehlert’s testimony.
Ehlert’s
that time.
The Court
strike the
the testimony
time.
to strike
at that
Court declined
declined to
testimony. The
testimony at

At the
the Court
the conclusion
the presentation
At
presentation of
of the
of evidence
on September
Court
conclusion of
September 20,
evidence on
20, the
Ehlert’s
Defendants’ motion
the parties
ﬁle briefing
brieﬁng regarding
motion to
strike Mr.
Mr. Ehlert’s
directed
regarding Defendants’
parties to
to file
to strike
directed the

testimony
hearing on
the motion
motion for
for October
an evidentiary
on the
2017.
and scheduled
October 10,
scheduled an
evidentiary hearing
testimony and
10, 2017.
“Memorandum in
On
in Support
Motion to
On September
Defendants filed
ﬁled aa “Memorandum
of Motion
to
Support of
September 28,
2017, Defendants
28, 2017,

Plaintiff’s
Strike
Elhert {sic}
Strike Testimony
for Violation
Violation of
of Dean
Dean Elhert
of I.C.
LC. §§ 39-108(2)(c).”
39-108(2)(c).” Plaintiff’s
Testimony of
{sic} for
Defendants’ Motion
Response
was filed
Motion to
Strike Testimony
to Defendants’
to Strike
ﬁled on
on October
along
Response to
October 6,
Testimony was
2017, along
6, 2017,

Plaintiff’ 5 Response
with the
in Support
Cecchini-Beaver in
with
Mark Cecchini-Beaver
the Declaration
Declaration of
of Mark
of Plaintiff’s
to
Support of
Response to
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Defendants’ Motion
Defendants’
Notice of
Plaintiff also
Motion to
Strike Testimony.
to Strike
ﬁled aa Notice
of Supplemental
Supplemental
also filed
Testimony. Plaintiff

Authority
on October
2017.
October 10,
Authority on
10, 2017.

At the
At
parties indicated
would not
be
the parties
not be
the hearing
hearing on
on October,
indicated they
October, 10,
2017, the
they would
10, 2017,
Defendants’ motion
in Defendants’
presenting further
the issues
motion to
presenting
further testimony
regarding the
strike.
to strike.
raised in
issues raised
testimony regarding

“Reply Memorandum
Defendants’ “Reply
Defendants’
ﬁling of
With the
With
the filing
of Defendants’
Memorandum to
to Support
Support Defendants’
Elhert {sic}
Motion
for Violation
Motion to
Strike Testimony
Violation of
to Strike
of Dean
Dean Elhert
of I.C.
on
LC. §§ 39-108(2)(c)”
39-108(2)(c)” on
Testimony of
{sic} for

October
under advisement.
the Court
the motion
motion under
Court deemed
advisement.
October 13,
deemed the
2017, the
13, 2017,
Defendants
Elhert regarding
things he
the Court
strike testimony
Mr. Elhert
regarding things
he saw
Defendants ask
to strike
of Mr.
Court to
ask the
saw
testimony of
on
Elhert testified
that he
Mr. Elhert
the
official drove
March 29,
another DEQ
on March
testiﬁed that
he and
to the
2013. Mr.
and another
drove to
29, 2013.
DEQ official
property, parked
property using
then walked
the property
path for
for
the fence,
onto the
using aa path
parked outside
and then
walked onto
outside the
fence, and
property,
vehicles. He
not have
While doing
doing so.
He admitted
admitted he
he did
He testified
testiﬁed to
to observations
he made
did not
vehicles.
have
observations he
made while
so. He
aa warrant
time he
the property
the time
the driveway.
warrant to
Defendants
to search
at the
he walked
search the
walked down
down the
driveway. Defendants
property at
allege
this entry
the property
the
of the
constitute aa search
allege this
search of
and argue
and visual
Visual observation
observation constitute
argue the
property and
entry and
search
unconstitutional. They
Ehlert
this Court
from Mr.
Mr. Ehlert
strike any
to strike
Court to
search was
ask this
was unconstitutional.
testimony from
They ask
any testimony
about
property.
until he
left the
the property.
the property
after he
he left
he walked
onto the
he made
walked onto
observations he
made after
about observations
property until

II.
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS
LEGAL

that DEQ
the property
Defendants
Defendants assert
ofﬁcials conducted
of the
warrantless search
assert that
search of
conducted aa warrantless
property
DEQ officials

at
violation of
39-108. Chapter
in Violation
Title 39
the Idaho
entitled
at issue
of I.C.
Chapter 11 of
of Title
of the
is entitled
Idaho Code
issue in
LC. §§ 39-108.
39 of
Code is
provides that
the
that
Environmental Protection
the Idaho
Health Act
Act (IEPHA).
Protection and
Section 108
Idaho Environmental
and Health
108 provides
(IEPHA). Section
“shall cause
the
the director
the department
environmental quality
department of
investigations to
director of
of the
of environmental
to be
cause investigations
be
quality “shall

made
upon receipt
violation of
information concerning
concerning an
receipt of
of information
an alleged
of [the
Idaho
alleged Violation
made upon
[the Idaho
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Environmental
permit or
Environmental Protection
Health Act]
Protection and
or of
of any
or order
promulgated
order promulgated
and Health
rule, permit
Act] or
any rule,
thereunder,
the director
other investigations
shall deem
investigations as
to be
director shall
and may
made such
such other
deem
cause to
be made
as the
thereunder, and
may cause
advisable.” I.C.
in pertinent
pertinent part:
The statute
further provides,
advisable.”
part:
statute further
I.C. §§ 39-108(1).
provides, in
39-1080). The
this chapter
(2)
For the
the purpose
enforcing any
of enforcing
provision of
of this
chapter or
or any
rule
purpose of
any provision
any rule
(2) For
director’s
in this
this chapter,
authorized
the
director
or
the
director’s
designee
shall
have
the
the
the
the
shall
authorized in
director
or
have
designee
chapter,
authority
to:
authority to:

(a)
program of
continuing surveillance
of continuing
of regular
regular or
or periodic
periodic
surveillance and
and of
Conduct aa program
(a) Conduct
inspection
potential environmental
air contamination
environmental hazards,
contamination
inspection of
of actual
or potential
actual or
hazards, air
sources,
pollution sources
of solid
water pollution
solid waste
and of
disposal sites;
waste disposal
sources and
sources, water
sites;

(b)
private or
Enter at
all reasonable
times upon
at all
or public
public property,
upon
upon any
reasonable times
property, upon
any private
(b) Enter
presentation of
purpose of
for the
the purpose
inspecting or
presentation
of appropriate
appropriate credentials,
of inspecting
or
credentials, for
investigating
possible Violations
violations of
this act
permits
investigating to
to ascertain
of this
or of
of rules,
ascertain possible
act or
rules, permits
or
promulgated by
board;
the director
the board;
or orders
director or
or the
orders adopted
and promulgated
adopted and
by the

All inspections
this
the authority
(c)
investigations conducted
inspections and
of this
under the
and investigations
conducted under
authority of
(0) All
in conformity
the prohibitions
shall be
chapter
be performed
with the
prohibitions against
chapter shall
performed in
against
conformity with
in the
the fourth
fourth amendment
unreasonable searches
amendment to
to
contained in
seizures contained
unreasonable
and seizures
searches and
the United
the constitution
the
constitution of
the
article I,
of the
United States
of the
section 17,
States and
and section
17, article
I, of
the state
The state
the authority
shall not,
constitution
under the
constitution of
of the
of Idaho.
state of
state shall
Idaho. The
authority
not, under
in
this chapter,
granted
by this
warrantless searches
private property
property in
granted by
of private
conduct warrantless
searches of
chapter, conduct
from the
either consent
the property
the absence
the
property owner
of either
or occupier
or
consent from
owner or
occupier or
absence of
exigent
public health
exigent circumstances
health or
environmental emergency;
or environmental
circumstances such
such as
as a
a public
emergency;
in and
in which
(d)
which the
property is
for the
the county
the subject
district court
is
court in
and for
subject property
county in
Any district
(d) Any
located
the director
warrant to
is authorized
authorized to
to issue
to the
director upon
search warrant
upon aa
located is
issue aa search
showing
probable cause
the existence
showing of
of (i)
to suspect
or (ii)
of
existence of
suspect aa violation,
cause to
Violation, or
(ii) the
(i) probable
aa reasonable
the
program of
warrant issued
of inspection.
inspection. Any
under the
search warrant
reasonable program
issued under
Any search
in scope
this chapter
limited in
authority
the specific
shall be
of this
chapter shall
to the
speciﬁc purposes
be limited
scope to
purposes
authority of
it is
for
which it
with specificity
for Which
the manner
manner and
the
shall state
is issued
state with
and shall
and the
issued and
speciﬁcity the
scope
the search
of the
authorized.
search authorized.
scope of

ORDER
DENYING MOTION
STRIKE TESTIMONY
ORDER DENYING
TESTIMONY -- 44
MOTION TO
TO STRIKE

001016

I.C.
I.C. §§ 39-108(2).
39-108(2).

IEPHA does
The
violate the
not state
the DEQ
the
The IEPHA
state remedy
should the
does not
remedy should
DEQ Violate

DEQ’s inspection
commands
that the
the DEQ’s
the
inspection of
of section
Defendants assert
of the
section 108(2)(c).
commands of
assert that
108(2)(c). Defendants
Ehlert’s testimony
property was
was illegal
that all
illegal and
all of
Mr. Ehlert’s
his observations
of Mr.
to his
related to
and that
observations
testimony related
property

during
warrantless search
be stricken
the warrantless
the property
the
stricken pursuant
during the
of the
to the
pursuant to
search of
should be
property should
exclusionary
rule.
exclusionary rule.

if the
A.
The
this
The Court
not decide
the exclusionary
A.
rule should
to this
Court need
should apply
need not
decide if
exclusionary rule
apply to
case.
case.
rule” is
“exclusionary rule”
The
judicial remedy
for addressing
The “exclusionary
unconstitutional
is aa judicial
addressing unconstitutional
remedy for
“bars the
searches,
it “bars
the admission
the illegal
illegal
or use
of evidence
to the
admission or
gathered pursuant
pursuant to
and it
evidence gathered
use of
searches, and
search.” State
508-09 (Ct.
search.”
App. 2015),
Idaho 784,
158 Idaho
352 P.3d
786-87, 352
P.3d 506,
State v.
v. Rowland,
Rowland, 158
784, 786-87,
506, 508-09
(Ct. App.
2015),

citing
Bunting, 142
142 Idaho
App. 2006).
Idaho 908,
136 P.3d
P.3d 379,
citing State
State v.
v. Bunting,
386 (Ct.
2006).
915, 136
379, 386
(Ct. App.
908, 915,
“is not
‘the challenged
Suppression
justified unless
in some
not justiﬁed
or exclusion
is in
exclusion “is
challenged evidence
Suppression or
unless ‘the
evidence is
some sense
sense

activity.’” State
the
product of
Dahl, 162
162 Idaho
the product
illegal governmental
governmental activity.’”
of illegal
Idaho 541,
400 P.3d
P.3d
State v.
v. Dahl,
541, _,
_, 400
“the exclusionary
541,
rule should
App. 2017)
should
634 (Ct.
(citations omitted).
exclusionary rule
omitted). Accordingly,
Accordingly, “the
541, 634
2017) (citations
(Ct. App.

be employed
fact been
there has
when there
in ﬁzct
has in
been a
violation
a violation
be
employed only
only when

of
deféndant’s constitutional
the defendant’s
constitutional
of the

rights.” State
rights.”
App. 2013)
Idaho 423,
155 Idaho
313 P.3d
P.3d 751,
State v.
v. Brown,
759 (Ct.
Brown, 155
(emphasis
2013) (emphasis
423, 431,
431, 313
751, 759
(Ct. App.

in
in original).
448 (2015)
Idaho 884,
158 Idaho
354 P.3d
P.3d 446,
See also
also State
State v.
v. Green,
original). See
Green, 158
446, 448
884, 886,
886, 354
(2015)
“suppression is
(holding
violations that
that “suppression
that do
not the
the appropriate
for statutory
not
is not
appropriate remedy
do not
(holding that
statutory Violations
remedy for

Violations”).
amount
amount to
to constitutional
constitutional violations”).
the government
not use
Generally,
use evidence
during an
government may
an unlawful
unlawful search
seized during
search
evidence seized
Generally, the
may not

in aa criminal
criminal trial.
trial. Lingo
as
Lingo v.
Salem, 832
proof against
against aa defendant
defendant in
832 F.3d
F.3d 953,
as proof
v. City
957
953, 957
ofSalem,
City of
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th
(9th
(9
Cir.
484 (1963).
Cir. 2016),
Wong Sun
Sun v.
371 U.S.
citing Wong
United States,
v. United
US. 471,
However,
States, 371
471, 484
2016), citing
(1963). However,

the exclusionary
ciVil cases:
reluctant to
courts
to extend
extend the
to civil
courts have
have been
been reluctant
rule to
cases:
exclusionary rule

“personal constitutional
aggrieved.”
right of
The
party aggrieved.”
the party
The exclusionary
not aa “personal
constitutional right
of the
is not
rule is
exclusionary rule
414 U.S.
United
94 S.
L. Ed.
2d 561
Ct. 613,
Ed. 2d
561
United States
States v.
v. Calandra,
US. 338,
S. Ct.
38 L.
Calandra, 414
348, 94
613, 38
338, 348,
“does not
(1974).
the rule
not proscribe
the introduction
introduction of
of illegally
proscribe the
rule “does
illegally
Correspondingly, the
(1974). Correspondingly,
in all
seized
proceedings or
persons.” Penn.
Prob., 524
all proceedings
all persons.”
524
Penn. Bd.
or against
against all
seized evidence
Bd. Of
evidence in
0fPr0b.,
2014 (internal
U.S.
118 S.
the
marks omitted).
at 363,
quotation marks
Ct. 2014
US. at
S. Ct.
(internal quotation
omitted). Indeed,
Indeed, the
363, 118
“repeatedly declined
Supreme
the exclusionary
to extend
extend the
to
Court has
declined to
Supreme Court
has “repeatedly
rule to
exclusionary rule
trials.” Id.
than criminal
criminal trials.”
that
proceedings other
Id. For
For example,
the Court
other than
held that
Court has
proceedings
has held
example, the
the
jury proceedings,
proceedings, civil
proceedings,
the rule
not apply
tax proceedings,
ciVil tax
to grand
grand jury
rule generally
does not
generally does
apply to
civil
proceedings, or
ciVil deportation
deportation proceedings,
or parole
at 363-64,
363-64,
parole revocation
revocation proceedings.
proceedings. See
See id.
id. at
th
(9th
1015-16 (9
118 S.
118
Lopez-Rodriguez v.
Mukasey, 536
Ct. 2014;
F.3d 1012,
but see
see Lopez-Rodriguez
v. Mukasey,
536 F.3d
S. Ct.
2014; but
1012, 1015-16
in deportation
still apply
that the
the exclusionary
Cir.
deportation
Cir. 2008)
rule may
exclusionary rule
(holding that
2008) (holding
may still
apply in
“egregious” constitutional
the government
proceedings where
government committed
committed an
an “egregious”
constitutional
Where the
proceedings
violation).
Violation).

Lingo, 832
Ramirez v.
at 958.
F. Supp.
832 F.3d
F.3d at
Vargas Ramirez
United States,
958. See
See also
also Vargas
v. United
93 F.
Supp. 3d
3d 1207,
Lingo,
1207,
States, 93
(“Because the
1230
the deterrent
the exclusionary
deterrent effect
1230 (W.D.
effect of
of applying
rule
Wash. 2015)
exclusionary rule
2015) (“Because
(W.D. Wash.
applying the

in civil
in
minimal and
in
its cost
civil cases
is significant,
general rule,
is minimal
obtained in
and its
cost is
evidence obtained
signiﬁcant, as
as a
a general
cases is
rule, evidence

an
be excluded
proceedings.”).
will not
from civil
manner will
not be
ciVil proceedings.”).
an unlawful
unlawful manner
excluded from
that the
the DEQ
the legislature
Here
Here the
legislature has
has specifically
commanded that
conduct
specifically commanded
DEQ conduct
th
4th
in conformity
with the
Art. I,
the 4
Amendment and
the
Amendment
investigations
investigations and
inspections in
17 of
of the
and inspections
and Art.
conformity with
I, §
§ 17

the legislature
not express
the consequence
Idaho
what the
would
constitution. However,
Idaho constitution.
legislature did
did not
express What
consequence would
However, the

be
be

if DEQ
42 U.S.C.
the aggrieved
if
provide the
party aa potential
potential
failed to
to do
aggrieved party
1983 may
do so.
so. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983
DEQ failed
may provide

7 may
remedy.
that does
the
not resolve
the evidentiary
here –
question presented
presented here
resolve the
does not
evidentiary question
However, that
remedy. However,
may the
th
4th
DEQ
use evidence
Amendment
in violation
in an
Art. I,
the 4
Amendment or
Violation of
of the
or Art.
17 in
an action
action
obtained in
evidence obtained
DEQ use
I, §§ 17

to
with its
its regulations?
to compel
regulations?
compliance with
compel compliance
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courts’ exclusionary
The
principles underlying
underlying the
ﬁrst expressed
The principles
the Idaho
Idaho courts’
rule were
were first
expressed
exclusionary rule

in his
in State
by Justice
Anderson, 31
174 P.
125
his dissent
Morgan in
P. 124,
31 Idaho
dissent in
Idaho 514,
Justice Morgan
State v.
v. Anderson,
124, 125
514, 519,
519, 174
by

(1918)(Morgan,
based
the Supreme
Court adopted
Supreme Court
rule based
adopted aa rule
thereafter, the
J. dissenting).
dissenting). Shortly
Shortly thereafter,
(1918)(Morgan, J.
in violation
on
Art. I,
for the
the exclusion
the
principals for
Violation of
on those
of evidence
of Art.
of the
exclusion of
those principals
obtained in
evidence obtained
§17 of
I, §17
44 Idaho
based on
state
Arregui, 44
The rule
254 P.
P. 788
on
constitution. State
state constitution.
Idaho 43,
rule was
788 (1927).
was based
State v.
v. Arregui,
43, 254
(1927). The

him
two
principles: aa defendant
was entitled
from him
the return
entitled to
taken from
to the
return of
of property
defendant was
two principles:
illegally taken
property illegally
in which
and
which the
use the
the proceeding
the government
the items
items illegally
government sought
to use
sought to
proceeding in
and the
seized was
was
illegally seized
in which
the
which the
violation.
the only
the defendant
for the
the constitutional
constitutional Violation.
defendant could
forum in
redress for
seek redress
could seek
only forum

See
Id.
See Id.
The United
The
based on
United States
an exclusionary
on
Court initially
States Supreme
Supreme Court
rule based
adopted an
initially adopted
exclusionary rule

trial of
into evidence
similar principles.
the admission
similar
procured by
by
items procured
principles. Originally,
at trial
of items
admission into
evidence at
Originally, the

unconstitutional seizure
was itself
itself an
unconstitutional act:
unconstitutional
an unconstitutional
seizure was
act:
produce the
by Virtue
virtue of
We
think that
in this
that the
this case,
the notice
the invoice
the order
notice to
to produce
of
invoice in
order by
We think
case, the
which itit was
which authorized
the law
the order,
which
authorized the
unconstitutional
and the
law which
were unconstitutional
was issued,
order, were
issued, and
and
void, and
by the
when
that the
the inspection
the district
district attorney
inspection by
of said
and void,
and that
said invoice,
invoice, when
attorney of
produced in
in obedience
to said
in evidence
and its
said notice,
obedience to
produced
evidence by
admission in
its admission
the court,
notice, and
court,
by the
were erroneous
proceedings.
unconstitutional proceedings.
erroneous and
and unconstitutional
were
Boyd v.
116 U.S.
29 L.Ed.
L.Ed. 746,
S.Ct. 524,
United States,
v. United
US. 616,
6 S.Ct.
States, 116
524, 536,
616, 638,
746, _
638, 6
536, 29
Boyd
_
it
(1886)(emphasis
was later
with an
that it
The U.S.
later faced
an issue
Court was
Supreme Court
faced with
issue that
US. Supreme
added). The
(1886)(emphasis added).

described
follows:
described as
as follows:
The
which we
we are
in the
in which
it involves
right of
with it
The case
the aspect
the right
the court
dealing with
of the
court
involves the
are dealing
aspect in
case in
in
in aa criminal
criminal prosecution
retain for
for the
the purposes
the letters
letters and
to retain
of evidence
prosecution to
and
evidence the
purposes of
correspondence
of
the
accused,
seized
in
his
house
in
his
absence
and
without
his
correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence and Without his
authority,
holding no
for his
his arrest
for
marshal holding
warrant for
United States
no warrant
arrest and
none for
States marshal
and none
authority, by
by aa United
the
the search
his premises.
of his
premises.
search of
Weeks
then held:
232 U.S.
The Court
34 S.Ct.
Court then
held:
384 (1914).
S.Ct. 341,
United States,
Weeks v.
V. United
US. 383,
States, 232
341, 384
383, 393,
393, 34
(1914). The
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If letters
in evidence
If
letters and
private documents
thus be
held and
and private
documents can
can thus
seized and
and held
and used
evidence
be seized
used in
4th Amendment,
against
citizen accused
the protection
the 4th
protection of
against aa citizen
of an
an offense,
of the
accused of
Amendment,
offense, the
right to
declaring
be secure
value,
his right
declaring his
to be
against such
is of
of no
no value,
and seizures,
such searches
searches and
secure against
seizures, is
might as
and,
placed are
from the
far as
the
stricken from
thus placed
well be
those thus
are concerned,
so far
as those
as well
be stricken
concerned, might
and, so
Constitution.
bring the
their officials
The efforts
the courts
the guilty
efforts of
of the
to
ofﬁcials to
to bring
Constitution. The
courts and
and their
guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy
by the
not to
the sacrifice
to be
of those
those
sacriﬁce of
are not
aided by
be aided
punishment,
as they
praiseworthy as
are, are
they are,
great
suffering which
principles established
which have
of endeavor
great principles
resulted
established be
and suffering
endeavor and
have resulted
be years
years of
in their
in the
their embodiment
the fundamental
the land.
fundamental law
in
embodiment in
of the
land.
law of
in violation
that items
Id. Thus,
been obtained
the fact
the constitution
items had
Violation of
fact that
of the
constitution was
obtained in
had been
Id.
was
Thus, the
in aa criminal
their admission
criminal action,
into evidence
initially
bar their
either
sufﬁcient to
to bar
admission into
evidence in
initially sufficient
action, either
because doing
itself violate
the constitution
the courts
doing so
constitution or
or simply
Violate the
courts
would itself
because
so would
because the
simply because
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reason that the exclusionary rule should apply to all court proceedings, or at least all
proceedings governed by the rules of evidence. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is,
as stated in Boyd, to return property to a person from whom the government has illegally
seized such property, it should matter little in what type of proceeding the citizen seeks to
challenge the seizure of his property. However, even Justice Morgan seemed to conclude
that the exclusionary rule was applicable only to criminal trials.
In order that the total disregard, disclosed by this record, of these constitutional
safeguards may be effectual, the court must become a party to it by receiving the
results as proof. I decline to do so, and hold that evidence procured by an illegal or
unreasonable search, the purpose of which was to discover and seize it, is
inadmissible if timely and proper objection be made to its introduction, because it
was procured by an invasion of the rights guaranteed to all persons within this state
by sec. 17, art. 1, of the Constitution, and to admit it, against a defendant in a
criminal case over such an objection, would be a violation, by the court, of sec. 13
thereof.

State v. Anderson, 31 Idaho 514, 527, 174 P. 124, 129 (1918) (Morgan, J.,
dissenting)(emphasis added). The language in Weeks was likewise specific to criminal
trials; not use of the illegally obtained items as evidence in court proceedings generally. It
was the court's complicity in the government's use of evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution to convict someone of a crime that seemed to be the independent
constitutional violation discussed in Weeks and Rauch.
The Idaho appellate courts have had few occasions to address the application of the
exclusionary rule outside of criminal trials. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held the
exclusionary rule is not applicable to proceedings where the government is attempting to
take children from their parents' custody. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 150
Idaho 103, 244 P.3d 247 (Ct. App. 2010). However, that holding was limited to motions
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY- 10
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Dated
Dated _________________________

______________________________
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Electronically Filed
12/4/2017 4:47 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)

)
Plaintiff,

CLOSING ARGUMENT

)

)
)

v.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,

)
)
)
)

)
)

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Trial in this matter commenced September 13, 2017, and concluded September 19,
2017 upon the allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint filed by the State of
Idaho, Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). Prior to trial, Defendants lodged their
Memorandum in Support ofDei(mdants' Motion for Directed Verdict presented to the court
at the close of the State's case. The Court took the matter under advisement, allowing
Defendant's to present their position advanced within the responses set forth in their Answer
to the pleadings filed in the matter.
DEQ claims their Agency has the jurisdiction and authority to regulate certain
"composting" activities, on agricultural lands, that store over 600 cubic yards of dirt

substances, suggesting such authority is found within the solid waste management rules and
regulations that relate to "Tier II" operations, being a quantity factor, as they believe is
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identiJied in Section 58 of the IDAPA Rules they adopted in 2002-03, and have chosen to
describe Gibson's composting operation at the at this agricultural facility located on these
agricultural lands to be subject to their site approval process, despite being an operation that
has been well known to DEQ personnel for many years, commencing back when the agency
was operating as a "Division" of the Department of Health and Welfare.
This composting operation has been conducted under the supervision of David R.
Gibson, who has operated in Ada County since 1974, and on this specific location, as it is
identified in the Amended Complaint, has been in continuous operation since August, 2004.
Gibson's agricultural activities have been well known operations to the general public, to all
Ada County officials, including their Developmental Services, their Commissioners, their
Civil Division, the State Officials with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), the
State Central District Health, the Ada County Highway District (a primary source oflcavcs
in earlier years), the former State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare,
environmental quality Division (H&W/DEQ), and throughout the transition into the newly
formed Agency, the State's Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), an Agency
established by Legislative enactment in 2000, as identified in I. C. §39-102A, which went
into effect July 1, declaring the following creation in I. C. §39-1 02A(2):
"(2) That all existing, but no new rights, powers, duties, budgets,
funds, contracts, rulemaking proceedings, administrative proceedings,
contested cases, civil actions, and other matters relating to environmental
protection as described in this chapter, vested in the director of the
department of health and welfare and the board of health and welfare on
.January 1, 2000, shall be transferred to the board of environmental
quality, the department of environmental quality and its director as
described herein effective July 1, 2000;" (Emphasis ours)
The "mission" of this "DEQ" Agency was therein described "to protect human
health and the environment as its sole mission", defined in I. C. §39-102A(l), and pursuant
to I. C. §39-1 02A(3), the "protection" of environmental values that included clean air, water,

and soil, reduce or eliminate environmental pollution (arising from human activities),
ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes, and ensure
the proper cleanup/restoration of existing natural resources.
As the testimony presented in this case serves to reveal by witnesses called by the
State, the only "substances" identified at this agricultural facility included what was believed
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to be grass clippings, leaves, and many rows of a material that (according to Michael
Woodward) had the color and appearance of being "dirt", and as Mr. Gibson has so
described in his testimony, the contents of the many rows of materials are, in fact, "dirt",
being what is referred to a nutrient enriched "soil" or "topsoil", as that would have been all
that the DEQ agents would have been able to observe on March 29, 2013, coming out of the
winter months and following the months of decomposition over the winter. Those
substances then present at that agricultural Jacility he described as being only a "dirt"
material, also referred to as "soil" or "topsoil" substances, all of which was derived from the
historic composting process of incorporated grass clippings and leaves that had been
processed by Mr. Gibson over years of prior composting activity, and have been
accumulated and stored at this specific agricultural operation since 2004. It has been these
agricultural operations and activities that are exclusively regulated (if and when necessary)
by the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), as that jurisdiction and authority has been
established through the enactments of the Right to Farm Act adopted in 1981 (RTF A) and
the Soil and Plant Amendment Act of2001 (SAPAA).
It is to be noted that these DEQ agents initially claimed they undertook an
"attempted" inspection of these agricultural activities from the access road, commonly
referred to as the Lake Hazel Extension; however, during trial testimony, Mr. Dean Elhert
came forth and admitted these agents actually entered upon this private property to conduct
an inspection of this agricultural operation, without any warrant and without any permission
or authorization, and while inside and upon the premises, they conducted an on-site 15 to 20
minute inspection and observed substances that Mr. Elhert described had the appearance of
being grass clippings, and other substances had the appearance of being leaves at the end of
piles or rows, and saw rows of materials that he did not describe as to what was their
content, but testified it appeared to be at various stages of decomposition. Mr. Michael
Woodward, the Boise City Parks and Recreation Director, described the materials in the
rows to have the color and appearance of being that of"dirt".
What should remain of significant interest to this court is that there has been no
measurements, weights, testing, or forensic analysis taken of any of the various substances
alleged to have been seen on this agricultural facility, so it remains impossible to say there
was 600 yards of grass clippings, or of leaves, or of the dirt like substances in the many rows
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located on this agricultural operation, which Mr. Gibson has testified the substance is soil or
topsoil, and not any solid "waste" or "hazardous waste". Without any differentiation of the
substances, and the quantification of any one of these referenced substances, Mr. Elbert's
opinion, from what he observed from the combination of the various quantities of what
materials were located on this agricultural facility, appeared to be in excess of 600 cubic
yards of substances being located or stored upon this premises is of little or no meaning to
the trier of fact in this case.
The claim of DEQ rests upon the assertion that merely because the "visual size" of
this "agricultural operation", it must therefore fall within their "Tier II" category of a "solid
waste" operation, but to say there is more than 600 cubic yards of some undefined and
untested materials on site, none of which is a "solid waste" or a ''hazardous waste" has no
evidential value to their claim, as neither grass clippings, leaves, or dirt, soil, or topsoil come
\vi thin the jurisdiction or regulatory authority for !he imposition of DEQ's regulations that
require such an operation to have an approved site plan on tile with the Agency under their
solid waste disposal regulatory authority.
None of these "substances" located on this "Gibson agricultural facility" has ever
been "analyzed" or "tested" by DEQ to determine what it is, whether it is hazardous,
whether it constitutes what is deemed to be a "waste" destined for "disposal, or even if the
purported "quantity" of "grass clippings" ever exceeded 600 cubic yards; or the purported
"quantity" of"leaves" on the premises ever exceeded 600 cubic yards; or the dirt/soil/topsoil
located on !he premises ever exceeded 600 cubic yards.
As the testimony confirmed, these DEQ Agents were on the property; and whether
they were there legally or illegally, they had entered upon these private, t{mced, and gated
premises with the initial intent to conduct an "odor" inspection, from what they purported to
be a verbal comment made to Tom Crumbly by Devin Downs, the operator of Tree Top;
that while there in their official capacity, these agents abandoned that initial purpose over an
"odor" concern, and !hen chose to divert their attention to the visual size of the operation,
and engaged in a non-scientific "volumetric inspection", though admittedly, was now being
conducted without the existence of any complaint of any violation made to the Department.
With that diverted attention, and while these Agents were then in a position to perform
precise measurements, weights, and take samples of what substances were present at this
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"agricultural operation", DEQ declined to conduct any meaningful investigation or to take
any samples from which to then conduct tests and comprise a forensic laboratory analysis
that would specifically identifY what substance or combination of substances were actually
present within this lawfully established "agricultural operation", which has been
continuously conducted under the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of IDOA since the
adoption of the statutory authority, being lawfully operated as "agricultural operations" and
"agricultural Jacilities" by Mr. Gibson throughout the past forty years in Ada County, at a
recognized "ah'ficultural facility", as defined by the Department of Agriculture, and
conducted under the exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority of that Department, as
established through the provisions ofRTFA and SAPAA.
Why were there no measurements? Why is there no samples of the materials? Why
is there no laboratory analysis conducted and preserved for presentation to support any
claim asserted by DEQ? Why is there no weights of anything identified and recorded for
evidence of the inspection? The initial answer to explain these "whys" is rather obvious!!!
They were on the property i11egally, and they knew it. This court has chosen to "exonerate"
their presence on the property, concluding the premise was actnally open to the public for
wliimited entry by the general public, but the closer evaluation of the record would be hard
pressed to support that conclusion, as the sig:tmge did not permit any such entry, as
addressed hereafter. These Agents knew they had violated the statute; that's why Mr. Gantz
was not called by DEQ to testify at trial. The State was in no position to produce any
evidence of their presence on the property.
The second answer is also rather obvious!!! The testing analysis would conclusively
confirm the entire contents of the many rows of substances on the premises were comprised
I 00% of a substance generally referred to as "dirt", commonly referred to as "soil" and "top
soil" materials. The time of year that this "observation" was being made was March 29,
2013, being conducted on the heels of a cold winter, and during the wet, windy, and cold
month of March, where not one blade of grass had come out of dormancy to commence
growing anywhere in the Treasure Valley for the past six months, let alone to have been
"clipped" in any lawn mowing process and delivered to this operation; there was not one
spring Crocus plant bloomed anywhere to mark the beginning of spring, those perennials
that sprout from their corms at the lirst sign of an emerging spring; there was not one
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Syringa bush yet to bloom, so quite to the contrary of any "observation" of grass clippings,
there would not have been any "grass clippings" visible on site, and nothing had been
brought to the agricultural facility since the last delivery of leaves from ACHD the
preceding fall, as the leaves delivered during the fall and early winter had been incorporated
and decomposed, blended into the mix where they break down into the dirt and soil
substances and become a component of the dirt, just as they do in every agricultural field,
recreation golf course, private and commercial lawn, park, common area of large
subdivisions, large landscape development barriers and the thousands of gardens
throughout the entire State of Idaho. To actually see a grass clipping or a leaf on tills
agricultural operation on March 29, 2013 would be a very special and unlikely occasion, as
it simply was not the season for their presence. That, as you might imagine, is why there are
no close up photographic illustrations of any "grass clippings" or "leaves" submitted as
evidence for tlris record, as there were no such substances actually seen to be illustrated in
any photographs taken to depict the presence of substances on this agricultural land.
To add to tills doubtfulness of the "perceived" observation of anything but basic
"dirt", the leaves that were previously delivered to tills premises by ACHD were transported
there the previous fall in November, and had broken down into the materials and no longer
identifiable as a visual presence of any "leaves" in their original form as a plant residue, and
that explains why notillng was measured, quantified or photographed, as to do such, the
resulting chemical analysis would confirm the presence of "dirt" substances.
The State has declined to produce any analysis from any State laboratory of any of
these substances that were located at tins agricultural facility on March 29, 2013, or at any
other period of time, and that is very important to understand, as that confirms there has
been nothing located at this "agricultural facility" that is of a hazardous nature, as what is
there is best described as "dirt", and certainly nothing that is considered to be a hazardous
waste substance, or a "disposed of' waste substance. Remember the sole mission ofDEQ is
to:
"protect environmental values, including clean air, water, and soil,
reduce or elinlinate environmental pollution arising from human activities,
ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes, and
ensure the proper cleanup and restoration of existing natural resources".
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The substance found at this agricultural facility is "dirt", more commonly referred to
as "soil" and "topsoil" substances, the very substance that DEQ is required to protect, not
regulate, as it is not a "pollutant" or a treated, stored, or disposed of "hazardous waste", and
is not the subject of a "cleanup" or "restoration" project of a natural resource.
Keep in mind this Agency entered upon private property to conduct an inspection of
an "odor", and found nothing of a nature that affected any provisions relating to clean air.
They knew the composition of what they saw was merely that of' humus enriched "soil" or
"dirt" substances, for which they also knew were intended and designed for application and
re-introduction onto agricultural soils,

a~

that

wa~

knovm to all interested agencies back in

1995, when Mr. Darrell Early assisted in writing the Appellate Decision involving Mr.
Gibson and Ada County in that pending litigation before the Idaho Supreme Court. It was
common knowledge at that time that Mr. Gibson was engaged in soil amendments and plant
foliar substances intended to be applied as a plant growth enhancement and development of
plant life, not ever to constitute any "environmental pollution" arising from human
activities, or involved in any treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes, rather the
highest inf,'fedient of an existing natural resource, constituting soil and topsoil substance, the
essence of life.
As before represented, the use of this humus enriched soil is intended for application
onto these surrounding 520 acres of agricultural land that is located adjacent to the existing
composting location, and has never been referred to by anyone, not even DEQ, as a "waste
site", or as a "waste product", or as a "waste disposal" site, or ever considered to have been
an "abandoned" or "discarded" product or material substance, as these substances arc soiltopsoil substances, the essence of nature, a natural consequence of natural de-composition of
plant residue by definition, and designed and produced for application upon agricultural
lands, gardens, lawns, and landscapes, consistent with the purpose and intent of RTFA and
SAPAA, the statutory enactments that exercise exclusive jurisdiction and regulation over
these soil producing agricultural operations.

WHY THE CONTROVERSY WITH DEQ

The Agency has taken the controversial position, after being to this agricultural
facility on March 29, 2013, after abandoning any concern over the "odor" comment that
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was supposedly expressed by Devin Downs, that the "material" presence at this facility
appeared to be more than 600 cubic yards, and that may bring forth the issue whether this
operation may be regulated as a "solid waste" disposal site, with a "Tier II" classification,
being a "regulated operation" of hazardous wastes and landfill debris that has in excess of
600 cubic yards of on-site materials. Once these agents concluded they detected no
offensive odor emanating from the previous operational activities, they entered upon the
premises (despite their pleading had stated four times to the contrary) and observed the
presence of rows of material, which they knew from previous documentation was a
substance generated lrmn grass clippings and leaves from Gibson's composting
operations. Failing to quantify or scientifically identify anything, these DEQ agents
concluded it was a "solid", and maybe it could he regarded as a "waste", and by that
definition, may potentially be subject to DEQ Regulatory authority (more than I 0 years
after IDAPA Rules governing "solid waste" disposal regulations were adopted, with
Gibson's prior "permit" still on file, and before told there would be no regulation of his
agricultural operations and no further inspections would he made of his agricultural
facilities, in light of the language in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii).
DEQ has referenced the substances they "observed" on page 4, Par. 13 of their
First Amended Complaint, stating these substances were "grass clippings and leaves",
and believed to be substances within the definition of "solid waste", referring to various
definitions of "solid waste". For DEQ Officials to say they saw "grass clippings and
leaves" on the premises on March 29, 2013, in that organic lorm of a "blade of grass" to
comprise a "clipping" or a leaf to be described as "leaves", and for them to say that is
what they saw from the roadway, and not on the premises, would be nothing short of a
miracle, as the many rows along the road are the oldest substances, dating back to 2004.
However, had these Officials instead chosen to be more forthcoming and instead say they
saw a substance that resembled dirt from the roadway that was within the many rows
along the roadway, and it was then their "opinion" those soil like substance was derived
from grass clippings and leaves, that would have been a most accurate and true statement.
Defendants have consistently recognized that leaves and grass clippings, which by
their very organic nature, are naturally converted into "soil" or "topsoil", and remain a
form of a "solid" substance, being the natural conversion of plant residue substances, but
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never has that substance been referred to in the context of a "waste", or as being a
"discarded" substance, or ever regarded to be an abandoned" material substance, and has
never been a substance contemplated by the Department of Agriculture or the Department
of Environmental Quality to require disposition in a disposal site, as the very mission of
DEQ is to protect the soil, not dispose of it. Soil substances are not among hazardous
wastes that go into landfill sites for final disposal. This was not a waste substance, and
has never been declared that this nutrient enriched soil was ever regarded to be waste
during the trial testimony, and this operation has never been regarded as "disposal site";
rather the substance is a humus and nutrient enriched soil and topsoil substance, used in
agricultural operations and farming activities, traditionally and commonly referred to as
dirt, "topsoil" "compost" and "soil amendments" under the criteria that is regulated by
the Department of Agriculture, which is the exclusive agency to regulate this substance.
DEQ, in years prior when operating as a "Division" of Health and Welfare, and
thereafter when the Legislature enacted legislation that created the "Department", DEQ
has been infinitely familiar with Mr. Gibson's historic composting operations, having
established an historic "documented paper relationship" with him in decade(s) past,
having issued a permit to him to conduct his operations, prior to the enactment ofthe Soil
and Plant Amendment Act (SAPAA) in 200 I, and thereafter previously engaged Division
Officials confirmed to him that he was not subject to any IDAPA modifications that took
place circa 2002-03. This "paper trail" included the former inspection and permit dating
back into 1992, then pertaining to his operations that were then located several hundred
feet away on land immediately north and west of this current agricultural facility, (as
identified in aerial photography presented at trial, being the former twenty acre site
currently owned by Lydia and Orson Merrill). In those prior years, the Central District
Health and DEQ, then as a Division of Health and Welfare, worked in conjunction with
Mr. Gibson, then generating composted substances and soil amendment products since
the early 1970's, composting in several locations within Ada County that he had
commenced in 1974.
It has been virtually three decades that Mr. Gibson has been operating agricultural

composting facilities within this Gowen Field Desert Front Area (commencing in 1988),
on agricultural lands that have been declared to be statewide permitted agricultural
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activities that includes composting (addressed hereinafter), legislatively declared to be
agricultural operations as defined by statute. Mr. Gibson began his operation in this area
in 1988, when leasing a parcel of property adjacent to Pleasant Valley Road owned by a
Stale governmental agency. This current premises is also in the Gowen Field area, south
of the Boise Municipal Airport, off Pleasant Valley Road, along Lake Hazel Extension,
being the expansion or extension of the prior twenty acre site Mr. Gibson operated from
1991 to 2004. He has remained in this area continuously since 1988, operating in the
same manner at the location described in the First Amended Complaint since moving
onto this agricultural operation in August 2004.
He has maintained each of his registered business names, including Black
Diamond Compost Products, with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA), having
registered various hUillus products through their Agency as requested and statutorily
required, and has been under their exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority
concerning composting activities and operations since 1981, as mandated within the
Right to Farm Act (RTFA, enacted in 1981) and in accordance with the Soil and Plant
Amendment Act (SAPAA, enacted 200 I), each of which Act is regulated exclusively
under the jurisdiction of IDOA.
Mr. Gibson has been very familiar with each of these various Agencies over the
many years, including Ada County Developmental Services, DEQ, Fire District agencies,
Ada County landtill agents, Central District Health officials, County Code Enforcement
personnel, and in 2009, Mr. Gibson had become directly involved in litigation over the
pre-emptive effects of the statewide '"permitted use" upon agricultural lands in
conjunction with agricultural composting operations, activities, and facilities authorized
and regulated by IDOA, which brought into the fray the statutory clarification from
IDOA of their RTFA legislation undertaken on July l, 2011 confirming composting
activities were always intended to be included within the Right to Farm of !981, just as it
was so declared in the Soil and Plant Amendment Act of 200 l, with their operations and
activities being not only statewide permitted uses, as described in l.C. §22-4501, but also
were operations, activities and facilities intended to be regulated exclusively by the
Department of Agriculture, wherein the legislature declared the right to engage in farm
operations, activities, and facilities was a natural right, and is recognized as a permitted
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use throughout the state of Idaho". The Legislature clarified their previous and continued

intentions regarding composting activities to have been within the purpose of the Right to
Farm Act from the inception, and declared that clarification in 2011, specifically to
conlirm their intention was always to include composting operations, facilities, and
activities to be conducted within that Act, similar to the way it was addressed by the
legislature in their Soil and Plant Amendment Act they adopted in 200 I.
That clarification, passed March, 20 II was made effective and treated retroactive
when enacted July I, 20 II, the direct consequence that came into being as a result of the
Ada County litigation that involved this very property, and these Defendants, brought
about because of Ada County's belief their Ordinance allowed them to require the
issuance of a conditional usc permit (CUP) before a composting activity on agricultural
land could be conducted. lhc clarification enactment confirmed the pre-emption intended
by the State statute had effectively pre-empted and invalidated any County Ordinance
that sought to require a conditional use permit to do what was already permitted to be a
statewide right of engagement, as had been so declared as a statewide permitted activity
and operation by the Idaho Legislature.
This statewide permitted agricultural use specifically includes all composting
operations and activities, as clarified in 2011, never deemed to be or ever declared or
regarded to be waste disposal sites, as a matter of legislative enactment, recognized to be
agricultural activities and operations under the Right to Farm Act (enacted in 1981 as Ch.
45) and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act (enacted in 2001 as Ch. 22), and no
conditional use permit (CUP) was ever to be required to engage in that agricultural
operation or activity, in any quantity, from any county or any state agency, division or
department, either through regulation or inspection. These operations are protected by the
language contained in the Local Land Use Planning Act, announced in I.C. §67-6529,
which states:
67-6529. APPLICABILITYTO AGRICULTURAL LAND-- COUNTIES
MAY REGULATE SITING OF CERTAIN ANIMAL OPERATIONS
AND FACILITIES. (1) No power granted hereby shall be construed to
empower a board of county commissioners to enact any ordinance or
resolution which deprives any owner of jitll and complete use of
agricultural landfor production of any agricultural product. Agricultural
land shall be defined by local ordinance or resolution. (Emphasis ours)
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The Right to Farm Act (enacted in 1981 ), and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act
(enacted in 2001) specifically declared composting activities were included within land
zoned for a!,'ficulturc, and Mr. Gibson's operations have always been conducted on
agricultural land, operated as a composting operation and facility on those premises, and
not ever regarded or defined to be the process or hazardous wastes at a disposal site. His
operations have always been an agricultural activity in accordance with those legislative
enactments of the State of Idaho, under the exclusive jurisdiction of IDOA.
The Right to Farm Act, along with Idaho's Soil and Plant Amendment Act,
helped in defining the inter-relationship and correlation within the State of Idaho as it
pertained to the Land Use Planning Act that was enacted in 1975, all of which was part
and parcel of the existing and independent body of law that existed when the Department
of Environmental Quality, later created as a separate Agency in 2000, formed and
adopted almost 20 years after the enactment of RTFA in 1981, and virtually
contemporaneously with the enactment of SAPAA in 2001. There was no grant of any
authority to regulate any of these established agricultural activities within the creation of
DEQ, and that was made clear in the enacting language that stated ; "(2) That all existing,
but no new rights, powers, duties, budgets, funds, contracts, rulemaking proceedings,

administrative proceedings, contested cases, civil actions, and other matters relating to
environmental protection as described in this chapter ..... , and the right of regulation

and exclusive jurisdiction remained, without interruption or usurpation, solely with the
Department of Agriculture, under RTFA since its enactment in 1981.
It was only upon the conclusion of that controversy with Ada County in 2013, in

which Gibson prevailed as a result of the clarification language adopted by the
Legislature, thereby pre-empting any County Ordinance seeking to require a conditional
usc permit, that Mr. Gibson was then confronted by DEQ (ostensibly emanating from a
bogus claim as to the existence of an "odor" complaint from Tree-Top, Devin Downs),
notwithstanding there was documented knowledge of Gibson's operations (permits from
the 1990's), and after ten years of utter silence (2003-2013), what then springs forth to be
a controversial assertion of a right to regulate "composting facilities" as a '"solid waste
disposal site" as a "tier II" sized operation, though historically deemed and
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unconditionally regarded as activities regulated exclusively by IDOA. Never since the
IDAPA rules were enacted (2002-2003) has there been any declaration that agricultural
composting activities, operations, and facilities were conducting "waste" sites or
constituted a landfill, and never has it been declared by IDOA that DEQ has usurped and
"taken over" their jurisdiction, authority, or regulatory authority that was specifically
vested in IDOA by the Legislature,
Compost substances have never before been regarded as "waste" by any Agency,
and the Department of Agriculture has never deemed composting that produces dirt, soil,
or "topsoil" to be a "waste", and quite too the contrary, has always been deemed to be an
agricultural product, not a substance to be "discarded or abandoned", merely because it
began from the organic and natural process or decomposition of grass clippings and
leaves atler being processed at a composting agricultural facility, as these materials could
never be considered as discarded or abandoned, when they are the ingredient for an
agricultural product, possessing humus-soil characteristics when processed through a
compost process, being a natural substance essential to life, typically regarded to be
"soil" or "dirt" derived from processing either plant residue or animal manure, and
critical to the development of plants and soil nutrition, defmed as plant and soil
amendments for future agronomic use, applied to existing soils and plants at specific
agronomic rates, either directly upon or into the existing soils, or to the external plant, as
a foliar application,
This Court was previously presented with Defendants' Motion and supporting
Memorandum for a Directed Verdict to confinn the Stale's failure to allege or prove any
cause of action for relief, and to then also apply the barring effects of L

C,

§39-1 08( 4) to

the State's unfounded claims, as DEQ (as both a Division and as a Department) had been
historically involved with Mr. Gibson, and the "size" of his operation (now claimed to be
a Tier II operation) has been known (in this area alone) since 1988, and has been known
to DEQ, first as a Division of the Dept ofH,&W,, and when an independent Department
by the same remaining personnel, after it became an independent Agency in 2000, Mr.
Gibson's operations have been on-going openly in the plain view of every governmental
agency since his operations began in 1974, having expanded into the Gown Field Desert
Front Areas in 1988, and Mr. Gibson had direct and on-going contact with many officials
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from each of these vanous City and County Agencies, State Divisions, and State
Departments, and especially so following his establishment to the Gowen Field Desert
Front area in 1988, as the Boise Municipal airport wanted agency confirmation these
agricultural composting operations would not attract birds to the area, a concern to jet
engine propulsion commercial aircraft.
This initial concern raised by the Municipal Airport brought into the inquiry other
agencies who were made aware of this concern about a possible bird attraction within the
flight pattern of the arrival and departure of these jet propulsion commercial planes, and
whether Gibson's agricultural operations, the activity of composting grass clippings and
leaves into soil amendments, would give cause to any concern over birds being attracted
to those substances, as seagulls are known to inhabit operations conducted as landfills.
Through their studies and their observations, the agencies confirmed no such attraction
existed at any of these grass clipping/leave composting facilities, and no threat to human
health, safety, or the environment was ever then found or known to exist.
That inquiry confirmed there was no landfill type wastes, refuse, or disposal that
would pose any attraction to birds, and all agencies expressed their acceptance over this
agricultural operation, then acknowledging it would not create any bird concerns, and
aware it was deemed to be an agricultural activity that was expressed by the Department
of Agriculture to be embraced within RTFA, and was controlled by statewide legislation.
As we once again review the manner in which this court has attempted to grapple
with terms and meaning of various word(s) that surfaced within this litigation, such as
'\vaste'', "crop": "grass'', "leaves'', ""plant", '"residue", "discard", ;'disposal'', "abandon",

"abandomnent", "dirt", "soil", and topsoil", the court must determine to what extent the
regulatory definitions and exceptions within IDAPA and the mission statement within the
legislation and the judicial determinations elsewhere reached, of which this court has
taken judicial notice, including the Ada County case against Gibson and others referred to
throughout these proceedings during earlier hearings, along with the 9th Circuit Court's
analysis of "grasses", relating to the concept of "grass residue" as it was addressed in the
matter of Sqfe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3'ct 1035 (2004), an enviromnental
dispute concerning North Idaho blue grass, and the natural process of the residues after
the grass seed was harvested, and the subject whether "grass residue" was a "solid
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waste", as defined under the federal Resource Recovery and Conservation Act (RCRA).
The Federal Court concluded "grass residue" is not a "solid waste", and given application
of that similar analysis, "crop residue" or "plant residue" (whether it be a grass/lawn/treeshrub leaf residue), would not be considered a ''waste" either, as that residue, either
through a natural process, or through human management in an agricultural operation,
will naturally be destined for re-integration into the soil through a natural decompositionmanagement process, exhibiting what agronomists call a humus-soil enriched dirt
composition that restores soils with nutrient enriched additives, and are not a "solid
waste" by virtue of their intended application in soil and plant development, never a
product to be "abandoned" or "discarded" in any agricultural operation, but always
intended to be applied upon and into a [uture agricultural soil-plant application and
beneficial use.
There has also been judicial determinations regarding the proper manner in
conducting statutory, ordinance, and rule interpretation, and ascertaining what the legislature
intended by their enactments. The standard of review for statutory interpretation has
always remained one of free review by the appellate courts, and the court's objective has
always been to give effect to the legislative intent with respect to the interpretation of the
Legislature's enactments. Among the more recent analysis is that analysis expressed in
Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), wherein our Supreme Court

reiterated the court's objective regarding statutory interpretation. It states:
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
legislative intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187
(2007). "when interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words of the
statute.... " Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.Jd 1186, 1192
(2011). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body must be given effect.. .." idaho Youth Ranch, inc. v. Ada Cnty.
Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 1110, 1114-115, 335 P3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal
quotations omilled) (quoting St. Lukes Reg 'I Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. o{Comm 'rs ofAda
Cnty, 146/daho 753, 755, 203 P3d 6113, 6/15 (2009)). This Court does not have the
authority to modify an unambiguous legislative enactment. Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg' l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P3d 502, 508 (20II) (quoting
Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P2d 1010, 1013 (1962))." (Emphasis ours).

In State v. Lee, 37213 (Idaho Ct. of Appeals, 6-29-2011) Docket No. 37213, filed
June 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals provided reference to the standard of review and
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objective of statutory interpretation to always be to give etfect to the plain language used
in a statute, stating:
"This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d II 03, II 06 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133
Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659,978
P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App.
2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules
of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court
must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative
intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idal10 at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be
examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute
and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an
interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd
result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004);
State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). The Court will not
deal in subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to
the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word
therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions. State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008)." (Emphasis ours).
In Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P. 2d 80 I (1995), about which

Mr. Darrell Early, the former counsel representing DEQ spoke of his official
involvement, the appellate court stated:
"Interpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, is an issue of law.
Therefore, this Court exercises free review of the district court's decision. See State v.
Nelson, 119 Idaho 444,446,807 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Ct.App.l991). It is axiomatic that
the objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428,849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993); Cox v. Department of
Insurance, 121 Idaho 143, 146,823 P.2d 177,180 (Ct.App.l991). Any such analysis
begins with the literal language of the enactment. Matter of Permit No. 36-7200,
121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992); Local 1494 of Intern. Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 991daho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978);
Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963). Where the
statutorv language is unambiguous, the clearlv expressed intent of the legislative
body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules
of statutory construction. Ada County v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho at 428,
849 P.2d at 101; Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852;
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Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991). Where the
language of a statute or ordinance is ambiguous, however, the court looks to rules of
construction for guidance, Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d 497 (1977), and
may consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. Umphrey v. Sprinkel,
106 Idaho 700, 706, 682 P.2d 1247, 1253 (1983). Constructions that would lead to
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58,
60, 608 P.2d 861, 863 (1980); Lawless, 98 Idaho at 177, 560 P.2d at 499." (Emphasis
ours).
In Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of llealth and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988

(2009), the appellate courts stated:
"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to
the legislature's intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc.,
125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the literal
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." McLean v. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006) (citations
omitted). " Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).
However, if the result is "palpably absurd," this Court must engage in statutory
construction. Id. When engaging in statutory construction, this Court has a "
duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that intent." Id. " IT! he
Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable
statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at
336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). " [The Court] also must take account
of all other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the
policy behind the statute." Id." (Emphasis ours).
Another statutory construction case is State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 884
P.2d 419 (1994), addressing the rules of construction in the following manner:
"To answer these questions, we look to the grammatical construction of the
statute as the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to
generally accepted principles of English grammar. See State v. Collinsworth, 96
Idaho 910, 914, 539 P.2d 263, 267 (1975). The Nebraska Supreme Court has
explained this concept well: "[I]t is the rule of interpretation that relative and
qualifying words and phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately
preceding and as not extending to or including other words, phrases, or clauses more
remote, unless the extension or inclusion is clearly required by the intent and meaning
of the context, or disclosed by an examination of the entire." State v. Jennings, 195
Neb. 434, 238 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1976). Under this rule, known as the rule of the last
antecedent clause, a referential or qualifying phrase refers solely to the last
antecedent, absent a showing of contrary intent. Id. See also Myer v. Ada County,
50 Idaho 39, 41, 293 P. 322, 323 (1930).
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Another interpretative case is State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d
1183 (2007), involving statutory construction of the intended scope of the "litigation
exception" under the open meeting law established through I. C. § 67-2345(1)(±). That
court stated:
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. Robison v. Bateman-Hal/, 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).
Because "the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute itself,"
the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the
statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,824,828 P.2d 848,853 (1992);
accord McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d
756, 759 (2006). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the Court does
not construe it but simply follows the law as written. McLean, 142 Idaho at 813,
135 P.3d at 759. The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads
to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516
(2004). In determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006)
(quoting In re Winton Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666
(1936))." (Emphasis ours).
The court then said:
"If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable
construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142
Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). An ambiguous statute must be
construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. Id. To ascertain
legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute,
but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the
statute, and its legislative history. !d." (Emphasis ours)
The court then said:
"Ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing
interpretations to the court. In re Permil No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823-24, 828 P.2d
at 852-53. If the language of the statute is reasonably susceptible of only one
interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there is no occasion to look beyond the
text of the statute. See ld. at 822-24, 828 P.2d at 851-53; Carrier, 142 Idaho at 807,
134 P.3d at 658. The first step is to examine the literal words of the statute to
determine whether they support the parties' differing interpretations."
Nowhere within the creation of the Department of DEQ (2000) did the Idaho
legislature grant any authority to this newly created agency to regulate any agricultural
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activities, operations, or facilities that were lawfully being engaged upon agricultural
lands that has been within the jurisdiction and authority of the Department of Agriculture
since 1981.

These soil substances derived from composting activities upon agricultural

lands (of which this Gibson operation is an agricultural activity upon agricultural lands)
was never intended to be within the scope of DEQ's jurisdiction or regulatory authority,
as they are not a substances destined for "disposal", nor are they a hazardous waste, nor a
pollutant, and is not a substance being deposited at a land till site that must be treated as a
hazardous waste to be disposed of in a fashion to protect the environment. This dirt
substance (soil, topsoil), is an agricultural product or commodity, clearly intended to be
excluded from DEQ regulation by the IDAPA exemptions as hereafter cited, and so
specifically intended to be within the declared exemptions from regulation within the
IDAPA Rules as specifically declared, and administrative rules, ordinances and statutes
are subject to the same interpretative analysis.
These materials consisting of grass clippings and leaves are environmental
friendly plant and/or crop residues, critical to the cycle of life, as any analysis of the
science of agronomy will confirm they impact proper soil maintenance and plant
development, never deemed to be a solid "waste" destined for landfill disposal, but rather
an agricultural asset, comprising the essence of plant life and soil nutrient restoration and
preservation, the very reason agricultural operations involving composting facilities are
maintained under the jurisdiction and authority of IDOl\.
When DEQ created their lDAPA Rules in 2002-2003, a specific declaration was
made to confirm the regulatory rules did not apply to those organic-agronomic
substances, setting forth the express exemption and exclusion in their IDAPA Rules,
declaring the "rules do not apply" to those solids (euphemistically referred to by their
reference to a category of "solid wastes"), excluded from both the definition and what
may be regulated under any definition of a "solid waste", and specifically excluded from
what is "regulated".
The court continues to grapple v.ith these vanous terms addressed within the
TDAPA Solid Waste Management Rules, and must address their interpretation and
application, essential to determine their meaning, usc, and application of such words like
''waste"~

"crop", "plant", '"residue", Hdiscard", "disposal",
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"dirt", "soil", "topsoil", "owner", "possessor" and the aspects of composting operations
that have been defined, regulated, and protected under RTFA and SAPAA, and in so
doing, the court must determine the interpretation and application of the express
exemptions set forth in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), as enumerated within the
exclusions of certain "solid waste", under the IDAPA provisions ("these rules do not
apply to the following solid waste ... "), which exclusions specifically include manure,
crop (plant) residue, and agricultural solid waste as excluded by IDAPA Rule 58

.01.06 (Solid Waste Management Rules), subpart .001 (Title and Scope), subpart (.03)
(Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to the
following solid wastes ... ) (b)(ii) and (b)(iii), (the effect of which expressly excludes
from the definition of "solid waste" those material substances consisting of manure
and crop (plant) residues which are intended to be returned to the soil at agronomic
rates, and any agricultural solid wastes managed and regulated by IDOA).

Nothing has been presented by the State during this trial that has provided any
factual revelation to conclude what substances are located at this "Gibson" agricultural
composting facility is anything other than what has been expressly excluded from the
definition of "solid waste" that is to be regulated by DEQ, as this agricultural activity and
operation is producing an agricultural product, which is a known natural substance that
comprises the substance "dirt", smells like dirt, and feels like dirt, that that is because it is
dirt, exactly what any analysis of it >Viii indicate; the agronomical reference is "soil", and
horticulturally referred to as "topsoil", defined to be a naturally existing humus-enriched
natural occurring substances that is essential for plant development and soil nutrient
enrichment for soil maintenance and plant development.
The words used in the IDAPA exclusions cannot be ignored or deemed to be
superfluous, as there was the intent to exclude from solid waste certain agriculturally
related substances, and those exemptions specifically brought the Department of
Agriculture into their analysis, by specifically referring to the Department of Agriculture,
and that cannot be ignored. That Department is within their definition as the second part
(iii) of their exclusionary intentions, aspects and applications, and no part of that allows
plant, manure or agriculturally related substances to be regarded as a waste, or as being
discarded, abandoned, or disposed of in a landfill site, as they come from a crop, plant, or

CLOSING ARGUMENT

P.20

001052

are plant parts or residue, and relate to operations and site intentions upon land that is
owned/operated as an agricultural function, activity or operation.
These definitions alone confirm DEQ lacks the required "standing" to file the
action, as their regulatory exceptions/exclusions precludes the alleged claim of a violation
of their regulations, stemming from the very language contained within DEQ's "solid
waste regulations", given the normal and common meaning and understanding of what
"grass clippings" and "leaves" are, which to anyone would be understood to be a plant
substance, typically referred to as a "plant residue", or in the fonn of a "crop residue" by
any ordinary usc of the words in defining and interpreting either those substances or the
exemptions, and as importantly, in addition to their lack of "standing" due to their own
exclusions, there is the further lack of "standing" resulting from the barring effects
specitically fonnulated by the Legislature in the application to those operations, immune
from any alleged violation in which DEQ has kno\'.'11 to be in existence, and in this
instance, the "size" (Tier II) has been of common knowledge, as in this very situation
since at least 1992, and that barring effect is contained in the Legislature's "statute of
repose", the provision about which Defendants have raised and seek this court to address
the application of that statutory bar to preclude the initiation of this action, as the inquiry
that came forth on March 29, 2013 went from an "investigation" over "odor" (that was
immediately abandoned) into an "investigation" over "size", suggesting the operation
was a "tier II" operation, despite being well known to DEQ since 1992, and throughout
each succeeding year through review of their annual aerial photography maintained by
the Department and accessible to them at a moment's notice on "Goggle Earth", The
"size" has always been what it was seen to be on March 29, 2013, as these composted
material shrink down to I 0% of their original volume, meaning it requires continual
addition to even maintain a previously "perceived" volume due to the natural decomposition process. The "size" has been relatively consistent at this facility since
August, 2004, due to the predictable shrinkage. What changes is the definition of the
finished product, from grass clippings and leaves to become "dirt", "soil", or "topsoil",
by definition.
Once again, DEQ has never quantitied what they claim to have seen to be the
presence of "grass clippings", what was "leaves", and what was dirt, soil or topsoil. They
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can never refer to this facility as a "tier II" operation, without producing volumetric
measurement of the substances they claim to have a right of regulation. "Size" only
becomes relevant when you can identify what it is, something that has never even been
attempted in this controversy, only addressed through speculation. Whatever the
substance, and whatever the size, despite its exempt status from the definition of "solid
waste" it has been no surprise or hidden fact, as DEQ, whether acting in its capacity as a
Division, or after the Legislature's adoption to become a Department in 2000, there has
been uninterrupted knowledge of its size, and that continuing knowledge, even after
becoming a Department, serves to preclude DEQ from exercising any perceived authority
to file this action over ten years after they were aware of this operation in 2004. , a
violation ofl.C. §39-108(4), which arguments Defendants has and will continue to raise
and maintain throughout these proceedings as a complete bar to the filing of the very
action against these Defendants.
These Defendants continue to assert the criteria identified in I. C. §39-108(4) as
representing the Legislature's perception of a "statute of repose" and was not intended to
constitute application as a "statute of limitation. That statute brings into our equation the
fundamental aspect of "standing" that must be applied against DEQ's assertion there is
any legitimate basis to inspect or investigate this agricultural operation in the first place
let alone as to its "size" (Tier IT), having known of its existence for over ten years. After
abandoning their "odor" inquiry, they entered upon the premise on March 29, 2013, well
knowing both its existence and the "size" of the operation since 2004, well known to
prior agents and personnel of DEQ as testified to by Mr. Gibson, at his earlier operation
when DEQ was functioning as a Division, and thereafter an independent Department.
The inquiry, as the testimony confirms, did evolve from curiosity over an "odor", into an
inquiry as to the "Tier" "size" of this operation, despite that issue being entirely irrelevant
because of the IDAPA exceptions, 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii). The visible "size" of
the operation and the awareness of the "substances" has always been known to DEQ, as
they have observed and monitored Mr. Gibson's operations since 1992, 1993, 1994 and
into 1995, and then declared him exempt from inspection thereafter, and declared he was
exemption after 2003. Notwithstanding whatever is perceived to be the "size" of the
Gibson agricultural operation, DEQ oflicials continue in their failure to identifY any
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"quantity" of any specific substance they may choose to claim to be a "solid waste" over
which they have a statutory right to regulate, failing to define any specific quantity (in
cubic yards) as to what amount of yards were grass clippings, what amount were leaves,
what was a dirt substance, a soil product, a topsoil product, or what quantity was in some
state of a composting or decomposition process. There is nothing in this record that
demonstrates any attempt by the Department, despite their personnel having entered upon
and engaged in the visible observation/inspection of various substances, as there is
nothing undertaken to present any quantitative analysis that specifies a particular
substance by any identity or chemical analysis to demonstrate it to be a "solid waste", not
otherwise exempt, essential for any argument that a patiicular substance constitutes a
"solid waste" that is to be regulated under the mission statement of the statute and not
exempt under 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii).
These Defendants are entitled to their Directed Verdict, and the entry of a dismissal
of this Amended Complaint filed by DEQ, both procedurally required under Rule 12(b)(6)
I.R.C.P, and for failure to present any violation of any rule or substance demonstrated to be
subject to their responsibility to regulate, as the Department has failed to either allege or to
prove the substance is a "solid waste" not specifically exempted by 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii)
and (iii), and that otherwise is an environmentally hazardous substance, a substance that falls
within their statutory mission and purpose for their regulatory authority, and specifically
identifies that substance that exceeds a quantity of 600 cubic yards of some hazardous
substance that is not merely a di1t substance or "soil", the very substance that DEQ is
directed to protect, not dispose of or declare as being a hazardous solid waste.
DEQ has failed to present testimony that supports any "cause of action" against
Defendants for which they are entitled to regulate any "solid waste" substance at this
agricultural facility that conducts an agricultural operation to generate soil, as the sole
mission of the "DEQ" Agency is "to protect human health and the environment", as defined
in I. C. §39-1 02A(l ), and according to I. C. §39-1 02A(3), the Department is to protect
environmental values including .... soil, ..... reduce or eliminate environmental pollution .....
ensure proper treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes ..... cleanup and
restore ...... natural resources. This substance at this agricultural facility has repeatedly been
characteristically identified to be dirt like, or dirt, soil or topsoil, the very substance DEQ
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must protect that environmental value, not regulate it as a "solid waste" to pursue the
"disposal" of it.
DEQ has no authority to regulate the existence of and accumulated quantities of
dirt, soil, and topsoil substances, or the grasses or leaves that are used to naturally and
organically formulate the soil substances, currently being stored in rows and preserved on
these agricultural grounds, derived from grass clippings and leaves, each being a crop
residue and/or a plant residue, a residue excluded as a ret,'Ulated substance from the
TDAPA Rules 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), and this court cannot expand upon the
nature of any unidentified and unspecified claim to relief, given the clear mission
statement of the Legislature, the express exemption under their IDAPA Rules,
58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), and in light of the "statute of repose" established within
the Department's enactment, l. C. §39-108(4).
Based upon these specific factors, the Department lacks standing, and to further
complicate their defects, the Department has failed to allege in their pleadings or to
demonstrate at trial, that the "size" and "quantity" of this agricultural operation (over 600
cubic yards) represents any substance other than a dirt or soil substance, a substance that
has been known to them long before two years preceding the filing of the complaint,
as "size" became the nature of the claim when they entered and conducted their
inspection on March 29, 2013, saying it was a Tier II size operation, and perceived the
operation to involve the storage or disposition of a regulated substance.
The substances creating the "size" of the Gibson's agricultural operation has been
a commonly known fact to DEQ since 2004. They were aware of the litigation with Ada
County in 20 I 0, as it was so confirmed during the earlier hearings within these
proceedings. This agricultural facility has always maintained the presence of dirt
substances in excess of 6oo cubic yards from August, 2004 to the present date, as prior
litigation, constituting public knowledge, has so consistently revealed.
The reason the Department has refused to conduct any analysis of the substances
contained within the many rows at this facility is because they truly know it is nothing
other than dirt, just like it appears to be. Their failure to produce any analysis of the
substances must be construed against them. They know it was "dirt", more commonly
referred to as "soil" or "topsoil" within the rows and there is no right of regulation of that
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substance. DEQ is required to allege that the Director of DEQ did not know or reasonably
could have known of the "size" of this operation, irrespective of the fact it was exempt
from any regulation, and notwithstanding it had been a known agricultural operation at
this location ongoing since 2004, with many thousands of cubic yards of dirt and soil
substances being both processed and stored there for future application to the surrounding
soil, as the size, the very essence to a Tier II claim (irrespective of being statutorily and
IDAPA exempt), is the focus of their claim, and from public knowledge, from litigation,
fi·om Mr. Early's personal awareness, lrom the knowledge of officials and agents of
DEQ, from the files and records in the DEQ office (admitted in testimony the 1992 tiles
were in the DEQ onice), including former permits and aerial photographs, all these
sources of information confirms the Director knew or should have been aware of the size
of the agricultural operation years prior to the two years preceding the filing of the DEQ
complaint.
The Department must assert aflirrnatively within their pleadings a factual
allegation they had no knowledge the operation ever exceeded the size of 600 cubic yards
of a regulated "solid waste" substance prior to the passage of two years, and must
affirmatively allege that substance was not known to be outside the right of regulation
prior to the passage of two years preceding the filing of the complaint. The action cannot
be filed ifthey had that knowledge.
That fanner "knowledge" is the very purpose for having this statute of repose.
How does DEQ intend to explain the gap following the 1992-1995 period of permits and
inspections, when they knew of and observed the many thousands of cubic yards of soil
substances then in these earlier years of inspections at these agricultural operations, and
what then allowed the ten year gap that passed aller 2003 without further permits or
inspections??? Well, they don't, because that would confirm they told Mr. Gibson he was
no longer to be inspected because he was determined to be exempt under their mission
purpose, and thereafter declared exempt under the purpose of the IDAP A exemptions,
58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii). DEQ has been aware of the size of this agricultural
operation since 2004, long before the "preceding two years prior to filing the complaint".
To even suggest otherwise is to ignore the obvious factors that existed during those years
of Gibson's operations and his agricultural activities. To claim a lack of this common
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knowledge would be most disingenuous, but the fail life to allege that lack of knowledge
should be seen as a failure to allege both jurisdiction and standing to bring the action,
The statute specifically states the Department cannot bring the civil action if the
condition (in this case, the "size" of the operation) was known to the Department more
than two years prior to filing the complaint. A statute of repose is viewed as a
"jurisdictional pre-requisite" or pre-condition to bringing the action, and is demonstrated
by the language used in the enactment.
A statute of repose (called a non-claim statute), is similar to that of a statute of
limitation, but instead of a defense, it is a statute that cuts off the legal right to take
action, if the deadline has passed. A statute of limitations is a lawsuit-filing time limit
based on when the plaintiff suffered a potential harm; a statute of repose sets a deadline
based on time of an event, separate and apart from any harm that gave rise to the lawsuit.
Statutes of repose, as stated in Defendants' Memorandum filed in support of the
Motion for Directed Verdict, create deadlines designed to bar actions after a specified

period of time from the occurrence of.mme event other than the injury.
In some cases, both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose may apply to
the same case, and there are situations when a statute of repose cuts off liability before a
statute of limitations has run. The concept of what constitutes a statute of repose was
addressed in Olsen v_ .!. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990), the court
stated:
"The provisions of !.C. §6-1403 constitute a statute of repose
limiting recovery for which there would otherwise be liability under the
product liability statutes. !.C. § 6-1403 is not a statute of limitations,
although subsection (3) of the statute does provide a two-year statute of
limitations barring any claim which is filed more than two years from the
time the cause of action accrued. The statute oflimitation portion of I. C.§
6-1403 is not involved in this action." .......
"Idaho's statute of repose advances a policy of finality in legal
relationships and thus furthers the objective of the legislature by providing
for "the maximum length of time products sellers are subject to liability."
The classification established by I.C. § 6-1403 bears a rational relation to
the legislative objective. The statute of repose falls within the "rational
basis" test which is generally appropriate to use when reviewing statutes
which impact social or economic areas and the classification advances
legitimate goals in a rational fashion. Leliefeld v. Johnson. 104 Idaho 357,
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659 P.2d Ill (1983) ..... .
'The role of the judiciary is limited when encountering a limitation when
considering legislation, including a statute of repose. The words of former
Chief Justice Donaldson in Leliefeld warrant repeating: So long as the
statute is constitutional, we have no intrinsic ability to review its inherent
wisdom or, if it seems unwise, the power to change it. Whenever lines are
drawn by legislation, some may seem unwise, but the responsibility for

drawing these lines rests with the legislature and judicial review is
limited."
Some jurisdictions have determined that the power to enact statutes of
repose that preclude a cause of action is implicit in the legislature's
power to abolish rights that have not yet vested. Rosenberg v. Town ()/N
Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Dague v. Piper Aircraft
Corp .. 275 Ind. 520,418 N.F.2d 207 (1981). In Rosenberg, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey explained that a cause of action does not accrue until
a careless act results in injury or danmge, and observed that the statute in
question ... docs not bar a cause of action; its effect, rather, is to prevent
what might otherwise be a cause of action, from ever arising. Thus injury
occurring more than ten years after the negligent act allegedly responsible
for the harm,jorms no basis for recovery. The injured party literally has

no cause of action.... The function of the statute is thus rather to define
substantive rights than to alter or modijj; a remedy. The Legislature is
entirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no
vested right is disturbed.
In West v. El Paso Products Co., 122 Idaho 133, 832 P.2d 306 (1992) the court
there stated:
"The appellants filed suit against El Paso on May 16, 1986, within two
years of the accident, but more than twenty years afier the reverse switch had
been installed by El Paso. The complaint alleged several causes of action.
Respondent filed its answer on December 4, 1987, alleging titleen affirmative
defenses, not including the I.C. § 5-241 statute of repose defense which
eventually prevailed. The district court set the case for trial on October 11, 1989.
It also set July 7, 1989, as the discovery cut-off date. On May 16, 1989, El Paso
filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion did not assert the I. C. § 5-241
defense. The motion for summary judgment was heard on July 31, 1989.
According to the appellants: "[a]fter the discovery cutoff, El Paso filed its Reply
Brief on the eve of the summary judgment hearing, asserting for the first time that
summary judgment was appropriate on the basis of I.C. § 5-241.. .. During the
summary judgment hearing, appellants urged the District Court not to consider El
Paso's argument based upon I. C. § 5-241 since El Paso had not pleaded the statute
as an affirmative defense." The matter was taken under advisement by the district
court. Before the court issued its ruling on the motion, El Paso filed a Motion for
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Leave to File an Amended Answer in order to assert the I.C. § 5-241 defense.
Appellants opposed the motion. The court granted both the motion to amend and
the motion for summary judgment."
"The summary judgment motion was granted solely on the basis that the
suit was barred by I. C. § 5-241. Appellants then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment. They argued that I. C. § 5-241 did not apply and alternatively asked the
court to reopen discovery. The court held that the installation of the switch was an
improvement to property as a matter of law and that I. C. § 5-241 was applicable
to the case. Judgment was entered against the appellants and this appeal timely
followed. The appellants contend that the motion for summary judgment was
improperly granted because 1) the district court erred in permitting the defense to
file an amended answer alleging the new affinnative defense, 2) that I. C. § 5-241
is not applicable to this case, and alternatively 3) that I.C. § 5-241, if applied in
this case, would violate the Idaho and United States Constitutions. We are not
persuaded by any of those three grounds taken singly or collectively, and
accordingly ai1irm the dismissal awarded by Judge Winmill."
A civil action, subject to a statute of repose, may he brought only upon those
limiting factors within the statute. As I. C. §39-108(4) states: "no civil action may be
brought" and therefore, given the language utilized by the Legislature, the right of action,
subject to the provisions of the repose, may properly be viewed as constituting an
element of standing to bring the action for any alleged violation based upon the "size" of

the agricultural operation, as there is a deadline imposed as a repose on their knowledge
that pertains to the size of the operation. not to be viewed merely as an "affirmative
defense". This statutory enactment created a "condition precedent" in the form of a
statute of repose, precluding the right to file the action if the Department Director knew
or ought to have known of the size of the operation, and they did for the pas! decade prior
to filing suit. This physical condition precedent claiming a Tier II site (size-over 600
cubic yards) was known to be in existence for many years before suit was filed, and the
specific language in I.C.§39-108(4) states:
(4) No civil or administrative proceeding may be brought to recover
for a violation of any provision of this chapter or a violation of any rule,
permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to this chapter more than
two (2) years after the director had knowledge or ought reasonably to
have had knowledge of the violation. (Emphasis added).
The "violation" perceived to be alleged in this First Amended Complaint is a
claim that this agricultural operation is a Tier 11 sized operation, processing regulated
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"solid waste", (over 600 cubic yards), and that the operation involves the handling of
substances that violate the IDAPA regulations pertaining to a regulated "solid waste",
saying a site permit is needed to conduct and operate the facility. For this court to allow
DEQ to file a "civil proceeding" without declaring, as a factual allegation, let alone fail to
prove at trial, that the Director (he's charged with the knowledge of the personnel) did
not have knowledge of, or reasonably could not have known of, the "size" of the Gibson
agricultural operation prior to two years preceding Jiling the action, then that failure
serves to defeat the very purpose for having that statutory language, and lets DLQ avoid
the statutory bar imposed upon them by the Legislature entirely.
Nowhere within Title 39, Ch. 1 is that pre-requisite made to be addressed as an
affirmative defense in the nature of a statute of limitation through Rule 8( c), IRCP; rather
it is structured as a jurisdictional condition to the right to file the civil proceeding.
DEQ's claim throughout these judicial proceedings has been a right to rej,'lllate
this agricultural operation because the substance is a "regulated solid waste",
notwithstanding the IDAPA exemptions 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), the very
language that excludes various substances from regulated "solid waste". DEQ then claims
that the size, based upon a specified cubic yardage of stored substances at the agricultural
facility (in excess of 600 cubic yards) makes it a Tier II category and needs an approved
site plan. However the size has been a matter of common knowledge since 2004, and
DEQ has declined to deny their knowledge within the course of the trial testimony, as
they were forced to admit they have the records of the former DEQ agency, when
operating as a Division, and that knowledge alone coniirms the inspections made of the
Gibson operations, and the knowledge of the historic size of those agricultnral activities.
The State has admitted the presence of documentation in their department files
that confirmed their knowledge and awareness as to the size of these operations, as they
possess not only the former permits and inspections, but also have possession of the
annual aerial photography of Gibson's agricultural activities that long before predates the
the effective application of the statute of repose.
Subject matter jurisdiction must be factually pled, and that is precisely why a
statement as to the grounds o.fjurisdiction must be identified in a pleading, so the issue

of jurisdiction is properly presented to allow the court and the defending parties to
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ascertain whether the court has jurisdiction and authority, since jurisdiction can neither be

conferred by agreement or stipulation, and cannot be waived, and is an issue that can be
raisedfor thefirst time on appeal. See for example, in re City of Shelley, !51 Idaho 289,
294,255 P.3d 1175, 1180 (201l); Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291,221 P.3d 81,
89 (2009); McClure Engineering, Inc., v. Channel 5KJDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, !55 P.3d
ll89, 1192 (2006); Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012);

Woodv. Wood, 100 Idaho 387,389,597 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1979).
As important subject matter jurisdiction is to the court, a fundamental issue that
also must first be addressed is DEQ's lack of standing to assert an alleged Tier II
violation, as their knowledge is a matter affecting their standing to bring the claim,
separate and apart from the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Evident
from DEQ's Amended Complaint, DEQ has declined to allege the lack of knowledge
element announced under I.C.§39-1 08(4), essential to establish standing as to any alleged
lack of knowledge of the size of this agricultural facility that existed many years prior to
two years before filing the action.
In the case of Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105,44 P.3d 1157,
1159-1160, (2002) the Court noted the significance and fundamental importance of

standing:
It is a fundamental tenet of American Jurisprudence that a person
wishing to invoke a court'sjurisdiction must have standing. Standing is a
preliminary question to be determined by this court before reaching the
merits of the case. The doctrine of standing is a subcategory to
justiciability. As this court has previously noted, the doctrine is imprecise
and difficult to apply. Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not
on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. To satisfy the case or
controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate
an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury. This requires a showing of a distinct
palpable [perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent,
distinct, manifest] injury and fairly traceable casual connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. (Emphasis added)

See also Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011), where
standing was again addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court and reiterated in 2011.

Our Appellate Courts emphasized this fundamental issue in McLean v. Cheyovich

Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 283 P.3d 742 (2012), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated
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the fundamental need for a litigant to establish and demonstrate standing, before a claim
can proceed. It stated:
"In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioner must allege
or demonstrate a distinct palpable injury in fact, [a Tier II size regulatory
violation involving a regulated solid waste] that the injury [violation] is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and that there is a substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the
claimed injury [no exemption !Tom the regulated solid waste violation]".
(Bracketed reference is added to emphasize how it pertains to this claim)
lt cannot be ignored that DEQ personnel (during their Division status with the

Dept. of Health and Welfare), made contact with Mr. Gibson in I 992, at which time he
was told by DEQ and Central District Health officials he needed their "conditional Use
Penni!", later stating he was not subject to their jurisdiction alter 1995, and again in
2003. Mr. Gibson understood from the Department of Agriculture that he did not need
any DEQ Division/agency permission to conduct his agricultural operations, which
included plant and/or crop residues, used in his composting activities on agricultural land,
and what he was doing had been deemed to be a "permitted use" statewide under the
Right to Farm Act (RTF A).
This composting activity has been defined to be an "agricultural operation" as a
matter of state law, as it has been specifically defined by I.C.§22-4502(2), which later
came to include the clarifying amendment referred to above. None of Mr. Gibson's
operations involved any materials intended for discard or disposal at any disposal site, as
the composted materials arc enriched soil and dirt substances in the final analysis,
specifically produced for use as a soil amendment or plant humus additive for

to liar plant

growth in agricultural production operations.
Mr. Gibson's agricultural operations have never been declared to reqmre
involvement from DEQ or any basis for DEQ intervention. All of Mr. Gibson's
registration and operational activities have been deemed to be under the jurisdiction of
the Agriculture Department, as he has always been so informed by the various personnel
with the Agriculture Department over the years.
Notwithstanding the exclusive right ofregulation by the Agriculture Department,
Mr. Gibson secured the conditional use permit from DEQ/Central District Health in 1992,
and when it was issued, he was then told their permit was in perpetuity, and he did not
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need to re-apply or renew what was given to him by that Agency, or any fees to pay.
Thereafter,

follov.~ng

1992, around 2002-03, new "rules" were being considered by

DEQ, who then possessed all records and related documents from their Division that had
been transferred to tbc Department, evidencing those previous permitting matters (identified
in tbe statute and confirmed those documents were observed in tbeir records during trial
testimony of Mr. Elbert), as the Division docwnents became tbe Department documents.
The new DEQ was familiar with tbe fonner Agency Division, and the Director(s) are
charged with tbe knowledge of those files and records.
Mr. Gibson later spoke with officials about the proposed IDAPA Regulations in
2002, and Mr. Gibson was told by the personnel he spoke with he did not need to worry
about or attend any of those discussions or meetings, as nothing in regard to his operation, or
the conditional use pennit tbey had before been given to him, would change in any manner
as it pertained to his existing operations and their knowledge of his composting activities,
and he was not a "regulated solid waste" as his operations were exempt.
In 1993, DEQ (then operating as a Division) conducted "inspections" of Gibson's
operations, knew the size his operations involved, which was attended by various oflicials,
including two individuals he personally knew, Dr. Ronald Baird (Central District Health)
and Mr. Dave Neal (Ada County operations). The third person was a DEQ agent, and
represented himself as an Agency representative. That on-site inspection confirmed tbat
what he was doing did not require any change in what his operations were, or how he was
conducting those operations, as he was a plant based compost operation, and his size always
comprised far in excess of 600 cubic yards of soil substance.
In late 1994, early 1995, there was a further inspections conducted by DEQ, and that
inspection included two of the same individuals, along with others from DEQ, and what was
said was they wanted to confinn there was no contamination from the possibility of other
substances at tbe facility, along witb any of the grass and leaf materials. They confirmed and
acknowledged Mr. Gibson was processing only grass clippings and leaves, acquired by him
from landscapers, various yard tenders operating throughout the sunnner season, and the
delivery of leaves by ACHD, which leaf materials had been swept from tbe streets of Boise.
That on-site inspection confirmed nothing changed, and DEQ personnel were
satisfied from what tbey observed. That during that 1994-95 inspections, the DEQ personnel
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stated to Mr. Gibson there was no need for any further inspections of those composting
operations, as DEQ officials were satisfied Mr. Gibson was processing grass and leaf
materials, and that type of plant residue was of no concern to them, and acknowledged the
materials were not being disposed of at a disposal site, and recognized the substances were
to be used for an agricultural purposes at a future date.
DEQ officials later confirmed to Mr. Gibson the materials were not, and would not
become an environmental concern after 2002, when new regulations were being processed
lor waste management, and Mr. Gibson did not hear from anyone further, whether they be
associated with Health & Weltarc, DEQ (as either a Division or Department), or Central
District Health, after the discussions in 2002, and not until a decade later, upon receiving the
letter from DEQ on April 2, 2013, following the statewide permitted use detern1ination with
Ada County that confinned no conditional usc permit (CUP) was to be required to operate a
composting facility on agricultural land within Ada County, given the clarifYing legislation
enacted on July 1, 2011.
The agricultural activities of Mr. Gibson's composting operations, have not changed
in the nature of the soil substances generated thereon, and there has never been a reduction
in size less than 600 cubic yards of dirt, soil or topsoil materials which is what was observed
in such a quantity on March 29, 2013, since his operations on the Gowen Desert front in
1988.
The location described in the Amended Complaint is an expansion to the operation
of his composting operations in 2004, authorized by I.C. §22-4502(2)(a), and this particular
expansion was across the road from the operation commenced in 1991, which DEQ officials
inspected in 1993 and again in 1994-95, as stated above, at those times were similar dirt-soil
substances, also far in excess of 600 cubic yards, and the operation on this current expansion
has been no less in size to that operation commenced in 1991.
DEQ has always been familiar with this current expansion location that commenced
in 2004, as it is perceived by IDOA as an expansion of the 1991 location across the road,
operating under the Right to Farm Act, as cited above. This operation described in the
Amended Complaint, and has been in continuous operation since August, 2004. DEQ was
well aware of it for the almost nine years prior to Mr. Gibson receiving the letter from DEQ
dated April 2, 2013.
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The provisions of I. C. §39-1 08(4) declares the specific pre-requisite to filing a
complaint (Standing), which DEQ has failed to allege, and these Defendants have been
forced to treat this pre-requisite to filing a complaint as though it were instead to be treated
and regarded as a statute of limitations, which Defendants stand by the proposition this
language contained in I.C §39-108(4) is more correctly to be applied as a "standing" and
'jurisdictional" issue to be alleged in the pleading, and not to instead be treated as an
atlirmative defense, the manner in which this court appears to require the Defendants to
incorporate the statute to be applied. DEQ cannot assert any right to impose penalties or
fines for any alleged violation of their regulations, if the director knew or ought to have
known of what is being the alleged violation. DEQ personnel, which the director is charged
with knowing, has been infinitely aware of Mr. Gibson's operations in Ada County, had he
become familiar with their historic files, back in 1992, and aware ofthe operations in 199495; aware of the further discussions ahout his operations in 2003; aware of the litigation
from 2009 through 2013; and ought to have been aware Mr. Gibson has been located in the
Gowen Field Desert Front area since 1988, and there can be no dispute DEQ has been aware
of his operations throughout the past quarter century, as DEQ became directly involved in
soliciting his participation in their permitting process in 1992, thereafter participated in the
inspection process in 1993, then again in 1994-95, and had discussions in 2003, and he has
never been held to be in violation of anything at any time by DEQ, and DEQ is estopped
from taking any position they were not familiar with his operations and activities.
This April 2, 2013 letter from DEQ, received over twenty years after the initial
inspection in 1992, referred to their "attempted" inspection on March 29, 2013, as DEQ's
Amended Complaint states DEQ "attempted to conduct an inspection" (see Amended
Complaint, P. 3, Par. 10) and from that "attempted inspection" (which was an actual on-site
inspection as Mr. Elhert so confirmed), stating: "the Department staff was able to observe
from the public roadway and the driveway prior to any gate or fence, large piles and
windrows of grass clippings, leaves, and other organic materials ... "; however, nothing in
that "observation" of an "attempted inspection" (or the actual and true on-site inspection)
could identify any substance as a "waste material", or any Tier II violation of a specifically
identified "regulated solid waste" subject to a management rule, as nothing was testified to
as being discarded or abandoned in the form of a "regulated solid waste", and more to the
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point, there has been no quantitative identification as to what quantities of any substance
was contained in the rows, or what was composed of dirt, what was composed of soil, what
was composed of topsoil, what amount consisted of grass (in truth, there were no visible
grass clippings, as delivery of that material ceased six months previous), or what amount
was comprised of leaves (also not visible to the naked eye, as their decomposition had
commenced that previous thll). \\That could only have been seen from the road was rows of
a "soil substance", stored and preserved in those rows for future application onto the
surrounding property, and no other specific material has been quantified. What was seen
after entry onto the premises remained the same, as there highly unlikely were any "grass
clippings" and certainly no identifiable leaf substance at this facility after the passage of
months of decomposition, located in the inner rows, none of which could have been seen
from the road.
The two year statutory bar to bring an action for a Tier ll size alleged violation
(notwithstanding the exemptions) is precluded by I. C. §39-108(4), having expired 10 times
over, as the "alleged" violation of a size (Tier TI) operation has been known to exist since
1992, as nothing in the operation changed in any manner of being less than 600 cubic yards
of dirt-soil substances, since their on-site inspection in 1992 and subsequent years ending in
1995. The size never receded upon subsequent inspections in 1993 and 1994-95, and upon
final discussions that took place in 2003.
Furthennore, DEQ has aerial photographs in their department files, showing county
wide activity in all prior years, and as recently of this Gibson operation in 2011 and 2012,
revealed in their proposed exhibits, later removed and called "reserved", as that
documentary evidence defeated their entire claim, acknowledging the application of the two
year statutory bar by repose. That is why DEQ has refused to allege their lack of knowledge
during the trial proceedings, as the Division/Department, have known of the size of
Gibson's agricultural operations for decades.
Additionally, DEQ witnesses have identified nothing present on the property that
constitutes a substance not exempt within their IDAPA Rules and Regulations. If they claim
a size (Tier II) "violation" from the inspection of March 29, 2013, it would be confirmed to
exist in that size in aerial photographs taken years before, as that same size minimum existed
twenty year before, as confumed by inspections in 1992. 1993, 1994-95, and a ten year
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lapse in any further discussions, following the 2003 exchange with Mr. Gibson. The
operation has not changed or been conducted in any manner inconsistent with the ongoing
process that was observed in 1992, 1993, and 1994-95 inspections, and aerial photographs,
including those taken as recently as 2011 and 2012, confirmed the "size" ofthis operation to
be what it has always been for over four decades. The relevant portion of this statute of

repose, (4) being a bar to filing the complaint, is identified in the excerpt cited below:
39-108.

(4!

No civil or administrative proceeding mav be

brought to recover for a violation o(anv provision o(this chapter or a
violation of any rule, permit or order issued or promulgated pursuant to
this chapter more than two (2) years a{ter the director had knowledge or
ought reasonably to have !tad knowledge o{the violation.
The testimony now confirms there was an actual on-site inspection, and the
opportlmity to quantify the substances located on the premises. There has been no
disclosure of what was analyzed, from which there has been any substance identified that
is classified to be a "solid waste" in what they are calling a Tier II operation, based on the
unidentified yardage. If there has been any Tier II (size) violation, it would have been
known during the 1992, 1993 and 1994-95 inspections, and addressed in the 2003
discussions, as they are identical operations, which have been knovm to the director, or

tlte director would have reasonably known o( a Tier II (size) violation back in 1992,
1993, and in 1994-95, as well as (rom the 2003 discussions and/or any aerial
photographs taken over the years, and as recently disclosed taken in 20 II and 2012,
preceding the on-site inspection .

The statutory pre-requisite announced in I.C. §39-

I 08(4) has precluded this unfounded allegation of a size violation DEQ has alleged in
their Amended Complaint, founded upon the presence of quantities that are not
quantitatively identified to confirm a "solid waste" that is to be subject to regulation.
These allegedly "observed" substances (grass clippings and leaves) as adopted
and implement by DEQ in 2003, did not give rise to any basis of any investigation, or
give rise to the basis for any inspection, and more to the point, there has been neither an
inspection or any investigation upon any information of an "alleged violation", as those
substances remain specifically excluded since enacting the 2002-03 regulations, as
confirmed to Mr. Gibson in 2003, and still maintained by the following language: These
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rules do not apply to the following solid waste ... ii. Manures and crop (plant) residues
ultimately returned to the mils at agronomic rates; and ... iii. Any agricultural solid
waste that is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted bv the Idaho
Department ofAgriculture. There is no definition of what constitutes "manure", or what
or what sources derived the mauure, or plant residues or what sources of crops that
produce these plant residues. There is no expressed distinction as to what is and what is
not included in the word "crop", and there is no express exclusion as to what is allowed
to be called a "plant", as no distinction is being asserted or defined so as to exclude from
the classification of crop and plaut the traditional inclusion of all plants, as they arc all, or
all could be, crops, to and including all grasses, trees, wheat barley, rye com sorghum,
maize grains, and any plants that bear fruits, any plants that produce vegetables, beans,
and melons, and when nothing is excluded, then all crop and plant substances are to be
deemed to be included.
There is a specific reference to the exemptions and exclusions in their "Solid
Waste Mauagement Rules and Regulations" to those exempt and excluded substances
that come under "crop (vlant) residue", and any agricultural solid waste that is

managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department o[
Agriculture.
An observation of "grass clippings and leaves", by auy definition, arc substauces
that are withln the concept of a "crop (plant) residue" as these substances are a plaut
residue that came from a plant that had the specific purpose to produce a grmvth, from
which a "crop" is raised or taken, the product to be used for a benefit.
A crop is "a plant or animal product that can be grown aud harvested extensively
for profit or subsistence." Crop may refer either to the harvested parts (like clippings,
residue, picking fruits aud vegetables). Mauy crops arc cultivated in agriculture,
horticulture, floriculture and industrial cropping, such as for clothing, biofuel, aud
compost, designed for the return to the soil or upon the plant as a nutrient emiched
amendment or foliar.
The Amended Complaint, Par. 13, page 4, refers to "grass clippings and leaves",
commonly understood to be within the meaning of a plant product, or itself to be the
crop, and for sure a plant residue", aud that was the only "substance" allegedly to have
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been "observed" on the "property" where this agricultural activity has been pursued in
the production of an agricultural product for many years, and whether observed by aerial
photograph in 20 11, 2012, or upon the inspection in 2013, just as has been before, back to
DEQ's first inspection in 1992, the substance has been the same and the size of the dirt
rows has been in excess of 600 cubic yards, There has no substances quantified on March
29, 2013, to identify any specific yardage (600 cubic yards) of any specifically defined
substance that is deemed to be a "regulated solid waste", and it has been a consistent
belief that "grass clippings" and "leaves" are those substances that were excluded from
within "regulated solid wastes", and in any event, no measurements were ever taken of
any substances on March 29, 2013, so there is no credible testimony as to what
"specifically" was contained in the rows of materials observed from the roadway on the
"property", and what quantity of the individual materials (dirt, soil, topsoil, grass, or
leaves) DEQ personnel observed in 2013, and it must be of a substance that is declared to
be a "regulated solid waste" that amounts to the quantity in excess of 600 cubic yards;
that dirt, soil, and topsoil has never been defined to qualify as a regulated solid waste, and
the mission statement would so confirm that soil is to be protected, not disposed of as
refuse. Since this inspection on March 29 was conducted at the tail end of winter, no
lawns are being clipped, and no leaves are being delivered by ACHD, so everything was
of a dirt substance. If there were any grass or leaves in their natural state at that time of
the year, being the very substances DEQ specifically excluded and exempted from the
"solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations, they nonetheless would have then been
in such an insignificant presence, that would explain why there was no attempt to
quantify such substance as being the "solid waste" of interest, as none then existed from
which to quantify of photograph.
It becomes rather disingenuous

t<.w DEQ to claim their Agency conducted an

"inspection" from which to allege a "Tier II" (solid waste quantity over 600 cubic yards)
violation, when they alleged in their pleadings (falsely) they "attempted" to conduct an
inspection, and that no actual inspection had ever taken place. Because they lied in their
pleadings when alleging they never entered the premises, that lie precluded them from
introducing any quantitative analysis as to the any non-existent identifiable grass
clippings and any non-existent identifiable leaves on the premises, neither of which had
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been delivered to the premises since the fall months. A "Tier II" violation under the
IDAPA Rules require a quantity in excess of 600 cubic yards of a "regulated solid
waste"; that what has been opined to be in excess of 600 cubic yards is not grass or
leaves, but dirt and soil substances, never defined to be a "solid waste" in any statutory or
TDAPA definition. Any "tier" references to the size of the exempted substances will not
prove their case, and composting activity within this existing agricultural operation, about
which DEQ has had knowledge about the size lor decades, precludes the action by virtue
of the statutory bar, notwithstanding that "waste" do not apply to these agricultural
operations and composting facilities that utilize either crop (plant) residue or manure. The
Agency must adhere to their own statutory bar, and also the exempting provisions within
the IDAPA enactments, 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), just as adopted in 2002-03.
As Mr. Gibson has made clear to the DEQ personnel, this grass and leaf substance
is not being "disposed of' at a landtill, but rather is an agricultural product as defined by
IDOA enactments, processed as a product for later application as a soil amendment, as
contemplated in the Soil and Plant Amendment Act enacted by the Idaho Legislature in
2001, following the earlier enactment of the Right to Farm Act in 1981, and recently
clarified to emphasize the inclusion and application to all aspects of composting, through
the clarifying amendment that went into effect in July, 2011. I.C.§ 22-4502(2)(d) confirm
these "agricultural operations" include, "plant compost", as declared in the following
language:
22-4502. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agricultural facility" includes, without limitation, any land, building,
structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance, machinery or equipment that is
used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation" means an activity or condition that occurs in
connection with the production of agricultural products for food, fiber, fuel and other
lawful uses, and includes, without limitation:
(a) Construction, expansion, use, maintenance and repair of an agricultural facility;
(b) Preparing land for agricultural production;
(c) Applying pesticides, herbicides or other chemicals, compounds or substances labeled
for insects, pests, crops, weeds, water or soil;
@ Planting, irrigating, growing, fertilizing, harvesting or producing agricultural,
horticultural, floricultural and viticultural crops, fruits and vegetable products, field
grains, seeds, hay, sod and nursery stock, and other plants, plant products, plant
byproducts, plant waste and plant compost; .... (Emphasis ours)
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This statute was amended several times since its enactment in 1981, starting with
the initial enactment of I. C. §22-4502, when it was added in 1981, ch. 177, sec. 1, p. 311;
then amended in 1997, ch. 341, sec. 1, p. 1025; then amended in 1999, ch. 377, sec. 1, p.
1035; and last amended in 2011, ch. 229, sec. 1, p. 623. The last amendment made in 2011
was undertaken pursuant to RS20384, therein stating the '"Statement of Purpose" to be:
The purpose of this legislation is to strengthen Idaho's Right to
Farm Act by: (1) more comprehensively defining the agricultural
activities to which the protections to the Act apply; (2) providing that
the protections of the Act apply to expansions to agriculture activities;
.... These changes arc based upon provisions to Right to Farm Acts of
several other states. (Emphasis ours)
The I .egislative findings and intent was previously expressed in I. C. § 22450 I to be as follows:
22-4501. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT........ The
legislature also finds that the right to farm is a natural right and is
recognized as a permitted use throughout the state of Idaho. (Emphasis
ours)
Each of the statutory enactments (Right to Fann and Soil and Plant Amendment
Acts) were made congruent with respect to composting activities, operations, and site
facilities, confirmed the authority of IDOA, and that Department has annually registered
Mr. Gibson's composted products and continuously aware of his composting operation.

DEQ never before contemplated becoming involved with composting activities,
confirmed by their discussions in 2003, and have ignored Mr. Gibson entirely since 2002,
until 2013. That during the conversation with DEQ personnel in 2002, their personnel
acknowledged the existence of the pre-emptive and exclusionwy e.f!ects contained within

their management rules, and as they acknowledged that concept in their discussion. Those
discussions confirmed the adoption of the IDAPA Rules had specifically exempted
composting of plant substances and animal manures. Mr. Gibson specifically discussed
the exclusions and exemptions in the regulatory provisions when the regulations were
being formulated in 200, and the effect of that dialogue was thought to have brought
closure to the subject as to any concerns over his agricultural operations.
For DEQ to claim Mr. Gibson is now in violation, knowing their statutory bar has
precluded this lawsuit by virtue of I. C. §39-108(4), and further precluded by their very
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own IDAPA Rules, they would need to demonstrate what changed in the law or his
operations since the historic inspections in 1993, 1994-95, and the representations made
by DEQ in 2002, and demonstrate how the IDAP A Rules have been modified to remove
the exclusion and exemption discussed in 2002, when officials acknowledged grass
clippings/leaves are a crop (plant) residue substance, and composting such substances
were excluded from regulation. Not only is "Disposal" not what is occurring in this
situation, but the substances pose no harm to human or animal health or the environment,
as they consist of the same substance found to be dirt, and typically called soil, witl1
concentrated nutrients, to be used as plant and soil additives and amendments, critical to
crop production in the agricultural industry. The Department of Agricultural even
addressed the subject and strengthened that as being an agricultural activity by the two
enactments mentioned above, and confirmed to be under the jurisdiction of IDOA.
If DEQ is granted authority to regulate what currently IDAPA Rules exclude from
their regulatory authority, and pursue every homeowner who elects to make enriched soil
from their composted grass clippings, tree and shrub plants, leaves, and landscape
trimmings, then their alleged liability would be subject to exclusion only upon an
arbitrary reference to size criteria (Tier), and that becomes an impossibility of
enforcement because the substance is in the process of going from plant residue to dirt
and soil composition, never a waste substance or material, and never discarded, as the
sole intention will be to incorporate the material back into the ground surface as an
enriching humus soil additive substance, never classilied by any homeowner as a waste
for disposal, as there is no hazardous substance or material declared to be dangerous to
human health in any such operation or activity.
CONCLUSION
There exists no basis to seek any claim of a violation of regulatory provisions of
solid waste materials, when these substances arc not waste, but rather soil substances, and
the component ingredients have been declared exempt from waste disposal materials, never
intended to regulate substances that constitute enhanced "soil substances".
These Defendants rely upon the exclusionary provisions of the IDAPA Rules, and
the barring effects of l.C.§39-108(4), along with the fact these materials are merely a
composition of soil substances, not waste of any kind, and never contemplated to be
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discarded or abandoned" material in the context of a "solid waste" deposited at a

and nullifYing effects of Title 22, Chapters 22
including I.C.§22-4502(1)(2)(d)(producing)
exclusive authority and jurisdiction of !DO
Respectfully submitted this 4tl' day of Dec

her, 2 17.
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LLC (“VHS”).
Quality
against David
R. Gibson
David R.
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS Properties,
above case
case against
Properties, LLC
Quality (“DEQ”)
Reporter’s Transcript
in this
this case,
the Reporter’s
Transcript of
These
by the
of Proceedings
closing arguments
arguments are
Proceedings in
These closing
are supported
supported by
case,
the exhibits
trial.
exhibits and
and
admitted at
at trial.
and the
and testimony
testimony admitted

PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING
PLAINTIFF’S
ARGUMENT -- 11
CLOSING ARGUMENT

001075

I.
I.

OVERVIEW
OVERVIEW

DEQ
with the
that apply
Mr. Gibson
the rules
asking VHS
is asking
to comply
to
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson to
and statutes
statutes that
rules and
comply with
DEQ is
apply to
the
by Mr.
years. The
the composting
Mr. Gibson
for years.
The Solid
Management Rules
composting facility
Solid Waste
Rules
Gibson for
operated by
Waste Management
facility operated
applicable
within the
that comes
Mr. Gibson
the purview
the
to VHS
to every
of the
applicable to
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson apply
comes within
purview of
facility that
every facility
apply to
act;
processing solid
waste at
his facility
Mr. Gibson
on
at his
Defendants are
no exception.
exception. Mr.
solid waste
are no
Gibson has
has been
been processing
facility on
act; Defendants
the
property since
Smith property
this day.
the Smith
The cumulative
at least
to do
to this
continues to
since at
least 2013,
cumulative
and continues
do so
so to
2013, and
day. The
volume of
waste at
both in
in 2013
than 600
his facility,
through trial,
of solid
at his
2013 and
is greater
greater than
solid waste
volume
and through
cubic
600 cubic
trial, is
facility, both
yards. His
11 Facility.
trial
Tier II
His composting
The evidence
therefore classifies
composting facility
at trial
classiﬁes as
evidence at
as a
a Tier
facility therefore
Facility. The
yards.
supported
both Mr.
Mr.
not entirely,
As aa result,
these conclusions
conclusions and
and was
supported these
undisputed. As
was largely,
result, both
entirely, undisputed.
largely, if not
Gibson
11 operating
siting requirements
with the
Tier II
the Tier
for
operating and
requirements for
to comply
required to
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS are
are required
and siting
comply with
Gibson’s facility.
Mr.
was undisputed
undisputed at
it was
trial that
that neither
neither Mr.
And it
Mr. Gibson
nor VHS
Mr. Gibson’s
at trial
complied
Gibson nor
VHS complied
facility. And

with the
11 facilities.
siting requirements
with
Tier II
the operating
operating or
requirements applicable
facilities.
or siting
to Tier
applicable to
DEQ
judgment assessing
both Mr.
Mr. Gibson
entitled to
is entitled
to aa judgment
against both
Gibson and
and
assessing aa $10,000
$10,000 penalty
penalty against
DEQ is
VHS,
with the
siting and
requiring VHS
Mr. Gibson
the siting
injunction requiring
permanent injunction
to comply
and aa permanent
and
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson to
comply with
VHS, and
operating
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.
operating requirements
requirements found
found in
58.01.06.012.
II.

STANDARD
STANDARD

The
grant or
an injunction
regarding aa grant
denial of
The standard
standard of
injunction is
of review
or denial
of an
is abuse
of discretion.
discretion.
review regarding
abuse of
513714 (1998).
Trustees, 132
A permanent
132 Idaho
permanent
Idaho 244,
P.2d 512,
Miller v.
Bd. of
970 P.2d
v. Bd.
24546, 970
244, 245–46,
512, 513–14
QfTrustees,
(1998). A

mandatory
party subject
injunction imposes
continuing obligations
the patty
the
obligations on
on the
to the
imposes affirmative,
subject to
affirmative, continuing
mandatory injunction
injunction,
prospective application
by the
continuing supervision
the Court.
application subject
to continuing
and has
has a
Court. See
supervision by
subject to
injunction, and
a prospective
See
City of
Boise v.
open-ended
147 Idaho
215 P.3d
524 (2009).
are open-ended
Idaho 794,
P.3d 514,
v. Ada Cty.,
514, 524
794, 804,
804, 215
They are
(2009). They
QfBoise
Cty., 147
in
in nature
42 Am.Jur.2d
nature and
and concern
continuing situation.
situation. Id. (citing
Am.Jur.2d Injunctions 302
concern aa continuing
302 (2009).)
(citing 42
(2009).)
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“Entitlement to
“Entitlement
upon the
relief depends
the presentation
the
presentation of
injunctive relief
to injunctive
of evidence
evidence by
depends upon
by the

applicant,
right to
In an
an injunction
like any
the right
injunction case,
the
establishing the
other case,
to such
relief. In
such relief.
applicant, establishing
case, like
case, the
any other
court’s findings
factito support
appropriateiare
district
that an
an injunction
findings of
its conclusion
injunction is
district court’s
of fact—to
is appropriate—are
support its
conclusion that
court’s
subject
under the
that standard,
the clear
the court’s
clear error
error standard,
to review
Under that
I.R.C.P. 52(a).
review under
subject to
standard, I.R.C.P.
standard, the
52(a). Under

factual
based on
be
Will not
factual findings
ﬁndings based
and competent,
not be
substantial and
though conflicting,
on substantial
evidence will
conflicting, evidence
competent, though
appeal.” Balla v.
disturbed
116 Idaho
151 (Ct.
Idaho 257,
on appeal.”
P.2d 149,
App. 1989)
disturbed on
v. Murphy, 116
775 P.2d
149, 151
257, 259,
259, 775
1989)
(Ct. App.

(citation
the remedy
the choice
and the
the scope
injunctive relief,
of the
of injunctive
choice of
scope thereof,
(citation omitted).
thereof,
relief, and
omitted). However,
However, the
remedy of
presents
upon which
will exercise
appellate court
the appellate
which the
free review.
presents aa question
question upon
court will
exercise free
review. Id. (citations
(citations
omitted).
omitted).
III.

THE EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL
EVIDENCE AT
THE

Gibson’s facility.
A.
Management Rules
The Solid
Mr. Gibson’s
A. The
to Mr.
Solid Waste
Waste Management
Rules apply
facility.
apply to

The
waste and
The Solid
Management Rules
to “all solid
solid waste
solid waste
Solid Waste
Rules apply
and solid
waste
Waste Management
apply to
Idaho,” except
management
in Idaho,”
the act.
facilities in
management facilities
except where
Where excluded
under the
excluded under
act. (IDAPA
(IDAPA
“discarded solid
58.01.06.001.02.
is defined
defined as
Solid waste
solid materials,
and 58.01.06.004.)
waste is
58.01.06.001.02. and
as “discarded
materials,
58.01.06.004.) Solid

including
waste materials
from industrial,
resulting from
including solid
materials resulting
agricultural operations
operations
solid waste
and agricultural
industrial, commercial,
commercial, and
.” (Idaho
and
IDAPA
from community
activities . . . .”
and from
Code §
see also IDAPA
community activities
(Idaho Code
39-10303); see
§ 39-103(13);
.

.

.

“solid waste”
58.01.06.001.11
waste” as
“any...discarded material
material including
including solid…material
solid. .material
58.01 .06.001 .11 (defining
as “any...discarded
(deﬁning “solid
.

“discarded” is
resulting
in Idaho
term “discarded”
The term
not defined
resulting from…community
from. .community activities.”.))
activities.”.)) The
is not
or
defined in
Idaho Code
Code or
.

“discarded” to
IDAPA.
in the
IDAPA. However,
term “discarded”
the context
the term
context of
of solid
to mean,
solid waste,
applies the
However, in
mean,
waste, DEQ
DEQ applies
“something that
“something
that the
that had
that material
that there
the generator
the person
material determined
there was
generator or
or the
no
determined that
person that
had that
was no

away.” (Trial
longer
wanted to
that material
Tr. 191:20191 :20material away.”
longer any
throw that
therefore wanted
or use,
to throw
and therefore
value or
(Trial Tr.
use, and
any value

25,
192:1-5.)
25,192:1—5.)
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“discarded” is
DEQ’s application
DEQ’s
word “discarded”
Ninth Circuit
with the
the word
the Ninth
Circuit Court
application of
of the
is consistent
consistent with
of
Court of
Appeal’s application
Appeal’s
in the
that word
the context
looking at
context of
Whether solid
application of
of that
of solid
When looking
at whether
solid waste.
solid
word in
waste. When
“the verb
‘discard’ is
waste has
been discarded,
Ninth Circuit
that “the
the Ninth
Circuit noted
is defined
defined by
noted that
has been
verb ‘discard’
waste
discarded, the
by

up.”’ Safe
‘cast aside;
dictionary
usage as
Air for Everyone v.
Meyer,
and usage
as to
to ‘cast
give up.’”
v. Meyer,
abandon; give
dictionary and
aside; reject;
reject; abandon;
Safé Airfbr
373
English Dictionary
1041 (9th
The New
Shorter Oxford
F. 3d
Cir. 2004)
Oxford English
New Shorter
684
373 F.
3d 1035,
Dictionary 684
(citing 11 The
1035, 1041
2004) (citing
(9th Cir.
(4th
waste has
been discarded,
Ninth Circuit
looking at
the Ninth
Whether solid
Circuit
at whether
solid waste
has been
When looking
ed. 1993)).
discarded, the
(4th ed.
1993)). When
“destined for
looks
beneficial reuse
in aa continuous
material is
the material
for beneﬁcial
whether the
is “destined
or recycling
looks at:
continuous
at: (1)
reuse or
recycling in
(1) whether

itself,” (2)
process
by the
being actively
materials are
generating industry
the generating
the materials
are being
whether the
or
process by
actively reused,
reused, or
industry itself,”
(2) whether

whether
potential of
being
materials are
the potential
the materials
are being
Whether they
whether the
have the
of being
being reused,
reused, (3)
merely have
they merely
(3) whether
reused
by its
use by
Air for Everyone
original owner,
its original
reclaimer. Safe
salvager or
as opposed
to use
0r reclaimer.
reused by
opposed to
owner, as
Safé Airfbr
by aa salvager
v.
Meyer, 373
for example,
1043 (9th
Cir. 2004)
bluegrass
F.3d 1035,
v. Meyer,
373 F.3d
(Citations omitted).
example, aa bluegrass
omitted). If,
1035, 1043
2004) (citations
(9th Cir.
If, for
farmer
benefit the
in order
a source
farmer burns
after harvest
his grass
the grass
grass residue
to beneﬁt
grass fields
fields as
as a
of
harvest in
burns his
order to
residue after
source of
nutrients,
burnt grass
at
then the
and pesticide,
the burnt
has not
not been
grass residue
discarded. See
residue has
fertilizer, and
been discarded.
nutrients, fertilizer,
See id. at
pesticide, then
Gibson’s facility
1045.
at Mr.
In contrast
in this
material left
left at
this case,
the organic
organic material
Mr. Gibson’s
contrast in
1045. In
discarded
facility was discarded
case, the

because
back.
at his
it back.
material at
left material
the individuals
his facility
individuals who
none of
of the
wanted it
who left
because none
facility wanted
Finally,
under the
the Solid
Management
more specific
of solid
solid waste
Solid Waste
speciﬁc type
waste covered
Waste Management
covered under
Finally, aa more
type of
waste.” Yard
“yard waste.”
Rules
waste is
brush,
is “yard
Yard waste
is defined
Rules is
deﬁned as,
grass clippings,
“[W]eeds, straw,
clippings, brush,
straw, leaves,
leaves, grass
as, “[w]eeds,

wood,
from general
other natural,
materials typically
maintenance
organic materials
general landscape
and other
derived from
landscape maintenance
natural, organic
wood, and
typically derived
activities.” (IDAPA
activities.”
58.01.06.004.52.)
(IDAPA 58.01.06.004.52.)

B.
that fall
fall under
materials that
the definition
deﬁnition of
Mr. Gibson
of solid
B. Mr.
solid
under the
solid materials
Gibson accepts
accepts discarded
discarded solid
waste.
waste.
Gibson’s operations
DEQ
in 2013
information received
Mr. Gibson’s
2013 as
result of
of information
investigated Mr.
operations in
received
as a
a result
DEQ investigated

about
that facility
from Treetop
Tr.
at that
Treetop Recycling,
to DEQ
ofﬁcials. (Trial
reported directly
odor at
about odor
facility from
directly to
(Trial Tr.
Recycling, reported
DEQ officials.
Gibson’s operations
200:12-25,
in response,
Mr. Gibson’s
200:12-25, 201:1-11.)
201:1-11.) DEQ
ofﬁcials researched
Dean
operations in
and Dean
researched Mr.
response, and
DEQ officials
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Gibson’s facility
Ehlert
went to
Ehlert and
Mr. Gibson’s
March 29,
Gantz went
204:5-25, 205:1-3.)
on March
to Mr.
2013. (Id.
205:1-3.)
and Jack
Jack Gantz
facility on
(Id. 204:5-25,
29, 2013.

Mr.
in the
Ehlert is
Unit Manager
Mr. Ehlert
the Assessment
the Waste
Management and
is the
Manager in
Compliance Unit
Assessment and
and Compliance
and
Waste Management
Remediation
years of
Division at
inspecting composting
Remediation Division
at DEQ.
He has
13 years
of experience
composting and
experience inspecting
solid
has 13
and solid
DEQ. He
waste management
Ehlert and
Tr. 176:11-25,
Mr. Ehlert
177:1-2, 374:14-22.)
176:11-25, 177:1-2,
management facilities.
facilities. (Trial
374:14-22.) When
and
When Mr.
waste
(Trial Tr.
Gibson’s facility,
Mr.
Mr. Gantz
Mr. Gibson’s
not observe
Gantz arrived
at Mr.
an odor
arrived at
did not
but did
did
odor violation,
observe an
Violation, but
facility, they
they did

Gibson’s composting
observe
Mr. Gibson’s
March 29,
composting operations.
291:7-24.) On
On March
operations. (Id.
observe Mr.
2013, they
(Id. 291:7-24.)
they
29, 2013,

observed
windrows containing
various stages
in various
containing grass
of decomposition.
decomposition.
numerous Windrows
and leaves
grass and
stages of
leaves in
observed numerous
Gibson’s facility
(Id.
211:21-25, 212:1-2.)
212:1-2.) They
Mr. Gibson’s
other
signs at
at Mr.
open signs
and other
also observed
observed open
facility and
(Id. 211:21-25,
They also

signage
who left
per load
forth aa fee
left material
setting forth
for those
charging $5
material there:
there: charging
signage setting
those who
fee structure
load if
structure for
$5 per
someone
per load
not sign
sign in.
in. (Exs.
signs in,
and $100
someone signs
load if they
do not
$100 per
17.1, 17.3,
(Exs. 17.1,
17.3, 17.5,
17.5, 17.6,
17.6, 17.7,
17.7,
in, and
they do
Gibson’s facility
17.13,
Trial Tr.
The signs
Mr. Gibson’s
Tr. 213:16-25,
213:16-25, 214:1-7.)
214:1-7.) The
signs on
on Mr.
discouraged
facility discouraged
17.14; Trial
17.13, 17.14;

branches
charging $1,000
for such
The signs
items. (Ex.
signs
construction materials,
branches and
and construction
such items.
materials, charging
17.5.) The
$1,000 for
(EX. 17.5.)
informed
that they
not
informed folks
folks that
or soft
soft green
green vegetation,
deposit grass
but not
grass clippings,
could deposit
vegetation, but
clippings, leaves,
leaves, or
they could
Gibson’s facility
branches,
waste, trash,
Mr. Gibson’s
or chemicals.
is
construction waste,
chemicals. (Ex.
branches, limbs,
facility is
limbs, construction
trash, or
17.5.) Mr.
(EX. 17.5.)

“most intelligent
open
professionals” enter
intelligent lawn
that the
the “most
his facility.
enter his
24/7 and
he advertises
open 24/7
and he
advertises that
lawn care
care professionals”
facility.

DEQ’s observations
Gibson’s facility,
(Id.
upon DEQ’s
Mr. Gibson’s
EX. 17.15.)
investigation of
of Mr.
and investigation
observations and
Based upon
17.15.) Based
facility,
(Id. and Ex.

they
was accepting
11
that he
Tier II
operating as
determined that
he was
accepting and
solid waste
processing solid
and processing
and operating
waste and
as a
a Tier
they determined
Facility.
Facility.
The
trial proved
that Mr.
The evidence
Mr. Gibson
ten acres
at trial
composting facility
on ten
Gibson operates
operates aa composting
evidence at
proved that
acres
facility on
“Smith property”).
17:16of
property owned
by Defendant
16:1-4, 17:16Tr. 15:25,
Defendant VHS
of property
property”). (Trial
VHS (the
owned by
(Trial Tr.
15:25, 16:1-4,
(the “Smith
Gibson’s composting
19.)
in Boise,
Mr. Gibson’s
of Pleasant
Pleasant Valley
composting facility
is located
Ada
located west
west of
facility is
Boise, Ada
Valley Road,
Road, in
19.) Mr.

County,
was undisputed
undisputed at
It was
trial that
that since
Mr. Gibson
14:5-9, 25,
15:1-14.) It
at trial
since 2013,
Gibson
Idaho. (Id.
2013, Mr.
(Id. 14:5-9,
25, 15:1-14.)
County, Idaho.
has
hayifrom
organic materials—specifically,
stale hay—from
has accepted
and stale
grass clippings,
materialsispeciﬁcally, grass
accepted organic
clippings, leaves,
leaves, and
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landscapers,
use in
in his
for use
his composting
the
farmers for
lawn care
composting operations
on the
operations on
and farmers
care individuals,
individuals, and
landscapers, lawn
Smith
property. (Id.
Smith propeny.
fall
25:1-25, 26:1-25,
26:1-25, 27:1-25,
27:1-25, 28:1-6;
28:1-6; 56:14-25,
56:14-25, 57:1-6.)
materials fall
These materials
57:1-6.) These
(Id. 25:1-25,
“solid waste”
waste” and
within
within the
fall under
the definition
deﬁnition of
the grass
clippings and
the more
of “solid
more
under the
and the
and leaves
grass clippings
leaves fall
“yard waste.”
specific
waste.” The
None of
definition of
The materials
the landscapers,
materials were
of “yard
of the
specific definition
were also
also discarded.
discarded. None
landscapers,
Gibson’s facility
lawn
left these
Mr. Gibson’s
farmers who
materials at
lawn care
or farmers
organic materials
at Mr.
these organic
who left
care individuals,
individuals, or
facility

received
back from
in their
their original
from Mr.
original form.
for those
Mr. Gibson
form. (Id.
materials back
or asked
52:8-25;
those materials
Gibson in
received or
asked for
(Id. 52:8-25;
53:1-21.)
title of
them to
Mr. Gibson
materials and
of these
is using
using them
to make
make
53:1-21.) Rather,
these materials
Gibson accepted
and is
accepted title
Rather, Mr.
compost.
504:10-24, 505:15-19,
other
at least
56:19-25, 57:1-6,
57:1-6, 504:10-24,
505:15-19, 507:14-19.)
least two
507:14-19.) Similarly,
compost. (Id.
two other
Similarly, at
(Id. 56:19-25,
Gibson’s facility
governmental
Mr. Gibson’s
entities discarded
materials at
governmental entities
organic materials
at Mr.
2013 and
and
discarded organic
between 2013
facility between

2015.
11-20, 438:4-11.)
438:4-11.)
2015. (Id.
306:4-9, 308:
308: 11-20,
(Id. 306:4-9,
At
At trial,
Mike Woodward,
Unit for
the Horticulture
for Boise
Parks and
manager of
of the
Horticulture Unit
Boise City
and
trial, Mike
Woodward, manager
City Parks
Gibson’s facility
Recreation,
Smith
that Boise
the Smith
clippings to
Mr. Gibson’s
on the
testiﬁed that
to Mr.
Boise City
hauled grass
grass clippings
Recreation, testified
facility on
City hauled

property
in 2013
from Boise
clippings were
2014. (Id.
2013 and
305:2-25, 306:1-9.)
These grass
Boise
and 2014.
grass clippings
were from
306:1-9.) These
property in
(Id. 305:2-25,
City’s regular
City’s
parks and
rights-0f—way
maintenance and
regular maintenance
activities on
on Boise
landscaping activities
Boise City
and rights-of-way
and landscaping
City parks

maintained
were
the City.
clippings were
maintained by
305:24-25, 306:1-3,
These grass
306:1-3, 307:5-20.)
grass clippings
307:5-20.) These
City. (Id.
(Id. 305:24-25,
by the
discarded,
the following
following testimony:
evidenced by
testimony:
discarded, evidenced
by the
Gibson's facility
Q.
in 2013,
clippings to
Mr. Gibson's
to take
take clippings
to Mr.
Boise City
did Boise
choose to
facility in
2013,
City choose
Why did
Q. Why
2014?
2014?

Gibson’s facility
A.
Mr. Gibson’s
meaning close
maintenance
A. Mr.
to our
our maintenance
provided aa convenient,
close to
convenient, meaning
facility provided
facility
down
here,
and
cost-effective
location
to
dispose.
cost-effective
location to dispose.
facility down here, and

Q.
use of
that they
left at
further use
Did Boise
the grass
clippings that
Mr.
of the
at Mr.
Boise City
have any
grass clippings
they left
City have
any further
Q. Did
Gibson’s facility
Gibson’s
in 2013
2014?
2013 and
and 2014?
facility in
A.
A. No,
not.
did not.
we did
No, we
Gibson’s
Q.
it left
that it
left out
Did Boise
the grass
clippings that
Mr. Gibson’s
want the
at Mr.
Boise City
out at
ever want
grass clippings
City ever
Q. Did
facility
back from
from him?
him?
facility back

PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING
PLAINTIFF’S
ARGUMENT -- 66
CLOSING ARGUMENT

001080

A.
A. No,
not.
did not.
we did
No, we
Q.
its grass
clippings back
to receive
Boise City
expect to
did Boise
receive its
Same question,
ever expect
grass clippings
back
question, did
City ever
Q. Same
from
from Mr.
Mr. Gibson?
Gibson?
A.
A. No,
not.
did not.
we did
No, we
Gibson’s facility.
(Id.
paid to
its grass
clippings at
Mr. Gibson’s
to dispose
of its
at Mr.
Boise City
grass clippings
308:6-20.) Boise
dispose of
facility. (Id.
(Id. 308:6-20.)
(Id.
City paid

313:7-25,
that
352:22-25, 353:1-12;
317:1-18, 352:22-25,
353:1-12; and Exs.
314: 1-8, 317:1-18,
Exs. 22,
313:7-25, 314:1-8,
Boise City
understood that
22, 23.)
23.) Boise
City understood
“debris were
Gibson’s facility
Mr.
were deposited
into aa compost
Mr. Gibson’s
or
Where “debris
and converted
converted into
compost or
place where
deposited and
was aa place
facility was
amendment.” (Trial
brother-insoil
In fact,
Tr. 318:16-25,
Mr. Woodward
his brother-insoil amendment.”
318:16-25, 319:1-11.)
319:1-11.) In
took his
Woodward took
(Trial Tr.
fact, Mr.

Gibson’s facility
law
purchase compost
in either
2014 or
Mr. Gibson’s
either 2014
for
amendment for
or 2015
2015 to
to purchase
or aa soil
soil amendment
to Mr.
compost or
laW to
facility in

brother-in-law was
aa greenhouse
his brother-in-law
starting. (Id.
344:1-12.)
318:5-24, 344:1-12.)
greenhouse his
was starting.
(Id. 318:5-24,

Scott
for the
the Ada
Maintenance for
Superintendent of
of Maintenance
Scott Frisbee,
Ada County
District,
Frisbee, Superintendent
Highway District,
County Highway
Gibson’s facility
testified
in 2013,
trial that
that Ada
Mr. Gibson’s
testiﬁed at
at trial
to Mr.
2015.
Ada County
hauled leaves
and 2015.
leaves to
facility in
2014, and
2013, 2014,
County hauled

(Id.
431:1-11, 434:18-25,
The leaves
434: 18-25, 436:3-16;
Exs. 21.9,
430:8-25, 431:1-11,
436:3-16; Exs.
hauled by
leaves hauled
21.11.) The
21.10, 21.11.)
21.9, 21.10,
(Id. 430:8-25,
by
Gibson’s facility
Ada
rights-of—way in
in Ada
fell from
from trees
Mr. Gibson’s
the roads
to Mr.
onto the
trees onto
Ada
Ada County
and rights-of-way
roads and
facility fell
County to

County.
that Ada
431:12-25, 432:1-25,
Mr.
Tr. 431:12-25,
432:1-25, 433:1.)
The leaves
took to
to Mr.
Ada County
leaves that
(Trial Tr.
433:1.) The
County. (Trial
County took
Gibson’s facility
Gibson’s
the following
following testimony:
were discarded,
evidenced by
testimony:
discarded, evidenced
facility were
by the
‘
‘
Gibson’s facility
Q.
in 2013,
that ACHD
ACHD hauled
The leaves
to Gibson’s
hauled out
out to
and ‘15,
leaves that
facility in
2013, ‘14,
14, and
15,
Q. The
did
ACHD have
further use
of those
those leaves?
did ACHD
have any
leaves?
use of
any further

A.
A. No.
No.
-- or
Q.
it
ACHD ever
that it
Did Ada
the leaves
or ACHD
to receive
expect to
Ada County
receive the
ever -ever expect
leaves that
County ever
Q. Did
Gibson’s facility
hauled
from Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
Mr. Gibson?
to Mr.
hauled out
out to
Gibson?
back from
facility back

A.
that I’m aware
Not that
A. Not
of.
aware of.
(Id.
County’s activity
hauling
off of
of Ada
438:4-11.) Ada
of sweeping
streets and
Ada County
and hauling
Ada County’s
sweeping leaves
leaves off
activity of
County streets
(Id. 438:4-11.)
Gibson’s facility
them
them to
Mr. Gibson’s
maintenance activities:
to Mr.
activities:
were community
community maintenance
facility were
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Q.
would sweep
it was
that ACHD
ACHD would
And it
off of
haul leaves
of Ada
and haul
Ada County
true that
leaves off
was true
sweep and
County
Q. And
streets
in 2013,
streets in
2015?
and 2015?
2014, and
2013, 2014,
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
Q.
was sweeping
ACHD aa
And was
hauling leaves
for ACHD
to aa facility
sweeping and
and hauling
out to
leaves out
facility for
Okay. And
Q. Okay.
maintenance
maintenance activity?
activity?
A.
was.
it was.
It was
maintenance activity;
A. It
was aa maintenance
activity; yes,
yes, it
‘15?
‘14, and
Q.
was aa maintenance
it was
in 2013,
And it
maintenance activity
and ‘15?
activity in
2013, ‘14,
Q. And

That’s correct.
A.
A. That’s
correct.

(Id.
understood that
was operating
Like Boise
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
operating aa
438:15-24.) Like
Boise City,
Ada County
Gibson was
County understood
(Id. 438:15-24.)
City, Ada
compost
436:24-25, 437:1-6.)
compost facility.
437:1-6.)
facility. (Id.
(Id. 436:24-25,
Gibson’s facility,
In
In sum,
the Solid
Mr. Gibson’s
Management Rules
to Mr.
he accepts
Solid Waste
Rules apply
Waste Management
accepts
as he
facility, as
sum, the
apply to

solid
All of
that he
his facility.
the material
his facility—grass
material that
facilityigrass clippings,
at his
of the
he collects
at his
solid waste
collects at
waste at
clippings,
facility. All
“solid waste.”
waste.” They
leaves,
within the
broad definition
hayifall Within
the broad
deﬁnition of
materials
of “solid
stale hay—fall
solid materials
and stale
are solid
leaves, and
They are

from
None of
from community
the grass
lawn care.
of the
and lawn
grass
care. None
maintenance, and
activities, i.e.,
landscaping, maintenance,
community activities,
i.e., landscaping,
Gibson’s facility
clippings,
that are
left at
Mr. Gibson’s
being reused
or hay
at Mr.
are being
are left
reused by
clippings, leaves,
facility are
leaves, or
hay that
by the individuals

or entities who
who left
it is
left these
that
Mr. Gibson
is undisputed
admitted by
materials. Rather,
these materials.
undisputed and
and admitted
Gibson that
Rather, it
by Mr.
these
ultimately humus.
The material
material at
materials are
being used
to make
make compost,
at
these materials
are being
and ultimately
humus. The
used by
compost, and
by him to
Gibson’s facility
Mr.
under the
fall under
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson’s
the more
thus discarded.
more
are thus
and leaves
grass clippings
discarded. And,
leaves fall
facility are
And, the

“yard waste.”
specific
waste.” There
in this
this case
that the
definition of
the Solid
There can
of “yard
no dispute
specific definition
Solid Waste
can be
dispute in
Waste
be no
case that
Gibson’s facility
Management
property.
Smith propelty.
Mr. Gibson’s
the Smith
Management Rules
to Mr.
on the
Rules apply
facility on
apply to

C.
Tier II Facility.
operating aa Tier
Mr. Gibson
and operating
is processing
solid waste
waste and
processing solid
Gibson is
C. Mr.
Facility.
“uses
Under
that “uses
the Solid
Management Rules,
is one
Under the
Solid Waste
processing facility
one that
Waste Management
facility is
Rules, aa processing

biological or
prepare solid
handling
for reuse,
or chemical
chemical decomposition
to prepare
excluding waste
biological
decomposition to
solid waste
waste for
waste handling
reuse, excluding
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centers.” (IDAPA
at
trial
The evidence
transfer stations
at transfer
stations or
or recycling
at trial
evidence at
58.01.06.005.32.) The
(IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32.)
recycling centers.”

proved that
waste processing
processing facility,
11 Facility.
that Mr.
Tier II
Mr. Gibson
solid waste
Gibson operates
operates aa solid
proved
speciﬁcally aa Tier
Facility.
facility, specifically
Mr.
processing the
into compost.
Mr. Gibson
the grass,
through
is processing
He does
Gibson is
and hay
compost. He
does so
so through
leaves, and
grass, leaves,
hay into
biological
what composting
it as,
it
Mr. Gibson
composting is,
biological decomposition.
decomposition. When
Gibson described
When asked
described it
asked What
is, Mr.
as, “pile it
up and
let nature
Tr. 24:8-12.)
Mr. Gibson
24:8-12.) When
take care
of it.” (Trial
When questioned
and let
nature take
questioned further,
Gibson
care of
up
further, Mr.
(Trial Tr.
testified:
testiﬁed:
Q.
And then,
let nature
let the
the natural
take care
of it,
mean let
natural decomposition
decomposition
nature take
care of
then, by
it, you
you mean
Q. And
by let
process take
with respect
to those
take place
those materials;
respect to
place with
true?
process
materials; true?
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
(Id.
which is
high in
in nitrogen,
high in
in
Mr. Gibson
which are
is high
24:16-19.) Mr.
takes grass,
Gibson takes
and leaves,
are high
nitrogen, and
leaves, which
grass, which
(Id. 24:16-19.)
carbon,
with water
water and
in
them with
41:1-7, 44:6-25.)
Mr. Gibson
mixes them
44:6-25.) Mr.
and mixes
and oxygen.
Gibson engages
engages in
carbon, and
oxygen. (Id.
(Id. 41:1-7,
windrow composting,
piled into
into distinct
far
the decomposing
distinct rows,
materials are
Windrow
Where the
decomposing materials
are piled
spaced far
composting, where
rows, spaced
enough
piles can
piles. (Id.
that the
the piles
air can
the piles.
28:16-25, 29:1,
apart so
enough apart
reach the
can be
turned and
and air
can reach
so that
be turned
29:1,
(Id. 28:16-25,
30:18-25,
in the
244:22-25, 245:1-25.)
the grass
the
While the
31:1-5, 244:22-25,
245:1-25.) While
30:18-25, 31:1-5,
and leaves
are decomposing
decomposing in
grass and
leaves are
windrows, the
kills things
things like
like weed
The heat
the windrows
heat kills
47:7-14.) The
generate heat.
heat. (Id.
Windrows generate
and
weed seed
seed and
Windrows,
(Id. 47:7-14.)
other
pathogens. (Id.
The heat
the desired
other pathogens.
temperature
heat range
range of
of 130
to 160
is the
47:15-19.) The
130 to
160 degrees
desired temperature
degrees is
(Id. 47:15-19.)
range
weed seed
pathogens. (Id.
windrows heat
up, they
kill things
things like
After the
like weed
the Windrows
range to
to kill
heat up,
48:2-8.) After
and pathogens.
seed and
(Id. 48:2-8.)
they
eventually
in the
the temperature
the material
the
material in
When the
begin to
to cool
48:9-12.) When
temperature drops,
cool down.
down. (Id.
eventually begin
drops, the
(Id. 48:9-12.)
49:1windrows become
by Mr.
Mr. Gibson).
48:13-25, 49:1or humus
to as
humus (referred
Windrows
compost or
become compost
as “dirt” by
(referred to
Gibson). (Id.
(Id. 48:13-25,

2).
breaking the
mixing grass,
the
natural decomposition
decomposition occurs:
and oxygen,
occurs: breaking
water, and
leaves, water,
grass, leaves,
oxygen, natural
2). By
By mixing
grass
into compost,
91:1-2,
44:6-25, 89:23-25,
90:1-25, 91:1-2,
89:23-25, 90:1-25,
and leaves
and ultimately
humus. (Id.
grass and
leaves into
ultimately humus.
compost, and
(Id. 44:6-25,
244:1-25,
244:1-25, 245:1-10.)
245:1-10.)
Mr.
process and
trial that
that the
that he
this process
the
Mr. Gibson
admitted that
admitted at
at trial
he uses
Gibson admitted
and also
also admitted
uses this
process is
is biological
biological decomposition:
decomposition:
process
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Q.
process that
we just
just described
biological
that that
that process
that we
is a
agree that
described is
Would you
a biological
you agree
Q. Would
decomposition
decomposition process?
process?
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
Q.
been using
using that
process at
Smith
that biological
And you
the Smith
at the
biological decomposition
decomposition process
have been
you have
Q. And
7
property as
your composting
part of
of your
composting operations
is –
operations since
since 2013;
as part
2013; is
property
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
-- that
Q.
that true?
true?
Q. --

A.
that aa question?
A. Is
Is that
question?
Q.
–
question 7
Yes. My
Q. Yes.
My question
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
-- is
-- okay.
Q.
that biological
And you
the
is -continue that
on the
biological decomposition
decomposition process
process on
okay. And
you continue
Q. -Smith
property today?
Smith propeny
today?

A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
(Id.
years to
it takes
that it
Mr. Gibson
10 years
to make
make humus,
admitted at
at
estimates that
takes about
49:9-23.) Mr.
Gibson estimates
and admitted
about 10
humus, and
(Id. 49:9-23.)
trial
be reused,
it can
trial that
that it
that the
that he
fertilizer.
the reason
he makes
is so
makes humus
humus is
can be
reason that
so that
as a
a fertilizer.
speciﬁcally as
reused, specifically
Gibson’s
(Id.
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
There is
92:1-6, 505:15-25,
is no
no dispute
91:3-25, 92:1-6,
505:15-25, 506:1,
507:14-23.) There
dispute that
506:1, 507:14-23.)
(Id. 91:3-25,
“processing facility”
facility” under
facility
the Solid
Management Rules.
qualifies as
under the
Solid Waste
Rules. (See
Waste Management
as a
a “processing
facility qualifies
(See

IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32.)
58.01.06.005.32.)
Gibson’s facility
Mr.
11 Facility.
A Tier
11 Facility
Tier II
Tier II
Mr. Gibson’s
more specifically,
is
Facility. A
facility is,
Facility is
speciﬁcally, aa Tier
is, more

classified
landfilling or
that the
the facility
determines that
is not:
not: (1)
or disposing
of
disposing of
classiﬁed as
such if DEQ
as such
facility is
DEQ determines
(1) landfilling
CESQG
pathogenic
high human
landﬁlling or
with aa high
human pathogenic
materials with
or disposing
of materials
disposing of
hazardous waste;
waste; (2)
CESQG hazardous
(2) landfilling
potential; (3)
will form
in aa manner
that Will
form toxic
manner or
managing solid
toxic leachate
or gas;
or
or volume
solid waste
leachate or
volume that
waste in
potential;
gas; or
(3) managing
(4)
waste in
volume that
pose aa substantial
in aa manner
that is
risk to
manner or
managing solid
human
or volume
is likely
to pose
to human
substantial risk
solid waste
likely to
(4) managing
health
in fact
this determination,
health or
the environment.
environment. (IDAPA
fact make
make this
or the
did in
determination,
(IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03.)
58.01.06.009.03.) DEQ
DEQ did
evidenced
by the
Notice of
Trial Tr.
Mr. Gibson,
Tr.
the Notice
Violation issued
to Mr.
of Violation
2013. (Ex.
evidenced by
dated July
issued to
Gibson, dated
(EX. 6;
July 30,
30, 2013.
6; Trial
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246:7-17.)
trial that
that the
And Mr.
Mr. Gibson
the above
not apply
his
admitted at
at trial
four activities
activities do
to his
246:7-17.) And
Gibson admitted
above four
do not
apply to
DEQ’s
facility.
understood that
was DEQ’s
it was
that it
Tr. 92:7-25,
Mr. Gibson
92:7-25, 93:1-25,
Gibson also
also understood
93: 1-25, 94:1.)
facility. (Trial
(Trial Tr.
94:1.) Mr.

position
11 Facility.
that his
Tier II
his composting
position that
composting operations
102:16-20.)
operations qualified
qualiﬁed as
as a
a Tier
Facility. (Id.
(Id. 102:16-20.)
In
In addition
meeting the
the above
addition to
to meeting
four criteria,
cumulative
processing facility
has aa cumulative
above four
criteria, if aa processing
facility has
volume
waste at
it is
11
time that
that is
than 600
Tier II
its facility
at any
is greater
greater than
is aa Tier
of waste
at its
one time
volume of
cubic yards,
600 cubic
facility at
yards, it
any one
Gibson’s had
Facility.
yards at
than 600
Mr. Gibson’s
his
more than
at his
had more
cubic yards
600 cubic
58.01.06.009.03.b.) Mr.
(IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03.b.)
Facility. (IDAPA

facility
than 600
his facility
the
March 29,
on March
at the
to have
more than
at his
continued to
and continued
have more
cubic yards
600 cubic
facility on
facility at
2013, and
yards at
29, 2013,
time
windrows at
in 2017.
Ehlert estimated
trial in
length of
time of
the length
the Windrows
Mr.
Mr. Ehlert
March 29,
of trial
On March
of the
at Mr.
estimated the
2017. On
2013, Mr.
29, 2013,
Gibson’s facility
Gibson’s
from the
point of
the vantage
the access
of the
to
to be
to 300
feet long,
200 to
vantage point
adjacent to
road adjacent
access road
be 200
300 feet
facility to
long, from

the
property. (Id.
Smith propeny.
that some
211:17-20, 226:6-20,
the Smith
Mr. Gibson
226:6-20, 36:22-25,
36:22-25, 37:1-3.)
testiﬁed that
Gibson testified
37:1-3.) Mr.
some
(Id. 211:17-20,
15-20
of
windrows on
Smith property
from six
six to
the Smith
the Windrows
range from
to 10
10 feet
feet high,
range between
on the
of the
and range
between 15-20
high, and
property range

Gibson’s Windrow
feet
windrow height
width estimation.
height and
with Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
estimation.
feet wide.
34:6-14.) DEQ
and width
agreed with
Wide. (Id.
(Id. 34:6-14.)
DEQ agreed

(Id.
36:22-25, 37:1-3,
215:1-4.)
37:1-3, 214:25,
214:25, 215:1-4.)
(Id. 36:22-25,
Gibson’s facility
Following
visit to
Ehlert used
the site
Mr. Gibson’s
Mr. Ehlert
his
Following the
March 29,
on March
site Visit
to Mr.
used his
facility on
2013, Mr.
29, 2013,
Gibson’s facility,
estimations
width of
plus measurements
height and
the windrows
Mr. Gibson’s
the height
estimations of
of the
at Mr.
of the
measurements
Windrows at
and width
facility, plus

of
be
that time
time to
the volume
the piles
of those
on Google
of the
piles at
at that
to be
estimated the
those windrows
Windrows on
and estimated
volume of
Google Earth,
Earth, and
greater
241:1-25, 242:1.)
than 600
238:11-25, 239:1-10,
240:18-25, 241:1-25,
239:1-10, 240:18-25,
greater than
236:16-23, 238:11-25,
cubic yards.
600 cubic
242:1.)
yards. (Id.
(Id. 236:16-23,
Gibson’s facility
215:9Mr.
Ehlert again
Mr. Ehlert
the windrows
Mr. Gibson’s
on August
again observed
at Mr.
August 14,
2017. (Id.
Windrows at
observed the
facility on
14, 2017.
(Id. 215:9-

20.)
were additional
windrows since
Ehlert observed
that there
Mr. Ehlert
March of
there were
of 2013.
additional compost
since March
2013.
compost Windrows
observed that
20.) Mr.
Gibson’s
(Id.
that the
the volume
Mr. Gibson’s
As of
of August
determined that
of waste
at Mr.
August 14,
236:2-6.) As
volume of
waste at
2017, DEQ
14, 2017,
(Id. 236:2-6.)
DEQ determined

facility
be in
in excess
to be
of 600
at
more specifically,
continued to
estimated at
and more
cubic yards,
excess of
600 cubic
was estimated
facility continued
specifically, was
yards, and
10,000
242:7-12, 410:22-25,
411:1-25, 412:1,
410:22-25, 411:1-25,
The amount
4133-21.) The
amount of
of leaves
cubic yards.
leaves
412:1, 413:3-21.)
10,000 cubic
yards. (Id.
(Id. 242:7-12,
Gibson’s facility
left
by Ada
in 2013
in and
left at
Mr. Gibson’s
through 2015
itself far
far exceeded
at Mr.
2013 through
2015 in
of itself
Ada County
and of
exceeded
facility by
County in
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Gibson’s facility
600
photos of
The aerial
Mr. Gibson’s
aerial photos
of Mr.
cubic yards.
600 cubic
similarly
21.11.) The
21.10, 21.11.)
facility similarly
21.9, 21.10,
(Exs. 21.9,
yards. (Exs.

proved that
windrows on
property was
was increasing
went on.
Smith property
time went
that the
the Smith
the compost
increasing as
on the
on. (Exs.
compost Windrows
proved
as time
(Exs.
DEQ’S evidence
11,
nothing at
Trial Tr.
trial that
that disputed
that Mr.
Tr. 407:4-9.)
Mr.
There was
at trial
407:4-9.) There
disputed DEQ’s
evidence that
was nothing
11, 12;
12; Trial

Gibson
yards at
his composting
Mr.
to have
an excess
of 600
at his
composting facility.
continues to
Gibson had
had and
and continues
have an
cubic yards
excess of
600 cubic
facility. Mr.
Gibson
11 Facility
siting and
Tier II
with the
the siting
is thus
thus required
to comply
operational
required to
Gibson operates
and is
and operational
operates aa Tier
Facility and
comply with
requirements
11 Facilities.
Tier II
Facilities. (IDAPA
requirements applicable
to Tier
applicable to
58.01.06.012.)
(IDAPA 58.01.06.012.)
that neither
D.
operating
neither Mr.
Mr. Gibson
nor VHS
the operating
D. It is
is undisputed
have complied
with the
complied with
undisputed that
Gibson nor
VHS have
siting requirements
and
Tier II Facility.
and siting
for aa Tier
requirements for
Facility.
When
processing facility
upon which
which the
11 Facility,
Tier II
the land
the
the owner
When aa processing
is aa Tier
both the
of the
land upon
owner of
facility is
Facility, both
facility
siting and
with the
the operator
the facility,
the siting
is located,
must comply
operational
of the
operator of
and operational
and the
facility is
located, and
facility, must
comply with
requirements
see also
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.
IDAPA 58.01.06.012,
requirements in
58.01.06.012. (See
58.01.06.012, 58.01.06.005.29;
58.01.06.005.29; see
(See IDAPA
Trial
Trial Tr.
siting requirements
things as
Tr. 246:18-25,
The siting
submitting aa site
246:18-25, 247:1.)
requirements include
site
include such
such things
as submitting
247:1.) The
application,
within aa 100
year flood
plain if the
that the
the facility
not located
the
ensuring that
is not
100 year
and ensuring
located Within
ﬂood plain
application, and
facility is
facility
year flood.
the flow
the 100
The operating
restrict the
operating
of the
ﬂow of
100 year
ﬂood. (IDAPA
58.01 .06.012.01 .a.) The
(IDAPA 58.01.06.012.01.a.)
facility will restrict
requirements
that the
limited to,
not limited
the facility
ensuring that
requirements include,
but are
are not
has made
made adequate
adequate
include, but
facility has
to, ensuring
provisions
when an
controlling and
for controlling
managing fires
fires and
attendant is
an attendant
is on
on
provisions for
and only
and managing
waste when
accepts waste
only accepts
duty.
It is
Smith
that neither
neither VHS
the Smith
is undisputed
of the
undisputed that
VHS (owner
58.01.06.012.03.f.-g.) It
(IDAPA 58.01.06.012.03.f.-g.)
(owner of
duty. (IDAPA
property)
siting and
with the
nor Mr.
Mr. Gibson
the composting
the siting
of the
composting facility)
complied with
Gibson (owner
and
have complied
(owner of
facility) have
property) nor
operational
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.
Tr. 247:2-19,
2472-19, 402:3-19.)
requirements in
operational requirements
4023-19.)
58.01.06.012. (Trial
(Trial Tr.
The
promotion and
protection of
the
the authority
the promotion
The Director
Director of
of the
of DEQ
to supervise
has the
and protection
supervise the
authority to
DEQ has
environment
in Idaho
relating to
all laws,
environment in
to
enforce all
Idaho and
and enforce
and statutes
statutes relating
regulations, and
rules, regulations,
laws, rules,
environmental
the Director
Director receives
environmental protection.
protection. (Idaho
When the
receives
Code §§
(Idaho Code
39-1056), 105(3)(i).)
105(3)(i).) When
§§ 39-105(3),
information,
be made
investigations to
to be
Violations of
of Idaho
Idaho
alleged violations
he/ she can
can also
made about
also cause
about alleged
information, he/she
cause investigations
Code
permit or
other rule,
other investigation
investigation
39-101, et seq.
or any
or order,
and conduct
conduct any
Code §
seq. or
order, and
rule, permit
any other
any other
§ 39-101,
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he/she
person violates
with
fails to
to comply
violates and
he/she deems
and fails
39-108.) If any
deems advisable.
advisable. (Idaho
Code §
(Idaho Code
comply with
any person
§ 39-108.)
Idaho
the Solid
the Director
Director can
39-101, et seq.
Management Rules,
or the
Idaho Code
Solid Waste
compel
can compel
Waste Management
Code §§ 39-101,
seq. or
Rules, the
compliance
in district
district court.
an individual
individual or
or entity
is found
to have
compliance in
found to
court. (Id.
have
entity is
(Id. §§ 39-108(3)(b).)
39-108(3)(b).) If an
violated
the Solid
ciVil penalty
39-101, et seq.
Management Rules,
or the
Idaho Code
Solid Waste
violated Idaho
can
Waste Management
Code §
seq. or
Rules, aa civil
penalty can
§ 39-101,
be
per day
in the
the amount
for each
continuing
Violation or
amount of
of $10,000
per violation
or $5,000
each continuing
be assessed
assessed in
$10,000 per
$5,000 per
day for
violation,
whichever is
is greater.
greater. (Id.
Violation, Whichever
(Id. §§ 39-108(5)(a)(iii).)
39-108(5)(a)(iii).)
In
In this
this case,
requiring VHS
injunction requiring
Mr. Gibson
permanent injunction
to comply
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson to
seeks aa permanent
comply
case, DEQ
DEQ seeks
with
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.012,
with the
the site
the submission
including the
operating requirements
requirements found
site and
found in
submission
and operating
58.01 .06.012, including
of
plan (IDAPA
operating plan
application (IDAPA
of aa full
full and
site application
an operating
complete site
and complete
and an
58.01 .06.012.02) and
(IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02)
(IDAPA
58.01.06.012.04).
penalty in
$10,000
in the
Am. Compl.
the amount
at 9.)
amount of
Compl. at
also seeks
seeks a
a penalty
58.01.06.012.04). (First
(First Am.
0f$10,000
DEQ also
9.) DEQ
assessed
justified because
This amount
Mr. Gibson.
the extent
extent of
amount is
is justiﬁed
against both
both VHS
of
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson. (Id.)
assessed against
because the
([5].) This
Gibson’s non-compliance
VHS
with the
was major
non-compliance with
Mr. Gibson’s
the Solid
Management Rules
major and
Solid Waste
Rules was
VHS and
and Mr.
and
Waste Management

inexcusable.
penalty in
in this
Ehlert testified
this case
Mr. Ehlert
the penalty
testiﬁed about
follows:
inexcusable. Mr.
about the
case as
as follows:
Q.
penalty against
in connection
with continuing
Mr. Gibson
continuing
Is DEQ
seeking aa penalty
against Mr.
connection with
Gibson in
DEQ seeking
Q. Is
violations?
Violations?
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
Q.
that amount?
And what
What is
is that
amount?
Q. And
A.
A. $10,000.
$ 1 0,000.
Q.
penalty?
that penalty?
And how
arrive at
at that
how did
did DEQ
DEQ arrive
Q. And
A.
was the
Notice of
It was
in the
initial $3,500
the initial
the Notice
And then,
the
identiﬁed in
A. It
of Violation.
Violation. And
then, the
$3,500 identified
-- or
ongoing
violations from
from the
from date
the date
ongoing Violations
of note
note – Notice
Notice of
of
of note
note -or from
date of
date of
Violation
the current
current date.
Violation to
to the
date.

,

Q.
in connection
with his
his
And why
Mr. Gibson
against Mr.
connection with
did DEQ
Gibson in
assess a
a penalty
penalty against
DEQ assess
Why did
Q. And
composting
composting operations?
operations?
-- oh,
A.
The -A. The
sorry.
Oh, sorry.

PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING
PLAINTIFF’S
ARGUMENT -- 13
13
CLOSING ARGUMENT

001087

Q.
ahead.
Go ahead.
Q. Go
A.
intent of
The intent
the rules
health and
the environment.
And
human health
environment. And
A. The
of the
is to
to protect
protect human
rules is
and the
--the
way to
the penalty
help the
the -- the
the violator
to get
get compliance,
or to
to rec
or help
Violator
is a
rec -- or
a way
compliance, or
penalty is
recognize
the seriousness
the violation.
recognize the
of the
Violation.
seriousness of
Q.
penalty that
in arriving
that it’s
arriving at
And what
the $10,000
What did
at the
dollar penalty
consider in
did DEQ
$10,000 dollar
DEQ consider
Q. And
Gibson’s composting
seeking
with Mr.
in connection
Mr. Gibson’s
seeking in
connection with
composting operations
operations today?
today?
****
**
THE
use two
THE WITNESS:
harm to
the potential
health
potential harm
human health
criteria. One
WITNESS: We
is the
to human
One is
We use
two criteria.
and
from the
the environment.
And then,
the second
the extended
the
environment. And
is the
deviation from
extended deviation
and the
second is
then, the
requirements.
requirements.
YEE-WALLACE: Okay.
Q.
BY MS.
that
arrive at
at that
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
how did
did DEQ
originally arrive
Now, how
Okay. Now,
DEQ originally
Q. BY
$3,500
penalty?
$3,500 penalty?

A.
believe the
was
harm was
the potential
the extent
extent of
potential harm
A. We
of deviation
deviation was
moderate and
and the
was moderate
We believe
major.
major.
Q.
that based
that DEQ
the
determine the
Is that
on some
sort of
of method
method that
to determine
some sort
based on
uses to
DEQ uses
Q. Is
seriousness
violation.
the Violation.
of the
seriousness of
-- evaluating
A.
process of
the calculation
the penalty.
of eval
of the
A. We
calculation of
evaluating the
eval -have aa process
We have
penalty.

Q.
And what
for that?
that?
What is
is range
range for
Q. And
A.
up to
It goes
from zero
A. It
zero up
to $10,000.
goes from
$10,000.
(Trial
this Court,
left
Tr. 254:15-25,
injunction issued
254:15-25, 255:1-25,
Absent an
an injunction
is left
256:1-4.) Absent
255: 1-25, 256:1-4.)
issued by
(Trial Tr.
Court, DEQ
DEQ is
by this
without aa remedy
with the
the Solid
Without
Management Rules.
to compel
Defendants to
to comply
compel Defendants
Solid Waste
Rules.
Waste Management
remedy to
comply With
Similarly,
been in
in violation
in light
light of
that VHS
the fact
Mr. Gibson
Violation of
of the
fact that
of those
those rules
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson have
have been
rules
Similarly, in
every
warranted.
single day
is warranted.
since 2013,
2013, aa $10,000
$10,000 penalty
penalty is
every single
day since
E.
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
The crop
not apply.
E. The
exception in
crop residue
residue exception
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii does
does not
apply.
Mr.
half-hearted attempt
that the
the defense
the Solid
Mr. Gibson
attempt to
to raise
raise the
Solid Waste
Gibson made
defense that
made aa half-hearted
Waste
Management
based upon
upon IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii,
him based
not apply
which states
Management Rules
to him
Rules do
states
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii, which
do not
apply to
that
that the
the soils
not apply
the rules
to the
to crop
at agronomic
agronomic
soils at
returned to
crop (plant)
residues ultimately
rules do
do not
ultimately returned
(plant) residues
apply to
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rates
with more
waste. (See
than incidental
mixed with
incidental quantities
quantities of
more than
of regulated
rates unless
these wastes
regulated waste.
unless these
are mixed
wastes are
(See
IDAPA
was no
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii.)
trial that
that supported
this defense.
There was
no evidence
at trial
supported this
evidence at
defense.
58.01 .06.001 .03.b.ii.) There
At
At trial,
that he
Mr. Gibson
not dispute
his facility.
not
he accepts
at his
He did
solid waste
Gibson did
did not
dispute that
did not
waste at
accepts solid
trial, Mr.
facility. He
dispute
waste on
property—grass, leaves,
that the
into
the volume
his propertyigrass,
of solid
on his
solid waste
dispute that
volume of
and hay
decomposing into
leaves, and
hay decomposing

compostiwas greater
compost—was
yards. Instead,
than 600
that he
Mr. Gibson
greater than
testiﬁed that
he intended
intended to
to use
Gibson testified
cubic yards.
600 cubic
use
Instead, Mr.
the
Smith property,
that he
the compost
his facility
the Smith
amendment on
soil amendment
on 520
of the
he makes
at his
makes at
compost that
520 acres
acres of
as a
a soil
facility as
property,
507:20at
unspecified time
in the
time in
the future.
Tr. 507:20at agronomic
agronomic rates,
at some
undetermined and
and unspecified
some undetermined
future. (Trial
(Trial Tr.
rates, at

Gibson’s
25,
was no
trial that
that the
But there
the material
Mr. Gibson’s
material located
there was
no evidence
at trial
at Mr.
508:1-14.) But
located at
evidence at
25, 508:1-14.)

facility
was crop
A crop
A crop
plant raised
proﬁt or
for profit
is aa plant
or food.
crop residue.
crop is
raised for
198:1-6.) A
crop
residue. A
food. (Id.
facility was
(Id. 198:1-6.)
residue
plant material
left over
the left
the crop.
Mr. Gibson
material after
after harvesting
is the
198:11-15.) Mr.
harvesting the
Gibson does
residue is
over plant
crop. (Id.
does
(Id. 198:11-15.)
199:13not
ultimately being
being returned
not manage
the soil
returned to
to the
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic rates.
manage crop
crop residue
rates. (Id.
residue ultimately
(Id. 199:13-

22.)
in this
this case.
The crop
exemption thus
application in
thus has
no application
has no
crop residue
residue exemption
case.
22.) The
IV.
IV.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

The
proved that
trial proved
that the
Mr. Gibson
The evidence
the Solid
Management Rules
to Mr.
at trial
Solid Waste
Rules apply
Gibson
evidence at
Waste Management
apply to
and
that
Mr. Gibson
material and
organic material
to turn
turn that
biological decomposition
decomposition to
and VHS.
Gibson accepts
and uses
VHS. Mr.
accepts organic
uses biological
Gibson’s facility
material
property. The
volume of
waste at
Smith property.
into compost
the Smith
The volume
Mr. Gibson’s
material into
on the
of waste
at Mr.
compost on
facility

exceeded
in 2013,
in 2017.
that amount
Mr. Gibson
amount in
2017. Mr.
and exceeded
Gibson operates
operates aa
cubic yards
exceeded 600
exceeded that
600 cubic
2013, and
yards in
Tier
judgment compelling
11 Facility
Tier II
Mr. Gibson
entitled to
compelling Mr.
to comply
is entitled
to aa judgment
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS to
and DEQ
Facility and
comply
DEQ is
with the
11 Facilities.
A penalty
in the
siting and
with
Tier II
for Tier
the siting
the amount
requirements for
Facilities. A
operational requirements
amount of
of
and operational
penalty in
$10,000
their
the extent
extent and
continuing nature
is also
appropriate against
against Defendants,
given the
of their
and continuing
nature of
also appropriate
Defendants, given
$10,000 is
Gibson’s composting
non-compliance
non-compliance of
that govern
the statutes
Mr. Gibson’s
of the
composting operations.
govern Mr.
operations.
statutes and
and rules
rules that
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Pursuant
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penalty of
perjury pursuant
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Pursuant to
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of perjury
to the
pursuant to
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declare under
Code §§ 9-1406(1),
9-1406(1), II declare
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that the
the state
the foregoing
foregoing is
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is true
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law of
and correct.
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the following
following parties
or counsel
to be
iCourt E-File
counsel to
be served
served by
caused the
system, which
by
electronic
Notification of
the Notiﬁcation
of Service:
on the
electronic means,
more fully
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as more
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2

Exhibit

3
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4

N:l.

1
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5

N:l.

3
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6

N:l.

6
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7
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8

N:l. 12

2015 aerial ph:>to incl Smith prop

9
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10

N:l. 17. 3
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11

N:l. 17. 5

Pl:Dto - signage fees

12
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Pl.cv/

84

12

13

N:l. 17. 2 through 17. 31

157

13

14

N:l. 18

15
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?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/

Mark/.Adnit

am

ro

notice
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Video of Smith property 8-14-17

16

N:l. 21.10 ACID Anm.1al Report FY 2014

17

N:l. 21.11 ACID Anm.1al Report FY 2015

18

N:l. 22

Eoise City :receipt pTt: Dave Gibson
Eoise City receipt pTt: Dave Gibson

19

N:l. 23

20
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21

N:l. 58 . 2 G:x:gle Earth irrage

22

N:l. 58 . 3 G:x:gle Earth irrage

(illustrative)

?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
?rev/
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?rev/

EXHIBITS

1
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4

105

5
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6
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7

129
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81
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154
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442

15

447
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451

17

310

18

315

19

208
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NA

21

NA

22

23

23

24

24

25

25

Descripticn
Cl:py of DEQ guidance re: anp::>Sting

378

I NA

8

7

1

IDISE, IDAHO

2

Wednesday, September 13, 2017, 9:00a.m.

3

4

'IHE CUJRI':

Be seated, please.

Thank }<JU.

We'll take up DEQ vs. Gibson.

5
6

are present, the lawyers are present.

7

trial.

'Ibe parties

'Ihis is our 0:::urt

Are the parties ready to proceed, Ms. Yee?
MS. YEE-WAUACE:

9

MR. EMTIH :

Arrl we are, Your H::Jnor.

10

'IHE CUlRI':

Ms. Yee, w:Jllld }0.1 like to rrake

11

an cpen:ing statarent?

12
13

MS. YEE-WAUACE:

that, I have three preliminary rratters, i f I could.

Ckay.

14

'IHE CUlRI':

15

MS. YEE-WAUACE:

16

17

Your H::lnor, before I cb

Nt.mber one is that we have

a oourtesy a:py of the Plaintiff's exhibits for the
O:::urt.

18
19
20

(Plaintiff's Exhibit Binder provided to

the O:::urt . )

21
22

23

'IHE CUlRI':

Thank }0.1.

MS. YEE-WAUACE:

Nt.mber 2, is that late

state, for the record, that we object to the filing of

2

the pretrial notion -- maroran:lum, arrl also the =rt:ent

3

in that naroran::lLtn, \\ftllch raises a lot of issues that

4

have already been disrussed by this c::tmt.

5

'IHE CUlRI':

6

MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:
'IHE CUJRI':

7

8

Yes, Your H=r.

8

1

read it, so.

9

All right.

-- I haven't seen it, I haven't

If it got filed yesterday, I was in oourt.
MS • YEE-WALI.ACE:

Arrl -- arrl IllTber three,

10

Your !boor, is When I'm questicning the witnesses, a

11

p:u:alegal fran our office, Rita Jensen, will be using

12

Trial Pad to project rur exhibits on the screen.

13

just wmted to rrake sure that was okay.

Arrl I

14

'IHE rom,

15

Mr. Smith any h::rusekeeping natters before we

Certainly.

16

begin?

18

l::P..fore we proceed.

19

ask rre alxut -- if I wmt to rrake an c:penin_:J statarent, I

20

lf..C>Uld reserve my cpen:ing statarent.

171

MR. EMTIH:

J1.ld3e, we have nothing to ad:l.

.lln:i When we reach the p::>int_ wh:>re ycu

21

'IHE CUJRI':

22

Ms. Yee, then, are }0.1 ready for }<JUr cpen:ing

23

All right.

staterent?

24

yesterday afterncon we received a Pretrial Merroran:lum

24

MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

25

fran the defendants in this natter.

25

'lbe plaintiff, the

Arrl we just wmt to

Well --

Arrl it's untirrely.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

Just briefly, Your H::mor.
~t

of --
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1

10
rre that, in my view, the significant issue for trial had

9

1

'lJlE <XXJRI':

Hold an just a se=rl, Ms. Yee.

am it

2

I -- I sl:Jclli.dn't have invited that before I get cbne

2

been~.

3

rressing with the electronic system here.

3

scmce of the rraterials Mr. Gil:eon adnits a:nposting,

4

MS. YEE-WAU..ACE:

4

whether those have been discarded or whether there's

5

'lJlE <XXlRI':

6

MS. YEE-WAU..ACE:

9

Go ahead.

'Ihank you.

JUst briefly, the plaintiff, Ilep3rtirent of

7
8

(kay.

All right.

5

scrrething that he's purchasing to nn his a:nposting

6

operation.
Can you tell rre M"lat you eJqJeet the evidence

7

EnviranrrentaJ. Q..Jality in this case, bxrugbt this lawsuit.
Arrl the evidence will s!=J that the deferxlant,

essentially cares 00v.n to the

8

will sh::m in that regard?

9

Yarr Hcn::>r, we think the

MS. YEE-WAUACE:

am rraterial

10

VHS Properties, LLC, purports to am the prcperty that's

10

evidence will s!=J that the rraterial,

11

at issue in this case.

11

quantities that triggers the regulatirns, are discarded

12

l<W:ag.:ment Rules, ur.dec IDAPA 58.01.06 apply Lo defer.dant

12

rca.tei..-:ials lm.:Er the Sold Waste

13

David Gibson's cx:nposting operations an the Snith

13

will present evidence fron folks to.ho discarded their

Arrl also, that the Solid Waste

r~bnagerre.nt

Rules.

in the

.Ani -we

14

prcperty because =ber one, he is running a processing

14

rraterial directly out to Mr. Gil:eon's facilities to prove

15

facility, is processing solid v.aste in a volume that

15

that.

16

1.\0Uld qualify his operatirns as a 'Iier II Facility ur.der

16

'lJlE <XXlRI':

17

t:h::6e rules.

17

Mr. Snith, you're going to reserve your

am

the evidence will also s!=J

18

19

that he has not a:nplied with the sighting or operating

19

20

requ:i..re!1'en.

21

pe:r:rrement injunction

22

violations.

18

Arrl he's --

23

am penalties

for =tirruing

All right.

MR.

As I was reviewing

my decision an the

aweared to

~=

N::>, Judge.

I'm going to rese:rve

20

my cpening statarent until I have the q:portunity to

21

present evidence.

23

Plaintiff's Motion for Sumary Judgrrent, it

'!bank you.

cpening, sir?

22
'lJlE <XXJRI':

24
25

Arrl so, the plaintiff is seeking a

All right.

'lJlE <XXlRI':

All right .

I th:Jught that ' s 'ttlat

I asked, rut that's-- ckay, I urrlerstarrl.

24

Ms. Yee, you can call your first witness.

25

MS. YEE-WAUACE:

'Ihank you, Yarr lbnor.

12

11
1

Plaintiff calls Mr. David Gibson.

2

Q.

In B:>ise, Idaro?

3

A.

B:>ise, Idah:>.

Your narre' s already part of the

4

Q.

And that's 83705?

5

A.

Cbrrect.

6

Q.

Do you have any other persanal or hlsiness

4

a p3rty in this action.

5

Cburt record.
Ms. Yee, you rray inquire.

6
7

8

3000 Rose Hill.

Mr. Gibson, have a seat up here,

'IHE <XXJRI':

sir.

A.

I don't need you to state your narre because you're

2
3

1

'IHE WTINESS:

I'm a defendant.

I am

David R. Gibson.

9

10

7

ad:lresses?

8

A.

N::>.

9

Q.

Are you errployed?

10

A.

Am I e1ployed?

11

a p3rty to this action, called as a witness, by

am an

11

Q.

And M"lat is your hlsiness?

12

J::ehlif of the Plaintiff, having been first duly sw::>m,

12

A.

I didn't --

13

was examined

13

Q.

I'm sorry.

14

A.

Varioos tl:ri.J::gs.

15

Q.

Anyt:h:i.nq else?

16

A.

Eeg pa.rcbn?

17

Q.

Anyt:h:i.nq else?

DAVID R. GlESCN,

am testified as

follows:

14
15
16
17

DIREJ::T EXAMINATICN
BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Q.

'Ihank you, Mr. Gil:eon.

I'm self-e1ployed.

What is your hlsiness?
Cblp:lsting is one.

18

A.

N::>.

19

A.

I am fine.

19

Q.

Do you have any hlsiness

20

Q.

Good.

20

A.

Just one phJne rrurri::er, yes -What is that?

18

21

Good m:n:r,i,.'lg.

Hem are :you?

And, Mr. Gil:eon, is it true that you

also go by Dave Gil:eon?

fh:me nurri.:lers?

21

Q.

22

A.

Yes.

22

A.

-- as a business ph::lne rrurri::er.

23

Q.

And cb you live here in B:>ise?

23

Q.

What is that, sir?

24

A.

Yes, I cb.

24

A.

344-4468.

25

Q.

And Mat's your ad:lress?

25

Q.

And that's area o:de 208?

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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13
1

A.

Yes.

1

right?

2

Q.

And ro other b.lsiness phcrJe nuni::Jers?

2

A.

Cn v.tat prcperty?

3

A.

N::l.

3

Q.

Ten acres of prcperty?

I didn't --

4

Q.

Did you graduate high sci=l?

4

A.

Yes.

5

A.

Beg pard::m.?

5

Q.

And that ten acres of prc:perty is located

6

Q.

Did you graduate fmn high school?

6

7

A.

Yes, I did.

7

A.

West

8

Q.

Where did you go to high school?

8

Q.

I'm sorry.

west of

~ Reed?
of~

9

A.

Los Angeles.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Did you go to oollege?

10

Q.

Here in--

11

A.

N::l.

11

12

Q.

So, you just rrentiaoed that you have a

12

13

<=p:>Sting b.lsiness --

'IHE COJRr:

Reed?

Ms. Yee, hang -- hang on a

seoond.
Mr. Briliff, a:llid w= try to fin:l. sorre --

13

14

A.

I'm son:y.

I coughed.

14

BAILIFF:

15

Q.

It's okay.

You just mentioned that you have

15

MS. YEE-WALI.l\CE:

16

'IHE COJRr:

16

a o:nposting business; is that oorrect?

'Ihey're en route, Your H:mor.

17

A.

Cbrrect.

17

BAILIFF:

18

Q.

And you're currently engaged in a <=p:>Sting

18

'IHE COJRr:

19

BAILIFF:

19

cpe.ration on ten acres of prcperty?

The hearir:g devices are en rcute.
All right.

A.

I didn't un::lerstand your q.JeStian; sorry.

20

MS. YEE-WALI.l\CE:

Q.

Okay.

21

'IHE COJRr:

22

A.

You have to speak a little louder.

22

MS. YEE-WALI.l\CE:

24

don't -Q.

Sure.

You are currently engaged in tre

25

<=p:>Sting cperations on ten acres of prcperty; is that

1

you are currently <=pOSting an is in Eoise, Idah:>; is

2

that right?

MS. YEE-WALI.l\CE:

15

And just try --

Okay.

-- and speak into tbe mic:J:q?h::me.

'IHE COJRr:

24
Q.

D::> -- do you w;mt to wait?

Cb ahead.

23
25

Thank you.

Ycu're v.elccrre.

21
23

Okay.

What's that?

20

I

N::l.

West of Pleasant Valley Reed?

Okay.

BY MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

And

tre ten acres that

1

16
acres of pn:perty that you have your o:nposting b.lsiness

2

on in Ada Cotmty, Idah:>, that is CJV.lJ:led by VHS Prcperties,

3

UC; is that right?

3

A.

In Eoise?

4

Q.

What city is it in?

4

A.

Yes.

5

A.

I don't believe it's in t:re city.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Oh, I think rraybe tbey did bring it into tbe

7

ten acres of prc:perty that you have your <=p:>Sting

It'sinEoise, yes.

8

b.lsiness on as tbe anith property; is that okay with you?

7
8

city, yes.

N::l.

.Ada Cbunty?

So, for t:re duration of this trial and

t:lm::ughout your testirrcny, I'm going to refer to th::>se

9

Q.

Eoise city?

9

A.

Yes.

10

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

So, v.hen I rrention

11

Q.

.Ada Cbunty?

11

un::lerstand that I'm referring to tbe ten acres in

12

A.

Yes.

12

Ada Cotmty, Iclah:J, that you are currently <=p:>Sting on?

13

Q.

Idah:>?

13

A.

Yes.

14

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

Q.

Okay.

17

favor as v.ell.

19

nw hearing's

20
21

Mr. Gfr:eon, if you v..ould do rre a

16

A.

I believe so, yes.

17

Q.

And your <=p:>Sting b.lsiness that you have

not very good.

'IHE w:riNESS:

22

'IHE CXXJRT:

23

'IHE w:riNESS:

25

All right.

I've been aJ::Ol.l!ld

too nuch lou:l. rrachinery, an:l airplanes, an:l --

24

'IHE CXXlRT:

Q.

And is it true that you also had a

<=p:>Sting J::usiness an t:re Smith prcperty in 2013?

I krow you're leanir:g fo:rward so you can

'IHE CXXJRT:

16

15

And --

tre Emith prc:perty, you

All right.
--

rut

Thank you, sir.

mine kind of v-ent away.

And, Mr. Gfr:eon,

ar".....J.Cted an tbe Str.it..'l property si...'1ce 2013 is also

referred to as Black Diam::n:J. O::npost; is --

20

MR. EMITH:

21

Thank you.

BY MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

18
19

tre ten

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

Q.

22

MR. EMITH:

23

to -- anything after

24

awear

25

*

'Ib which --

BY MS. YEE-WAU.ACE: -- that right?
-- to which,

J~,

let rre abject

tre referenced period of 2013 w::llid

to be irrelevant to tbe issue raised in this case.
'IHE COJRr:

Ms. Yee?
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Yarr Jfcn:)r, in paragraph 48

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

1

18
1

2

and in the prayer for relief in the Ccnplaint, the

2

3

plaintiff has alleged cn;ping violaticns and is seeking

3

4

penalties for Cll:lg)ing violations sinoe the filing of the

4

5

cmplaint.

plans.

Okay.

A.

Because there -- there -- there v.ere other

It I.IBSil't just a rosiness of cmposting.
Q.

Would you feel rrore o:mfortable with the tenn

'lhe plaintiff is also seeking a penrenent

s

6

injunction for current cmpliance with the Sold Waste

6

A.

Yes.

7

Managerent Rules, an:i arr case is still ripe.

7

Q.

Okay.

And so, any operaticns that have been cn;ping

8
9

sinoe 2013 are absolutely relevant to these proceedings.

10
11

overruled.

12
13
14

Cbjectian -- abjection is

'IHE CXXJRT:

Q.

cmposting operations?
So, let me ask you one rrore time.

Your cmposting operaticns that you've been

8

engaged in sinoe 2013 an the Snith prcpert:y is also

9

referred to as Black Diam:x:d Ccnpost?

10

You may continue.

11

A.

It has been in the past, yes.

i•!S. YEE-WALIACE:

12

Q.

And you continue to cp::rate as Black D:iamx.:l

BY M'l. YEE-WALtl\CE:

Do you need me to

13

restate the question, Mr. Gibson?

15

A.

l'buld you repeat the question, yes.

16

Q.

Sure.

So, the cmposting rosiness that you

Ccnpost today?

14

A.

N::>.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

Diam:x:d Ccnpost?

17

have been engaged in an the Snith prcpert:y sinoe 2013 is

17

18

also referred to as Black Diam:x:d Ccnpost; is that true?

18

19

A.

We have -- yes.

19

20

Q.

And you operate as Black Diam:x:d Cl:rcp:lst to

20

21

this day?

22

A.

23

What v.ord w::W.d you use?

Q.

A.

When did you oease operating as Black

As to a year or rronth, I oouldn't tell you.

It's just kin1 of gone away.
Q.

Okay.

But isn't it true that Black Diam:x:d

Ccnpost was just a -- a dl:a in the state of Idaho?

21

A.

22

Q.

It's not a formal, legalized entity?

o:mfortable with the v.ord rosiness

23

A.

What Cb you mean a formalized --

Q.

It's not a separate rosiness.

I'm not -- I'm not sure I v.ould be

24

Q.

What v.ord v.ould you --

24

25

A.

-- as far as that.

25

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

Yes.

It's you v.to

are operating as Black Dianorrl Ccnpost; is that true?

19

3

20
operations fran 2013 to the present; okay?

1
Mr. Gibson, the Marshall's

'IHE CXXJRT:

2

A.

Okay.

3

Q.

So, can you describe the cmposting process

4

brought you s::me hearing devices.

5

hear Ms. Yee's questions a little better.

6

to use them if you cbn't want to, sir, J::ut they might

6

7

he.1p.

7

cmposting violation, that mayte that w::W.d be sareth:ing

8

DEQ w::W.d need to answer --

8

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WALtl\CE:

9

A.

N::>.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

N::>.

12
13

Is that better?

Do you want to tum it --

It's rot better at all.

BAJLIFF:

'IHE WI'IN&SS:

It's

Try again.

BY MS. YEE-WALtl\CE:

16

A.

N::>.

Is that better? N::>?

'Ihere -- there's noise in there that --

BAJLIFF:

5

that time frame?
A.

9

Q.

So --

10

A.

-- rather than myself.

12

Q.

'IHE CXXJRT:

21

'IHE WI'IN&SS:

So, Mr. Gibson, earlier today, just a few

minutes ago, you told me an:i this Court that you have a

14

cmposting operation an the Snith prcpert:y.

15

raretber that test:irrorry?
A.

I did.

Q.

And that you have been engaged in a

'Ibat J::uzzing noise rrakes it --

19

cmpostL.~

'Ihank you.
-- totally inpossible.

BY MS. YEE-WALtl\CE:

If at any time

Okay.

A.

q;:eration sir..ce 2013?
And that is v.l:Jat I believe that I am Cbing or

20

was cbing.

21

is the one that l::n:'o.lght this charge against me.

22

believe that you are the one that needs to

And you are the one that l::n:'o.lght the -- DEQ

23

you want me to restate my question or you can't hear me,

23

Q.

24

just let me krJa.J.

24

A.

-- the process is, so that --

25

Q.

'Ihank you for that.

25

Do you

17
18

20

If you believe I'm

cmposting, then so be it.

16

sir, and fix it.
'IHE WI'IN&SS:

I believe that if I am being charged with

I'll -- I'll take t.l:nse,

Okay.

19

Q.

that you have been using an the Snith property during

13

Q.

17

4

11

They \\Orlc, I've tested them.

15

22

You don't have

just he has to --

14

18

They might let you

I'm hafpy to Cb that.

So, I want to talk alx>ut your cmposting

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

*

Okay.

And I

~r

v.l:Jat --

So -But my --
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2

I krolr 11tlat ycu' re -- I krolr 11tlat ycu' re

A.

1

speaking of.

Q.

3

4

2

pnxiuce evidenoe is by asking you questions urrler oath.
'Ihey have tbe ability to call you as a witness.

So, you are req..rired to arJSI.\er 11¥ questions

4

Arrl oo, 11¥ questicn. to ycu is, since 2013,

6

through tbe present, can ycu just describe 11tlat ycur

7

cx:nposting c:pe:rations have been an tbe Snith property?

8

Just describe 1/.[]at it is you cb

9

ycu cb it.

....ren you

cx:npost; l::oN do

ansv.er as to 'tbm it becares CCITpOSt?

M'l. YEE-WALU\CE:

12

'IHE ~·ITTIESS ;

Your Hcn::>r --

I rrean, if w= 're -- I 'vc l:::ee.n

refusal to

7

against tbe Court.

case can be considered by rre 'tbm I'm deciding 11tlat has

12

}''O..lr

13

disfavorably against yc:u by rre.

14

You need to prove ycur case, rot rre, rot by 11¥

15

16

l!O.lth.

19

Mr. Gibson, that ycur refusal to ansv.er questions in this

or has rot been proved.

case.

Mr. G:i.l::son, let rre tell yc:u tbe situation yc:u

fini yourself in.

'Ihis is a civil pr=ee::ling.

20

THE WI'INE:SS:

21

THE CUJRT:

Uh-huh.
As far as I krolr,

none of tbe

22

ansv.ers to Ms. Yee's questions could be used against you

23

in a =iminal proceeding.

24

right to rerrain silent cbes rot aj;ply.

That rreans ycur Cbnstitutianal

1"'-JE:.L----e

ca.lld l::e c-ansidel.-e::l

Do yru understand kirrl of the position yc:u're

in?
Ci<:ay.

THE WI'INE:SS:

I understan:i.

Arrl I

17

aloo understand alltl¥ Cbnstitutianal rights still apply

18

in this crurt:ro:rn.

19

First .lm:!rrlrent, v.hlch is 11¥ right to speak, Mlich

Arrl I believe if I want to awly the

20

inh=ren.tly has the right rot to speak with it, that I

21

w::cld be able to assert that.

22
23

Arrl, again, I'm -- I'm -- 11tlat -- I'm rot
being disrespectful to tbe Court, sir.

24

Certainly, tbe plaintiff in this case has tbe

25

So, unlike a criminal action,

re:fusal to ar.swer questions

16

18

I 'm rot sure I w:JUld get there.

11

11¥ belief that I don't nee:l. to be tbe one proving tbe

an a minute.

Your

questions could be an act of cmterpt

10

15

J:Jan:J

~

You sinply nee:l. -- I need yc:u to urrlerstan:i,

8

14

Ms. Yee,

got right down to

6

charged with violating s::rre on:linance, s::rre rule.

THE CUJRT:

~

it, I could require ycu to ansv.er questicns.

13

It's

I S1.JWOSe, yru krolr, if

5

9
Can yc:u

11

17

One of tbe ways tbey can

3

tod:ty.

A.

J::m:den of pnxiucing evidence.

'!bank ycu, Mr. Gil::s::ln.

5

10

22
1

25

THE CUJRT:

NJ.

I understan:i that, Mr.

Gil::s::ln.

23
I -- yc:u kn::w, I -- 11tlat I 'm

THE WI'INE:SS :

1

2

saying is, tbey bralght tbeir case.

3

tbeir case sh:>uld be .l::ased up:m 11tlat tbey can fini rut
'Ihey

I don't believe

brcJu:Jbt tbe

4

fran rre here in tbe crurt.

5

t.h.inking tbey already had that infonration, an:i -THE CUJRT:

7

THE WI'INE:SS :

8
9

THE CUlRT:

to

12

That's all I wanted ycu to krolr.

arJStJer

THE WI'INE:SS :

14

THE CUJRT:

1 I

Q.

9

ycur refusal

Ci<:ay.
~

So, earlier When I asked yc:u i f yc:u ~
in a ccrrp:>stin;:J opa.raticn, yo..:t said yes; do Y'::JU

-~

~gecl

19

ren:nber that?

ycu aj;ply that term in daily life an:i

A.

Just generally, l:i.ke everyl::cdy in this :ro:rn

Q.

Arrl11tlat -- arrl11tlat -- l::oN -- 1/.[]at cb you

oansicler carposting to be?
Pile it up arrl let nature take care of it.

10

A.

11

Q.

I'm oon:y?

12

A.

Pile it up arrl let nature take care of it.

Q.

d<ay.

14

So, Mr. Gil::s::ln, rraybe

~

w::cld consider CCITpOSting.

13

can go about this a different way.

1~

Q.

in ycur b.lsiness --

8

Go ahead, Ms. Yee.

BY M'l. YEE-WAU.ACE:

are you wanting rre to be very specific =?

7

questions is s::rrething that I ' 11 oansicler.

13

16

As I stated,

cx:nposting, I -- I ailSit.ered it as a general -- are yc:u --

3

6

-- ycu that tbe -- tbe Crurt

ansv.er -- ask ycu questions.

2

5

system permits than to call ycu as a witness an:i to

11

exactly, specifically -- Wben -- when yru said

4

-- that ' s 11¥ --

10

15

case

Arrl I'm-- I'm just telling --

6

24
1

And by that, you rrean pile up oertain

oJ::ganic rraterials?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Arrl tben, by let nature take care of it, yru

17

rrean let tbe natural deo::npositicn. prooess take plaoe

18

\•.d.t...l:.

19

~._.spect

to t...lx::se rraterials; tr.Je?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Ci<:ay.

NJw, since 2013, yc:u -- ycur

20

A.

Uh-huh.

20

21

Q.

Yes?

21

cx:nposting c:peratians an tbe Snith prq;:ert.y uses leaves

22

A.

Yes, I cb.

22

that have been left on tbe Smith property; is that b:ue?

23

Q.

Ci<:ay.

24
25

So, When yc:u agreed with that w:m:l,

cx:nposting, 11tlat cbes that ro:rd rrean to yc:u?
A.

It's a very general term to rre.

I den' t kna.ll

Sue Heronemus, RPR,

23
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Uses 11tlat?
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1

Q.

And since at least 2013, your

Ci<ay.

26
1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And so, t:.hJse lan:lscapers arrl lawn care

2

c:atp:)Sting process an the Snith prcperty also uses grass

2

3

as part of that process?

3

:in::lividuals cp out of their vay to bdng grass clifpings

4

to your a:np::lSting cperatians an the Snith prcperty?

4

A.

Glass cliw:Lrgs.

5

Q.

Ci<ay.

And t1=le grass clifpings that you use

5

A.

Yes.

6

in your a:np::lSting cperatians have been left at the Snith

6

Q.

And that's been true since 2013?

7

prcperty since 2013; is that true?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Ci<ay.

9

A.

Yes.

Q.

Ci<ay.

8

A.

N::>.

I acquired possession of them.

9

Q.

Ci<ay.

fut isn't it true that folks bdng

10

grass cliwings to your facility out an the Snith --

10

11

Snith prcperty?

11

A.

12

Let rre explaiiJ..

'Itey go cut of their v.a.y to

13

bring t:.hJse rraterials to rre, to rrake the cx:np:st: that

14

rrake fran it.

15

more easily.

11.e

'Itere are rrany places they could cp nuch

So, I just want to break that cbwn, so the

16

Q.

17

reoord is clear.

12

to b:l::i.ng leaves to your =-.post:UJg cpaatiuns a1 u)f:;

13

Snith prcperty?

14

A.

'Ihat' s correct.

15

Q.

And that bas been true since 2013?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And that rerrains true tc:day?

18

A.

Yes.

bdng t:.hJse rraterials to rre; so I just want to -- I vant

19

Q.

Ckay.

20

to underst:arrl vmat that sentence rreans.

20

I heard you say they cp out of their vay to

And similarly, larxlscapers and other

lawn care :in::livictuals here in Idaho cp out of their vay

19

18

And that rerrains true today?

Do you use any other rraterial in your

cx:np:st:ing cperatians an the Snith prcperty since 2013?
Serre straw delivered fran -- or -- or stale

21

A.

Yes.

21

22

Q.

By they, \\dD -- \\dD are the they?

22

23

A.

'Ibe lan:lscape pecple, lawn care pe::ple.

23

24

Q.

And are t:.hJse lan:lscapers arrl lawn care

24

their way to bdng you their straw or stale bay for your

25

use in your cx:np:st:ing cperatians at the Snith prcperty?

25

pecple here -- fran here in Idah::>?

A.

bay delivered fran fanrers.
Q.

And is it true that those farrrers cp out of

27
1

A.

I have r.o idea v.frly they c:b it.

Q.

fut there are fanrers wh:> leave straw arrl

28
1

organic rraterial; is it =t?

2

A.

Yes.

3

stale hay an the Snith prcperty for your carp:lSting

3

Q.

And leaves are also an organic rraterial?

4

cperatians?

2

5
6

4

A.

Yes.

A.

'Ib be used for carp:lS\:, yes.

5

Q.

As is straw arrl stale hay?

Q.

And that bas been true, that t1=le fanrers

6

A.

Yes.

7

have brought t:.hJse rraterials to the Snith prcperty s:i=e

7

Q.

So, as part of your carp:lSting process an the

8

2013?

8

Snith prcperty since 2012, the leaves, and the grass

9

cliwings, arrl the straw or stale hay, those are plaoed

9

10
11

12

A.

I c:bn' t Jav..J that any have been brcught in

since tben; I couldn't
Q.

ans11.er

that.

And Cb fanrers, today, =rently bdng

Ckay.

~that;

A.

I can't

14

Q.

Ci<ay.

A.

I -- I c:bn't re -- r.o.

15
16

A.

What c:b you rrean by distinct piles?

Q.

So, c:b you have piles of rraterial an the

14

Snith prcperty?

Today I c:bn't kn::m;

15

A.

I guess they could be described as such, yes.

So --

16

Q.

Ckay.

I'mson:y.

17

Q.

Right.

18

..~.

-- no

19

Q.

I' 11 ask a better question.

A.

Ci<ay.

20
21
22
23

I

I don't kn::1..,r t:r.a.t .

I -- What I'm saying is, is since 2013

Ci<ay.

Any other rraterial that you use in

your c:atp:)Sting cperations at the Snith prcperty?

24

A.

l'b.

25

Q.

Ci<ay.

And the rraterial -- grass is an

Have you heard, in the =tpOSting

17

:i.rdlstry, the piles that you have at the Snith prcperty

18

:t::e:L~

19

tmtil present, I c:bn't l<:n:m.
Q.

true?

13

I c:bn't kn::m.

I'm here in the oourt right today.

in very distinct piles an the Snith prcperty; is that

11

12

straw or stale bay?

13

10

refe......-red to as

'\r'lli...~~·v~?

A.

Being referred to as What?
Win:lrcws?

20

Q.

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Ci<ay.

And c:b you agree that you have

23

win:lrcws an the Snith prcperty as part of your cx:np:st:ing

24

cperatians?

25

A.

I=sely, I -- yes.

I=sely it could be
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29
1

describe:i as such.

1

grass, ar:rl leaves, and straw or stale hay?

2

A.

3

prcperty are rrade up of the rraterial that ycu just

3

Q.

Is that right?

4

testified to; is that right, in various fonrs --

4

A.

Partially.

Q.

What's the other part that they're cmprised

7

A.

MJre dirt.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

N:J.

Q.

Okay.

2

Q.

And t:h:\se w.i.n:l:rows that are on the Smith

5

A.

'Ihe wi.n:lrc:!.lls that are there rrM?

5

6

Q.

Yes.

6

7

A.

N:J.

8

Q.

So, s:xre of t:h:\se wi.n:lrc:!.lls are rrore advanced

9

I w:mld rnt:.

in their clea::trposition; w::W.d ycu agree with that?

Partially.

of?
Anything else?

So, getting hack tc my original

10

A.

Yes.

10

11

Q.

So, are sore of t:h:\se wi.n:lrc:!.lls at the Smith

11

question, the win:ll:cm'S that are on the Smith prcperty as

12

p;ut of yiJ\.lr carp:::>Et"..ir.g c:pe1:ations, tl-:ose are distil11..-"t

13

rows;

12

prcperty act'ually catpJSt as

13

o:npost?

iroie

sit hei.--e t.o:la.y, 1sahl e
j

are they rnt:?

14

A.

N:J.

14

A.

As q;:posed tc \<hat?

15

Q.

N:Jne?

15

Q.

As q;:posed tc one big heap \\here eve:ryt:hing

16

A.

Well, not as o::npost, no.

16

17

Q.

Ckay.

17

A.

Yes.

18

A.

It has been -- it has been describe:i by a

18

Q.

Okay.

19

What 'M:Jllld ycu call it?

Fburth Judicial District Jirlge as being dirt.

19

is just t.hro..-..n in tcgether?
And -- ar:rl t:h:\se win:lrows are spaced

apart fran one arother; is that true?

20

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Yes.

21

A.

And that' s what I will call it to:lay.

21

Q.

And part of the reason M1y you space t:h:\se

Q.

Okay.

22
23

So, it is ycur <XJntention that the

wi.n:lrc:!.lls on the Smith prcperty are rrade up of dirt?

22

w.i.n:l:rows apart fran one arother is ro that ycu can t:t.n:n

23

t:h:\se piles?

24

A.

Yes.

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And that dirt, if ycu will, was formerly

25

Q.

And -- and have access tc th:ro?

1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And it alro allows for air to reach the

1

32
hay is -- is at a -- it looks rrore like roil or dirt; is

2

that true?

31
2

3

rraterials, which aids in the decrnposition process; is

3

A.

Yes.

4

that oorrect?

4

Q.

And that dirt is alro what is o:mronly kno.m

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Ckay.

5
N:Jw, is it true that the wi.n:lrc:!.lls at

6

as o:npost?
A.

N:J.

7

the Smith prcperty that are part of ycur o:nposting

7

Q.

Ckay.

8

cpe:rations are at various stages of clea::trposition?

8

A.

It'S just dirt.

Q.

Okay.

9

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

So, for exarrple, s:xre of the rc:MS, the grass

10
11

retain their original characteristics; is that true?

12

that last answer.

13

Q.

N:J.

A.

With certain -- ex:cuse rre, I will q..alify

cl:ifpings, the leaves, ar:rl the straw or stale hay still

12

A.

So, Mr. Gili3::m, IAfrlen grass, ar:rl

leaves, ar:rl straw or stale hay deo::xn --

11

13

Just dirt?

Ckay.

It is dirt, with s::ne nutrient value.
I guess we' 11 have tc get tc that

14

Q.

Ckay.

14

15

A.

You say sore?

15

So, is the -- what ycu're referring tc as

16

Q.

Right.

16

dirt in the wi.n:lrc:!.lls on the Smith pJ::C:perty, is that a

17

A.

Sare.

17

traJ::ketable product for ycu?

18

Q.

ar.ay.

19

A.

Sare might.

20

Q.

Ckay.

21

A.

N:J.

22

Q.

then.

18

A.

Is it a rra....vketable?

19

Q.

Prcduct.

20

A.

I SUfPOSE! it w:mld be.

21

Q.

And, in fact, you sell anpost on a

Sare might; okay.

22

called Black --

Whereas, other win:lrows are further alor.g in

So, t.l-J:e a..-n..s:...er to my --

So, the answer to my question was yes?

Sare might.

23

A.

We did way lor.g tirre age, yes.

24

the decrnposition process, ar:rl ro the grass ar:rl -- the

24

Q.

'11lat

25

grass clippings, ar:rl the leaves, and the straw or stale

25

A.

We --

23
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Q.

1

2
3

-- oold al:x:ut maybe ten, at the vel)' nost,

A.

little baggies of it.

4
5

tcx:lay?

Q.

fut in addition to selling this --

C!<ay.

sell it directly to folks

7

well?

\b:)

A.

Probably a leaf mold or -- like I say, I'm

2

guessing.

I -- I'm totally guessing 'cause I have not

3

seen that website for a vel)' lCJn3" t:irre.

4

W::at you're referring to as dirt off of a website, you

6

34
1

5

ccrne an to the property as

Q.

Well, v.e'll get tack to the website

'Ihe w:i.n::h:aNs that are on the Smith prq;lerty,

6
7

C!<ay.

then, Mr. Gibson.
t:h:lse are vari= heights?

8

A.

N::l.

8

A.

Varia.JS heights?

9

Q.

Have you ever given any of it av.ay?

9

Q.

Serre of the w:i.n::h:aNs ran:Je betv.een 6

10

A.

Yes.

Q.

C!<ay.

11

10
And When you give it av.ay, cb you

12

advertise it or say t:l".a.t it's dirt or cb

13

is crnpost:?

14

A.

N::l.

}'Ul

Serre of it v.e give av.ay to the pecple

15

that bring the stuff in to be made into crnpost:.

16

part of the agrearent.

17

11

say W\....at it

'Ihat' s

And When you advertise the sale of W::at

Q.

Yes.

A.

FO.ssibly.

12

13

to 20 feet wide?

14

A.

Ibssibly.

15

Q.

And the wi.n:ID::Ms that are an the Smith

16

pn:pert.y as part of your a::npJSting c:pemtirns are

17

awraxmately 2oo yards lCJn3"; is that right?

18

you're referring to as dirt an your website, do you refer

18

A.

200 yards lCJn3"?

19

to it as dirt or do you refer to it as a::npJSt?

19

Q.

S:Jn:y.

You krJa..l, it's been a lCJn3" time since I've

20

A.

'Ihat I couldn't tell you.

21

even looked at that website, many years as a matter of

21

Q.

C!<ay.

22

fact.

22

MR. EMI'IH:

23

referred to as anp:JSt.

23

MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

20

A.

24
25

And I lt.Ulld say p:t:d::ably not -- probably not

Q.

Well, W::at cb you refer to it as an

C!<ay.

your website?

to

10 feet high, w::lllld you say?

200 feet lCJn3".

Which exhibit, Cynthia?
It's Exhibit 51.

And I'm

24

mt going to introduce it.

I'm just going to shcM

25

Mr. Gibson, see if it refreshes his rerollectian.

35
(Plaintiff's EKhibit N::l. 51 provided to

1

the witness. )

2
3

4

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WALil\CE:

So, Mr-. Gi.l::s::Jn, you've

36
1

do you :t:erra1ber that lawsuit?

2

A.

Uh-huh.

3

Q.

Yes?

4

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And do you :re:renber giving test:im.:lly in that

5

been handed W::at' s been rra.iked as Plaintiff's EKhibit 51.

5

6

If you could go to page 51 of that exhibit?

6

lawsuit?

7

A.

Page 51?

7

A.

Yes, I cb.

8

Q.

Yes.

8

Q.

And cb you J::"EilBlber testifying al:x:ut the

9

A.

Ci<ay.

10

Q.

If you could read fran lines 9 t.hrcugh 15.

11

12

9

'IHE CUJRI':

'Ib yourself right rrM,

Mr. Gi.l::s::Jn.

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And cb you recall testifying that the

12

13

'IHE WTINESS:

14

'IHE CUJRI':

Beg pardon?

13

I said read to yourself right

w:i.n::h:aNs in that lawsuit?

10

14

wi.n:ID::Ms are ag:>roximately 2 00 feet lCJn3"?
A.

I believe it says that I w::lllld guess they're

al:x:ut that.

15

Q.

Mr. Giboon, cb you see page 51?

16

A.

And I said al:x:ut, oo.

And aloo, i f you could

17

Q.

You did not say guess; is that right?

18

lo::k at page 50 of t..h..at eY.hibit, a.'t1d read fran li..TES --

18

A.

I'm saying -- I'm sa:y:ing t...h.e sarre

19

to yourself --

19

15

ITJ;J.

16
17

'IHE WTINESS:

Q.

C!<ay.

BY MS. YEE-WALil\CE:

~ch?

here as I'm telling you

t...hi!'B

in

rr:M.

20

A.

Page

20

Q.

Ckay.

21

Q.

so, the preceding, fran lines 10 t.hrcugh 19.

21

A.

I cbn't krJa..l for sure.

22

A.

Ckay.

22

Q.

Ckay.

Q.

S:J, I guess I should have said earlier W::at

23

the w:i.n::h:aNs that are an the Smith pn:pert.y that are part

24

of your anp:JSting cperatians are al:x:ut 200 feet lCJn3"; is

25

that true?

23
24

you're looking at is a transcript fran another lawsuit

25

that you

1/.ere

involved in, with kla Camty, back in 2010;

9;) --

'!hey' re al:x:ut that.

S:J, just oo that the reooni is clear,
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38

A.

Ckay.

1

pecple wanted to leave the grass cliw:ings ani leaves.

2

Q.

Yes or no?

2

We -- we'd spoken about it; okay? And they wanted to

3

A.

I'll go-- I'll go with that, yes.

3

cbnate to help defray s::ne of the costs of the catp:JSting

4

Q.

Ckay.

4

cperatian, the fuel and rep;Urs, et cetera; okay?

5

A.

Ma}be, 'cause I'm rrt sure.

5

6

Q.

Thank you.

6

please rrake a cbnation.

7

will be, that w::cldn't be gett:ing very rrany cbnatians,

1

Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
Ckay.

So, Mr. Gibson,

7

vny

Cb you ask larrlscapers

And we were going to put a sign up there,
~.

pecple be:ing what they

8

ani other lawn care professionals to leave grass at your

8

pecple w:::Ul.d take advantage of it.

9

cx:np:lSt:ing facility on the Smith prcpert:y?

9

we -- that I was speaking with said ro, it has to be as a

10

A.

l'fu:y Cb I?

11

Q.

Yes.

10

In particular,

vny grass?

12
So, you agree --

Q.

Ckay.

14

A.

And I'm not tJ:y:i.n::r to be evasive.

15

want to krx:M - -

13

16

Q.

17

question.

Uh-huh.

A.

".Il".e.{'d junt l"..aul it a"vvay to t.'h...e dunp

l'b .

And rra}be it v..as a confus:ing

~t:ing

19

of your

20

oouple of sh:ds; is that true?

Uh-huh.

Q.

-- an the S:ni.th prcperty as part of your

19

cx:np:lSt:ing cperatians, one of the th:ings that you charge

20

a fee for is for folks to leave grass; is that true?

21

22

Q.

And that signage provides for a fee schedule

22

25

A.

Ckay, let rre explain that to you.

My question v..as, so an the signage that is --

18

Yes.

for h::M nuch you charge folks to leave grass?
Years

reck, a l::unch of pecple -- this is 1.1ay reck -- a l::unch of

So, I think it might be helpful if you let rre

A.

A.

24

Q.

17

21
23

let

finish my question.

16

cperatians, you have signage an a

a..~

it go in the landfill.

14

So, an your -- on the Smith prcpert:y, as part

18

Q.

12

15

Sure.

fee or we're not going to cb it.

11

13

I just

And t:.luse pecple they

A.

It isn't actually a fee; it's designated as

such, but yes.

23

Q.

Well, 'Abat w:::Ul.d you call it?

24

A.

A cbnation.

25

Q.

Ckay.

Arry other reason?

So, in addition to your signage

39

40

1

request:ing that folks pay a fee, or if you want to call

1

Q.

2

it a cbnatian, you also designate that grass --

2

A.

Beg pardon?

Arry other reason?

3

A.

l'bw, they --

3

Q.

4

Q.

-- an:l. leaves are s::neth:ing that you accept

4

A.

lb.

5

Q.

Is branches ani oanstructicn rraterials

5

for d:xlatians?

6

A.

Grass cliw:ings

we cb accept, yes.
'llxlse are the --

typically used in a catp:JSting process?

7

Q.

Ckay.

8

A.

And leaves.

8

believe there are a oouple of sites here in -- in Boise

9

Q.

-- t-v.o th:ings; okay.

9

that are us:ing that stuff for cx:np:lSt, yes.

7

And then, for branches or oanstructian

10
11

And leaves?

6

rraterial, you charge $1,000 fee or a $1,000 donation?

A.

Q.

10
11

I believe the City is us:ing t:h:rn, and I

Ckay.

&lt you claim that your a::npost:ing is

organic ; is that right?

12

A.

And Cbesn 't that soun:l. ridiculc:us?

12

A.

Hasn't been designated as such 1:.hJ::cugh --

13

Q.

Is that -- is that true is my question?

13

Q.

Right.

A.

I rrean -- no.

I'm--

14

A.

-- through prcper charmels, ro.

15

to defray pecple fron leaving branches or oanstructian

15

Q.

I'm just ask:ing h::M you refer to it, and you

16

rraterials.

16

refer to your cx:np:lSt:ing process as organic; isn ' t that

17

right?

14

17

Q.

And

I don't charge that.

vny is it that you don't want folks to

18

bri......TYJ bra..n..c.."l-)es or ccnstructicn rraterial to

19

cx:np:lSt:ing cperatian?

20

A.

'Ibat's

}'CUr

Basically because that w::cld be solid 1.19.Ste.

18

A.

N3.tm:cd.

19

Q.

Ckay.

20

And w::cld you agree that construction

rraterials are not organic?

21

'Ibat w::cld be 'Abat w::cld be called -- 'Abat I w::cld call

21

A.

l'b, I WJU.ldn't agree with that.

22

solid 1.19.Ste.

22

Q.

Serre construction rraterials are organic?

23

Q.

And--

23

A.

2 by 4s is organic as the grass is.

24

A.

Old l:xm:ds, an:::rete, rocks, th:ings of that

24

Q.

Ckay.

25

nature.

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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41
D:l ycu have any idea of -- al::ou.t \'fuether or

1

2

1

not gxass is high in nitrogen?

2

A.

I didn't say that.

Q.

Ckay.

Tell rre heM water is used in your

A.

It's high in nitrogen, yes.

3

4

Q.

And leaves are high in carlxln?

4

A.

If it rains or snows, the piles get water.

5

A.

Beg panbn?

5

Q.

So, ycu don't

6

Q.

Leaves are high in carlxln?

6

A.

No.

7

A.

Yes, tlJey are.

7

Q.

Ckay.

8

Q.

And t:h:Jse are tv.o elements that ycu -- that

8

3

9

are typical for a:nposting, in ad::liticn to water an:i air?

a:nposting cperatians.

oo any watering of

the piles?

We'll get back to that, Mr. Gibson.

You have a watering truck?
D:l I have one?

9

A.

10

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Yes.

11

Q.

And, in fact, that is heM ycu a:npost an the

ll

A.

'Tho, as a rratter of fact.

12

Sni.th p1.--c:pe1.ty, is by tak:ir.rg rrat~-:i.als that at.c 1-.d.gh in

12

13

nitrogen, high in cartx:m., and then ycu add water, tnJe,

13

A.

Yes.

14

to tlnse rraterials?

14

Q.

And you're saying ycu drn.'t use t:h:Jse as part

15

15

A.

I have a prd::>len with add water.

16

Q.

Ckay.

17

A.

18
19
20

Q.

D:l ycu have water at --

20

21

A.

No.

21

oo ycu have

of your a:nposting cperatians?

16

A.

No.

Because I d::n' t add water.

17

Q.

And ycu don't use any water whatsoever?

Q.

You d::m.'t at:PlY any water to any of the --

18

A.

I didn't say that.

A.

I

19

Q.

Ckay.

Why

oo not

a prd::>len with that?

at:PlY water, no.

rain and the
A.

We're goir:g back again.

Other than fran the wiirl -- fran the

srnf?

Other fran -- other than fran the rain or the

no.

22

Q.

-- the 9nith property?

22

23

A.

'Ibat's Ml.y we cb not apply water.

23

24

Q.

Ckay.

24

gxass, Mlich is high in nitrogen, leaves, Mlich is high

25

in carlxln, water fran a s:JUrce, SCJUiils like nature, an:i

25

So, you're saying no water is used

M-latsoever --

sr:rM,

Q.

<:kay.

So, your a:nposting process uses

44

43
1

also air?

1

an.sv-er.

ycu'll let him give an

2

A.

Yes.

2

3

Q.

And that is h:M the rraterial de --

3

4

A.

M::lre specifically --

4

5

Q.

I'm sorry.

5

6

A.

-- oxygen.

6

7

Q.

I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I wasn't finished with

7

8

my question.

10
11

9

A.

You asked rre a question al::ou.t the -- al::ou.t

air.
So, I'll rephrase --

12

Q.

Ckay.

13

A.

And I'm saying --

aiJS~~.er

MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

1HE COJRI':

repJrter.
Q.

So, we'll start

So, your a:npostir:g cperatians en the 9nith

10

A.

Yes.

ll

Q.

And leaves, that's high in carlxln?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And then, water fran nature?

Q.

-- my --

14

A.

Yes.

-- nore specifically oxygen.

15

Q.

And oxygen?

16

Q.

16

A.

Yes.

Mr. Gibson, Ms. Yee, ycu folks

17

Q.

And then, through that process, natural

My ccm:t repJrter has to take

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Ckay.

1HE COJRI':

19

to c=tirrue to haj;pen.

20

cbNn M-at everylx;dy says.

21

keep track M1.en you foJks are taJ.kir:g at the sarre tirre.

cle=!p::>sitian OCClLrs?

18

It's inprol:able for her to

And that de<x:npositian breaks cbNn

t:h:Jse leaves an:i gxass --

21
22

A.

Into dirt, yes.

23

her questicn -- her questions terri to be ki.n:l of lan::J'.

23

Q.

<:kay.

24

So, I krl<:M that ycu think ycu krl<:M M1.ere she's going

24

25

before she gets there, an:i ycu just really want to

25

22

<:kay.

p:rc:perty use gxass, Mlich is high in nitrogen?

A.

17

So, Mr. Gibson, if ycu'll let Ms. Yee finish

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

--

-- that will help my ocm:t

BY MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

14

'Ibat's a gcxxl. clarificaticn.

starts~

Sure.

1hank ycu both.

15

Ckay.

M1.en he

over.

8
And that is h:M --

9

If ycu'll let her finish first, Ms. Yee, if

Into M-at ycu' re calling dirt, not

a:npost?
A.

*

Cbrrect.
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Q.

1

2

Okay.

As part of the COTpOSting process, you

tt= piles with a tractor loader?

46
A.

1

And ...Wt lines?

2

Q.

8 thro.Jgh 18.

A.

Yes.

3

A.

Okay.

4

Q.

And that leader is an yoor property?

4

Q.

So, in 2010 you estirrated that a cubic yard

5

A.

Yes.

5

of the rraterial in the w:i.n:Jra;.s an the 9:nith property

Q.

Okay.

6

weighed l::etw=en 1,200 arrl 2, 000 pourrls --

3

6
7

And you urxlersta:rrl that a cubic yard

is 3 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet?

7

A.

My test --

8

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

-- is that right?

9

Q.

And a cubic yard of the rraterial in the

9

A.

-- llo/ test.irrony tl::ere is a=~ to the

rroisture amtent.

10

w:i.:ndJ:cMs, at various stages of decarp;:sitian, can weigh

10

11

between 1,200 arrl 2,000 p:mrls, is that true, based an

11

Q.

Okay.

12

ycur estirration?

12

A.

A~

13

A.

Say again?

13

sh:M you cubic yards that probably w::::uldn't weigh 20

14

Q.

'!be rraterial that ' s in the w:i.:ndJ:cMs an your

14

poonds.

So --

I v..ill sP'....ay '"Vvd.th tb..at because I c::::uld

15

prcperty, a cubic yard weighs between 1,200 arrl 2,000

15

Q.

So, depending an the rroisture amtent --

16

poonds; w:::llid you agree with that estirratian?

16

A.

Yes.

Q.

-- a cubic yard of rraterial weighs l::etw=en

17

A.

N::>t necessarily, no.

17

18

Q.

Mr. Gibson, cb you still have Exhibit 51 in

18

19

frmt of you?

20

A.

21

Q.

22

19

1' 200 arrl 2' 000 poonds?
A.

Yes, I cb.

20

Okay.

21

Q.

22

A.

If you rould look at page 49.

And rould you read lines 8 thro.Jgh 18 to

N::>.

You testified to that in 2010; is that right?
I think -- I believe it says I w:::llid say.

23

yourself.

24

A.

At ~~.hat page?

24

25

Q.

I'm sony; page 49.

25

Q.

it with llo/ hand.

23

1

47
in the w:i.:ndJ:cMs an the 9:nith prcperty can weigh l::etw=en

1

2

1,200 arrl 2,000 pourrls, depending on the rroisture

2

3

amtent?

3

I just said no, that isn't -- I -- I

w::::uldn't say that definitely, oo.

I don't -- I don't koow ...Wt the

Ckay.

amtest of all that was, rut ...
Is it p:lSSible that a cubic yard of rraterial

48
Q.

Okay.

Do you koow if the range of 130 to 160

degrees is prefaable to kill --

4

A.

It's possible, yes.

4

A.

5

Q.

Okay.

5

Q.

-- sony -- to kill w=ed seed arrl pat:J:ngens?

6

A.

'Ibat 's quite a wide range, by the vay.

6

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

'Ibat is the desired targ;>erature range?

7

~the

So, Mr. Gibson,

grass arrl

Yes.

7

Q.

8

leaves, ccnbined with vater arrl oxygen, are decarp;:sing

8

A.

Yes.

9

as part of the cx:npJSting q:>eratians, cbes the -- cb the

9

Q.

Okay.

~

-- strike that -- do the w:i.:ndJ:cMs generate heat;

10

wid

11

cb you kr:l::M?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And that heat is

13

Q.

14

17

~~.hat

kills things like w=ed

seed?

And as that te:rperature drrps, that' s

lttJen it beo:tres rrore akin to ...Wt you're calling dirt?

15

A.

When the te:rperature drrps, yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

So then, at that point, w:::llid you

A.

Yes.

17

agree that the leaves arrl the grass clig;>ings have taken

18

an a diffe..rent fo:rm, into What you're

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

18
19

start to =1 cb.-m?

13

Do the w:i.n:Jra;.s

15

11

Generate heat.

A.

16

~~.hat?

w:i.:ndJ:cMs -- after they've generated heat, eventually they

12

12

And then, eventually, as th:>se

10

ca~lirB

A.

Repeat that q.estian, please.

Q.

Okay.

dirt?

And is there a particular range or

20

21

telperature that you twically see for COTpOSting in your

21

prcperty have heated up to between 130 arrl 160 degrees,

22

q:>eratians \\hen the piles are generating heat?

22

okay, then th::>se piles =1 cb.-m; true?

20

23

A.

Is tl::ere a :rar:ge?

24

Q.

25

A.

Yes.

So, after the w:i.n:Jra;.s an the 9:nith

23

A.

Yes.

What is that range?

24

Q.

And then, you testified that

You're g::rrma think this is funny, rut I test

25

~

those piles

=1, it -- they beo:tre rrore akin to ...Wt is ref --
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1

you're referr:ir.g to as dirt?

50
1

your crnposting q>erations is -- is in a volure greater

than 600 cubic yards?

2

A.

Yes.

2

3

Q.

So, w:JUld ycu agree that the grass cliro:ir.gs

3

A.

Say that question again.

Q.

Okay.

4

an:i the leaves that were part of the w:i.n:lrcM that v.ent

4

5

through that heat:ir.g up an:i =l:ir.g d::Mn process, has

5

the Snith pn:perty that are part of your catp:)St:ir.g

6

then changed fonn fran grass an:i leaves to IIIDat you're

6

q>erations is in a volure greater than 600 cubic yards.

7

call:ir.g dirt?

7

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you agree that that pu:x::ess that'-"=

9

just described is a biological decarposition process?

10

8

9
10

8

lVIR. i:MTIH:

of dirt, or are '-"= talki:r:g aJ:x:ut yards of grass, or are
'-"= talki:r:g al::xJut yards of leaves.
If she can't dist:in;Juish that, then

11

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And you have been us:ir.g that biological

12

Mr. Gibson can't

13

answ=r:ir.g.

decarpositicn p=ess at the Snith pn:perty as part of

14

your a::nposting q>erations since 2013; is --

15

A.

14

Yes.

To which I w:JUld abject, Judge.

Firstly, '-"= have to determine, are w= talki:r:g abcut yards

12
13

So, the material in the w:i.n:lrcMs on

that.

arJS\'8::

THE CXXlRI':

Well, I think she ' s ask:ir.g abcut

15

all of the w:irJdrcw; on the pn:perty, regardless of IIIDat
they're rrade of.

16

Q.

-- that true?

16

17

A.

Is that a question?

17

MS. YEE-WALLACE:

18

Q.

Yes.

18

lVIR. i:MTIH:

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

-- is --

21
22

19

okay.

And you continue that biological

decarpositicn process en the Snith pn:perty tcday?

23
24
25

f.tr question --

He w:JUld have no way of

That's correct.

So' i f she ' s ask:ir.g if it ' s dirt'

if she's asking for yardage of dirt --

20

THE CXXlRI':

She ' s

21

l'IIR. i:MTIH:

-- let rre just note the cibjecticn

--

22

for the record that the questicn, as asked, cannot be

A.

Yes.

23

answ=red in that context.

Q.

And w:JUld ycu agree that the w:i.n:lrcMs arrl

24

rraterial on the Snith pn:perty that you use as part of

25

THE CXXJRI':

All right.

Well, he can

certainly estirrate the volune of the tote -- the total

51
1

volure of rraterial on the pn:perty, if he's able to.

2

That abjection's overruled.

3
4

Q.

6

Say IIIDat?

Q.

can you

A.

arJS\'8::

I can't

arJS\'8::

Q.

Ckay.

Q.

And they --

2

A.

As a rratter --

3

Q.

-- wanted --

4

A.

-- of fact, there's prol::ably one out there

5
my question, please,

your question, no.

I don't

kn:::m h:::lw rruch is there.

10
11

A.

Mr. Gibson?

8
9

can you answ=r my

questions, please, Mr. G:il:eon?

5
7

BY MS. YEE-WALLACE:

52
1

6

Q.

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

Do ycu think it's less than 600 cubic

yards?

right ocm gett:ir.g s::rre.
Sare of the dirt?

What al::xJut the lawn care

professionals, did any of them =re back arrl get their

10

grass or leaves in their original fo:rm or ask for those

11

back?

12

A.

I w:JUld not hazard a guess to it.

12

A.

13

Q.

So, as of 2013 -- I just wm.t to rrake sure

13

Q.

Ckay.

A.

And it w:JUld be inpossible to -- for them to

N:>.

14

that '-"= sort of tie a ro, on this part of your

14

15

testim::my -- did the grass that you received for your

15

16

crnpost:ir.g cperations on the Snith pn:perty =re fran any

16

Q.

Because it's ocm dirt?

17

other third party other than lan:l.scapers arrl lawn care

17

A.

Because it's ocm dirt.

18

professionals?

18

Q.

Okay.

19

get them back in the sarre --

Sane questicn for tt'le las.-dscapel.-s.

A.

And fa.:rrrers, like I said.

19

20

Q.

Anyone else?

20

lan:l.scapers ask you for their grass cliro:ir.gs or their

21

A.

2000 -- I don't kn:::m.

21

leaves back fran you in their original fonn?

Q.

And in 2013, through the present, have any of

22

Fran 2013 through the present, did any of those

22

A.

N:>.

23

those larxlscapers asked to obtain the rraterial back fran

23

Q.

Ckay.

24

you?

24

for them to d::> that since they're

25

dirt?

25

A.

Oh, yes.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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53
1

A.

'Ibat' s a rather =woluted question, but --

2

Q.

I was just t:rying to p;u:aphrase What I

3

th::llght you said.

4

I'm not sure h:::M I \'O.lld answer that.

A.

I

cbn' t know h:::M to answer that.

5
6

Q.

Well, let rre ask you this.

Q.

1

Have any of the

-- cperations?

2

A.

-- I have any names?

3

Q.

Yes.

4

A.

I prol::sbly w::W.d, yes.

Of any of the cxnpanies or landscapers?

5

Q.

can you narre

6

A.

N:l.
N:lt one?

sore?

7

fanre:rs that bJ:CI..lght material to the Smith prcperty fran

7

Q.

8

2013 through the present asked f= their materials back

8

A.

I will rot, ro.

9

in tbeir =ig -- its original fo:rm?

9

Q.

You--

A.

'l1ley did rot give rre pe:rmission to use tbeir

10

I cbn' t know What you're sayi.IB by

A.

it back.

11

asld.nJ

for

I --

10
11

narres in the court, sc.

So, al.t you sayirq }'Ul r.a:ve :ncu-nes of

12

Q.

Fbr exanple --

12

13

A.

I rrean --

13

Q.

if a farrrer bJ:CI..lght bay, did he ask you

14

A.

I have the names in my head, yes.

15

Q.

Are you're --

14
15

for his hay back in its original fo:rm?

16
17

A.

N:l.

Q.

Okay.

16
Did any fo:rm -- farrrer make such a

request to you fran 2013 tbrough the present?

18

17

A.

Speak up, please.

Q.

Are you refusing to give th:Jse narres to rre?

A.

I am refusing to give you th:Jse narres, yes.

A.

Did they rrake such a request?

19

20

Q.

Yes.

20

21

A.

N:lt that I 'm a\'B.re of .

22

Q.

Okay.

23

for your o:nposting --

24

Q.

Okay.

Are they all lan:lscapers here in

thinking of?

lan:lscapers YhJ delivered traterial to the Smith prcperty

1

Okay.

Poise, the ones that are in your head that you're

24

Do--

Q.

22

23

A.

'l1ley did rot give rre pe:rmission to do sc.

21

Do you have any narres of specific

are you refusing to give th:Jse

narres to rre?

18

19

25

Q.

lanlscapers, but you're refusing to provide them?

25

A.

I cbn't know \\bere they -- \\bere they do

their la;,..n rn:Ming arrl larrlscaping, I d:n't know.

56

55

But they care fran here in Idah::>, is

1

Q.

.Ada Cc::unty Hightlay District?

2

A.

.Ada Cc::unty Hightlay District did, yes.

3

A.

I StJfPOSe.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Q.

-- leaves?

4

leaves to the Smith prcperty since 2013 for use in your

5

A.

I cbn't know that for sure.

5

o:nposting cperations?

6

Q.

Okay.

your underst:andir:g, the grass cliJ::Pings arrl --

2

Did you also accept grass cliJ::Pings

fran Poise City fran 2013 to any tirre in the present?

7

So, .Ada Crunty High!.-.ay District took

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Do you know h:::M nuch material .Ada Cc::unty left

8

A.

I may have one or two truckloads, yes.

8

at the --

9

Q.

And --

9

A.

Do I --

10

A.

Three truckloads, four truckloads; I cbn't

10

Q.

-- Smith Prcperty?

11

A.

-- know?

12

Q.

Yes.

11

know.

12

N:lt very nuch.

Q.

Okay.

And the grass cli};pings w::W.d have

13

J::een delivered to the Smith prcperty for your o:nposting

13

A.

N:l.

14

cperations fran Poise City; is that right?

14

Q.

Okay.

15
16

~~

.io

I

And just to be clear, you =tinue to

A.

N:l -- say again.

15

accept grass arrl leaves at the Smith prcperty for use in

Q.

So, B::>ise City delivered grass cli};pings to

16

your o:nposting cperations?

the Smith prcperty since 2013 for use in your o:nposting

17

q:e:aticms?

18

19

A.

I believe sc, yes.

20

Q.

Okay.

A.

I WOLlld prefer calling it to make o:npost

rather t..'I-Jan a..'1. cpe....'Y'aticn, b.1t do I canti..l'll..le? Yes .

19

Q.

Okay.

And you =tinue to accept grass and

And sarre with .Ada Cc::unty; .Ada Cc::unty

20

leaves fran lan:lscapers in Idah::> for rreking o:npost on

21

bJ:CI..lght leaves to the Smith prcperty since 2013 for use

21

the Smith prcperty?

22

in your o:nposting cperations; true?

22

A.

N:lt true.

23

24

Q.

.Ada Cc::unty did not?

24

25

A.

N:l.

25

23

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

A.

I think you just asked that question, but

Q.

Okay.

yes.
And you continue to accept grass and

leaves fran la;,..n care professionals on the Smith prcperty

(208) 287-7690

001107

CVOC-2015-03540 Idaho Dept of Environmental Quality vs. David R.Gibson, et al
57
1
2

A.

Do lf.Je =time to?

3

Q.

Ci<ay.

58
MR. SIU'IH:

My objection is asked and

3

'IHE OXJRI':

Sustained.

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

1

for use in your =rposting operations?
Yes.

2

And do you also an:irrue to accept

4

material f:ran farrrers at the Smith prc:perty for use in

4

5

your =rposting operations?

5

6
7

A.

We w:JU.ld, yes.

Q.

Ci<ay.

6

And are you still charging a fee or a

Yes.

Q.

What do you grew?

A.

We've got plants there, things that lf.Je're

at your =n -- to rrake =rpost an the Smith prc:perty?

9

A.

Are lf.Je still charging a fee, did you ask?

10

11

Q.

Or if you v-.ant to call it a donation, that's

11

12

okay too.

13

A.

A danatian,

14

Q.

Ci<ay.

16

grass?
A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And $1,000 for braJ:Jeres or oanstructian

18

material?

19

testing ani playing with.
Q.

t:..."xlse

12

yes.

1b which I abject to the

And v.tJe:re -- v.tJe:re an the property are

(kay.

pla..~

located?

13

A.

Varioos places.

14

Q.

And Mla.t kind of plants are they?

15

A.

Bushes, trees, alfalfa, things of that
What kind of l::usbes are an the Smith

16

MR. SIU'IH:

Do you grew anything on

the Smith p:rcperty, Mr. Gibson?

A.

9

And it's still $5. 00 for leaves and

Ci<ay.

BY M::. YEE-WALIACE:

7

donation to those folks to leave their grass ani leaves

15

Q.

8

8
10

answered.

nature.

17

Q.

18

prqJerty?

19

A.

20

Q.

Yes.

21

A.

Dan' t

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

I clan' t kn::::M'.

What kind of l::usbes?

20

reference of $1,000 for branclES or crmcrete material.

21

He's already

22

of such a solid \laste --

23

'IHE WI'1NESS:

24

MR. SIU'IH:

-- to the premises.

24

Q.

What kind of alfalfa?

25

'IHE OXJRI':

So, your objection is 1.1frJat?

25

A.

As to the t}'];X' of alfalfa, I'm mt sure of

~lained

that it's to prevent the delivery
Cb:rrect.

]m:)w.

What kind of trees?

59
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13

Q.

Ci<ay.

And Why do you grew that an your -- an

Fbr testing.

Q.

What is -- Mla.t do you rrean by -- h::Jw do you

test it?
Fbr testing for the -- 1.1frJat -- Mla.t the dirt,

nutritional dirt w:JU.ld do to it.
Okay.

And h::Jw rruch -- so, you use the dirt

an both the l::usbes, trees, ani alfalfa?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And it's purely for testing?

yes.

14

A.

Right

15

Q.

Ci<ay, Mr. Gibson.

16

MR. SIU'IH:

17

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

18

Is it purely

for testing that you use the dirt an those materials?
rr:M,

Which exhibit?
Ch, this is Exhibit 20.

I'm sorry.
MR. SIU'IH:

20

20?

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

Yes.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit NJ. 20 provided to

24
25

'IHE OXlRI':

Ms. Yee, you've handed the

Mr. Gibson, earlier you

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

If you <XJUld look at just Exhibit 20, an::l

7

tell me if that cq::pears to be a oopy of your website for

8

Black Diam:Jn::l. Catpost, a printout of that website?

9

A.

Again, like I say, I have rot seen the

10

website for a very long tirre.

11

prObably it, but I'm mt sure of it.

12
13

Q.

Ci<ay.

I w:JU.ld say yes, that's

And the website is located at

w-w-w

d::>t Black Diam:Jn::l. Catpost cbt =n?

'!bat's 1.1frJat it says, yes.

14

A.

15

Q.

Is that the website that you own?

16

A.

According to that, yes.

17

Q.

Ci<ay.

A.

-- say, it 's been a vexy lang tirre since I've

Like I --

had anything to do with this at all.

20

the witness.)

Yes.

BY M::. YEE-WALIACE:

talked al::alt a website that you had; is that true?

19

21
23

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Q.

18

19

22

2
4

A.

Q.

witness Exhibit NJ. 2 0?

3

the Smith prcperty?

A.

60
1

that either.

Q.

Ci<ay.

And is this printout -- lc:d< like a

21

true and accurate oopy of your website, as it existed in

22

2015?

23

A.

24

Q.

Ci<ay.

25

A.

1b be perfectly honest, I never saw the
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1

reoess for a period of 15 minutes.

2

before I recess?

3

MR. EMTIH:

Judge, I believe not at the

5

'IHE o:JJRI':

Ms. Yee?

6

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

4

m:rrent.

7
8

1

Anyth.ing to take up

'IHE o:JJRI':

No, Your lbmr.

All right.

We'll be in reoess

for 15 minutes.
Mr. Gil:e::m, you can starrl d::1.<Jn, sir.

9
10

(Brief recess taken. )

11

Thank you.

Be seated, please.

'IHE o:JJRI':

14

Mr. Gil:e::m is tack an tbe witness starrl, the

parties -- lawyers are present.
Mr. Gibson, I'll re:nirrl you you're still

16
17

under oath.

4

their natu:ral =rlition into a:npost; is th3.t true?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Into a \\hat?

Ms. Yee, you may amtinue.

19

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Q.

Thank you, Your lb!Dr.

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Okay.

So, Mr. Gil:e::m, I

Into a h.mi.c p:ro:luct.

7

A.

H.Jm:i.c substance.

8

Q.

H-U-M-I-C, h.mi.c?

9

A.

H-U-M-I-C.

10

Q.

What is a h.mi.c substance?

11

A.

Basically, it's after the organic material

14

lJaS broken coxpletely d:Mn..
Q.

So, eb you refer to this hun:Lc p:ro:luct also

as hunus, H-U-M-U-S?

15

A.

Saretimes.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

18
20

it takes ten years to change the grass cli:g;Jings, arrl tbe
leaves, arrl the st:ray [verbatim] or a stale hay fran

13

13
15

2
3

12

12

general -- I'll strike th3.t question-- you estimate that

And is hunus the same thing as

a:npost?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

lbw does it differ?

20

A.

Cl:np:)st is in a process.

Q.

And h::M does that differ fran hunus?
Hurrus is ro 1~ in th3.t process.

21

want to ask you a few folla.-J-up questions arrl then I'm

21

22

going to tmn to sore docurrents.

22

A.

23

Q.

It's finished?

23

So, I'm referring tack

rON

to your

llEld.J:B

24

a:npost an the Smith pn:perty fran 2013 through the

24

A.

Finished, cbne.

25

present.

25

Q.

So, hunus is v.htt you consider to the errl

And -- arrl I guess before I say th3.t, just in

92

91
1

product of the deccnpositian prooess fran a:nposting?

2

A.

In our -- in v.htt we're cbing, yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

So, eb you estimate th3.t it takes ten

1

reused; true?

2

A.

So we can reuse it, yes.

3

Q.

And v.htt are the benefits of using l:rurrus?

A.

There's a l:xx:>k. ab:Jut yay-thick th3.t tells all

4

years to change the grass cli:wings, leaves, arrl st:raw or

4

5

stale hay fran their natu:ral =rlitian into hunus?

5

th3.t.

6

is the fertilization.

l~r.

6

A.

Appn::ocinately; saretimes

7

Q.

And v.htt is hunus used for?

8

used for?

9

A.

10

What is bums

What we're g::>ing to use it for or \\hat it can

be used for?

7

The benefits -- the benefits we're get out of it

Q.

Okay.

And so, I want to taJk -- go tack to

8

your cx::rrp=ting cperatians on the Smith pn:perty.

9

2013, was your cc:rrpost:ing cperatians an the Smith

10

pn:perty a larrlfill?
A larrlfill?

11

Q.

In general, v.htt is hunus used for?

11

A.

12

A.

We're g::>ing to use it to p.1t on the pn:perty

12

Q.

Yes.

13

A.

Of course rot.

14

Q.

In 2013 -- well, let rre strike th3.t.

13

to gr= rursery plants.

'Ibat was the plan at one time.

So, are you rraking hurrus an the Smith

In

14

Q.

15

pn:perty?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And th3.t' s --

18

A.

Dil.t.

19

Q.

And you--

19

the Smith pu::perty a disposal site for any type of

20

A.

-- v.htt tbe Court called it.

20

material?

Q.

And you've

21

A.

Of course rot.

22

Q.

Is your a:nposting cperatians an the Smith

21
22
23
24
25

Is your a:nposting cperatian an the Smith

15
16
17

It --it's l::asically di1.t.

That's --

teen llEld.J:B hunus since 2013 an

the Smith pn:perty?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And the reason that you make hunus on

A.

Of course rot.

18

23

the Smith pn:perty is th3.t so -- so th3.t it can be

pn:perty a larrlfill tcx:lay?

pn:perty a disposal site for any material presently?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Does your a:nposting cperations

an the Smith
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93
prr.perty have a high risk of creating pat:hcgens, such as

2

e-roli, that 110.1ld irrpact burren health?
A.

3

94

1
2

A.

'Ibat ' s true tcx:lay.

Q.

Ckay.

Mr. Gibron, you have registered ywr

Does it have a high risk of do:i.r.g ro?

3

hurrus as a procD.rt with the I<lah:J DEp3rtment of
Agriculture?

4

Q.

Yes.

4

5

A.

N::>.

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And that w;,s true in 2013?

6

Q.

And that w;,s true in 2013?

7

A.

Yes.

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And that's true today?

8

Q.

And that' s true tcx:lay?

9

A.

'Ibat' s true today.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

d<ay.

10

Q.

And you didn't register it as a dirt, did

Do you -- d:Jes ywr crnposting

11

cperations an the Smith prr.perty fo:rm toxic leecbate or

11

12

gas?

12

~.

As

13

Q.

Yes.

13

you?

a d:L."'t?

A.

Leechate?

14

Q.

d<ay.

14

A.

N::>.

15

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

You registered that product as hurrus?

16

Q.

And that's true today?

16

A.

Yes.

17

A.

'Ibat 's true today.

17

Q.

And that hurrus carre fran the Smith prcperty?

Q.

Does -- do ywr cmposting cperations an tbe

18

A.

In -- in -- in 2013, are you speaking?

19

Q.

So, the hums that you registered with the

18
19

N::>.

And w;,s that true in 2013?

Smith prcperty pose a substantial risk to buran health?

20

A.

N::>.

20

Ilefart:rret1t of Agriculture in 2013

21

Q.

Or the envi.rament?

21

hurrus on the Smith prr.perty; true?

w;,s

referr:i.r:g to the

22

A.

1\b.

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And w;,s that true in 2013?

23

Q.

And that's the sarre -- you're referr:i.r.g to

24

A.

Correct.

24

hurrus ccm:i.r.g fran the Smith prcperty that is currently

25

Q.

And it's true today?

25

registered with the I<lah:J r:eprrt:rrent of Agriculture?

1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And -- and t.h:>se v..ere, again, oot registered

95
2
3

96

as dirt?

4

A.

N::>.

I cbn't believe they register dirt.

5

MR. EMTIH:

6

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

7

MR. EMTIH:

1

you ever sul:mitted a sit:i.r.g <3HJlicatian with the

2

Ilefart:rret1t of Envi.rarnental Q.Jality in amnectian with

3

ywr cmposting cperations on the Smith prcperty?

4

Which me?

5

I'm sorry; 53.

6

53.

7

A.

Acrord:i.r.g to statute, I didn't believe I

needed to.

Q.

So, have you sul:mitted such a sit:i.r.g

<3HJlicatian with -- I'm going to call than DB;)?

Mr. Gibson, you've been

8

A.

Have I?

9

ban:Je::i lf.i:Jat 's been rrru:ked as Plaintiff's Exhibit N::>. 53;

9

Q.

Yes.

10

and I' 11 represent to you that t.h:>se are the Solid Waste

10

A.

Ever?

11

M3nagerent Rules in the state of I<lah:J.

11

Q.

Correct.

Q.

8

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Have you ever seen th:Jse regulations before?

12

A.

Yes.

13

A.

Yes, I have.

13

Q.

Ckay.

14

Q.

d<ay.

14

12

15

And are you familiar with th:lse

15

A.

N::>.

16

A.

Fairly.

16

Q.

Have you ever sul:mitted -- or have ycu

17

Q.

Were you familiar with t.h:>se regulations in

17

sul:mitted an operating plan in connection with ywr

18

=rposti..'1g c:peratians on t.I-Je Smit..l-1 prq;:erty at a..TJy time

19

A.

N::>.

19

fran 2013 through the present?

20

Q.

When did you becare familiar with those

20

A.

N::>.

21

Q.

And, =ently, ywr cx:nposting cperations an

18

21

regulations?

Did you sul:mit a siting <3HJlicatian

with DB;) at any time fran 2013 through tbe present?

2013?

regulations?

22

A.

In 2013, Wlen. I got a letter.

23

Q.

Fran tbe

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Ckay.

Ilefart:rret1t of Enviromental Q.Jality?

And fran any time, have you ev -- have

22

the Smith prcperty is oot closed?

23

A.

24

Q.

It's c:pen?

25

A.

Yes.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

N::>.

(208) 287-7690

001110

CVOC-2015-03540 Idaho Dept of Environmental Quality vs. David R.Gibson, et al
102

101
A.

1

2

'lbat 's stuff that my wife takes

-- k:t:o\l.

care of; I dJn' t k:t:o\l.

3

Q.

Ci<:ay.

:&lt you ass:x:iate that wel::site with

4

your l::usiness, Black D:i.arrarrl Cb!p:x3t?

5

you sold anp:>st to foJks thJ::ough that wel::site; true?

6
7
8

1

I believe you said

'lbat trey

Q.

'lbat you

6

Yes.

Q.

So, you use that wel::site is part -- in part

It 's been a lang tirre since I sold anything

A.

A.

3
4

of your anp:>sting J::usiness?

9

2

off of that -- that website at all.

11

lang tirre, arx:l I dJn 't k:t:o\l h:m lang.

It's been a very

~.~ere

~.~ere

claiming What?

a Tier II anp:>sting facility,

by my of this letter?

5

A.

10

letter?

MR. s.ITIH:

J\.ld;Je, let rre just tenler an

objection, arx:l say the d:::x::u!rent, the Exhibit already

7

adnitted, will speak for itself as to What it says arx:l we

8

don't need to speculate al:x:ut its content.

9

MS. YEE-WAill\CE:

10

'IHE c:n:JRI':

I'm--

Well' she's just asking al:x:ut

11

What he un:lerstood the letter was telling him.

12

Q.

Ci<:ay?

12

cbjection •s vven:uled.

13

A.

So, I can't -- I can't answer that ha:Je.stly.

13

14

Q.

So, this letter directed you to lcx:k up the

14

Q.

BY!>£. YEE-WAUACE:

So, the

You can answer,

Mr. Gibson.

15

IDAPA rules that you just lcx:ked at in Ex:hibit 53; is

15

A.

What was the questicn again?

16

that true?

16

Q.

Did you un:lerstand, by my of this letter,

17

A.

Yes.

17

tbat it was DEO's position tbat your anp:>sting

18

Q.

Did you do that at -- when you received that

18

cperatians en the Snith pn:perty qualified as a Tier II

19

anp:>sting facility?

19

letter -- this --

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

-- letter?

Ci<:ay.

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And this letter asked to you to arrange a

rreeting with DEO?

And you read t:h:Jse regulations?

22

23

A.

Yes, I did.

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And you un:lerstood that DEO was claiming that

24

Q.

Did you do that?

25

A.

Yes.

22

25

you

~.~ere

a Tier II anp:>sting facility, by \lay of this

104

103
1
2
3

And v.tJen

A.

I d:ln't recall exactly; it \laS within tv.o

\laS

!>£. YEE-WAill\CE:

1

Q.

that rreeting?

2
3

weeks tirre.

MR. s.ITIH:

Yeah.

What are we cbing with 1, are you

going to adnit it?

Q.

Where did that rreeting take place?

4

A.

At DEO office.

5

Your Hi:Jmr, I'd rrove for the adnissian -- I think it has

6

Q.

Who was present?

6

been.

7

A.

I really d:ln't rE!TBTiJer M1o was there for

7

'IHE c:n:JRI':

1 was adnitted witlnlt objection.

8

MR. s.ITIH:

Ci<:ay.

8

sure.
It was you --

9

Q.

Ci<:ay.

10

A.

I k:t:o\l there ~.~ere tw::J DEQ people, tw::J

11

rren.

MS. YEE-WAUACE:

Did I mt --

4
5

MS. YEE-WAill\CE:

9

Oh.

'Ihanks.

DE0

10

I believe there was a lady there also fran DEO.

11

harxJed What's been rnaxked as Plaintiff's Ex:hibit N:>. 3;

12

cb you reo::>gnize Plaintiff's Ex:h:ibit lb. 3?

12

Q.

And What was the :p.u:pose of that rreeting?

13

A.

'Ib -- well, DEO' s

purpose, I St.1fPOSe, was to

13

Q.

A.

BY!>£. YEE-WAUACE:

Mr. Gibson, you've been

I'm reading it to see.

14

try to tell rre that I was a Tier II cperation.

15

reason for being there was to sh:::M than tbat I was

15

Q.

16

exenpt, a=:rdin:J to their= regulations.

16

in May of 2013?

17

A.

As to the exact date, I cbn't k:t:o\l.

18

Q.

So, my qu.,-Stian W"...S, is t.his a letter that

17

Q.

Ci<:ay.

18

A.

Saret:h.in::f betv.een a 1-.alf-r.our

19

Q.

Ci<:ay.

20

And my

And h:m l<DJ did tbat rreeting last?
ru~

an hour.

19

!>£. YEE-WAill\CE:

Ex:h:ibit 3.

23

(Plaintiff's Ex:hibit 1\b. 3 provided to
the witness.)

24
25

20
21

21
22

14

MR. s.ITIH:

3?

Yes.

I do reo::>gnize the letter.

Is this a letter that you received fran DEO

you received fran DEO in May of 2013?
A.

And I said I cbn't kn::M if it -- What date

it -- v.tJen I -- v.tJen I got the letter, no.

22

Q.

:&lt you did receive --

23

A.

:&lt I --

24

Q.

-- it?

25

A.

-- did receive the letter, yes.
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161
1

any of t:be rraterials or substances might be an the

2

so-called Gibson cperatian?

1

since 1972.

2

Q.

Say that again?

3

A.

No.

3

A.

I've been wrldng as a pOOt:ogl::apher and

4

Q.

Was that t:be only t:i.rre in August of 2017, I

4

5

believe it was August 13 of 2017, that you were an this

5

6

pn:perty?

6

videographer for -- for attorneys since 1972.
Q.

Appreciate that.

My question t:ben was,

relative to this pn:perty, this premises, and/or this

7

A.

14.

7

Gibson operation, were yc:u ever asked to go out there to

8

Q.

August 14; tbank you, Jolm.

8

prcx:luce pl:rt.ographic ren:l.er:i.r:gs anyt:i.rre prior to

9

August 14, 2017?

Arxl. did yru actually go onto any of the

9
10

pn:perty v.frlere yc:u saw tbese rows or piles?

11

12

13

A.

No.

Q.

So, you stayed on w:at you 1.-efen:ed to as an

access road?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Very good.

12
13

'lba:nk yc:u,

JU<:tle .
Mr. Smith, tbank yc:u.

14

A.

Correct.

14

'lHE OXIRI':

15

Q.

And so this record rray be rrore specific an

15

kr:i redirect?

16

that point, is that access road referred as the

16

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

17

Lake Hazel &tension?

17

'lHE OXIRI':

18

A.

I don't k:r:Jo..;.

18

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

19

Q.

Okay.

19

'lba:nk you, Jabn.

20

A.

I just don't krDw that.

21

Q.

Okay.

And if I understcxxl. your test:irrany

He rray.

'lHE OXIRI':

Mr. Smith?

21

All right.

Mr. Hall, thank you for OOlling.

correctly, never before were you asked to un::lertake

22

'lHE WIIN&SS:

23

ph::>tcgramretric ren:l.er:i.r:gs of eit:ber this pn:perty or

23

MR. EMITH:

24

this operation?

24

25

A.

Yes, sir.
Judge, w= w::llid stip.il.ate that he

rray -- Jabn Hall rray be excused entirely.

25

1

1

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

2

MR. EMITH:

Bye, Jolm.

2

3

'lHE OXIRI':

Ms. Yee, before I ask you to

3

'!hank you.

All right.

'lHE OXIRI':

163

'Ulanks.

Ho=r.

20

22

Well, I've been Cbing that sort of thing

No, Yo.rr

May this witness be excused?

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

164
It's ckay; I k:r:Jo..; Who you

all are referring to.
MR. EMITH:

Okay.

4

art:inue, you -- this witness' test:irrany has brought up

4

'lHE OXIRI':

'lba:nk you.

5

t:be question in my mirrl \\dlet:ber I've been referring to

5

Call yc:ur next witness t:ben.

6

yc:u incorrectly tbroughJut --

6

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

7

Plaintiff calls Dean Ehlert.

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

7

8
9

'lHE OXIRI':

-- these proceedings.

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

11

to both.

12

fire.

I have

= --

-- or Yee, or Yee-wallace,

I go by all three.
'lHE OXIRI':

17

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

All right.

Well --

Sincerely.

-- I -- I 'm :b..ar.:p.f to call J'Oll

J:v...ever you prefer to be called.

20

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

I just --

I kind of like Ms. Yee,

'lHE WIIN&SS:

11

'lHE OXIRI':

My narre is Dean Ehlert.

Can you spell your last narre,

please?

13

'lHE WIIN&SS:

14

'lHE OXIRI':

16

E-H-L-E-R-T.
'lba:nk you.

All right.

DEAN EHLERI',

called as a witness, by and an behalf of the Plaintiff,

17
18

:b.a..v:i...TJg been first duly sv.orn,

19

as follows:

22

MR. EMITH:

Ms. M"lat?

23

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

24

MR. EMITH:

22

Ms. Yee is fire.

Arxl. I keep calling you Ms.

t.'>SS

e.xa.rrined arrl testified

20
21

actually.

Wallace.

Sir, can you tell ne your full

'lHE OXIRI':

15

16

'IHE c.r.-L'ltiT:

'lba:nk JUl., Yo.rr H:Jn:>r.

narre, please.

10
12

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

25

Arxl. so, I answer

I'm both.

All right.

14

18

8
9

Wallace -'lHE OXIRI':

21

yc:u

yeah -- you -- it's C01pletely

13

19

Do

prefer Wallace or Yee-wallace?

10

15

Oh.

DIREX::T EXI'MINATICN
BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

23

Q.

Mr. Ehlert, v.frlere do you wrk?

24

A.

I wrk for t:be Idah:> Ilep3rt:ITEnt of

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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2

Q.

165
And 11.i:Jat is your =rent position with

Okay.

the -- I'm goir:g to call it DEl;); is that okay?

2

3

A.

Perfect.

4

Q.

Okay.

A.

I'm =rently the Assessn:nt a:rxi Cb:tpliance

5

1

What is your current position with

DEl;)?

6

Q.

Okay.

166
So, you were the Solid Waste Progl:am

Mmager up until July of 2015?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

And you referred to the Solid Waste Progl:am

5

of DEl;); can you tell the Court 11.i:Jat -- 11.i:Jat that rreans,

6

11.i:Jat 's a Solid Waste Program?

7

Unit Mmager in the Waste Mmagarent a:rxi Reraiiatian

7

8

Division.

8

Act, statutory autlx:>rity to regulate rrunicipal solid

9

vaste la:rxifills.

Did you w::>J::k for DEl;) in 2013?

A.

We have, un:ler the Solid Waste Facilities

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

Yes, I did.

10

la:rxifill.

11

Q.

What did you oo for DEQ in 2013?

11

health districts an operations, closure, post-closure.

12

A.

I vas the Solid Waste Progl:am rvanager.

12

13

Q.

And 11.i:Jat vas your role= duties as the Solid

13

14

Waste Progl:am Mmager?

15

A.

I oversaw the solid vaste

16

state of Idalxl.

p~

for the

I insured corrpliant aJ;Plicatian of both

So, for exarrple, l:ike the kla County

We certify the site design, we 1.10:rk with

And.. U.l...en, tlu."C:Ugh tl-.e Envircnre.nta.l

Protection Health Act, we're authorized to p:rorulgate

14

rules for other types of solid vaste facilities, like

15

non-rrunicipal la:rxifills.

16

industrial landfills or construction a:rxi darolitian

EKarrples of that v.a.lld J:;e

17

state a:rxi Federal regulations.

I provide technical

17

la:rxifills.

18

assistance to all types of pe::ple involved in solid

18

So, a facility 1.lftlere people v.a.lld take their waste,

'Ihose rules v.a.lld regulate transfer stations.

19

vaste; industry, rounties, cities, citizens, the health

19

deposit it an a -- typically a tiwing floor or concrete

20

district, industry.

20

floor.

21

to health districts in our regional offices.

22

Q.

23

Progl:am Mmager?

24

A.

25

Okay.

And I provide technical assistance

How lar:g

~

you the Solid Waste

I started in Septe:rber, 1999, a:rxi transferred

in JUly, 2015.

1

take -- they v.o.lld

We also regulate processing facilities.

22

that w:JUJ.d either l:;e -- exarrples w::mld l:;e corrposting

23

facilities or anaerdri.c digesters.

24
25

ren:JI.Te

And then, it is transp::>rted to a la:rxifill.

21

167
contaminated soils, put it cut

And then, we also regulate

petroleun contaminated soil la:rxi farms.

~<hat

So,

are called

So, pe::ple

168
starting with, did you grad:!ate fran high

1

2

an the grourrl a:rxi let microbes a:rxi volatilization treat

2

3

that soil, reduce the petroleun levels until they're

3

A.

Yes, I did.

4

belCM a -- a particular level.

4

Q.

And 1.lftlere did you go to high school?

5

A.

I \\6lt to catoctin High Scb:x:>l in 1bunront,

6

Maryla:rxi.

5
6

Q.

Okay.

And did you have an involvarent with

issuing the N::>tice of Violation to Mr. Gibson in 2013?

school?

And did you go an to oollege?

7

A.

I did.

7

Q.

8

Q.

And 11.i:Jat was your role?

8

A.

Yes, I did.

9

A.

Part of our process is that when the regional

9

Q.

And was that directly after high school?

10

office w:JUJ.d get a corrplaint, they v.a.lld investigate.

10

A.

N::>, it was mt.

11

And based an their investigation, they v.a.lld also have

11

Q.

Okay.

12

discussions with myself.

12

And through that, they v.a.lld

13

rrake a referral f= enforcenent to the state office.

14

this case, with solid vaste, it v.a.lid l:;e a referral to

15

rre.

16
17

In

I v.alid take that referral a:rxi dusk -discuss with the JIG's office l=J to proceed.

Typically,

13

What did you 00 l:;etw=en high school

a:rxi college?
A.

I \\6lt into the Air Fbrce for five years.

was stationed in Denver, Colorad:J, Guam, a:rxi then I er.rled

15

for enlisbrent in Wurtsmith, Michigan.

16
17

Q.

And then, after military service, did you go

on to college?

18

we w::lli.d eit.L'~-.er issue a to.a.J..""T.i..t.Jg letter, a :r-btice of

18

19

Violation, or rrake a direct referral to the Attorney

19

And then, I rroved to Boise, Idalxl, a:rxi atten:led Boise

20

General's Office for a corrplaint.

20

state University.

21

Q.

Okay.

Like a -- like a civil lawsuit?

22

A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

And did you graduate fran Boise state?

21

Q.

Clkay.

22

A.

Yes, I did.
What year was that?

So, I wmt to get a little bit nore

23

Q.

24

into that, J::ut J::efore I oo, I want to take a step back

24

A.

I grad:!ated in 1995.

25

a:rxi get a little bit rrore about your backgrourrl.

25

Q.

And did you OOtain any degrees?

23

I

14
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A.

1

Yes.

1

170
SubtitleD, l!.hich was basically the ool -- the Municipal
Solid Waste I..ar:dfill P:rogJ:am, was being inplarented in

2

Q.

And \\bat degrees were th:lse?

2

3

A.

A Bachelor's of Science in Envirarrrental

3

Idah:J.

4

a database and track the status of rrunicipal solid waste

5

landfills in Idah:J.

4

Health, with a minor in Biology.

5
6

Q.

And can you describe for the Ca.n:t \\bat a

Bachelor of Science in Envirar:rrental Health entails?

And so, c:ne of the thi.r:gs that I did was a create

And tben, I also w::>:tked an pollution

6

wrere you'll

It oovered a -- a breed array of subjects.

7

prevention.

8

Ccmn.mity health, =munical -- o::mrunicable diseases,

8

find alternatives for primarily bazardous waste.

9

gxo.mi water, surface water, hazan:lc:R.:ts waste, solid

9

find less bazard:Jus materials that can Cb the sane

7

10

A.

waste, food inspections.
Q.

11

12

aftei cullege?

13

14

10

And did you begin w::>l:kiLg for D.EJ;;l :i.nrrediately

A.

.Actually, I was an intern at DEQ

~!.bile

atterrli.ng Boise State.
Q.

<:kay.

16

A.

I started, I l:elieve, April, 1994.

Q.

<:kay.

17

And hJw lang were you an intern for

A.

19

Tho year --

v.ell, I was an intem and tben

20

transferred to \\bat was called an environrrental trainee,

21

and I did that for tw::> years.

22
23

Q.

And M1at did you Cb as an intem and

an envi:ramental trainee at DEQ?

24
25

Okay.

A.

w::>:tked an.

rut

are less bazanlous.

And you held those positions through 1996?

Q.

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

And tben, .mat did you Cb in 1996, did you

continue to w::>rk for D.EJ;;l?

I was a Air Q.Jality Specialist.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And \\bat did you Cb as an Air Q.Jality

17

DEQ?

process or the sane t:.h:i.ng,

So, you

11

14

And 1l.ben were you an intem?

15

18

I was

So' it's basically the idea

Specialist f= D.EJ;;l?
I looked at -- it was a federal prcg:ram that

18

A.

19

was coming rut.

20

And -- and it bad to Cb with certain techmlogies that

21

were being required an certain types of facilities.

22

I did an evaluation an hJw that w::>Uld inpact Idah:J.
Q.

23

I bad several pral:ably rrain projects that I

24

One was -- at the t:i.rre that I started, the

25

I believe it was called the 102-E.

<:kay.

So,

And hJw lang were the Air Quality

Specialist for D.EJ;;l?
A.

I cbn't reTBTi:ler specifically, b.lt it was

172

171
1

just several months.

2

Q.

3

positions at D.EJ;;l?

4

5

A.

<:kay.
Yes.

1

And then, did you hold any other

2
3

I was a Air Q.Jality Program Specialist

in the Boise regional office.

Correct.

Q.

<:kay.

Science Officer?
A.

Q.

And .mat did you Cb in that position?

A.

I =rdinated the 1\da Co.mty State

7

10

Q.

Okay.

A.

Sorry.

What's EM-10?

the rrain sources w:JUld be l:ike w:xxi STOke.

12

:tased an the size of the particle.

13

EM-10 was the rrain mncem; later EM-2.5.

And .mat did you Cb as a Hazard Waste

I was resp:!OSible for rraintaining -- it was

8

called the RIFRA Info r:atabase.

9

database, rrenaged. by EPA.

So, one of

10

activities, so things like inspections, enforcarent,

11

permit related issues with hazarcbus waste permitted

M::. that t:i.rre, the
So, it was a

facilities got entered in this database.

13

basically a tracking database for all the activities for
Idah:J.

smaller diarreter particulate, mainly Like f:ron autmotive

14

15

exhaust.

15

Q.

16

position?

17

A.

Fbr about a year.

18

Q.

OkBy.

Q.

<:kay.

17

A.

And pral:ably the rrain

19

is, the larger

So, the smaller the particle, the more cancem you bave.

20
21

CCI1Celll

Q.

<:kay.

And hJw lang did you hold that

position with D.EJ;;l?
A.

I 1:elieve it was mt quite a year.

23

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

24
25

19

Did you hold any other positions with

D.EJ;;l?
I was a Hazard:Jus Waste Science

A.

'Ihen I becarre the Solid Waste P:rogJ:am

Q.

N?w, I believe that you said the solid

<:kay.

waste prcg:ram rrenager, position is that a State position?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

<:kay.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

And tllen, did you hold any other

Mmager.

22
23

And hJw -- hJw lang did you hold that

positions with DEQ?

20
21

22

And it was

12

14
16

So, it was a national

And all of bazarcbus waste

It ' s -- it ' s

It's particulate matter.

11

looks

like betw=en about '98, '99; is that -A.

7

inplerentatian plan for EM-10.

And so, by my calculation, was that

5

6

9

Q.

4

6

8

Officer.

*
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A.

1

2

174

And so, I had responsibility for l::asically

1

all the solid v.aste activity in the state of Iclal:o.
Q.

3

2

So, can yru describe for the Court, vfuen it

3

A.

Cbrrect.

Q.

And also, as the Solid Waste Program M3m.ger,

did you awly IDAPA?

4

cares to the Solid Waste Program, what the difference is

4

A.

Yes.

5

be~

5

Q.

And \lhlch IDAPA sections?

6

irrplarenting the Solid Waist Program.

6

A.

IDAPA 58.01.06.

7

Q.

And th:Jse are referred to as the Solid Waste

state offices arrl regional offices, in terms of

A.

7

'Ihe regional offices are J::asically v.=king an

So, for exanple, the Eoise regional

8

regional issues.

9

office w:JUJ.d oversee the activities within scut:hwest

10

Idah;:) arrl the facilities in there.

11

kla County landfill, Elnore County larrlfills, there's

8

'lbey v.o:rked with the

12

t:t:ans -- tl.ansfa· station, calp:)&tirB facilities.

13

the v.orked primarily with the facilities tbanselves.

So,

M3m.gement :re;]Ulations?

9

A.

Cbrrect.

10

Q.

Okay.

Waste Program M3m.ger, \\bat v.as your re<t pcsitian with

12

DB;i?

13

:i.rJ.surirB

And then, after you v..ere the Solid

11

I v.as the G.t:am:i water arrl Retrediatian

A.

14

'Ihe state office v.as responsible for

15

that that program v.as irrplemented consistence --

15

Q.

16

consistently across the state.

16

A.

Fran July, 2015, until Ppril of 2017.

17

Q.

And \\bat did t:lE.t pcsitian entail?

A.

I oversaw staff t:lE.t inplerented several

17

Q.

Ci<ay.

As part of yrur pcsitions,

14

M3m.ger in DEQ's Eoise regional office.
And h::w lCIIXJ did you hold t:lE.t pcsitian?

18

specifically as Solid Waste Program M3m.ger fran 1999

18

19

t.l:n:rugh 2015, v.as it part of yrur jcb to awly Idah;:)

19

different p:rograms; hazardous v.aste

20

O:x:le?

20

sto:tage tanks, leaking un:lergrourrl sto:tage tanks, b =
fields, general remediation, arrl our g:rrurrlt..ater program.

21

A.

Yes, it was.

21

22

Q.

kJy particular provisions?

22

23

A.

Well, one of the main provisions v.as Ida

23

24

axle -- Idah;:) O:x:le 39-7401, arrl then 39-100 or 101.

25

Q.

Ci<ay.

And the subsequent sections?

Q.

Ci<ay.

p~,

urxlergramd

And then, cbes t:lE.t bring us to your

current pcsitian?

24

A.

Cbrrect.

25

Q.

Ci<ay.

'Ibat yru've held since?

175

176
1

A.

activities t.l:n:rugh t:lE.t association.

Q.

2

A.

3

office arrl health districts.

Q.

4

an a bi-annual period.

state?
A.

Q.

I had CIIXJOing meetings with both our regional

5

18 nonths v.e w:ill.d meet arrl go over issues.

6

have peq:>le care in arrl -- arrl present an different

7

tcpics.

9
10
11

12
13

A.

Yes.

regional, state synposiuns, conferences, an a wide range
of tcpics.
Did yru have any t:taining or education during

Q.

the course of your career at DEQ related to ocnposting?
Yes.

A.

I attealed a tv.o-day a::rrpost t:taining

14

in I believe it v.as March, 2013, at the Eoise state

15

University.

16

Association.

It v.as t.l:n:rugh the Idah;:) Solid Waste
I participated in nurrerous 1\eb -- 1\ebinars.

17

Q.

-- the State arrl regional offices?

17

18

A.

Yes, yes.

18

I atter.de.:l a 2005 -- it

19

Q.

Ci<ay.

19

rut there

carcasses as a -- a managenent tool.

It's a cxx:lL."'\lir.a.tErl. effort.

Did yru have any continuing education

20

cancenll:ng solid v.aste over the course of your career

20

21

with DB;)?

21

22

A.

I attealed national conferences.

I v.as an

23

the Eoard of the Idaho Solid Waste Association starting

24

in 2001.

25

their Education Connittee.

And then, starting in 2006, I was the chair on

I =rdi.nated educational

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

We w:JUld

Like I said, I've attended both national,

8

16

Fonral, J::asically, t:taining

So, it v.as p:roi:Ebly al:x:ut evecy

22
23

Q.

\\ere

V\6S

called a CCL.--cass synposiun,

seve:tal tcpics an ocnposting animal

And did you have any experience in your jcbs

at DEQ with ocnposting facilities?
A.

I inspected ocnposting facilities, I v.o:rked

24

with facilities an going t.l:n:rugh their approval process;

25

the site, the design, the cperating plans.

*
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1

calls and discussed different issues regard:ir:g can --

2

ccnposting.

3

4
5

Q.

1

Q.

an in-vessel?

2
Did you have any tra:in:ing or education about

varirus o:::nposting rreth:xls?
Yeah.

A.

Sore of the synposiUllS t:l:Jat I

atteriled, they talked about the w:i.ncl:l:t::r#, which is yo..rr

7

rrore J::asic type.

8

of ccnpost.

It allows you to rrenage large velures

'Ihere' s an aerated static pile method, \<frJere

9

3

A.

Cbrrect.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

6

178
WinJra...r, aerated static nethod, or in the --

So, v-e'll get into th:JSe a little bit

rrore.
Do you -- did you have any ongoing

6
7

self- tra:in:ing to got -- to gain kn::>wlErl3e on solid waste

8

topics or a:nposting?

9

A.

Because of the -- the broad array of solid

10

you J::asically file the feed stock and then -- 11>ell,

10

waste types of facilities, the rraterials t:l:Jat are rrenaged

11

actual, you lay ch.n perforated pipe, and then put the

11

under solid waste, it was J::asically an ongoing

12

rraterial on top.

And you use sene type of blCMer that

12

educational process fran

13

you wmt to p.!ll the rraterial ch.n t:.h:l:ulgh the - - the

13

I left.

And rather than t:u:mi.ng, t:l:Jat's l:lOJJ you

14

ccnpost pile.

15

keep the pile aerated.

16

14

Q.

Okay.

t..~

day I st--...arted until t-1-Je day

And can you describe sore of the ways

t:l:Jat you engaged in self-training?

15

And then, there' s an:Jt.her process called

16

So, you have s:me type of enclosed vessel

17

the

18

at What other states required as far as facilities.

19

participated in national conference calls; s:me of those

17

in-vessel.

18

t:l:Jat you put the rraterial in, t:l:Jat allows you to better

19

rronitor the oxygen and rroisture content.

And s:::xre of

A.

I w:Jllld look at trade associations, so like

u.s. Cblp:lst Cbuncil I was a

ll8li:er of.

I 1f..Ccld look
I

20

th:JSe in-vessels actually all= you to inject either

20

v-ere on a quarterly basis, to leam h:lw other states, you

21

water or -- and/or air to rraintain the cpt:i.rral

21

kn::>w, rrenaged solid waste.

22

=rlitions.

22

23
24

Okay.

Q.

So, you've just described three

different tret:bocls of ccnposting?

25

A.

Cbrrect.

1

Q.

Okay.

I can't rereri:Jer everything.

24

Q.

'Ihat continues through the present day?

25

A.

Cbrrect.

179
Have you authored any publications,

But it was,

like I said, an arlg:)ing educational process.

23

1

180
also provided a ch=ck list to assist them v.d1en they v-ere

2

either as part of yo..rr job at DEQ or part of your arlg:)ing

2

filling out either their site design or cperations plan,

3

training education?

3

to insure t:l:Jat they v-ere including all the require:rents

4

in the rule.

4

Yes.

A.

I've authored three.

One was a rredical

5

waste guidance, one was a prooessing facility guidance,

5

6

and one was a nan-rrunicipal solid waste landfill

6

7

guidance.

8

Q.

9

Okay.
M3. YEE-WALI.ACE:

Exhibit 57.

ccnpost process is, and What DEQ's role was in t:l:Jat

process.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit N:>. 57 provided to
the witness.)

13
BY M3. YEE-WALIACE:

So, Mr. Ehlert, you've

It is on the DEQ

And did you obtain this d:x:urrent from the DEQ

w=J:site?

14

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

15

16

Exhibit N:>. 57; d:> you re<:ngnize Exhibit 57?

16

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

A-rl v.hat is it?

A.

'Ibis is the p=essing or ccnpost facility

~ite.

A.
Q.

just been han:led What's been rre:rked as Plaintiff's

17

And \\here is this publication

11

13
Q.

Okay.

12

15

19

Q.

rraintained?

10

11

14

7
8
9

10
12

And it also -- one of the intents, too, was

to help just the average citizen unclerstan:i W:Jat the

171
18

19

And is it a true and correct copy of

the publication t:l:Jat you authored?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Jl.nd h:lw lcrg did it take you to author and

produce this publication?

20

guidance and ch=ck list for Tier II and Tier III

20

A.

Prol:sbly, f=n start to finish, about a year.

21

prooessing facilities that I authored.

21

Q.

Okay.

22
23
24
25

Q.

Okay.

And What was the pt.n:p:)Se of this

22

p..lblicaticn?
A.

One of the rrain intents

was to help facility

cw:ers and cperators urrlerstan:i the require:rents.

It

So' v.d1en d:> you tbink you started

w::>:rk:i.:ng on it?

23

A.

Prol:sbly the winter of 2011, I w:Jllld say.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

Early :opring of 2012.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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1

1

true?

the State offioe, generally?

2

A.

Cbrrect.

2

A.

Cbrrect.

3

Q.

And ;o.o:rXs directly with the facility?

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Cbrrect.

4

Q.

And are they cbing that -- v,by -- v,by are

5

A.

Cbrrect.

6

Q.

--

5

6

they cbing that, ...t1y cb they cb that?

7
8
9
10

Can you clarify the questicn?

7

Q.

Meaning what is their goal when they

8

A.

Cbrrect.

9

Q.

Okay.

to w::n:k with the facility?
A.

Well, the initial investigaticn is to

12

detennine \o'.hether tleie ls a vi.olaticn.

13

there is, they try to v.o:t:k with the facility to correct

14

that violation.

15

Q.

16

Okay.

Arrl then, if

And is that what you refer to as

or civil enforcerrent?
I wmt to talk about haN DEQ, a:rrl haN

10

you specifically as the Solid vaste P.rogram Mar:ager,

11

ao:plied IDAPA 58.01.06 with respect to the violaticn

12

that' z allege:! i."1. t..tris

ca._~.

So, first of all, When DEQ is applying the

13
14

Solid Waste Mar:agarent Rules, haN cbes it apply the te:rm

15

a:rrl what cbes it rrean -- what is solid 1/B.ste?
You can look at -- or if you don't want to

16

voltmtary anpliance?

17

read it, you can tell us vmich IDAPA citaticn you refer

And vas there voltmtary anpliance

18

to for that definition when you apply t:h:>se rules.

with respect to Mr. Gibson's cperatians in this case?

19

17

18
19

as a wanring letter, l'btioe of Violation,

A.

investigate, a:rrl they f:ini a violation, a:rrl then they try

11

And then, you -- you describe the

cptians un::ler fo:r:nal enforcerrent --

20

A.

O:npliance; correct.

Q.

Okay.

A.

l'b.

20

A.

The definition of solid v.aste in is -- is in

IDAPA 58.01.06.05.44.

And in that definition it refers to

21

Q.

At any tirre between 2013 through the present?

21

22

A.

l'b.

22

other discarded naterial, including solid, liq.rid,

Q.

Okay.

23

sani -solid, or a:nt:a.iJJed gas= naterial resulting --

23

If the regional offioe is unable to

24

get voltmtary anpliance v.orking directly with the

24

25

facility, is that when a cmplaint \\Ollld be referred to

25

191
un:3erstan:i, rut I -- I den' t like the leading fo:rm of the

1

2

q.restion.

2
MS. YEE-WALil\CE:

Okay.

MR. EMTIH:

of the q.restion.

Let rre object to the leading fo:rm

If she 1/B.Uts to ask him what it says, I

192

1
3

Q.

Your Honor, COJld 'I.e ask

vaste Mar:agerent Rules?
A.

So,

'I.e

\\Ollld look at discarded naterial as

3

scrrething that the generator or the person that bad that

4

the Crurt to take judicial notioe of IDAPA 58. 01. 06.

4

naterial detennined that there vas no longer any value or

5

It's -- it's a State regulation, it 's p.lblished a:rrl

5

use, a:rrl therefore wanted to t:h:r1::M that naterial away.

6

verifiable.

7

line.

8

9

Otherwise,
'IHE CXXlRI':

'I.e

can go through these line by

MR. EMTIH:

object a:rrl troVe that that

Mr. Snith, as to the req.rest that

8

this Crurt to take judicial notioe of any referenced

9

descripticn of the w:>:rd discarded, as q:posed to his

Jud;:Je, I \\Ollld have no objection

10

personal cpinion or his selective tJ:uJgbt on what it
COJld or sh:::uld be.

11

for the State -- or for this Crurt to take the State's

11

12

IDAPA 58.01.06.05.44, take judicial rotice of it.

12

13

I have

13

no problan with that, Your H=r.
I'll take notioe --

'IHE CXXJRT:

All right.

15

MR. EMTIH:

'lbey are --

15

16

'IHE CXXlRI':

-- Ms. Yee.

16

17

MR. EMTIH:

-- p.Jblisred.

17

18

'IHE CXlRI':

I '11 do that.

18

19

MS. YEE-WALil\CE:

Q.

Okay.

BY MS. YEE-WAI.IACE:

21

Cbt.n that definition.

22

naterial.

So, let's just break

It talks about other discaxded

'IHE CXXlRI':

19

an.s\\er

be stricken, and ask

Ms. Yee, can you give rre the

q.restion again?

14

14

20

'Ib vmich, Judge, I'm going to

7

I read the regulations?

10

MR. EMTIH:

6

MR. EMTIH:

rules,

~Ae

In essence, if it's not in the

don't speculate and guess.
MS. YEE-WALil\CE:

Your Honor, it's

part of

Mr. Ehlert's job -'IHE CXXlRI':

I just 11B.I1ted to know what the

question vas.

20

MS. YEE-WALil\CE:

Cl:l, I'm rorry.

21

HJw cbes DEQ awly the term other discaxded

22

naterial When it ccrres to determining if scrrething is a

cbes DEQ apply the te:rm other discarded

23

solid waste violation un::ler the Solid Woste Mar:agerent

24

naterial When it ccrres to dete:rmining if scrrething is a

24

Rules.

25

solid waste violation un::ler that rule -- un::ler the Solid

25

23

}bw

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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197
crcp under that exarptian in the Solid Waste Mmageren.t

2

Rules?

3

198
1
2

A crcp II-.OUld re a plant that is gx=1 for --

A.

N::M, let me abject,

Q.

finish your

3

Jucl3e.

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:
~

A.

N:>.

I'm sorry, did ycu

to that question?

4

Q.

Ckay.

5

'Itlere 's oo fam:Jation for him to give this testi!IOIJY.

5

A.

S:J, a crop WJUld rea plant that is raised

6

It's either oon:t.ai:ned in :IIIAPA or it's not.

6

MR. EMITH:

4

And any

for profit or for food.

7

speculation by sareone else or their interpretation is

7

8

irrelevant.

8

when you ..ere aj;plying IDAPA as the S:Jlid Waste Program

And -- and that rray re part of the pu±>lem

9

Manager?

S:J, I WJUld abject to

10

A.

Cbrrect.

11

Q.

And h::1.ll d::Jes DEQ determine if sarething is a

9

Q.

And is that also h::1.ll you applied that term

10

..e're having here in this case.

11

any testi!IOIJY speculating 11.bat these rratters rray be

12

understood to be, or tln.lght to be, or wished they """"'"'

12

Cl.l:p

13

to be.

13

l'IBl:la.gerent !W.es?

14

S:J, I cbject to his opinion.

15

TilE CXXlRI':

14

Well' it's certainly not

15

16

determinative of -- as a rratter of fact of the questions

17

at issue here.

18

explain h::1.ll the Depa.rtrrent got to wb=re it was contacting

19

Mr. Gibson.

20
21

residue ur..cler trnt

I think Ms. Yee is sirrply try:i.I:g to

I'm assuming that there's going to be sore
testi!IOIJY alx:ut staterrents Mr. Gibson rray or rray not have

are relative to the language of these rules.

A.

exe.~ptian

S:J, the crcp residue II-.OUld re the left over

plant rraterial after harvesting a crcp.
Can ycu give exanple?

16

Q.

Ckay.

17

A.

S:J, for exanple,

18
19

Judge, for the reocxd, abject to giving exanples when ..e

20

don't find any of this in IDAPA or the statute.

21

it's speculative fran their perspective, arxilf.le're just

22

going Clo= this ral::bit !:ole on =jectures.

22

trade that

And SO, at this point, it appears tore potentially

23

TilE CDJRI':

24

relevant.

24

MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

25

basis.

25

1

199
they're investigating violations and folks try to claim

=·

N::M, let me -- let me again,

MR. EMITH:

23

I'm going to anlitianally adnit it on that

of the Solid Waste

Ms. Yee,

~!.here

Jleain,

are ycu going?

Your H:Joor, so DEQ has to

determine v.hether or not there's violations.

And when

200
1

definition, rule, or regulation.

And I II-.OUld also note,

2

an exarptian, ..e need to know h::1.ll DB;) aJ;Plies that

2

3

exarptian an:l. h::1.ll specifically he ar:plied it as the S:Jlid

3

J1Jd3e, at the -- at the so-called meeting they had, they
ackn:::r.-Jledged he was exa:rpt, rut that will o::rre in

4

Waste Program Manager, Mlich he was during the time of

4

test:inony fran Mr. Gibson.

5

this violation, to understand v.by this N:>tice of

5

TilE ClJJRI':

6

Violation is still going fon.a:rd, v.by they did nat accept

6

cbjectian's overruled.

7

his exa:rptian.

7

to re v.hether or not Mr. Ehlert had an c:pinion al:x:>ut

8

v.hether it was or wasn't being returned in agrananic

I 'm laying foun::lation ab:Jut: h::1.ll th:Jse

8
9

exa:rptions are aj;plied in his jab at DEQ.

10

TilE CXXJRI':

All right.

Well,

9

rra.YJ:le

if ycu --

c.peration, so.

ycu wmt to start asking questions that are specific to

11

11.batever Mr. Gibson is d::Jing.

12

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Does Mr. Gibson's

He was sirrply explaining v.by the Depa.rtrrent

decided to take the position it took as to Mr. Gibson's

12

Q.

13

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

'Ih:rough an inspection by an Air Q.Jality

cx::rrposting c.perations fall witlrunder -- within that

14

15

exa:rptian?

15

Inspector at a nearby facility.
Mr. Gibson's ccnpost facility.

A.

N:>.

16

17

Q.

And v.by not?

17

18

A.

Based on tre rrateria.ls we saw at l"d.s

18

awear

19

facility, it did not

20

residues that WJUld ultirrately re returned to the soil at

21

agroocmic rates.

22

Q.

23

that he was rranaging crcp

Ckay.
MR. EMITH:

19

J1Jd3e, I' 11 nove that

A.

He was inforrred of

Q.

Ckay.

And of M1cm are ycu speaking?

Q.

Ckay.

S:J, Tan Krinke.

Can you descrire in a

20

little bit rrore detail 11.bat he was <bing and then h::1.ll DB;)

21

learned of Mr. Gibson's c.perations?

22
To which,

And, Mr. Ehlert, h::1.ll did

Mr. Gibson's operations o::rre to the attention of DB;)?

14
16

Well' that

I didn't underst:arrl the question

10

11

13

rates.

All right .

A.

So, Tan Krinke was inspecting Treetop

23

Recycling in

~

to a carplaint.

And during his

24

that re stricken, in that it's based up::n his

24

=satian with Devin

25

speculation, his =jecture, not based upon an IDAPA

25

a.rer, Mr. D:Jwns inforrred him that i f he was ==ned

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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1

al:x:ut cx:br, then v.e shJuld look at Diam:md Street

2

Recycl:in;:J arrl Black D:i.arrond O::rrpJs:in;:J.

1

C'arpJst.

2

fact.

202
'lbat doesn't = r l to rre like an assertion of

rre --

3

Q.

Which v.as Gibson's cperations?

3

MR. EMl'IH:

Let

4

A.

Correct.

4

'IHE c:aJRr:

Is tbere s::xrething else in the

Q.

And

5

v.frlat is 'Itm Krinke's position with

OCM,

DEJO?

6

7

He's in

=

Boise

re:Jianal

office as an Air

Quality Inspector.

9

Q.

10

And

..men

did Mr. Krinke go out arrl

investigate Treetcp?

11

testirrony that I missed?

6
A.

8

5

A.

March 28, 2013.

MR. EMI'IH:

8

cpinian given arrl wasn't necessarily given for the truth

9

of the rratter, it v.as just a ccmrent.
But I will still starrl by my objection, I

11

believe, because it's hearsay arrl it's speculation an

12

What is nt::rnll by cxbr.

13

said.

14

discussion with 'Itm arrl the reference to Mr. D::Mning as

14

haven::> idea.

And, Ju:'ge, at this tirre I' 11

We have n::> way of verify:in;:J any of that,

15

that's hearsay.

16

arrl I rrove that it be stricken.

17

'IHE CXXJRr:

18

What v.as the assertion of fact

19

MR. EMI'IH:

v.e

So, I'm go:in;:J to object ton::> fCJLirJdatian, as

v.ell as hearsay.

17

If, in fact, they're say:in;:J that

.Alrl we cbn' t klXNJ wl-e.1. it was

We don't k:nr::M if it was wintertirre, spring,

15
16

that you believe constitutes a hearsay stat:arent?

It was an

10

rrove to strike that testirrony that he just gave as to the

MR. EJVilTJ:i:

I -- I hear v.frlat you're

say:in;:J.

13

l2

NJ.

I urDerstand v.frlat you' re say:in;:J.

7

'IHE c:aJRr:

Ms. Yee, are you offering this

18

to -- as evidence that tbere was sare cxbr at

19

Mr. Gibson's facility?

20

it -- they're n::>t offer:in;:J it for the truth, then I WJUld

20

21

have n::> abjection.

21

offering it rnt for the truth of the rratter asserted, but

22

the effect that it had an DEQ personnel as they rroved

23

forward in the investigation --

22

'IHE CXXJRT:

Well, I -- it didn't seem to rre
As I understocd, it v.as a

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

NJ, Yarr Honor.

We're

23

to be an assertion of fact.

24

staterent by the a.-mer of s::xre other carpany that if you

24

'IHE c:aJRr:

25

want to be oancemed al:x:ut cxbr, go look at Black Diarrond

25

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

-- of Mr. Gil::s::m's

1

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Well, that's v.frlat I--

All right .

204

203
1

cperations.

2

'IHE CXXJRT:

3

Go ahead.

4

Q.

Cl:>jectian's overruled.

BY M3. YEE-WALIACE:

After Mr. Krinke had the

5

mnversatian with the a.-mer of Treetcp Recycl:in;:J an

6

!'larch 28, 2013,

7

meet:in;:J?

8

A.

9

oo

you k:nr::M v.frlat be did follcM.ng that

a second.

'IHE WI'INE'SS:

4

describ:in;:J Mr. Krinke's oonversation with Devin J::a.ms.

5

Q.

6

Mr. Ehlert, just -- hang an just

What happened next with

A.

Jack G3ntz arrl I \lerlt out to the site an

!'larch 29, 2013.

9
10

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

reEpeCt to investigat:in;:J Mr. Gil::s::m' s cperations?

7

I apologize.

So, I -- I was forwarded an

e-mail fran Jack G3ntz that he received fran 'Itm Krinke,

8

When he returned to --

'IHE CXXJRT:

10

2

3

Q.

Ci<ay.

And \\hen you say the site, \\bat cb you

rrean by that?

11

A.

Mr. Gil::s::m' s =post cperation.

12

testirrony al:x:ut th:in;:Js that be has pers::n k:nr::Mledge of.

12

Q.

Ci<ay.

13

Generally that's ah3ervations he's rrede, th:in;:Js be's

13

cperations are.

Ms. Yee, Mr. Ehlert is crnpetent to give

11

You're ask:in;:J him lots of

14

seen, th:in;:Js he's heard.

15

questions al:x:ut v.frlat soreane else did.

16
17

I

15

I have n::> idea whether he v.as present during

any of those th:in;:Js, if be ' s rely:in;:J an s::xrething that

r..as

S:J, we can cut off wT..at I see

18

s.:rrecne else

19

as a ler.gt:by series of likely abjections if you --

20
21
22
23
24
25

Q.

told l"'ilitl.

BY M3. YEE-WALIACE:

My -- my question v.as,

cb you k:nr::M v.frlat Mr. Krinke did next.
A.

cx:nplaint.
v.frlat Mr. Krinke did?

16

How -- h:M cbes Mr. Ehlert J<:rv;.;

A.

It is v-est -- or an an access road west of

Pleasant Valley Road.
Q.

Ci<ay.

And before you went to Mr. GiJ::s::m's

17

cperations an !'larch 29, 2013, did you cb any other

18

research l:e.fore

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What did you cb?

A.

We got an Gocgle Earth arrl looked at a Gocgle

21

He sp:tke with Jack G3ntz regarding the

'IHE c:aJRr:

14

And describe Where those cx:npost

of t..l:!e -- Mr. G4 ~' s cperatictlS?

22

Earth irrage of the facility, arrl also did an Internet

23

search for Black Diarrorrl O::rrpJst.

24
25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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1

2
3

A.

Q.

2

Ckay.
MS. YEE-WALIACE:

And, actually, do you have

Exhibits 11 and 12?

6

7
8

(Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 11 and12
provided to the witness. )
Q.

I guess I'll ask you, so

BY MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

Q.

'lbank you.

rea:gnize Wla.t 's depicted in Exhibits 58 .1, 58.2, and

4

58.3?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Ckay.

7

A.

It is an Gcx:>gle Earth irrage of Mr. Gil:ron' s

8

cmpost facility.
Q.

10

picture sh:w.i.ng?

Ckay.

And start:ing with 58.1, Wla.t is that?

And Wla.t exactly is this Gcx:lgle Earth

11

you've been banded what's been rra:rked Exhibit 11 and 12.

11

A.

It is showing the

12

Did you lcx:k at any aerial plDt:os of Mr. Gil:ron' s

12

Q.

Ckay.

13

cperatians at any tilre during the -- D.EQ' s investigation

13

14

of his cmpost:ing?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Ckay.

The Gcx:>gle Earth irrages.

So, Mr. Ehlert, do you

BY MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

3

9

9

10

1HE Wl'lNESS:

1

aj:plication of the Solid W>ste Rules.

4
5

Just Jack and I bad a discussion al:Dut the

l1l..1lTerOUS

cmpost win:'IJ:=.

And is this the Gcx:>gle Earth irrage

that you locked at as part of your investigation?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

JUst the Gcx:>gle Earth?

16

Mr. Gibson's operations -- actually, lf.ihen -- Wla.t --

17

A.

Correct.

17

is this picture taken,

18

Q.

18

tilre period does this depict?

Ckay.
Is that 11, Cynthia?

19

MR. !'MITH:

20

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

21

MR. !'MITH:

22

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

58.

58?
Yeah, the Gcx:lgle Earth.

23
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 58 provided to

24
25

the witness.)

And does it accurately depict

=~!.hen

~!.hen

was this picture -- WE.t

19

A.

2013.

20

Q.

Ckay.

21

A.

O:J. Gcx:>gle Earth there's a historical per --

And h:M do you Jm::1...1 that?

You can go tack in tilre and vi""-' a -- a

22

perspective.

23

particular area, and it will provide certain elates an

24

lf.ihen that proto was taken or that irrage vas taken.

25

Q.

Ckay.

208

207
Y= Haror, v.e w:Jllld offer

1

1HE Wl'lNESS:

No.

1

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

2

58.1 purely for derranstrative p.n::poses.

2

o::xm:

krf --

3

to the adnissian of Exhibit 58 .1, in that it's irrelevant

MR. !'MITH:

So, I then w:cld object, Judge,

3

1HE

4

MR. 9'1TIH:

J'ud.:fe --

4

to the subject rratter she vas inql..riring as to what

5

1HE <XXJRI':

-- objection?

5

wen±: to before

MR. !'MITH:

-- let rre ask a question in aid

6

March 29' 2013 .

6
7
8
9
10
11

7

of objection.
Exhibit 58 -- Cynthia, was it 1 and 2?
MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:
MR. !'MITH:

fra:Jt of you

nt::M,

1HE Wl'lNESS:

13

MR. !'MITH:

14

Yes.
58.1, WE.t specific elate was

1HE Wl'lNESS:

16

MR. !'MITH:

17

1HE Wl'lNESS:

10

1HE <XXJRI':

It -- you have in -- adnitted

11

If you W3.llt to use that to illustrate s:me al:servatians

12

that he rrade

13

llfuere v.e're go:ing -- sare reason you can't use that one?

It sh:Jwed a elate of 4/20/13.

15

4/20/13 w:Jllld be April 20, 2013?

16
17

Correct.

Your Haror, I can rephrase,

into evidence a satellite irrage of this prq:Jerty in 2013.

14

sh::wn that it was plx:Jtographed?

15

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

re

physical inspection an

I can seek ad::litianal fCll.JIXlatian as to this d:::x:::t.Trent .

9

Just 1.

Just 1? Do you have that in

Dean?

12

8

re undertook a

~!.hen

re

wen±: to the site -- as I assurre

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:
plx:Jto.

'Ibis one is just a better

B.lt --

1HE
objection.

o::xm:

All right.

I'll oven:ule the

It's r.ct: be:ing offered to prove that the

18

facility

19

that you went to Gcx:>gle Earth to inspect the -- it before

19

'Ibis witness is awaren;tly go:ing to sinply use it to

20

you went out to inspect the premises an March 29, v.dllch

20

illustrate Wla.tever testimony

21

w:cld be 3/29 --

21

adnit it for that p.n:pose only.

18

!vR. EMI'IH:

22

1HE Wl'lNESS:

23

MR. !'MITH:

Alii I believe yo.u" testirrony v.a.s

Correct.
-- 13?

1~

a particular way an a particular date.

re

inten:ls to give.

I'll

22

So, you didn't have that

23

24

d:::x:::t.Trent in front of you at the tilre you went to Gcx:lgle

24

25

Earth prior to March 29, 2013, did you?

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

*

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 58.1 adnitted
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1
2

So, Me. Ehlert, in

BY MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

Q.

Q.

1

lociking at EKhibit 58.2, v.ben -- v..l:Jat is 58.2?

2

SO,

you just printed this yesterday?

3

A.

It is a Gbogle Earth :i.rrage.

4

Q.

Ci<ay.

5

A.

Me. Gil:s:m's =rpost cperatian.

5

6

Q.

As of Wri.ch date?

6

A.

Yesterday.

7

A.

Of August, 2013.

7

Q.

Ci<ay.

8

Q.

And this is a G:Jogle Earth :i.rrage that you

8
9

A.

Fbr 2017.

10

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Ci<ay.

11

Q.

And v.ben did you pull this Gbogle Earth

11

A.

Yesterday.

13

Q.

Ci<ay.

9

12

pulled?

:i.rrage?

13
14
15

And a Gbogle Earth :i.rrage of what?

16

And v..l:Jat is the significance between

MR.. 91TIH:

Well,

TYJIJ

we're getting into

18

testify fron -- fron d::x:urrents that otherwise speak for

19

t:harselves.

20

that, Y= H::l!lor.

21

So, let rre object to his test:irrony regarding

'lEE CXXRI':

I'll sustain the

All right.

Cbrrect.

Q.

Ci<ay.

If you want to ask him ab:ut differences in
the pictures, let's do that after it's admitted.

25

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Ci<ay.

Did you have -- the G:Jogle Earth :i.rrage

58.3, v.ben did you print that?
And that was a Gbogle Earth image for

v..l:Jat date?
And so, what was the p.n::p:JSe for

printing these G:Jogle Earth :i.rrages?
A.

'I\)

ol::ee:tve ad:iitianal ccrcp:>sti.J.--.g rr::m -- or

w:i.n:lJ:'<:1II that w=re an the facility J::etween 2013 and 2017 .

Q.

14

And v.ben you say the facility, you're

referr:in;:J to?

16

A.

17

Q.

Gibson's o::np:lSt:in;)' cperatian.
Ci<ay.
MS. YEE-WAL!..ACE:

18

Y= H::n:>r, we w:xUd nove

19

for the adnissian of 58.1 t:.hJ::aJgh 58.3 ]XIrely for

20

daronstrative

21

objection to that question.

23
24

A.

4

15

Tile --

A.

17

22

3

12

58.1 and 58.2?

210
Did you have similar --

BY MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

p.n::p:>SeS.

MR. 91TIH:

Which I will abject as be:in;:J

It all is at a point in titre suJ::sequent to

22

irrelevant.

23

v..l:Jat SLIHJOSe::l.ly triggered his

24

an:l/or investigation that occurred in Mrrch of 2013.

p.n::p:JSe

of an inspection

It ar:pears irrelevant to that, and it cq:pears

25

212

211

1

irrelevant to anything thereafter withJut first

1

or the w:i.n:lJ:'<:1II cq:pearsd to have grass and leaves
deposited at the end of a pile.

2

establishiJ:B, as a matter of law, that there bad been a

2

3

violation of any of the IDAPA rules ooncerning the Solid

3

4

Waste Mamgarent Rules in March 29, 2013 .

4

location, can you tell the C=t

5

we're call:in;)' Gibson's cperatians;

It

5
6

awears otherwise

'lEE CXXRI':

to l::e irrelevant.

All right.

Well, illustrative

Q.

And just so that we're clear ab:ut the

6

A.

We --

7

exhibits are always irrelevant J::ecause they're not

7

Q.

H:Jw did you --

8

admitted to prove s::rre fact.

'fu:y are admitted to

8

March 20 -- 29th.

9

illustrate test:irrony.

9

I've already ad:nitte::l. 5 -- 58.1 for that

10

I 'm go:in;:J to deny the llDtian to adnit 58.2 and

11

p.n::p:JSe.

12

58.3 because they ar:pear to J::e different than 58.1.

13

so far I haven't beard anything ab:Jut v.ben this witness,

14

or if this witness, has ever

15
16

g<:~tE

And

A.

row

row you arrived at what
row do you get there?

did you get there an

We drove d:Mn or south en Orchard, drove an

10

G<::Men Read, turned south en Pleasant Valley, and then

11

turned west an the access road into the Gibson

12

o::np:lSt:in;)'.
Q.

13

Ci<ay.

And then, clescril::e for the Cburt what
~~.ere

driv:in;:J d:Mn the

14

you observed, for exarrple, v.ben you

..try one or the other of the pictures might be

15

access :road appn:ach:in;)' Mr'. Gibson's cperatians.

illustrative of his testim::my.

16

Q.

17

BY MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

to the facility, and

So, Me. Ehlert, you did

18

te:,-t.ify that you an:i Jack v..ent to r.tr. G.i.bs::ln' s facility

19

an March 29, 2013?

20
21

A.

Cbrrect.

Q.

Ci<ay.

And clescril::e what you observed at

A.

Well, as you tum in the facility, at that

17

titre there was ro -- there -- there was no signage

19

there.

20

ran.:Jelarrl.

21

As you drove in, an roth sides it was primarily

As we got closer to the Gil:s:m a:npost:in;)'

facility, we could see what ar:peare::l. to be w:i.n:lJ:'<:111.

22

at that loca -- at Mr'. Gil:s:m' s cperatians an that site

22

23

visit.

23

When we got closer, we oould see several of the piles

24

alrng the :road that aweare::J. to J::e in varicus stages of

25

dea:npositian.

24
25

stages of deo:xlpJsitian.

O:le of the etrls, the catp:>St

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS * (208) 287-7690
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'IHE CXXJRI':

2

'IHE WI'INESS :

3

'IHE CXXJRI':

1

There was --

ask you a clarifying question.

5

in, there was nc signage.

6
7

in, and a th::Jusand if the load contains branches or

2

construction material.

Let rre

3

open.

You said, 1.lfrJen you tumed

4

-- hang on just a seoon:i.

4

Were you referencing the tmn

There was other signage that said

Within the facility, there

~>.ere

signs

5

pcinting to directions 1f..d1ere we ass.mrl pecple depositing

of off Pleasant Valley Road, or were you referencing a

6

material there were to drive and dxcp off their

turn off the access road into the facility itself?

7

materials.

8
9

214

Mr. Ehlert --

1

It's the tmn off fran Pleasant

'IHE WI'INESS:

8

Valley Road onto the access road.

10

'IHE CXXJRI':

11

Gc ahead.

12

Q.

BY M3.

9

'!bank you, sir.

YEE-t~:

.9:), I t}-lj_nl{ jlOU \-\lE:-re

Q.

Okay.

And 1.lfrJen you said you saw winch:cMs in

various stages of deccnpositian, let rre ask you, did you

10

have experience with w:i.n:h:cMos in various stages of

11

deccmpositian?

12

13

describing \'.bat you absel:ved on M>rch 29, 2013 on the

13

14

S:nith prcperty f= Gibson's cperations.

14

Q.

And describe \'.bat your experience is in that

A.

I have atten::led different tra:i.niJ:Bs, I have

regard.

15

A.

Cbrrect.

15

16

Q.

And I think you just described the w:i.n:h:cMos.

16

inspected different o:::nposting facilities that o:::npost a

A.

Cbrrect.

17

wide variety of materials, including g:r:ass and leaves.

17

As we got to the pcint vtJere the

And ln-J could you tell that the w:i.n:h:cMos on

18

fence started -- 1Aell , we saw fencing a.:roun::l the Gibson

18

19

o:::npost facility on the routh and -- or I'm sorry -- the

19

the S:nith prcperty at Mr. Gibson's =rpJSting cperations

20

east and ncrth side.

20

were in various stages of deccnpositian?

21

entrance, there was signage irrlicating nc branches.

And as we got closer to the

When we got to the entrance, we al::served a

22

Q.

21

A.

22

g:r:ass and leaves.

As I stated, we saw one that at the errl bad

There are others M1ere you could rrake

23

s:rall structure that bad several signs on it.

There was

23

out pieces of grass or pieces of leaves.

24

\'.bat appeare:i to be a fee structure, basically saying $5

24

are others that lcnked like it was of =rpJSt material.

25

for -- per load if you sign in, $100 if you do not sign

25

Q.

And did you hear Mr. Gibson's test:inuny about

1

A.

Yes.

1

215
ln-J tall and h= wide those w:i.n:h:cMos ag:>rax:inately were?

216

2

A.

Yes.

2

3

Q.

De you -- did you agree with his test:im:Joy?

3

4

A.

Yes.

4

M3. YEE-WAUACE:

5

Q.

Okay.

5

'IHE CXXJRI':

6

7

Exhibit 18,

So, we're going to play Exhibit 18.

I'm not going to permit the witness to kirrl of have a

7

ruming narrative because --

A.

Approx:i.rrately 15 to 20 minutes.

8

And then, have you been to mister -- the

9

10

S:nith prcperty and Mr. Gibson's cx:np::>Sting cperations

10

11

since M>rch 29, 2013?

11

I've been on the access road adjacent to

A.

Mr. Gibson's o:::nposting facility?

14

February 26, 2017, then August 14, 2013 -- or

15
16

Q.

Okay.

So, were you present with Jalm Glenn

tcnk the videos and the footage on

August 14' 201 7?
A.

Yes, I was.

21

Q.

Okay.

So, if you want to ask him CJ)lestian, please
pause the video --

17

M3. YEE-WAUACE:

18

'IHE CXXJRI':

19

19
20

And v.hile we do that, can you narrate vtJere

21
22

Okay.

-- feel free to ask him questions

about \'.bat we've seen to that pcint.

20

So, we're going to go ahead and play

-- I w:::m't be able to match the

reference the tirre oounter cant:inuously.

When was that?

men he

'IHE CXXJRI':

narrative with the video, and nc one reading the
transcript will be able to tell \'.bat it is he's taJking

Q.

Hall

I can ask him

about v.hile the video's playing Wlless you're going to

A.

18

Okay.

13

15
2017.

M3. YEE-WAUACE:

sare --

12

14

17

'Ibat's right.

I'm l:Jawy to let you P-J):>lish it.

6

lar:g did that site visit last?

Q.

16

Ms. Yee, this is a video wit:h:Jut

So, let me ask you this before we play

8

13

'IHE CXXJRI':

s:=rl?

mw

9

12

And then, there

M3. YEE-WAUACE:

Yeah.

I'll do that,

Your Honor.

22

Exhibit 18.

23

you were standing in relation to Jalm Glenn Hall and mat

23

let rre have a continuing oojectian that here, once again,

24

you, based an experience at DEQ, \'.bat you believe this

24

we're dealing with an Aug-- August 14, 2017, video, and

25

vide:> is pu:rpcrting to sh::w.

25

we haven't even established a violation.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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(Plaintiff's EKh:i.bit N:>. 18 playe:l.. )

1

2

2

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

3

4
5
6
7

8

Q.

step here.

BY MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

So, just

~

in at

A.

Ihis is a view f:ron the acoess road, lcddng

east of Pleasant Valley Road.

Q.

Ckay.

10
11

15
16
17

closer up view of s:me of the win:Jro..Js.

6

A.

I'm sorry.

Q.

can you access hem -- did you estirrate l:x:M --

hem lang the w:i.n::lJ::a..Js went f:ron the vantage point of the

12

were?

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

13

Ckay.

So let's-- let's

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

Fran WELt view is -- at

15

anything, rut I d:ln't IIBilt speculation.

16
17

It was a

18

of the eastern side of Gibs:n

20

through here.

20

Ckay.

She asked for an estirratian;

'lHE CXXJRI':

that's oven:uled.
'lHE WTINESS:

We estirrated the w.irrlrows to be

awroximately 200 to 300 feet lang.
Q.

Ckay.

21

22

(Plaintiff's Exhibit N:>. 18 playe:l.. )

22

(Plaintiff's EKh:i.bit N:>. 18 playe:l..)

23
MS. YEE-WAlU\CE:

24

24
MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

step right there.

1

227
12 minutes 40 sec=cls, WELt bas the footage sh::Jwn us f:ron

2

the last step?
A.

She can inqLri.re if he measured

any speculation.

Ihis is a view f:ron the acoess road, la::king
p3Il.

'Ib which I'm going to cbject to

MR. iMI'IH:

14

19

25

can you repeat that question?

access road, hem lQrB -- WELt the lergth of the w:irrlrows

=rpost facility, with the =rpost rows through --

23

Did you estirrate l:x:M lQrB the w:irrlrows went

9

southwest.

3

Q.

cbt.n f:ron the acoess road?

8

19

Q.

of Gibson =rpost

Close up view -- or

5

18

21

p3Il.

11

9 minutes 53 secancls, WELt view is this pan taken?
A.

Ihis is, again, a

10

step it here.
Q.

A.

facility f:ron the access road.

(Plaintiff's EKh:i.bit N:>. 18 playe:l.. )

12

13

Is this a -- at

4

7

Ckay.
MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

BY MS. YEE-WAlU\CE:

10 minutes 38 secancls is -- WELt is -- vJJat is tbis?

3

9 minutes 28 secancls, WELt is tbis view dfpicting?

9

14

226
Q.

1

~in

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WAlU\CE:

And just

1

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WAlU\CE:

228
And WELt -- WELt -- tlftlat

2

So, WELt the video sh:MEd was a view f:ron the

step it there.

25

at

are we loOking at at 13:53?
A.

3

So, tbis is a view f:ron the access road,

4

access road, a close up of a w:irrlrow an the mrtheast

4

lcddng at the east entrance.

5

side of the facility.

5

the I.IOOden structure, with the sign that says sign in

6

east entrance, with the 'WOCden structure at the entrance.

6

here.

7

states by using tbis facility, it's an adhesion art:ract.

8

And then, tbis sign says ro branches.

7
8

Q.

Ckay.

And the last slrt here is of the

And were t:hJse different piles that

the video sh:Me:i, different rroJIXls?

9

A.

Cbrrect.

10

Q.

Ckay.

9

And could you tell -- 1<.hen you said

11

that those are various stages of deaarp::>Sitian, is that

11

WELt you were testify:i..ng about?

12

A.

Cbrrect.

14

Q.

And -- okay.

15
16

Q.

Sare you could observe ti<Xrly debris, or

14

MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

step it there.

BY MS. YEE-WAlU\CE:

Just checking in at

16

f:ron our last step?

17

18

d::::Min yet.

18

19

daJ:ker b:t:= or black rolor.

rrore mr.LSistent of a

Q.

15 minutes, tlftlat did the f=tage sl=J us up to this point

straw, other organic rraterials that have rot been brciken
WELt

Ckay.

15

17

A-rl ob."-:er piles

Ihis sign basically

(Plaintiff's EKh:i.bit :tb. 18 playe:l.. )

13
How can you tell f:ron t:hJse

piles that they're in various stages of cleccnp:Jsitian?
A.

Here's the fee signage.

10

12
13

You can see the -- again,

A.

It

~

adii.tianal win:Jro..Js, an::l other

pieces of rrater.Ld.ls on the site.

19

Q.

What are we loOking at here?

20

Q.

'!hat's oansistent with?

20

A.

Ihis is the -- the west entrance, with a --

21

A.

Cbrpost.

21

the I.IOOden structure, with ad:litianal signage similar to

22

the east entrance.

22

23

(Plaintiff's EKh:i.bit N:>. 18 playe:l.. )

24
25

23

Q.

Ckay.

24
MS. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

step it there.

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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233
(Plaintiff's Exhibit :t'b. 18 played. )

1

2

2
MS. YEE-WALIACE:

3
4

5
6
7

8

9
10

(Plaintiff's Exhibit :t'b. 18 played. )

1

Step it here.

Q.

BY MS. YEE-I'IALil\CE:

What is 24:19 a picture

A.

Ihis is a picture of a sign on the west

of?
enb:ance structure.

Q.

4

Yes, it was.
can ycu read what the sign says?

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

And what is this a

picture of at 25:45?

5

A.

Ihis is a picture of a :ruJ::l::er tire loader.

6

Q.

And are loaders typically used an cx:npJSting

7

Was this sign also on the pn:perty wb=n ycu

went there an March 29, 2013?
A.

Q.

3

cperatian?
Yes.

8

A.

9

Q.

For what?

10

A.

'Ihey can be used for several different
'Ihey can be used to assenble windJXJNs, they can

11

things.

12

be used to tum win:iJ::"c:Ms.

It takes

13

anpost into screeners, they can be used to lead anpost

14

four minutes to get to Treetcp and I -- hJnestly, after

14

into durrp trucks for all hauling on site.

15

that, I can't read it.

15

11

Q.

Ci<ay.

12

A.

'I':tll:rugh these portals pass the rrost

13

16

intelligent lawn care professionals in Poise.

Q.

16

Ci<ay.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit :!'b. 18 played.)

18
19
20

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

21

Q.

22

at 25:16?

23

A.

24

So, an a anpost site, they can be used for

rrany different p.n:poses.
Q.

Did ycu hear Mr. Gibson's testirrany abJut a

yam

of anpost, depend.inJ on the noisture, could

17

17

Arrl step it here.

BY MS. YEE-Wl\LIACE:

What is this picture of

So, this piece of equiprent is a screener,

used to screen anpost.

25

Q.

Ci<ay.

1

A.

Based an that v.eight estimate, yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

'I'ney can be used to lead

18

cubic

19

v.eight bet.w=en. 1,200 and I believe it was 2,000 pounds?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Do ycu agree with that staterent?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Arrl in that instance, I!.Ulld you need

24

equiprent such as this loader to be able to tum

25

anpost piles?

=

nnve

236

235

(Plaintiff's Exhibit :t'b. 18 played.)

4

5
MS. YEE-WALIACE:

6
Q.

8

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

9

at 26 minutes and 17 seo::xii.

10
11

Ci<ay.

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

So, mist --

Arrl so, the video is over

site visit on March 29, 2013 until Algust 14, 2017?

4

Well, the main differences that I noticed was

the ad:li.tian of the east entrance, a'Xi then a new section

6

of cx:npJSting wiixlra.ITs an the east side of the pn:perty.

7

Q.

Anything else?

8

A.

There was adlitianal eqt.liprent that I did --

9
Mr. Ehlert, wb=n ycu

10
11

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

A.

5

visited the Smith property and looked at Mr. Gibs:Jn's

Q.

Jack Gantz.
And h:JJJ had the property changed frcm ycur

2

3

3

7

Q.

1

did not see back in 2013.
Q.

was the signage an the west entrance the sane

as the signage that ycu saw an Algust 14, 2017?

12

anposting cperatians an March 29, 2013, did ycu actually

12

A.

Yes.

13

go an to the Smith prcperty?

13

Q.

Ci<ay.

A.

Yes.

14

15

Q.

Arrl -- and describe what you did and -- and

15

A.

Yes.

16

l.lfrJere ycu w=nt .

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

14

We entered -- at that tirre it was the only

18

entr:a.t1L'e, rut cw:rently tJat w::x.Ud b:: tt.e

19

We proceeded dcMn the center aisle; v.e v.ere lcx:king to

~"t

enb:ance.

17

And then, after the site visit, what

did you and Jack clo next?
A.

18

19

And by that I meant the signage an --

on March 29, 2013, the sarre as on Algust 14, 2017?

We ~-eturned to b'1e office.

And based an our

estimation of the height and width of the piles, and then

20

find a site attendant or s::mel:o:ly on site that v.e could

20

using rrea.surements frcm Google Earth, v.e estimated the

21

speak with.

21

volurre in the piles.

22
23

We observed anpost

rrMS

in various stages of

22

Q.

What did you estimate the volurre in the piles

to be on March 29, 2013?

23

decorrpositian.

~:

24

Q.

Arrl wb=n ycu say v.e, that was ycu and?

24

MR.

25

A.

Jack Gantz.

25

1HE WI'INESS:

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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1

MR. f.MTIH:

-- I'm going to abject, Ju:lge,

2

firstly as to Mla.t particular substance are they

3

est:inated.

4

leaves, or soil, or sore =rpJSt in sare deo::np::>sitian

5

stage.

There's been m indication it was grass, or

238
there's been no indication that he's distinguished any --

2

any particular velure.
So, I object to any foun::lation an:l. any

3

So, unless he can verify that as a

6

1

4

speculation as to any voluretrics of any substances that

5

he canmt identify accurately.

6

'IHE

c:x:xm:

Ms. Yee, I ' ll intexpret that as

7

foun::latian, I'm g:Jing to cbj ect to any estirration of any

7

an objection to foun::latian to his ability to give the

8

quantities of soil or dirt, as the case, in fact, is.

8

est:inate.

9

the estirratian was reached an:l. Mla.t the estirrate is of.

9

'IHE CURl':

Your abjection is Mla.t legal

11

MR. f.MTIH:

Pardon rre,

12

'IHE ClliRI':

Well, I just -- it's easier for

10

basis?

I'm ask you to be s:m=What rrore precise in hem

10
J~?

MS. YEE-WAU..I\CE:

Q.

11

12

Sure.

BY MS. YEE-WAUACE:

So, the win:Jrows that

you observed on the Snith prcperty en March 29, 2013, in

13

rre to rule one abjections if you state an abjection urxler

13

=mectian with Mr. Gibson's =pcsting facility, did you

14

the terms of the Rules of Evidence, so.

14

est:inate the velure of the rraterial in those win:Jrows on

15

that date?

15

MR. f.MTIH:

He v.u.U.d be speculating as to

16

ME.t it was he is trying to estirrate he's rreasuring.

17

doesn't know if it's dirt or--

18

'IHE CURl':

He

He wasn't asked specifically to

19

give an est:inate of any particular substance.

20
21

He was

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And as part of ycur jcb at DEJ',2, is it part of

18

your job to estirrate velure of solid waste?

19

A.

Yes.

just asked to estirrate, as I un:lerstcx:rl it, Mla.t he saw

20

Q.

And have you cbne that th:roughout the course

at the facility.

22

MR. f.MTIH:

21

of your career?

But the clear objective is, fran

22

A.

Yes, I have.

~

23

Q.

Fbr exanple, in lay terms, h::M rruch is --

23

the question asked, that the assumed

24

relate to volumetrics of a substance they're g:Jing to try

24

25

to claim is C01p)St.

25

A.

1

it's conjecture.

2

mt be allCMed to give any further speculation test:inmy.

is going to

There have been r:o test 61=,

Mla.t is a crnpariscn to a cubic yard of solid waste?
Well, if you take an average size durtp

239
1

truck, that's 10 cubic yard durtp bed.

2

be 10 cubic yards in a duJp bed.

So, there w:JUld

240
And I rrove that it be stricken an:l. he

3

4

est:inate h::M much rraterial was in the win:Jrows on the

4

5

Snith prcperty in =mectian with Mr. Gibson's COlp)Sting

5

he's already given.

6

cperatians?

6

Mla.t was in the win:Jrows.

We est:inated the width an:l. the height of the

7

question, he's slirply referring to Mla.t it is that he's

8

=pest w:i..n::lrows, an:l. then using Gocd Earth we estirrated

8

est:inating.

9

the length of the -- of the win:Jrows.

And fran that, we

9

Q.

A.

7

10

calculated an estirrated volume.
Q.

11

12

<:kay.
MR. f.MriH :

13

Q.

14
15

<:kay.

~

And v..hen --

'IHE o::xJRI':

oansicler the test:i.rrany of Mr. Ehlert, other than ME.t
He's already stated an cpinian about

I think I urilerstan:l. Mla.t he rreans.
~t

10

further cpinion about

11

just trying to tell rre

12

of.

~t

arJS~t.er

as

constitutes th::>se :rows.

He's

it is he estirrated the volume

So, I'll -- I~. Mr. Snith, in part I'm

13
14

sustaining your objection.

be stricken an the basis that he referred to

15

use of that v.ord.

-- with that, JUdge, I

But as to this particular

I 'm r:ot going to accept that

rrove that

MR. f.MTIH:
that

And --

BY MS. YEE-WAUACE:

All right.

Well, I will mt

And on March 29, 2013, h::M did you

3

I'm mt g:Jing to strike his

I slirply WJn't aclnit it for p=f that

16

it specifically as being o::rrp:>st.

16

it was, in fact, =pest, despite his earlier testirrony

17

this record to deronstrate that that is, in fact, ME.t he

17

to that regard.

TIJe:r:e' s been rn fa.udation of any

18

1bere' s mthing in

So 1 on H::trc:h 29, 2013,

18

saw in tl.use win:.lrt»JS.

19

tests, there's been m sh::Ming that it wasn't, in fact,

19

20

soil or dirt as the a Fburth District <burt has before

20

height an:l. width of the win:Jrows piles en the Snith

21

declared it to be.

21

prcperty, was that based an ycur visual observation?

was --

Q.

BY filS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

>~hen

you est:inated the height arrl weight of --

22

'IHE CURl':

All right.

Well --

22

A.

Yes, it was.

23

MR. f.MTIH:

His att61pt to categ:Jrize it as

23

Q.

And was that also based an other thir.gs?

24

=pest by this volunetric rreasuranent concept is J::oth

24

specifically talking about the height arrl width of the

25

with:Jut foun::latian, an:l. therefore it's speculation an:l.

25

win:Jrows piles.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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1

A.

I guess I cb:J.'t ur:derstand your question.

Q.

I'm just tJ:y:i.ng to say, did -- was -- was it

2
3

based an anything other than your visual obseJ::vatian?

4

A.

N::l.

5

Q.

<l<ay.

6

And tben, you estinated the velure, it

SCJl.ln:Js, the length; is tbat =ect

242

was over 600 cubic yards.

1
2

Q.

And have you estinated the velure of the

3

w:in:'lJ:c:M rraterial an the Smith p:rcperty in =mectian with

4

Mr. Gibs:Jn' s =rpost:ing operations tln::o.Jgh today --

5

present?

6

A.

N::l.

Q.

<l<ay.

7

A.

Correct.

7

8

Q.

-- of the piles?

8

d:me anything to dete:rmine \lhether or not the velure

9

rerains over 600 cubic yards as of Algust 14, 2017?

And you did tbat us:ing Goo.:Jle Earth?

9

Based an your observations, have you

=

10

A.

Correct.

10

11

Q.

And h::w did you go al:x:ut deterrrrining the

11

ad:litian of other w:i.ndrows, it w:::llid

12

still over 600 cUbic yards.

12

length?

13

'Ibere' s a tool on Goo.:Jle Earth that allows

A.

A.

13

Q.

Based an

<l<ay.

initial estinatian, and tben the
~that

it is

After your vit -- your site visit an

14

you to rreasure distances in feet, rreters, miles, yards.

14

15

So, we used the feet rre3Sl.lreiTEJJ feature an that tool.

15

W:1ether or not the rraterial in the w.i.n:l:rows an the Smith

16

p:rcperty oanstituted solid -- solid waste, as that is

17

defined un:ler the Solid l'a.ste Managerrent Rules?

16
17

Is that a feature that you use frequently in

Q.

your =:rk at DEQ to rreasure velure of solid waste?

18

A.

19

distance.

20

velure.

21

Well, we use that feature to rreasure
And tben, we use the distance as a way to get

Q.

<l<ay.

M3rch 29, 2013, did you rreke arry conclusions abcut

18

MR. EMl1ll:

19

'IHE WI'INESS:

20

MR. EMl'lll:

Ji.Jd3'e -Yes.
-- I'm going to object to arry

And What did you estinate the velure

21

cpinian relative to the definition of solid waste with:Jut

22

of rraterial in the w:i.n:lrt:ms to be on the Smith p:rcperty

22

reference to the mAPA rules.

23

in =mectian with Mr. Gibson's =rpost:ing operations on

23

24

M3rch 29, 2013?

24

25

A.

We estinated that the velure an the p:rcperty

243
He's defined this to be noth:ing

1

issue of solid waste.

2

other than plant or crcp residue.

3

grass clipp:ings, or stxaw, or leaves.

4
5

'IHE CXXJRr:

We ' re kind of gett:ing into

clos:ing argurent again.

6
7

<l<ay.

He's referred to it as

Ms. Yee, =lid you rejin:ase the question for

rre?

8

MS. YEE-WAIU\CE:

Q.

9

Yes.

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

=:~elusions

11

Managerrent Rules afPlied to Mr. Gibs:Jn' s operations -A.

al:x:ut \lhether or not the Solid l'a.ste
Yes.

4

that term is defined un:ler the Solid Waste Managerrent

5

Rules?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And What was your conclusion?

A.

That it was a processing facility as defined

9

Q.

And What did you l:ase tbat an?

11

A.

Based on the definition of process:ing

-- an the Smith p:rcperty in 2013?

13
14

<l<ay.

Q.

Okay.

17

un:ler the Solid l'a.ste Managerrent Rules.

10

Yes.

That the Solid Waste Managerrent Rules did

And What was your conclusions?

afl)ly.

facility in the Rules.
Q.

15
16
18

And What al:x:ut Mr. Gibson's operations led

you to the =elusion that it was a process:ing facility?
A.

That he was us:ing biological decx:npositian to

rrsnage solid waste for re-use.

17
And did y-ou nake aJ.-ry carclusiCii1S a.b..J-ut

244
Did you rreke arry conclusion after your

site visit an M3rch 29, 2013, as to W:1ether or not

Q.
Q.

Okay.

Mr. Gibs:Jn's operations were a process:ing facility, as

A.

A.

-- indication that plant -- crcp

2

14

16

MR. EMl'lll:

3

13

18

Q.

1

12

15

Sustained.

an::l/or plant residue is specifically exatpt f:ron the

8

So, did you rreke arry

10
12

25

'Ibere' s no --

'IHE CXXJRI':

Q.
t·Bl.w~

And h::w cculd you tell he was Cb:ing that an

29, 2013?

\lhether or not the rraterial an Mr. Gib's -- on the Smith

19

p:rcperty in =mection with Mr. Gibs:Jn's operations were,

20

nitrcgen and leaves that are high in ca:rl.xm., mixing them

21

in fact, solid waste?

21

into a pile and allCM:ing decx:nposition to

A.

Q.

By taking grass clippings that

are high in

19
20

Yes.

22

23

Q.

And What did you l:ase that on?

23

W:1ether or not Mr. Gibson was ccnpost:ing an

24

A.

That there was grass and leaves an the

24

M3rch 29, 2013, an the Smith p:rcperty?

25

p:rcperty.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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*

Did you rreke any

oc=.

A.

25

<l<ay.

=:~elusions

22

al:x:ut

Yes.
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1

2

3

~t W>S

Q.

And

A.

That by placi.n;J those, the grass cli:Wi.n;Js

246

that =:tclusian?

1

and the leaves, in w:i.n:lrc:Ms and allON:i.n.:J biolcg.i.cal

4

clea:np:)siticn, that that

5

defined in the solid

6

Q.

Whether or mt be

8

as of March 9, 2013?

9

A.

w:i.rrl=tJs.

ccnposti.n;J or processing, as

rules.

And did ycu draw any conclusions about

7

10

W>S

~e

usi.n;J a certain ccnposti.n;J rrethod

W>S

W>S

ccnposting using

Ckay.

And after the site visit an

2

March 29, 2013, did you cb any other investigation of

3

Mr. Gibson's operations leadi.n;J up to the N::>tice of

4

Violation, other that

5

to?

6

A.

N::>.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

Based an ~t I saw, be

Q.

9

~t

~t

ycu've previously testified

Did ycu make any determinations about

type of facility Mr. Gibson's cpe:r:ations appeared

to be under the Solid waste Mma.gEment Rules as of

10

March 29, 2013?

~t

11

A.

Yes.

12

specifically was it about his cperations that l<:d you to

12

Q.

Ar.d. vJ:-.at vas ycur conclusion.?

13

that crmclusion en March 29, 2013?

13

A.

That it was a Tier II processing facility.

14

Q.

And

Q.

11

Ckay.

And -- and ycu've said that, blt

14

A.

I'm sorry.

15

Q.

~twas

I cbn't ur:derstand.

it specifically about Mr. Gibson's

15

16

cperatian that led you to believe he was using windrow

16

17

ccnposting rreth:xi as of Mrrch 29, 2013?

17

18
19

A.

'Ihe -- the way piles are assembled an the

20

Q.

21

were assemled?

22

Ckay.

~t W>S

19

special about the way they

Well, the piles are basically triangular in

led ycu to that conclusion about

Well, based an our estimation of the arramt

A.

of material an site, that it was over 600 cubic yards.

18

p:tcp -- =an Mr. Gibson's ccnposting facility.

~t

Mr. Gibson's operations?

Q.

Ckay.

When a processing facility is a

Tier II facility under the Solid vaste Managanent Rules,

20

are there req.llrarents that the facility operator nust

21

abide by?

22

A.

Yes.

23

shape, lang w:i.n:lrc:Ms that are sep;rrated by distaiJce that

23

Q.

And

24

allONS equiprent in betw:.en the

24

A.

So, under IDAPA 58.01.06.012, there's site

25

water, or win -- nove the piles a:roun::l..

A.

rONS

to either tum, or

25

~tare

those req.llrarents?

and cperati.n;J req.llrarents Tier II facilities are

247
1

248

2

Q.

Q.

1

reqllred to crnply with.
Did Mr. Gibson crnply with any of the site or

2

advantage of that q:portunity?

3

cperating requirerents for a Tier II facility as of

3

A.

Yes.

4

March 29' 2013?

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

N::>.

5

Q.

And has he crnplied with any of those site or

6

A.

N::>, I

7

Q.

Ckay.

6

7

cperating requirerents to this day?

8
9

A.

N::>.

8

Q.

Are there certain clasu:re req.llrarents that

Were ycu at the rreeting that be

described in his testinony?

the

<XY..Jrse

not.

W>S

~t

happene:l after that rreeti.n;J, in

of the investigation of Mr. Gibson's facility?
Jack Gantz tried several tirres to request

9

A.

10

apply to a Tier II facility under the Solid waste

10

infomatian that

11

Managerent Rules?

11

12

D::l ycu lm.::1N if Mr. Gibson took

Okay.

W>S

discussed at the rreeting.

MR. SVITIH:

N::>w, let rre cbject to that as

A.

Yes, there are.

13

Q.

And M1en cb those apply?

13

that.

14

A.

'lbey apply just before the facility w:uld

14

rrove that it be stricken an:i that he not ang...er the

15

question.

Q.

So, Mr. Gibson w:llid not have to o:nply with

15
16

12

close.

17

the closure requirerents at this tirre if be

18

upen fox.- l::usinessi is tt..a.t true?

W>S

still

he's -- again, be's by speculation, an:i I -- I don't want
So, there's m fcundatian in the speculation.

16
17

'IHE CXXlRI':

Testim:Joy about What

s::meon= else

did is goi.n;J to be mt permitted unless there's a basis

18

fran •.bich I caTl cancllrl= that thjs witness has sare

19

A.

Cbrrect.

19

pers:mal Jm::>..Jle:'l;Je about

20

Q.

~t

20

person teak.

happene:l after ycu concluded that

21

Mr. Gibson's facility

22

and that be bad not carplied with the siti.n;J or cperating

23

requirerents under the Solid waste Managanent Rules?

24
25

A.

W>S

a Tier II processi.n;J facility,

We sent Mr. Gibson a letter aski.ng him to

rreet with DEQ.

21
22
23
24
25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

I

~t

-- the actions the other

So, that objection is sustained; the prior
ang...er

is stricken.
Ms. Yee, is this a good tirre for our

afterman recess?

I lm.::1N w= teak a brief one earlier.

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

Sure, yes.
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1

Who

2

3
4
5

A.

'>laS

1

Michael McC.\.n:dy?

He, at that t:irre, w:ts the state Response

Program Mmager arrl my direct supervisor.

Q.

that enclosed the N:>tice of Violatiem, dated

7

July 31, 2013?

9

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And locking at the notice of a vile -- the

Violation em page one?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

<:kay.

4

And did ycu receive a ccpy of this letter

6
8

254

fl:an Michael McCul:dy to Mr. G:ibs::ln.

And oo the reasons depicted in the

N:>tice of Violation that's attached to the July 31, 2013

5

letter, is it DEQ's positiem that Mr. G:ibs::ln is still in

6

violatiem of tl:ose Solid Waste Mmagement Rules today?

7

A.

Cbrrect.

8

Q.

As set forth in that N:>tice of Violaticm?

9

A.

Yes.

10

N:>tice of Violaticm that w:ts attacred to that

10

'IHE o::xJRI':

11

July 31, 2013 letter, did you have any =le in drafting

11

filing of the G:nplaint, Ms. Yee.

12

tre Notice of Violation?

13

A.

Yes.

12
13

~~.hat w:ts

I kirrl of figured that fran the

BY MS. YEE-Wll.Il.J\CE:

Q.

So, is t.P..at v-.T..a..t led to

the filing of the G:nplaint in this case?

14

Q.

And

that =le?

14

A.

Yes.

15

A.

I did draft this N:>tice of Violatiem.

15

Q.

Is DEQ seeking a penalty against Mr. G:ibs::ln

16

Q.

<:kay.

17

A.

Cbrrect.

18

Q.

Who

19

And it w:ts signed by CUrt B:rans:ln?

'>laS

the Director of DB;;) as of

July 30' 2013?

20

A.

Cbrrect.

21

Q.

And at least as of July 30, 2013, DEQ

22
23
24
25

16

'>laS

seeki.n;:; a penalty of $3, 500 against Mr. G:ibs::ln?

in =mection with ocmtinuing violaticms?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And

19

A.

$10,000.

20

Q.

And l:JcM did DEQ arrive at that penalty?

21

A.

It

~~.hat

'>laS

is that arrount?

the initial $3, 500 identified in the

22

N:>tice of Violation.

And then, the arlg)ing violaticms

A.

Cbrrect.

23

fran date of note -- or fran the date of note -- N:>tice

Q.

And the reasons for the violaticms of Solid

24

of Violation to the current date.

Waste Management Rules are dEpicted em the N:>tice of

25

Q.

And v.hy did DEQ assess a penalty against

1

A.

We have a p=cess of eval -- evaluating the

255
1

256

Mr. Gibscm in =mectiem with his CUip)St.ing cperaticms?

2

A.

'Ibe -- ah, oorry.

2

3

Q.

Gc ahead.

3

calculatiem of the penalty.
Q.

And

4

A.

'Ibe intent of the rules is to protect hurren

4

A.

It gees fran ze= up to $10,000.

Q.

<:kay.

~~.hat is~

for that?

5

health arrl the envi=mEnt.

And the penalty is a way to

5

6

get co:rpliance, or to rec -- or help the -- the violator

6

7

recognize the seriousness of the violation.

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

can ycu narre s:ne of those?

8
9
10

Q.

~~.hat

did DE;;) ccmsider in arriving at the

$10, 000 oollar penalty that it's seeking in =mection
with Mr. Gil:eon' s co:rposting cperaticms today?

11

12

And

MR. EMTIH:

Cc:llid you speak up, please,

Cynthia?

13

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

14

MR. EMTIH:

15

MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

16

'IHE WI'INE'SS:

Sure.

Eecause be can't bear you.
<:kay.

9

O:le is

WALPACA, O'Brien's o:nposting in Blaine

A.

'Ibere's Wynn's o:nposting in Blaine Cb.mty.

10

Cb.mty.

11

'Ibere' s several larrlfills ac=ss the state that CUip)St.

12

leaves arrl grass.
And oo those all fall within the Solid Waste

13

Q.

14

Mmagerrent Rules?

15

We use tw::> criteria.

Are there other CUip)St.ing facilities

in Idaho that are similar to Mr. G:ibs::ln' s cperatians?

16

A.

Yes.

Q.

<:kay.

Are there any CUip)St.ing facilities

17

the potential harm to buren health arrl the enviranrent.

17

in the state of Idaho that com -- are anp:u:able to

18

l'nd tJJen, the se=rl is t..l-Je exten:led deviation fran the

18

Mr _ Gib-son's in te:rrrs of volure?

19

reguirerrents.

20
21
22

23
24
25

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WAU.ACE:

<:kay.

N<::w, l:JcM did DEQ

originally arrive at that $3,500 penalty?
A.

We believe the potential harm '>laS moderate

arrl the extent of deviation
Q.

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And

21

A.

WALPACA, Wynn's o:nposting, arrl O'Brien's

22

rraj or.

23

Is that based en s:ne sort of rreth:xi that DB;;)

24

'>laS

uses to determine the seriCJl.JSrleSS of the violation.

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

~~.hat

facility w:JJJ.d that be?

o:nposting.
Q.

What is -- \\hen ycu say alp3.ca wins,

A.

WALPACA is a co:rposting facility in

~~.hat

is

that?
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1HE c:xx.RI':

1

All right.

290
1

Go ahead.

Did ycu ever have a rreeting

2

Q.

3

with Mr. Gib9:Jn?

4

A.

I did rot.

4

BY MR. SIITIH:

2

Q.

3

it.

MR. SllTIH:

-- replu:ase

1HE c:xx.RI':

-- as to form.

BY MR. EMITH:

In this investigatim, the

issue of cCbr got anpletely eliminated, did it rrt?

5

Q.

Chly Jack did?

5

A.

It v..as not ad::lressed, no.

6

A.

Cbrrect.

6

Q.

All right.

7

Q.

So, ycu•re the individual that does the

7

It v..as rot ad:lresse:i J::ecause

there v..as ro c<'br, Dean, im't that true?

8

inspectim and the investigatim, ycu tell the persm to

8

A.

I -- I can't corrnent an that.

9

core and rreet with

9

Q.

Well, let's try to cx:mrent 01 it.

10

}0.1, l:ut

yet ycu d:n' t participate in

the rreeting?

10

The reason I wmt a =nrent an it frcm ycu is

11

A.

Poth Jack and I Cb Cb inspectims.

11

ycu are with the State of Idah::>, the

12

Q.

Well, Cb ycu krow if there are any minutes of

12

Ehvil:rnrrental Q-Jality, that ycu claim receiverl a

13

=rplaint, that ycu claim }0.1 w:nt cut to rrake an

13

the rreetings that Jack had with Mr. Gib9:Jn?

~t

of

14

A.

Yes.

14

investigatim and an inspecti01, that ycu claim ycu w:nt

15

Q.

And in those minutes, does it indicate that

15

for that p..n:pose.

16

Jack told David that this is mly an o<'br issue?

17

18
19

I -- ro.

21

Q.

.sare.-Alere in the process, the o<'br got lost,

M3. YEE-WAI.ll'CE:

17

I'm going to dlject to the

form of the questim, and -- and as to relevance.

22
23

I d:n't J::elieve so.

didn't it?

20

1HE c:xx.RI':

N::>w, I wmt ycu to corrnent, v..as there an ocbr

16

A.

issue an the Gib9:Jn operation?

18

1HE c:xx.RI':

19

M3. YEE-WAI.ll'CE:

20

1HE c:xx.RI':

Mr. Sl1i.th - -

21

M3. YEE-WAI.ll'CE:

I'm rrt sure I understand the

22

1HE c:xx.RI':

24

question, and I'll --

23

24

MR. SIITIH:

All right.

25

1HE c:xx.RI':

-- sustain the cbjectim --

I'll --

25

Ycur lb:Jor --

-- are }Ul --- he's --

-- asking i f he srrellerl s:::nething

01 Mrrch -- 1.\hatever the date vas in M3.rch?
MR. SIITIH:

Ycur Fbror.

We can certainly start with that,

He's talking abOJt I w:nt cut there J::ecause

291
1

of an o<'br.
1HE c:xx.RI':

2

Mr. Sl1i.th, I'll -- I'll sirrply

3

ask ycu to ask precise questims, not a lengthy

4

explanatim of W:Jy

292
1

me earlier and told rre that ycu had neither an>ent ror

2

did ycu have a wurant, in essence it's a wlll:antless

3

search, that neans everything ycu fcurl that ycu may J::e

wmt him to an.sv..er =rething.

4

referrin:.:J"

5

Just ask him, did he s:rell sarething m a particular

5

6

date.

6

7

Q.

}0.1

BY MR. SIITIH:

1-!c:w ab:Jut that, did ycu srell

8

any c<'br cut there that I.IO.lld J::e an issue for the

9

D=pntrrent of El:lvi.rrnrrental Q..Jality?

10
11
12

Q.

Did that J::ecore an issue to the

~t

of

Ehvixmrrental Q..Jality?

1HE CUlRI':

Sustained.

MR. SIITIH:

And so, l::eing that }Ul have

am, at this tirre, going to

everything ycu said relative to that unlawful,
~<S.rrantless

A.

N::>.

13

Q.

Because ycu famd no violation of any c<'br;

14

17
18

fair encugh?
A.

Yes.

Q.

N::>w that, J:'ean, sh:Juld have

bl.~ht

an errl to

the investigaticn, shcllid it not have?

this cturt to strike

11

14
15

testifierl as ycu have, h::nestly, relative to ro a:nsent
and ro wurant, and ycu o:n::l.ucted a wrrrantless search, I

12

13

16

Ycur H::n:>r, I'm going to

8
9

I did srell an o<'br, yes.

M3. YEE-WAI.ll'CE:

He's asking for a legal cnnclusi01.

dlject.

7

10

A.

to is subject to suwressi01?

search

trOVe

}0.1 a:n:lucted

m Mrrch 29, 2013.

And I wmt that dljecti01 I've raiserl and

15

that noti01 to strike m the record for the cturt to rrake

16

a determination.
1HE c:xx.RI':

17

Well, Mr. S:nith, if ycu had that

18

type of a noti01, ycu neede:l. to raise that before ron.
I'm rrt going to strike the testinony 01 this basis.

19

A.

N::>.

19

20

Q.

And tell us W:Jy not.

20

MR. SIITIH:

Then I' 11 --

21

A.

'ih31 we clo an -- an inspection, it may J::e in

21

1HE CUlRI':

Go ah=ad.

MR. SllTIH:

--

22

regards to cne issue, rut

23

cb the inspectim, there may J::e other violatims that are

23

24

d::se:rved.

24

25

Q.

~~.hen

we get an site or W1en we

N::>w, J:'ean, J::ecause ycu' ve l:een so h::mest with

22

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

Jtrlge.

tlal I'll inquire further 01,

Thank ycu m that.

Q.

BY MR. EMITH:

J:'ean, did ycu ever rotify

arr,we in any writing that ycu o:n::l.ucted a v..m:rantless

*

(208) 287-7690

001129

CVOC-2015-03540 Idaho Dept of Environmental Quality vs. David R.Gibson, et al
301
1
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1
2
3

3
TilE CXXJRT:

4

5

Back an the record in DEl;:) vs.

Thank you, ycur Hooor, the

MS. WALLACE:

plaintiff calls Mike W:Jodv.ard.
TilE CJ:.El:<K:

4

O:Junsel are present, Mr-. Gibson is here.

Gibson.

ycur witness, please.

YCl.l cb solermly

S\\e3r

or affixm

5

that the testirrony you're al:oJ.t to give before this Court

6

will be the truth, the v..l:Jole truth, and nothing b..rt: the

7

court had a teleph::me oanference to talk al:oJ.t the

7

truth, so help you God?

8

ab9ence of -- crmtinued ab9ence of court rep::xrter

8

TilE WTINESS:

I cb.

9

scheduling issues.

9

TilE BIULIFF:

Please have a seat an the

After v..e recessed yesterday camsel and the

6

It was the party's agrearent that v..e w::uld

10
11

reconvene t:alay, that v..e w::uld r.ct. resurre the

12

c....voos-e.~rr.L......atian

of Mr. Bl'..le...."'t.

to~Je ~d

10

witness stand.

11

:perrnit

~"':le

12

TilE CXXJRT:

can you tell ne ycur full narre,

please.
Michael W:Jodv.ard,

13

plaintiff to call one witness, v..l:Jo is awarently going to

14

be unable to atterxi the pux:eedings next

15

witness's test:i.m:my is =lu:led, we 1AOUJ.d then recess

15

TilE CXXJRT:

16

for the day.

16

Ms. wallace, you rray inquire.

~.

When that

Ms. Valcich, Judge Hippler vas kind erx::ugh to

17

TilE WTINESS :

13

14

W-0-0-D-W-A-R-D.
Thank you.

17

18

offer her services for a limited period of time t:alay.

18

MICHAEL w:xx:wARD

19

Her time is limited, so that was our agrearent.

19

having been duly swm, testified as follows:

20

Is that an accurate statarent?

20

21

MS. WALLACE:

Yes, ycur H:Jnor.

21

22

TilE CXXJRT:

Ml:". Smith.

22

MR. S\1l'IH:

'Ibat is accurate, ycur H=r,

23

Q.

Ml:". W:x::dward, W:Jere cb you wrlc?

24

A.

I w:>xk for the City of Boise Parks and

23
24

yes.

25

TilE CXXJRT:

All right.

Ms. Wallace, call

25

DIRECT EXAMINATICN
BY MS. WALU\CE:

Recreation Departrrent.

304

303
1

Q.

2

A.

I w:>rlc for the horticulture unit.

2

3

Q.

l:bw lang have you wrlc for the Boise City

3

4

Ib you w:>rlc for a particular unit?

1

A.

Prol:sbly the last 20 years.

5

Q.

Cbrrect.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Today during ycur testirrony when I say "Boise

6

Q.

City, " I'm going to be referring to Boise City, Pa:rks and

7

A.

8

Rec, Horticulture Unit.

8

Is that okay with you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What are ycur current job duties?

A.

OJn:ently I rranage the oorticulture unit for

11

Cbrrect.

What are t00se seas::nil crews for?

A.

Seasonal staff probably cb the rrajority of

13

departrrent rraintains, excluding trees and shrubs.

14

171
18

19
21
22

the labor w:>xk for us, so they are the folks that are

15

cperating the

16

beds.

A.

Cbrrect.

17

Q.

When yc:u say 11 Eoise City rrei.ntai.nsl ,, 00 you

18

Q.

la~

out there typically, t..eeding

And cb the crews you wrlc with wxk year

rourrl for Boise City?

A.

19

rrean here in Boise City?

20

And you mentioned that you have seas::nil

crews?
Q.

pr:inarily everything that is green and grc:M.ng that the
When you say, "the clepart:rrEnt rraintains," do

Q.

'!hey can rar.ge a:nyv.frlere fron a single person

up to five to ten.

A.

13

Q.

c;re,;,

l:bw many :in:lividuals an a particular crew?

11

14

you rrean that Boise City rraintains?

I have a full-tine crew of al:oJ.t 15

12

the parks and recreation departrrent.

16

'Ihat involves

10

12

15

as a

9

9
10

I cb.

and a seas::nil staff up to 50.

7

6

Ib you supervise or wrlc with any

crews at Boise City?

4

horticulture unit?

5

A.

'Ibe seas::nil staff wrlc for us Mrrch to

A.

Cbrrect.

20

October typically, the rerraining full time staff cb w:>rk

Q.

l:bw lang have you been cbing that job in

21

year round.

particular?

22

Q.

Are you familiar with David Gibson?

23

A.

Since 1995.

23

A.

Yes, I am.

24

Q.

So you v..ere obviously doing that in 2013,

24

Q.

And are you familiar with llivid Gibson's

25

2014?

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS •

ccnp::lSing facility?
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306

A.

Yes, I am.

1

2

Q.

l:bw are you familiar with Mr. Gibs:Jn or his

2

practices on Eoise City parks and right of -ways we

3

facility?

3

rraintain.

4

A.

1

In the capacity with the City of Boise, we

4

5

have hauled debris fran our rraintenance yards to

5

6

Mr. Gibs:Jn's facilities for disposal.

6

7
8

Q.

7

Eoise City hauled the rraterial to, WJe:re is that located?

9
10

And WJe:re are Mr. Gibs:Jn facilities that

A.

They are located south of the airport off of

Pleasant Valley Road, "-"'St of Pl63Sa!lt Valley Road.

A.

Q.

As a result of our regular rraintenance ~

And \\hen did Eoise City disp::>se of grass

cliro:i:n;os at Mr. Gibson's facility?
A.

I can speak to the time f:rarre on the invoices

that I have fou:rrl, so fron late 2013 through '14.

8

Q.

2014?

9

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And \\hen you say that the grass cl:ipp:i:n;os you

10

11

Q.

Was that true in 2013, 2014?

11

tcx::k. out to Mr. Gibson facility carre fron parks and right

12

A.

Yes, it was.

12

of -ways, can you give us s::.me exanples of tbose?

13

Q.

So tcday d.u:ing your test:irrmy \\hen I refer

13

A.

Yes, I can.

Cbviously there the bigger parks

ravis, Kathryn

14

to Mr. G:i.J::ecn' s facility, I will be referring to tbe

14

d::wl here in Eoise, Ann l'brrison, Julia

15

location that you just described oouth of the ai:rport,

15

Albertsons.

16

"-"'St of Pl63Sa!lt Valley Road.

16

w:>uld rerognize w:W.d be H3rrison Boulevard, J3:roadl..ay

17

Avenue, the J3:roadl..ay-Chirrlen amn=ctor.

17

A.

Yes, it is.

18

Q.

And so What

\laS

Is that okay with you?

Eoise City's relationship

18

Q.

Sare of the right of way facilities pecple

can you describe h:::M your crews w:W.d an:luct

19

with Mr. Gibs:Jn or his facility dlr:i:n;o the time you've

19

its rra.intenance activities with respect to the grass at

20

v.ork for Eoise City?

20

tbose location?

21

A.

JIJ3ain, we w:W.d use

Mr. Gibson's facility as

21

A.

Yes, I can.

We are on a regular seven-day

22

a location to dispose of prirrarily grass cl@ings, rraybe

22

tTONi.ng cycle.

23

s::rre leaves l::ut prirrarily grass.

23

nuch grass as possible; ix::w:;ver, d.u:ing excessive g:r<:1Nth,

24

spr:i:n;o flushes, cur rrachires canoot rrulch all that grass

25

right back into the turf, so tbose excess cliw:i:n:J"s are

24
25

Q.

And the grass cliw:i:n:J"s that you took cut to

Mr. Gibson's facilities, \\here did tbose =re fran?

OJr rrowers are desigred to try to rrulch as

307
1

~t

or oollected and we'll st=kpile than in our

308
1

trucks?

2

rraintenance facility, prirrarily J\.Jlia Davis Park, and

2

A.

.l'pprox:i.rrately 10-yards.

3

onoe that beo::rnes over full, we've got to look to disp::>se

3

Q.

When you say 10-yards, <b you rrean 10 cubic

4

of than.

4

5

Q.

And so the grass cliw:i:n:J"s that were taken

5

A.

10 cubic yards, Y=·

6

Q.

Why did Eoise City ch:Xlse to take cliw:i:n:J"s

6

out to Mr. Gibson's facility in 2013 and 2014 likely carre

7

fron your J\.Jlia Iavis rraintenance yard?

7

8

A.

'Ihat is correct.

8

9

Q.

It v.ould have been grass clipp:i:n;os that were

9

10

st=kpiled there and then hauled out and disp::>sed at

11

Mr. Gibson's facility?

12

13

A.

'Ihat is correct.

Q.

And

\laS

10
11

that landscap:i:n:J" activity, both

yards?

to Mr. G:i.l::ecn•s facility in 2013, 2014?
A.

Mr. Gibson's facility provided a convenient,

rreanin3" close to cur rraintenance facility

d::wl here, and

oost-effective location to dispose.
Q.

Did Eoise City have any further use of the

12

grass cliw:i:n:J"s that they left at Mr. Gibson's facility

13

in 2013 and 2014?

14

oollect:i:n;o the grass cliwings stor:i:n;o than and tak:i:n;o

14

A.

N::>, we did not.

15

than cut and leav:i:n;o than at Gibs:Jn's facility, a

15

Q.

Did Eoise City ever wmt the grass cliw:i:n:J"s

16

landscap:i:n;o activity at Eoise City?

16

that it left out at Mr. Gibson's facility back fron him?

17

A.

Yes, it is.

17

A.

N::>, wedidnot.

18

Q.

Ar.d alro a rrainter.a.n.ce activity at B::Jise

18

Q.

8&-re

19

City?

19

question, did B:Jise City ever e:<pect to

receive its grass cliw:i:n:J"s back fron Mr. Gibson?

20

A.

Yes, it is.

20

A.

N::>, we did not.

21

Q.

What types of vehicles did Eoise City use to

21

Q.

I wmt to go through a couple of exhibits,

22

transp::>rt grass cliw:i:n:J"s fran the maintenance yard to

22

23

Mr. Gibson's facility?

23

starting with Exhibit 22 and 23.

Mr. W:x:dward, you've been harrled what I've

24

A.

We have tw::> tv.o-and-a-half ton durtp trucks.

24

rrru:ked for p.n:poses of this trial as Plaintiff's

25

Q.

And what is the volure cap3.city of tbose durtp

25

Exhibit N::>s. 22 and 23.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

Let's take up each one by one.
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1

2

313
And WJUld have rrade a ccpy with that petty

2

cash d::x:ure:n!: an top of that?

3

314
1

3

A.

Cbrrect.

Q.

Walk rre through the petty cash,

v.ro

A.

Yes, it does.

Q.

Ci<:ay.

And then it says "posted 10/24/14."

What does that ir:dicate, that rotation?

4

A.

I canr:ct. speak exactly to that.

5

have filled that out, v.W w:>Uld have signed it an:l. Mla.t

5

Q.

So Mla.t Boise City

6

the stanp rreans.

6

invoice an Exhibit 22

7

amount of $60?

4

7

A.

WJUld

So right here it's describing Mla.t the

W3S

W3S

paying for with the

for o::np:>sted debris in the

8

purchase ...as (in:l.icating) , the arramt of the purchase,

8

A.

Cbrrect.

9

there's an account line to charge down here, those are

9

Q.

And that W3S to leave carpost debris out at

10

all account nurrbers specific to Boise City Parks an:l.

11

Recreation D:partrrent.

"~roved

12

sigr.atl.u:.-e right W.'L-.ere.

''Recei.v"Erl b'y" is rig'r..t J:-.ere

13

(in:l.icating).

14
15

Q.

I cannot speak to \\hose signature that is.

Ci<ay.

And then the received

A.

Cbrrect.

'Ihat w:JUJ.d have been vbm the

A.

Cbrrect.

12

Q.

So

d::x::rnent ...as received by Parks an:l. Recreaticn Depn:trrent.

14

Exhibit :tib. 23.

17

d::x::rnent an top of it .

19

A.

The FY15 stan:l.s for our fiscal year 2015.

19

20

Q.

Do yuu have an

21

rotation is for?
A.

Cbrrect.

The fiscal year, Boise City fiscal

year runs fl:an Cttaber to

Septeroer.

So does that in:l.icate vbm this invoice WJUld

24

Q.

25

have been paid?

Exhibit 23 is similar to 22 in that it is a

receipt received f:ran Mr. Gibson with a petty cash

18

23

A.

If yuu can be locking at

What is Exhibit 23?

16

Do yuu k:J:JaN Mla.t the FY15 rotation means?

22

we a...ve goi...."'lg to cb t..lJe exact sarre

exercise with Exhibit :tib. 23 .

Q.

Mla.t that

rotl

13

18

un::lersta.ndin

Mr. Gibson's facility?

11

15

Septeroer 2sth, 2014, is that a Boise City stanp?

16
17

10

by," that is my

Q.

So it's amther invoice that Boise City w:JUld

receive f:ran Mr. Gibson?

20

A.

Cbrrect.

21

Q.

And is this also an invoice that W3S kept an:l.

22

maint:a:U1ed in the ordinary course of J::usiness cpeJ:atians

23

at Boise City?

24

A.

Yes, it was.

25

Q.

Is that also in the accam:t:ing unit?

1

A.

Yes, it v.ould.

Q.

Satre thing going down fl:an the line, staying

316
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1

A.

Yes, it is.

2

Q.

Did yuu obtain this record f:ran Boise City's

2

3

an the left-hand ocrner, "rrake check payable to Dave
Gibson," is that information in that sort of lcmer, mid

3

acoounting unit?

4

A.

Yes, I did.

4

5

Q.

Is it a true an:l. ocrrect ocpy of the d::x::rnent

5

left-han::l. side, did that =ne an the invoice that Boise

6

City received frcm Mr. Gibsan?

6

yuu pulled f:ro;n Boise City's aceot.mting unit?

7

A.

Yes, it is.

8

MS. WAllACE:

9

adnissian of Exhibit 23.

Your H:nor, w=

m:JVe

for the

7

A.

Yes, it did.

8

Q.

Satre thing, the mtice an the

bottcm of

Exhibit 23, did that =re an the invoice vbm it

9

W3S

received frcm Mr. Gibson to Boise City?

10

MR. f:MTIH:

I have m objection, yuur H:::ln::lr.

10

11

'IHE CUJRI":

'The:lty-three is adnitted.

11

A.

Yes, it did.

12

(Exhibit 23

12

Q.

h_:jain, rroving over to the right-hand side,

13

BY MS. WAllACE:

14

Q.

We

15

can see it.

16

right in that?

17
18
19

adnitted. )

are going to p..lblish this

!VIii

so the ocurt

So it looks similar to Exhibit 22, am I

13

have amther petty cash slip that was ccpied an top of

14

the invoice Mr. Gibson?

15
16

A.

w=

Yes, that's ocrrect.
MR. f:MTIH:

Jl.ld:je, if we could.

let rre put

A.

Yes, yuu are.

17

an objection to the cant:irruing leading cpestians.

Q.

So, agai'1, lcaJc.i.Tlg in the upper left-hand

18

oculd diSCOirrage leading questions to let him answ=r the

19

question, testify, I WJUld ar:preciate that.

20

objection as to the leading form of the cpestian.

oc:rner, it says, "Steve, Steve, Steve," and it has three

20

elates.

21

been in?

22

W3S

Do yuu k:J:JaN Mla.t year those entries WJUld have

21

A.

It is my belief that is 2014.

22

Q.

'IHE CUJRI":

If we

let rre rrake

As to that one, that's sustained.

I'm mt going to give yuu a oant:irruing objection to

And WJUld those have been a sign-in that the

23

leading questions because the next question might oot be.

24

Boise City crews WJUld have signed in an those dates and

24

So that one is sustained.

25

times in the upper left-hand oc:rner?

25

23

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

MR. f:MTIH:

Ci<:ay.
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1

BY MS. WALl1'CE:
~

1

Q.

318
Have you ever been to Mr. Gibson's facility?

2

A.

Yes, I have.

3

that says "received," can you tell the oourt wtat that

3

Q.

And when v.ould that have been?

4

starrp is?

4

A.

It w::W.d have been s::rretirre in 2014 or 2015.

5

A.

5

Q.

And lltJy were you at Mr. G:il::son's facility

2

6

Q.

right-bani oomer

That is the date the docurrent ;as received by

the Parks arrl Recreation repart:rrent.

7
8

So the starrp in the

Q.

6
8

receipt an tq:J of Exhibit 23 rreans?

9

A.

Yes, I can.

s::rret:ime in 2014, 2015?

7

Can you describe wtat this petty catch

That is a c:loct.nent for Boise

A.

I ;,as there an a personal nature with my

brother-in-law looking for soil anerrlrent.

9

Q.

Ckay.

And when you say a "soil arrendren.t,"

you looking for a soil arrerrlrent or ;,as your

10

City Parks arrl Rec that allows us to p=ess petty cash

10

11.ere

11

paym=nts to an irilividual.

11

brother-in-law?

12

A.

Mf

13

Q.

Do you rerrarber if you 11.ere out there an a

Q.

12
13

as

A.

'Ihis ;,as for debris :raroval fran= Julia

Davis rraintenance yard to Mr. Gibson's facility.

16
17

p-.~-ucess:i.ry

reflected in this petty cash receipt?

14
15

And wrnt payrrent was Boise City

Q.

And lor.~ much did it look like Boise City

paid?

14

particular day?

15

A.

It w::W.d have been a Saturday.

16

Q.

Ckay.

you arrl your brother-in-law \\et1t to Mr. Gibson's facility
an a Saturday saret:ime in 2014

A.

In this instance Boise City paid $15.

18

19

Q.

~>grin,

19

20

cbes that notation rrean?

21
22

A.

20

=

fiscal year 2016 cperat:i.ry bud3et.

23
24

That rreans that this was paid out of

Q.

So is the FY16 handwritten notation an

Exhibit 23 a Boise City notation?

25

A.

Yes, it is.

And can you just describe lltJy it is

17

18

Cbes it indicate, it says "FY16," 1.1ft"lat

brd-Lller-i.t.J.-law v..a.s lo::::kh"'l3' for it.

A.

Yes, I can.

=

'15?

My brother arrl law had started a

new g:reenhJuse in his backyard arrl needed quite a bit of

21

soil amendrent.

22

Mr. Gibson's facility out there arrl thought 11.e \\Ulld just

We looked at cptians.

I knew of

23

drive out arrl see if be ;,as available arrl if

24

obtain anything fran him.

11.e

rould

25

Q.

Did you call Mr. Gibson in advance before you

1

A.

He did not.

Q.

And you say that Mr. Gibson was actually

319
1

320

\\et1t out to his facility an that Saturday?

2

A.

N::l, 11.e did not.

2

3

Q.

Do you k:rJaw if your brother contacted

3

present when you visited Mr. Gibson's facility in 2014,

4

2015?

4

Mr. Gibson in advanre?

5

A.

He did not.

5

A.

He was.

6

Q.

And when you got to that facility with your

6

Q.

Had you ever rreet Mr. Gibson prior to this

7

brother-in-law, can you describe 1.1ft"lat you saW?

8

describe the facility?

9

Yes.

11.ere

deposited arrl converted into a o:rrp::>st or

debris

11

soil anerrlrEnt.

13

Q.

7

Was there any structures at the entrances of

A.

Yes, I have.

9

Q.

l'fuen w::llid that have been?

10

A.

That w::llid have been prior to '14, ' 15.

11

Q.

Where did you rreet Mr. Gibson?

A.

My recollection is that Mr. Gibson carre to

12
13

the facility?
I'm not sure exactly 1.1ft"lat you're sp=ak:ing to

visit with your brother-in-laW?

8

to be a facility where

A.

10
12

It~

Can you

the Parks ar.d Rec facilities.

14

Q.

15

A.

Yeah, be arrl I rret specifically.

16

Q.

And the t\'.0 of spoke?

I can't say for sure that there ;,as.

17

A.

Yes,

Did yo..1 sign- i..r:t t..ben you

18

Q.

Do j'OU rerrarber

14

A.

15

as of structure.

16

Q.

17

A.

18

Q.

Sare

sort of shed or sign-in?
t•.ent

to Mr. Gibs:ln' s

And specifically rret with you?

1t.e

did.

,..m_t t.l)e pu.."'JJse of t.l:!at

19

facility anyv.here? Do you rerenber if you v.ould have

19

20

signed in?

20

A.

I canrrt say for sure.

21

Q.

l'fuen you

21

A.

en

22

Q.

Cbrrect.

23

A.

24

Q.

25

an that be date?

this partia.:tlar visit?

rreet:i.ry ;as?

11.ere

at Mr. Gibson's facility an

22

than Saturday in either 2014 or 2015 with your brother,

We did not.

23

did Mr. Gibson appear to recognize you?

Did you ever cbserve your brother signing in

24

A.

I believe that be did.

25

Q.

Ckay.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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And did you tell Mr. Gibson why you
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341
no reference to the business name of Black Diarron:i, is

2

there?

3

342
1

2
A.

'Ihe:re is not.

3

Q.

And have you seen any d=u!Entatian in any

A.

N:Jt: an this cbcurrent:.

Q.

Have you seen any cbcurrent:s where Mr. G:ihs:m.

refers to himself as cperating a landfill?

4

A.

I have not.

5

reoord with the Boise City Paiks and Recreation or

5

Q.

And an Exhibit 23, dJ you see there that once

6

billing depart.rrent that bas clccurent that cx:ntains the

6

7

.ords "Black Diarron:i" pJ:Oducts?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And cb you see any\\here an Exhibit 23 that

4

8
9

A.

I have not.

Q.

So what you kn::1.-.T is the relatian.sbip

bet~

9

again he's referring to grass and leaf recycling?

there's any reference to Mr. G:ibson cperating a landfill?

10

Boise City and Mr. G:i.bsan w:mld suggest, fran what you've

10

A.

I cb not.

11

seen in cloc::urentatian, that it's with the City of Boise

11

Q.

And the term or phrase "recycling," cb you

12

and him peroonally?

12

have an opinion vhit tbat ueans?
Your Honor, I'm going to d::Jject

13

A.

'lbat is correct.

13

14

Q.

Ib you have 22 ani 23 in front of you?

14

as to relevance be:ing beyarl the soope of.

15

A.

Yes, I cb.

15

offer up this witness as an expert witness or lawyer.

Q.

In there we have a reference fran Mr. Gibson

16

16

MS. WAllACE:

'IHE CUJRI':

We didn't

Well, he's not giving an expert

17

\\here he's referring to grass and leaf recycling, is he

17

opinion, he's sinply be:ing asked what he unclerstarrls the

18

not?

18

.ords an the docurent you introduced rrean.

19
20
21
22

A.

Are you speaking to the starrp an his, "rrake

checks payable to I:ave Gibson, grass and leaf recycling. "

Q.

'lbat' s 1ftlere I'm referring it's located.

Ib

you see \\here it refers to grass and leaf recycling?

19

Go ahead, Mr. W:xx:'lv.ard.

20

'IHE WTIN&SS:

In my opinion recycling is

21

rraking use of a discarded prcxluct for another pt.UpOSe.

22

BY MR. EMI'IH:

A.

Correct.

23

24

Q.

N::lMlere dces Mr. G:ihs:m. refer to himself as a

24

that the grass clippings and leaves are used in a

25

recycling process for the fornation of carpost: naterial?

25

landfill, cbes he?

Q.

All right.

And cb you have reseon to d:Jubt

23

343
1

2
3
4

5
6

A.

In general?

Q.

Well, let rre put it in the =tt:eKt of

344
1

anything delivered to Mr. G:ibson.
A.

I canrrt speak for what Mr. G:ihs:m.' s final

outocme was for what we deposited at his facility.
Q.

And you ani your brother-in-law went out to

2

Mr. G:ihs:m. to get scme insight and direction fn:m

3

Mr. G:ihs:m. because of his longstanding operation in the

4

carpost:ing b.lsiness?

5

Ib you have any reas:n to believe that he

Q.

6

A.

My brother and law and I visited Mr. G:ihs:m.'s

facility net for infornatian, for prcduct.

7

w:llid not use the grass clippings ani leaves for the

7

Q.

8

pt.UpOSe

of rraking carpost for soil arre:rrlnent?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

So

9
10

A.

.Again, I dan' t koow what Mr. G:ibson' s final

plans were for the naterials at his facility.

rDtJ

we went fn:m an assutptian to a

10

deliberation intent to go to the location to get a
pJ:Oduct' fair en::ugh?

It's interest:ing you say you don't koow what

11

12

his plans were M1en I un::lerstocd you earlier to say that

12

A.

Fair ern.1gh.

13

you and your brother-in-law went out to the G:ibson

13

Q.

And that prcxluct that you v.ent there to

11

Q.

&.it for pJ:Oduct?

14

facility to get infornaticn.

15

ocrrectly?

16
17

18
19

A.

Did I understand that

When my brother-in-law and I visited his

facility, yes, we were lccking for soil arrerrlrEnt.
Q.

Ib yol.l tl1.ink y= rrayte cb ha:'ve sore

unclerstarrl:in

of what Mr. G:ibson was cbing?

20

A.

I have an assutptian.

21

Q.

let's start with that aSSU!ptian.

Your

14

Was

Q.

All right.

17

A.

It can be.

And is cx:npost a soil arre:rrlnent?

18
19

A.

'I1Jey can be.

20

Q.

All right.

So having gone out there to the

21

G:ibson cperatian -- tell rre \\hy didn't you go to one of
the other cx:nposting operations?

22

assutptian was that Mr. Gibscn was wanting grass and

22

leaf -- grass cl:ifpings arrl leaves to create carpost: for

23

24

a soil arrerrlrEnt.

24

25

A.

Yes.

a soil arrerrlrent.

A.

16

23

Would that be a ocrrect assunptian?

deliberately get was a cx:npost prcxluct?

15

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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I can't say \\hy, other than I knew

Mr. G:ibson's facility was there.
Q.

Your brother-in-law was W3Ilt.i:t:g to find the
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1

350

you saw?

1
2

backyard.

2

A.

l3:t:'c:Mn.

3

Q.

<:kay.

5

A.

It had the color of dirt.

5

=rpost:.

6

Q.

Did you go arrl look at it?

6

brother-in-law want to cb with this substance you're
calling =rp::>St?

4

So it had the awearance of being

dirt?

that led him to understand that tbere was this location

4

that you tw could go to to get this &lbstance you called

7

A.

I was there, I observed it.

7

8

Q.

Would you say that it had the ~ of

8

9

dirt?

You had discussion with your brother-in-law

Q.

3

9

So fran your un:lerstarrling, Mla.t did your

A.

Again, in putting a greenh:nse in his

backyard, be's looking to obviously grow some sort of

You k:n::!w in

10

11

terms of its physical rrak.eup, I can't say I picked it up,

11

Q.

In the soil arrendtent?

12

shifted it tlrrough rny har:ds.

12

A.

And

13

Q.

A median to grow it in as a soil arrerrlrent?

10

13

14

A.

Q.

Again, it had the color of dirt.

You didn't feel it to determ:i.n= the texture

with your l:Brrls, have I got that right?

plant in that greenl::ouse.

r.e Is

lcx:k for a rred.i..a.'"l to grc:rv.; it

~"1..

14

A.

As a median to grow the actual plant in.

15

A.

libt: that I recall.

15

Q.

All right.

16

Q.

fut you do recall seeing it had the

16

17

And you grow pa."lts in soil or

dirt, do you not?

color arrl texture of dirt?

17

A.

Correct.

A.

It had the color of dirt.

18

Q.

So "--U.ld it be a fair statenent to say that

19

Q.

Did it also cg;:pear to be the texture of dirt?

19

Mla.t your brother in law wmted ;-as a median that was

20

A.

Again, I can't recall that I sifted it

20

soil arrl dirt that

18

21
22

~.

t:brough my hands or squeezed it.
Q.

N:Jw, your brother-in-law took that pickup

23

load of rraterial J::ecause

24

pt.n:pOSe?

25

A.

Again,

re

re

wanted to use for what

ccllid grow his plant in?

MS. WALlACE:

22

1HE CUJRT:

23

was starting a gree.nh::>use in his

re

21

Cbjection, speculation.
Cbjection as to speculation is

overruled.

24

MS. WALlACE:

25

your H:m::lr, arrl is also irrelevant.

It also lacks fcundation,

351
1
2

3

1HE CUlRl':

352

I'll sustain those cbjections.

BY MR. EMI'IH:

Q.

A.

I can't speak to exact volume.

2

Q.

And cb you k:n::!w MleJ:e that volume came fran?

3

A.

Are you speaking to the rraterial in the back

1

Would it be correct to say that you arrl your

4

brother-in-law \\ell: out to the Gibson facility to get a

4

5

median that "--U.ld grow plants, as does soil arrl dirt?

5

Q.

I am.

6

A.

It came fran Mr. Gibson's facility.

Q.

When you say fmn Mr. G:ibsan's facility,

6
7
8
9
10

A.

I can't speak to my brotrer-in-law's t:lulghts

specifically.

7

your t:h:Jughts?

Q.

Were those

A.

My t:lulghts WJUld be that v.e

11.ere

looking for

a prcx:luct that cnuld provide a good medium.

grow plants in?

8

MleJ:e did Mr. G:ibsan with the front-end loader go to get

9

the &lbstance to put in the pickup?

10

A.

11

facility.

11

Q.

12

A.

Correct.

12

13

Q.

And is that ccosistent with what soil arrl

13

14

dirt is used for?

'Ib

of the truck?

Q.

Fran one of his stockpile

ere

of the stockpiled

:ro.-JS

=·

on his

!):)

you recall

1.\hlch stockpile row it was?

14

A.

I do not.

15

A.

Correct.

15

Q.

If you can try to recall relative to

16

Q.

Took us a 1.\hlle Mike, but v.e did get trere.

16

Unless you're talking about the

17

17

1HE CUlRl':

location, was it closer to the road or to the south side?
A.

I can't recall.

18
19
21
23
24
25

as to h::m old the rraterial was that

I understand you might need some

20

the pickup?

21

A.

I cb not.

1HE CUlRl':

l?el::haps.

22

Q.

N:Jw, in the grass cl:iwings that Eoise City

=rp:>St.

22

BY MR. EMI'IH:

Q.

re

19
MR. 9'1I'IH:

Mr. Snith.

20

N:Jw, tell me if you can, Mike, h::m much of

that rraterial in the back of that pickup was trere?

J:Ut in the back of

23

delivered to the Gibson facility, is it your position

24

that t.hose grass clippings were placed with a recycling

25

facility or v.ere they placed in a larrlfill facility?
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2

of Poise did not need. to recover than.
Q.

3

4

353
'Ihey were placed at a facility M1ere the City

A.

1

Okay.

5

2

I awreciate 1ftlere you're wmt:in;r to

go, rut try to answer my question.

Which

\laS

it?

I can't speak to the exact nature of

A.

6

Mr. Gibson's facility, other than it v..as a facility that

7

v..as offered to us as a place to dispose of

8

cl:iw:in:Js.

9

Q.

All right.

11

=

gl:O.SS

we'll take that f= the m:nent.

You \\6lt to the facility to dispose of the

10

9l3SS cliw:in:Js, fair en::A.Jgh?

12
13

A.

Fail: erough.

Q.

But you and your brother-in-law \\6lt to the

facility to reocver and take f:ron the facility a product,

15

did you not?

17

MR. 9.'1TIH:
Q.

we did.

Q.

'lbat I.IOJld sean to suggest that whatever you

'Ib your kn::Mledge,

received =reSjJCUlence or sent ccrrespondence to a Black

5

Diam:Jnd product entity?

6

A.

I have not.

7

Q.

Did you ever known Mr. Gfrsan to refer to any

8

activity or cperatian in the narre of Black Diarrorrl

9

Ccnpcst:in:J?

10

A.

I have not.

11

Q.

In fact, when, Mike,

~...-c.

t~vm

of the

13

A.

Only in the last few rrontbs.

14

Q.

All right.

16
17

MR. 9.'1TIH:
check and see.

J'*,

thank you.

18

'IHE cn:.RT:

19

Recreation vas not discaxded, I.IOJld you agree with rre?

19

MS. WAllACE:

Cbjection to the fo:rm of the

He's asking f= a legal oonclusian and lacks

21

question.

22

fourxlatian alxmt: he said he didn't kn::M which particular

22

23

materials.

23
'IHE cn:.RT:

25

pcint a lar:g titre age.

Sustained.

kry redirect?

'lbank you.

20

21

24

J\.Jd:3e, wait just a m:nent, let rre

Mike, I have no further questions.

tcx:k f:ron the facility f:ron the Poise City Parks and

MS. WAI.U\CE:

is the first titre you

Black Di.am::n:l CC!rp:::'Sting prcducts?

18
20

Mike, have you ever

4

15

A.

As lar:g as """ got the pcint, then

I'll nove an.

3

12

14
16

354
1

Mt:'. Sn:i.th, I got your

REDIREl:T EXAMINATICN

BY MS. WALIKE:
Q.

Mr. W:x:dward, to your kn::Mledge does Poise

24

City rrake clonatians to facilities such as Mr. Gibson's to

25

diEpOse of its 9l3SS cliwings?

356

355
A.

1
2

'Ib my knowledge

Poise City does not rrake

clonations.

3

Is the source of the funds that Poise City

Q.

4

v.ould have used to pay the invoice reflected in Exhibit

5

22 and 23

6

A.

~yer

7
8

dollars?

4

8
'IHE cn:.RT:

10

MS. WAllACE:

11

MR. 9.'1TIH:
'IHE cn:.RT:

12

hear f:ron rre to help rre get it cantirued.

7

your Honor.

9

h::p:in:J to get rid of it.

3

May

this witness be excused?

He may, your Honor.

9

an the issue of the c=t repcrters.

I awreciate the

Mt:'. W:x:dward after tcday, that

12

be in recess.

15

to take tcday given

16

reporter back.

Cbunsel, that's the only testim:ny

'I.e

are go:in:J

J'* Hiwler's need. for his c=t

let ' s talk al:x:ut schedules for next lAeCk.

171 As I indicated previously I have to be in Elmore Cbunty

18

at 9:00 a.m.

19

20

Wednesday to Friday afternoon if you need. it.

scredu.l:in;r issues f:ron the plaintiff's perspective for

22

that prcposed scredu.le?

kry

--oOo--

17

19
21

(Proceedings cancluded. )

16

an F.cida.y after.nccnl I can rea:nvene this tr.i :::l1 Wednes:iay
Ycu will have my =tplete attention f:ron

we'll

15

18

20
21
22

Jl.Jd3e, that's the 20th and the

21st and ma:Jibe the 22:rrl?
'IHE cn:.RT:

I apolcgize for the inconvenience

see everyi:xrly back here next Wednesday, 9:00a.m. we'll

again.

24

'IHE cn:.RT:

11

14

25

As will the plaintiff,

Jl.ld3e, he may.

14

MR. 9.'1TIH:

MS. WAU.ACE:
your Honor.

parties willingnesses to accarm::xil.te the scredu.le.

13

23

Sounds like Mt:'. Smith is go:in:J to

10

may be the last titre you ever help a brotber-in-law

13

'IHE cn:.RT:

If I have any glitches, you'll

rrake it I/.Ol:k for him.

6
lib further questions,

Another trial I've got, I'm

2

5

Yes, they are.
MS. WAllACE:

MR. 9.'1TIH:

1

23
24

Correct.

25
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373
-- an G:x:>gle Earth?

1

A.

Correct.

2

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you can't give rre the date?

3

Q.

Ci<ay.

A.

I do mt :r:eTBTi:;er the date that

Q.

All right.

1

Q.

2

3
4

5

Well, Mlen. you say you got

600 cubic yards, at least, what is that 600 cubic yards?

8
9

an there,

no.

6

7

1I.6S

It w:cld be rraterial that's in the carpost

A.
rc:MS,

being axtpOSted or being biologically~-

:tx:m do

4

Q.

N::>w'

A.

When we went to the site, an the road we

you kn::M that?

12

could see rows that wae in v-a:d.atian stages of

13

deca:lpositian.

'I'hen -- tben we go to my question, hatJ

do you kn::M that?

5

A.

I could see grass and leaves.

6

Q.

Where did you see grass and leaves?

A.

Well, there

7

1I.6S

one rrM that bad grass and

8

leaves that were being cc:nbined in one end of the

9

And there were other rcMS that there

10

10
11

dirt?

1/..aS

rrM.

partially

de=rposed leaves and grass.

ll

Q.

And did you take any tests of any kin:l of

13

A.

N:>.

14

Q.

Did you take any sanples?

14

Q.

So, as you sit here tcday and testify under

15

A.

N:>.

15

cath, are you able to say, in the absence of any tests,

16

Q.

Did you ccn::luct any fonn of any test?

16

that there

17

A.

N:>.

17

to soil or dirt?

Q.

Can you state there tcday, under cath, that

18

A.

19

Q.

So, it's your cpinian.

20

A.

Based an my 13 years of el'pe:t:'ience inspect.:i.nJ

18
19

this -- what you saw, as you say fran tbe J::Oad, in fact,

20

1I.6S

only soil or dirt?

1I.6S

600 yards of grass and leaves, as cpposed

Based an what I saw, yes.

21

A.

Can you repeat the question?

21

carpost:i.nJ facilities and other solid 11.6Ste nenagarent

22

Q.

Yes.

22

facilities, yes.

As you sit here tcday, testify:inJ under cath,

23

23
24

can you say that anything you saw fran the J::Oad, that

25

cb3erved

rc:MS,

that t:hey were anything other than soil or

Q.

d::m't have a written anplaint, or a written inspection

25

rep:>rt, or your av.areness of the G:x:>gle Earth imagery,

375
1

tbe year that you used to rrake this analysis --

2

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Q.

3
4

MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

of tbe question.

7

=rpoond.

8

-- I'll cbject

It's been asked and

'IHE cxx:Rr:

to tbe fonn

~;

it's also

And it's argurentative.

Sustained.

10

Q.

2

BY MR. SIITIH:

Now,

an M3rch 29, 2013, were

376
Did you go to speak to Mr. Gibs:Jn, to get his

cpinian an quantities?

3
4

6

9

I'm go:i.nJ to cbject --

staterrent?

5

Q.

1

BY MR. SIITIH: -- w:llid that be a fair

It's that sarre 13 years of experience that we

24

A.

When we rret with him -- well, Mlen. Mr. Gantz

rret with him later, I believe tJ:ey discussed that.

5

Q.

But you weren't there?

6

A.

N:>, I

7

Q.

N::>w, do you :r:eTBTi:;er last week that we bad

1I.6S

mt.

8

rore discussion by you, :in your direct testirrany, alxut a

9

publication you p.1t together oonceming a guidanoe an

10

carpost:i.nJ?

11

you able to describe the color of sare of that substance

11

A.

Yes.

12

to be that of the color of dirt or soil?

12

Q.

Have you reviewed that at all s:ince it

The tenn soil is pretty bJ::Oad, and it --

13

A.

14

colors can vary.

15

Q.

16

A.

Yes.

16

17

Q.

When you were out there an M3rch 29, 2013,

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Do you harPffi to have a

Do you want rre to

18

did yt::U see rraterl.wl,

19

dirt or soil?

refhrase the question?

stll:s~...ances, t...~t

:b..ad t..lJe color of

20

A.

'I'he color?

Q.

N::>w, did you cp and =iluct any texture

22

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Have you reviewed that at all relative to any

19

21

Yes.

as.t;:ect of this case?
ccpy of it with you

today?

20

A.

I -- I rray in my briefcase.

21

Q.

You've got a ccpy :in your briefcase.

22

tests?

1I.6S

published?

13

right.

let rre -- I've got a ccpy here as well.

All
let rre

23

A.

N:>.

23

first s:tx:m it to your Cbunsel, to rrake sure that t:hey can

24

Q.

Did you go and touch any of the rraterial?

24

a];preciate what I'm go:i.nJ to sh::w you.

25

A.

N:>.

25

MR. SIITIH:

'Ihen I'll ask that we baixl. to the
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MS. YEE-WALIACE:

1

2

question.

3

'IHE CXXlRI':

4
5

MR. EMI'IH:

9

Cbjectian, Judge; asked an::i
'Ibat ' s been -- I '11 sustain that .

I think it's been-- he's explained

12

!v1r. G:ibs:n' s facilit-y an

to

my

MR. EMI'IH:
saJre

17

answered or asked.

to testirrony elicited an

Q.

A.

7

A.

N::>.

8

Q.

And fran 2013 th:t:ulgh the present, bas

VHS Properties, Ll..C ever =tplied with the cperating

9

12

MR. SMTIH:

'Ibat question bas rot been

=ss.

I '11 give ycu sore lee.ay,

object.

14

examination, an::i rot rovered in my cross-examination.
'IHE CXXlRI':

17

=ss.

18

d:>jectian.

I cbn't recall the question.
'IHE WI'INESS:

20

Q.

And tell rre What that

There was an cpen sign at the entrance, with

N::>.

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

22

that you used after M>.rch 29, 2013 to determine the

23

volurre of rraterial an Mr. Gibson's facility; is that

24

right?

403
What other techniques did you use to estinate

1

the volurre an Mr. Gibson's facility as of M>.rch 29, 2013?

2

of rraterial an Mr. Gibson •s facility an::i What that

3

rraterial was.

directing the plblic into the facility.

Q.

A.

We used our site visit an::i the size of the

A.

Cbrrect.

piles we OOserved to estinate the volurre of rraterial an

4

MR. EMI'IH:

Judge,

5

Mr. Gibson's facility.

5

'IHE CXXlRI':

I --

6

Q.

And did ycu estinate the volurre --

MR. EMI'IH:

-- wait a minute.

7

'IHE CXXJRI':

-- I recall that being as to his

This bas been asked an::i answered in

8

use of the Google earth inage in 2013.

9

any =ss-examinatian alxJut his testirrony regarding the

d:>ject cnce again.

9

direct, an::i bas =t been ad:lressed in the -- in the

=ss.

10
'IHE CXXJRI':
Q.

Wl.it --

6

8

11

rr:JN

Please, Judge, I'm going to

MR. EMI'IH:

7

404
the volurre

ha.o the defendant was able to estirrate the

4

12

On cross-examination,

25

3

10

I'll overrule the

you indicated that Google Earth was one of the techniCJl.l€8

21

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

Well, if it was asked an::i

answered an direct, you had a cbance to rover it in

16

19

Yes.

Judge, to t•.hich I'm goit1.g to

'Ihis bas been asked an::i answered in direct

13

There was

arn:1NS

1

2

Waste Managerent Rules?

29, 2013, that corkr.J::uted

was?

24
25

req..ri.rerrent un:ler 'N.er II facilities urrler the Solid

6

reguirerrents for a 'N.er II facility un:ler the Solid Waste

OVerruled.
'IHE WI'INESS:

22

5

Mmagarent Rules?

It •s in direct rel:uttal, Your H::n::>r,

'IHE CXXlRI':

21

And fran 2013 th:t:ulgh the present, did

Q.

VHS Properties, Ll..C ever =tply with the siting

4

15

18

Ms. Wallace.

gate, let alone a locked gate.

11

'Ib which I object once again for

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

19

2

402
There was =

Was there anything abJut

reason.

16

23

there an

you w=nt an the prcperty?

14
the

r~---ch

a sign an the b.ri.lding that said cpen 24/7.

10

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

Q.

13

20

my he 1.I6Jt

nultiple occasions.

11

15

Why did you go an to

answered in direct examination.
'IHE CXXlRI':

1
3

Mr. Gibson's prq:erty an M>.rch 29, 2013?

8
10

Go ahead.

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

Q.

6
7

I can rephrase the

Let her finish the question.

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

Did you estirrate the

I cbn•t recall

video.

11

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

12

Q.

Oh, okay.

BY MS. YEE-WALIACE:

Irrespective of the

13

volurre as of August 14, 2017, the day that the video vas

13

video, did you, at any other titre, estinate the volurre of

14

taken, al:x:Jut ha.o nuch volurre was an Mr. Gibson •s

14

rraterial an Mr. Gibson's prq:erty after 2013?

15

facility?

15

16
17

MR. EMI'IH:

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

'Ib which I object, Judge.

It was

=t rovered in cross; rutside the scx:pe.
'IHE O:X.."'T:
Q.

All right.

BY MS. YEE-WALI.ACE:

.sus+-...a:i.ned.

Did you estinate the

volurre at any titre after 2013?
A.

Yes.
MR. EMI'IH:

I object.

G:J.ce again, not

rovered in =ss.

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

It was rovered in cross.

'There were specifically C]l.l€Stians al:x:Jut volurretrics an::i

A.

16

Yes.
MR. EMI'IH:

1b which I cibject.

J'9ain,

rot

rovered in cross; outside the scx:pe of cross-examination.

17
18

MS. YEE-WALIACE:

It -- it was rovered in

19

=ss, Yrur H::n::>r.

20

volurretrics an::i ha.o Mr. Gibson estirrated the volurre of

21

rraterial an Mr. Gibson's property.

22

There was discussion abrut

MR. EMI'IH:

N:m, that's a misstat:errent of

23

What the =ss-examinatian was.

24

1.I6Jt to the issue of his staterrent that there vas at

25

least 600 cubic ya.J:ds, l:Bsed upJrJ. What, the 2013 analysis
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1

405
of s::rre prior GCXJgle Earth rratharatical, pb:>t:cgrarrrretric

1

irrelevant to the alleged violation in 2013, and it's

2

develq;:m=nt.

2

outside the sccpe of cross-examination.

3
4

Mr. Smith, I'll give you chance

'IHE CUJRI':

3

at recross if this is rrov:i.:ng into a re;, area.

4

'IHE CUJRI':

'lbe Ccnplaint covers 2015.

the abjection as to relevance is overruled.

So,

As to

5

v..ibether it's outside the sccpe of cn:JSS-examinatian, I' ll

6

give you a chance to cross-examine him again.

after March 29, 2013, other than your initial estirration

7

overruled as well.

8

of over 600 cubic yards, did you, at any other t:irre,

8

9

estirrate the volure of rraterial an Mr. Gibson's facility?

9

She can -- go ahead, rra 'am.

5
6
7

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

Did you, at any t:irre

Well,

'IHE Wl'!NESS:

1.\e

So, that's

estirrated ab:JUt 10,000

cubic yards.

Okay.

And based an your

10

A.

Yes.

10

11

Q.

When w::til.d that have been?

11

visits an the site in 2017, oo you believe that that

A.

I d::n't recall b'1e date, rut we did address

12

est~-rate

12
13

that after that inspection.

14

Q.

15

A.

16
17

What year?
I believe it was 20 -MR. 91I'IH:

can't recall a date.

I will abject to anything 1f.ben he
We've got no foun::latian.

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

A.

2015.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Okay.

18
19
20

23
24

can you estirrate the

year?
Did you do it in any other years?

A.

I believe it's different.

14

Q.

And h::M so?

15

A.

There's been ad::litianal rows ad:ied.

16

Q.

So, it IIOUld be trore?

17

A.

Correct.

18

Q.

'Ibe volune an Mr. G:ibscn's facility --

19

rraterial volure an Mr. Gi.bs::m' s facility today wruld be

20

trore than it was in 20,000 -MR. 91I'IH:

Q.

22

And v.i:Jat did you estirrate the volure

23
24

MR. 91I'IH:

'Ib Which, again, I'll abject

is b.t.....e same or diffe.&."e!lt tcday?

13

21

to be in 2015?

25

BY MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

Q.

as

'Ib Which --

BY MS. YEE-WALU\CE: -- in 2013?
MR. 91I'IH:

-- I'm going to abject to the

leading fo:rm of the questicn.

25

MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

1

road and observed ad:litianal

I was just trying to

407
1

clarify his prior

2
3

4

408

~.

'IHE CUJRI':

2

'lbe question is leading;

3

sustai.nerl.

Q.

BY MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

So, h::M w::til.d the

w:i..n:lrcY;Js.

Q.

Did you go an the prcperty this subsequent

t:irre?

4

A.

!:b.

5

rraterial an Mr. Gibson's facility, the volure, be

5

Q.

What was the

6

different today?

6

A.

February 22, 2017, and August 15, 2017.

7

A.

There ' s been ad:litianal

7

14th, I'm =ry.

8

Q.

So, w::til.d the volure be?

8

9

A.

Greater.

9

10

Q.

ad:ied.

Okay.

10

MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

11

w:i..n:lrcY;Js

'lbank you.

11

12

'IHE CUlRI':

Cross-examination an t:h::>se --

12

13

MR.. 91I'lH:

I IIOUld --

13

14

'IHE CUJRI':

-- points?

15

MR.. 91I'lH:

-- Judge.

'lbank you.

Q.

subse:Juent

t:irre?

And did you choose -- well, \\ere the sarre

signs located en the facility, saying cpen, there in 2017

as

they~

in 2013?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And was the sarre sign saying 24/7 there in

2017 as it was in 2013?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

fut in 2017, you ar.pare:ntly becarre aware that

16

16

you dan' t go on prcperty with:Jut a search w:u:rant issued

17

17

by a Court?

18
19

BY MR. 9'1TIH:
Q.

You in::licate that you can:lucted a further

I didn't go an.

18

A.

'Ibat' s rot t.l-Je reas::n

19

Q.

Tell rre the reason MTj you did net go an to

\•.~.!

20

inspection, after Mrrch 29, 2013, of this Gi.bs::m

20

this prq:>erty, if }Ql're there to trake a further

21

cpexatian?

21

inspection?

22

A.

!:b.

22

A.

I was not rraking an inspection.

23

Q.

So, you did net oo any further inspection; is

23

Q.

Tell tre why you chose not to go an the

24

prq:>erty in 2017?

24
25

that ocrrect?
A.

J:bt inspection.

I \\erlt out to the -- the

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

25

*

MS. YEE-WALU\CE:

Cbjectian; relevance.

(208) 287-7690

001139

CVOC-2015-03540 Idaho Dept of Environmental Quality vs. David R.Gibson, et al
409
1

'IHE o::xJRT:

2
3

'IHE WI'INE'SS:

Q.

I didn't believe there v.ould be

BY MR. SIITIH:

410

Well, what time of the clay did

you Cb it in February and Algust?

As you approach fmn the

A.

1

anYJ:xxly on site to taJk to than about the site.

4
5

Overruled.

2

d::wl and see ad:litional

3

errl of the property.

4

Q.

east, you can lcnk

You can see d::wl to the

:rotJS.

And did you detenn:i..ne the texture of that

5

rraterial?

6

A.

In the noming.

6

A.

N::>.

7

Q.

And you tlvJght there w::uld not be anyaJe

7

Q.

And was that, again, of the sarre color as

9

A.

Cbrrect.

10

Q.

N::Jw, if you went cut there in 2017, and i f it

8

there?

8

soil or dirt?
It lcnked like the sarre windrows that w=

9

A.

10

absel:ved in 2013.

11

v.as not in relation to an inspection, tell rre what the

11

12

~was?

12

had c:il:Js<o_rved in 2013, by that are you sJggest:i.ng that

13

they were there in 2013?

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A.

'Ib get an est -- or an estirrate on what had

occurred since 2013.
Q.

'Ib get an estirrate on what had occurred; what

do you rrean by that?
A.

If there were additional w:in:l:D::Ms that had

been added.

Q.

So, if it lcnked like the sarre w:in:l:D::Ms you

Q.

14

A.

1he additional w:in:l:D::Ms?

15

Q.

Well, that 1.16Stl't what you said.

You said

16

that the -- I asked abcut color, and you said they looked

17

the sarre as they did in 2013 .

18

1he color and texture of the additional

A.

lcnked the sane as the

J:UtJS

that were there in 2013.

And so, are you saying there were additional

19

20

w:in:l:D::Ms fmn what you observed or fmn your d:Jsel:vation

20

Q.

And that's the color of dirt or soil?

21

of Gocgle Earth?

21

A.

1he color? Yes.

22

A.

Both.

22

Q.

N::Jw, the -- you're saying the estirrations

23

Q.

N::Jw, h::M OJUld you rrake that determination

23

that you rrade led you to conclude, in your cpinian, that

24

there was 2,000 cubic yards; did I hear that correctly?

24

without go:i.ng onto the pren:i.ses, M1ere suh9Equent

25

are to the south, l::eh.in:l. the access right of way?

J:UtJS

:rotJS

25

A.

I don't believe I said 2,000.

1

A.

1he irragery that w: ],coked at in 2013.

Q.

All right.

412

411

1

Q.

You didn't say 2, 000?

Well, what v.as your

And I believe I've asked you, and

2

then personal cpinion that you were ob9erv:i.ng on the

2

3

pren:i.ses in 2017 as to the velure?

3

you didn't krow, hJ.t I'm go:i.ng to ask you again, to rrake

sure that v.e're

4

A.

Can you repeat that, please?

4

5

Q.

I can.

5

What is the basis -- or what is the cubic

6

t:a.J.k:in3"

the sane term.

When you lock at a G:x:gle Earth ph:Jtograph in

6

2013 to rrake estirrate of 600 cubic yards, what was the

7

yardage arramt you're saying you absel:ved on the pren:i.ses

7

year of that Gocgle Earth photcgraphy?

8

in 2017?

8

A.

I --

9

A.

1he estirration that I rrade.

10

Q.

And what is that estirration?

10

ooject.

11

A.

10,000 cubic yards.

11

misstate prior testim::xly.

12

Q.

You believe it was 10,000?

12

600 cubic yards.

13

A.

Cbrrect.

13

14

Q.

N::Jw, the other clay you indicated that it was

14

15
16
17

18

11-E. YEE-WALI.l\CE:

9

in excess of 600 cubic yards; do you reranber that?
Yes.

16

Q.

And v.as your estirration of that 600 cubic

17

yaJ:.Tl...s basErl up:m the G:x:gle Errth ph:Jto;p::aphy in 2017?

g.rr'!H:

was greater than

I believe you're go:i.ng to give us

'IHE o::xJRT:

I' 11 sustain the oojection.

It's

been asked and answ=red.

Q.

BY MR. SIITIH:

Yw say you went to

18

G:x:gle :Earth in 2017 to assist you in rrak:i.ng your

19

estirration?

19

A.

I -- I'm sorry.

20

Q.

I rray.

20

A.

Cbrrect.

Your estirration of 600 cubic yards, that you

21

Q.

And what was the year of the G:x:gle Earth

21

Can you repeat that, please?

MR.

He said it

the -- is he allc::Med to answer, Jud;Je?

15

A.

Your H::lnor, I'm g::>:i.ng to

It's been asked and answ=red, and it Cbes

22

gave us last ......eek, was that hased up:n the G:x:gle Earth

22

23

ph:Jto;p::aphy that was taken in 2017?

23

A.

2017.

Q.

And so, is it your belief that the i.ncJ::ease

24

A.

N::>.

24

25

Q.

What was it hased on?

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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413
1

yards?

1

that you did not go an the premises, lUA1 do
><ffit you saw was merely scil arrl dirt?

1.\le

kJ::o;.J that

2

A.

No.

2

3

Q.

What is yarr cpinian?

3

4

A.

'!hat it increased fmn 2013 to 2017.

4
5

Q.

And \<ffit did they ar:pear to be?

6

A.

A mixture of grass arrl leaves :in various

5

Q.

fut you dan' t Jmo...r by lUA1 nuch?

6

A.

We rrade the --

7

10

Q.

10
A.

Taking the estirrated width and height,

Q.
A.

Envil:arm::ntal Qvality?
No.

A.

12

And as I urxlerstan:i it, you did mt go an the

p:t:qJerty, sc it's mt J:::ased up;n a rreasurerent?

15

And did you put any of this so-called

Q.

cbservatian in any official r<p:Jrt with the JJEpartnent of

11

divided by tv.o, t:irres the ler>;Jth of tl1e piles.

it~

stages of deo:xtpooiticn.

8
9

yards.

13
14

7

Tell me what process you used to o::tre up with

this estirration :in 2017 that there was 10,000 cubic

11

12

rrade the estirrate in 2013

that it was over 600.

8
9

1.\le

Well, aga:in, fmn \<ffit I saw,

A.

that those piles were mt scil.

13

the Gibson operation, :in 2013 to 2017, has any of it

14

gotten into a

Cbrrect.

15

written~?

A.

It was :in the Notice of Violation.

Q.

other than the Notice of Violation that ws:tt

16

Q.

It's based up;n an cpinian?

16

17

A.

An estirratian.

17

out .i'pril 2 of 2013, is there anyth:ing :in any written
rep::>rt?

18

Q.

B3.sed up;n an cpinian?

18

19

A.

An estirratian.

19

A.

Not to my kn:::Mledge.

20

Q.

Your

20

Q.

E'D, DEl';) has m files and m cbcurents

21

A.

Yes.

21

22

Q.

It's mt based up;n any clirrensianal

22

23

detenninatirns?

24

A.

25

Q.

Now,

estirratian is J:::ased up;n your cp:inian?

has.

of this

SllfPJSErl :investigaticn?
I'm go:ing to OOject to the

form of the question; it's been asked arrl

We did rot rreasure, m.

24

misstates prior testirrony.

v.ren you say

25

We got into 2017

2

~

MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

23
10,000 cubic yards, arrl

'IHE CUJRI':

rJCM.

Yo.rr earlier questions were broad

3

enc:ugh I certainly understcxxl. that he had m records at

4

all.

So, I'll sustain that d:Jjectian.

MR. EMITH:

rDJJ,

I d:m't krow that it

2

are you also meaning to say there are w docurents,

3

reocrds, or files that perta:in to any volumetric

4

estirrates, l:e 600 yards or 10,000 yards?
I'm go:ing to

5

Q.

6

records at all.

7

which you have either recorded or clocurented in writirB

7

testirrony.

8

your estirratian of 10, 000 cubic yards?

8

Mr. Gibson, pericd,

9

specifically ab:>ut his estirratian of cubic yards.

9

10

BY MR • .'MriH:
Lb

1.\le

6

have any cbcurentatian in DEl';) in

A.

No.

Q.

So, if I go to DEJ;;l today arrl ask the DEl';)

11

12

anpost:ing facility operation, I will firrl m cubic yard

12

13

reference :in any files they have --

13

14
15

MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

Q.

16

171 to foundation.
18

MR. EMITH:

their rran.

21
22

25

him to EpeCU].ate abcut all

.:hld;:Je, he ought to kn:::M, he's

'!hat's v.hy he's here.
'IHE CUJRI':

Well, he's already said there's

m record or clocurent c:o:Jta:i.n:i.I his estirratian.

23
24

a.sk:UB

I'm go:ing to ooject as

DE'J officials a..~ ;vi"'.a.t t...'1e'l rray or nay mt fi....""Xl.

19
20

He's

--

MR. EMITH:

Q.

And so.

Well, then I'll clarify it.

BY MR • .'MriH:

When you say tlJere's m

clocurents or reocrds ><ffitroever rega:rding !:avid Gibson

15
16

Your Honor,

Now he's saying there's zero reocrds abcut

v.ren the

'IHE CUJRI':

prior question was

I understood this question to be

specific to the estirraticn.
MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

pericd.

He said abcut Mr. Gibson

'Ihat misstates prior testirrony.

14

I'm go:ing to --

BY MR . .'MriH: -- is that a ocrrect state:rent?
MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

MS. YEE-WALT.ACE:

ooject to that questicn because that misstates prior

10

officials to give to me to review the !:avid Gibson

11

arrl

416
arrl his anposting facility arrl operation, are you all --

5

As you irrlicate, you've got m

Well

~.

1

415
1

==n:ing any

'IHE CUJRI':

Q.

Oven:uled.

BY MR. .'MriH:

And I SUfPOSe you want me to

restate, don't you?

17

A.

If you w:>Uld, please.

18

Q.

<:kay, a'1d I 1..!l:X'lerst-...a.'1d.

If I to.ent to DEl';) today and asked the

19
20

officials to produce for me the reocrds ocncerning

21

!:avid Gibson's CCilpOStirB operation and facility, arrl I 'm

22

lcx:hlng specifically to firrl either a 600 cubic yards or

23

a 10, 000 cubic yard estirratian, will I firrl that anyWhere

24

:in those reocrds?

25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *
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1

2
3

A.

You f:irrl it in soil and dirt; mrrect.

Q.

And it, therefore, l:::ea:rres p3rt of soil and

dirt, does it oot?
A.

4
5

6

It bea::lres part of it, yes.
J\.dge, I've got no further

MR. SVITIH:

questions of Dean.

'Thank }Ul very nuch once again.
Mr. Snith, thank ycu.

7

'IHE ClJJRI':

8

Mr. Ehlert, ycu can stand d:wl, sir.

9

426
1

'Ihank

ycu.

'IHE ClJJRI':

'IHE WI'INESS :

11

'IHE ClJJRI':

'Ihank you.

please.

4

narre?

cnce ycu're seated, can yru tell rre ycur full

5

'IHE WI'INESS:

6

'IHE ClJJRI':

7

'IHE WI'INESS:

8

'IHE ClJJRI':

l2

noming reoess.

13

rea::nvene at 10 minutes to the h:::ur.

F-R-I-S-B-I-E.
'Ihank ycu, sir.

f'/S. YEE-I'JAI.U'(E:

'Ihank ycu, Yoor Horor.

11

We'll i::e in reoess for 20 minutes, we' ll

Cl:urt's in reoess.

14
(Brief reoess taken.)

15

My narre is Scott Allen Frisbie.

Spell ycur last narre for rre.

Ms. Wallace, ycu rray inquire.

10

This is a good time to take =

}UJ..

Sir, rave a seat up rere, if ycu w::uld

2
3

9

10

Frisbie; thank

16

swn

12
13

FRISBlE,

called as a witness, by and m i::el:"alf of the Plaintiff,

14

raving i::een first duly =m, ...as examined and testified

15

as follONS:

16
'Ihank ycu.

17

'IHE ClJJRI':

18

Looks like we need Ms. wallace and -- all
We're tack m the

19

right.

20

=.mseJ. are present.

remro

17

Pe seated, plrese.

18

in DEl;) vs. Gibsm;

21

Ms. wallace, ycu may call ycur next witness.

22

f'IS. YEE-I'JAI.U'(E:

23

Plaintiff calls Scott Frisbie.

24

'IHE ClJJRI':

25

rvs .

'Ihank ycu, Yo.tr Hooor.

Q.
A.

I w:>rk for kla CoJnty Higrn.,ay District.

21

Q.

What de yru de for the kla Cl:Jlmty Highv.ay

22

District?

24

Frisbie.

Mr. Frisbie, Where do ycu w::>rk?

19
20

23

Mr. Crispen?

YEE-I'JAI.U'(E:

DIRECI EXPMINI'a'ICN
BY f'/S. YEE-I'JAI.U'(E:

A.

I'm a superintendent of maintenance in oor

Cloveulale divisim.

25

Q.

lbw lcng rave }Ul w:>rked for the -- can t<e

1

Q.

Ckay.

2

A.

As well

3

cx:::nbine efforts.

427
1

call the kla CoJnty Highv.ay District AGlD for short?

428

as W'latever erergency needs are, t<e

2

A.

Abrolutely.

3

Q.

Ckay.

4

A.

23 years.

4

5

Q.

What W3S ycur job duties for AGID in 2013?

5

6

A.

2013 I ...as a crew chief m the utility crew.

6

A.

It's a utility crew.

7

Q.

And W'lat were your jcb duties as a crew chief

7

Q.

Ckay.

8

lbw lcng h3:ve yru w:>:t:ka:i for AGID?

8

m the utility crew --

9

A.

I --

10

Q.

-- the 2013?

A.

-- okay.

Sorry abcut that.

Q.

Are there any other --

so, does ycur crew go

by a p3rticular narre?

Are there any other utility crews that

w:>rk in kla Ocunty for AGID?

9

A.

Yes, there is.

10

Q.

l'hich cnes are t:h:>se?
'Ihere' s ones at the klams locatim.

I overseed all

11

A.

12

the utilities, un:le.rgro..rii utilities, drainage, all the

12

Q.

Ckay.

13

brid:Jes, as t<ell as all the omcrete; curb, gutter, and

13

A.

M:. the Cloverdale locatim.

14

sidev.alks.

l'hich locatim are ycu at?

11

And another at the?

14

Q.

15

Q.

I'm w:n:y, the ccncrete?

15

A.

I'm at the Cloverdale locatim.

16

A.

Cbncrete; curb, and gutter, and sicle\.a.lks.

16

Q.

Ckay.

17

Q.

Ckay.

18
19

And

>..culd -- did ycur crew mver a

p3rticular area in 2013?
It's-- yes.

A.

We-- we oover abcut half the

20

o:Jt.mty for part o f = - - = service.

21

service, the brid:Jes, is a crunty-wide progxam.

22

Q.

Ckay.

ro

}Ul w:>rk

The other

with other crews M1en it

Ib the Clove.rcBle utility crews and

the ."d3ms utility crews w:>rk t:.c:getlo.er?

17
18

A.

Yes, t<e do.

19

Q.

can ycu descril::e for the O::urt h:::M yru de

20

that?

21
22

A.
Well, we just -- dep:nd:ing m the situatim,
we h3:ve -- we de h3:ve definite lines of service. B..!t if

there's erergency situatims, we o:nbine efforts to take

23

o:rres to specifically clearing the streets, sicle\.a.lks,

23

24

and gutters?

24

care of the problems, as well as winter maintenance

25

t.hrc:ui:Jhcut the =ty.

25

A.

Yes, t<e do.

A winter maintenaooe.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS
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2

roads.

3

leaves pick up, as \.\ell as debris pick up.

4

efforts an large storrrs to get the roads cleared up.

5
6

Q.

Okay.

8

S:>, ycu mentioned that leaf pick up is

for AOID?

cre<tJS

Ckay.

And when ycu say fall, are those

Yeah.

A.

Typically, in October'-"" start seeing

14

the leaves hit the grourrl, but it's --it's lbvent:er,

15

Dece:ttJer, Janua:ry.

16

1.\eatber

17

and~

18

Q.

It just deperx:ls an the

it ' s

1.\eather;

related when '-"" can get in and get them picked up

up.

that place, that facility.

6

Q.

In 2013?

A.

Yes.

Q.

S:>, in 2013 , was ACID using Mr. G:iJ:s::m' s

defetrlmt in this case, in 2013?
A.

Yes, I vas.

21

Q.

lbw

were ycu familiar with Mr. G:i.l:s::m in

2013?
A.

It was brought to llo/ attention by other crew

chiefs and supervisors.
Q.

facility in amrectian with the -- its leaf pick up?

10

A.

Yes, were '-""·

11

Q.

can you

13

respect to using Mr. G:iJ:s::m's facility for leaf pick up?

14

A.

2

it's a nuisance.

pick -- sweep up the leaves.

Yeah.

\AJa.S

doing Ln. 2013 with

2013, '-"" were picking up the leaves

15

off the :road during the fall.

16

'-"" were hauling them over to that facility.
Q.

Okay.

~1

And at that -- that tirre,

S:>, let's talk a little bit rrore about

ACID's, I guess sweeping operaticns, is

18

just in

19

that how ycu refer to it for leaves?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

S:>, let's talk al:x:>ut ACID's Sl.\eeping

22

operaticns en an annual basis, and how the crews w:>:rk,

23

and then vb:re that mater -- vb:re the leaves are taken.

25

A.

Okay.

Yeah.

Evexy year'-"" -- '-""have leaves

that fall en the grourrl and en the :road, and it creates

432

431
water quality issues, it -- it causes public hazards, and

3

to the G:Jurt What ycu were

Cbing i."1 2013 -- or v·.ret .ACHD

24

And descr:i.J::e What you were aware of al:xJut --

~lain

12

17

Were ycu familiar with Mr. G:i.l:s::m, wh::> is the

20

1

5

9

pa.Lticular nonths?

25

that'-"" can haul all o f = leaves to that -- that point,

8

And when Cbes the utility crews for

Typically in the fall.

24

-- '-"" were aware of it was a o:npost facility

4

Okay.

Q.

23

-- al:xJut mister --

A.

Q.
A.

22

Q.

3

7

11

19

2

It is one of them.

AOID anluct picking up leaves?

13

We

A.

10
12

We crnb:ine

were--

A.

1

During the spring and fall, '-"" have oertain, l:i.ke

one of the activities of the utility

7

9

430

We Cb minor efforts to take care of the

1

1

S:>, '-"" -- '-"" cx:nbine foroes and '-""
We haul them to a 23rd

right -of-v.ay trees as \.\ell.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

And pa:rks.

Q.

Okay.

4

street site, as \.\ell as =

5

to Cb short hauls at that tirre, to get them off the

5

6

street.

6

A.

Trees within the right-of-v.ay.

7

Q.

'Ibat are C1.I1Iled by?
AOID.

Jldams location.

And'-"" txy

4

And then, at that point, '-"" pick them up, and

7

What do you rrean by right-of-way

trees?

8

lead them back in the trucks, and take them over tc

8

A.

9

G:i.l:s::m' s facility.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

And forestxy managarent:.

Q.

Okay.

10

Q.

'Ibat was What occurred in 2013?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

.Ada County picks up

14
15
16

A.

'Ihey're

Q.

Okay.

12

canin3 fran?
canin3 fran the trees.

13
14

But en \\hich streets or areas do

ycu --

17

A.

You k:na.ll, it ' s t:brougbout .Ada County.
t.~

18

}br'-....h Errl's

19

state Street.

20
21
22

11

S:>, vb:re are the leaves that

big one.

The

We eb have s:rre stuff off

A.

Well, because tbey -- tbey bcrder our

roads --

15

Q.

16

A.

-- and the trees.

17

Q.

What type of pa:rks?

Okay.

18

A.

Just the city pa:rks.

19

Q.

Okay.

cancentratian of large trees, and that cln:p leaves in the

20

A.

Uh-huh.

:road.

21

Q.

Is that correct, yes?

22

A.

That is -- that is correct.

Q.

It's just 1!.herever there's a large

Ckay.

And then, the leaves that =ne fran

23

the trees, are those generally fran residences in

23

24

.Ada County?

24

25

And then, you said that tbey alro a::xre

fran trees that are in pa:rks?

A.

Well, J::oth.

Cb:nbin=d residence and our

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS

25

*

'Ibat b::>rder .Ada O:>tmty roads?

Any tree that

b::>rder our :road potentially gets leaves en our :road.

Q.

Okay.

And when ycu say oor roads, you're

referring to the roads that ACID maintains?
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1

A.

ACHD reads.

Q.

What type of equiprent does ACHD use to pick

2
3

1

up the leaves in Ada County?

4

A.

We use pr:irrarily sweepers, street sweepers.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

And hJw do the -- hJw rreny sweepers

al:x:ut the fact that the leaves becare a public hazard.
Can you just expand a little bit more abcut \.\bat you mean

4

by a public J::aza:rd?
A.

vater quality issues, arrl hazards to the motoring public.

Cun:ently, v.e have 22 of them.

7

Q.

H:Jw rreny sweepers did Ada CoJnty have J::ack in

8

Q.

9
A.

Probably ara.md 20.

11

Q.

Ckay. arrl cb the

crB>'S

that pick up the

'Ihe -- the biggest problem w= have, it

plugs up storm drains, arrl then creates puddling arrl

A.

10

Yeah.

6

7
2013?

And ;-..hy -- you mentioned a little bit

2

5

does Ada County use to pick up leaves in Ada County?

Okay.

3

8
9

Q.

crB>'S

Okay.

And then, you also rrentianed that the

sweep the leaves arrl then take them to at least t\10

10

locations, one on 23ed Street arrl one on Adams; is that

11

right?

12

leaves en the st..---eet a=.md Ada County -- well, let rre

12

A.

Yes.

13

just ask you this, is it only the streets that leaves

13

Q.

Jlu:e leaves also swept ani then directly

14

fall on?

14

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

also pick up f:ron si<Jel..lalks or gutters?

18
19

A.

Q.

Okay.

And cb the

crB>'S

Win sweep the leaves

for Ada Cl:Junty w::n:k full-time?

22

A.

Yes, they cb.

Q.

Okay.

23
24

'Ihat 's a hare a.-mer's resp:n::!Sibility, hlt

eventually it gets blCMltl out into the rood.

20
21

Is there also -- <b they -- do you

leaded on site ever?

15

A.

Yes, they are.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Yes, as well.

18

Q.

And does Ada County haul t:h::>se leaves that

are collected on site,

to s:rre other facility?

21
22

But the -- is the b..1sy season the fall

rrearri..n.:J

19
20

A.

24
25

Well, to G:ib3on's.

We v.ould direct --

directly-- s:rretimes haul them directly to Gibson's.

23

period that you described earlier?

v.bere they were picked up,

Q.

Okay.

And that vas true in 2013, that ACHD

vas hauling leaves out to G:ib3on's facility?

25

A.

Yes, it is.

1

Q.

Okay.

1

2

A.

That's correct.

2

A.

Yes, they are, they're full.

3

Q.

So, then at other times 1.lftJen the leaves are

3

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

435

436

And v..d1en -- did ACHD also sweep arrl

4

collected, say at 23rd Street or Adams, hJw are they then

5

taken f:ron t:h::>se locations out --out to G:ib3on's

5

A.

Yes, that's correct.

6

facility, say in 2013?

6

Q.

Did ACHD also sweep arrl haul leaves out to

Yeah.

When the

get caught up, they --

7

A.

8

they join forces.

9

trucks lined up, arrl then we take a leader out there arrl

10

we load up the leaves arrl w= take it out to G:ib3on's.
Q.

11

12

crB>'S

We all >10:r:k together, arrl v.e get the

And did you -- are they -- did you say that

you take them into -- at a leader?
A.

We use a leader to load them up at that

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

-- 'cause that's a big pile.

17

Q.

Right.

13
14

18

time --

And then, what cb you p..1t the leaves

into?

4

facility in 2013?

7

G:ib3on's facility in 2015?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

And v..d1en ACHD hauled leaves in 2014,

10

again w=re the trucks generally full that \OSJt out to his

11

facility?

12

A.

That's correct; they were.

13

Q.

And v..d1en ACHD hauled leaves rut to G:ib3on' s

14

facility 2015, were the dmp trucks usually full then as

15

v.ell?

16

A.

'IheY were full; that's correct.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

19

A.

We p..1t the leaves into dmp trucks.

19

20

Q.

Okay.

20

And hJw big are the dmp trucks that

haul leaves rut to G:ib3on's facility in 2014?

\'fuy vas ACHD hauling leaves out to

Mr. Gibson's facility in 2013, '14, arrl ' 15?
A.

Well, it vas a facility that vas a place that

w= can take them, that there vas no chal:ge, arrl it vas

21

you -- that ACHD uses to haul leaves rut to Gibson's

21

agreed that v.e can haul them rut there.

22

facility?

22

not part of the agreerrents, so I vas directed that that 's

23

A.

l>bst of our trucks are 12 cubic yards.

23

a facility that w= can haul the leaves rut to.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

And ger:erally, are t:h::>se full 1.lftJen you

w:JUld -- v..d1en ACHD VJOUld haul leaves out to Gibson's

24
25

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

Q.

Okay.

I v.ould -- I vas

And did you have an understa:nding

al:x:ut what kind of facility Mr. Gibson's cperatians were?
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A.

1

Yes.

It

VB£

a ccrq;ost facility.

2

Q.

And l:xM did you have that

3

A.

wen,

4

Corpost.

1

urrlerst:an:lli

through the narre, Black Diarrand

And it VB£ b:rrught to my attention that -- a

A.

Yes.
Ckay.

Yes, it --

2

Q.

3

A.

-- is.

4

Q.

'Ihe leaves that ArnD hauled out to Gibs:n' s

5

supervisor at that tirre, that's What he told rre, it's a

5

facility in 2013, '14, and '15, did ArnD have any further

6

bampast facility.

6

use of tl:ose leaves?

7

Q.

&:>, What I've been referring to as

8

Mr. Gibs:n' s facility, does ArnD refer that -- to that

9

actually as Black Diam::nrl Corpost?

10

A.

we

7

A.

N::l.

8

Q.

Did Ada Camty ever -- or ArnD ever expect to

9

refer to, actually, three

tlJin:3s;

Black

A lot of the

10

receive the leaves that it hauled out to Mr. Gibs:n's
facility back fran Mr. Gibs:n?

11

Diam::nrl, Gibson's, and Pleasant Valley.

12

folks co..lldn't J::'Efl'B1'ber the narre, ro

13

said haul then out to Pleasant Valley, and that rreant

13

14

Gibs:n's facility.

14

A.

Yes, v.e do.

15

Q.

And it was true that ACHD w::uld sv,eep and

15

Q.

v.;e;

j1..1St -- ws just

&:>, and when v.e've been using that term,

11

A.

N::lt that I 'm ato.are of.

12

Q.

dr~y.

..n...'1:d

St-<.eepi..."lg t..l-e lea'\'eS -- I •m

t>Ja.S

asSL1l1ing ArnD continues to d::> that to this day?

16

Gibs:n's facility, during the crurse of your test:i.rrony,

16

haul leaves off of Ada Cbunty streets in 2013, 2014, and

17

can you just descr:i.l::e generally, so that the Crurt Jm::!...ls

17

2015?

18

the location of that pn:perty, \\here that road is

18

A.

Yes.

19

located -- or vtJere that facility is located?

19

Q.

Ckay.

20

A.

Yes, I can.

It's located off of

20

And VB£ sweeping and hauling leaves

cut to a facility for .ACHD a rraintenance activity?

21

Pleasant Valley, to the east -- or to the v.est, excuse

21

A.

It

22

rre.

22

Q.

And it was a maintenance activity in 2013,

23

And it's just south of GcMen Road.

Q.

Ckay.

&:>, \\hen v.e said Gibs:n's facility

23

VB£

a rraintenance activity; yes, it

'14, and '15?

24

prior and as we use it going forward, that -- is that a

24

A.

'I1lat ' s correct .

25

pn:perty location v.e' n be referring to?

25

Q.

Ckay.

439
the leaves that ArnD hauled out to Gibs:n' s facility in

1

2

2013, '14, and '15 --

2

A.

Did --

VB£

there any other material in

440

1
3

wen --

micrcpbone closer to h:im.
TilE WI'JNE:SS:

3

Q.

Ckay.

BY M3. YEE-WAI.U\CE:

Is that better?
Thank you.

4

Q.

-- other than leaves?

5

A.

Other than leaves, What -- Whatever

6

the road.

7

Q.

8

A.

Yeah.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

was the material pred:rninantly leaves?

9

Q.

can you describe that for the Crurt?

10

A.

It

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

Ckay.

A.

-- yeah.

12
13

5

in

Ckay.

VB£

&:> JX:M, when the crews, the ACHD crews w::uld

4
VB£

pretty rruch leaves --

Percentage-wise, prcib3bly close to

there s;:rre sort of =di.r:g or reporting that

'15,

7

tl:ose crews did ab::lut l:xM nuch they hauled?

VB£

10

At the end of the day, the drivers

w::uld give the -- the arramt of loads they hauled to that

12

facility to the crew chief.

13

docurrent that into his data entry.

14

Q.

Ckay.

At that point, he wo..lld

&:>, for exanple, the crews ;ofuo hauled

14

Q.

And that

15

A.

'I1lat ' s correct.

15

leaves cut to Gibs:n's facility in 2013, '14, and '15,

16

Q.

When -- so, I'm assuming that the -- the

16

after they hauled the leaves, they w::uld erne back and

17

report that to the crew chief?

17

W3S

true in 2013, 2014, and 2015?

haul leaves out to Gibs:n's facility in 2013, '14, and

6

11

100 percent leaves.

VB£.

hauling all oc=red by utility crews for ACHD?

18

A.

Ye.s.

Q.

And --

P....

Utility a..TJi gr=a...-de

19

Q.

Ckay, utility and grade crews.

19

20

A.

And -- and the sv..eeper crew as v.ell, they

20

A.

At the end of the day.

21

Q.

'Ihe end of the day.

18

21

cre.-\15.

have ex:t:ra trucks.

And then, the crew

22

Q.

Ckay.

22

chief, you said, v..cUld enter it in s::rre sort of data

23

A.

we

23

entry?

24

Q.

25

anbined efforts; ever:YJ::ody helped cut.

Ckay.
MR. S\ITIH:

Cynthia, have h:im pill. that

24

A.

It

25

Q.

Ckay.

Sue Heronemus, RPR, CRS *

VB£ --

yeah.

It was our data base.

'Ihe ArnD data base?
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1

an argurrent for a rrotion that hadn't been rrade, I l>BS!l't

2

sure was ever goll:g to be made.

3

it \\Ol.lld be made.

And I didn't k:ncM 1.\hen

I might have been able to divine

490
cap3.city.

1
2

'IHE CXXlRI':

3

Mr. G:i.J::s::m, have a seat at the witness stand.

All right.

'Ihank you.

4

fran -- mayl::e I sba.lld have read it over lunch, given

4

I d::m't need you to state your narre.

5

....ret this -- this rrornir:g, but I did rot.

5

party, your narre' s already part of the record, but thank
you.

Since you're a

6

So, I'll take that matter under advisenent.

6

7

Mr. Snith, I'm goll:g to require you to p..1t an

7

'IHE WI'IN&SS:

8

'IHE CXXlRI':

Mr. S:nith, you may .ir:quire.

9

MR. EMTIH:

Jud:Je, thank you.

8

evidence today sirrply because I want to use our ti.rre

9

wisely.

If I etrl up grantll:g your rrotion, I guess that

10

will have been a waste, rut to rre that's preferable than

10

11

brealdng until I rrake that decision.

11

12

'UI'X3er advisanent.

With that, did you want to rrake an opening

13
14

So, I'll take that

staterent?

15

MR. EMTIH:

Jud:Je, at this titre, I w::cld

a p3rty to t.he action l:Jerl>jn, called as a witness, by an:l

13

an behalf of the Deferilants, having been first duly

14

sw::n:n, was examined as testified

waive the presentation of an cpen:ing staterrent an:l go

16

direct to test:irrony.

17

At this titre, I'd call Mr. David Gibs:m back

to the stan:l to examine in both in the =text of !I¥

20

cross-examination an:l in sorre direct examination.

21

'IHE CXXJRI':

22

cross.

23

you reserve cross.

24

yourself.

Well, you had an q:portunity for

You said you were reserving that; I didn't let

25

Ycu can call Mr. G:i.J::s::m as a witness

MR. EMTIH:

as follows:

15

17
18

DAVID GIBSCN,

12

16

19

'Ihank you.

We will Cb it, Jud:Je, in that

DIREO' EXt'MINATICN
BY MR. EMTIH:

18

Q.

Mr. Gil:son, you have before testified to the

19

effect that you have been engaged in the cal];X)St

20

cperatians and agricultural cperatians; is that =reel:?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And 1l.ben

\..e

talk in terms of an agricultural

23

cperatian or c:an:luct:ing an agricultural facility,

24

Cbes that relate to carpost?

25

MS. YEE-WALI..ACE:

row

Your Hamr, I'm goll:g

to

491
1

Object as to relevance.
I ' ll sustain it .

2

'IHE CXXlRI':

3

If you want to specify a titre frarre,

4

Mr. S:nith.

5
6
7

MR. 9\ITIH:

All right.

Well, I CXJUld .ir:quire

in that regard.
Q.

BY MR. s.ITIH:

Mr. Gibson,

row

lang have you

been engaged in the agricultural cperation an:l

9

agricultural facility of crnposting activity?

11

row

question to be

14

carpost facility.

Overruled.

4

'IHE CXXlRI':

5

'IHE WI'IN&SS:

Say -- ask rre the g.testian
We have a Division of --

again.

7

Q.

BY MR. s.ITIH:

8

A.

Okay.

-- Environrental Q.Jality.

I think --

-- I rarenber.

11

Q.

Do you rarenber rDtJ?

Well, I'm goll:g to consider the

12

A.

Yes.

lang have you been involve:l. with the

13

Q.

Go ahead an::l ans\..er.

A.

I have been -- I have had o:mrunicaticns with

'IHE WI'INESS:

Q.

I'm rot sure lf..bat -- lacks

Q.

14

Go ahead an::l an.sv.er that question.

16

foundation.

A.

'IHE CXXJRI':

13

17

=rpound question.

3

9

I'm goll:g to cbject as it

lacks foundation.

15

2

It -- I'm -- I'm rot -- it's a

10

MS. YEE-WALI..ACE:

12

form of the question.

6

8
10

492
1

BY MR. s.ITIH:

Since a;:praxirrately 1974.
And have you engaged

15

both the Division of Envi=lrrental Q.lality and the r:ewly

16

formed r:epartrrent --

17

Q.

All right.

18

=rt::i.nuo..JSly, t.l-Jen, either at that p3rtiCl!lar original

18

A.

-- of Envi=Irental Q.lality.

19

location or expansion of that since 1974?

19

Q.

And have you cx:me to understan:l, in your

20

A.

At different locaticns I have, yes.

20

camunicaticns with than, that they are one in the sarre

21

Q.

N:Jw, tbere's been sorre talk whether the

21

in tenus of the

22

A.

Pretty nudl one in the sarre.

Q.

All right.

22

Division of Erivi.rcrire:nt quality or the r:epartrrent of

23

Envi.=Jrrental Q.lality are in any ;o.ay different.

24

engaged in camunicatians with eadl over the years?

25

MS. YEE-WALI..ACE:

Have you

I'm going to abject to the

Sue Heronemus, RPR,

23

N:M, tell us 1.\hen your direct

involverrent with the division began.

24
25

CRS

clef:artrrent division facility?

A.

*

Jlppraxirrately 1992.
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1

passed, that is fran 2003 to 2013.

'Ibe third reas::n is,

502
1

this testim:ny in, I'll sustain objecticn.

2

t:he ally puxpose \:hey v.ent out \:here v.as to inspect

2

3

rega.rdin;J an ocbr, m ot:her reas::n over quantities.

3

4

'Ibere was m ot:her p.rrp::Jse.

4

irrelevant

5

I'll listen to their positicn.

Eb, v.e have t:he passage of tirre ani v.e h3:ve

5
6

t:he representation, all of which ccn:firms that t:he

7

~t

8

ani v.as S3.tisfied that re v.as rot regulated.

vas S3.tisfied.

9

'lHE CUJRI':

7

Well, ani I've asked this

nultiple tirres in this p:r:oceeding ro far.

11

d1anged their mind.

12

d::es that get rre to Where I need to go?

So they

Certainly it's a matter of argurrent;

Q.

O<ay.

BY MR. EMI'IH:

Mr. Gibscn, tl:en let's

8

progress to the issue of yoJr relaticnship with

9

A':la Cb.lnty' in particular the A':la Cb.lnty Hight.ay

10

I 'm -- h::w d::es that get rre -- h::w

DC1N.

MR. EMI'IH:

6

'They knew of his cperations

10

Fgain, their legal view of t>.bat t:he

regulations oover is as irrelevant ten ymrs ago as it is

District.
There has I:JeEn testim::ny earlier, presented

11

12

by Soctt, to t:he effect that re is av.are that you have

13

MR. EMI'IH:

Well, that --

13

I:JeEn receivin3 leave -- leaves fran A':la Cb.lnty Hight.ay

14

'lHE CUlRI':

'Ibe fact that \:hey took a

14

District since 2005; cb yw recall that testim::ny?

15

different position in t:he past than rray!:e \:hey are

16

ro Mla.t?

17

MR. EMl'IH:

O<ay.

DC1N,

Well, let's take that

15

A.

Yes, I cb.

16

Q.

In fact, Mr. Gibscn, h::w lrng have yoJ I:JeEn

17
18

receivinJ leaves fran A':la Cbunty Hight.ay District?
Mmy trore ymrs than fran 2005.

18

th:lught for the rrorent ani S3.Y that \:hey' ve changed \:heir

19

position.

20

up:n the IDI\PA Rules, mr wuld it have changed based

20

21

up:n the statute.

21

agreerrent or t:he J:asis of the agreerrent yoJ had with A':la

'Ireir position v.ould rot have changed based

E'o, I \\811.t to have Mla.t it v.as.

19

And

A.

.l'f:praxirrately 1992.
Q.

And explain to t:he Cb.Jrt t>.bat yoJr initial

22

tl:en, yoJ can determine can \:hey change their mind

22

Cb.lnty Highit.ay District for tl:em to deliver to yoJ ani

23

with::ut: a statutory or an IDI\PA Rule J:asils.

23

transfer title to yw of t:he leaves?

24

for yc>J, tl:en, to decide.

And that's

24

25

'lHE CUJRI':

If that's t:he J:asis that you v.ant

1

'lHE CUlRI':

I ' ll -- v.ell, overruled.

25

M3. YEE-WALIKE:

Cbjectim; relevance as to

this arrangerent back in 1992.

504

503
'lHE WTINESS:

2

brin3

1
2

The agreerrent was that \:hey

Q.

BY MR. EMTIH:

E'o, yw have sev -- several

different cbcurents?

3

A.

I have t1t.0 sep3rate cbcurents.

streets to rre, ratter than haulinJ tl:em to t:he dt.rrp to be

4

Q.

And each of with .IOID?

5

disp::>sed of.

5

A.

Yes.

6

ro that t:hey'd be able to cperate

6

Q.

And cb you have a particular clccurent issued

3

v.ere goinJ to

4

t:he leaves that \:hey sw=pt fran t:he

And \:hey built a read, in order to cb ro,

durin3

t:he winter.

7

Q.

Did KliD act:ulll y oonstruct that read?

7

8

A.

Yes, \:hey did.

8

9

Q.

And in Mla.t }ffir did .I'DID oonstruct that read

9

10

for tl:em to then be able to deliver ani to deposit to yoJ

10

11

title to tl:ese leaves?

11

tren I:JeEn created by .IOlD rolely for t:he puxpose of
deliverinJ t:hese leaves to yoJr site?

to yw fu:rn .I'DID licensinJ yoJ to utilize that read?
A.

I have a cbcurent licens:irg me to use that

read, yes.
Q.

All right.

12

A.

Jlpproxirrately 1992.

12

13

Q.

And did that cxntinue ccntinuously until

13

A.

14

\:hey oould, yes.

14

2015?

They did t:he gravelinJ of that read ro that

tren, t>.bat \:hey brin3 to yw, cb yw

15

A.

Cbrrect.

15

16

Q.

And t:he ~t yoJ had with A':la Cb.lnty

16

actually tl:en receive CWJerShip, and title, ani are t:he

17

last p:Assess::>r of those leaves?

17

1-!.ighv.a.y District, to yoJr kn<:Mledge, v.as that ever

18

rerluoed to a written

19
20

~t?

Q.

And is that t:he read that has

And

18

A.

Yes.

Q.

Dces anybody \:hereafter receive title or

A.

It vas.

19

Q.

And in the rerluctim of that cbc -- t:he

20

possessim to those leaves?

21

ag:rearent to a -- to a written understanding, did that

21

A.

N:).

22

include the licensinJ of yw for the use of that read?

22

Q.

And to this present day, v.b:> has t:he title,

23

A.

23

N:).

24

M3. YEE-WALIKE:

25

'lHE WTINESS:

Cbjectim.

It's a sep3rate cbcurent.

ani ew1ership, ani pcssessicn of those leaves?

24

A.

I cb.

25

Q.

And t>.bat have you chJsen to de with those
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1

leaves?

506
1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is your intent in the -- be the leaf or

2

A.

tn.t:irrately or?

2

3

Q.

Well, in this course of ult:irrately?

3

the grass substance that you receive title and

4

to, do you then have an intent, ultirrately, for their

5

use?

5

Your Ha:Jor, I'm just g::>ing

MS. YEE-WAI.UICE:

4

to -If the coorse of ult:irrately.

6

'IHE WI'INESS:

7

MS. YEE-WAI.UICE:

ta1k:irB

6

A.

Yes.

-- I'm g::>ing to Object as

7

Q.

And vmat is the int:erx:led use?

al:x:ut since 1992 \lfrlat has he

8

A.

Ch, at the present time and for the last --

8

to relevance.

9

dor.e with certain leaves frcm certain roads?

Is he

10

o::mfused an \lfrlat leaves he's aSking al:x:ut.

11

and lacks famdatian.

12

'IHE CU.."''T:

Overruled.

ta1k:irB

13

Mr. Gibson to be

14

frcm 1992 through 2015.

~p

I guess I'm
It's vague

9
10

I unde...rsto::d

\<ere

g::>ing to use it to start a

Ill.li'Sery.

11

Q.

en that particular prcperties?

12

A.

en the prcp=rty.
And that WJUld include the entire 520 acres?

13

Q.

14

A.

Yes.

And so, tell us, those leaves,

15

Q.

And the substances that you currently have

16

\lfrlat do you do with those leaves that kla OJunty Highway

16

locate::l. an the p:rcperty, WJUld that place anything mere

17

District transfers the title, and ONJ:JerShip, and

17

than just a dust CJOIIering an the total 520 acres?

18

p::>SSesSian to you?

Q.

15

BY MR. S'II'IH:

al:out his cperatian oonti:rruously

for the past years, ..._.,

18

A.

Basically just a dust a::wering.

19

A.

I rreke than into CUIJ;OSt.

19

Q.

If that's the case, then :t:1atJ much quantity

20

Q.

And the process of doing that, vmat does it

20

t<OUJ.d be reguire::l. to actually provide for the soil

21

en::l up beccm:ing?

21

arren:irent?

22

A.

23

22

substance.

24
25

'I11e en::l pnxluct cx:rres to be a humic

Q.

23
And is that hl.mi.c SLlbstance then vmat g::>es

24

into soil and dirt Sl.lbstances?

25

A.

Would I kn::m :t:1atJ rruch it WJUld take, ;-.as that

the question?

Q.

NJ, that W3Srl't the question.

1he question

;-.as, it -- it takes large quantities to derive emugh

507
1

carpost to create a soil arren:irent to the 1.\h::>le 520

2

acres?

3

508
1

2

A.

4

Yes.

3

MS. YEE-WAI.UICE:

I'm going to object.

ta1k:irB

It

al:out .mat he inten::ls to

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is your intent to introduce that as a

soil arren:irent to that prq;>erty at agran::mic rates?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And have you been engaged in an

5

lacks fc:urxlatian.

6

do with the stuff in the future, rot vmat he is doing

6

exper:ilrentatian and determination an vmat the apprcpriate

7

with the stuff.

7

agran::mic rates WJUld be relative to this Sl.lbstance?

He ' s

Overruled.

8

MS. YEE-WAI.UICE:

Well, since that question --

9

'IHE CDJRI':

10

that objection suggeste::l. .mat you inten::l to do and .mat

10

11

you will do, is there any difference in your intent, vmat

11

12

you're g::>ing to do and vmat you will do?

12

8

9

13

14

'IHE CDJRI':

Q.

BY MR. S'II'IH:

A.

I don't kn::m :t:1atJ there t<OUJ.d be.

Q.

All right.

&::>, Mr.

Gibron, the -- the grass

13

Cbjectian; relellailce.

O'.'errule::l..
1he arrount WJUld depend upon

'IHE WI'INESS:

soil tests.
Q.

BY MR. S'II'IH:

And have ..._., =:ducted any of

the soil tests yet, given the size of the premises?

14

A.

NJt yet. ,

15

cliwings you rereive frcm these intelligent lawn care

15

Q.

All right.

16

pers::mnel, do you receive fran than as \<ell the title,

16

intent, at any time frcm 1974 to the present, to disp:::>Se

17

==-ship, and p::>SSeSrory rights to those grass

17

of or to disoard any of this carposte::l. material?

18

cl:itp:ings?

18

A.

NJ.

Q.

And has the entire substance that you have

19
20

A.

I do.

19

Q.

And with respect to the grass cl:itpings, is

Mr. G:ibsan, do you have any

20

generate::l. inten:le::i for amt:inuing use as a soil

21

your intent to use them in the sarre fashion, to rreke

21

arren:irent?

22

carpost, as you do with the leaf p:rcducts?

22

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is it your belief that you are subject to

23
24
25

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Is the intent to use all of that material on

24

the :r:egulatians of both the Right to Fann Act and the

25

&::Jil and Plan Arrerrl - - htErrlrent Act?

the site, inclu::ling the entire 520 acres?
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PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF
FACT
PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT
1.
1.

Gibson’s operations
DEQ
in 2013
information
Mr. Gibson’s
2013 as
result of
of information
investigated Mr.
operations in
as a
a result
DEQ investigated

received
that facility
from Treetop
at that
Treetop Recycling,
to DEQ
ofﬁcials.
reported directly
received about
odor at
about odor
facility from
directly to
Recycling, reported
DEQ officials.
(Trial
Tr. 200:12-25,
200:12-25, 201:1-11.)
201:1-11.)
(Trial Tr.
2.
2.

Gibson’s operations
DEQ
in response,
Ehlert
Mr. Gibson’s
ofﬁcials researched
Dean Ehlert
operations in
and Dean
researched Mr.
response, and
DEQ officials

Gibson’s facility
and
went to
Mr. Gibson’s
Gantz went
March 29,
204:5-25, 205:1-3.)
on March
to Mr.
2013. (Id.
and Jack
205:1-3.)
Jack Gantz
facility on
(Id. 204:5-25,
29, 2013.

3.
3.

Mr.
in the
Ehlert is
Unit Manager
Mr. Ehlert
the Assessment
the Waste
is the
Manager in
Compliance Unit
Assessment and
and Compliance
Waste

Management
Division at
inspecting
Management and
Remediation Division
at DEQ.
He has
13 years
of experience
experience inspecting
has 13
and Remediation
DEQ. He
years of
composting
waste management
Tr. 176:11-25,
177:1-2, 374:14-22.)
176:11-25, 177:1-2,
management facilities.
facilities. (Trial
374:14-22.)
composting and
solid waste
and solid
(Trial Tr.
4.
4.

Gibson’s facility,
When
Ehlert and
not
Mr. Ehlert
Mr. Gantz
Mr. Gibson’s
Gantz arrived
When Mr.
at Mr.
arrived at
did not
and Mr.
facility, they
they did

Gibson’s composting
observe
Mr. Gibson’s
291 :7-24.)
an odor
composting operations.
operations. (Id.
but did
did observe
odor violation,
observe an
observe Mr.
Violation, but
(Id. 291:7-24.)

5.
5.

On
windrows containing
containing grass
March 29,
On March
numerous Windrows
and
grass and
observed numerous
2013, they
they observed
29, 2013,

leaves
various stages
in various
211:21-25, 212:1-2.)
212:1-2.)
of decomposition.
decomposition. (Id.
stages of
leaves in
(Id. 211:21-25,
6.
6.

Gibson’s facility
They
Mr. Gibson’s
setting
other signage
signs at
at Mr.
signage setting
and other
open signs
also observed
observed open
facility and
They also

forth
who left
forth aa fee
left material
charging $5
for those
material there:
signs in,
there: charging
per load
those WhO
fee structure
someone signs
load if someone
structure for
$5 per
in,
and
they do
Trial Tr.
not sign
sign in.
in. (Exs.
Tr.
per load
and $100
load if
do not
$100 per
17.14; Trial
ifthey
17.13, 17.14;
17.1, 17.3,
(Exs. 17.1,
17.3, 17.5,
17.5, 17.6,
17.6, 17.7,
17.7, 17.13,
Gibson’s facility
213:16-25,
The signs
Mr. Gibson’s
213:16-25, 214:1-7.)
214:1-7.) The
signs on
on Mr.
construction
branches and
and construction
discouraged branches
facility discouraged

materials,
that they
charging $1,000
for such
The signs
informed folks
folks that
items. (Ex.
signs informed
such items.
could
materials, charging
17.5.) The
$1,000 for
(EX. 17.5.)
they could
deposit
but not
not branches,
or soft
soft green
green vegetation,
construction
deposit grass
grass clippings,
vegetation, but
clippings, leaves,
branches, limbs,
limbs, construction
leaves, or
waste, trash,
or chemicals.
chemicals. (Ex.
trash, or
waste,
17.5.)
(EX. 17.5.)
7.
7.

“most intelligent
Gibson’s facility
Mr.
intelligent
that the
Mr. Gibson’s
the “most
is open
24/7 and
he advertises
open 24/7
and he
advertises that
facility is

lawn
professionals” enter
his facility.
EX. 17.15.)
enter his
lawn care
care professionals”
facility. (Id.
17.15.)
(Id. and Ex.
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8.
8.

Mr.
Mr. Gibson
ten acres
composting facility
on ten
of property
Gibson operates
operates aa composting
acres of
owned by
facility on
propeny owned
by

“Smith property”).
Defendant
property”). (Trial
16:1-4, 17:16-19.)
Tr. 15:25,
Defendant VHS
17:16-19.)
VHS (the
(Trial Tr.
15:25, 16:1-4,
(the “Smith

9.
9.

Gibson’s composting
Mr.
in
Mr. Gibson’s
composting facility
is located
of Pleasant
Pleasant Valley
located west
west of
facility is
Valley Road,
Road, in

Boise,
14:5-9, 25,
15:1-14.)
Ada County,
Idaho. (Id.
Boise, Ada
(Id. 14:5-9,
25, 15:1-14.)
County, Idaho.
10.
10.

Since
Mr. Gibson
organic materials—specifically,
Since 2013,
Gibson has
has accepted
materialsispecifically, grass
grass
accepted organic
2013, Mr.

clippings,
use in
in
hayifrom landscapers,
for use
farmers for
lawn care
stale hay—from
and stale
and farmers
care individuals,
individuals, and
landscapers, lawn
clippings, leaves,
leaves, and
56:14his
property. (Id.
Smith property.
his composting
the Smith
25:1-25, 26:1-25,
26:1-25, 27:1-25,
27:1-25, 28:1-6;
28:1-6; 56:14composting operations
on the
operations on
(Id. 25:1-25,

25,
57:1-6.)
25, 57:1-6.)
11.
11.

“solid waste”
These
within the
waste” and
fall within
definition of
the definition
the grass
clippings
materials fall
of “solid
These materials
and the
grass clippings

“yard waste.”
and
under the
waste.”
fall under
definition of
the more
more specific
of “yard
and leaves
speciﬁc definition
leaves fall

12.
12.

The
None of
The materials
the landscapers,
materials were
of the
were also
also discarded.
lawn care
care
discarded. None
landscapers, lawn

Gibson’s facility
individuals,
who left
left these
Mr. Gibson’s
farmers who
materials at
or farmers
or asked
organic materials
at Mr.
these organic
received or
asked
individuals, or
facility received

for
in their
their original
from Mr.
original form.
Mr. Gibson
for those
form. (Id.
materials back
52:8-25; 53:1-21.)
53:1-21.)
those materials
Gibson in
back from
(Id. 52:8-25;
13.
13.

Rather,
title of
them to
Mr. Gibson
materials and
is using
using them
to make
make
of these
these materials
and is
Gibson accepted
accepted title
Rather, Mr.

compost.
504:10-24, 505:15-19,
56:19-25, 57:1-6,
57:1-6, 504:10-24,
505:15-19, 507:14-19.)
compost. (Id.
507: 14-19.)
(Id. 56:19-25,
14.
14.

At
At trial,
Mike Woodward,
Unit for
the Horticulture
for Boise
Parks
manager of
of the
Horticulture Unit
Boise City
trial, Mike
Woodward, manager
City Parks

Gibson’s facility
and
that Boise
clippings to
Mr. Gibson’s
the
testiﬁed that
to Mr.
on the
Boise City
and Recreation,
hauled grass
grass clippings
Recreation, testified
facility on
City hauled

Smith
property in
in 2013
Smith property
2014. (Id.
2013 and
305:2-25, 306:1-9.)
and 2014.
306:1-9.)
(Id. 305:2-25,
15.
15.

City’s regular
These
from Boise
clippings were
maintenance and
regular maintenance
These grass
Boise City’s
and
grass clippings
were from

landscaping
by the
rights-0f—way maintained
the City.
maintained by
activities on
on Boise
parks and
landscaping activities
Boise City
and rights-of-way
City. (Id.
(Id.
City parks
305:24-25,
305:24-25, 306:1-3,
306:1-3, 307:5-20.)
307:5-20.)
16.
16.

These
were discarded,
clippings were
the following
following testimony:
These grass
grass clippings
evidenced by
testimony:
discarded, evidenced
by the

Gibson's facility
Q.
in
clippings to
Mr. Gibson's
to take
take clippings
to Mr.
Boise City
did Boise
choose to
facility in
City choose
Why did
Q. Why
2013,
2014?
2013, 2014?
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Gibson’s facility
A.
Mr. Gibson’s
meaning close
A. Mr.
to our
our
provided aa convenient,
close to
convenient, meaning
facility provided
maintenance
cost-effective location
maintenance facility
location to
to dispose.
and cost-effective
down here,
dispose.
facility down
here, and

Q.
use of
that they
left at
further use
Did Boise
the grass
clippings that
of the
at
Boise City
have any
grass clippings
they left
City have
any further
Q. Did
Gibson’s
Mr.
in 2013
Mr. Gibson’s facility
2014?
2013 and
and 2014?
facility in
A.
A. No,
not.
did not.
we did
No, we
Gibson’s
Q.
it left
that it
left out
Did Boise
the grass
clippings that
Mr. Gibson’s
want the
at Mr.
Boise City
out at
ever want
grass clippings
City ever
Q. Did
facility
back from
from him?
him?
facility back

A.
A. No,
not.
did not.
we did
No, we
Q.
its grass
clippings
to receive
Boise City
expect to
did Boise
receive its
ever expect
grass clippings
Same question,
question, did
City ever
Q. Same
back from
from Mr.
Mr. Gibson?
Gibson?
back
A.
A. No,
not.
did not.
we did
No, we
(Id.
308:6-20.)
(Id. 308:6-20.)
17.
17.

Gibson’s facility.
Boise
paid to
its grass
clippings at
Mr. Gibson’s
to dispose
of its
at Mr.
Boise City
grass clippings
dispose of
facility. (Id.
(Id.
City paid

313:7-25,
314:1-8, 317:1-18,
352:22-25, 353:1-12;
317:1-18, 352:22-25,
353:1-12; and Exs.
Exs. 22,
313:7-25, 314:1-8,
22, 23.)
23.)
18.
18.

“debris were
Gibson’s facility
Boise
understood that
were
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
Where “debris
Boise City
place where
was aa place
facility was
City understood

amendment.” (Trial
deposited
into aa compost
Tr. 318:16-25,
or soil
soil amendment.”
318:16-25, 319:1-11.)
319:1-11.)
and converted
converted into
compost or
deposited and
(Trial Tr.

19.
19.

Gibson’s facility
Mr.
brother-in-law to
in either
2014 or
Mr. Woodward
his brother-in-law
Mr. Gibson’s
either 2014
took his
to Mr.
or
Woodward took
facility in

2015
purchase compost
brother-in-law was
his brother-in-law
for aa greenhouse
starting.
amendment for
2015 to
to purchase
or aa soil
soil amendment
greenhouse his
compost or
was starting.
(Id.
344:1-12.)
318:5-24, 344:1-12.)
(Id. 318:5-24,
20.
20.

Scott
for the
the Ada
Maintenance for
Superintendent of
of Maintenance
Scott Frisbee,
Ada County
Frisbee, Superintendent
Highway
County Highway

Gibson’s facility
District,
in 2013,
trial that
that Ada
Mr. Gibson’s
testiﬁed at
at trial
to Mr.
Ada County
hauled leaves
leaves to
District, testified
facility in
2014,
2013, 2014,
County hauled

and
431:1-11, 434:18-25,
434:18-25, 436:3-16;
Exs. 21.9,
430:8-25, 431:1-11,
436:3-16; Exs.
2015. (Id.
and 2015.
21.11.)
21.10, 21.11.)
21.9, 21.10,
(Id. 430:8-25,
21.
21.

Gibson’s facility
The
fell from
from trees
The leaves
Mr. Gibson’s
the
to Mr.
onto the
trees onto
hauled by
Ada County
leaves hauled
facility fell
County to
by Ada

roads
rights-0f—way in
in Ada
431:12-25, 432:1-25,
Tr. 431:12-25,
432:1-25, 433:1.)
and rights-of-way
Ada County.
roads and
(Trial Tr.
433:1.)
County. (Trial
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22.
22.

Gibson’s facility
The
that Ada
The leaves
Mr. Gibson’s
took to
to Mr.
Ada County
were discarded,
leaves that
facility were
discarded,
County took

evidenced
by the
the following
following testimony:
evidenced by
testimony:
‘
‘
Gibson’s facility
Q.
in 2013,
that ACHD
ACHD hauled
The leaves
to Gibson’s
hauled out
out to
and ‘15,
leaves that
facility in
2013, ‘14,
14, and
15,
Q. The
did
ACHD have
further use
of those
those leaves?
did ACHD
have any
leaves?
use of
any further

A.
A. No.
No.
-- or
Q.
it
ACHD ever
that it
Did Ada
the leaves
or ACHD
to receive
expect to
Ada County
receive the
ever -ever expect
leaves that
County ever
Q. Did
Gibson’s facility
hauled
from Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
Mr. Gibson?
to Mr.
hauled out
out to
Gibson?
back from
facility back

A.
that I’m aware
Not that
A. Not
of.
aware of.
(Id.
438:4-11.)
(Id. 438:4-11.)
23.
23.

County’s activity
Ada
off of
hauling
of sweeping
of Ada
streets and
Ada County’s
sweeping leaves
and hauling
Ada County
leaves off
activity of
County streets

Gibson’s facility
them
them to
Mr. Gibson’s
maintenance activities:
to Mr.
activities:
were community
community maintenance
facility were

Q.
would sweep
it was
that ACHD
ACHD would
And it
off of
haul leaves
of Ada
and haul
Ada County
true that
leaves off
was true
sweep and
County
Q. And
streets
in 2013,
streets in
2015?
and 2015?
2014, and
2013, 2014,
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
Q.
was sweeping
ACHD aa
for ACHD
hauling leaves
And was
to aa facility
out to
sweeping and
and hauling
leaves out
facility for
Okay. And
Q. Okay.
maintenance
maintenance activity?
activity?
A.
was.
it was.
It was
maintenance activity;
A. It
was aa maintenance
activity; yes,
yes, it
‘15?
‘14, and
Q.
was aa maintenance
in 2013,
it was
And it
maintenance activity
and ‘15?
activity in
2013, ‘14,
Q. And

That’s correct.
A.
A. That’s
correct.

(Id.
438:15-24.)
(Id. 438:15-24.)
24.
24.

Like
was operating
Like Boise
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
operating aa
Boise City,
Ada County
Gibson was
understood that
County understood
City, Ada

compost
436:24-25, 437:1-6.)
compost facility.
437:1-6.)
facility. (Id.
(Id. 436:24-25,
25.
25.

Mr.
processing the
into compost
Mr. Gibson
the grass,
through
is processing
Gibson is
and hay
compost through
leaves, and
grass, leaves,
hay into

biological decomposition.
biological
decomposition. (Id.
49:9-23.)
(Id. 49:9-23.)

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED
PLAINTIFF’S
FINDINGS OF
PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF
AND CONCLUSIONS
FACT
FACT AND
LAW -- 55
OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF

001153

26.
26.

When
up and
it as,
it up
Mr. Gibson
let
When asked
What composting
composting is,
Gibson described
and let
described it
asked what
is, Mr.
as, “pile it

nature
Tr. 24:8-12.)
Mr. Gibson
24:8-12.) When
take care
of it.” (Trial
When questioned
testiﬁed:
nature take
questioned further,
Gibson testified:
care of
further, Mr.
(Trial Tr.
Q.
And then,
let nature
let the
the natural
take care
of it,
mean let
natural
nature take
care of
then, by
it, you
you mean
Q. And
by let
decomposition
process take
place with
with respect
take place
to those
decomposition process
those materials;
respect to
true?
materials; true?
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
(Id.
24:16-19.)
(Id. 24:16-19.)
27.
27.

Mr.
which are
high in
in nitrogen,
high in
in
Mr. Gibson
which is
is high
takes grass,
Gibson takes
and leaves,
are high
nitrogen, and
leaves, which
grass, which

carbon,
with water
water and
41 :1-7, 44:6-25.)
them with
mixes them
44:6-25.)
and mixes
and oxygen.
carbon, and
oxygen. (Id.
(Id. 41:1-7,
28.
28.

Mr.
windrow composting,
where the
in Windrow
the decomposing
Mr. Gibson
materials
decomposing materials
Gibson engages
engages in
composting, Where

are
into distinct
that the
far enough
the piles
air can
distinct rows,
piled into
apart so
piles can
enough apart
are piled
can be
turned and
and air
can
spaced far
so that
be turned
rows, spaced
reach
piles. (Id.
244:22-25, 245:1-25.)
the piles.
31:1-5, 244:22-25,
28:16-25, 29:1,
245:1-25.)
30:18-25, 31:1-5,
reach the
29:1, 30:18-25,
(Id. 28:16-25,
29.
29.

While
windrows
in the
the grass
the windrows,
the Windrows
While the
and leaves
are decomposing
decomposing in
grass and
leaves are
Windrows, the

generate
weed seed
kills things
things like
like weed
The heat
other pathogens.
heat kills
47:7-14.) The
generate heat.
heat. (Id.
pathogens. (Id.
and other
seed and
(Id. 47:7-14.)
(Id.
47:15-19.)
kill things
things
The heat
the desired
heat range
range of
of 130
to 160
is the
range to
to kill
47:15-19.) The
temperature range
130 to
160 degrees
desired temperature
degrees is
like
weed seed
pathogens. (Id.
like weed
48:2-8.)
and pathogens.
seed and
(Id. 48:2-8.)
30.
30.

When
windrows become
become compost
in the
the temperature
the material
the Windrows
material in
or
temperature drops,
compost or
When the
drops, the

humus
by Mr.
Mr. Gibson).
48:13-25, 49:1-2).
49:1-2).
to as
humus (referred
as “dirt” by
(referred to
Gibson). (Id.
(Id. 48:13-25,
31.
31.

By
water, and
mixing grass,
natural decomposition
decomposition occurs:
and oxygen,
occurs:
leaves, water,
grass, leaves,
oxygen, natural
By mixing

90:1breaking the
into compost,
the grass
44:6-25, 89:23-25,
breaking
89:23-25, 90:1and leaves
and ultimately
humus. (Id.
grass and
leaves into
ultimately humus.
compost, and
(Id. 44:6-25,

25,
244:1-25, 245:1-10.)
91:1-2, 244:1-25,
245:1-10.)
25, 91:1-2,
32.
32.

Mr.
it takes
that it
Mr. Gibson
10 years
to make
make humus,
admitted at
at
estimates that
takes about
and admitted
Gibson estimates
about 10
humus, and
years to

trial
be reused,
it can
trial that
that the
that he
that it
fertilizer.
the reason
he makes
is so
makes humus
humus is
reason that
can be
so that
as a
a fertilizer.
speciﬁcally as
reused, specifically
(Id.
92:1-6, 505:15-25,
91:3-25, 92:1-6,
505:15-25, 506:1,
507:14-23.)
506:1, 507:14-23.)
(Id. 91:3-25,
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33.
33.

Gibson’s facility
DEQ
in IDAPA
IDAPA
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
met the
the criteria
criteria in
determined that
facility met
DEQ determined

58.01.06.009.03.,
by the
Notice of
the Notice
Mr. Gibson,
Violation issued
of Violation
to Mr.
evidenced by
58.01 .06.009.03., evidenced
dated July
issued to
Gibson, dated
July 30,
30,
2013.
Trial Tr.
Tr. 246:7-17.)
2013. (Ex.
246:7-17.)
(EX. 6;
6; Trial
34.
34.

Mr.
trial that
that the
Mr. Gibson
the above
not apply
his
admitted at
at trial
four activities
activities do
to his
Gibson admitted
above four
do not
apply to

facility.
Tr. 92:7-25,
92:7-25, 93:1-25,
93:1-25, 94:1.)
facility. (Trial
(Trial Tr.
94:1.)
35.
35.

DEQ’s position
Mr.
was DEQ’s
position that
it was
that it
that his
Mr. Gibson
his composting
composting
Gibson also
understood that
also understood

operations
11 Facility.
Tier II
102:16-20.)
operations qualified
qualiﬁed as
as a
a Tier
Facility. (Id.
(Id. 102:16-20.)
36.
36.

Neither
property) nor
Smith property)
Neither VHS
the Smith
nor Mr.
Mr. Gibson
the
of the
of the
Gibson (owner
VHS (owner
(owner of
(owner of

composting
with the
in IDAPA
IDAPA
siting and
the siting
requirements in
operational requirements
composting facility)
complied with
and operational
have complied
facility) have
58.01.06.012.
Tr. 247:2-19,
247:2-19, 402:3-19.)
4023-19.)
58.01.06.012. (Trial
(Trial Tr.
37.
37.

On
windrows at
Ehlert estimated
length of
the Windrows
Mr.
Mr. Ehlert
the length
March 29,
On March
of the
at Mr.
estimated the
2013, Mr.
29, 2013,

Gibson’s facility
Gibson’s
point of
from the
the vantage
the access
to
to 300
feet long,
of the
to be
200 to
vantage point
adjacent to
road adjacent
300 feet
access road
be 200
facility to
long, from

the
property. (Id.
Smith propeny.
211:17-20, 226:6-20,
the Smith
226:6-20, 36:22-25,
36:22-25, 37:1-3.)
37:1-3.)
(Id. 211:17-20,
38.
38.

Mr.
Smith property
from
that some
the Smith
Mr. Gibson
the windrows
on the
range from
testiﬁed that
of the
Windrows on
Gibson testified
some of
property range

15-20 feet
six
between 15-20
six to
to 10
10 feet
feet high,
range between
feet wide.
34:6-14.)
and range
Wide. (Id.
high, and
(Id. 34:6-14.)

39.
39.

Gibson’s Windrow
36:22DEQ
windrow height
height and
with Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
Width estimation.
estimation. (Id.
and width
agreed with
(Id. 36:22DEQ agreed

25,
215:1-4.)
37:1-3, 214:25,
214:25, 215:1-4.)
25, 37:1-3,
40.
40.

Gibson’s facility
Following
visit to
Ehlert
the site
Mr. Gibson’s
Mr. Ehlert
Following the
March 29,
on March
site Visit
to Mr.
facility on
2013, Mr.
29, 2013,

Gibson’s facility,
used
width of
height and
Mr. Gibson’s
the windrows
his estimations
the height
estimations of
at Mr.
of the
of the
Windrows at
plus
and width
used his
facility, plus

measurements
volume of
piles at
that
the volume
the piles
of those
on Google
of the
at that
estimated the
measurements of
those windrows
Windrows on
and estimated
Google Earth,
Earth, and
241:1time
time to
than 600
238:11-25, 239:1-10,
240:18-25, 241:1239:1-10, 240:18-25,
to be
greater than
236:16-23, 238:11-25,
cubic yards.
be greater
600 cubic
yards. (Id.
(Id. 236:16-23,

25,
242:1.)
25, 242:1.)
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41.
41.

Gibson’s facility
Mr.
Ehlert again
Mr. Ehlert
the windrows
Mr. Gibson’s
on August
again observed
at Mr.
August 14,
Windrows at
observed the
facility on
14,

2017.
2017. (Id.
215:9-20.)
(Id. 215:9-20.)
42.
42.

Mr.
were additional
windrows since
Ehlert observed
that there
Mr. Ehlert
March of
there were
of
additional compost
since March
compost Windrows
observed that

2013.
2013. (Id.
2362-6.)
(Id. 236:2-6.)
43.
43.

As
volume of
that the
the volume
Mr.
As of
of August
determined that
of waste
at Mr.
August 14,
waste at
2017, DEQ
14, 2017,
DEQ determined

Gibson’s facility
Gibson’s
in excess
to be
of 600
more specifically,
continued to
and more
cubic yards,
excess of
be in
600 cubic
was
facility continued
specifically, was
yards, and

estimated
242:7-12, 410:22-25,
411:1-25, 412:1,
410:22-25, 411:1-25,
4133-21.)
at 10,000
estimated at
cubic yards.
412:1, 413:3-21.)
10,000 cubic
yards. (Id.
(Id. 242:7-12,
44.
44.

Gibson’s facility
The
in 2013
left at
Mr. Gibson’s
The amount
2013
amount of
of leaves
at Mr.
Ada County
leaves left
facility by
County in
by Ada

through
yards. (Exs.
in and
itself far
far exceeded
through 2015
2015 in
of itself
and of
cubic yards.
exceeded 600
600 cubic
21.11.)
21.10, 21.11.)
21.9, 21.10,
(Exs. 21.9,
45.
45.

Gibson’s facility
The
photos of
that the
The aerial
Mr. Gibson’s
the compost
aerial photos
of Mr.
compost
proved that
similarly proved
facility similarly

407:4windrows on
property was
Smith property
Trial Tr.
time went
the Smith
Tr. 407:4increasing as
went on.
0n the
Windrows
on. (Exs.
was increasing
as time
(Exs. 11,
11, 12;
12; Trial

9.)
9.)
46.
46.

DEQ
requiring VHS
Mr. Gibson
injunction requiring
permanent injunction
to comply
VHS and
and Mr.
Gibson to
seeks aa permanent
comply
DEQ seeks

with the
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.012,
with
the site
the submission
including the
operating requirements
requirements found
site and
found in
submission
and operating
58.01.06.012, including
of
plan (IDAPA
operating plan
application (IDAPA
of aa full
full and
site application
an operating
complete site
and complete
and an
58.01.06.012.02) and
(IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02)
(IDAPA
58.01.06.012.04).
at 9.)
Comp]. at
58.01.06.012.04). (Am.
(Am. Compl.
9.)
47.
47.

DEQ
penalty in
in the
the amount
amount of
of $10,000
against both
both VHS
VHS
also seeks
seeks a
a penalty
assessed against
$10,000 assessed
DEQ also

and
Mr. Gibson.
and Mr.
Gibson. (Id.)
(Id.)
48.
48.

Mr.
penalty in
in this
Ehlert testified
this case
Mr. Ehlert
the penalty
testiﬁed about
follows:
about the
case as
as follows:

Q.
penalty against
in connection
with continuing
continuing
Mr. Gibson
against Mr.
connection with
Is DEQ
seeking aa penalty
Gibson in
DEQ seeking
Q. Is
violations?
Violations?
A.
A. Yes.
Yes.
Q.
that amount?
And what
What is
is that
amount?
Q. And
A.
A. $10,000.
$10,000.
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Q.
penalty?
that penalty?
And how
arrive at
at that
how did
did DEQ
DEQ arrive
Q. And
A.
was the
Notice of
It was
in the
initial $3,500
the initial
the Notice
And then,
the
identiﬁed in
A. It
of Violation.
Violation. And
then, the
$3,500 identified
-- or
-- Notice
ongoing
violations from
Notice of
from date
from the
the date
ongoing Violations
of note
note -or from
of note
note -of
date of
date of
Violation
the current
current date.
Violation to
to the
date.
Q.
in connection
with
And why
Mr. Gibson
against Mr.
connection with
did DEQ
Gibson in
assess a
a penalty
penalty against
DEQ assess
Why did
Q. And
his
his composting
composting operations?
operations?
-- oh,
A.
The -A. The
sorry.
Oh, sorry.

Q.
ahead.
Go ahead.
Q. Go
A.
intent of
health and
the environment.
And
The intent
the rules
human health
environment. And
of the
is to
to protect
protect human
A. The
and the
rules is
-- or
-- the
the
way to
the penalty
help the
the -the violator
is a
to get
get compliance,
or to
to rec
or help
Violator
rec -a way
compliance, or
penalty is
recognize
the violation.
the seriousness
recognize the
of the
Violation.
seriousness of
Q.
penalty that
in arriving
that
arriving at
And what
the $10,000
What did
at the
dollar penalty
consider in
did DEQ
$10,000 dollar
DEQ consider
Q. And
Gibson's composting
it’s seeking
in connection
with Mr.
Mr. Gibson's
seeking in
connection with
composting operations
operations today?
today?
****
**
THE
use two
THE WITNESS:
harm to
the potential
potential harm
human
criteria. One
to human
WITNESS: We
is the
One is
We use
two criteria.
health
the extended
health and
the environment.
And then,
the second
environment. And
is the
deviation
extended deviation
and the
second is
then, the
from
from the
the requirements.
requirements.
Q.
YEE-WALLACE: Okay.
BY MS.
arrive at
at
how did
did DEQ
MS. YEE-WALLACE:
originally arrive
Now, how
Okay. Now,
DEQ originally
Q. BY
that
penalty?
that $3,500
$3,500 penalty?
A.
believe the
was
harm was
the potential
the extent
extent of
potential harm
A. We
of deviation
deviation was
moderate and
and the
We believe
was moderate
major.
major.
Q.
that based
that DEQ
the
determine the
Is that
on some
sort of
of method
method that
to determine
some sort
based on
uses to
DEQ uses
Q. Is
seriousness
violation.
the Violation.
of the
seriousness of
-- evaluating
A.
process of
the calculation
the penalty.
A. We
of eval
of the
calculation of
evaluating the
eval -have aa process
We have
penalty.

Q.
And what
for that?
that?
What is
is range
range for
Q. And
A.
up to
It goes
from zero
A. It
zero up
to $10,000.
goes from
$10,000.
(Trial
Tr. 254:15-25,
254:15-25, 255:1-25,
255:1-25, 256:1-4.)
256:1-4.)
(Trial Tr.
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49.
49.

Mr.
that he
that he
Mr. Gibson
the compost
his
testified that
he intended
intended to
to use
he makes
at his
makes at
Gibson testified
compost that
use the

facility
Smith property,
the Smith
amendment on
soil amendment
on 520
of the
at agronomic
agronomic rates,
at some
520 acres
some
acres of
as a
a soil
facility as
rates, at
property, at
undetermined and
in the
time in
the future.
Tr. 507:20-25,
undetermined
507:20-25, 508:1-14.)
508:1-14.)
and unspecified
unspeciﬁed time
future. (Trial
(Trial Tr.
50.
50.

A
A crop
A crop
plant raised
proﬁt or
for profit
the
is aa plant
or food.
is the
crop is
raised for
198:1-6.) A
crop residue
residue is
food. (Id.
(Id. 198:1-6.)

left
plant material
left over
the crop.
material after
after harvesting
harvesting the
198:11-15.)
over plant
crop. (Id.
(Id. 198:11-15.)
51.
51.

Mr.
ultimately being
being returned
Mr. Gibson
not manage
the soil
to the
soil at
at
manage crop
returned to
Gibson does
crop residue
residue ultimately
does not

agronomic
agronomic rates.
199:13-22.)
rates. (Id.
(Id. 199:13-22.)
PROPOSED
LAW
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF
Gibson’s facility
The
because he
The Solid
Mr. Gibson’s
Management Rules
he accepts
to Mr.
Solid Waste
Rules apply
Waste Management
accepts
facility because
apply to

“solid waste”
waste” at
discarded
his facility,
at his
Idaho Code
Idaho Code
deﬁned by
and
discarded “solid
as defined
Code §
Code §§ 39-103(13)
39-10303) and
facility, as
by Idaho
§ Idaho
Gibson’s facility
“processing facility”
facility” under
IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.11.
Mr. Gibson’s
the
qualiﬁes as
under the
58.01.06.001.11. Mr.
as a
a “processing
facility qualifies
Gibson’s facility
Solid
IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32.)
Tier
Mr. Gibson’s
Management Rules.
is aa Tier
Solid Waste
Rules. (See
Waste Management
58.01.06.005.32.) Mr.
facility is
(See IDAPA

II
11 Facility.
than 600
Mr. Gibson
his facility
more than
at his
Gibson had
had more
cubic yards
600 cubic
(IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03.)
58.01.06.009.03.) Mr.
Facility. (IDAPA
facility
yards at
on
than 600
time of
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
(208) 345-1129
Fax:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)
REPLY TO DEQ'S
)
CLOSING ARGUMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has filed their closing argument in
this matter, the essence of which argument has again followed the continuing accusation that
Mr. Gibson is operating an illegal Tier II solid waste processing facility.

These assertions and conclusions they advance require the court to adopt their
perception that is unfounded and unsubstantiated, proposing the proposition that "grass
clipping" and "leaves", the particular substances or materials they claim to have seen from
the road and now perceptively the substance they perceived to have observed at the end of
some row of material while upon this agricultural facility, constituted a "solid" substance,
and represents what is perceived by DEQ to be a regulated "solid waste".
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DEQ continues in their failure to identify any scientific or chemical analysis of what
it is they claim to have seen, but persist in their belief that what they "must have seen" was
what they believe to have been grass clippings and leaves, as that is what Mr. Gibson has
traditionally composted at these agriculture facilities; he composts aetna! substances that are
deposits of nature grass clipping and leaves, and he has historically processed that substance
into dirt, and stockpiles this dirt in the rows that are stored at this agricultural premises.
DEQ, however, has never demonstrated to this court that such substances referred to
as "grass clippings" and "leaves", being compostablc, even if they were ever to have been
seen to be located on this agricultural facility, are even scientifically defined to be such a
substance that comes within any recognized definition of a "solid", from which DEQ is even
realistically capable of advancing a proposition these agricultural activities, operations, and
facilities are engaged in the process of converting a "solid" (not a plant waste that is
compostablc) into an agricultural product that Mr. Gibson will re-introduce into the soil in
the future at agronomic rates.
DEQ cannot point to any definition that will place "grass clippings" and "leaves"
into a category that will get them to where they want to be with any scientific definition, let
alone what is contained within the Code of Federal Regulations, addressed hereafter. This
failure to cite a scientific definition reflects a failure to their entire "house of cards" premise
that such substances of grasses and leaves are "solid wastes". The very idea that such
substances are solid wastes is, in any event, completely undermined by the very exceptions
and exclusions to their own IDAPA Rules and Regulations, wherein it is there expressed
that certain substances ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED TO BE SOLID WASTES
WITHIN THEIR RULES. Those exceptions and exemptions were not mere superfluous
language; it has meaning and purpose, and provides the reason why a "non-solid" plant
residue substance would be excluded from the term "solid waste", particularly when such a
compostable substance is covered extensively throughout the statutory reference to what is
within the jurisdiction and authority of the Department of Agriculture, and those statutes that
declare these agricultural activities, operations, and facilities to be unconditionally regulated
and under IDOA authority, subject only to the rules and regulations of the Department of
Agriculture, identified in various specific statutory provisions, encompassing these activities
conducted on agriculture lands, pursuant to the statewide right authorizing the unconditional
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right to do so, which right has statuto rily pre-empted all county ordinances that seek to
requi re any conditional use perm it (CUP) to conduct these agricultural operations, or to
impose any requi rement to secure any county authorization or county inspections prior to its
uninterrupted right of operation .
W ith respect to the de fi nitions utilized by the Federal National Parks Service,
Department of Interior, Solid Waste D isposal Sites in Units of thc National Park System, the
fo llowing Code of Federal Regu latio n sets out the clear exemption of compos/able

suhstances.fi·om solid wastes in the following provisions.

Code of Federal Regulat ions
Title 36. Parks, Forests , and Public Property
Chapter I. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR
Part 6. SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITES IN UNITS OF THE
NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM

§ 6.3. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this part:
Agricultural solid waste means solid waste that is genera ted by the
rearing or harvesting of animals, or the producing or harvesting of
crops or trees.
Boundaries means the limits of lands or waters that constitu te a unit of the
National Park System as specified by Congress, denoted by Presidential
Proclan1ation, recorded in the records of a State or poli tical subdivision in
accordance wi th applicable law, published pu rsuant to law, or otherwise
published or posted by the National Park Service.
Closure and Post-closure care means all of the requirements prescribed by
40 CFR part 258, C riteria For Municipal Solid Waste Landfi lls at 40 CFR
258.60 and 258.61 .
Compostible materials mea ns organ ic substances tha t decay under
natural and/or human-assisted cond ition w ithin relatively short time
inten ral , generally not in excess of ninety days.
Degrade means to lessen or diminish in quantity, quality or value.
Hazardous waste means a waste defined by 40 CFR part 26 1, Identification
And Listing O f Hazardous Waste. Hazardous waste does not include any
so ljd waste listed under 40 CFR 261.4(b).
Leachate means liquid that has percolated thro ugh solid waste and has
extracted, dissolved o r suspended materials in it.
Mining overburden means material overlying a mineral deposit that is
removed to gain access to that deposit.
Mining wastes means residues that result from the ex traction of raw
materials from the earth.
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National Park Service activities means operations conducted by the National
Park Service or a National Park Service contracto r, concessionaire or
commercial use licensee.
National Park System means any area of land or water now or hereafter
admini stered by the Secretary of the Interio r through the National Park
Service for park. monument. historic. parkway recreationaJ or other
purposes.
Natural resource means the components of a park, both biotic and abiotic.
including but not limited to, vegetation, wi ldlife, -fish, water, includ ing
Slllface and g round water, air, soil , geological features, including subsurface
strata, the natural processes and interrelationships that perpetuate such
resources, and attributes that contri bute to visitor enjoyment.
Operator means a person conducting or proposing to conduct the disposal of
so lid waste.
PCBs or PCB item means an item as defined in 40 CFR part 76 1,
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing. Processing, Di stri bution
In Commerce, And Use Prohibitions at 40 CFR 761.3(x).
Residential solid waste means waste generated by the nom1al activities of a
household, including, but not limited to, food waste, yard waste and ashes,
but not including metaJ or plastic.
Solid waste means garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other
discarded materiaJ , incl uding solid, liquid semisolid, and contained gaseous
materiaJ resulting from industriaJ, commercial, mining and agJicultural
operations or fi·om community activities. "Solid waste" does not include a
materiaJ listed under 40 CFR 261.4(a).
Solid waste disposal site means land or water where deliberately
discarded solid wa ·te, as defin ed above, is discharged, d eposited,
injected, dumped, pilled, leaked, o r placed so that such solid waste o r a
constituent thereof m ay enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into waters, including g r ound waters. Solid waste dis posal
sites include faciliti es for the inciner·ation of solid waste and transfer

Facilities for the 1nanagenzent of compostible
IIUtterials are not defined as solid waste disposal sites
for the purposes of this part.
stations.

These statutory provisions under the j urisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
are mo re specificaUy identified in Title 22, Chapters I, 6, 22, and 45 Statutes of the State of
Idaho which we again cite this extensive authority to this colll1, as fo llows:

22- 110. Authority and duties of dir·ector concerning agricultural waste.
(1) In addition to other powers and duties, the director of the state
depaiiment of agriculture shall have authority to regulate ag ricultural
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solid waste, agricultural composting and other similar agricultural
activities to safeguard and protect animals, man and the environment.
The director may promulgate rules in compliance with chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code, that may be necessary for the efficient enforcement of the
provisions of this section. The director may collaborate with any state
agency, federal agency or other governmental entity in the development of
rules promulgated pursuant to this section.
22-603. Definitions. When used in this chapter:
(1) "Biosolid(s)" means a primary organic solid material produced by
wastewater treatment processes that can be beneficially recycled for its plant
nutrient content and soil amending characteristics, as regulated under the
code of federal regulations, 40 CFR 503, as amended.
(2) "Brand" means a tenn, desil,'ll, or trademark used in connection with one
(I) or several grades of fertilizer.
(3) "Calcium carbonate equivalent" means the acid-neutralizing capacity of
an agricultural liming material expressed as a weight percentage of calcium
carbonate.
(4) "Compost" means a biologically stable material derived from the
composting process.
(5) "Composting" means the biological decomposition of organic
matter. It is accomplished by mixing and piling in such a way to
promote aerobic and/or anaerobic decay. The process inhibits
pathogens, viable weed seeds and odors.
(6) "Coproduct" means a chemical substance produced for a commercial
purpose during the manufacture, processing, use or disposal of another
chemical substance or mixture.
(7) "Deficiency" means the amount of nutrient found by analysis to be less
than that guaranteed, which may result from a lack of nutrient ingredients or
from lack of uniformity.
(8) "Department" means the Idaho state department of agriculture or its
authorized representative.
(9) "Distribute" means to import, consign, manufacture, produce,
compound, mix, or blend fertilizer, or to offer for sale, sell, barter or
otherwise distribute or supply fertilizer in this state.
(I 0) "Distributor" means any person who distributes.
(11) "Fertilizer" means any substance containing one (1) or more
recognized plant nutrient which is used for its plant nutrient content
and which is designed for use or claimed to have value in promoting
plant growth, and includes limes and gypsum. It does not include
unmanipulated animal manure and vegetable organic waste-derived material,
or biosolids regulated under the code of federal regulations, 40 CFR 503, as
amended.
(a) "Bulk fertilizer" means a fertilizer distributed in a nonpackaged form.

REPLY TO DEQ'S CLOSING ARGUMNT P. 5

001164

(b) "Customer formula fertilizer" means a mixture of fertilizer or materials of
which each batch is mixed according to the specific instructions of the final
purchaser.
(c) "Fertilizer material" means a fertilizer which either:
(i) Contains important quantities of no more than one (1) of the primary plant
nutrients: nitrogen (N), phosphate (P205) and potash (K20), or
(ii) Has eighty-five percent (85%) or more of its plant nutrient content
present in the form of a single chemical compound, or
(iii) Is derived from a plant or animal residue or byproduct or natural

material deposit which has been processed in such a way that its content
of plant nutrients has not been materially changed except by
purification and concentration.
(d) "Micronutrient fertilizer" means a fertilizer that contains valuable
concentrations of micronutrients, but does not contain valuable
concentrations of total nitrogen (N), available phosphate (P205), soluble
potash (K20), calcium (Ca), magnesium (Mg), or sulfur (S).
(e) "Mixed fertilizer" means a fertilizer containing any combination or
mixture of fertilizer materials.
(f) "Packaged fertilizer" means fertilizers, either agricultural or specialty,
distributed in nonbulk form.
(g) "Specialty fertilizer" means a fertilizer distributed for nonagricultural use.

(h) "Waste-derived fertilizer" includes any commercial fertilizer
derived from an industrial byproduct, coproduct or other material that
would otherwise be disposed of if a market for reuse were not an option,
but does not include fertilizers derived from biosolids or biosolid products
regulated under the code of federal regulations, 40 CFR 503, as amended.
(12) "Grade" means the percentage of total nitrogen, available phosphate,
and soluble potash stated in whole numbers in the same terms, order, and
percentages as in the guaranteed analysis. Provided however, that specialty
fertilizers may be guaranteed in fractional units of less than one percent (I%)
of total nitrogen, available phosphate, and soluble potash: provided futther,
that fertilizer materials, bone meal, and similar materials may be guaranteed
in fractional units.
(13) "Guaranteed analysis" means the minimum percentage of plant nutrients
claimed, for a total nitrogen, available phosphate, or soluble potash fertilizer,
consistent with the grade and in the following order and form:
(a) Total nitrogen
Available phosphate
Soluble potash

(b) Unless approved by the department, all fertilizer intended for
agricultural use with a total nitrogen, available phosphate, or soluble
potash guarantee shall contain five percent (5%) or more of available
nitrogen, phosphate, or potash, singly, collectively, or in combination.
(c) For unacidulated mineral phosphatic materials and basic slag, the
guaranteed analysis shall contain both total and available phosphate and the
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degree of fineness. For bone. tankage, and other organic phosphatic
materials, the guaranteed analysis shall contain total and available phosphate.
(d) The guaranteed analysis for limes shall include the percentage of calcium
or magnesium expressed as their carbonate; the calcium carbonate equivalent
as determined by methods prescribed by the association of official analytical
chemists, international (AOAC); and the minimum percentage of material
that \viii pass respectively a one hundred (100) mesh, sixty (60) mesh, and
ten (1 0) mesh sieve.
(e) The guarantees for nutrients other than total nitrogen, available
phosphate and soluble potash shall be expressed in the form of the
element. The source (oxides, salts, chelates, etc.) of such other nutrients
may be required to be stated on the application for registration and
shall be included on the label Other beneficial substances or
compounds, determinable by laboratory methods, also may be
guaranteed by permission of the department. Other guarantees shall not
be included with the guarantee for nutrients, but shall be listed
separately as "nonnutrient substances." When any plant nutrients or
other substances or compounds are guaranteed they shall be subject to
inspection and analysis in accordance with the methods and rules
prescribed by the department.
(f) In a fertilizer with the principal constituent of calcium sulfate (gypsum),
the percentage of calcium sulfate ( CaS042H20 ) shall be given along with
the percentage of total sulfur (S).
(14) "Investigational allowance" means an allowance for variations inherent
in the taking, preparation and analysis of an official sample of fertilizer.
(15) "Label" means the display of all written, printed, or graphic matter,
upon the immediate container, or a statement accompanying a fertilizer.
(16) "Labeling" means all written, printed, or graphic matter, upon or
accompanying any fertilizer, or advertisements, brochures, posters, and
television and radio announcements used in promoting the sale of such
fertilizer.
(17) "Lime" means a substance or a mixture of substances, the principal
constituent of which is calcium carbonate ( CaC03 ), calcium hydroxide
(Ca(OH)2), calcium oxide (CaO), magnesium carbonate (MgC03),
magnesium hydroxide (Mg(OH)2) or magnesium oxide (MgO), singly or
combined, and capable of neutralizing soil acidity.
(1 8) "Manipulation" means actively processed or treated in any
manner.
(19) "Manufacture" means to compound, produce, granulate, mix,
blend, repackage, or othenvise alter the composition of fertilizer
materials.
(20) "Micronutrient" means boron (B), chlorine (Cl), cobalt (Co), copper
(Cu), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), molybdenum (Mo), nickel (Ni), sodium
(Na), and zinc (Zn).
(21) "Official sample" means any sample of fertilizer taken by the director or
his authorized agent and designated as "official" by the department.
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(22) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings, leaves,
weeds, bark, plantings, prunings and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes from logging and milling operations, and food wastes. "Organic
waste-derived material" does not include products that contain biosolids
as defined in this section.
(23) "Packaged fertilizer" means fertilizers, either agricultural or specialty,
distributed in nonbulk form.
(24) "Percent" or "percentage" means the percentage by weight.
(25) "Person" means an individual, partnership, association, firm or
corporation.
(26) "Primary nutrient" means total nitrogen, available phosphate, and
soluble potash.
(27) "Production" means to compound or fabricate a fertilizer through
a physical or chemical process. Production does not include mixing,
blending, or repackaging fertilizer products.
(28) "Registrant" means the person who registers fertilizer under the
provisions of this act.
(29) "Storage container" means a container, including a railcar, nurse tank or
other container that is used or intended for the storage of bulk liquid or dry
fertilizer. It does not include a mobile container at a storage facility for less
than fifteen (15) days if this storage is incidental to the loading or unloading
of a storage container at the bulk fertilizer storage facility. Storage container
does not include underground storage containers or surface impoundments
such as lined ponds or pits.
(30) "Storage facility" means a location at which undivided quantities of
liquid bulk fertilizer in excess of Hve hundred (500) U.S. gallons or
undivided quantities of dry bulk fertilizer in excess of fifty thousand (50,000)
pounds are held in a storage container. Temporary field storage of less than
thirty (30) days is not considered a storage facility.
(31) "Ton" means a net weight of two thousand (2,000) pounds avoirdupois.
(32) "Tonnage-only distributor" means any person who assumes the
responsibility for inspection fees and reports as provided for in sections 22608(1) and 22-609, Idaho Code. A tonnage-only distributor must register
with the department on forms provided by the director. A tonnage-only
distributor is subject to section 22-608, Idaho Code.
When not specifically stated in this section or otherwise designated by
the department iu rule, the department will be guided by the definitions
of general terms, fertilizer materials and soil and plant amendment
materials as set forth in the Official Publication of the Association of
American Plant Food Control Officials (AAPFCO) or the Merck Index,
published by Merck Co., Inc.
22-604. Adoption of rules. The department shall administer, enforce,
and carry out the provisions of this chapter and may adopt rules
necessary to carry out its purposes including, but not limited to, the
proper use, handling, transportation, storage, display, distribution,

REPLY TO DEQ'S CLOSING ARGUMNT P. 8

001167

sampling, records, analysis, form, mmtmum percentages, fertilizer
ingredients, exempted materials, investigational allowances, definitions,
labels, labeling, misbranding, mislabeling and disposal of fertilizers and
their containers. The adoption of rules is subject to public hearing as
prescribed by the Idaho administrative procedure act, chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code.
22-2203. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(I) "Aged" means exposed to weathering and/or natural decay, such that
the original material is significantly altered.
(2) "Biosolid(s)" means a primary organic solid material produced by
wastewater treatment processes that can be beneficially recycled for its
plant nutrient content and soil an1ending characteristics, as regulated under
the code of federal regulations, 40 CFR 503, as amended.
(3) "Brand" means the term, designation, trademark, product name or
other specific designation under which individual soil amendments or
plant amendments are offered for sale.
(4) "Bulk" means in nonpackaged form or in packages of one (1) cubic
yard or more.
(5) "Bulk density" means dry weight per unit of volume.
(6) "Compost" means a biologically stable material derived from the
composting process.
(7) "Composting" means the biological decomposition of organic
matter. It is accomplished by mixing and piling in such a way to
promote aerobic and/or anaerobic decay. The process inhibits
pathogens, viable weed seeds and odors.
(8) "Coproduct" means a chemical substance produced for a commercial
purpose during the manufacture, processing, use or disposal of another
chemical substance or mixture.
(9) "Customer formula mix" means a soil amendment or plant amendment
which is prepared to the specifications of the final purchaser.
(1 0) "Deficiency" means the amount of ingredient found by analysis to be
less than that guaranteed, which may result from a lack of ingredients or
lack of uniformity.
(11) "Department" means the Idaho department of agriculture.
(12) "Director" means the director of the Idaho department of agriculture
or his duly authorized representative.
(13) "Distribute" means to import, consign, manufacture, produce,
compound, mix, or blend soil amendments or plant amendments, or to
offer for sale, sell, barter or otherwise supply soil amendments and
plant amendments in this state.
(14) "Distributor" means any person who distributes.
(15) "Horticultural growing media" means any substance or mixture
of substances which is promoted as or is intended to function as a
growing medium for the managed growth of horticultural crops in
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containers and shall be considered a plant amendment for the
purposes of this chapter.
(16) "Investigational allowance" means an allowance for variations
inherent in the taking, preparation and analysis of an official sample of
soil amendments or plant amendments.
(17) "Label" means the display of all written, printed or graphic
matter upon the immediate container or statement accompanying a
soil amendment or plant amendment.
(18) "Labeling" means all written, printed or graphic matter, upon or
accompanying any soil amendment or plant amendment, or
advertisements, brochures, posters, or television or radio
announcements used in promoting the sale of the soil amendment or
plant amendment.
(19) "Manipulation" means actively processed or treated in any
manner.
(20) "Manufacture" means to compound, produce, granulate, mix,
blend, repackage or otherwise alter the composition of soil
amendment or plant amendment materials.
(21) "Micronutrients" means boron (B); chlorine (Cl); cobalt (Co); copper
(Cu); iron (Fe); manganese (Mn); molybdenum (Mo); sodium (Na); and
zinc (Z:n).
(22) "Minimum percentage" means that percent of plant or soil
amending ingredient that must be present in a product before the
product will be accepted for registration when mentioned in any form
or manner.
(23) "Mulch" means any organic or inorganic soil surface cover used to
help retain moisture longer in the soil by retarding evaporation, to
discourage weed growth, to help maintain a constant temperature by
insulating the soil, to discourage runoff and soil erosion by shielding the
soil surface from water abrasion or to promote water absorption and
retention.
(24) "Official sample" means any sample of soil amendment or plant
amendment taken by the director or his agent.
(25) "Organic" refers only to naturally occurring substances
generally recognized as the hydrogen compounds of carbon and their
derivatives.
(26) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings, leaves,
weeds, bark, plantings, prunings, and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes from logging and milling operations and food wastes. "Organic
waste-derived material" does not include products that contain
biosolids as defined in subsection (2) of this section.
(27) "Other ingredients" means the nonsoil amending or nonplant
amending ingredients present in soil amendments or plant amendments.
(28) "Percent" or "percentage" means by weight.
(29) "Person" means individual, partnership, association, firm or
corporation.
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(30) "Plant amendment" means any natural or synthetic substance
applied to plants or seeds which is intended to improve germination,
growth, yield, product quality, reproduction, flavor or other desirable
characteristics of plants except commercial fertilizers, soil
amendments, limes, unmanipulated animal manure and vegetable
organic waste-derived materials, pesticides, mulch and other
materials which may be exempted hy rule.
(31) "Processed" means deliberately treated or manipulated to modifY or
transform physical, chemical, or biological characteristics of the natural
state of a substance.
(32) "Raw" means in the natural state, and not prepared, modiJied,
processed or manipulated for usc.
(33) "Registrant" means the person(s) who registers soil amendments or
plant amendments under this chapter.
(34) "Soil amendment" means:
(a) Any substance which is intended to improve the physical, chemical
or biological characteristics of the soil to favor plant growth; or
(b) Any material which is represented as having a primary function of
enhancing, changing or modifying soil microorganism reproduction,
activity or population, or material which is represented as having the
primary function of forming or stabilizing soil aggregates in soil to
which it is to be applied and thereby improving the resistance of the
soil to the slaking action of water, increasing the soil's water and air
permeability or infiltration, improving the resistance of the surface of
the soil to crusting, improving ease of cultivation of soil, or otherwise
favorably modifYing the structural or physical properties of soil; and
(c) "Soil amendment" does not include commercial fertilizers, plant
amendments, limes, gypsum, unmanipulated animal manures and
vegetable organic waste-derived materials, pesticides, mulch and
other material which may be exempted by rule of the department.
(35) "Ton" means a net weight of two thousand (2,000) pounds
avoirdupois.
(36) "V crification of label claims" means explanatory information
describing how the registrant determined the truthfulness and accuracy of
the registrant's words or statements describing the product according to
recognized standards.
(37) "Waste-derived soil amendment" or "waste-derived plant
amendment" means any soil amendment or plant amendment that is
derived from an industrial byproduct, coproduct or other material
that would otherwise be disposed of if a market for reuse were not an
option, but does not include any soil amendment or plant amendment
derived from biosolids or biosolid products regulated under the code of
federal regulations, 40 CFR 503, as amended.
(38) "Weight" means the weight of material as offered for sale.
(39) "Wood" means the hard fibrous material located beneath the bark of
trees, which constitutes the greatest part of the stems of trees and shrubs.
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When not specifically stated in this section or otherwise designated by
the department in rule, the department will be guided by the
definitions of general terms, fertilizer materials and soil and plant
amendment materials as set forth in the Official Publication of the
Association of American Plant Food Control Officials (AAPFCO), or
the Merck Index, published by Merck & Co., Inc.
22-2204. Authority to adopt rules. The department shall administer,
enforce, and carry out this chapter and may adopt rules necessary to
carry out its purposes including, but not limited to, the proper use,
handling, transportation, storage, display, distribution, sampling,
records, analysis, form, minimum percentages, soil amending or plant
amending ingredients, exempted materials, investigational allowances,
definitions, labels, labeling, misbranding, mislabeling and disposal of
soil amendments and plant amendments and their containers. The
adoption of rules shall be subject to public hearing as prescribed by the
Idaho administrative procedure act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
22-450 I. Legislative findings and intent. The legislature finds that
agricultural activities conducted on farmland in urbanizing areas are
often subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and
even force the premature removal of the lands from agricultural uses, and
in some cases prohibit investments in agricultural improvements. It is the
intent of the legislature to reduce the loss to the state of its
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which
agricultural operations may be deemed to be a nuisance. The
legislature also finds that the right to farm is a natural right and is
recognized as a permitted use throughout the state of Idaho.
22-4502. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agricultural facility" includes, without limitation, any land,
building, structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance,
machinery or equipment that is used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation" means an activity or condition that
occurs in connection with the production of agricultural products for
food, fiber, fuel and other lawful uses, and includes, without
limitation:
(a) Construction, expansion, use, maintenance and repair of an
agricultural facility;
(b) Preparing land for agricultural production;
(c) Applying pesticides, herbicides or other chemicals, compounds or
substances labeled for insects, pests, crops, weeds, water or soil;
(d) Planting, irrigating, growing, fertilizing, harvesting or producing
agricultural, horticultural, floricultural and viticultural crops, fruits
and vegetable products, field grains, seeds, hay, sod and nursery
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stock, and other plants, plant products, plant byproducts, plant waste
and plant compost;
(e) Breeding, hatching, raising, producing, feeding and keeping livestock,
dairy animals, swine, fur-bearing animals, poultry, eggs, fish and other
aquatic species, and other animals, animal products and animal
byproducts, animal waste, animal compost, and bees, bee products and bee
byproducts;
(t) Processing and packaging agricultural products, including the
processing and packaging of agricultural products into food and other
agricultural commodities;
(g) Manufacturing animal feed;
(h) Transporting agricultural products to or from an agricultural facility;
(i) Noise, odors, dust, fumes, light and other conditions associated with an
agricultural operation or an agricultural facility;
(j) Selling agricultural products at a farmers or roadside market;
(k) Participating in a govemment sponsored agricultural program.
(3) "Nonagricultural activities," for the purposes of this chapter, means
residential, commercial or industrial property development and use not
associated with the production of agricultural products.
(4) "Improper or negligent operation" means that the agricultural operation
is not undertaken in conformity with federal, state and local laws and
regulations or permits, and adversely affects the public health and safety.

22-4504. Local ordinances. No city, county, taxing district or other
political subdivision of this state shall adopt any ordinance or resolution
that declares any agricultural operation, agricultural facility or expansion
thereof that is operated in accordance with generally recognized
agricultural practices to be a nuisance, nor shall any zoning ordinance that
requires abatement as a nuisance or forces the closure of any such
agricultural operation or agricultural facility be adopted. Any such
ordinance or resolution shall be void and shall have no force or effect.
Zoning and nuisance ordinances shall not apply to agricultural operations
and agricultural facilities that were established outside the corporate limits
of a municipality and then were incorporated into the municipality by
annexation. The county planning and zoning authority may adopt a
nuisance waiver procedure to be recorded with the county recorder or
appropriate county recording authority pursuant to residential divisions of
property.
Local Land Use Planning Act, as announced in I.C. §67-6529, which
states:
67-6529. APPLICABILITY to agricultural land -- Counties may regulate
siting of certain animal operations and facilities. (1) No power granted
hereby shall be construed to empower a board of county commissioners to
enact any ordinance or resolution which deprives any owner of full and
complete use of agricultural land for production of any agricultural
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product. Agricultural land shall be defined by local ordinance or
resolution.
When DEQ created their IDAPA Rules in 2002-2003, they made the specific
declaration their regulatory rules did not apply to those organic-agronomic substances,
setting forth their express exemption and exclusion within their IDAPA Rules, declaring
emphatically these "rules do not apply" to those wastes which were also euphemistically
referred to in their reference to "solid wastes", as plant residue and manure was excluded
from the definition of the term, and excluded from what may be regulated under any
definition of a "solid waste", excluded from what they may choose to say is a "regulated"
matter.
This court must apply the common language used in the interpretation and
application of these express exemptions set forth in IDAPA 58.01.06.00 1.03(b)(ii) and
(b)(iii), enumerated within the exclusions from what is deemed to be a "solid waste",
under the IDAPA provisions; their regulations state "these rules do not apply to the
following solid waste ... ", which exclusions include manures, crop (plant) residues, and
agricultural solid waste, (this brings the Department of Agriculture into the equation,
with their specific statutory legislation cited above). These substances are excluded by
IDAPA Rule 58 .01.06 (Solid Waste Management Rules), subpart .001 (Title and Scope),
subpart (.03) (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not
Apply to the following solid wastes ... )

(b)(ii) and (b )(iii), (the effect of which

expressly excludes from the definition of what is considered to be a "solid waste"
from any right of regulation by DEQ, those material substances consisting of
manure and crop (plant) residues which are intended to be returned to the soil at
agronomic rates, and any agricultural solid wastes managed and regulated by
IDOA).
These substances are to be under the statutory jurisdiction and regulatory authority
of IDOA, not anywhere allowed to be considered to be part of the "solid waste" rules and
regulations of DEQ, otherwise controlling certain hazardous "solid wastes" identified in
IDAPA.
Not only do the IDAP A Rules expressly exclude these plant residue substances from
their definition of what constitutes a "solid waste", as explained in detail in Defendants'
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closing argument, but even the very definition of what constitutes a "solid" will not even
allow DEQ to make the case that "grass clippings" and "leaves" are considered to be a
"solid" as a matter of fact, or as a scientific definition. A "scientific" definition of "solid"
states it to be:
"the state of matter in which materials are not Jluid but
retain their boundaries without support, the atoms of
molecules occupying fixed positions with respect to one
another and unable to move freely"
Another "scientific" definition provides:
"a solid is a state of matter characterized by particles
arranged such that their shape and volume are relatively
stable. The constituents of a solid tend to be packed together
much closer than the particles in a gas or liquid. The reason a
solid has a rigid shape is because the atoms or molecules are
tightly connected via chemical bonds. There bonding may
produce either regular lattice (as seen in ice, metals, and
crystals) or an amorphous shape (as seen in glass or
amorphous carbon)."
Examples of a "solid", as the word is commonly used, would be concrete, crystals,
bricks, stone, metals, and other such non-organic substances that possess hard and stable
molecules, Grass clippings and leaves, being plant residue, are an organic composition, no
molecules ever in a fixed state, as they are either in in a constant state of flux with a growth
change, but when their growth is curtailed, the molecules comprising the substance separate
and fall away, and the substance is no longer a grass clipping or a !eat: but decomposes into
a soil like enriched nutrient

substance, in the natural process of decomposition as a

composed product.
As this court will recall, Mr. Early was involved (as a law Clerk) in relation to
Mr. Gibson involvement with the Ada County governmental agency in years prior, when
he was referring to Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P. 2d 801 (1995), from
which he and others in DEQ acquired their public knowledge as to the on-going
composting activities that have historically been conducted by Mr. Gibson, dating clear
back to 1991, and in fact earlier. That Decision has confirmed the agricultural activity
that has been actively pursued by Mr. Gibson to the present. Mr. Early was referring to
that specific language within that Decision that stated:
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In 1991, David Gibson acquired rights to a parcel of real property in Ada
County with the apparent purpose of operating a tree and shrub nursery. fl]
The condition of the soil on this parcel is such, however, that prior to its use
Jor growing nursery stock large amounts of compost must be added to the
soil. Toward this end, Gibson has accumulated on the parcel large
amounts of organic material. [2]
[Footnote [2]] These organic materials include leaves and grass clippings
from the Ada County Highway District and private lawn care companies and
are not at issue in this case.
This present Facility is within a stone's throw of that property referred above, and
this Facility is surrounded by 520 acres of real property that will benefit from this soil
substance when incorporated onto it in the future. This land has the same soil condition
that needs large amounts of nutrient enriched soil that must be added to the topsoil, and
DEQ has repeatedly made reference to these grass clippings and leaves within this
controversy, calling these substances a "solid waste" when they are neither solid, nor a
waste, and otherwise has been exempted from any definition of "solid waste" as
identified in IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (iii), and believing such organic
substances mav be regulated by DEQ, as found from their reference on page 4, Par. 13 in
their Amended Complaint, stating "grass clippings and leaves", are or should be among
substances within the definition of"solid waste".
CONCLUSION
DEQ agents have provided no factual basis at trial, nor provided any authority to
claim a violation of any Tier ll regulatory provisions of "soli

s

agricultural facility, and has no factual basis to claim the oil substances stored on this
facility is a "waste", but rather constituted soil and di
disposed of in any disposal site, and has been declar

subst

es, not a was

to be

e empt from waste di osal

'
materials, never intended to regulate substances that constitu enhanced "soil substances".
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December,

V emon K. Smitfi, a
for Defendants
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Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
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v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defimdants.

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)
)
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY
TO DEQ'S CLOSING
)
)
ARGUMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
The Defendants before submitted their "Reply" to the Closing Argument presented
by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), wherein Defendants sought to further
respond to the continuing misdirected accusations and flawed analysis presented by DEQ in
their effort to advance a disingenuous claim that Mr. Gibson has been operating an illegal,

Tier II, solid waste processing facility in the State of Idaho. The undisputed evidence
proflered by the Department in this case has been that the substances, to the extent any
substances even existed in their original form delivered to this agricultural facility, were
nothing more than grass clippings and leaf materials, and with that being the extent of the
identity of the materials, about which this case was initiated, there has been no follow-up
showing by the Department that either of those referenced materials (grass clippings and
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leaves) are anywhere identified within any "classical" or "technical" definition of being
"hazardous" to human health or the environment, let alone defined to even be regarded as a
"solid" material, as these substances, grass clipping and leaves, are in a constant state of
flux, either growing or decaying. "Solid Waste" materials, which are materials that are
actually abandoned and discarded, are those materials are deposited in covered landfill sites,
for permanent disposal, there being where the suqject of regulatory concern should be
directed by these environmental Departments, (EPA and DEQ), not to be concerned with the
direct use of composted materials that have a beneficial use in an agricultural application.
In fact, the Department has failed to even identify either of these materials as
representing a "solid" in any sense of the word, as they realize these substances are either in
a state of growth, or in a state of decay, and in neither instance, is there a "fixed state" within
its molecular structure throughout their biological existence. The requirement of a "fixed
state" is deemed to be a fundamental element to what constitutes a "solid" material, by
definition.
To that deficiency, the Department has then failed to demonstrate in what manner
these grass and leaf materials become a "waste" material, when they are destined for a
recognized beneficial use, as recycled and reusable material substances, thereby receiving
different treatment by the Department of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as
these substances are not regarded to be hazardous materials, and are not regulated through
the administration of the provisions of the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (Title 39,
Chapter74) or the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), as was cited to the court
in the Reply argument previously. The RCRA was enacted in 1976, and has been enforced
consistently since then, recently amending their Jinal rules regarding the definitions of solid
wastes, promulgating their Final Rule in 2015 so as to enhance the recycling processes, and
the exclusion of such recycled materials from their defmition of "solid wastes". The 2015
Final Rule announced within the RCRA was undertaken to encourage recycling practices,
thus certain materials were specifically excluded from the definition of solid waste, and
some solid wastes were excluded from the definition of hazardous wastes. There was a
dedicated effort to exclude any attempt to enter the regulatory arena of certain materials that
have the nature of being "composted organic materials", and to accomplish that, the 2015
Final Rule Definition of Solid Waste (DSW) exempted three types of waste materials from
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the definition of what is a "solid waste", one of which being those materials used an
ingredient that is directly used in a production process. These grass clippings and leaves
are "directly" used as an ingredient in the production process of this agricultural product that
has a beneficial use, which is a soil amendment and plant foliar products, destined tor
specific agricultural application. These materials have been historically left to a regulation
within the jurisdiction of the State Departments of Agriculture, as thus we find the very
intended exemptions announced with the provisions of the lDAPA Rule 58 .01.06 (Solid
Waste Management Rules), subpart .001 (Title and Scope), subpart (.03) (Wastes Not
Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to the following solid
wastes ... ) (b)(ii) and (b)(iii), (the effect of which expressly excludes from the defmition
of what is considered to be a "solid waste" from any right of regulation by DEQ, those
material substances consisting of manure and crop (plant) residues which are intended
to be returned to the soil at agronomic rates, and any agricultural solid waste which is
managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho Department of
Agriculture.
The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), an Act promulgated and
regulated by EPA, is identified in 42 USC 6901-6933, and EPA has declined to support any
of these reckless assertions or conclusions that unfortunately have been senselessly
advanced by DEQ throughout this meritless litigation fostered by DEQ.
DEQ has been unwilling to provide this court with the fundamental elements that
would justify the pursuit of their assertions and accusations, and has been unwilling to
honestly present this Court with the correct "legal authority" that demonstrates these
"agricultural operations and facilities" engaged in composting are not subject to any solid
waste disposal regulatory authority expressed within IDAPA 58 .0 1.06 when such materials
arc expressly excluded from the Solid Waste Management Rules within subpart .001,
subpart .03 (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to
the following solid wastes ... )(b)(ii) and (b)(iii), the effect of which expressly excludes these
materials from solid waste, just as in the provisions of the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act,
I. C. §39-7401 et seq., wherein we again find certain exclusions to the definition of"solid

waste", including "crop residues and manure", as these materials are substances that are
specifically excluded from the definition of "solid waste", as identified in I. C. §39-
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7403(50)(e), finding also these composted materials are also excluded by virtue of the
recycling provisions contained in the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA).
This Department should be admonished from initiating these proceedings, since they
refuse to cite these controlling definitions and exclusions about which they are charged to
have a responsibility to recognize and respect. Nothing has been found to support their
illogical position in this matter. These "grass clippings" and "leaves" substances have never
constituted a hazardous substance, and have never been found to be regulated under EPA or
DEQ authority, thereby justifying this court to declare this action as having no foundation in
law or fact, and to bring this spurious action against these Defendants, to a close, and
dismiss the action with prejudice.
As a further matter of concern, DEQ has failed to demonstrate these substances were
ever regarded to be a "solid", let alone a "waste" in the established technical sense where
regulatory authority is to be exercised, in the disposal of a "solid waste" in solid waste
landfill site for permanent disposal. Given these failures, it becomes an insurmountable
attempt for this court to find any factual basis or legal justification to conclude that these
"grass clippings and leaves" substances pose any threat or hazard to the environment or
human health, the sole concept upon which the right of regulation was placed with DEQ, the
aspect of hazard being the essence of the concern for the legislation upon which both EPA
and DEQ has been premised and established throughout the history of the agencies and
departments of government..
When these particular substances are not destined to be deposited at a landfill for
permanent disposal, but rather recycled as a composted material, traditionally referred to as
an "organic derived material", defined within the legislation over which the Department of
Agriculture has the exclusive authority under the law, the entire essence of which has been
understood in the context of a "soil nutrient", for use as a "soil amendment" and/or as a
"plant foliar", so it becomes disingenuous for DEQ to even attempt to promote the
proposition that they have any regulatory authority over that which is not within the mission
statement of the legislation by which they were even created and established through the
enactment of Title 39, Statutes of the State of idaho.
When substances are recognized within Idaho's law to be organically decomposed
substances that are destined for the reincorporation into the soils for the benetit of mankind,
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it becomes simply irrational to suggest they should be considered as a hazardous material, or
regarded as a "solid waste" substance that must be regulated under the solid waste landfill
site regulatory authority established tor an entirely different purpose. The decomposition
process of organic substances have been continuously declared in Idaho to be under the
jurisdiction and authority of the State's Department of Agriculture, and have never been
destined for any regulation by either EPi\ or DEQ, under any recognized Act or enactment
within any legislative or administrative body of either the Federal or State governments, as
these grass and leaf substances, destined for the transforrnalive process of becoming a
composted commodity for soil reintroduction and plant pollination, development and
growth, arc to be exclusively regulated, if regulated at all and in any manner, through the
enactments of state legislation that has placed the jurisdiction and authority within the State
Department of Agriculture, where that jurisdiction and authority has been recited within the
statutory authority exclusively placed with the Idaho Department of Agriculture (IDOA),
through such enactments including the Right to Farm Act (RTFA, contained in Title 22,
Chapter 45, enacted in 1978) and the Soil And Plant Amendment Act (SAPAA, contained in
Title 22, Chapter 22, enacted in 200 I).
These enactments vested by Idaho's Legislature within the Department of
Agriculture came into being to protect agricultural activities, operations, and facilities, to
avoid nuisance claims, and to preserve the use of agricultural land, aspects of which we have
cited to the court previously, and this jurisdiction has been placed with that specific
Department to assure their exclusive right to regulate these agricultural activities, and
specifically those acts that relate to growing, harvesting, developing, processing and
composting organic plant materials and residues into agriculture substances and
commodities for reincorporation into the soils or onto plants to enhance growth.
These statutory provisions, placed exclusively under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture are identified in Title 22, Chapters I, 6, 22, and 45, Statutes of
the State of Idaho, and it bears repeating, this time in an abbreviated fashion, the relevant
excerpts from this extensive authority that is so critical and fundamental to this litigation,

and cannot be ignored by this court in reaching a disposition of this controversy. The
legislation that vests the exclusive jurisdiction and authority over this specific subject matter
is vested within the Department of Agriculture, and aspects thereof are as follows:
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22-110. Authority and duties of director concerning agricultural
waste. (1) In addition to other powers and duties, the director of the state
department of agriculture shall have authority to regulate agricultural
solid waste, agricultural composting and other similar agricultural
activities to safeguard and protect animals, man and the environment. The
director may promulgate rules in compliance with chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code, that may be necessary for the efficient enforcement of the provisions
of this section. The director may collaborate with any state agency, federal
agency or other governmental entity in the development of rules
promulgated pursuant to this section.
22-603. Definitions. When used in this chapter:
(4) "Compost" means a biologically stable material derived from

the composting process.
(5) "Composting" means the biological decomposition of organic
matter. It is accompli~hed bv mixing and piling in such a wav to promote
aerobic and/or anaerobic decav. The process inhibits pathogens, viable
weed seeds and odors.
(22) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings.
leaves, weeds, bark, plantings, prunings and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes from logging and milling operations, and (ood wastes. "Organic
waste-derived material" does not include products that contain biosolids
as defined in this section.
22-604. Adoption of rules. The department shall administer,

en[orce, and carrv out the provisions ofthis chapter and mav adopt rules
necessary to carrv out its purposes including. but not limited to, the proper
use, handling. transportation, storage, display, distribution, sampling.
records, analvsis, [orm, minimum percentages, fertilizer ingredients,
exempted materials, investigational allowances, definitions. labels,
labeling. misbranding. mislabeling and disposal of fertilizers and their
containers. The adoption of rules is subject to public hearing as prescribed
by the Idaho administrative procedure act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
22-2203. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Aged" means exposed to weathering and/or natural decay, such

that the original material is significantly altered.
(6) "Compost" means a biologically stable material derived (rom the
composting process.
(7) "Composting" meam· the biological decomposition of organic
matter. It is accomplished by mixing and piling in such a way to promote
aerobic and/or anaerobic decay. The process inhibits pathogens, viable
weed seeds and odors.
(11) "Department" means the Idaho department of agriculture.
(12) "Director" mean.~ the director of the Idaho department of
agriculture or his duly authorized representative.
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(24) "Official sample" means all)l sample o{soi/ ame11dment or plant

ame11dmenttaken hv the director or his agent.
(25) "Organic" refers onll' to natural/)! occurri11g substances genera/It
recognized as the hvdroge11 compounds of carbon a11d their derivatives.
(26) "Organic waste-derived material" mea11s grass clippi11gs, leaves,
weeds, bark, plallli11gs, pm11i11gs, ami oth er vegetative wastes, wood
wastes {rom loggi11g and milling operations and food wastes. "Organic
wastc-der·ived material" doc not in clude pr·oduct that contain
biosolids as defin ed in subsection (2) of thi ection.
(30) "Plant amendme11t" mea11s alii' 11atural or stmthetic substance

applied to pla11ts or seeds which is i11te11ded to improve germi11atio11,
growth, pie/d, product qualitv. reproduction, fla vor or other desirable
characteristics o{plauts except commercial fertilizers. soil amendments,
limes. uunwnipulated animal mrm m·e and vegetable organic wastederived materials. pe ticides, mulch and oth er materials which mav he
exempted hv rule.
(31) "Processed" mea11s deliberately treated or manipulated to modify or
transform physical, chemical, or biological characteristics of the 11atural
state of a substance.
(34) "Soil amendment" means:
(a) A nv substa11ce which is intended to improve th e phpsica/, chemical or
biological characteristics o(the soil to [a vor plant growth,· or
(h) A 11 v material which is represented as havi11g a priman1 [u11 ctio11 of
e11ha11ci11g, cha11gi11g or mor/i{ving soil microorga11ism reproduction,
activitp or population. or material which is represented as having the
primary {un ction of forming or stabilizing soil aggregates ill soil to
which it is to be applied and therebp improving the resistance o(the soil
to the slaking action o{ water, increasing the soil' water and air
permeabilitv or i11[iltration, improving the resistance of the surface of
the soil to crusting. improvi11g ease of cultivatio11 of soil. or otherwise
{avorab/pmodi{ving the structural or ph ysical properties o{soil; a11d
(3 7) "Waste-derived soil amendment" or "waste-derived plant
amendment" means am' soil amendment or plant amendment that is
derived {rom an industrial hpproduct, coproduct or other material that
would otherwise he disposed o(i{a market {or reuse were 11ot an optio11,
but does not include any soil amendment or plant amendment deri ved
fi·om biosolids or bioso lid products regulated under the code of federa l
regulations, 40 CFR 503 as amended.
(39) "Wood" means the hard fibrous materia/located beneath the bark

o{ trees. which constitutes the greatest part of the stems of trees and
shrubs.
22-2204. Authority to adopt rules. The department shall administer,
enforce, and carry out this chapter and may adopt rules necessary to
carrv out its purposes including, but not limited to, the proper use,
handling, tran portation, torage, display, distribution, sampling,
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records, analysis, form, minimum percentages, soil amending or plant
amending ingredients, exempted materials, investigational allowances,
definitions, labels, labeling, misbranding, mislabeling and disposal of
soil amendments and plant amendments and their containers. The
adoption of rules shall be subject to public hearing as prescribed by the
Idaho administrative procedure act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
22-4501. Legislative findings and intent. The legislature finds that
agricultural activities conducted on farmland in urbanizing areas are
often subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and
even force the premature removal of the lands from agricultural uses, and
in some cases prohibit investments in agricultural improvements. It is the
intent of the legislature to reduce the loss to the state of its
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which
agricultural operations may be deemed to be a nuisance. The
legislature also finds that the right to [arm is a natural right and is
recognized as a permitted use throughout the state of Idaho.
22-4502. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agricultural [acilitv" includes, without limitation, anv land,
building. structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance,
machinerv or equipment that is used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation" means an activitv or condition that occurs
in connection with the production of agricultural products [or (ood,
fiber, fuel and other lawful uses, and includes. without limitation:
(d) Planting, irrigating, growing, fertilizing, harvesting or producing
agricultural, horticultural, floricultural and viticultural crops, fruits
and vegetable products, field grains, seeds, hay, sod and nursery
stock, and other plants, plant products, plant bvproducts, plant waste
and plant compost;
22-4504. Local ordinances. No city, county, taxing district or other
political subdivision o( this state shall adopt any ordinance or
resolution that declares any agricultural operation, agricultural
facility or expansion thereof that is operated in accordance with
generally recognized agricultural practices to be a nuisance, nor shall
any zoning ordinance that requires abatement as a nuisance or (orces
the closure o[any such agricultural operation or agricultural facility be
adopted. Any such ordinance or resolution shall be void and shall have
no (orce or effect. Zoning and nuisance ordinances shall not apply to
agricultural operations and agricultural facilities that were established
outside the corporate limits of a municipality and then were incorporated
into the municipality by annexation. The county planning and zoning
authority may adopt a nuisance waiver procedure to be recorded with the
county recorder or appropriate county recording authority pursuant to
residential divisions of property.
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These grass clippings and leaves are defined in Idaho law to be an organic material,
referred to in the statutes as "Organic waste-derived material", not a "solid waste" to be
deposited or disposed of in a solid waste landfill disposal site. There is the court's legal
definition of what these grass clippings and leaves are regarded to be, under Idaho law.
This "legal definition" includes those substances specifically referred to be "grass
clippings", "leaves", weeds, bark, plantings, prunings, and otl1er vegetative wastes, wood
wastes from logging and milling operations, and food wastes.
DEQ conveniently declines to present their awareness of this legal definition, as they
were infinitely aware of the litigation that brought to light this legislative regulatory
authority that had been vested within the Department of Agriculture, as presented from the
2009 litigation in which Mr. Gibson's agricultural operations, activities, and facilities were
inextricably involved within that controversy initiated by Ada County over this precise
parcel of property, advancing the misguided belief that Ada County has the right to impose a
conditional use permit (CUP) upon the property owner or operator before such an
agricultural composting activity could be conducted upon agricultural grounds. Thereby
attempting to avoid the pre-emptive effects of Idaho law. It was not only that case from
which it remains undisputed that DEQ was infmitely aware of the Gibson's operations since
2004 at that particular location, but of equal, if not greater factual awareness as to Mr.
Gibson's operations stems from the litigation that reached statewide awareness with Mr.
Gibson's operations in the decision rendered by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1995, Ada

County v. Gibson, 126 Idallo 854, 893 P. 2d 801 (1995), clearly confirming DEQ, both
when operating as a former division of the Department of Health and Welfare, and thereafter
as an agency in 2000, was intricately aware of these operations, including their size and the
composition of the material substances. Evidence on this fundamental issue as to what this
substance is, and recognition of the legal definition of the materials in question, is
fundamental in the process of engaging in any analysis of this jurisdictional issue, and that
explains why the IDAPA Rules specifically excluded these known agricultural substances
(plant residue, manure, and other waste substances regulated by the Department of
Agriculture) as IDAPA cannot contradict the exclusionary definitions contained in the Idallo
Solid Waste Facilities Act, identified in I. C. §39-7403(50)(e) from the regulatory authority
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of DEQ's definition of "solid waste" In IDAPA 58, an awareness that is critical for the
disposition of this controversy, and to avoid the misguided argument that Mr. Gibson is
violating the mission statement upon which DEQ has been formulated, or violating the
IDAPA Rules that pertain to the regulation of "solid waste" disposition and disposal of
certain substances in landfill disposal sites.
The Gibson facilities have been in operation for decades, the fact of which has been
established by virtue of these two prior "high profile" episodes of "Gibson related
litigation", commencing with the Idaho Supreme Court in 1995, referred to as Ada County v.
Gibson, 126 Idal1o 854, 893 P. 2d 801 (1995), and the subsequent Ada County case

identified as Ada County v. VHS Properties, LLC, CVOC 2010-02298, which litigation
commenced in 2010 and culminated in 2014, following the Legislative clarification of
certain definitions contained within RTFA, so as to be congruent with SAP AA, resulting in
the denial of Ada County's misguided effort to exercise conditional use authority (a
conditional use permit) upon what was already a statewide permitted use of agricultural land
engaged in the act of conducting composting operations in Idaho, which statutory legislation
pre-empted any city or county attempt to impose a condition upon what had previously been
declared to be a statewide right and activity within the state of Idaho. This publicized case
history, involving Mr. Gibson, has found its way into this case, the substance thereof and the
factual basis about which this court shall take judicial notice of Mr. Gibson's historic and
continuing composting activities over the preceding decades.
This Court is entitled to take judicial notice of these litigious proceedings, which
on occasion within this litigation, has been referred to by DEQ. This court has the
unrestricted right to take judicial notice of these previous case citations. See City of
Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322,325-27,420 P.2d 805, 808-10 (1966); l.C. § 9-101; Rule

201, I.R.E.; See also, Crawford v. Department of Correction, 133 ldaho'633, 636 n. 1, 991
P.2d 358, 361 n. 1 (1999) ("We take judicial notice of House Bill 73, which was not
submitted as part of the record on appeal, but is contained in the public records maintained by
the Office of Legislative Services located in the State Capitol Building. I.R.E. 201(f);
Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337,340,775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Howell, 122

Idaho 209, [213], 832 P.2d 1144, [1148] (Ct. App. 1992)." (bracketed references added)).
As this court will recall, Mr. Early was involved (as a law Clerk) in relation to
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Mr. Gibson's involvement with the Ada County governmental agency decades ago, then
referring to Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P. 2d 801 (1995), from which he
and others in DEQ acquired their public knowledge as to the on-going composting
activities that have historically been conducted by Mr. Gibson, dating back to 1991and
years earlier. That Decision confirmed these agricultural activities have been actively
pursued by Mr. Gibson to the present. Mr. Early was referring to specific language within
that Decision that stated:

In 1991, David Gibson acquired rights to a parcel of real property in Ada
County with the apparent purpose of operating a tree and shrub nursery. [I]
The condition of the soil on this parcel is such, however, that prior to its use
for growing nursery stock large amounts of compost must be added to the
soil. Toward this end, Gibson has accumulated on the parcel large

amounts of organic material. [2]
[Footnote [2]] These organic materials include leaves and grass clippings
from the Ada County Highway District and private lawn care companies and
are not at issue in this case.

Mr. Gibson has been conducting these composting operations at several composting
facilities in accordance with the Right to Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil And Plant
Amendment Act (SAPAA), not only at this particular agricultural facility since 2004, but
known to DEQ from prior encounters with the DEQ personnel in 1992, and operating
composting facilities in this immediate area on State owned land since 1988, and on the
adjacent twenty acre parcel located less than a "stone's throw away" from this agricultural
facility since 1991, until relocating to this operational facility in 2004.
These assertions and baseless conclusions forthcoming from DEQ are disturbing, as
they arc charged with the knowledge of the history of Mr. Gibson, charged with the
awareness of the statutory and Rule exclusionary language, charged with the awareness of
the exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority ofiDOA, and charged with the awareness
of the exclusion of compostable organic waste materials recognized to be "Organic wastederived material" from the right of regulation by DEQ, expressly defined to mean grass
clippings, leaves, weeds, bark, plantings, prunings, and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes and food waste substances, and certainly charged with the knowledge of the Idaho
Solid Waste Facilities Act and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, despite which
we find them acting with an unconscionable attitude they possess a right to impose a "site
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on agriculture lands, pursuant to the statewide right authorizing the unconditional right to do
so, which right has statutorily pre-empted all county ordinances that seek to require any
conditional use permit (CUP) to conduct these agricultural operations, or to impose any
requirement to secure any county authorization or county inspections prior to its
uninterrupted right of operation .
These Defendants before cited the definition utilized by the Federal National Parks
Service, Department of Interior, referring to their Solid Waste Disposal Sites and the Code
of Federal Regulations, wherein they set out a clear exemption of compostable substances

from being what is otherwise d4ined to be solid wastes. Their definitions are expressly
congruent with that of the Idaho Department of Agriculture, and it bears repeating those
provisional excerpts that are referring to compost, agricultural wastes, and organic
substances, wherein it is declared within these excerpts:
Code of Federal Regulations
Title 36. Parks, Forests, and Public Property
Chapter I. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Part 6. SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITES OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM

§ 6.3. Definitions

The following definitions apply to this part:
Agricultural solid waste means solid waste that is generated by the
rearing or harvesting of animals, or the producing or harvesting of
crops or trees.
Compostible [sic] materials means organic substances that decay under
natural and/or human-assisted conditions within relatively short time
intervals, generally not in excess of ninety days.
Solid waste disposal site ....... include facilities for the incineration of
solid waste and transfer stations. Facilities for the management of
compostible [sic] materials are not defined as solid waste disposal sites for
the purposes ofthis part.
When DEQ created IDAPA Rules and Regulations in 2002-2003, they were
mindful of the Idaho Solid waste Facilities Act (ISWFA) and made the specific
declaration their regulatory rules did not apply to those organic-agronomic substances,
setting forth their express exemption and exclusion within their IDAPA Rules, declaring
emphatically these "rules do not apply" to those wastes which were also euphemistically
referred to in their reference to "solid wastes", as plant residue and manure was excluded
from the definition ofthe term in ISWFA (I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), and excluded from what
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Plan" regulatory requirement upon an agricultural operation that is subject only to the
regulation of IDOA. This has not only been a rather disturbing governmental attitude, but
seen to be an unlawful usurpation of legislative authority that rests with another agency,
and there has never been, nor could there be, any "re-delegation" of this exclusive
authority by any means other than an act undertaken by the legislature itself, legislation
that has not taken place to alter the present application of existing law.
DEQ would ask this court to adopt an unsustainable perception that is both
unfounded and unsubstantiated, proposing the proposition that "grass clippings" and
"leaves", the particular substances or materials they claim to have been seen from the road
and now perceptively the substance they perceived to have observed at the end of some row
of material while upon this agricultural facility, must be viewed as a "solid" substance that
represents what is perceived by DEQ to be a regulated "solid waste", despite the restrictive
efTects of Title 39, Chapter 74, cited in further detail hereafter.
DEQ cannot point to any definition that will place "grass clippings" and "leaves"
into a category that will get them to where they want to be with any scientific, statutory or
case definition, let alone restrained by what is contained within the Code of Federal
Regulations, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Idaho Solid Waste
Facilities Act, addressed in detail hereafter. This failure to cite a scientific, statutory or case
authorized definition retlects a failure to their entire "house of cards" upon which they had
premised their failed hypothesis that such substances as grasses and leaves are "solid
wastes". The very idea that such substances are solid wastes is undermined by the very
exceptions and exclusions to their own IDAPA Rules and Regulations, wherein it is there
expressed that certain substances were not to be considered to be solid wastes within their
rules. Those exceptions and exemptions were not mere superfluous language; it has meaning
and purpose, and provides the reason why a "non-solid" plant residue substance would be
excluded from the term "solid waste", particularly when such a compostable substance is
covered extensively throughout the statutory reference to what is within the jurisdiction and
authority of the Department of Agriculture, and those statutes that declare these agricultural
activities, operations, and facilities to be unconditionally regulated and under IDOA
authority, subject only to the rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture,
identified in various specific statutory provisions, encompassing these activities conducted
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may be regulated under any definition of a "solid waste" or a "regulated" matter.
This court must apply the common language used in the interpretation and
application of these express exemptions set forth not only in the Resource Conservation
Recovery Act (RCRA) which controls EPA, but also both ISWFA (I. C. §39-7403(50)(e)
and IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (b)(iii), wherein these specific exclusions are
am10unced from what is a "solid waste". The IDAPA provisions mirror the ISWFA with
this exclusion, as their regulations state "these rules do not apply to the following solid
waste ... ", which exclusions include manures, crop (plant) residues, and agricultural
solid waste, (this brings the Department of Agriculture into the equation, with their
specific statutory legislation cited above). These substances are excluded by IDAPA Rule
58 .01.06 (Solid Waste Management Rules), subpart .001 (Title and Scope), subpart
(.03) (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to
the following solid wastes ... )

(b )(ii) and (b )(iii), (the effect of which expressly

excludes from the definition of what is considered to be a "solid waste" from any
right of regulation by DEQ, those material substances consisting of manure and
crop (plant) residues which are intended to be returned to the soil at agronomic
rates, and any agricultural solid wastes managed and regulated by IDOA).
These expressly excluded substances have been recognized to be within the statutory
jurisdiction and regulatory authority of lDOA, not anywhere allowed to be considered as a
"solid waste" substance subject to the rules and regulations of DEQ, as the mission
statement and objective of DEQ by their statutory creation, is only to control certain
hazardous "solid wastes" that were otherwise identified in IDAP A.
Not only do the IDAPA Rules expressly exclude these plant residue substances from
their definition of what constitutes a "solid waste", as is the case with ISWFA, but also
explained in detail in Federal case authority identified hereafter, as "grass clippings" and
"leaves" are not a discarded or abandoned material substance.
This present Facility is within a stone's throw of the former 20 acre parcel
operated by Mr. Gibson from 1991 until 2004, when, in 2004 he transferred his operation
to this present agricultural facility, and this Facility is surrounded by 520 acres of real
property that will benefit from this soil substance when incorporated onto it in the future.
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This land has the same soil condition that needs large amounts of nutrient enriched soil
that must be added to the topsoil, just as was referenced in the 1995 Decision.
DEQ is statutorily obligated to follow the definition(s) that serve to restrict the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as it has been promulgated and maintained within
their legislation. DEQ has deliberately ignored even this definition, as it would have the
direct effect of terminating their ba~elcss action, just as does the application of the law as the
definitions are identified in the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), the Soil and Plant Amendment
Act (SAP AA), the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Idaho Solid
Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA). Each of these enactments pre-empt this senseless litigation,
and the court is obligated to find in accordance with this non-application of any regulatory
authority ofDEQ over agricultural operations.
DEQ has been deliberately withholding any number of relevant factors during this
litigation, including not just the deliberate concealment of their physical entry onto the
property on March 29, 2013, and their effort to ignore the relevance of RFTA, SAPAA,
RCRA, and ISWFA, but also their own IDAPA Rules that exempt these substances from
"solid waste", being plant residue JDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (b)(iii), along with
their undisputed awareness of the size of the Gibson's operations for many decades,
reaching back to their records and files from 1992, which in itself, had there been any
violation, mandates the application of I. C. §39-1 08(4), as this present facility was
commenced in August, 2004, at which time substantial portions of the existing dirt and soil
materials stored on the 20 acre parcel of property were re-located to this agricultural facility,
and this functioning agricultural operation became the primary Gibson facility, about which
DEQ had direct knowledge from the discussion held with Mr. Gibson after the 2000
formation ofDEQ as an independent Agency, and the formation of the IDAPA Rules in the
years of2002-2003 that followed. The 2015 Final Rule contained within RCRA re-affirms
the prohibition of this action taken by DEQ, and the court is statutorily obligated to impose
this re-emphasized restriction.
As to the Idaho statutes, we turn to Title 39, (Health and Safety), Chapter 74, the
"Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act" (ISWFA), which therein defines "solid waste" (I. C.
§39-7403(50)(e) to exclude "agricultural waste" that is "manures and crop residues" that
are "returned to the soils at agronomic rates", That definition states:
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(50) "Solid waste" means any garbage or refuse, sludge from a waste water
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility
and other discarded material including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations and from community activities, but does not include
solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials
in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges that arc point sources subject
to permit under 33 U.S.C. 1342, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material as defined in the atomic energy act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat.
923). These regulations shall not applv to the following solid wastes:
(a) ... ;
(b) ... ;
(c) ... ;
(d) ... ;
(e) Agricultural wastes, limited to manures and crop residues, returned to the
soils at agronomic rates;
(f) ... ;
(g) ... ; and
(h) .. ..

Within this definition and within the Solid Waste Facilities Act, (I. C. §39-7404)
it states:
39-7404. Consistency with federal law-- Status of appendices. The legislature
intends that the state of Idaho enact and carry out a solid waste program that
will enable the state to achieve approved state status with respect to solid waste
disposal facility regulation from the federal government.
The legislature finds that subtitle D of RCRA, [Resource Conservation Recovery
Act]and in particular the code of federal regulations [CFR], title 40, part 257 and
258, establish complex, detailed and costly provisions for the disposal of solid
waste. By the provisions of this chapter, the legislature desires to avoid
duplicative or conflicting state and federal regulatory systems and allow local
MSWLF unit owners the maximum flexibility possible under 40 CFR 257 and
258, to meet the substantive goals of protection of human health and the
environment with consideration for actual site and climatic conditions. At any
time that 40 CFR 257 or 40 CFR 258 is amended, any additional flexibility or
extension otherwise prohibited by this chapter shall be allowed as applicable.
The board mav NOT promulgate anv rule pursuant to this act that would
impose conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in scope than the
referenced RCRA regulations of the United States environmental protection
agency or the provisions of this chapter. Until regulations are adopted, agency
conclusions in appendix B through appendix H, inclusive, per the "Federal
Register" of October 9, 1991, shall be used for technical guidance for relevant
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
History:
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[39-7404, added 1992, ch. 331, sec. I, p. 979; am. 1993, ch. 139, sec. 5, p. 350;
am. 1994, ch. 75, sec. 4, p. 166.]
This chapter has not been amended since 1994, and remains the authority that
limits the Board of DEQ from promulgating any rule that would impose conditions or
requirements more stringent or broader in scope than within the RCRA regulations of the
United States environmental protection agency (EPA) or any of the provisions of this
chapter (which includes I. C. §39-7403(50)(e)). That emphatically means DEQ cannot
take these organic substances that are processed into an agricultural product and make
them a regulated "solid waste". The reference to "Board", under "Definitions" within the
Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), established in I. C. §39-7403(5)&(6),
historically meant (in 1994) the Idaho board of environmental quality, and since 2000,
that reference now is to the board of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.
With respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), we
become familiar with what the Federal courts have been saying about the definition of
"solid waste" ever since I 987, wherein the controlling language relating to "solid waste"
relates to that substance intended for abandonment and to be a permanent discard, not
otherwise intended for being processed as an organic substance, as are composted
material, for use as an agricultural products, just as it has been so addressed and retlected
in the National Park Systems treatment of these vegetative materials mentioned above.
The EPA has been specifically restricted in its authority to regulate certain
substances, recognized by express case authority that dates back to 1987 in American
Mining Congress and Engelhard Corporation v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 824 F2d 1177 (1987), wherein it discussed the restriction and its decision with the

following excerpts:
These consolidated cases arise out of EPA's regulation of hazardous wastes under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), as amended, 42
U.S.C. Sees. 69016933 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Petitioners, trade associations
representing mining and oil refining interests, challenge regulations promulgated by
EPA that amend the definition of "solid waste" to establish and define the agency's
authority to regulate secondary materials reused within an industry's ongoing
production process. In plain English, petitioners maintain that EPA has exceeded its
regulatory authority in seeking to bring materials that are not discarded or
otherwise disposed of within the compass of "waste. "
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As will become evident, this case turns on the meaning of the phrase, "and other
discarded material," contained in the statute's definitional provisions.
Petitioners, American Mining Congress ("AMC") and American Petroleum
Institute ("API"), challenge the scope of EPA's final rule. Relying upon the
statutory definition of "solid waste," petitioners contend that EPA's authority
under RCRA is limited to controlling materials that are discarded or intended for
discard. They argue that EPA's reuse and recycle rules, as applied to in process
secondary materials, regulate materials that have not been discarded, and
therefore exceed EPA's jurisdiction. [3]
Guided by these principles, we turn to the statutory provision at issue here.
Congress, it will be recalled, granted EPA power to regulate "solid waste."
Congress specifically defined "solid waste" as "discarded material" EPA then
defined "discarded material" to include materials destined for reuse in an industry's
ongoing production processes. The challenge to EPA's jurisdictional reach is
founded, again, on the proposition that in-process secondary material~ are
outside the bounds of EPA's lawful authority. Nothing has been discarded, the
argument goes, and thus RCRAjurisdiction remains untriggered.

The ordinary, plain-English meaning of the word "discarded" is "disposed of,"
"thrown away" or "abandoned. " [7/ Encompassing materials retained for
immediate reuse within the scope of "discarded material" strains, to say the least,
the everyday usage of that term.
The question we face, then, is whether, in light of the National Legislature's
expressly stated objectives and the underlying problems that motivated it to enact
RCRA in the first instance, Congress was using the term "discarded" in its
ordinary sense--"disposed of' or "abandoned"-or whether Congress was using
it in a much more open-ended way, so as to encompass materials no longer
useful in their original capacity though destined for immediate reuse in another
phase of the industry s ongoing production process.
For the following reasons, we believe the former to be the case. RCRA was
enacted, as the Congressional objectives and findings make clear, in an effort to
help States deal with the ever increasing problem of solid waste disposal by
encouraging the search for and use of alternatives to existing methods of disposal
(including recycling) and protecting health and the environment by regulating
hazardous wastes. To fulfill these purposes, it seems clear that EPA need not
regulate "spent" materials that are recycled and reused in an ongoing
manufacturing or industrial process. [11/ These materials have not yet become
part of the waste disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial reuse
or recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry itself.
After this mind-numbing journey through RCRA, we return to the provision that is,
after all, the one before us for examination. And that definitional section, we
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believe, indicates clear Congressional intent to limit EPA's authority. First, the
definition of "solid waste" is situated in a section containing thirty-nine separate,
defined terms. This is definitional specificity of the first order. The very care
evidenced by Congress in defining RCRA's scope certainly suggests that Congress
was concerned about delineating and thus cabining EPA's jurisdictional reach.
Second, the statutory definition of "solid waste" is quite specific. . ... .It
contains three specific tenns and then sets forth the broader term, "other discarded
material." That definitional structure brings to mind a long-standing canon of
statutory construction, ejusdem generis ........ Here, the three particular classes-garbage, refuse, and sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility--contain materials that clearly fit within the
ordinary, everyday sense of "discarded." It is most sensible to conclude that
Congress, in adding the concluding phrase "other discarded material," meant to
grant EPA authority over similaT types of waste, but not to open up the federal
regulatory reach of an entirely new category of materials, i.e., materials neither
disposed of nor abandoned, but passing in a continuous stream or flow from one
production process to another.
In sum, our analysis of the statute reveals clear Congressional intent to extend
EPA's authority only to materials that are truly discarded, disposed oJ, thrown
away,orabandone~

We are constrained to conclude that, in light of the language and structure of
RCRA, the problems animating Congress to enact it, and the relevant portions of
the legislative history, Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent

that "solid waste" (and therefore EPA's regulatory authority) be limited to
materials that are "discarded" by virtue of being disposed oJ, abandoned, or
thrown away. While we do not lightly overturn an agency's reading of its own
statute, we are persuaded that by regulating in-process secondary materials, EPA
has acted in contravention of Congress' intent.
CONCLUSION
DEQ agents have provided no factual basis at trial, nor provided any authority in
their closing arguments to support any claim there has been a violation of any Tier II
regulatory provision of any "solid waste" material being accumulated within this
agricultural operation and facility, and as specifically defined within the provisions of the
Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act, Title 39, Chapter 74, and IDAPA Rules 58 .01 .06.001 .03
(b )ii and (iii), along with the restrains within RCRA, and the restraints imposed by the
Department of Interior, within their National Parks Service, DEQ is so restricted, and has no
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factual basis to claim the soil substances stored on this agricultural facility are a "solid
waste" material over which Idaho's DEQ has any regulatory authority.
These grass and leaf materials have been directly used in a production process,
specifically exempted within the categories and references made within RCRA, ISWFA
EPA DOl, the JCR's and Idaho's IDAPA, and these materials have never been discarded
and never abandoned, and instead are the very ingredients that have been and arc being
directly used in a production process to generate a beneficial agricultural product, known as
a soil amendment and a plant foliar. These mateiials now constitute a soil and dirt substance,
not a solid waste to be disposed of or discarded in any solid waste disposal landfill site, as
de lined by Chapter 74, and that is to be regulated by DEQ through their regulation under the
Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act, wherein there is found the extensive reference to the Code
of Federal

Re~o'Ulations

(CFR), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42

U.S.C. sec. 6901, et seq.) and those regulations adopted pursuant thereto, now addressed
within I. C. §39-7401 eta!, and the specific exemption of these materials from the delinition
of "solid waste" I. C. §39-5403(50)(e), being manures and crop residues, returned to the
soils at agronomic rates, as these grass clippings and leaves are plant/crop residues and
agricultural organic waste, declared exempt from

wastty~Jtl'S:afmaEial:;,-tJ~

be regulated substances, and regarded to be enhan ed "soil substan
an agricultural applications and future operations.

)

Respectfully submitted this 151h day of January, 201

Vernon K. Smith, attorney
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DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
STATE OF
THE
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN

IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF
IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,

CVOC-2015-03540
Case
No. CVOC-2015-03540
Case No.

AND
FINDINGS OF
FACT AND
FINDINGS
OF FACT
LAW
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF

vs.
VS.
DAVID
DAVID R.
BLACK
R. GIBSON,
d/b/a/ BLACK
GIBSON, d/b/a/
DIAMOND
DIAMOND COMPOST
COMPOST PRODUCTS,
PRODUCTS,
and
and VHS
VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES, LLC,
LLC,
Defendants.
Defendants.

(“DEQ”) or
This
This is
Environmental Quality
Department of
ciVil action.
is aa civil
of Environmental
or
action. Plaintiff,
Idaho Department
Plaintiff, Idaho
Quality (“DEQ”)
(“the Department”)
Department”) seeks
Plaintiff
(“the
what Plaintiff
from continuing
the Defendants
continuing to
enjoin the
to enjoin
Defendants from
to operate
operate What
seeks to

alleges
until Defendants
with various
Defendants comply
is aa solid
regulations
solid waste
processing facility
alleges is
various regulations
waste processing
facility until
comply with

Plaintiff also
Plaintiff
Plaintiff. Plaintiff
promulgated by
by Plaintiff.
commanding Defendants
Defendants to
to pay
an order
promulgated
order commanding
also seeks
seeks an
pay Plaintiff
non-compliance with
A court
trial
monetary
penalties for
with those
for past,
those regulations.
court trial
and any
regulations. A
monetary penalties
future, non-compliance
past, and
any future,
in this
in
then heard
this matter
matter was
The Court
motion to
held on
on September
to
2017. The
Court then
heard aa motion
September 13,
and 20,
was held
13, 15,
15, and
20, 2017.

strike
permitted the
written closing
strike testimony
the parties
parties to
to submit
submit written
closing arguments.
arguments.
and permitted
testimony and
In
On
November 20,
the Court
the motion
motion to
strike testimony.
On November
an Order
on the
to strike
entered an
Court entered
Order on
testimony. In
2017, the
20, 2017,
in which
that Order,
file simultaneous
the Court
the parties
that
which to
written closing
parties two
to file
closing
simultaneous written
Court gave
two weeks
weeks in
gave the
Order, the

Both parties
The Court
arguments.
parties did
on December
arguments.
arguments. Both
2017. The
Court has
those arguments.
December 4,
has considered
did so
considered those
so on
4, 2017.

“reply” to
Plaintiff’s closing
The Defendants
the Plaintiff’s
The
argument on
Defendants subsequently
ﬁled aa “reply”
to the
closing argument
on
subsequently filed
reply” to
Plaintiff’s closing
“supplemental reply”
the Plaintiff’s
December
argument on
to the
closing argument
on
December 12,
and aa “supplemental
2017, and
12, 2017,
Defendant’s December
12 reply
in
that the
January
the fact
the Defendant’s
Despite the
fact that
submitted in
2018. Despite
December 12
was submitted
January 15,
reply was
15, 2018.
AND CONCLUSIONS
LAW -- 11
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Court’s order,
violation of
the Court’s
the Court
The Court
not
Violation
of the
Court has
those arguments.
Court has
has considered
arguments. The
has not
considered those
order, the

considered
trial
the supplemental
the testimony
supplemental reply
on January
on the
at trial
submitted on
2018. Based
considered the
Based on
testimony at
January 15,
reply submitted
15, 2018.
and
findings of
the arguments
the Court
the findings
of law
arguments submitted,
of fact
fact and
Court now
makes the
conclusions of
law
and conclusions
and the
now makes
submitted, the
set
forth herein.
herein.
set forth
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff
Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant,
himself or
the name
Black
name Black
or under
under the
David Gibson,
alleges that
Defendant, David
Gibson, himself
Diamond
by Defendant,
LLC
Diamond Compost,
on land
land owned
VHS Properties,
operates aa facility
owned by
Defendant, VHS
Properties, LLC
facility on
Compost, operates

(“VHS”), in
in
in Ada
in March
Plaintiff alleges
(“VHS”),
this facility
that in
March of
there was
of 2013
2013 there
at this
Ada County.
alleges that
was at
facility in
County. Plaintiff

Plaintiff alleges
excess
waste. [First
six hundred
Amend. Compl.
of six
of cubic
hundred (600)
Compl. ¶ 14].
alleges
cubic waste.
excess of
[First Amend.
14]. Plaintiff
yards of
(600) yards
11

Mr.
was composting
waste for
purpose of
Mr. Gibson
for the
the purpose
composting large
large volumes
of solid
of resale
or
solid waste
humus or
Gibson was
resale as
volumes of
as humus

Plaintiff alleges
compost.
this solid
of grass
Amend. Compl.
Compl. ¶ 15].
solid waste
alleges this
consisted of
compost. [First
grass
waste consisted
[First Amend.
15]. Plaintiff
11

clippings,
other organic
material. [First
organic material.
Amend. Compl.
Compl. ¶ 13].
and other
clippings, leaves,
[First Amend.
leaves, and
13].
11

Gibson’s facility
11 Solid
Plaintiff alleges
Plaintiff
Tier II
definition of
Mr. Gibson’s
the legal
legal definition
of aa Tier
meets the
Solid Waste
alleges Mr.
Waste
facility meets

Processing
that neither
that facility
neither Mr.
Mr. Gibson
the operator
nor VHS
of that
Processing Facility
operator of
and that
Gibson as
VHS
as the
Facility and
facility nor
Properties,
property upon
upon which
which the
LLC as
the owner
the real
the facility
is located
of the
real propeny
owner of
located have
have
as the
Properties, LLC
facility is
in various
forth in
complied
with the
the requirements
the
regarding the
requirements set
regulations adopted
complied with
set forth
various regulations
adopted by
DEQ regarding
by DEQ

Plaintiff seeks
management
processing facilities.
management of
facilities. Plaintiff
of solid
to enforce
regulations
enforce those
solid waste
those regulations
waste processing
seeks to
pursuant to
to I.C.
pursuant
I.C. §§ 39-108(3)(b).
39-108(3)(b).
(“EPHA”), the
it passed
When
passed the
Environmental Protection
the Idaho
Health Act
Act (“EPHA”),
the Idaho
Protection and
When it
Idaho Environmental
Idaho
and Health
“protect human
Environmental Quality
Legislature
the Department
Department of
health and
the
human health
of Environmental
to “protect
Legislature created
and the
created the
Quality to
environment.” I.C.
promulgate
environment.”
The legislature
the authority
granted DEQ
to promulgate
legislature granted
LC. §§ 39-102A(1).
39-102A(1). The
authority to
DEQ the
“rules as
“rules
be necessary
with problems
which
to deal
to … solid
problems related
related to
solid waste
disposal … which
deal with
waste disposal
as may
necessary to
may be
relating to
shall
purpose which
for
the force
shall … have
which may
of law
to any
force of
feasible for
and feasible
law relating
have the
be necessary
necessary and
any purpose
may be

[EPHA].” I.C.
enforcing
the provisions
enforcing the
of [EPHA].”
provisions of
LC. §§ 39-105(2).
39-105(2).
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“the collection,
“solid waste
disposal” to
The
The legislature
to include:
defined “solid
legislature defined
include: “the
waste disposal”
collection, storage,
storage,
waste.” Id.
treatment,
processing, or
Id.
ﬁnal disposal
or final
of solid
solid waste.”
disposal of
utilization, processing,
treatment, utilization,
39-105. Those
DEQ
various regulations
pursuant to
under I.C.
its authority
to its
Those
regulations pursuant
I.C. §§ 39-105.
adopted various
authority under
DEQ adopted

(“IDAPA”). DEQ
in the
regulations
the Idaho
different
Administrative Code
regulations are
Idaho Administrative
are codified
codiﬁed in
adopted different
Code (“IDAPA”).
DEQ adopted
regulations
pollution, water
water quality,
waste, and
waste. Plaintiff
Plaintiff
air pollution,
regarding air
regulations regarding
solid waste.
and solid
hazardous waste,
quality, hazardous
alleges
with several
the Solid
Management Rules
Defendants have
failed to
to comply
of the
Solid Waste
Rules
alleges Defendants
several of
have failed
Waste Management
comply with
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.
adopted
forth in
and set
set forth
adopted by
58.01.06.
DEQ and
by DEQ

The
various classes
based on
into various
The Solid
the
facilities into
Management Rules
on the
Solid Waste
Rules segregate
segregate facilities
Waste Management
classes based
IDAPA
amount
for disposal
the facility
or processing.
amount and
of solid
solid waste
processing. IDAPA
and type
disposal or
waste the
accepts for
facility accepts
type of
IDAPA
58.01.06.009.
various regulatory
requirements. See
Each type
of facility
must meet
meet various
58.01.06.009. Each
See IDAPA
facility must
regulatory requirements.
type of
11 Facilities,
begins to
58.01.06.010-013.
that begins
Tier II
the owner
58.01.06.010-013. As
As to
to Tier
of aa facility
to
operator of
owner and
and operator
Facilities, the
facility that

accept
the date
the Solid
after the
Management Rules
Solid Waste
Rules were
date the
were adopted
accept waste
waste after
Waste Management
adopted (April
(April 2,
2003)
2, 2003)
must
various applications
various approvals
prior to
obtain various
to accepting
must submit
submit various
applications to
to DEQ
accepting any
and obtain
approvals prior
DEQ and
any
waste. Facilities
were adopted
time the
existing at
the time
the Solid
Facilities existing
Management Rules
must do
at the
Solid Waste
Rules were
Waste Management
waste.
adopted must
do
within aa certain
so
were adopted.
time after
the rules
after the
certain time
rules were
adopted.
so within

“facility” is
“any area
A “facility”
A
for solid
including
management activity,
is defined
solid waste
deﬁned as
area used
waste management
as “any
used for
activity, including
“Tier II
waste.” IDAPA
Facility” includes
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(14).
A “Tier
11 Facility”
… [p]rocessing,
of solid
solid waste.”
includes aa
58.01.06.005(14). A
[p]rocessing, … of
“processing facility
“processing
volume of
that has
the facility
incinerator that
or incinerator
of wastes
at the
at any
cumulative volume
has aa cumulative
wastes at
facility or
facility at
any

IDAPA 58.01.06.009(03)(b).
A
one
yards.” IDAPA
time that
that is
than six
six hundred
is greater
greater than
hundred (600)
one time
cubic yards.”
58.01.06.009(03)(b). A
(600) cubic
“a facility
“Processing Facility”
Facility” includes
that uses
“Processing
uses biological
or chemical
chemical decomposition
to
biological or
decomposition to
includes “a
facility that
centers.”
handling at
for reuse,
prepare solid
waste handling
transfer stations
excluding waste
at transfer
stations or
or recycling
prepare
solid waste
waste for
recycling centers.”
reuse, excluding

IDAPA 58.01.06.005(32).
IDAPA
58.01.06.005(32).

Plaintiff must
matter of
Therefore,
be entitled
judgment as
entitled to
to be
to judgment
of law,
must establish
establish
as a
a matter
Therefore, to
law, Plaintiff
that
the operator
Defendants
Properties are
Defendants Gibson
of an
an area
operator and
owner respectively
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS Properties
are the
and owner
area that
respectively of
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uses biological
biological decomposition
other organic
materials
organic materials
to prepare
decomposition to
prepare grass,
and other
uses
leaves, and
grass, leaves,

for
for reuse
reuse as
as

in I.C.
defined
yards of
that on
than 600
the area
March 29,
on March
more than
of
deﬁned in
had more
area had
cubic yards
LG §§ 39-103(13);
600 cubic
2013, the
39-10303); that
29, 2013,

grass,
that as
neither Defendant
other organic
March 29,
Defendant had
organic material;
of March
and that
and other
had
as of
material; and
leaves, and
2013, neither
grass, leaves,
29, 2013,
IDAPA 58.01.06.012.
plan or
plan required
submitted
siting plan
the siting
operating plan
or operating
to DEQ
submitted to
required under
under IDAPA
58.01.06.012.
DEQ the

Plaintiff
burden of
Plaintiff has
the burden
the evidence.
proving these
of the
of proving
propositions to
to aa preponderance
these propositions
preponderance of
has the
evidence.
FINDINGS
FINDINGS OF
FACT
OF FACT
in south
VHS
west of
Properties owns
of Pleasant
Pleasant Valley
land in
south Ada
Ada County,
VHS Properties
owns land
Road.
slightly west
Valley Road.
County, slightly

In 2013,
In
that land.
Mr. Gibson
terms aa composting
Trns. p.
What he
he terms
composting operation
operation on
on that
land. Trns.
Gibson operated
operated what
p. 12,
2013, Mr.
12,
15-16. The
lns.
pp. 13-14;
barbed wire
10-14; pp.
13-14; pp.
that
The land
There is
Wire fence
is aa barbed
lns. 10-14;
land is
is largely
fence that
desert. There
bare desert.
pp. 15-16.
largely bare

encloses
year 2013
the space
Mr. Gibson
his operation.
the year
through the
the
at least
2013 through
operation. Since
Where Mr.
Since at
least the
Gibson has
has his
encloses the
space where
present, landscapers,
professionals, and
farmers have
lawn care
and farmers
delivered grass
care professionals,
have delivered
grass clippings,
landscapers, lawn
clippings, straw,
present,
straw,
Gibson’s operation.
and
pp.25-26, p.
p. 39.
Mr. Gibson’s
Mr. Gibson
the grass
Trns. pp.25-26,
to Mr.
operation. Trns.
stale hay
combines the
and stale
Gibson combines
39. Mr.
grass
hay to
29-32. This
in large
clippings,
windrows. Trns.
pp. 29-32.
with dirt
dirt in
This is
Trns. pp.
large Windrows.
is done
stale hay
and stale
done
clippings, straw,
straw, leaves,
leaves, and
hay with

in the
so
piles and
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
the piles
air to
the materials
the
materials to
turn the
to reach
to aid
allow air
reach the
Gibson can
can turn
and allow
aid in
so that

decomposition
process. Id.
Id. Trns.
p. 45.
purpose of
people bringing
bringing the
The purpose
the grass
clippings and
Trns. p.
of people
decomposition process.
45. The
and
grass clippings
“be made
compost.” Trns.
11-15. The
it can
other
that it
into compost.”
lns 11-15.
The
other materials
Trns. p.
materials is
is so
can “be
made into
so that
p. 33,
33, lns

kills weed
decomposition
pathogens. Trns
that kills
Trns
other pathogens.
materials produces
of those
heat that
decomposition of
those materials
and other
produces heat
weed seeds
seeds and
p. 47.
within aa temperature
Mr. Gibson
the piles
piles to
to stay
range between
temperature range
47. Mr.
Gibson desires
130 and
and 160
160
desires the
between 130
p.
stay Within
degrees
piles’ temperature
this is
not exact
Mr. Gibson
the piles’
although this
is not
exact as
tests the
temperature
Gibson simply
degrees Fahrenheit,
Fahrenheit, although
as Mr.
simply tests
with
with his
people who
bring
his hand.
the compost
Mr. Gibson
Trns. p.
to people
hand. Trns.
compost away
who bring
48. Mr.
Gibson occasionally
gives the
p. 48.
occasionally gives
away to
In the
such
Id. He
his site.
the compost
the
materials to
to his
He has
on at
at least
to another.
another. In
site. Id.
least one
has on
one occasion
compost to
such materials
occasion sold
sold the

past, he
product made
using the
the compost
liquid product
he attempted
attempted to
to sell
sell aa liquid
compost
made using
past,

little success.
with apparently
with
success.
apparently little

In 2013
their vehicles
In
where people
people pull
pull their
off the
the road
there are
2013 and
signs near
near Where
to
vehicles off
and now,
are signs
road to
now, there

enter
property and
the property
the windrows.
for dumping
enter the
there is
dumping
to approach
signs indicate
indicate there
is aa fee
Those signs
and to
approach the
Windrows. Those
fee for
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materials
visitors to
with their
their name
that
sign aa sheet
although that
materials and
to sign
name and
contact information,
sheet with
and ask
ask Visitors
and contact
information, although
fee
years Mr.
with
Mr. Gibson.
Through the
the years
Mr. Gibson
arrangements with
is rarely
fee is
collected by
Gibson has
has had
had arrangements
Gibson. Through
rarely collected
by Mr.
various lawn
would deposit
which they
governmental agencies
professionals and
under which
and governmental
deposit
various
agencies under
lawn care
care professionals
they would
grass
windrows on
into his
clippings and
his windrows.
For many
Mr. Gibson
his Windrows
on
and leaves
Windrows. For
Gibson had
had his
grass clippings
leaves into
many years,
years, Mr.
VHS’
another
piece of
property. However,
prior to
another piece
of real
real property.
to 2013
2013 they
on VHS’
since prior
located on
have been
been located
However, since
they have

property.
property.
In 2013
In
with Boise
Mr. Gibson
arrangement with
an arrangement
2013 and
Boise City.
Boise City
and 2014,
Gibson had
had such
such an
2014, Mr.
City. Boise
City
in the
generates
parks. When
from mowing
the spring,
its various
often in
mowing grass
most often
at its
When
generates grass
various parks.
grass clippings,
grass at
clippings, most
spring, from

those
process, the
the mowing
the clippings
clippings are
during the
mowing process,
cannot be
at a
mulched during
those cannot
are collected
collected and
and stored
stored at
be mulched
a
facility
prior to
time prior
For some
Park. Trns.
Trns. p.
near Julia
to 2013
2013 Boise
Julia Davis
Davis Park.
Boise City
some time
would
p. 307.
307. For
facility near
City would
In 2013,
it would
discard
would be
be more
clippings at
the Ada
the city
Landﬁll. In
at the
more
those clippings
Ada County
discard those
decided it
2013, the
County Landfill.
city decided
Gibson’s Windrows.
in Mr.
economical
windrows. The
The VHS
clippings in
Mr. Gibson’s
to deposit
is closer
to
economical to
those clippings
deposit those
VHS property
closer to
property is
Gibson’s fee
the
was lesser
than the
Landﬁll and
for dumping
Mr. Gibson’s
the County
the Julia
dumping was
Julia Davis
Davis facility
lesser
fee for
and Mr.
facility than
County Landfill
329-330. In
In 2013,
than
what the
than what
landﬁll charged.
the landfill
the city
Trns. 308,
delivered approximately
charged. Trns.
30
approximately 30
2013, the
308, 329-330.
city delivered

In 2014,
cubic
yards of
property. In
clippings to
the VHS
the city
of grass
to the
VHS property.
delivered approximately
grass clippings
cubic yards
approximately
2014, the
city delivered

130
clippings to
the VHS
Mr. Gibson
of grass
to the
Since 1992,
130 cubic
VHS property.
Gibson has
has had
had aa
cubic yards
grass clippings
property. Since
1992, Mr.
yards of

(“ACHD”) whereby
similar
with the
would
District (“ACHD”)
similar arrangement
the Ada
arrangement with
Ada County
Highway District
whereby they
County Highway
they would
in lieu
Prior to
deliver
them to
transporting them
the County
Landfill. Prior
his property
to his
lieu of
of transporting
to the
to
deliver leaves
leaves to
property in
County Landfill.
in 2010,
sometime
Mr. Gibson
kept his
his windrows
different parcel
sometime in
on aa different
of real
real property.
Around
parcel of
Windrows on
Gibson kept
property. Around
2010, Mr.
498the
year 2010,
the year
the windrows
the VHS
Trns. pp.
remain. Trns.
he moved
to the
Where they
Windrows to
VHS property
moved the
pp. 4982010, he
property where
they remain.

in 2013,
District delivered
99.
The Ada
Mr. Gibson
to Mr.
2015.
Ada County
delivered leaves
Gibson in
and 2015.
leaves to
99. The
2014, and
2013, 2014,
Highway District
County Highway

In March
in the
In
the
the windrows.
material in
March of
there existed
of 2013,
large quantity
of material
As of
of the
existed aa large
Windrows. As
quantity of
2013, there
trial this
this volume
date
volume had
p. 236.
volume of
the trial
The Court
the total
the
Trns. p.
total volume
of the
ﬁnds the
of the
Court finds
had increased.
increased. Trns.
date of
236. The
in the
material
windrows as
The windrows
the Windrows
material in
March 29,
of March
Windrows
cubic yards.
exceeded 600
600 cubic
as of
2013, exceeded
yards. The
29, 2013,
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contained
that
The Court
mixture of
of grass
ﬁnds that
contained aa mixture
Court finds
and compost.
compost. The
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
straw, hay,
leaves, straw,
soil, and
hay, soil,
between 2013
than 600
2014 Boise
clippings and
more than
of grass
2013 and
Boise City
and 2014
and
deposited more
grass clippings
cubic yards
between
600 cubic
yards of
City deposited
leaves
windrows on
into the
ACHD hauled
the Windrows
the VHS
on the
2013 and
more
VHS property.
and 2015,
hauled more
Between 2013
leaves into
property. Between
2015, ACHD
than
yards of
property.
than 11,000
the VHS
of leaves
to the
VHS property.
cubic yards
leaves to
11,000 cubic
The
Plaintiff has
that neither
neither Mr.
The Court
Mr. Gibson
nor VHS
LLC
ﬁnds Plaintiff
Court finds
proven that
has proven
Gibson nor
VHS Properties,
Properties, LLC
has
plan for
siting application
for the
the composting
Mr.
operating plan
application or
or operating
composting operation
operation on
on Road.
submitted aa siting
has submitted
Road. Mr.
Gibson
that he
not done
his composting
its current
current
testiﬁed that
he has
he moved
composting operation
operation to
to its
since he
Gibson testified
has not
done so
moved his
so since
13-25. Mr.
location
with DEQ,
Smith Property.
the Smith
lns 13-25.
Mr. Ehlert,
Trns. p.
investigator with
location on
on the
an investigator
also
p. 96,
Ehlert, an
Property. Trns.
96, lns
DEQ, also

testified
that as
with the
Mr. Gibson
not complied
the site
plan
March 29,
operating plan
testiﬁed that
of March
site or
or operating
complied with
Gibson had
had not
as of
2013, Mr.
29, 2013,
2-12. Mr.
11 Facility.
requirements
p. 247,
Ehlert also
Tier II
that from
from
for aa Tier
Mr. Ehlert
Trns. p.
requirements for
lns. 2-12.
testiﬁed that
also testified
Facility. Trns.
247, lns.

March
with the
through the
the date
the trial,
LLC has
the
March 29,
2013 through
of the
complied with
never complied
VHS Properties,
has never
date of
Properties, LLC
trial, VHS
29, 2013
DEQ’s regulations.
11 Facility
siting
p. 402,
siting or
Tier II
for aa Tier
Trns. p.
operating requirements
requirements for
or operating
lns.
regulations. Trns.
under DEQ’s
Facility under
402, lns.
3-19.
3-19.

CONCLUSIONS
LAW
OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF
11
Plaintiff alleges
Plaintiff
that the
Tier II
the Defendants
the operator
Defendants are,
of aa Tier
operator and
owner of
alleges that
and owner
respectively, the
are, respectively,

Solid
with the
various regulations
not complied
the various
regulations
Defendants have
Processing Facility
complied with
Solid Waste
and Defendants
have not
Waste Processing
Facility and
promulgated by
people who
the Department
Department for
for people
facilities.
promulgated
who own
own and
and operate
operate such
such facilities.
by the

It is
It
undisputed that
that neither
neither Mr.
Mr. Gibson
nor VHS
the appropriate
is undisputed
appropriate
submitted the
Gibson nor
VHS has
has ever
ever submitted
DEQ’s regulations
11
siting plan
siting
plan or
plan required
under DEQ’s
Tier II
or operation
operation plan
regulations of
of owners
of Tier
required under
operators of
owners and
and operators
that what
Facilities.
been doing
Mr. Gibson
There is
Facilities. There
is no
no dispute
What Mr.
doing since
2013 is
is occurring
occurring on
on
since 2013
dispute that
Gibson has
has been
11 Solid
trial is
Tier II
land
by VHS.
whether Mr.
The issue
Mr. Gibson
operating aa Tier
at trial
is simply
is operating
land owned
Solid
Gibson is
VHS. The
issue at
owned by
simply whether

Waste
Processing Facility.
Waste Processing
Facility.

“facility” is
“any area
As
waste management
for solid
management
As noted
is defined
noted above,
solid waste
deﬁned as
area used
as “any
used for
above, aa “facility”
“Tier II
waste.” IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(14).
A “Tier
II
activity,
including … [p]rocessing
of solid
solid waste.”
58.01.06.005(14). A
[p]rocessing … of
activity, including
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“processing facility
Facility” includes
Facility”
volume of
that has
incinerator that
or incinerator
of wastes
at
cumulative volume
includes aa “processing
has aa cumulative
wastes at
facility or

IDAPA
the
yards.” IDAPA
time that
that is
than six
the facility
six hundred
at any
is greater
greater than
hundred (600)
one time
cubic yards.”
facility at
any one
(600) cubic
“a facility
“Processing Facility”
Facility” is
A “Processing
58.01.06.009(03)(b).
biological or
that uses
is “a
or chemical
chemical
uses biological
facility that
58.01.06.009(03)(b). A

decomposition
prepare solid
handling at
for reuse,
transfer stations
to prepare
excluding waste
at transfer
stations or
or
decomposition to
solid waste
waste for
waste handling
reuse, excluding
centers.” IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(32).
recycling
recycling centers.”
58.01.06.005(32).

if the
The
biological or
then determine
The Court
the VHS
for the
the biological
determine if
must then
is an
an area
or
Court must
VHS property
area used
used for
property is
if so,
chemical
whether the
for reuse
the VHS
chemical decomposition
of solid
at
decomposition of
solid waste
VHS property
has had
had at
waste for
reuse and,
property has
and, if
so, Whether
any
waste that
time aa cumulative
that is
than 600
of waste
is greater
greater than
cumulative volume
one time
volume of
cubic yards.
600 cubic
yards.
any one
This
This involves
Are the
the grass
clippings and
Mr.
answering aa related
related question:
question: Are
involves answering
and leaves
grass clippings
leaves Mr.
“solid waste”?
waste”?
Gibson
professionals and
from lawn
others “solid
lawn care
and others
Gibson receives
receives from
care professionals

“solid waste”
The
waste” as
that term
term is
The grass
clippings and
and leaves
Mr. Gibson
are “solid
grass clippings
as that
is
leaves Mr.
Gibson receives
receives are
defined
in I.C.
defined in
I.C. §§ 39-105(2).
39-105(2).
Mr.
that he
from various
Mr. Gibson
testified that
he receives
Gibson testified
and hay
various
receives grass
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
straw, and
leaves, straw,
hay from
persons.
persons.

Plaintiff presented
Plaintiff
the amount
Mr.
regarding the
almost no
no evidence
amount of
of straw
straw and
presented almost
and hay
evidence regarding
hay Mr.

Gibson
property. Therefore,
will ignore
the Court
the property.
or is
is currently
on the
Court will
ignore those
those
Gibson has
has received
received or
Therefore, the
currently on
Plaintiff’ s allegation
materials
clippings and
The Court
regarding grass
materials and
allegation regarding
must
on Plaintiff’s
Court must
and leaves.
and focus
focus on
leaves. The
grass clippings

if those
determine
determine if
materials are
those materials
solid waste.
are solid
waste.
The
The legislature
legislature defined
defined solid
solid waste
waste as:
as:
Garbage,
including solid
other discarded
solid
radionuclides and
and other
discarded materials,
materials, including
Garbage, refuse,
refuse, radionuclides
waste materials
from industrial,
resulting from
materials resulting
commercial and
agricultural operations
operations
and agricultural
waste
industrial, commercial
in
and
but does
from community
not include
materials in
activities but
or dissolved
include solid
solid or
and from
dissolved materials
does not
community activities
in water
domestic
other significant
significant pollutants
pollutants in
or other
water resources,
domestic sewage
such as
sewage or
as silt,
resources, such
silt,
in industrial
dissolved
waste water
water effluents,
industrial waste
or suspended
solids in
dissolved or
dissolved
suspended solids
efﬂuents, dissolved
39in irrigation
irrigation return
materials
other common
materials in
return flows
or other
common water
pollutants. I.C.
water pollutants.
ﬂows or
I.C. §§ 39103(13).
103(13).
“to discard”
“to get
discard” means
Outside
useless or
rid of
of aa card
get rid
of especially
or
means “to
Outside of
card game,
as useless
especially as
game, “to
th
(11th
“Discard implies
unwanted.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
unwanted.” Merriam-Webster’s
ed.
implies the
the
Collegiate Dictionary
ed. 2005).
Dictionary (11
2005). “Discard
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letting
letting go
that has
throwing away
something that
though often
often
or superfluous
or throwing
of something
has become
superﬂuous though
become useless
useless or
go or
away of
“to discard”
discard” has
clothes].” Id.
not
Id. The
verb “to
been defined
The verb
not intrinsically
has also
deﬁned
old clothes].”
also been
valueless [discard
intrinsically valueless
[discard old
th
(4th
“cast aside;
as
up.” The
New Shorter
English Dictionary
The New
Shorter Oxford
to “cast
Oxford English
684 (4
give up.”
as to
Dictionary 684
abandon; give
reject; abandon;
aside; reject;

“garbage” and
“the worthless
“refuse” have
ed.
worthless or
similar meanings.
The terms
terms “garbage”
or
meanings. Refuse
is “the
Refuse is
and “refuse”
have similar
ed. 1993).
1993). The

useless part
part
useless

th
(11th
something.” Merriam-Webster’s
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
of
ed.
is
of something.”
Collegiate Dictionary
Garbage is
ed. 2005).
Dictionary (11
2005). Garbage

material.”11 Id.
“discarded or
“discarded
useless material.”
Id.
or useless

Defendants
that the
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
not aa
Defendants argue
and leaves
Gibson composts
are not
composts are
grass clippings
leaves Mr.
argue that

“solid.” This
“solid.”
their plain
This argument
This Court
plain
terms their
argument is
is simply
is required
to give
required to
Court is
ridiculous. This
give terms
simply ridiculous.
ordinary
that the
the grass
Mr. Gibson
not
meaning. Defendants
Defendants argue
and leaves
Gibson composts
are not
composts are
argue that
grass and
leaves Mr.
ordinary meaning.
garbage
because they
into aa useful
This Court
that the
the
or refuse
Court concludes
can be
turned into
product. This
concludes that
garbage or
refuse because
useful product.
be turned
they can
in I.C.
definition
possessor no
use
deﬁnition of
longer has
materials aa possessor
of solid
no longer
solid waste
includes materials
has a
waste in
LG §§ 39-103(13)
a use
39-103(13) includes

if those
willing to
for
for and
the possessor
materials may
is Willing
to give
or discard,
those materials
give away,
and the
even if
possessor is
abandon, or
discard, even
may
away, abandon,
have
value or
that Mr.
the fact
Mr. Gibson
the grass
or use
to another.
another. Therefore,
fact that
Gibson decomposes
and
have value
grass and
decomposes the
use to
Therefore, the
leaves
produces humus,
useful product,
whether or
not determinative
not the
the grass
determinative of
is not
of Whether
or not
and produces
and
grass and
leaves and
product, is
humus, aa useful
“solid waste.”
leaves
waste.” The
The determinative
not the
the grass
Whether or
determinative question
is whether
or not
question is
are “solid
and leaves
grass and
have
leaves are
leaves have
“discarded.”
been “discarded.”
been

Ninth Circuit
In Safe
In
Air for
for Everyone
Meyer, the
the Ninth
Whether
Circuit Court
of Appeals
Court of
Appeals considered
considered whether
v. Meyer,
Everyone v.
Safe Air
farmers’ fields
in the
the
bluegrass plants
from Kentucky
left in
the stubble
the farmers’
the farmer
farmer
plants left
after the
fields after
straw from
and straw
stubble and
Kentucky bluegrass

has
were solid
waste under
the seeds
the federal
federal Resource
solid waste
under the
has harvested
and Conservation
Conservation
Resource Recovery
harvested the
seeds were
Recovery and
th
(9th
“solid waste”
(“RCRA”). 373
Act (“RCRA”).
The definition
deﬁnition of
Act
Cir.
waste” used
used by
Cir. 2004).
of “solid
Congress
F.3d 1035
1035 (9
373 F.3d
2004). The
by Congress

in RCRA
in I.C.
RCRA is
that found
similar to
definition
the definition
in
identical to
is substantially
to that
to the
found in
and identical
LC. §§ 39-103(13)
substantially similar
39-103(13) and

“any garbage,
in IDAPA.
In RCRA,
IDAPA. 58.01.06.005(44).
in
solid waste
deﬁned solid
waste as
Congress defined
as “any
refuse,
RCRA, Congress
58.01.06.005(44). In
garbage, refuse,
from aa waste
treatment plant,
treatment plant,
air pollution
sludge
water supply
plant, or
pollution control
control facility
or air
sludge from
waste treatment
facility
plant, water
supply treatment
1
1

DEQ
has chosen
garbage more
to define
more restrictively
to include
I.D.A.P.A. 58.01.06.005(15).
include only
deﬁne garbage
chosen to
scraps. See
food scraps.
58.01 .06.005(15).
restrictively to
See I.D.A.P.A.
DEQ has
only food
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and
and

other
other discarded
discarded material,
material,

including
including

solid,
solid,

liquid,
liquid,

semisolid,
semisolid,

or
or

contained
contained

gaseous
from industrial,
material resulting
resulting from
agricultural operations,
and agricultural
and
gaseous material
industrial, commercial,
commercial, mining,
mining, and
operations, and
activities.” 42
42 U.S.C.
from
from community
U.S.C. §§ 6903(27).
community activities.”
(emphasis added).
added).
6903(27). (emphasis
in the
In Safe
Ninth Circuit
In
Air, the
that whether
left in
the grass
the fields
the Ninth
Whether the
Circuit determined
determined that
ﬁelds
residue left
grass residue
Safe Air,

“solid waste”
after
was or
was not
waste” under
under RCRA
RCRA
not “solid
after farmers
farmers harvested
or was
bluegrass seeds
harvested Kentucky
seeds was
Kentucky bluegrass
material.’ Id.
‘discarded material.’
depended
upon whether
was ‘discarded
Id. 373
After
the grass
1041. After
Whether the
at 1041.
residue was
grass residue
F.3d at
depended upon
373 F.3d

it was
considering
by other
Ninth Circuit
the Ninth
other circuits,
Circuit determined
determined it
appropriate to
to
considering decisions
decisions by
was appropriate
circuits, the
“discarded.”
evaluate
when determining
been “discarded.”
determining whether
material had
three questions
Whether aa certain
certain material
questions when
had been
evaluate three

Those
Those questions
questions are:
are:
“destined for
in aa
(1)
beneficial reuse
the material
for beneﬁcial
material is
whether the
is “destined
or recycling
reuse or
recycling in
(1) whether
itself”; (2)
continuous
whether the
the generating
the materials
generating industry
materials
continuous process
process by
industry itself”;
by the
(2) whether
are
being actively
potential of
the potential
Whether they
of being
being
or whether
are being
have the
actively reused,
reused, or
merely have
they merely
reused;
whether the
being reused
by its
original owner,
the materials
its original
materials are
are being
reused by
as
owner, as
reused; (3)
(3) Whether
opposed
by aa salvager
Id. 373
citations
or reclaimer.
reclaimer. Id.
to use
at 1043
1043 (internal
salvager or
F.3d at
opposed to
use by
373 F.3d
(internal citations
omitted)(emphasis
in original).
original).
omitted)(emphasis in

“solid waste”
RCRA
that the
The Ninth
the grass
not “solid
The
Ninth Circuit
waste” under
Circuit concluded
under RCRA
residue was
grass residue
concluded that
was not

because
because

it was
in aa process
original owners,
the original
the farmers,
it
by the
process beneficial
beneficial to
to
reused by
was actively
farmers, in
owners, the
actively reused

them. Id.
them.
Id.

that are
original possessor
original
the original
the original
As
by the
materials that
As to
to materials
or the
are arguably
discarded by
possessor or
arguably discarded
then later
the question
later reused
consumer
by another,
whether those
materials qualify
of Whether
question of
those materials
consumer and
and then
reused by
as
another, the
qualify as

“solid waste”
RCRA appears
the RCRA
the facts.
“solid
waste” under
under the
for example,
dependent upon
upon the
facts. See
Citizens
appears very
See for
example, Citizens
very dependent
609-611 (W.D.
Penn.
Coal
Matt Canestrale
Inc., 51
51 F.Supp.3d
Canestrale Contracting,
Council v.
F.Supp.3d 593,
Coal Council
v. Matt
Contracting, Inc,
(W.D. Penn.
593, 609-611

2014)(holding
whether
in amended
complaint sufficient
sufﬁcient to
to raise
of fact
fact as
to Whether
allegations in
raise issue
amended complaint
issue of
as to
2014)(holding allegations
materials” under
“discarded materials”
coal
under RCRA
RCRA and
ultimate
refuse and
and coal
ash were
and discussing
discussing ultimate
coal refuse
coal ash
were “discarded

conclusion
Fertilizer v.
E.P.A., 350
is aa factual
1268 (D.C.
conclusion is
and Safe
and Fertilizer
factual one),
Food and
F.3d 1263,
v. E.P.A.,
350 F.3d
1263, 1268
(DC.
Safe Food
one), and
“discard” clearly
Cir.
that while
term “discard”
the term
not include
material reused
while the
Cir. 2003)(stating
or
include material
reused or
does not
clearly does
2003)(stating that
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in the
recycled
that material
the converse
not true.
The mere
the generating
material is
generating industry;
is not
mere fact
fact that
is
converse is
true. The
recycled in
industry; the
“discarded”).
destined
by another
been “discarded”).
that material
for recycling
not mean
material has
another does
mean that
destined for
has necessarily
does not
necessarily been
recycling by

Here
the grass
clippings and
the City
the various
Here the
of Boise,
and leaves
and the
landscapers
various landscapers
grass clippings
leaves the
ACHD, and
Boise, ACHD,
City of
Gibson’s Windrows
and
windrows is
beneficial reuse
into Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
not destined
for beneﬁcial
lawn professionals
is not
professionals deposited
destined for
and lawn
deposited into
reuse

it is
in aa continuous
or
people. While
point Mr.
Mr. Gibson
While at
testified it
is
at one
or recycling
continuous process
those people.
one point
Gibson testified
process by
recycling in
by those
“part of
agreement” that
“part
who dump
pick up
up compost,
that people
the agreement”
of the
to pick
dump grass
and leaves
people who
grass and
come back
back to
leaves come
compost,

there
little evidence
that such
the Ada
there is
is little
Boise City
and the
Ada County
evidence that
such ever
ever occurs.
occurs. Certainly
Certainly Boise
Highway
County Highway
City and
in exchange
District
were not
their grass
District were
for their
clippings and
not receiving
receiving compost
When those
exchange for
those
compost in
and leaves.
grass clippings
leaves. When

clippings
property there
being actively
clippings and
the VHS
there are,
arrive at
at the
to some
and leaves
VHS property
some extent,
leaves arrive
reused.
extent, being
actively reused.
are, to
They
their decomposition
into
with soil
mixed with
other compost
soil and
to encourage
decomposition into
are mixed
and other
compost and
and aerated
aerated to
encourage their
They are
what the
by their
their original
Will call
original owner.
not being
the Court
materials are
call compost.
being reused
What
Court will
Those materials
are not
owner.
compost. Those
reused by
The
The Court
the grass
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
ﬁnds the
Court finds
solid waste
under
and leaves
Gibson received
are solid
grass clippings
received are
waste under
leaves Mr.
I.C.
prepare that
that solid
The Court
Mr. Gibson
the VHS
ﬁnds Mr.
is using
using the
to prepare
Court finds
solid
Gibson is
VHS property
I.C. §§ 39-103(13).
39-103(13). The
property to
waste for
biological decomposition.
Mr. Gibson
for reuse
through the
the process
is
of biological
decomposition. Therefore,
Gibson is
waste
reuse through
process of
Therefore, Mr.
in the
if
EPHA. The
processing solid
then decide
the EPHA.
The Court
terms are
must then
solid waste
those terms
Court must
processing
are defined
deﬁned in
waste as
decide if
as those

Mr.
possessed aa sufficient
waste such
time possessed
that the
Mr. Gibson
the VHS
sufficient quantity
at any
of solid
solid waste
Gibson has
has at
one time
VHS
such that
quantity of
any one
11 Facility.
property qualifies
Tier II
qualifies as
as a
a Tier
Facility.
property

The
this issue.
The Department
Department argues
the requirement
requirement
on this
To meet
meet the
somewhat inconsistently
argues somewhat
issue. To
inconsistently on
11 Facility,
of
being aa Tier
Tier II
time aa volume
that is
Mr. Gibson
of waste
is
of being
must have
at any
Gibson must
one time
volume of
have at
waste that
Facility, Mr.
any one

than 600
The Department
Department
greater
yards. (IDAPA
greater than
cubic yards.
600 cubic
(IDAPA 58.01.06.009.03.b)(emphasis
58.01.06.009.03.b)(emphasis added).
added). The

“processing solid
in the
taking solid
that Mr.
form
the form
Mr. Gibson
argues
waste” because
is “processing
he is
is taking
solid waste”
solid waste
Gibson is
waste in
argues that
because he
them through
through biological
clippings and
of
biological decomposition
of discarded
decomposition
processing them
and leaves
and processing
grass clippings
discarded grass
leaves and
that can
into compost
The Department
Department concedes
into
useful materials
materials that
these are
can
compost and
and ultimately
humus. The
are useful
concedes these
ultimately humus.
this Court
be reused.
the Department
Department argues
all
Court should
consider all
should consider
argues this
reused. However,
be
However, the

in the
of
the material
the
material in
of the
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“waste” for
if the
11 Facility.
windrows as
purposes of
Tier II
determining if
for purposes
the VHS
The
of determining
is a
Windrows
VHS property
as “waste”
a Tier
Facility. The
property is

it believes
Department
proper. The
this is
Department makes
The Court
argument as
no argument
to why
is proper.
makes no
Court can
can only
believes this
conclude
as to
only conclude
Why it
“solid waste”
the
be “solid
waste” under
EHPA. The
the Department
Department believes
the EHPA.
The
both compost
to also
humus to
under the
compost and
and humus
believes both
also be

Court
not agree.
Court does
agree.
does not
Compost
in I.C.
and humus
are not
not solid
as defined
humus are
solid waste
waste as
Compost and
deﬁned in
I.C. §§ 39-103(13).
39-103(13).
Mr.
uses to
Mr. Gibson
the process
clippings.
testified as
to the
he uses
to decompose
and grass
Gibson testified
grass clippings.
leaves and
process he
decompose leaves
as to
in Windrows
He
windrows so
with compost
them with
them in
the rows
mixes them
or
He arranges
arranges them
can receive
and mixes
compost or
receive oxygen
rows can
so the
oxygen and

In this
in the
soil.
provide water.
water. In
Rain and
this environment,
the soil
microorganisms in
soil rapidly
soil. Rain
and snow
snow provide
environment, microorganisms
rapidly
in the
consume
produces heat
kills
This produces
nitrogen and
the nitrogen
the grass
which kills
heat which
and carbon
carbon in
and leaves.
consume the
grass and
leaves. This

unwanted seeds.
portion of
the microorganisms
the available
microorganisms have
When the
of the
organic
unwanted
available organic
have consumed
consumed some
some portion
seeds. When
product useful
useful as
material,
fertilizer or
the rows
remains is
What remains
is an
an organic
organic product
or soil
soil
rows cool.
cool. What
as a
a fertilizer
material, the
amendment.
amendment.
Mr.
process as
this process
Mr. Gibson
the end
Mr. Gibson
referred to
to the
of this
being humus.
testiﬁed
Gibson referred
end goal
goal of
humus. Mr.
Gibson testified
as being
it can
trial variously
it
years to
The parties
the trial
throughout the
take as
10 years
to create
parties throughout
can take
create humus.
humus. The
as many
as 10
variously
many as
in the
referred
windrows on
property as
the material
the Windrows
the VHS
The
material in
referred to
to the
on the
soil. The
VHS property
and soil.
as compost,
compost, humus,
humus, and

Court
will explain
understanding of
definition of
explain its
its understanding
the definition
of the
of those
terms.
those terms.
Court will
fertilizing
Compost
used for
that consists
mixture that
matter used
for fertilizing
is aa mixture
of decayed
organic matter
consists largely
Compost is
largely of
decayed organic
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
and
term given
the term
conditioning land.
is the
given
Collegiate Dictionary
land. Merriam-Webster’s
and conditioning
Compost is
255. Compost
Dictionary 255.

to
partially decayed
ultimate stage
remaining at
the material
the ultimate
material remaining
matter. Humus
at the
of
organic matter.
is the
to partially
Humus is
stage of
decayed organic
the material
decomposition
material can
longer be
of organic
organic matter,
when the
no longer
broken down
organic
decomposition of
can no
down by
be broken
matter, when
by organic

It is
that portion
matter which
decomposition.
portion of
which is
is that
of soil
soil organic
organic matter
is completely
decomposition. It
and has
has
completely amorphous,
amorphous, and
The Biochemistry
no
plants. Whitehead,
no cellular
cellular structure
characteristic of
of plants.
of
D.C. &
structure characteristic
& Tinsley,
J ., The
Biochemistry of
Whitehead, D.C.
Tinsley, J.,

8497857
the Science
Humus
of the
of Food
Journal of
Humus Formation,
and Agriculture,
Science of
Vol. 14,
Food and
Issue 12,
Formation, Journal
Agriculture, Vol.
14, Issue
12, 849–857

in the
point in
(1963).
the process
the grass
clippings and
Thus at
at some
of decomposition,
and leaves
some point
grass clippings
process of
leaves
decomposition, the
(1963). Thus
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“compost,” at
become “compost,”
which stage
fertilizer or
at which
or soil
soil amendment.
amendment. However,
are useful
useful as
stage they
become
as a
a fertilizer
However,
they are

it can
At this
it is
compost
will continue
point it
properly called
until it
this point
continue to
to decay
no more.
is properly
more. At
compost Will
can decay
called
decay until
decay no
in soil
it is
humus
unchanged for
for long
long periods
time.
remains in
of time.
soil unchanged
is stable
humus and
periods of
stable and
and remains
and it

Using
neither
the Court
the same
deﬁnitions of
finds neither
Using the
of solid
solid waste
Court finds
same definitions
waste discussed
discussed above,
above, the
compost
EPHA. Certainly
that people
nor humus
the EPHA.
there is
is no
no evidence
humus are
solid waste
under the
compost nor
are solid
evidence that
people
waste under
Certainly there
Gibson’s testimony
have
property. As
from Mr.
Mr. Gibson’s
the VHS
at the
As is
is clear
discarding compost
clear from
compost at
VHS property.
have been
been discarding
testimony

about
uses, compost
time
the process
investment of
he uses,
both require
require some
of energy
humus both
compost and
and humus
and time
some investment
about the
process he
energy and
to
be
making compost
from discarded
Mr. Gibson
to create.
is making
What he
he creates
cannot be
Gibson is
compost from
but what
create. Mr.
creates cannot
discarded materials,
materials, but
said
waste rules
well. The
this conclusion
The solid
The
to have
solid waste
support this
conclusion as
said to
have been
been discarded
discarded by
rules support
as well.
anyone. The
by anyone.
“Yard Waste”
Waste” as:
“Weeds, straw,
Department
Department has
has defined
deﬁned “Yard
grass clippings,
as: “Weeds,
clippings, brush,
straw, leaves,
leaves, grass
brush, wood,
wood,

and
from general
other natural,
materials typically
maintenance
general landscape
and other
derived from
landscape maintenance
natural, organic,
organic, materials
typically derived
activities.” IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(52).
activities.”
This definition
definition does
not include
or humus
include compost
humus made
compost or
made
does not
58.01.06.005(52). This

by decomposing
the materials
materials listed.
of the
listed.
decomposing any
any of
by
When
being grass
become
clippings and
clippings and
When do
and leaves
stop being
and leaves
and become
grass clippings
grass clippings
leaves stop
leaves and
do grass
in this
little evidence
compost?
was little
this issue
this
trial. As
There was
on this
at trial.
As discussed
presented on
compost? There
evidence presented
issue at
discussed above,
above, in
Merriam-Webster defines
case,
of partially
consists of
compost simply
and leaves.
deﬁnes
grass and
leaves. Merriam-Webster
partially decayed
simply consists
decayed grass
case, compost
in the
fertilizing and
trier of
compost
being used
for fertilizing
the trier
the
conditioning. As
of fact
fact and
of being
As the
compost as
and conditioning.
and in
capable of
used for
as capable

absence
what itit believes
believes to
be the
Will simply
the contrary,
the Court
the
of any
to the
to be
Court will
evidence to
absence of
simply apply
contrary, the
any evidence
apply What
plain meaning
become compost
when
plain
this question.
meaning of
clippings and
of compost
to this
question. Grass
compost to
and leaves
compost when
Grass clippings
leaves become
it is
in texture,
like soil;
they
black, crumbly
smell
look like
is black,
no odor
of decay,
and has
has no
but may
odor of
texture, and
soil; it
crumbly in
they look
decay, but
may smell
rotting plants.
like earth
than rotting
This conclusion
slightly
plants. This
rather than
earth rather
smells like
is consistent
consistent
conclusion is
Compost smells
sweet. Compost
slightly sweet.
Department’s definition
with
with the
the Department’s
deﬁnition of
which is
which waste
of recycling
is defined
defined as
waste
process by
as a
a process
recycling which
by which

in such
into aa new
that the
original identity
materials
manner that
the original
materials are
transformed into
are transformed
new product
product in
such aa manner
as a
a
identity as

IDAPA 58.01.06.005(37).
product is
is lost.
lost. IDAPA
product
58.01.06.005(37).
LAW - 12
12
FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS
FINDINGS OF
FACT AND
OF FACT
OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF
—

001209

The
little or
from which
The Department
Department produced
the Court
the
which the
determine the
or no
no evidence
Court could
evidence from
could determine
produced little
makeup
the windrows
the VHS
contain soil
of the
on the
soil (not
makeup of
solid waste);
Windrows on
VHS property.
discarded
property. They
(not solid
They contain
waste); discarded
grass
waste); compost
waste).
clipping and
solid waste),
humus (not
solid waste).
compost (not
and humus
and leaves
grass clipping
leaves (solid
(solid waste);
(not solid
(not solid
waste), and
Mr.
windrows have
Ehlert offered
that the
Mr. Ehlert
the Windrows
approximation that
total volume
rough approximation
offered aa very
exceeding
volume exceeding
have aa total
very rough
10,000
yards. However,
the Court
the windrows
determine how
cannot determine
much of
of the
Court cannot
Windrows are
how much
are
cubic yards.
However, the
10,000 cubic
“waste” and
in March
“waste”
went to
Ehlert initially
Mr. Ehlert
the property
March of
much are
not. Mr.
to the
of 2013
2013 due
to
and how
how much
are not.
due to
initially went
property in

aa complaint
property lodged
Ehlert
from the
the property
Mr. Ehlert
complaint of
another composting
of odor
composting operation.
operation. Mr.
odor from
lodged by
by another
detected
This suggests
that either
the Court
either the
the volume
clippings and
no foul
foul odor.
to the
of grass
Court that
volume of
and
detected no
grass clippings
odor. This
suggests to
in the
leaves
were well
well mixed
windrows.
into the
the early
the Windrows.
mixed into
or they
of decomposition
decomposition was
low or
stages of
leaves in
was low
early stages
they were

From
pictures, the
places Where
where
From the
the pictures,
the windrows
there are
to be
Windrows appear
are some
compost. Certainly
some places
appear to
be compost.
Certainly there
grass
being such.
from the
the
distinguishable as
or straw
Visible and
straw are
are visible
and distinguishable
and hay
grass and
such. However,
as being
However, from
hay or
photographs alone,
windrows appear
unwilling to
the Windrows
The Court
photographs
to consist
of compost.
is unwilling
to
consist largely
Court is
compost. The
appear to
alone, the
largely of
conclude
from the
that the
time had
the windrows
the VHS
at any
of
alone that
Windrows alone
VHS property
has at
one time
had aa volume
volume of
conclude from
property has
any one
greater
waste.2
than 600
greater than
of waste.2
cubic yards
600 cubic
yards of

if there
Therefore,
that the
the Court
the VHS
there is
other evidence
determine if
must determine
is other
at
Court must
VHS property
evidence that
Therefore, the
property at
any
volume of
time had
than 600
clippings or
The
of grass
or leaves
greater than
one time
had aa volume
grass clippings
cubic yards.
leaves greater
600 cubic
yards. The
any one
Department
presented testimony
from aa Mr.
the Ada
Mr. Scott
Department presented
an employee
of the
Scott Frisbie,
Ada County
Frisbie, an
testimony from
employee of
County
Highway
District. Through
Through his
his testimony
the documents
his testimony,
the
during his
admitted during
and the
documents admitted
testimony and
Highway District.
testimony, the
Gibson’s Windrows
in 2013;
Court
windrows in
ACHD delivered
Mr. Gibson’s
of leaves
to Mr.
Court concludes
delivered 5003
concludes ACHD
cubic yards
leaves to
5003 cubic
2013;
yards of

in 2014;
in 2015.
this sufficient
from which
4,908
yards in
yards in
which
sufﬁcient evidence
Is this
2015. Is
and 1,548
evidence from
cubic yards
cubic yards
2014; and
1,548 cubic
4,908 cubic
that over
the
yards of
were on
property at
the Court
the property
of leaves
on the
at any
given
Court can
can conclude
conclude that
over 600
cubic yards
leaves were
600 cubic
any given

it is.
time?
The Court
time? The
Court concludes
is.
concludes it
22

in the windrows should
The Department has
The
all be
never argued
should all
argued that the material in
has never
considered waste
waste because
because it
be considered
’nfor
should
Ass’n
for Restoration
the Environment,
having been
Inc.
all be
should all
Restoration of
Environment, Inc.
considered as
abandoned. See
been abandoned.
be considered
as having
See Community
Community Ass
ofthe
that argument.
v.
LLC, 80
won’t consider
the Court
Therefore the
v. Cow
1180 (E.D.Wash.
argument.
Court won’t
consider that
F.Supp.3d 1180
Cow Place,
80 F.Supp.3d
Place, LLC,
(E.D.Wash. 2015).
2015). Therefore
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in dump
12
F risbie testified
Mr.
ACHD delivered
that have
the leaves
Mr. Frisbie
testified ACHD
of 12
delivered the
dump trucks
trucks that
have aa capacity
leaves in
capacity of

was no
cubic
There was
no testimony
on any
given day.
how many
trucks delivered
delivered leaves
cubic yards.
about how
leaves on
testimony about
yards. There
many trucks
day.
any given
in October,
However
November, and
Mr. Frisbie
the leaves
Frisbie testified
testiﬁed most
most of
of the
delivered in
and
However Mr.
were delivered
leaves were
October, November,

Gibson’s testimony
December
process
Mr. Gibson’s
the composting
of each
composting process
Given Mr.
December of
how slow
each year.
slow the
about how
testimony about
year. Given

it is
can
be, the
than not
that if ACHD
ACHD delivered
the Court
not that
is more
more likely
is convinced
Court is
can be,
convinced it
delivered even
even 4000
4000 cubic
cubic
likely than

yards of
between October
that there
Mr. Gibson
there must
must have
of leaves
to Mr.
2013 and
December 2013,
Gibson between
and December
October 2013
have
leaves to
2013, that
yards
existed
property at
yards of
time more
than 600
the property
The Court
on the
at one
more than
of leaves.
existed on
Court reaches
one time
reaches aa
cubic yards
leaves. The
600 cubic
similar
unwilling to
similar conclusion
the year
The Court
the year
2014. The
to the
is unwilling
to do
to the
conclusion as
Court is
2015.
as to
do so
so as
as to
year 2014.
year 2015.

Plaintiff has
Therefore,
met its
its burden
the Court
the Plaintiff
the claim
proving the
claim set
of proving
Court concludes
has met
burden of
set
concludes the
Therefore, the
in its
forth
forth in
its complaint.
The Court
the affirmative
afﬁrmative defenses
complaint. The
of the
Court must,
raised
some of
defenses raised
address some
however, address
must, however,

by the
the defendants.
defendants.
by
The
at the
The grass
clippings and
and leaves
the VHS
are not
not crop
grass clippings
leaves received
VHS property
crop residue
residue
received at
property are
under
IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.ii.
under IDAPA
58.01.06.03.b.ii.
sub-part 3,
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001
Defendants
that DEQ
Defendants argue
has specifically
argue that
58.01.06.001 sub-part
speciﬁcally chosen,
chosen, in
DEQ has
3,

to
waste management
from the
clippings and
the solid
exempt grass
management regulations
to exempt
solid waste
regulations because
and leaves
grass clippings
grass
leaves from
because grass
“crop (plant)
residue.” IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.ii
clippings
that the
clippings and
the rules
and leaves
are “crop
speciﬁes that
rules
58.01.06.03.b.ii specifies
leaves are
(plant) residue.”
“manures and
regulating
ultimately returned
not apply
regulating solid
to
to “manures
solid waste
returned to
and crop(plant)
residues ultimately
waste do
do not
cr0p(plant) residues
apply to
rates.” The
in its
the
this affirmative
the soil
The Court
its Memorandum
afﬁrmative defense
soil at
at agronomic
agronomic rates.”
Memorandum
Court addressed
defense in
addressed this

Plaintiff’ 5 Motion
Decision
Motion for
for Summary
The Court
Decision and
incorporates
Order Denying
Court incorporates
Judgment. The
and Order
Denying Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment.

it expressed
the
judgment summarily
that defense
the reasoning
The Court
enter judgment
reasoning it
there. The
to enter
on that
Court declined
declined to
defense
expressed there.
summarily on
because the
the Court
an issue
Court concluded
concluded an
issue
because

of
where Mr.
Mr. Gibson
his
receiving his
of fact
fact existed
to Where
existed as
Gibson was
as to
was receiving

trial only
grass
– the
The evidence
clippings and
the city
at trial
of Boise
Boise
established two
and leaves.
evidence at
grass clippings
leaves. The
sources 7
two sources
only established
city of
from various
City
various parks
parks owned
the Ada
District. The
The grass
clippings came
and the
Ada County
grass clippings
came from
owned
Highway District.
County Highway
City and
in Ada
from trees
that border
and
border streets
the City
The leaves
of Boise.
streets
trees in
and operated
Boise. The
Ada County
operated by
came from
leaves came
County that
City of
by the

AND CONCLUSIONS
LAW -- 14
14
FINDINGS
FINDINGS OF
FACT AND
OF FACT
OF LAW
CONCLUSIONS OF

001211

ACHD’s right-of-ways.
right-of-Ways. The
and
Within ACHD’s
The Court
not crop
materials are
or are
Court concludes
these materials
are within
and roads
are not
crop
concludes these
roads or

IDAPA 58.01.06.03.b.ii
residue
within the
plants were
were not
the meaning
meaning of
not plants
plants
of IDAPA
those plants
residue within
58.01.06.03.b.ii because
because those

being cultivated
profit or
for profit
being
or subsistence.
cultivated for
subsistence.
Idaho
not aa statute
Idaho Code
statute of
is not
of repose.
repose.
Code §
39-108(4) is
§ 39-108(4)
In their
In
their closing
closing arguments
arguments Defendants
Defendants have
additional arguments
arguments and
raised additional
and made
have raised
made
in the
additional
upon in
this Court
the various
citations to
additional citations
to authority
on an
an issue
Court ruled
various summary
issue this
ruled upon
authority on
summary

judgment motions.
will not
their arguments.
That was
time for
The Court
not
the time
for Defendants
Defendants to
to make
make their
judgment
motions. That
arguments. The
Court will
was the
reconsider
will address
The Court
argument.
reconsider those
those decisions.
Court Will
one argument.
decisions. The
address one

Plaintiff from
bringing this
Defendants
bars Plaintiff
from bringing
this action.
that I.C.
Defendants contend
action.
contend that
1.0 §§ 39-108(4)
39-108(4) bars
Defendants
based on
this as
that statute
afﬁrmative defense
Defendants failed
failed to
to timely
an affirmative
on that
of
raise this
and raise
defense based
statute of
plead and
as an
timely plead
Plaintiff’s motion
it in
in their
limitations.
judgment
their opposition
limitations. Defendants
motion for
for summary
Defendants raised
opposition to
to Plaintiff’s
raised it
summary judgment

Plaintiff from
and
was an
precluded Plaintiff
this was
from recovery.
that precluded
standing that
Defendants
an issue
of standing
and argued
Now Defendants
issue of
argued this
recovery. Now
advance
that I.C.
the argument
of repose.
cite generally
to aa
is aa statute
argument that
statute of
repose. They
advance the
LG §§ 39-108(4)
39-108(4) is
generally to
They cite
6-1403. However,
decision
by the
that decision
interpreting I.C.
the Idaho
not
Idaho Supreme
Court interpreting
decision does
decision by
Supreme Court
I.C. §§ 6-1403.
does not
However, that

help
whether I.C.
limitations.
help decide
of limitations.
of repose
or aa statute
is a
statute of
statute of
I.C. §§ 39-108(4)
repose or
decide Whether
a statute
39-108(4) is
6-1403 explicitly
it is
I.C.
for subsection
which is
of repose,
is aa statute
is aa statute
except for
states it
subsection (3)
statute
statute of
I.C. §§ 6-1403
explicitly states
repose, except
(3) which

“no civil
6-1403. Defendants
of
words “no
limitations. I.C.
the words
ciVil or
administrative proceeding
of limitations.
Defendants argue
or administrative
proceeding
1.0 §§ 6-1403.
argue the

may
be brought
brought … more
than two
the director
after the
more than
director had
or ought
ought reasonably
to
knowledge or
had knowledge
two years
reasonably to
years after
may be
have
violation” means
the Violation”
not aa statute
is aa statute
of repose;
of the
means I.C.
knowledge of
had knowledge
statute of
statute
have had
I.C. §§ 39-108(4)
39-108(4) is
repose; not
in other
in Idaho.
limitation. However,
limitations in
similar words
of
other statutes
of limitation.
of limitations
statutes of
Idaho. See
appear in
words appear
See
However, similar

(“No claim
5-201 (“Civil
(“Civil actions
this chapter
I.C.
under this
be brought”)
brought”) and
claim under
chapter may
actions
and I.C.
I.C. §§ 6-1403(3)
LC. §§ 5-201
6-1403(3) (“No
may be
commenced”). The
it is
can
The Court
not aa statute
is not
of repose,
is aa
Court concludes
can only
statute of
I.C. §§ 39-108(4)
concludes I.C.
be commenced”).
39-108(4) is
repose, it
only be
that issue
limitations. Defendants
statute
afﬁrmative defense.
of limitations.
Defendants failed
failed to
to timely
an affirmative
statute of
plead that
defense.
issue as
as an
timely plead
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Defendants’ failed
Additionally,
failed to
to prove
of
under I.C.
statute of
defense under
prove aa defense
I.C. §§ 39-108(4)
as a
a statute
39-108(4) as
Additionally, Defendants’

Gibson’s composting
limitations.
that DEQ
limitations. Defendants
the size
Mr. Gibson’s
claim that
Defendants claim
knew of
of the
size of
of Mr.
composting operation
operation
DEQ knew

thing to
it is
since
to
Defendants have
is one
since 2004.
2004. However,
one thing
have successfully
as Defendants
argued themselves,
themselves, it
However, as
successfully argued

It is
thing entirely
know
waste
that Mr.
Mr. Gibson
lot of
another thing
to know
know how
much waste
is another
of compost.
know that
how much
Gibson has
has a
compost. It
a lot
entirely to
in the
he
the record
the
While there
there is
is some
he has
or has
to suggest
of the
has or
has received.
record to
some evidence
evidence in
received. While
suggest employees
employees of

Department
prior to
Department knew
Mr. Gibson
there is
operating aa composting
knew Mr.
composting facility
to 2011,
is no
no
Gibson was
was operating
facility prior
2011, there
evidence
was receiving
that any
ofﬁcial or
materials (as
or employee
knew he
he was
receiving discarded
evidence that
discarded materials
employee knew
DEQ official
(as
any DEQ
opposed
purchasing grass
not crop
materials were
to purchasing
knew those
knew
those materials
crop residue
and leaves),
residue (i.e.
were not
grass and
opposed to
(i.e. knew
leaves), knew
the
volume of
was receiving.
the volume
the grass
the grass
the source
or knew
knew the
of the
he was
of the
receiving.
and leaves),
and leaves
grass and
leaves he
source of
grass and
leaves), or
REMEDIES
REMEDIES

Plaintiff asks
Plaintiff
permanent injunction
this Court
requiring Defendants
injunction requiring
to issue
Defendants to
to submit
submit aa
Court to
asks this
issue aa permanent
full
plan, and
plan. The
siting application,
with an
The
operating plan,
operating plan.
full and
an operating
complete siting
and complete
and comply
application, operating
comply with
Department
penalty against
this Court
Department also
Defendant of
to impose
against each
of
Court to
impose aa monetary
also asks
asks this
each Defendant
monetary penalty
$10,000.
$10,000.
Idaho
bring an
the Department
Department may
enforcement action
an enforcement
action to
to compel
compel
Idaho Code
Code §
39-108(b) says
says the
may bring
§ 39-108(b)
compliance
with any
provision of
this act
The Department
Department wants
the Court
of this
or any
to compel
compliance with
wants the
Court to
compel
act or
rule. The
any provision
any rule.
siting plan
Mr.
plan and
with it.
that request
Mr. Gibson
plan and
it. However,
operating plan
to submit
submit aa siting
Gibson to
and operating
and comply
request
However, that
comply with
Department’s belief
appears
belief that
volumes of
that Mr.
the Department’s
Mr. Gibson
to the
large volumes
of waste
related to
Gibson currently
has large
appears related
waste
currently has

VHS’ property.
in the
sitting on
sitting
years
that sometime
the Court
the years
on VHS’
As discussed
is persuaded
sometime in
Court is
persuaded that
discussed above,
property. As
above, the
that he
than 600
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
2013
2013 and
more than
of grass
he
and leaves
and 2014,
Gibson had
had more
grass clippings
cubic yards
leaves that
600 cubic
2014, Mr.
yards of

through biological
for reuse.
was processing
processing through
biological decomposition
decomposition for
Those are
are now
now certainly
compost
reuse. Those
was
certainly compost

in the
It is
EPHA. It
fall under
that as
the definition
deﬁnition of
the EPHA.
the
and,
waste in
longer fall
no longer
of waste
is clear
of the
under the
clear that
as of
therefore, no
and, therefore,
the trial,
Mr. Gibson
clippings and
the Court
date
of the
to receive
cannot
continues to
Court cannot
Gibson continues
and leaves,
but the
receive grass
date of
grass clippings
trial, Mr.
leaves, but

might be.
time might
conclude
what volume
the material
material he
of the
he continues
to receive
or has
at any
continues to
volume of
has at
one time
receive or
conclude What
be.
any one
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The
important fact
The volume
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
of grass
is an
an important
fact
volume of
and leaves
Gibson receives
grass clippings
receives is
leaves Mr.
because that
under the
that determines
the Solid
The
his obligations
Management Rules.
determines his
obligations under
Solid Waste
Rules. The
Waste Management
because
“cumulative volume
Department
waste processing
processing facilities
volume of
Department has
the “cumulative
facilities based
on the
of
classified solid
solid waste
has classified
based on

time.” IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.009.
wastes at
The Department
Department appears
the facility
at any
to
at the
one time.”
appears to
wastes
58.01.06.009. The
facility at
any one

it has
contemplate
that aa facility
time
the volume
of waste
contemplate that
at any
or decrease
increase or
volume of
has at
one time
waste it
decrease the
facility may
may increase
any one
“below
and,
For example,
the Department
Department defines
change categories.
deﬁnes aa facility
categories. For
as “below
therefore, change
facility as
example, the
and, therefore,
concern” provided
it does
regulatory
provided it
not manage
the cumulative
certain waste
of
manage certain
cumulative volume
and the
volume of
waste and
does not
regulatory concern”

solid
waste at
time is
than or
the facility
three hundred
at any
is less
or equal
to three
at the
hundred (300)
solid waste
one (1)
less than
equal to
cubic
facility at
any one
(300) cubic
(1) time

(“BRC”)
IDAPA 58.01.06.009(01).
yards. IDAPA
of aa below
concern (“BRC”)
operators of
and operators
below regulatory
Owners and
regulatory concern
58.01.06.009(01). Owners
yards.
IDAPA 58.01.06.010(02).
facility
not submit
the Department
Department at
application to
submit an
an application
to the
at all.
all. IDAPA
need not
facility need
58.01.06.010(02).

Although
maintain on
Although they
the quantity
of waste
to maintain
on site
site documentation
of the
documentation of
required to
and type
are required
waste
quantity and
they are
type of
“the facility’s
status.” Id.
facility’s BRC
it
they
verify “the
Id. The
verify that
this means
that it
The Court
BRC status.”
to verify
Court assumes
means verify
receive to
assumes this
they receive

“at any
time” had
has
volume of
that exceeds
not “at
of waste
cumulative volume
has not
one time”
had aa cumulative
waste that
cubic yards.
exceeds 300
300 cubic
yards.
any one

if on
Left
Left unanswered
the Solid
the question:
single
on aa single
is the
What happens
Solid Waste
Rules is
happens if
question: What
unanswered by
Waste Rules
by the
day
unexpectedly large
waste and
for aa single
BRC facility
single day,
an unexpectedly
large load
of waste
and therefore,
gets an
load of
therefore, for
facility gets
they
day aa BRC
day, they
have
waste that
that exceeds
next day
The next
of waste
on hand
hand aa cumulative
cumulative volume
volume of
have on
cubic yards?
exceeds 300
300 cubic
yards? The
they
day they
process that
volume requirement.
Tier I1
that waste
fall back
the volume
Are they
after aa Tier
requirement. Are
forever after
and fall
back below
waste and
below the
process
they forever
“at one
time” they
volume above
Facility
the BRC/Tier
The Court
BRC/Tier I1 threshold?
threshold? The
Court
one time”
had aa volume
because “at
above the
Facility 7– because
they had

concludes
be read
that strictly.
the regulations
the Solid
Management
cannot be
regulations cannot
Solid Waste
read that
concludes the
Waste Management
strictly. Interestingly,
Interestingly, the
“prior to
Tier of
with the
that Tier
Tier “prior
the regulations
Rules
of Facility
to comply
regulations applicable
to that
require each
to
Rules require
applicable to
each Tier
Facility to
comply with
waste.” See
IDAPA 58.01.06.010(01),
accepting
at least
accepting waste.”
least some
and .012(01).
some
See IDAPA
However, at
58.01.06.010(01), .011(01),
.012(01). However,
.011(01), and

until they
into which
Tier they
fall until
processing facilities
which Tier
facilities cannot
cannot know
know into
of
processing
volume of
receive some
some volume
they fall
they receive

it is
within
that determines
Tier they
fall within
For some,
the volume
the volume
waste. For
volume and
is the
determines what
what Tier
alone that
and the
waste.
volume alone
some, it
they fall
with which
and,
which they
What regulations
must comply.
regulations with
therefore, what
comply.
and, therefore,
they must
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The
siting requirement
with the
The Court
Mr. Gibson
not required
the siting
requirement
is not
to comply
required to
Court concludes
Gibson is
concludes Mr.
comply with
11 Facilities
and
unless he
wants to
Tier II
time more
plan for
for Tier
Facilities unless
having at
operating plan
he wants
to continue
continue having
at any
more
and operating
one time
any one

If Mr.
than
yards of
than 600
than 300
clippings and
Mr. Gibson
of grass
and leaves.
Gibson receives
grass clippings
receives less
less than
cubic yards
cubic
leaves. If
600 cubic
300 cubic
yards of
before he
then he
them into
into compost
clippings and
turns them
he
of grass
he gets
and leaves
and turns
compost before
gets any
leaves and
grass clippings
more, then
yards
any more,
would qualify
below regulatory
concern facility.
would
as a
a below
facility.
regulatory concern
qualify as
The
will enjoin
from accepting
The Court
Mr. Gibson
enjoin Mr.
accepting any
Court will
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS Properties,
Properties, LLC,
LLC, from
any
additional
unless they
ﬁrst comply
with the
the
additional discarded
or straw
straw unless
grass clippings,
discarded grass
clippings, leaves,
leaves, hay,
comply with
they first
hay, or
IDAPA 58.01.06.010
provisions of
below regulatory
The Court
facilities. The
of IDAPA
to below
provisions
concern facilities.
Court
applicable to
58.01.06.010 applicable
regulatory concern

will enjoin
will
from accepting
that property
Mr. Gibson
LLC from
enjoin Mr.
or depositing
depositing on
on that
accepting or
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS Properties,
Properties, LLC
propelty
more
yards of
within any
than 300
similar material
material within
more than
of grass
or similar
grass clippings,
cubic yards
300 cubic
clippings, leaves,
straw, hay
leaves, straw,
hay or
any
twelve-month (12)
contiguous
unless they
ﬁrst complied
with the
the regulations
complied with
regulations
contiguous twelve-month
have first
period, unless
they have
(12) period,

volume of
wish to
applicable
the greater
material they
to accept.
to the
greater of
of volume
of material
applicable to
accept.
they Wish
The
The Department
Department also
Idaho Code
establishes
requests aa monetary
also requests
Code §
39-108(a) establishes
monetary penalty.
penalty. Idaho
§ 39-108(a)
in aa civil
that
provision of
that any
the
civil enforcement
enforcement action
determined in
action to
to have
of the
person determined
violated any
have violated
any person
any provision

EPHA or
EPHA
pursuant to
be liable
the act
for aa civil
not to
shall be
ciVil penalty
or any
to the
liable for
to exceed
promulgated pursuant
act shall
rule promulgated
exceed
penalty not
any rule

$10,000
per violation
violations whichever
for continuing
continuing Violations
Violation or
or $1,000
per day
is greater.
Whichever is
greater.
$10,000 per
$1,000 per
day for
As
the Department
Department did
not establish
Mr. Gibson
As stated
on how
establish on
stated above,
did not
how many
Gibson
occasions Mr.
above, the
many occasions
may
than 600
clippings
of more
more than
of discarded
cumulative volume
had aa cumulative
volume of
have had
grass clippings
discarded grass
cubic yards
600 cubic
yards of
may have
it occurred
in 2013
and
property. The
persuaded that
that it
the VHS
The Court
on the
is persuaded
at least
2013
Court is
least once
and leaves
VHS property.
occurred at
once in
leaves on
in 2014.
In their
their argument,
fine for
and
violation. They
the Department
Department seeks
for only
2014. In
and once
one Violation.
ask
once in
seeks a
a fine
argument, the
They ask
only one

maximum amount
for
for the
the maximum
permitted of
amount permitted
of $10,000.
$10,000.

In I.C.
In
the legislature
the monetary
authorizes whoever
is calculating
calculating the
legislature authorizes
Whoever is
I.C. §§ 39-108(5)(b)
monetary
39-108(5)(b) the
faith efforts
into account
with
penalty to
the seriousness
the violation
efforts to
Violation and
to take
take into
of the
to comply
and good
account the
seriousness of
good faith
penalty
comply with

At trial,
in determining
Ehlert testified
that in
fine to
the
determining the
the law.
Mr. Ehlert
the amount
testiﬁed that
amount of
of aa fine
to levy
weighs
law. At
trial, Mr.
DEQ weighs
levy DEQ
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the
potential for
harm to
the potential
for harm
the environment
the extent
extent of
the deviation.
environment and
Trns. p.
of the
to humans
humans and
deviation. Trns.
and the
and the
p.
255.
the appropriate
ﬁne for
for Mr.
Mr. Gibson
appropriate fine
Gibson as
255. Originally,
assessed the
as $3,500.
Apparently
Originally, DEQ
$3,500. Apparently
DEQ assessed
because Mr.
Mr. Gibson
not agree
Gibson did
did not
because
agree

DEQ’s position
with
by the
with DEQ’s
that his
the
his activities
position that
activities are
are governed
governed by

EHPA,
believes the
maximum fine
the maximum
ﬁne of
of $10,000
is appropriate.
appropriate.
now believes
EHPA, DEQ
$10,000 is
DEQ now
The
being low.
The Court
the seriousness
the violations
Mr. Gibson
of the
Violations as
Court assesses
Gibson composts
composts
seriousness of
10W. Mr.
assesses the
as being

If done
grass
poorly, that
that activity
clippings and
unpleasant odors
and leaves.
can potentially
create unpleasant
grass clippings
done poorly,
odors as
leaves. If
as
potentially create
activity can
well as
things
other undesirable
There is
indication any
attract bugs
animals. There
is no
no indication
of those
well
those things
undesirable animals.
and other
as attract
bugs and
any of
have
property. The
property is
the VHS
The property
There are
on the
is extremely
remote. There
VHS property.
are few
few residences
residences
have occurred
occurred on
extremely remote.
in all
visible in
the site
trial. Those
all of
the pictures
taken at
at the
site admitted
admitted at
at trial.
of the
Visible
Those homes
homes are
distance
are some
pictures taken
some distance

be elevated
away
from the
the level
the windrows.
There are
to be
of the
no nearby
level of
water
and appear
Windrows. There
are no
appear to
elevated from
nearby water
away and
might wash
features
blow and
into which
the decomposing
which the
or blow
features into
problems.
decomposing grass
and leaves
and create
create problems.
grass and
wash or
leaves might

The
be useful
information about
The Court
the danger
the runoff,
no information
What is
is likely
to be
Court has
danger the
has no
about the
useful
runoff, carrying
carrying what
likely to
might have
fertilizer,
the sparse
the property.
The biggest
the site
the
to the
ﬂora near
near the
at the
site to
to the
biggest danger
danger at
have to
sparse flora
fertilizer, might
property. The

environment
people that
from the
that the
the discarded
the Court
environment or
equipment and
or any
Court can
and
can see
discarded equipment
comes from
see comes
any people
dilapidated
buildings.
dilapidated buildings.
DEQ’s regulations.
Certainly
with DEQ’s
Mr. Gibson
effort to
no effort
to comply
he
regulations. Indeed
Gibson has
has made
Indeed he
made no
Certainly Mr.
comply with
EPHA and
has
vigorously asserted
position that
that the
the solid
not
his position
the EPHA
management rules
solid waste
has vigorously
and the
asserted his
waste management
rules do
do not
in the
apply
ultimately unavailing
unavailing in
that position,
his composting
The Court
the
while ultimately
to his
composting actions.
ﬁnds that
Court finds
actions. The
position, while
apply to
Court’s View,
in good
Court’s
view, was
faith. The
The regulation
taken in
facilities is
of composting
composting facilities
is aa topic
topic of
of
regulation of
one taken
was one
good faith.

in various
that should
significant
various places
places and
different approaches
taken different
signiﬁcant debate
to how
and states
states have
how that
should
have taken
approaches to
debate in

be done.
The application
application
done. The
be

Gibson’s
EPHA and
of
the EPHA
the Solid
Mr. Gibson’s
Management Rules
of the
to Mr.
Solid Waste
Rules to
and the
Waste Management

their arguments
activities
by no
Mr.
activities was
no means
or straightforward.
arguments about
straightforward. Indeed,
means obvious
despite their
about Mr.
obvious or
was by
Indeed, despite
Department’s main
main concern
Gibson
processing discarded
clippings and
the Department’s
concern appears
Gibson processing
and leaves,
grass clippings
discarded grass
appears
leaves, the
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to
volumes of
which, this
that he
this Court
storing large
to be
he is
is simply
large volumes
of compost
humus which,
Court
compost and/or
and/0r humus
be that
simply storing
concludes,
not solid
is not
solid waste.
waste.
concludes, is
EPHA
person determined
violated the
Idaho
that aa person
the EPHA
determined to
to have
Idaho Code
mandates that
have violated
Code §
39-108(a) mandates
§ 39-108(a)

shall
penalty. The
penalty of
From the
for aa civil
The Court
Mr. Gibson.
the
shall be
ciVil penalty.
liable for
of $1,000
to Mr.
Court assesses
Gibson. From
be liable
assesses a
a penalty
$1,000 to
in the
it also
evidence,
limited role
LLC has
the operation.
the
While it
role in
operation. While
violated the
VHS Properties,
has had
had aa limited
also violated
Properties, LLC
evidence, VHS

it should
EPHA,
be assessed
the Court
determines it
of $250.
Court determines
should be
assessed a
a penalty
$250.
EPHA, the
penalty of

The
will enter
judgment consistent
with these
The Court
findings.
enter aa judgment
consistent with
these findings.
Court will
IT
IT IS
ORDERED.
IS SO
SO ORDERED.

_____________________________
MEDEMA
JONATHAN MEDEMA
JONATHAN
District Judge
District
Judge

Signed: 2/28/2018 05:22 PM
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CERTIFICATE
MAILING
CERTIFICATE OF
OF MAILING

03/01/2018 , 2018,
II hereby
that on
the
on _____________,
of the
correct copy
and correct
true and
served aa true
certify that
2018, II served
hereby certify
copy of
within instrument
within
instrument as
follows:
as follows:
Yee-Wallace
Cynthia
Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Mark
Cecchini-Beaver
Mark Cecchini-Beaver
Office
the Attorney
of the
General
Ofﬁce of
Attorney General
P.O.
BOX 83720
PO. Box
83720
ID 83720-0010
83720-0010
Boise,
Boise, ID
Email:
Email: Cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Cynthia.wallace@ag.idah0.g0V
Mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
Mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho. gov

(( )) U.S.
Prepaid
Postage Prepaid
US. Mail,
Mail, Postage
(( )) Interdepartmental
Mail
Interdepartmental Mail
(X)
Electronic
Mail
Mail
Electronic
(X)
(( )) Facsimile
Facsimile

Vernon
Smith
Vernon K.
K. Smith
Law
LLC
Office of
of Vernon
Vernon K.
K. Smith,
Law Office
Smith, LLC
1900
Main Street
Street
1900 W.
W. Main
Boise,
Idaho 83702
83702
Boise, Idaho
Email:
Email: ws1900@gmail.com
W51900@gmail.com
vkslaw@live.com
Vkslaw@live.com

(( )) U.S.
Prepaid
Postage Prepaid
US. Mail,
Mail, Postage
(( )) Hand
Hand Delivered
Delivered
(X)
Mail
Electronic Mail
(X) Electronic
(( )) Facsimile
Facsimile

CHRISTOPHER
RICH
CHRISTOPHER D.
D. RICH
Clerk
District Court
the District
Clerk of
of the
Court

By:___________________________
By:
Deputy
Clerk
Court Clerk
Deputy Court
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Filed:03/01/2018 07:36:35
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Ellis, Janet

IN THE
THE DISTRICT
IN
THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF
FOURTH JUDICIAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE
OF
COURT OF
THE STATE
IN AND
AND FOR
THE COUNTY
ADA
THE
STATE OF
FOR THE
OF IDAHO,
OF ADA
COUNTY OF
IDAHO, IN

IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF
IDAHO DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
QUALITY,

cvoc—2015-03540
Case
No. CVOC-2015-03540
Case No.

JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VS.
DAVID
DAVID R.
BLACK
R. GIBSON,
d/b/a/ BLACK
GIBSON, d/b/a/
DIAMOND
DIAMOND COMPOST
COMPOST PRODUCTS,
PRODUCTS,
and
and VHS
VHS PROPERTIES,
PROPERTIES, LLC,
LLC,
Defendants.
Defendants.

JUDGMENT
ENTERED AS
JUDGMENT IS
IS ENTERED
AS FOLLOWS:
FOLLOWS:
Defendant
pay to
Plaintiff the
the sum
shall pay
Defendant David
R. Gibson
to Plaintiff
of $1,000.
David R.
Gibson shall
sum of
$1,000.
Defendant
Plaintiff the
the sum
shall pay
Defendant VHS
to Plaintiff
of $250.
sum of
VHS Properties,
Properties, LLC,
$250.
LLC, shall
pay to
Defendants
from
Defendants David
R. Gibson
enjoined from
David R.
Gibson and
and VHS
VHS Properties,
are hereby
Properties, LLC,
LLC, are
hereby enjoined
in any
engaging
the following
following activities:
engaging in
of the
activities:
any of

1.
1.

Accepting
Accepting or
or receiving
receiving any
of discarded
discarded grass,
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
quantity of
leaves,
grass, grass
any quantity

permitting anyone
straw
from discarding
of grass,
or hay,
or permitting
discarding any
straw or
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
quantity of
leaves,
anyone from
grass, grass
any quantity
hay, or
straw,
upon that
that real
the Northwest
Township 2N,
Northwest ¼ of
real property
of Section
or hay
Section 5,
described as
as the
straw, or
property described
2N,
hay upon
5, Township
1%;

Range
parcel S1505220000
the Ada
Meridian and
identiﬁed by
Range 2E,
Boise Meridian
and identified
Ada County
81505220000
Assessor as
as parcel
County Assessor
2E, Boise
by the
IDAPA 58.01.06.010.
unless Defendants
with the
provisions of
ﬁrst comply
the provisions
Defendants first
of IDAPA
unless
58.01.06.010.
comply With

2.
2.

Accepting
permitting anyone
from discarding
that real
Accepting or
real
or receiving,
or permitting
discarding upon
upon that
receiving, or
anyone from

1%; of
property described
the Northwest
Meridian
Northwest ¼
of Section
Range 2E,
Section 5,
Township 2N,
Boise Meridian
described as
as the
property
2N, Range
2E, Boise
5, Township

and
within any
the Ada
identified by
parcel S1505220000,
and identified
Ada County
Assessor as
contiguous
as parcel
81505220000, Within
County Assessor
any contiguous
by the
JUDGMENT -- 11
JUDGMENT
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twelve-month (12)
twelve-month
period aa cumulative
of discarded
cumulative volume
volume of
discarded grass,
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
straw,
leaves, straw,
grass, grass
(12) period

unless Defendants
with those
provisions of
or
that exceeds
ﬁrst comply
or hay
of
Defendants first
those provisions
cubic yards
exceeds 300
300 cubic
comply with
yards unless
hay that
IDAPA 58.01.06
IDAPA
based on
volume of
the volume
material they
on the
of such
to receive.
applicable based
desire to
such material
receive.
58.01.06 applicable
they desire
it is
It shall
This
upon the
This injunction
injunction is
the date
remain effective
shall remain
is effective
is signed.
effective upon
effective
date it
signed. It

permanently.
permanently.

IT IS
IT
ORDERED.
IS SO
SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/28/2018 05:23 PM
___________________________________
Jonathan
Jonathan Medema
Medema
District
District Judge
Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

03/01/2018
I hereby certify that on _ _
_ _ _ _ _ , 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
within instrument as follows:

Cynthia Y ee-Wallace
Mark Cecchini-Beaver
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Email: Cynthia. wallace@ag.idaho. gov
Mark. cecchini-beaver@deq .idaho .gov

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Interdepartmental Mail
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

Vernon K. Smith
Law Office ofVernon K. Smith, LLC
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Email: ws1900@gmail.com
vkslaw@live.com

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

By:~~
D~coillt Clerk
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Electronically Filed
3/13/2018 11:52 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345- 11 29

IN Ti lE DISTRICT COURT OF Til E FOURTil JUDICIAL DI TRICT OF
THE TATE OF IDAHO. IN AN D FOR THE COUNTY Of ADA

IDAHO DEPARTM ENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

) Case o. CVOC-1503540
)
)

PlaintiiT,

)
)
)
)
)

V.

DAVlD R. GIB ON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCT , and VH PROPERTI ES,
LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR
RECONSJDERATION OF
FINDING OF FACT.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENT ENTERED
MARCH 1, 2018

COM ES NOW the Defendants above named, David R. Gibson and VHS Properties,
LLC, by and through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and respectfully request this
Court reconsider its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
1, 2018, pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2)(B), I. R. C. P., the b
within the Memorandum submitted in support of this Moti
sched uled hearing to be heard in this matter.
Dated this 13111 day of March, 2018

Attorney for Defendants

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

P. I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13th day of March 2018. I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be deli vered to the following persons at the
following add resses:

Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W. Front treet
Boise, Idaho 83 702

(

)

(

)
)
X )

(

(

U.S. Mail
Fax 287-6919
Hand Delivered
1-Court/E-Filed

Cynthia Vee-Wallace
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. JeiTerson St. 2"d Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
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Electronically Filed
3/13/2018 11:52 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345- 1 125
(208) 345-1129
Fax:

fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VI-IS PROPERTIES,
LLC,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOC-1503540
MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED MARCH I , 2018

)
)

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
This district court has entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
on March 1, 2018, thereby enjoining Defendants from the continuation of the com posting
operations, and the imposition of a penalty in the amount of$1 ,000.00 levied against David
R. Gibson and $250.00 against VHS Properties. LLC. The fundamental issue(s) that have
emanated from this controversy are in need of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court to protect
the jurisdictional and regulatory rights of the Department of Agriculture, and the continuing
enforcement of the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), pat1icularly I. C. §39-7404,
wherein the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) cannot seek a broader definition
of "solid waste" than mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSfDERATION P. I
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Resource Conservation Recove1y Act (RCRA), and therefore, it remains these Defendants'
position that DEQ does not have any regulatory authority or jurisdictional standing to bring
an action against these Defendants for their agricultural operations and activities upon the
pretext they are conducting a "solid waste'' facility, nor does DEQ have any statutory
authority to regulate any "composting operations", as this process constitutes a recycli ng
process of incorporating the substances (grass clippings and leaves) as 'direct ingredients"
to generate compost and humus, a direct substitute of commercial fe1tilizers, each of which
constitute an exemption within the RCRA, pre-empting any attempt to classify these
substances as a "solid waste" under either Federal or state legislation and regulat01y
authority. These substances are direct ingred ients and the product of compost and humus
substitute for commercial fertilizers, declared to be exempt :fi·om "so ljd waste" when
utilized in the recycl ing process within the State of Idaho, given the Federal and State
cod ifications and statutory enactment pre-emptive effects through their declared exemption
to such efforts to regulate these composting ingredients by DEQ, removed further from their
reach by virtue of the legislation that places jurisdiction and statutory regulation for the
registry and regulation of compost and humus products with the Department of Agriculture.
Before proceeding with our appeal of this comt s determination that holds for the
proposition that "grass clippings and leaves•· constitute a "solid waste", and therefore subject
to regulation by DEQ within their Tier classification structure, being the issues forthconung
from this controversy, it remains the obligation and responsibility of these Defendants to
bring the conect law to the attention of the court, and afford this cowt the further
opportunity to clarify, refine, and to thereby reverse its decision, as not only are the factual
findings not supp01ted by the evidence and inconsistent with the pleadings and prayer for
reiief as filed by DEQ, but the conclusion of law that "grass clippings and leaves" are within
the definit ion of "solid waste", and subject to regulation by DEQ, is inconsistent with the
controlling Federal and State law.
Defendants' first concern begins with the scope of the relief that was actually being
sought by DEQ, giving rise to Defendants' challenge as to the factual findings of thi s court.

WHAT IS ALLEGED IN DEQ'S COMPLAINT, AND
WHAT FACTS MUST BE PROVEN TO PROVIDE RELIEF,
ASSUMING THE INGREDIENTS, GRASS CLIPPINGS AND

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION P. 2
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LEAVES, WERE A "SOLID WASTE" AND SUBJECT TO
REGULATION BY DEQ
The pleadings relevant to this controversy are the Am ended Complaint and Answer
to DEQ's Amended Complaint. The only date all eged to give rise to any alleged "violation"
of a "Tier 11 Facility" is March 29, 20 13; not any day, month or year thereafter. The relevant
evidence to that al legation raised in the pleadings is the ident[fication and quantification of
that material/substances present on thi s agricu ltural facility on March 29, 20 13, totally
absent from the record of this trial.
These Defendants before submitted their '·Reply" and "Supplemental Reply'' to
DEQ's Closing Argument, wherein Defendants responded to the accusations and analysis
presented by DEQ, providing applicable and mandatory authority :fi·orn Idaho and the
Federal Regulatory authority that pre-empts the clai ms of DEQ, wrongfully arguing Mr.
Gibson has been operating an illegal, Tier II, "solid waste" processing facility in the State
of Idaho.
The district court declined to consider the content of Defendant's "Supplemental
Reply", and that law will again be presented to this court as part of tlus Reconsideration,
along with issues specific to the en·oneous factual fi ndings of the comt, the effect of wruch
demonstrate that neither DEQ nor EPA can expand their jurisdiction or regulatory authority
beyond mandatory pre-emptive Federal legislation identified in those Federal enactments, as
expressly identified within the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act, Title 39, Chapter 74, (!. C.
§39-7403(50)(e), defirung cettain exclusions to ·'solid waste" such as "crop residue", and l.
C. §39-7404, mandating the application of the Resource Conservation Recove1y Act
(RCRA), which exempts all recycling ingredients, and their products that constitute a
substitute to commercial fertilizers. These Federal regulations expressly address composting
substances and their ingredients (grass clippings and leaves) and their exclusion from any
definiti on or regulation as a "solid waste" substance, from any regulatory capacity.
We begin this reconsideration with a clear recogrution the allegation contained
witrun the Department's Amended Complaint is that a Tier IT regulatory violation existed at
tills agricultural facility on March 29, 2013 , and nothing was alleged thereafter through any
futther amending pleadings to expand this allegation to assert existence of any Tier II
violation at any subsequent date, such as alluded to in the findings ofthis court, identifying

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION P. 3
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subsequent periods in 2013, and the years of 20 14 or 20 15. This court's anal ysis must be
confined to the date of the 'attempted inspection" of March 29, 2013, as alleged within
these pl eadings, and cannot go outside the pleadings to presume "assumed regulatory
allegations" not pled within the formal complaint.
Given this limitation, and then utilizing this court's analysis within the Conclusions
of Law, there cannot be found within thi record any sufficient identity or quantitative

evidence that wou ld support any assertion there were 600 cubic yards of identifiable and
quantified grass clippings and leaves (in that natural state) on this agricultural faci lity on
March 29, 20 13. There had been no deliveries of ei ther substance received at this faci lity
since the fall of 20 12. as such materials/substances are no longer available fo r delivery, and
wi th this court' s legal conclusion that humus and compost substances are not a "solid
waste", and there has been a transformation of any previously delivered grass clippings

and leaves into humus and compost, it remains elementary that what had been delivered to
this facility in the early fa ll of 20 12 had transformed into compost and humu long before
March 29, 2013, such that nothing delivered to this agricultural facil ity, approximately fivesix months prior to March 29 2013, had any recogn ition as being of a "grass clipping or leaf
substance, in that natural organ ic structure, and certai nly no evidence has been presented to
demonstrate there were present "600 cubic yards of such grass clippings and leaf materials
at this agricu ltural facility on March 29, 20 13.
Thi s court appears to have found otherwise, but no evidence supports that finding,
and the conclusion regarding the exclusion of compost and humus from "solid waste" would
serve to contradict any such finding. as all that could be present at this .facility, after this
prolonged period of decomposition (October to March). would be on ly a composted
material into organic compost and humus, just as is the same situation this present moment,
March 2018 as nothing has been delivered to this facility for over six months.
The unrelated evidence pertaining to photographs and videos of events in the later
years of20 14, 20 15, 2016 or 20 17 are not relevant to what is contained within the pleadings,
limited to March 29, 20 13, the "attempted inspection" alleged within the existing pleadings.
Through the proffered evidence by the Department, attempting to demonstrate the presence
of grass clippings and leaves at this facil ity, to any extent any of those substances were even
seen on the premises in any of the years of 20 14, 20 15, 20 16 or 20 17, that observation
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remains irrelevant to this controversy, a what counts by way of evidence is that which
existed at this agricultural facility, operated under the registTation of David R. Gibson under
the jurisdiction and authority of the Idaho Department of Agriculture, as purportedly

observed 011 Marclt 29, 2013. That is the only relevant evidence in this controversy, and it
remains abundantly clear there is no physical evidence or testimony to demonstrate any

quantitative ji11ding to prove the presence of 600 cubic yards of ''grass cl ippings and
leaves·· on this agricu ltural facility on March 29, 20 13, and absolutely no offering of any
measurement or quantitative analysis as to the actual yardage of any physical presence of
any such non-transfom1ed substance of grass clippings and leaf material on that occasion.
That is the crux of this case; what is the identity and quantitative presence of ' grass
clippings and leaves··, in that natural state, at this agricultura l facility on that single occasion.
that when quantified, exceeded 600 cubic yards of that particular substance on that specific
date, March 29, 2013, the alleged Tier 11 violation, about whiclt this case is specifically

confined to wit en it was initiated, and without dispute, there has been no factual showing by
the Department with any "evidence" that on March 29, 2013, those referenced materials
(grass clippings and leaves) were present at that agricultural facility in an amount that equals
or exceeds 600 cubic yards, the threshold quantity required to assert the existence o(a Tier

II (acilitv (al l of which asswnes that material is a "solid waste", and assuming the
jurisdictional and statutory authority to regulate such recycling/decomposing substances).

ARE GRASS CLIPPINGS AND LEAVES
HAZARDOUS, OR EVEN A SOLID SUBSTANCE
There has been no authority in case law or by definition, or within any treatise, Lhat
presents any "classical", "techni cal", scientific, chemical, or legal finding these composting
substances (grass clippings and leaves) are '·hazardous" to human health or the envirorunent,
and to go one step further, (as ridiculous as it may seem) there is no finding these substances
are, in any '·state of being' regarded to be a '·solid'. material as to argue such remains
scientifical ly, biologically, physically and chemically impossible, since these substances
(grass clipping and leaves) are best identified as an organic plasma substance, constantly in
a state of flux , either in their atomic-molecular state as a p lasma organism in a growing
process, or in a plasma state of decay, never can a biological substance fully meet the
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criteria as to what (scientifi cally) constit utes a ..solid" substance. Despite the '·frustration·'
such biological organisms and organic elements may serve to present to this court, the
biological "di vide" presents the underlying logic why these decomposition substances are
excluded from "solid wastes' in Federal Legislation, as there is unifo rm acceptance they
present no hazard. cannot be a "solid waste'·. as their biological composition, becoming a
recycl ing ingredient. renders them to become ingredients for substitute commercial
prod ucts. T hey are not regarded a ·'solid waste·· as these substances and materials have no

fit:ed state of ex isteuce, and being recycling ingredients, are not a material that is
abandoned and discarded, not what is wanted at a ·'solid waste disposal landfi ll facility".
EPA and DEQ have no concern with composting or composted substances. the ingredients
of whi ch form hum us and compost products used as a substitute for commercial fertilizers.
recognized to have a benefi cial use in agricultural applications.
T hough we realize it remains a frustrating topic with this court, the fact remains the
Department has not presented any definitional source to the court to support any proposition
that "grass clippings and leaves" are recognized to be a "so lid" substance, much less a "solid
waste" in the controlling legislation that pre-empts DEQ regulatory action.
"Seeing" and "feeling" something does not render it a "solid"; you see water but a
recognized liquid; you feel a breeze, but regarded an atmospheric vapor or gas. Nothing
provides any support to any proposition that "grass clippings and leaves" are deemed a
"solid substance" ; yes, you can see it, but these substances, while a grass or leaf substance,
contain substantial liquid, by weight, and due to thei r constant state of fl ux, that is why they
can decompose to 10% of their original volume and weight. These substances cannot be
considered ·'solid'·, nor a "solid waste"; 90% or their physical volume/weight disappears
tlu·ough the recycling process, something a ··solid .. could never undergo. These substances
may be more characteristic of a biological or organic plasma, regarded to be a fourth state of
matter. Plasma is a Greek word meaning " moldable substance"; plasma is also

refen~ed

to as

being protoplasm or cytoplasm, being a mixture of organ ic substances, such as protein,
carbon, and water being the physical basis for all life.
It remains essential for this court consider the provisions of the Idaho Solid Waste
Facilities Act, Title 39, Chapter74, including 1. C. §39-7404, which finds these composted
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materials excluded by virtue of the recycling provisions contained in the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and, which specifically states:
The board may not promulgate any rule pursuant to this act that would
impose conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in scope than
the referenced RCRA regulations of the United States environmental
protection agency or the provi sions of this chapter. (Emphasis added).
Conseq uently, the Federal legislation trumps DEQ 's JDAPA Rules if they become
confli cting, regarding what constitutes ..solid wastes'·, and their Tier 11 categories, as RCRA
specifically exempts and excludes these ingredients in thei r recycling exclusions.
DEQ must accept these material substances (ingrecticnts that make compost and
humus) to be in a biological state of growth. or in a biological state of decay, not a hazard
and not a solid or a solid waste, and in all instances, these biological .. ingredients" are not in
a "fixed state .. within its molecular structure throughout their biological formati on and
decomposition. The requirement of a ·'fi xed state" is fundamental to what constitutes a
"solid" material , by definition.
lt is not by coincidence thi s court has been unable to include within its Finding of
Fact and Conclusion of Law any reliance upon any recognized authority, be it any passage
from any dictionaries, scientific studies, or anatomical analysis of such biomass-biological
substances (grass clippings and leaves) to suppmt any proposition that grass clippings and
leaves are regarded a 'solid" state material o r substance, as they are and remain entirely a
biological mass-organic pl asma substance in composition, more akin to a form of ki11etic
energy than a ' solid" substance, always in a continuing state of transition within its organic
composition, due to its constant state of flux, entirely in an unstable organic composite of
molecular movement and shifting elements, like a plasma state of existence.

WHAT MATERIALS/SU BSTANCES EXISTED AT TillS
AGRICULTURAL FACILITY O N MARCH 29, 2013
The issue to first be decided by thi s cowt, pursuant to the pleadings filed by DEQ, is
whether there is 600 cubic yards of a recognized "solid waste" material at this agricultw·al
faci lity on March 29, 201 3. To accomplish that, DEQ must first identify what specific
substances were at this agricu ltural facility on March 29, 2013; then DEQ must quantify
those substances; and then establish the substances to be a " solid' , and then to be regarded a
··waste'·, as defmed by Federal (controlling) law; and then establish any such "solid'"
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" waste" to have been ··abandoned" and ··di carded·· so as to come within any definition of
being a ''solid waste·· at a disposal site.

owhere has it been developed in the record there

was 600 cubic yards of g rass clippings and leaves at this agricultural fac ility on March 29
20 13, as to do so was a physical impossibi lity. Even had there been, then comes the
provisions of the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (Title 39, Chapter 74, specilically I. C.
§39-7404), mandating application o f the Resource Conservation Recove1y Act (RCRA), that
pre-empts anything within the effect of IDAPA Rule 58 .0 1.06 ( olid Waste Management
Rules), regardless o f Defendants· belief that subpart .001 (Title and

cope), subpart (.03)

(Wa te Not Regula ted Under T he e Rule ). (b) (These Rule Do Not Apply to the
fo llowing olid waste ... ) (b)(ii) and (b)(ii i). (the effect of which expre sly exclude from
the defini tion of a " olid wa te", a ny right of regula tion by DEQ of tho e ma terial
ubstance consisting of ma nure and cr·op (pla nt) re idues in tended to be returned to
th e soil at agr onomic r ate , a nd a ny agricultural solid waste which is managed and
regulated pur uant to rules adopted by the Ida ho Department of Agriculture.

T he excl usionruy provisions of RCRA, identified in detail hereafter, control the preemptive effects of that federal enactment to DEQ 's attempt to regulate these organic
substances, in any size of an agricultural decomposition facility.
Thi s court entered a Finding of Fact on p. 5 of its Finding of Fact and Conclus io n of
Law (herea fter at times cited as FF/CL), making a F inding to the effect:
In March of20 13, there existed a large quantity of material in the wind rows.
As of the date of the tria l this vo lume had increased. Tms. p. 236. The Court
finds the total volume of the material in the windrows as of March 29, 20 13,
exceeded 600 cubic yards.
Though this com1 has stated that the "total volume of the material in the windrows

as ofMarch 29. 2013, exceeded 600 cubic yards". whether that be a COITect finding, absent
any identifiable means of quru1tification, that .. finding.. does not address what portio n ofthat
..total volume·· constitutes a' solid waste··, as this court con·ectly declru·ed in its Conclusions
of Law, addressed hereafter, that " humus and compost"" are not a solid waste s ubstances.
The difficulty w ith this ··Finding'" i what Defendants perceive to be the court's
inability to identify what '·materiar · there ru·e within this perceived •·total volume .. that
exceeds 600 cubic yards, as none of it has been proven to be actually defined to be a "solid
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waste··, as none of the humus or the compo t product within that .. total volume'· constitutes
a ..solid waste', as is the court's conclusion. and that is now critical to this controversy.
Is it critical for this court to make a finding as to what ··actuar· quantity of the ·'total
volume'· of any alleged material presence is bei ng identified as a ..solid waste.. located at
this agricultural faci lity on March 29, 20 13. claimed to be subject to the regulatory authority
of DEQ under the olid Waste Management Rules they enacted !!! The truth is the entire
·'total volume", as of March 29, 20 13. was then. and could only be, a humus product, a
compost product. a soil substance, or a dirt material/substance. because it had all become

composterl, as

110

materials had been rlelil•ererl ince the [all o[2012. Whatever was there,

it could only have been the remai ning ubstance/materials fi·om the prior years and that prior
fa ll delivery. since nothing lwrl been rlelil•ererl to thi agricultural facility after the late

summer/early fall of 2012, as no grass clippings are available after the late summer
dormancy, and

110

leaves are available after the fall collection. Of interest, there is no

evidence in this record that any gras

clippings or leaves were delivered to this

agricultural facility at any time in the year 2012, either by Boise City, ACHD, or anyone
else.
The rationale there was only a "lmmuslcompostlsoilldirt material/substance" is
derived from the natural consequence of biological organic materials. embraced by this
court· s Conclusions of Law, whereupon the court concluded compo t and humu are not
"solid wa te ". Though this Court found that there were '·increa ed" quantities of
substances delivered to the facility, those quantities of material s/substances were then also
"humus/compost/soil/dirt" substances. and such materials/substances are not within the
definition of ··solid waste".
This Court made the FF on p. 6 of the FF/CL, by stating the fo llowing:
"The Court finds that between 20 13 and 20 14 Boise City deposi ted more
than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings and leaves into the windrows on the
VIIS property. Between 20 I3 and 20 15, ACHD hauled more than I I,000
cubic yards of leaves to the VH property:·
Michael Woodward, the manager of the Parks and Recreation Department
lloJticulture Unit, actually testifi ed at trial by stating that the City of Boise delivered two
loads (totaling 20 cubic yards) to this agricultural fac ility on September 10 and October 18,

2013, (Trial Trp., pgs. 311-312; Ex. 22). There were no grass clippings delivered by Boise
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City to this faci lity prior to the inspection date of March 29, 2013. Then Boise City
delivered more grass clippings almost a year later on June 3 through A ugust 29, 2014
(Trial Trp., pg. 3 12; Ex. 22) giving no specified yardage. but referenced to Ex. 23, listing
additional deli veries in 20 14 (no specific dates) (Trial Trp. Pg. 315), but nothing was ever
delivered on or before March 29, 20 13. These deliveries, once again were long after the
relevant inspection date of March 29, 20 13, and irrelevant to this controversy, because those
unce1iain volume were delivered after the in pection date.
Additionally, the exchange of dialogue (between Cynthia Vee-Wallace and Mr.
Woodward) during the testimony of Mr. Woodward , came to define these materials
delivered after March 29 20 13 to be in the nature of a "composted debris''. Mr. Woodward
testified the City of Boise paid $60.00 and $ 15.00, respectively, for what lte and DEQ were
di scussing to be "composted debris" delivered at later periods (T1ial Trp., pg. 31 4; Ex.
22/23). Consequently it becomes uncertain whether ..grass clippings and leaves" in their
original/ natural state, were ever delivered to this facility even after March 29, 20 13.
What remains important while addressing Lhis Motion for Reconsideration is that
the testimony from Boise City and ACHD confi1m no "grass cl ippings or leaves" (in any
fom1, composted or otherwise) were delivered to this agricultural facility before or on March
29, 2013, and no testimony that any substances were delivered in any fonn by anyone at this
agricultural facility in the year 20 I2. That remains important to w1derstand, as no delivery of
grass cl ippings or leaves from any source have been delivered to tlus facility after the fall
months of a preceding year. as lawns and landscape features are then dormant, and remain
such until late April of the following year. Consequently, all materials at tllls agricultural
faci lity were '·compost' or a "humus" product as of March 29, 2013, no "solid waste"
presence, and the cowt' s Conclusion of Law so supports such an amended finding.
As to the delivery of 11,000 cubic yards of leaves between the years 2013 and 2015,
that reference. as cited by the court, serves to span the three fall seasons of leaf collection by
ACHD, but once again, no testimony ACHD ever delivered any leaves prior to or on March
29, 2013. There is no factual basis to find the presence of "'600 cubic yards·· of ·'grass
clippings and leaves" at this agricultural facility on March 29, 20 13, as the cowt has
erroneously expressed in the above referenced Finding.
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The on ly "allegation·· of a "violation.. of a ..Ti er II faci lity., is that allegedly
occun-ing on March 29. 2013· that is the single occasion of an alleged ..violation'' claimed to
have occurred, and only on March 29, 2013, ' hen observed during this ·'attempted
inspection·' on that specific date. There has been no alleged violation within the pleadings
that serves to delve into those subsequent periods of years of operation.
Though the Court made the above Find ing of Fact as to the delivery of grass
clippings and leaves in those subsequent years (a span from 2013-20 15), we find the
absence of any con·elation within the record to demonstrate how such deliveries of uch
materials/substances. (already recognized to be a composted debris) after the ..alleged
violation" on March 29, 20 I3, bears an) evidence of substances/materials at this agricultural
faci lity to supp01t volumes of material at this '·attempted inspection" on March 29, 20 13.
This is an important factor, as the court undertook an analysis to make patently clear

humu and compost is not a "solid waste", so obviously, if this agricultural facility is in an
organic decomposition process of such material/substances, there must be a quantification

of what is claimed to be a "solid waste", as there is obviously humus or compost or dirt or
soil being observed, and cannot be lumped into a .. total volume" theory when attempting to
separate what is known not to be a "solid waste". as the court has precluded that resuJt.
What was seen by DEQ Officials on March 29, 20 I 3 was nothing other than substances

referred to as being either humus, compost, soil or dirt, and it remained a natural and
scientific impossibility to label those material /substances a "solid waste'·, when they are
comprised of an organic derived material.
"Solid wastes·· does not include any materi al ingredients that fom1 humus, compost,
soil or dirt substances. as mandated by RCRA, as well as this court having specifically
concluded, starting on p. 11 , that lumws and compost is not a usolirl waste", by the
following conclusion:
Compost and humu arc not olid wa ·tea defmed in I.C. § 39-103(13).

Mr. Gibson testified as to the process he uses to decompose leaves and grass
clippings. He arranges them in windrows so the rows can receive oxygen and mixes them
with compost or soil. Rain and snow provide water. In this environment, microorganisms in
the soil rapid ly consume the nitrogen and carbon in the grass and leaves. This produces heat
which ki lls unwanted seeds. When the microorganisms have consumed some portion of the
available organic material. the rows cool. What remains is an organic product useful as a
fertilizer or soil amendment.
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Mr. Gibson referred to the end goal of thi s process as being humus. Mr. Gibson testified it
can take as many as I 0 years to create humus. The parties throughout the trial variously
referred to the material in the windrows on the VH property as compost, humus, and soil.
The Court wi ll explain its under tanding of the definition of those tem1s.
Compost is a mixture that consi ts largely of decayed organic matter used for
ferti lizing and conditioning land. MerTiam-Webster's Collegiate Dicti onary 255. Compost is
the term given to partially decayed organic matter. ll umus is the material remaining at the
ultimate stage of decomposition of organic matter, when the material car1 no longer be
broken down by organic decomposit ion. It is that portion of soil organic matter which is
completely amorphous. and has no cellular structure characteristic of plants. Whi tehead,
D.C. & Tinsley, J., The Biochemistry of llumus Fonnation, Journal of the cience of Food
and Agriculture, Vol. 14, Issue 12. 849-857 ( 1963). Til us at some point in the process of
rlecompo ilion, the grass clippings and leave become "compost," at which stage they are
useful a a fertilizer or soil amendment. However, compost will continue to decay until it
can decay no more. A t this point it is properly called l111m11 and it i stable am/ remains in
soil unchanged for long p eriods of time.
Using the same definitions of solid waste discussed above, the Court finds neither
compost nor l111mus are solid waste under the EPHA. Certainly there is no evidence that
people have been discarding compost at the VH property. As is clear from Mr. Gibson's
testimony about the process he uses. compost and humus both require some investment of
energy and time to create. Mr. Gibson is making compost from discarded materials. but
what he creates cannot be said to have been discarded by anyone. The so lid waste rules
support this conclusion as well. The Department has defined "Yard Waste" as: "Weeds,
straw, leaves, grass clippings, brush, wood, and other natural, organic, materials typically
derived from general landscape maintenance activities.'" lDAPA 58.01.06.005(52). This
definition does not include compost or humus made by decomposing any of the materials
listed.
When do grass clippings and lea es stop being grass clippings and leaves and
become compost? There was little e idence presented on this issue at trial. As discussed
above, in this case, compost simply consists of partially decayed grass and leaves. MerriamWebster defines compost as capable of being used for fertilizing and conditioning. As the
trier of fact and in the absence of any e idence to the contraJy , the Court will simply apply
what it belie es to be the plain meaning of compost to thi s question. Grass clippings and
leaves become compost when they look like soil; it is black, crumbly in texture, and ltas no
odor of decay, but may smell sligllt~)' sweet. Compost smells like earth mther titan rotting
plants. This conclusion is consistent with the Department's definition of recycling which is
defined as a process by which waste material are transformed into a new product in suclt
a numner that the original identity as a product is lost. IDA PA 58.01.06.005(37).
This Conclusion, though true. is not the only way to describe what constitutes
compost. But notwithstanding. this conclusion becomes an important focal point in this
controversy. as what was found to exist at thi s facility by Mr. Dean Ehlert (in the presence
of Jack Gantz) on March 29, 20 13 was nothing other than wit at tit is court ltas recognizer/
and defined to be at this agricultural faci li ty as either a compost substance or a hurnus
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substance in the many rows they saw on March 29, 2013, as nothing had been delivered to
this agricultural facili ty for almost a half year by the time of their "attempted inspection.
This becomes a direct question that requires the application of what remains a scientific
(biological) fact through the decomposition process. as grass clippings and leaves were not
delivered to this facility after the early fall months, and so a period of between five and six
months did pass when the "attempted inspection·· of March 29, 20 13 occurred. All grass
varieties go into dormancy each year in the early fall, and the delivery of leaves cease after
early fa ll collections each year by ACHD.
No uch substances (i n the fom1 of gra

clippings or leaves) were in ex istence by

March 29, 20 13, after that passage of time all owed for any possible deliverie to have
decomposed into compost or humus, during that Jive-six month period following early fa ll
of20 12. There has been no testimony that any deliveries were even received in 20 12. What
could only be een at thi s agricultural facility when Dean Ehlert arrived on March 29, 20 13
(having also admitted he could not detect any foul or offensive odors) could only be that
existi ng material in its state of natural decomposition as an organic matter, now within the
older rows of humus. compost, soil, and di11, having decayed over the preceding period of
time, then to become more humus and compost. and referred to by most to be "soil" or
··dirt'', enriched with nutrients by the introduction of decomposed organic materials. just as
the court concluded regarding "humus" and "compost" materials/substances found to be
present in the years of20 14-20 15, which were recognized to have been transformed from
grass clippings and leaves into humus and campo t, where the court specifically stated:
Grass clippings and leaves become compost wlten tltey look like soil; it is
black, crwnb~) ill texture, fmd lw no odor of decay, but may smell slightly
sweet. Compost smells like eartlt ratlter titan rolling plants. This conclusion
is consistent with the Department's definition of recycl ing which is defined
as a process by which waste materials are transformed into a new product
ill suclt a manner tit at lite origillal identity as a product is lost. IDAPA
58.0 1.06.005(37).
The cou11 will recall the testimony of Michael Woodward, stating he recalled seeing
(at this agricultural facility) what looked to him to be "soil" or "dirt", and Mr. Elhert could
not detect any unpleasant odors on any occa ion of his presence.
Mr. Dean Ehlert alluded to the belief he saw what to him appeared to be grass
clippings and leaves at the end of a row, but produced no pictures, no analysis, and if that
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statement were to have any credibility, it on ly serves to beg the critical question: where is
the quantitative analysis of the presence of a natural state of "grass clippings and leaves" to
claim there were 600 cubic yards o f a specific ..solid waste .. ? He never took any
photographs, o r attempted to quantify any of thi ·· ubstance" within trus " total volume". the
determination of which is critical to this controver y. What he says he saw o nly begins the
discussion, and with all due respect to Mr. Elbert. if the truth be spoken, by the March 29,
2013. given the prior fi ve-six months of a wet and decaying fall and winter months, just as
every year at this agricultural faci lity, there is not a single identifiable blade of grass or a
single identifiable leaf in its o riginal identifiable plasma degradable f01mation as a "blade"
of grass or as a .. lea r · structure, a that fonn could, by then. no longer exist, as the passage
of time caused such organic materials to become somewhat or entirely decomposed, so the
critical question remains: where is the evidence to support any allegatio n that from this
·'total volume" seen at this agricultural facility, there is the presence of any "solid waste·'
material /substance on March 29, 2013 that constitutes a quantitati ve presence of 600 cubic
yards of any perceived di scarded material defined under the Resource Conservation

Recove1yAct (RCRA). administered by the EPA, to be a "solid waste?
To that deficiency, the Deprutment has failed to demonstrate in what manner these
grass cl ippings and leaf materials had not

tran~formed

from any quantified substance of a

" waste" material on March 29, 2013. This obvious deficiency is not just from the fact there
was

110

usolirl waste" materials/substances were present at this agricultural {acilit!' o n

March 29, 20 13, but DEQ could not find any measurable runount of any substance that was
not humus/compost/soil/dirt witrun the rows of these material substances. Remember, these
agents went onto the premises; so there is no excuse there is a complete absence of proof.
We know these DEQ officials (Dean Ehlett and Jack Gantz), though having gone
onto the premises, certainly could have, and would have, conducted measurements had there
been any substance of a ··solid waste" nature capable of being measured and quantified,
Nothing of that nature existed from which to yield anything of significance, and they left,
and the Department then fa lsely alleged in their pleadings they ·attempted to conduct an
inspection·', which had that been true, would again lea e this court with no demonstrative
evidence whatsoever as to quantities required to establish anything, be it the existence of the
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quantitative presence of 6oo cubic yards of an identifiable material/substance that will meet
the criteria of the court 's analysis of'·solid waste'·.
Were DEQ officials are unwi lling or unable to take any measurements on the
premises, docs that not demonstrate the complete lack of evidence? Or is it circumstantial
evidence they knowingly viewed what they knew to be compost and humus, soil and dirt
wi thin the windrows, substances they knew fro m Gibson's long history of agTicul tural
acti ities and agricultural facil ity operations were a recognized beneficial use, as a recycled
and reusable material substances as a substitute ror commercial rertilizers, knowing that
such products were receiving different treatment by the Department of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). through the CFR's under the RCRA, as these substances are not
regarded to be hazardous materials, excluded from ·'solid wastes··. and not regulated through
the mandatory provisions or the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (Title 39, Chapter 74,
including I. C. §39-7404), incorporating the exempt status of such grass clippings and leaves
as a direct ingredient and commercial substitute in composted substances under the
provisions of the Resource Conservation Recovety Act (RCRA).
T he RCRA was enacted in 1976. and has been enforced consistently since then,
recently amendi ng their final rules regarding definitions of ..solid wastes· and establishing
exemptions from 'solid wastes.., promulgating among their Final Rule in 2015, specifica lly
designed to enhance the recycl ing processes, the exc/u ion of s uch rec_ycled materials f rom

their definition of ''solid wastes". The 20 15 Rule announced within the Resource
Conservation Recove1y Act (RCRA) was undertaken to encourage recycling practices, thu
certai n materials were spec(fically excluded from the definition of solid wa te, and some
solid wastes were excluded rro m the definition of hazardous wastes. There was a dedicated
effort to exclude from the regulatory arena certain materials in the nature of being

"composted organic materials", and to accompli h that the 2015 Final Rule Definition of
olid Waste (0 W) exempted three types of waste materials from the definition of w hat is a

''solid wa te ", one being materials used as an ing r·edieot that is directly used in a
produ ction proce s. And o ne being used as a substitute for commercial products. These
grass clippings and leaves are ·directly'' used as an ingredient in the production process of
this agricultural " humus·· and ..compost' products that have a beneficial use, referred to as
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compost and humus, and is a substitute for commercial fertilizers, being a soil an1endment
and plant foliar product, destined for specific agricultural appl ication.
These materials have been hi torically left to a regulation within the jurisdiction of
the

tate's Departments of Agriculture, and that brought forth the exemptions of manure

and crop residues announced ' ith the provi ions of the IDAPA Rule 58 .0 1.06 ( olid Waste
Management Rules), subpart .00 I ("rit lc and cope), subpat1 (.03) (Wastes Not R egulated
Under These Rules), (b) (T hese Rule Do Not Apply to the following olid wastes . .. )
(b)(ii) (the effect of which excluded tho c sub tances fro m the definition of w hat i
con ider ed a "solid wa te" from a ny .-ig ht of regulation by DEQ, those materia l
ub tance con i ting of manure and crop (plant) re id ues intended to be returned to
the oil at agr·onomic rate , and (b)(i ii). being anp agricultum l solid waste wlticlt is

mmwged and regulated pursuant to rules adopted bv the ldalto Department of
Agriculture.
Clearly, compost, and the process of compo ting, is ''managed and regulated by the
Idaho Department of Agriculture a

cited previously to the court, as those statutory

enactments are clearly expressed in the oil and Plant Amendment Act, and the Right to

Farm Act, being Title 22, Chapter 45, speci ficall y I. C. §22-4502, which specificall y states:
22-4502. Definitions. As u ed in this chapter:

( 1) "Agricultural faci lity" include , without limitation, any land, building,
structw·e, ditch. drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance, machinery or
equipment that is used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation" meat1s an actil ity or condition that occurs in
connection with the production of agricultural products for food, fiber, fuel
and other lawful uses, and includes, without/imitation:
(a) Construction. expansion, use, maintenance and repair of an agricultural
facility :
(b) Pre pari ng land for agricultural production;
(c) Applying pesticides, herbicides o r other chemicals. compounds or
substances labeled for insects, pests. crops, weeds, water or soi l;
(d) Planting, irrigating, growing. fertilizing. harvesting or producing

agricultural, horticultural. floricultural and viticultural crops. fi"uit and
vegetable products, field grains. seeds, hay, od and nurse1y stock, and other
plants, plant products, plant bvproducts, plant waste am/ plant compost,·
(e) Breedi ng, hatching. raising, producing. feeding and keeping livestock,
dairy animals, swine, fur-bearing animals, poultry, eggs, fish and other
aquatic species, and other animals, animal products and animal byproducts,
animal waste, animal compost, and bees, bee products and bee byproducts;
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({) Processing and packaging agricultural products, including the processing
and packaging of agricultural products into food and other agricu ltural
commod ities:
(g) Manufacturing animal feed ;
(h) Transporting agricultural products to or from an agricultural facility;
(i) Noise, odors, dust, fumes, light and other conditio ns associated with an
agricultural operation or an agricultural facility;
U) Selling agricultural products at a fam1ers or roadside market;
(k) Parti cipating in a government sponsored agricultural program.
(3) "Nonagricultural activities," for the purposes of this chapter, means
res idential, commercial or industri al prope11y development and use not
associated '"~th the production of agri cultural products.
(4) "Improper or negligent operation" means that the agricu ltural o peratio n is
not undertaken in con formity with federal, state and local laws and
regulations or pe1mits, and ad ersely affects the public health and safety.
Notwithstanding what the IDAPA Rules do or do not exempt, the Resource

Conservation Recove1y Act (RCRA), pre-empts it entirely, being an Act promulgated and
regulated by EPA, is identified in 42 U C 690 1-6933, and EPA has expres ly precluded any
of these assertions of these organic waste-derived materials being called "solid waste" as
advanced by D EQ throug hout this litigation.
DEQ has been unwilling to provide this court wi th the needed evidence or
fundamental elements to justi fy their accusations, and has been unwilling to address the
prevailing ''Federal legal authority'. that demonstrates these '·agricultural operations and
faci lities.. engaging in composting are not subject to any solid waste disposal regulatory
authority expressed within any porti on of IDAPA 58 .0 1.06 when such materials are di rect
ingred ients and/or a composted product intended as a substitute for a commercial product as
exempted by RCRA, embraced fUI1her by (b)(iii). when it remains clear the Department of
Agriculture has expressed this jurisdiction over compostiug activity and construes it to be an
agricultural activities within their Right to Farm Act and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act,
when finding these specific composting ingredients (grass clippings and leaves) to be
expressly excluded by the RCRA and that exclusion expressly adopted by the Idaho Solid

Wa te Facilities Act. Title 39. Chapter 74, I. C. §39-7404, and where there is also found the
exclusion of "crop residues and manure.. within I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), and specifically
identified within I. C. §39-7404 regarding the RCRA provi sions, wherein the RCRA does
address ingredients in composting acth ities as being substances/materials that are excluded
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from '·solid waste'' by vi1tue of definitions within the RCRA , wherein we find the Idaho

Solid Waste Facilities Act cany forward these certain exclusions to the definition of '·solid
was te .., by the specific lang uage:
39-7404. Consistency with federal law -- Status of appendices. The
legislature intends that the state of Idaho enact and carry out a solid waste
program that will enable the state to achieve approved slate status with

respect to solid waste disposal facility regulation from the federal
go' ern men/.
The legislature finds that subtitle D cl RCRA. and in particular the code of
federal regulations, title -10. part 25 .., and 258, establish complex, detailed
and costly provisions for the disposal of solid waste. By the provisions of
this chapter, the legislature desires to avoid duplicative or con fli cting state
and federal regulatory systems and allow local M W Lf unit owners the
maximum flexibility possible under 40 CFR 257 and 25 8, to meet the
substantive goals of protection of human health and the environment with
consideration for actual site and cl imatic conditions. At any time that -10 CFR

257 or -10 CFR 258 is amended, any additional flexibility or extension
otherwise prohibited by this chapter shall be allowed as applicable.
Th e board may not promulgate any mle pursuant to this act that would
impose conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in scope than
tile referenced R CRA regulations of tile United States environmental
protection agency or tile provisions of this chapter. Until regulations are
adopted, agency conclusions in appendix B through appendix H inclusive,
per the "Federal Register" of Octobe r 9. 1991. shall be used for technical
guidance for relevant provisions of this chapter.

That serves to mean the e materials that are a direct ingredient (grass clippings and
leaves) are runong the substances that are speci fically excl uded from the definition of '·solid
waste", in addition to that which is identified in I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), referring to
Agricultural wastes of manures and crop residues. that ru·e retwned to the soils at agronomic
rates. I. C. §39-7404, has pre-empted any defini tio n of .. so lid wastes" to be what is defined
by the RCRA, and D EQ cannot promulgate any rule any broader than allowed by the
provisions of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), holding to the effect these

composted materials are e.:.::c/urlerl by virtue of the recycling provisions contained in
RCRA. These RCRA provisions are accessed to by go ing to www.epa.gov which therein
will reveal the exclusions from the definition of ..solid waste'· as such .. ingredients·· as grass
clippings and leaves are not subject to RCRA Subtitle C regulation, which comprises the
following:
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Recycled Materials that are not Subject to RCRA
Hazardous Waste Regulation
In order to encourage recyc li ng practices. certain materials are specificall y excluded fro m
the definition o f solid waste, and some so lid wastes are excluded from the definition of
hazardous waste. Furthermore, ccriain hazardous ' astes are exempt from regulation
when recycled. These three categorie are discussed below.

•

Recycled Material Specifically Excluded from th e Definition of Solid Waste

Important Rulemaking
The 20 15 De finiti o n of oli d Waste (D W) Final Rule updates some the
recycl ing exclusions found in the table below and provides clear guidance on how
EPA defines legitimate rec\ clint!.
In order to encourage waste recycling, RCRA exempts three types of wastes from
the de finition of solid waste:
o

o

o

Waste Used as an Ingredient: I[ a material is directly used a · an
ingredient in a production process without first being reclaimed, then that
material is not a solid waste.
Waste Used as a Product Substitute: {(a material i directly used as an
effective substitute for a commercial product (without first being
reclaimed), if is exempt from I he definition ofsolid waste.
Wastes Returned to the Production Process: When a material is returned
directly to the production proces · (without firs t being reclaimed) for use
as a feedstock or raw material, if is not a solid waste.

We again take the position this Depar1ment has been pre-empted by Federal law, yet
have chosen to ·'play dumb .. regarding these controlling exclusions from the definitions of
.. solid waste.. within RCRA, clearly mandated by the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act
(ISWFA) (l. C. §39-7404) where it mandates that no rules may be promulgated that creates
greater restrictions than as defined within the RCRA. DEQ is charged to have the
responsibility to recognize and to respect the application of the RCRA. Nothing suppo rts the
position that has been wrongfully advanced in this matter, and this court's conclusion as to
the obvious exclusio n of compost and humus produced through these agricultural
composl ing activities begins to appreciate the purpose of the RCRA excl usion

as thjs

transfo rmation of grass clippings and leaves into humus and compost products is not only
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what the RCRA excludes from the definition of a "solid waste.. but is precisely what the
Idaho Department of Agriculture seeks to regulate, register, and license in Idaho.
As addressed above, DEQ has failed to demonstrate any cri teria or definition
to supp01t their proposition these ingredients were ever scientifically, biologically or
chemically regarded to be a '· olid", let a lo ne not a composting ingred ient from an
agricultural "waste", w here regu latory authority is not authorized.
Given these fa ilures. it becomes an insunnountable attempt for this court to find any
factual or legal basis to classify ··gras clippings and leaves'· as a ''solid waste'', or as a
substance to pose a threat o r hazard to the envi ronment or human health. There is no lega l
basis to claim any alleged violation of any IDAPA Rule on March 29.20 13, as the IDAPA
Rules cannot be promulgated to create any broader rule that as restricted by RCRA .. l f
DEQ is alleging a T ier II violation took place on March 29. 20 I 3, it cannot be based upon
"grass clippings and leaves.., and in all respects, they have failed to prove any violation, and
that proof of a'· olid waste" is essential to the right of regulation.
W hen these particular substances are not destined to be deposited at landfi ll s for
petmanent disposal, but rather recycled as a composted material as defined by the RCRA
exclusions, traditional ly refened to as an ·'organic waste-derived materia]", de fmed within
the legislation over which the Department of Agriculture has the exclusive authority under
the law, the entire essence of which has been understood in the context of a "soil nutrient"',
for use as a ··soil amendment"" and/or as a "plant foliar .., it becomes disingenuous for DEQ
to attempt to promote the proposi tion that they have any regulatory authority over that which
is not within the mission statement of the legislation, incapable of being advanced by any
IDAPA Rule. and limited by the effects of the enactment ofTitle 39, C hapter 74, tatutes of
the tate of Idaho, specifically I. C. §39-7404.
When substances are recognized within Idaho' s law to be organica lly decomposed
substances destined for the reincorporation into the soils for the benefit of mankind, it
becomes simply irrational to suggest they should be considered as a regulated material as
that of a hazardous material, or as a ..solid waste" substance that must be regulated under the
solid waste landfi ll regu latory authority established for an entirely different purpose.
This decomposition process of organic substances have been continuously declared
in Idaho to be llllder the jurisdiction and autho rity of the State's Department of Agriculture,
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and have never been destined for any regulation by either EPA or DEQ, under any
recognized Act or enactment within any legislative or administrative body of either the
Federal or

tate governments, as these grass and leaf substances, destined for the

transfom1ati ve process of becoming a composted commodity for soil reintroduction and
plant poll ination, development and growth. arc to be exclusively regulated through the
enactments of state legislation that ha placed the jurisdiction and authority within the tate
Department of Agriculture, where that juri diction and auU1ority has been recited within the
statutory authority exclusively placed with the Idaho Depmtment of Agricul ture (1 DA),
tlu·ough such enactments including the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), contained in Title 22,
Chapter 45, enacted in 1978, and the Soil And Plant Amendment Act (SAP AA), contained in
Title 22, Chapter 22, enacted in 200 I.
These enactments, ve ted by Idaho's Legislature, are exclusively within the
Department of Agriculture, designed to protect agricultural acti ities, operations, and
facil ities, to avoid nuisance claims, m1d to preserve the use of agricultural land, and this
jurisdiction has been placed with that Department to assure their exclusive right to regulate
these agricultural activities, and specifically those acts that relate to growing, harvesting,
developing, processing and composting organic plant materials and residues into agriculture
substances and commodities for reincorporation into ilie soils or onto plants to enhance
growth, as promoted, encouraged, and ultimately mandated by the RCRA in 2015.
These statutory provisions, placed exclusively under the j wisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture m·e identified in Title 22, Chapters 1, 6, 22, and 45, Statutes of
the tate of Idaho, and in an abbreviated fashion , the relevant excerpts from this extensive
authority fundamental to th is litigation, cannot be ignored by this court in reaching a
disposition of this controversy. The legislati on that vests the exclusive jurisdiction and
authority over iliis specific subject matter is vested within the Department of Agriculture,
and aspects iliereof are as follows:
22-1 10. Authority and duties of director concerning agricultural
waste. (1 ) In addition to other powers and duties, the director of the state
depmtment of agriculture shall have authority to regulate agricultural
solid waste, agricultural composting and other similar agricultural
activities to safeguard am/ protect animals, man and tlte environment. The
director may promulgate rules in compliance with chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code, that may be necessary for the efficient enforcement of ilie
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provtstons of this section. The director may collaborate with any state
agency, federal agency or other governmental entity in the development of
rules promulgated pursuant to this section.
22-603. Definitions. When used in this chapter:
(4) "Compost " means a biologically stable material derived (rom

the composting process.
(5) "Composting" means the biological decomposition o( organic
matter. It is accomplished hi' m ixing and piling in such a wav to promote
aerobic and/or anaerobic rleca)l. The process inhibits pathogens, viable
weed seeds and odors.
(22) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings,
leaves, weeds, bark, plantings, pnmings and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes (rom logging and milling operations, and {ood wastes. " Organic
waste-derived ma teria l" doe not includ e products that contain biosolids
as d efined in this section.
22-604. Adoption of r ules. The department shall administer,

en force, and carry out the provisions o(this chapter ami may adopt rules
necessary to carry out its purposes including, but not limited to, the proper
use, handling, transportation, storage, disphlF, distribution, sampling,
records, analysis, form, minimum percentages, fertilizer ingredients,
exempted materials, in vestigational allowances, definitions, labels,
labeling, misbranding, mislabeling and disposal o( fertilizers and their
containers. The adoption of rules is subject to publi c hearing as prescribed
by the Idaho administrative procedure act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.
22-2203. Definitions. As used in thjs chapter:
(1) "Aged" means exposed to weathering and/or n atural decay, such

that the original material is significantly altered.
(6) "Compost" means a biologicallv stable material derived [rom the
composting process.
(7) "Composting" m eans the biological decomposition of organic
matter. It is accomplished bv mix ing and piling in such a wall to promote
aerobic tm dlor anaerobic rlecav. The process inhibits pathogens, viable
weed seeds and odors.
(11) "Depa rtment" means the /dalt o department of agriculture.
( 12) "Director" means the director of the /rialto department of
agriculture or his duly authorized representative.
(24) "O({icial sample" means an y sample of soil amendment or plant
amendment taken by the director or /tis agent.
(25) "Organic" refers oniF to naturall11 occurring substances gen erally
recognized as the h ydrogen compounds of carbon and their derivatives.
(26) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings, leaves,
weeds, bark, plantings, pnmings, ami other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes (rom logging and milling operations ami food wastes. "Organic
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wa te-derived material" doe not include products that contain
bio olids as defin ed in sub ection (2) of this section.
(30) "Plaut amendment" means £111!1 natural or svntlletic substance

applied to plants or seeds wllicll is intended to improve germination,
growth, yield, product qua/if! , reproduction, [la vor or other £1esirable
characteristics o[plauts e..'l;cept commercial fertilizers, soil amendments,
limes, tlllmfmipulated animal manure and vegetable organic wastederived materials, pesticides, mulch and other materials which nw11 be
exempted b y rule.
(31) "Processed" means deliberately treated or manipulated to modify or
transform physical, chemical, or biological characteristics of lite natural
state of a substance.
(34) "Soil amendment" m eans:
(a) A n )I substance which is intended to improve the physical, chemical or
biological characteristics o(tlte soil to favor plant growth,· or
(b) An v material which is represented as having a priman1 [unction of
enlwncing, changing or modi[11ing soil microorganism reproduction,
activiry or population, or material wltich is represented as having the
primary [un ction of (ormiug or stabilizing soil aggregates in soil to
which it is to be applied and thereby improving lite resistance o[the soil
to the slaking action of water, increasing the soil's water and air
permeability or infiltration, improving the resistance of tlte surface of
the soil to crusting, improving ease of cultivation of soil, or otherwise
[avorablt~ modi[viug tile structural or pll vsical properties o[ soilj am/
(37) "Waste-derived soil amendment" or "waste-derived plant
amendment" means mw soil amendment or plant amendment that is
derived (rom au industrial b11product, coproduct or other material that
would otherwise be disposed o{i[ a market [or reuse were not au option,
but does not include any soil amendment or plant amendment derived
from bioso lids o r biosolid products regulated under the code of federa l
regulations, 40 CFR 503, as amended.
(39) "Wood" means tile liard fibrous materia/located beneath the bark

of trees, which constitutes the greatest part of the stems of trees and
shrubs.
22-2204. Authority to adopt rules. The d epartment shall administer,
enforce, a nd ca rry out this chapter a nd may adopt rules necessary to
carrv out it purpo c in cluding, but not limited to, the proper use,
handling, transportation, storage, dis play, distribution, sampling,
record , analysis, form, minimum percentages, soil amending or plant
amending ingredients, exempted materials, investigational allowances,
definitions, labels, labeling, mis branding, mislabeling and dispo al of
soil amendments and plant amendments and their containers. The
adoptio n of rules shall be subj ect to public hearing as prescribed by the
Idaho administrati ve procedure act, chapter 52. title 67, Idaho Code.
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22-450 I. Legislative findings and intent. The legislature finds that
agricultural activities conducted on farmland in urbaniz ing areas are
often subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and
even force the premature removal of the lands from agricultural uses, and
in some cases prohibit investments in agricultural improvements. It is the

intent of tile legislature to reduce the loss to the state of its agricultural
resources by limiting the circumstances under wllicll agricultural
operations may be deemed to be a nuisance. The legislature also finds
that the right to (arm is a natural right and is recognized as a permitted
use throughout the state o(ldaho.
22-4502. Definitions. As used in thi s chapter:
(1) "Agricultural (acilitp" includes, without limitation, an v land,

building, structure, ditch, drain, pond, impoundment, appurtenance,
machine1]1 or equipment that is used in an agricultural operation.
(2) "Agricultural operation " means an ttctivitv or condition that occurs
in connection with tile production of agricultural products (or food,
fiber, fuel and other lmv(uluses, am/ includes, without limitation:
(d) Planting, irrigating, g rowing, fertilizing, harvesting or producin g
agricultural, horticultural, flori cultural and viticultural crops, fruits
a nd vegetable products, field g rains, seeds, hay, sod and nursery
stock, and other plants, plant products, plant bvuroducts, plant waste

and plant compost;
22-4504. Local ord inances. No city, county, taxing district or other
political subdivision of this state sha ll adopt any ordinance or
r esolution that declares a ny agricultural operation, agricultura l
facility or expansion thereof that i operated in accordance with
generally a·ecognized agricultural practices to b e a nuisance, nor shall
any zoning ordinan ce that requires abatement a a nuisance or forces

the closure o(nnv such agricultural operation or agricultural facility be
adopted. A n v such ordinance or resolution shall be void and shall have
no force or effect. Zoning and nuisance ordinances shall not apply to
agricultural operations and agricultura l faci lities that were established
outside the corporate limits of a municipality and then were incorporated
into the municipali ty by annexatio n. T he county plann ing and zoning
authori ty may adopt a nuisance waiver proced ure to be recorded w ith the
county recorder or appropriate county recording authority pursuant to
residential divisio ns of property.
These grass clippings and leaves are defined in Idaho law (by the Department of
Agriculture enactments) to be an organic material, referred to in the statutes as "Organic
waste-derived material", no t de fined to be a ·'solid., or a "solid waste'·, or to be deposited
or disposed of in a solid waste landfi ll d isposal site. This became a legal definition of
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what these ..grass clippings and lea es.. may be regarded e·organic waste-derived
material '") under Idaho law. Thi s "legal definition" is found in the

oil and Plant

Amendment Act (SAPAA) Title 22, Chapter 22. I. C. §22-2203(26), which includes
those substances that are specificall y referred to as being ''grass clippings.., '·leaves··,
weed s, bark , plantings, prunings, and other vegetative wastes, wood wastes from logging
and mi ll ing operations, and food wastes, identified within subpart (26) as follows:
·'(26) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings, leaves,
weeds, bark, plantings, prunings, and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes from logging and milling operations and food wastes:·
DEQ conveniently declines to present their awareness of the RCRA, the I WF A, or
this legal definition. though infini tely aware ofthi legislative authority that had been vested
wi thin the Ocprutment of Agriculture, as presented from the 2009 litigation in which Mr.
Gibson's agricultural operations, activiti es, and faci lities were inextricably involved within
that controversy initiated by Ada County over thi precise pru·cel of proper1y, advancing the
misguided belief that Ada County has the right to impose a conditional use perm it (CUP)
upon the property owner or operator before such an agricultural composting activity could
be conducted upon agricultural grounds. Thereby attempting to avoid the pre-emptive
effects of Idaho law. It was not only that ca e from which it remains undisputed that DEQ
was infinitely aware of the Gibson· operations since 2004 at that particular location, but of
equal, if not greater factual awarene s a to Mr. Gib on' s operations stems from the
litigation that reached statewide awareness with Mr. Gibson's operations in the decision
rendered by the Idaho Supreme Cour1 in 1995, Ada County v. Gibson, 126 ldal1o 854, 893 P.
2d 80 I ( 1995), clearly confirming DEQ, both when operating as a former division of the
Department of Health and Welfare, and thereaf1cr as an agency in 2000, was intricately
aware of these operations, including their size and the composition of the material
substances. Evidence on this fundamental issue as to what this substance is, ru1d recogn ition
of the legal deflil.ition of the "ingredient'· materials in question. is fundamental in the
process of engaging in any analysis of this regulatory issue, and that explains why the
IDAPA Rules sought to specifically exclude knovvn agricultural substru1ces (plant residue,
manure. and other waste substances regulated by the Idaho Department ofAgriculture) as
IDAPA cannot contradict the exclusionary definitions contained in the idaho olid Waste
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Facilities Act, identified in I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), and the restrictive content of I. C. §397404, pre-empting the regul atory authority ofDEQ's defi ni tion of "solid waste".
The Gibson faciliti es have been in operation for decades, a fact established by the
two prior ··high profi le" episodes of "G ibson related litigation", commencing with the Idaho
upreme Cow1 Decision rendered in 1995, refen·ed to as Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho
854, 893 P. 2d 801 ( 1995). and the subseq uent Ada County case before identified as Ada

County v. VHS Properties, LLC, CVOC 2010-02298, which litigation commenced in 20 10
and cu lminated in 2013 , fo llowing the Legislati ve clarifi cation of certain defmit ions
contained within The Rig ht To Farm Act (RTF A), so as to be congruent with the Soil And
P lant Amendment Act (SA PAA), resulting in the denial of Ada County's effort to exercise
condi tional use a uthority (seeking a conditional use permit) upon w hat was already a
statewide permitted agricultural use of agricultural land engaged in the act of conducting
composting operations in Idaho. This statutory legislation pre-empted any city or county
attempt to impose a condition upon what had previously been declared as a statewide ri ght
and activity within the state of Idaho. Th is publicized case history involving Mr. Gibson
and VHS Propert ies, LLC, has found its way into this case, the substance thereof and the
factual basis about which this court must take judicial notice of Mr. G ibson's historic and
continuing composting activities over many decades.
T his Court may not only take judicial notice of these li tigious proceed ing under
Rule 20 1 IRE, but also reference wa made to them in this case by D EQ. TI1is court may
take judicial noti ce of previous case citations. See City of Lewiston v. FrG/y, 91 Idaho
322,325- 27, 420 P.2d 805. 808-10 ( 1966): l. C. § 9- 10 I; Rule 20 I, I.R.E.; See also, Crawford
v. Departmen/ of Correction, 133 ldaho' 633. 636 n. I, 99 1 P.2d 358, 36 1 n. I ( 1999) ("We
take judicia l notice of House Bill 73, which was not submitted as part of the record on
appea l, but is contained in the public records maintai ned by the Office of Leg islative Serv ices
located in the State Capitol Building. I.R.E. 20 I(f); Trautman v. Hill, 11 6 Idaho 337,340,775
P.2d 65 1,654 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209. [2 13], 832 P.2d 11 44, [1 148]
(Ct. App. 1992)." (bracketed references added)).
This court w ill recall that M r. Early was involved (as a law C lerk) in the 1995
case relating to Mr. Gibson' s in volvement with the Ada County as he referred to Ada

County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P. 2d 801 ( 1995) d uring prior hearings. DEQ
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acquired public knowledge as to these on-go ing composting activities conducted by Mr.
Gibson, dating back to 199 1 (in that case). and aware of years earlier. That Decision
confirmed agricultural acti viti es were actively pursued by Mr. Gibson to the present. Mr.
Early was referring to specific language within that Decision:
Jn 1991 , David Gibson acquired rights to a parcel of real property in Ada
County with the apparent purpose of operating a tree and shrub nursery. [ 1]
The condition of the soil on this parcel is such, however, that prior to its use
for growing nur ery stock large amounts of compost must be added to the
soil. Toward this end, Gibson has accumulated on the parcel large
amounts of organic material. [2}
lFootnote [2]] These organic materials include leaves and grass clippings
from the Ada County Highway District and pri vate lawn care companies and
are not at issue in this case.
Mr. Gibson has been conducting composting operations at several agricul tural
facilities in accordance with his registration and under the regulation of the Depru1ment of
Agricul ture, pursuant to The Right to Farm Act (RTFA) and The Soil And Plant
An1endment Act (SAPAA), not only at this pruticulru· agricu ltural fac ili ty since 2004, but
known to DEQ (as a Division of Health and Welfare and as a Department) from prior
encounters with the DEQ personnel regarding pennitting purposes in 1992, and operating
composting facilities on State owned land since 1988, as well as on the adjacent twenty acre
pru·cel located less than a '·stone's throw away" from this agricultural facility from 1991
unti l relocating to this agricu ltural facility in 2004.
DEQ is charged with the public knowledge of this hi story of Mr. Gibson, charged
with the awareness of the statutory and Rule excl usionary language, charged with the
awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority of lSDA, charged with the
awru·eness of the exclusion of compostable organic-derived waste materials, recognized to
be "organic waste-derived material" as defined in SAPAA, and the restricted scope
mandated by the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), I. C. §39-7404, restricting no
broader scope as to what constitutes solid wastes" than as identified within RCRA,
which has the categories of recycl ing exclusions from ·'solid waste", incorporated into the
Idaho Legislation by the language expressed in the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act
(ISWFA), specifically I. C. §39-7404, and charged with the knowledge as to what the Idaho
Legislature has defined in 200 1 to be "organic waste-derived material" to be expressly
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defined to : " mean grass cli ppings, leaves, weeds, bark, pl antings, prunings, and other
vegetati ve wastes, wood wastes and food waste substances··, no ne of which are to be
considered as being '·solid wastes'' under the recycling provisions of RCRA, and most
certainly DEQ must be charged with the knowledge of the ex istence of the Idaho Solid

Waste Facilities Act (JSWFA) and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, (RCRA). all
the w hil e knowing thi s agricultura l operation is subject o nly to the regulation o f the Idaho
tate Department of Agriculture (JSDA) .
DEQ cannot point to any defi nition that will place ..grass clippings'· and "leaves'·
into a category that alters the exclu ion by the recycling provisions of RCRA, and no trung
can get them to where they want to be with any scientific, statut01y or ca e law definition, as
they are restrained by what is contained within the Code of Federal Regulations, the

Resource Consen 1ation RecoveiJ' Act (RCRA), and the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act,
(1 WFA). This failure by them to cite these restrictive effects of the provisions of the
RCRA, by a scientific, statutory or case authorized definition, reflects a failure upo n which
they had premised their hypothesis that such substances as grass clippings and leaves are
"solid wastes".
Clearly certain substances were not to be considered as "solid wastes" within their
rules. Those exceptions and exemptions were no t intended to be mere superfluous language;
it has meaning and purpose, and provides reason why any ..non-solid" plant residue
substances and '·organic waste-derived materials" are intended to be excluded from the term
"solid waste" (which is mandated by RCRA), pruticular ly when such a compostable
substance is covered extensively througho ut the statut01y references within APAA, RTFA,
1 WF A, and the Federal regulations w ithin RCRA.
These Defendants before cited another Federal agency definition utilized by the
Federal National Pru·ks Service, Department of Interior, consistent with RCRA, refen·ing to
their Solid Waste Disposal Sites and the Code of Federal Regulations, wherein they also
declru·e a clear exemption of compos/able substances ji·om being ·what is otherwise defined

to be solid wastes. Their definitions ru·e expressly congruent with EPA's RCRA, Idaho's
ISWFA and Idaho's Department of Agriculture RFTA and SAPAA acts, and it bears
repeating those provisional excerpts that are therein referring to compost, agricultural
wastes, and organic substances, wherein it is declared within these excerpts:
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Code of Federal Regulations
Title 36. Parks, Forests, and Public Property
Chapter I. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR
Part 6. SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITES OF THE NATIONAL
PARK SYSTEM
§ 6.3. Definitions
The following definitions apply to this part:
Agricultural solid waste means solid waste that is generated by the
rearing or harvesting of animals, or the producing or harvesting of
crops or trees.
Compostible [sic] materials mean organic substances that decay under
natural and/or human-assi ted conditions within relatively short time
intea-vals, genera lly not in excess of ninety days.
Solid waste disposal site .. .. ... include facilities for the incineration of
solid waste and transfer station . Facilities (or tlte management of
compostible [sic/ materials are not de{ined as SOLID WASTE disposal
sites (or the purposes o[tllis part. (Emphasis added)
When DEQ created IDAPA Rules and Regulations

111

2002-2003, they were

charged with the knowledge of the idaho Solid waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), and
especially I. C. §39-7404, which was inco rporated into the Act in 1002, directing the
controlling application of EPA ' s RCRA to the fS WFA, and made specific provisions to
exempt organic-agronomic substances, which likely influenced their exclusion of
manures and crop (plant) residues within their IDAPA Rules, declaring those "rules do
not apply'' to those wastes which were also euphemistically refen ed to in their reference
of "solid wastes'", being plant residues and manures, from whatever origin, and they were
then excluded from the definition in ISWFA (1. C. §39-7403(50)(e) (manures and crop
residue) and thereafter (1992) specifically restricted within T. C. §39-7404), to enact
definitions no broader that what RCRA may regulate to be a "solid waste" and a
"regulated'" matter.
This court must apply the language used in the application of these express
exemptions, restrictions and mandates, set forth in the Resource Conservation Recovery

Act (RCRA) which is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
incorporated into Idaho law by the ISWFA's provisions within 1. C. §39-7403(50)(e) and
I. C. §39-7404), which was intended to be congruent with IDAPA 58.01 .06.001 .03(b)(ii)

and (b)(ii i), wherein these organic waste-deri ved materials were intended to be excluded
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from what is a "soli d waste", and now clearly mandated by the 2015 RCRA Final Rule
clarifications on tllis subject of what is not to be regarded ..sol id waste". The lDAPA
exemptions mirrored the provision of I. C. §39-7403(50)(e) found in ISWFA, but each
are further pre-empted by the limiti ng effects contained in JSWFA's I. C. §39-7404),
whi ch cannot promulgate a rule broader in scope of EPA's RCRA recycling
exemptions/exclusions, which determines the phrase "so Lid waste" .
These expressly excluded substances have been recogn ized to be within the statutory
jurisdicti on and regulat01y authority of 1 DA. not anywhere allowed to be considered as a
'·solid waste" substance subject to the rules and regulations of DEQ, but as an "organic
waste-derived mate1ial .., not within the mission statement and objective of DEQ by their
statutory creation, which was formed to control ce1tain hazardous "solid wastes" to human
health or the environment.
This present agricultural faci lity is within a stone's throw of the former 20 acre
parcel operated by Mr. Gibson from 1991 until 2004, when, in 2004 he expanded his
operation to this present agricultural facility, where it is surrounded by 520 acres of
agricultural property that will benefit from this so il substance when incorporated onto it
in the future. T llis land has the same soil condition that needs large amounts of nutrient
enriched soi l that must be added to the topsoil, just as was referenced in the 1995
Decision.
DEQ is statutorily obligated to follow the restrictive definition(s) of "solid waste'·
through the Environmental Protection Agency' s (EPA) RCRA enactment, and within
numerous provisions of the Code of Federal Regulation, including 40 CFR 261.4(b)(2),
which has been incorporated and maintained witllin Idaho's JSWFA legislation. DEQ has
ignored these restrictive criteria, as it would have the direct effect of tenninating their action,
just as does the application of the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), the Soil and Plant Amendment

Act (SAPAA), the Resource Conservation Recove1y Act (RCRA) and the Idaho Solid Waste
Facilities Act (TSWFA). Each of these enactments pre-empt this litigation, and this court
must address these enactments in this request for reconsideration.
DEQ has chosen to avoid numerous relevant factors during this litigation, including
their concealment of the physical entry onto the property on March 29, 20 13; their disregard
of the Department of Agriculture's exclusive regulatory authority under RFTA and SAPAA,
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as it relates to agricultural faci lities engaged in composting activities; their failure to review
and apply the restrictions in the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and the
limitation of any broader scope of regulation as a result of the Idaho Solid Waste Facility
Act (ISWFA); and their complete disregard of the exemptions within the IDAPA Rules,
where certain materials and substances are exempt from ··solid waste" regulation, being crop
(plant) residue and all agricultural waste regulated by ISDA , specifically identified in
IDAPA 58.01.06.00 1.03(b)(ii) and (b)(iii), frustrated further wi th their undisputed
awareness of the Gibson operations for decades of mixing dit1, soil, leaves, and grass
clippings, identified in their records and files from 1992, which Defendants continue to
believe serves to mandate the application of L C. §39-108(4), (be it a statute or repose or
limitati ons) as any claim of a yardage violation (Tier II 600 cubic yardage criteria) has been
the identical operation at this facil ity since August 2004, and there has never been any
quantity of a claimed 'solid waste" identified to exist either before or on March 29, 2013.
There has always been substantial porti ons of existing compost, dirt, and soil
materials mixed into and with any grass clippings and leaf substances at this agricultural
faci lity, and this cow1 has now declared that compost, humus, dirt and soil substances are
not a "solid waste", so this conclusion of law requires a separation and quantification of
what is being claimed to be a "SOLID WA TE" at this facility on March 29, 2013 , and
there has been no identification or separation of any materials, and none of these quanti ties
of '·non-sol id waste materials" have been deducted from the perceived 600 cubic yards of
"total volume" of material presence at this facility on March 29. 20 13. This cou11 must
require such "non-solid waste'' material s be deducted from any calculation, given the
Conclusion of Law of the Court has entered.
Once this cou11 correctly applies the limitations of I. C. §39-7404 to the restrictive
application ofthe exemptions within RCRA, there can be no fmding of fact or conclusion of
law that grass clippings and leaves are a "solid waste" material , when it is being used as a
direct ingredient in the recycling process, that generates a substitute commercial product by
this agricultural operation at this faci lity. The 20 15 Rule clarification contained within the
2015 Final Rule to the RCRA provisions re-affirms the prohibition that pre-empts this
regulatory action being pursued by DEQ, and the court is statutorily obligated to impose this
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exemption of grass clippings and leaves from what constitutes a '·solid waste'', as mandated
within the enactment of I. C. §39-7404.
Title 39, (Health and Safety), Chapter 74, specifically the Idaho Solid Waste

Facilities Act (JSWFA), not only defines ··solid waste" ( 1. C. §39-7403(50)(e)) to exclude
'·agri cultural waste" ("manures and crop residues·· that are " returned to the soi ls at
agronom ic rates'"), but also mandates the restrictive reference to what is a "so lid waste'·
as applied within RCRA. I. C. §39-7403(50)(e) first states:
(5 0) "Solid waste" means any garbage or refuse, sludge from a waste water
treatm ent plan t, water sup ply treatment plant, or a ir poll ution control facility
and other discarded material including solid, liquid semisolid, o r contai ned
gaseous material resulting from industria l, commercial , mining, and
agricultural operations and from community activities, but does not include
solid or disso l ed materials in domestic sewage, o r solid or dissolved materials
in irrigation retw-n fl ows or industrial discharges that are point sources subject
to permit under 33 U.S.C. 1342. or source. special nuclear, or byprod uct
materia l as defined in the atomic energy act of I 954, as amended (68 Stat.
923). T!tese regulations sltallnot applv to tile following solid wastes:
(e) Agricultural wastes, limited to manures and crop residues, returned to

the soils at agronomic rates;
Nowhere within these definitions does the Idaho legislature attempt to define
' crop residues" in any manner to exclude · g rass clippings" that may be derived from
residential yard mowing or landscape properties that are groomed,

or clippin gs

harvested from large grass and sod prod ucing farms, o r the leaves that have fallen from
trees in orchards, landscaping and yard co llections. Grass clippings and leaves are a form
of a crop residue, as they are derived from a biological source (grass and trees),
recognized to be an agriculture or among various acti viti es of ho rticulture, and these
clipped grass leaves and tree leaves become a bio logical residue, and specifically
mentioned wi thin the compost process of the definitions within the Right to Farm Act.
The Solid Waste Facilities Act, (I. C. §39-7404) goes on to state:
39-7404. Consistency with federal law -- Status of appendices. T he legislature

intends that tile state of Idaho enact and carry out a solid waste program that
will enable tile state to achieve approved state status witlt respect to solid waste
disposal facility regulation from tile federal government.
The legislature finds that s ubtit le D of RCRA, [Resource Conservation Recovery
Act]and in particular the code of federal regulations [CFR], title 40, part 257 and
258, establish complex, detailed and costly provisio ns for the disposal of solid
waste. By the provisions of this chapter, the legislature desires to avo id
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duplicative or conflicting state and federal regu latory systems and allow local
M WLF unit owners the max imum flexibi lity possible w1der 40 CFR 257 and
258, to meet the substantive goals of protection of human health and the
environment with consideration for actual site and climat ic conditions. At any
time that 40 CFR 257 or 40 CFR 258 is amended, any addi ti onal flexibility or
ex tension otherwise prohibited by this chapter sha ll be allowed as appl icable.
Tlte board ma)l NOT promulgate anv rule pursuant to tltis act tltat would
impose conditions or requirem ents more stringent or broader in scope titan tlte
referenced R CRA regulations o( the United States environmental protection
agenCJI or t!te provisions o(tltis chapter. Until regulations are adopted, agency
conc lus ions in appendi x B through append ix H, inclusive, per the "Federal
Register" of October 9, 199 I , shall be used for technica l guidance for relevant
provisions of this chapter. (Emphas is ours)
Hi story:
[39-7404, added 1992, ch. 33 1. sec. 1. p. 979; am. 1993, ch. 139 sec. 5, p. 350;
an1. 1994, ch. 75 sec. 4, p. 166.]
This chapter has not been amended since 1994, and remains the authority that
limits the Board of DEQ from promulgating any rule (IDAPA) that would impose
conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in scope than what is within the
RCRA regu lations of the U nited States Envirorunental Protection Agency (EPA) or any
of the provisions of l. C. §39-7403(50)(e).
DEQ cannot take these organ ic waste-derived materials that are a direct ingred ient
into the composting process that produces an agricultural product and claim them to be a
regulated "solid waste ·. T he reference to .. Board·', under " Definitions.. within the Idaho

Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA) established in l. C . §39-7403(5)&(6), historically
meant (in 1994) the Idaho board of environmental quality, and since 2000, that reference
is now to the board of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.
With respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovel'y Act (RCRA), the
Federal courts have been stating lim itations about the defi nition of "solid waste" ever
s ince 1987, wherein the controlling description of a "solid waste" begins w ith whether
the substance was intended for abandonment and a per1nanent di scard, not otherwise
intended as an ingredient for being processed as an organic substance, as are composted
materials, for use as an agricultural products, just as it has the n been addressed in RCRA

and reflected also in the National Park Systems treatment of these organic vegetative
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materials, as an orgamc waste-derived material used as a direct ingredient m the
composting-recycling process.
The EPA has been specifically restricted in its authority to regulate certain
substances, recognized by express case authority back to 1987, with American Mining

Congress and Engelhard C01poration v. United Stale Em ironmenta/ Protection Agency.
824 F2d 1177 (1987), wherein it discussed the restriction ex isting in 1987, cited within the
following excerpts:
..These consolidated cases arise out of PA's regulation of hazardous wastes under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), as am ended, 42
U.. C. Sees. 69016933 (1982 & Supp. lii 1985). Petiti oners. trade associations
representing mining and oi l re fining interests, challenge regulations promulgated by
EPA that amend the definition of "solid waste" to establish and define the agency's
authority to regulate secondary materials reused within an industry's ongoing
production process. In plain English, petitioners maintain that EPA has exceeded its
regulatory authority in seeking to bring materials that are not discarded or

otherwise disposed of within the compass of "waste."
As wi ll become evident, this case turns on the meaning of the phrase, "and other
discarded material," contained in the statute's definitiona l provisions.
Petitioners, American Mining Congress ("AMC") and American Petrolewn
Institute ("API"), challenge the scope of EPA's final rule. Relying upon the
statutory definition of "solid waste." petitioners contend that EPA 's authority

under R CRA is limited to controlling materials that are discarded or intended f or
discard. They argue that EPA's reuse and recycle rules, as applied to in process
secondary materials, regulate materials that ha ve not been discarded and
therefore exceed EPA's jurisdiction. (3]
Guided by these principles, we turn to the statutory provrsron at issue here.

Congress, it will be recalled , granted EPA power to regulate "solid waste."
Congress specifically defined "solid waste" as "discarded material." EPA then
defined "discarded material" to inc.lude materials destined for reuse in an industty 's
ongoing production processes. Tile challenge to EPA's jurisdictional reach is

fo unded, again, on the proposition that in-process secondary materials are
outside the bounds of EPA's lawful authority. Nothing lias been discardetl, the
argument goes, and thus RCRA jurisdiction remains untriggered.
The ordinary, plain-English meaning of the word "discarded" is "disposed of,"
"thrown away " or "abandoned." [7/ Encompassing materials retained for
immediate reuse within the scope of "discarded material" strains, to say the least,
the everyday usage of that term.
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Tlte question we face, then, is whether, in light of the National Legislature 's
expressly stated objectives and the underlying problems tltat motivated it to enact
RCRA in the first instance, Congre was using tlte term "discarded" in its
ordinary sense-"disposed of' or "abaudoned"-or wfl etlter Congress was using
it in a much more open-enrlerl way, so as to encompass materials no longer
useful in their original capacity tltouglt de tined fo r immediate reuse in another
phase of tlte indusltJ' 's ongoing production process.
For tlte f ollowing reasons, we believe lite former to be tlte case. RCRA was
enacted, as lite Congressional objective our/ findings make clear, in an effort to
lte/p States deal witlt tlte ever increasing problem of solid wa te disposal by
encouraging tlte search for anrlu e of a/tem atives to existing methods of disposal
(including recycling) and protecting !tea/tit am/ tlte environment by regulating
hazardous wastes. To fu lfill the. e puq)oses, it seems clear that EPA need not
regulate "spent" materials that are reCJ clerl and reused in au ongoing
manufa cturing or industrial process. Jllj These materials ltave not yet become
part of tlte waste disposal problem; rather, tltey are rlestinerl f or beneficial reuse
or recycling in a contiuuou process by tlte generating industry itself.
After this mind-numbingjourney thro ugh RCRA, we return to the provision that is,
after all , the one before us fo r examinatio n. And that definitional section, we
believe, indicates clear Congressional intent to limit EPA's authority. First, the
definition of "solid waste" is situated in a section containing thirty-nine separate,
defined terms. This is definiti onal specificity of the first o rder. The very care
evidenced by Congress in defining RCRA's scope certainly suggests that Congress
was concerned about delineating and thus cabining EPA's jurisdictional reach.
econd, the statutory definiti on of "solid waste" is quite specific. . ... .It
contains three specific tetm s and then sets fotth the broader term. "other di carded
material." That definitional structure brings to mind a long-standing canon of
statutory construction. ej usdem generi s.. . . . . .. Here, the three particular classes-garbage, refu e, and sludge from a ' aste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution contro l faci lity--contain materials that clearly fit within the
ordinary, everyday sense of "discarded." Jt is most sensible to conclude that
Congress, in adding the conclud ing phra e "other d iscarded material," meant to
grant EPA a uthority over similar· types o f waste, but not to open up the federal
regulatory reach of an e ntirely new category of materials, i.e., materials neither
disposed of nor abandoned, but passing in a continuous stream or fl ow from one
production process to ar1other.
In sum, our analysis of the statute re eals clear Congressional intent to extend
EPA's authority only to materials that are truly discarded, disposed of, thrown

away, or abandoned.
We are constrained to conclude that. in li ght of the language and structure of
RCRA, the problems animating Congress to enact it and the relevant portions of
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the legislative hi story, Congress clearly and unambig uously expressed its intent

that "solid waste" (and therefore EPA 's regulatory authority) be limited to
materials that are "discarded" by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or
thrown away. Whi le we do not light!) overturn an agency's reading of its own
statute, we a re persuaded that by regulating in-process secondary materia ls, EPA
has acted in contraventio n of Cong ress' intent.'. (Emphas is added)
The E PA has further ex pressed the li mi tations to the defin it ion of ''solid waste'·
fro m being "only to materials that are tmly di carded, dispo ed of, thrown away,

or abrmrloned", to also expressly exclude any such a pplication to o rganic wastederi ved materials that arc d irectly used as an ingredient in the recycling proce s, i.e
compost and humus products.

ERRO R W ITJ liN Til ~ ENJ UNCTJON
CONTA INED WIT IIIN THE JUDGM ENT
T he Judg me nt of this court has enjoined the Defendants in the o peration of
thi s agric ultural facility from recei ving grass cli ppings and leaves in a quantity of
three hundred (3 00) c ubic yards w ithin a twelve ( 12) month peri od. T here is no
restriction to such quantities with such a prolo nged peri od as the IDAPA
provis io ns (had they had any app li cation) restrict the receipt to that of 300 cubic
yards at any o ne time, no t thro ugho ut the accumulat ion over a period of twelve
months, as the materia ls trans form into compost and humus. T his has been
erroneously expressed w ithin the Judgment. T hough it remains, as a matter of
law, that the IDAPA Rules can ha e no appli cati on to materi als/substances that
create a restriction greater than as allowed by EPA's RC RA, in light o f the
limi tations anno unced in I.

. §39-7404 that expressly prevents the promulgation

of any rule broader than the coverage of EPA ' administration of the Resource
Conservation RecoveiJI Acl (RCRA), and the Federal Legislatio n, within their
20 15 Final Rule clarifi catio ns, have ex pressly declared that three categories
(types) of materials/substances are expressly exempted from the defi nition of
"so lid

waste",

in

accordance

with

the

administrati on

of

the

Federal

Government's recycling programs, which have been expressly declared to be the
fo llo wing:
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In order to encourage waste recycl ing, RCRA exempts three types of
wastes from the definition of solid waste:
o

o

o

Waste U. ed as an Ingredient: I( a material is directly used as an
ingredient in a production process without first being reclaimed. then that
material is not a solid waste.
Waste Used as a Product Substitute: If a material is directly used a an
effective substitute for a commercial p roduct (without first being
reclaimed), it is exempt from the definition ofsolid was/e.
Wastes Retumed to the Production Process: When a material is re/urned
direclly /o the produclion proces · (wilhoul first being reclaimed) for use
as a feedslock or raw mal erial, it is not a solid waste.

Grass clippings and lea es come within each of these three types of
exemptions, as these materi als are a direct ingredient to make compost and
humus, without any reclamati on fi rst required; these materials are directly used
as an effective substitute for a commercia l product (commercial fertilizers and
foliars) without any reclamation first required; and these materials are returned
directly to the producti on process, without being first reclaimed, as they are reincorporated as a ·'feedstock" into the windrows so as to enhance the microbiological process (decomposition of newly added materials, as with the
introducti on of soil substances) to accelerate the decompositi on to enhance the
nutrient development of the humus production.
DEQ cannot promulgate any I DA PA Ru le that broadens the regulatory
authority over any material/substance that has been exempted from the de finition
of ·'solid waste", but that sa id, the BRC identified in IDAPA (Be low Regulatory
Concern) is expressed as a limitation of 300 cubic yards at any one time, not a
measurable quantify over a period of one year. T his rationale of ·'at any one
time .. is premised upon the enfo rcement o f a Rule that is premi sed upon the
ex istence of a true "solid waste", something that " is known to be'· and something
that remains to be in a "fi xed state" such that it can be quantified, in its original
state, at any one time. You can never quanti fy an "organi call y derived waste
material ', as those materials are constantly in a state of flux-changetransformation, and what is delivered on one day is in a transfonnative state from
that moment on, never the same vo lume or weight, and in this instance, '·grass
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clippings and leaves" are being dai ly transformed from any prio r delivery into
compost and humus, a substance thi court has acknowledged is not a "so lid
waste'' at all. and cou ld not have been deri ved from a '·solid waste" as
recognized by the clarifications that have been incorporated into the current
RCRA provisions. Tho ugh the entire .Judgment is in erro r. the content of the
pro posed injunction is in confli ct with the specifi c BRC provisio ns that are
contained within the IDAPA Rules regardi ng so lid waste management o f
disposal sites.

CONCLU JON
The courr s FF/CL has expressed the recogn ition that " humus'· and ..compost'' are
not a "solid vvaste .., precisely congruent \ ith the long applied limitations to the definit ion of
what con titutes a .. solid waste.., especially announced within the federal regulations, as
reflected in EPA's Re ource Conservation and Recove1y Act ( RCRA). and RCRA ·s
mandatory application through Idaho's Solid Waste Facilities Act, I WF A. (1. C. §397404), prohibiti ng any broader regulatory cope to be given to ''solid waste" than as
a llowed by the R CRA provisio ns. It bears repeating:
In o rder to encourage waste recycli ng, RCRA exempts three type of
was tes from the definiti on o f so lid waste:

Waste Used a an I ngredient: I( a material is directly used as an
ingredient in a production process without first being reclaimed. then that
material is not a solid was/e.
o Waste Used a a Product ub titute: If a material is directly u ·ed as an
effective substitute for a commercial product (without first being
reclaimed), it i · exempt fro m the definition ofso/id waste.
o Wastes Returned to the P roduction Process: When a material is
returned directly to the production process (without first being reclaimed)
for u e a· afeed.r;tock or raw material, it is not a solid waste.

o

Grass clippings and leaves are the direct ingredients used in the production of
compost and humus products; grass clippings and leaves are directly used to make compost
and humus products as an e ffective substitute for commercial products-

being commercial

fertilizers and foliars; that the composted product made from grass clippings and leaves are
returned directly within the production process by using it as a compost ..feedstock.. to
activate the deco mposition process within newly added grass clippings and leaves, which
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are a direct ingredient, to enhance the biological organic process with the active microbiological organi sms to accelerate the decomposition process.
Thi s production process is a constant process of mixing compost, humus, grass
clippings, leaves, dirt and soil substances into these repeated mixtures, naturally processed
in this organic decomposition process that transforms the e organic substances of grass
clippings and leaves into quantities of humus and composted products, and all the materials
located on this agricu ltural facility (on March 29. 2013) have within it the dir1, soil, compost
and hLunus substances from which they have been mixed throughout their life within these
many windrows. and therefore none of this material/substances located on this agricultural
facility can ever be regarded as a --solid waste ... as a matter of Federal controlling Jaw,
because of the recycling criteria within EPA· s RCRA. The Federal agencies have rightfully
and responsibly exempted decomposable agricultural substances from solid wastes, to
encomage that waste recycl ing process. As stated in the Idaho Solid Waste facilities Act,

(1. C. §39-7404), compliance with RCRA is mandatory:
39-7404. Consistency with federal Jaw -- Status of appendices. The legislature
intends that the state of Idaho enact and carry out a solid waste program that will

enable the state to achieve approved state status with respect to solid waste
disposal facility regulation {rom the federal government.
The legislature finds that subtitle D of RCRA , [Resource Conservation
Recovery Act/and in particular the code of federal regulations [CFR] title 40
part 257 and 258, establ ish complex. detailed and costly provisions for the
disposal of solid waste. By the provis ions of this chapter, the legislature desires
to avoid duplicative or conflicting state and federal regulatory systems and all ow
loca l MSWLF unit owners the maxi mum fl exibil ity possible under 40 CFR 257
and 258, to meet the substanti ve goals of protection of human health and the
environment with cons ideration for actual site and climatic conditions. At any
time that 40 CFR 25 7 or 40 CF R 258 is amended, any additional fl ex ibi lity or
extension otherwise prohibited by this c hapter shall be allowed as applicable.

The board mm1 NOT promulgate an y rule pursuant to this act that would
impose conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in scope than the
referenced RCRA regulations of the United States environmental protection
ageuq or the pro visions oft/lis chapter. (Emphasis added).
DEQ agents are bound by these Federal regulations that exempt these material
substances "grass clippings and leaves", fro m their efforts to deftne them as a "solid waste" .
Furthermore, by the court's own recognjlion that compost and humus are not '·solid wastes·•,
the further recognition tills process consists of a mixture process of these substances

ME MORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDE RATION P. 39

001262

(compost, humus, soil, dirt, grass clippings, leaves. and water), it remains undisputed there
has been no competent, material, and substantial evidence presented to this court to
demonstrate or establish a factual basis to conclude there was any quantitative presence of
600 cubic yards of a "solid waste ". even assuming "gras cli ppings and leaves"' were to be
anywhere defi ned to be as a ··solid waste··. when the "attempted inspection·· was conducted
on March 29, 20 13, so a to give rise to an allegation to claim a "Tier II violation'" occurring
on March 29. 20 13.
This court Jack any legal basis to classify "grass clippings and leaves" as a ·'solid
waste·· material substance because of the c ·emption announced in the RCRA. Each of
these mixing substances are in their constant state of nux as a compostable, recycled direct
ingredient, product substitute and feedstock material used in the production of compost and
humu products, intended to be applied as a substitute for commercial products, that being a
commercial ferti lizer and commercial foliar, and not considered a "so lid waste'· under the
Federal Regulatory provisions of EPA 's RCRA, as declared now in the 20 15 Final Rule of
clarification.
These grass and leaf matelials have been directly used in Gibson 's recycling
production process si nce 1974, specifically regarded to be exempted within the law and has
been maintained as such by virtue of the categories and re ferences made within EPA s
RCRA Idaho s ISWFA, Idaho's 1 DA, the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR 's). and being
further protected by the fact the e materials, in any of its state of fl ux. have never been

discarded and certainly never abmulonerl by their owner, David R. Gibson.
They represent the very ingredients that have been and are being directly used in a
production process to generate a beneficial agricultural prod uct, knov:n as a soil amendment
and a plant foliar. T hese materials become the very compost and humus that clearly is not a
solid waste to be disposed of or discarded in any solid waste disposal landfi ll site, and not to
be regulated by DEQ, by virtue of the restraints within the i daho Solid Waste Facilities Act,
wherein there is found the extensive reference to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
the Resource Conservation and Recove1y Act (RCRA) (42 U . .C. sec. 6901, et seq.) and
those regulations adopted pursuant thereto, add ressed within I. C. §39-7404 and specifically
exempted from the definition of"solid waste" by being crop residues, returned to the soils at
agronomic rates, as defined in I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), as these g rass clippings and leaves are
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from a plant/crop taken as a residue and u ed as an agricullural organic waste-derived
material in a recycling process, declared exempt by pre-emptive Federal enactments, never
intended to be regulated substances, and regarded to be enhanced "soil substances" of a
beneficial use in an agricultural applications and future operations.
These ··grass clippings"' and ·'leaves·' substances have never constituted a hazardous
substance, and have never been found to be regulated under EPA or DEQ auth01ity, thereby
justifying thi court to declare this action as having no foundation in law or fact, and to bring
this spuriou action against the e Defendant to a close with the dismissal of the acti on with
prejudice. This court is req uested to amend its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lm , and
Judgment, so as to properly address the applicable Federal Law (EPA·s RCRA) to the
restricti ve provisions of Idaho's Law (I. C. §39-7404) that precludes the promulgation of
any broader regulatory authority through the improper expansion of the definition of ··solid
waste'·, thereby removing ··grass clippings and

Defendants to be the prevailing pruties in this ac ·
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of March, 20

Vernon K. Smith, attorney
fo r Defendants
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I.
I.

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Although
this
Although styled
motion for
for reconsideration,
Defendants are
requesting this
are actually
reconsideration, Defendants
as a
a motion
actually requesting
styled as
“amend its
Judgment” and
“declare these
Court
F act, Conclusions
Findings of
its Findings
of Fact,
of Law,
Court “amend
these
Conclusions of
and Judgment”
and “declare
Law, and

action.” (Defs.’
(Defs.’ Mem.
Defendants
be the
parties in
words,
in this
In other
this action.”
the prevailing
prevailing parties
other words,
Defendants to
to be
Mem. at
at 41.)
41.) In
Court’s March
Defendants
this Court’s
Findings of
March 1,
Defendants seek
of this
2018 Findings
of Fact
Fact and
complete reversal
reversal of
and
seek aa complete
1, 2018

(“Findings”), as
Conclusions
in the
the penalties
injunction in
the
permanent injunction
of Law
well as
penalties and
Conclusions of
Law (“Findings”),
and permanent
as well
as the

accompanying
without
This extravagant
improper and
extravagant request
is both
both procedurally
Judgment. This
request is
and without
procedurally improper
accompanying Judgment.
legal
be denied.
merit. Therefore,
the Motion
Motion should
legal or
or factual
should be
denied.
factual merit.
Therefore, the
II.

STANDARD
LEGAL
LEGAL STANDARD

C.P.” (Mot.
“pursuant to
Defendants’ Motion
Defendants’
purports to
I.R.C.P.”
Motion purports
to be
to Rule
Rule 11(a)(2)(B),
be “pursuant
(Mot.
11(a)(2)(B), I.R.

Recons.
by order
it by
the Idaho
There is
at 1.)
is no
no Rule
Rule 11(a)(2)(B),
Idaho Supreme
Court rescinded
order
Supreme Court
rescinded it
Recons. at
as the
1.) There
11(a)(2)(B), as
2016.11 Additionally,
dated
purportedly
the Motion
Motion is
March 1,
while the
is purportedly
effective July
and effective
dated March
Additionally, while
2016, and
July 1,
1, 2016,
1, 2016.

based on
previously governed
that previously
the rule
on the
of interlocutory
Defendants
reconsideration of
governed reconsideration
rule that
based
interlocutory orders,
orders, Defendants
actually
Findings and
the Findings
amendments to
to the
Judgment.
and Judgment.
seek amendments
actually seek
improper” for
According
“procedurally improper”
it is
for aa party
the Idaho
is “procedurally
to seek
According to
to the
Idaho Supreme
Supreme Court,
seek
Court, it
party to

amendment
judgment under
under the
ﬁnal judgment
the former
former Rule
amendment of
Rule 11(a)(2)(B).
of aa final
160
v. Barrett, 160
11(a)(2)(B). Pandrea v.
“the correct
Idaho
thing
With such
When faced
correct thing
Idaho 165,
such impropriety,
P.3d 943,
faced with
369 P.3d
953 (2016).
impropriety, “the
165, 175,
175, 369
943, 953
(2016). When

to
the motion
motion asserts
for relief
relief under
determine if the
to do” is
is to
to determine
Rule 59(e)
or Rule
Rule 60(b).
under Rule
grounds for
asserts grounds
60(b). Id.
59(6) or
“does not
If the
properly invoke
it also
then it
the Motion
Motion does
not assert
for relief,
not properly
the
invoke the
assert grounds
grounds for
also “does
does not
relief, then

jurisdiction”
jurisdiction” of
Idaho v.
Inc., 112
112 Idaho
this Court.
Tr. of
of this
Idaho 30,
Court. First Bank & Tr.
v. Parker Bros.,
730
Bros., Inc,
ofldaho
32, 730
30, 32,

P.2d
P.2d 950,
952 (1986).
950, 952
(1986).

1
1

Available
at: https://isc.idaho.gov/orders/IRCP_Newly_Formatted_Rules_Order_02.16.pdf
Available at:
https://isc.idaho.gov/orders/IRCPiNeliFormattediRulesiOrdeLOZ.16.pdf
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Both
judgment and
Both aa Rule
motion to
motion for
for relief
relief
alter or
Rule 59(e)
to alter
or amend
Rule 60(b)
amend aa judgment
and aa Rule
59(6) motion
60(b) motion
court’s sound
1757
from
judgment are
trial court’s
from judgment
the trial
committed to
to the
at 175–
discretion. Pandrea, 160
Idaho at
are committed
160 Idaho
sound discretion.

court’s exercise
953754. A
76,
will be
be upheld
upheld on
A trial
trial court’s
the court
at 953–54.
of discretion
discretion Will
on appeal
court
exercise of
P.3d at
appeal if the
369 P.3d
76, 369

correctly
within the
bounds of
the decision
the bounds
its discretion,
is discretionary,
of its
recognizes the
decision is
and
acts Within
discretion, and
correctly recognizes
discretionary, acts
reaches
its conclusion
through an
an exercise
of reason.
at 171,
at 949.
conclusion through
Idaho at
exercise of
160 Idaho
reaches its
reason. Id., 160
P.3d at
949.
369 P.3d
171, 369
III.
A.
A.

ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

Defendants
are not
not entitled
relief under
entitled to
Defendants are
to relief
Rule 59(e).
under Rule
59(e).
Defendants’ Motion
If Defendants’
under Rule
it fails.
trial
Motion is
is reviewed
Rule 59(e),
fails. Rule
Rule 59(e)
allows aa trial
reviewed under
59(6) allows
59(6), it

court
proceedings.” City of
in its
that had
its proceedings.”
errors both
both of
of fact
fact and
correct errors
court “to correct
and law
law that
had occurred
occurred in
of
Pocatello v.
152 Idaho
quotation omitted).
Idaho 830,
275 P.3d
852 (2012)
P.3d 845,
v. Idaho, 152
(internal quotation
omitted).
845, 852
830, 837,
837, 275
(2012) (internal
“must be
However,
it existed
the case
the status
the analysis
of the
to the
Rule 59(e)
existed
under Rule
directed to
status of
case as
as it
be directed
However, the
analysis under
59(6) “must

“A Rule
based.” Id. “A
when
judgment is
the decision
the judgment
the court
which the
is based.”
Rule 59(e)
when the
entered the
court entered
decision upon
upon which
59(6)
motion
wishes it
in hindsight,
it
litigant wishes
motion cannot
the litigant
offer evidence
cannot be
to raise
raise issues
and offer
evidence that,
issues and
be used
used to
hindsight, the
that, in
would
judgment.” Id. And,
when the
ﬁnal judgment.”
prior to
the moving
the entry
moving party
to the
of aa final
presented prior
have presented
would have
And, when
entry of
party
merely
judgment, the
trial court
entering judgment,
the trial
the motion
motion is
is properly
facts the
court considered
before entering
considered before
reargues facts
merely reargues
properly
denied.
at 176,
at 954.
Idaho at
160 Idaho
denied. Pandrea, 160
P.3d at
954.
369 P.3d
176, 369
1.
1.

39Defendants’ unpled
Defendants’
regarding preemption
and Idaho
preemption and
Idaho Code
unpled defenses
defenses regarding
Code §§ 397404
trial.
after trial.
cannot be
7404 cannot
considered after
be considered

DEQ’s claim
Defendants
violates Idaho
39-7404. They
claim is
Defendants assert
is preempted
preempted and
Idaho Code
assert DEQ’s
and violates
Code §
They
§ 39-7404.

assert,
with no
waste Defendant
the solid
explanation or
supporting authority,
Defendant Gibson
no explanation
or supporting
solid waste
Gibson processes
processes
assert, with
authority, the
EPA’s RCRA,
‘solid waste’
waste’ under
is
under Federal
of EPA’s
is “not considered
provisions of
Federal Regulatory
considered aa ‘solid
as
Regulatory provisions
RCRA, as
(Defs.’ Mem.
clarification.” (Defs.’
declared
in the
Final Rule
the 2015
afﬁrmative
2015 Final
Rule of
of clarification.”
Mem. at
at 40.)
These affirmative
now in
declared now
40.) These
Defendants’ answer
defenses
before trial.
in Defendants’
ﬁrst
not included
trial. They
or otherwise
included in
answer or
otherwise asserted
defenses were
were not
asserted before
They first

DEQ’s Closing
Defendants’ “Supplemental
“Supplemental Reply
Argument,” which
appeared
which was
was filed
in
in Defendants’
filed in
to DEQ’s
Closing Argument,”
appeared in
Reply to
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Court’s November
violation of
November 20,
this Court’s
file simultaneous
the parties
directing the
Violation
of this
parties to
to file
2017 Order
simultaneous
Order directing
20, 2017

DEQ’s Closing
closing
this Court
Arg. at
closing arguments.
to DEQ’s
Closing Arg.
at 2-5.)
arguments. (See
2-5.) Accordingly,
Court
Supp. Reply
Accordingly, this
Reply to
(See Supp.
“Supplemental Reply,”
refused
Reply,” and
the “Supplemental
not even
to consider
Defendants have
attempted to
to argue
consider the
and Defendants
have not
even attempted
argue
refused to

the
in doing
the Court
doing so.
at 2.)
Court erred
erred in
so. (Findings
(Findings at
2.)
There
basis for
in any
for such
There is
argument in
is no
no basis
Defendants had
ample opportunity
to
event. Defendants
had ample
such argument
opportunity to
any event.
properly assert
their affirmative
this Court
that failure
affirmative defenses,
failure to
to assert
an
recognized that
Court has
assert their
and this
has recognized
assert an
defenses, and
properly
defense.” (Order
“normally results
affirmative
waiver of
in aa responsive
in waiver
the defense.”
afﬁrmative defense
pleading “normally
of the
results in
responsive pleading
defense in
(Order

Defs.’ Mot.
on
there are
Dismiss at
on Defs.’
Mot. to
to Dismiss
at 5
to
exceptions to
While there
are exceptions
5 (Jan.
(footnote omitted).)
2017) (footnote
omitted).) While
(Jan. 9,
9, 2017)

“afﬁrmative defenses
that
that general
that “affirmative
the Idaho
general rule,
held that
must
Idaho Supreme
Court has
Supreme Court
has repeatedly
defenses must
repeatedly held
rule, the

be raised
before trial
trial
raised before
be

.” Med.
. . . .”
Med. Recovery Servs.,
162 Idaho
Idaho 30,
394 P.3d
P.3d 73,
v. Siler, 162
Servs., LLC v.
30, 35,
35, 394
73,
.

.

.

78,
Dep’t’t of
151 Idaho
Idaho 310,
256
v. Dep
(emphasis added);
310, 316,
316, 256
Welfare, 151
added); Patterson v.
78, (2017)
(2017) (emphasis
ofHealth & Welfare,
4837
P.3d
Dep’t’t of
Transp., 143
803704, 153
724 (2011);
143 Idaho
Idaho 800,
153 P.3d
P.3d 718,
P.3d 480,
v. Dep
0fTransp.,
718, 724
480, 483–
800, 803–04,
(2011); Fuhriman v.

“must
84
party seeking
pleadings “must
the pleadings
affirmative defense
84 (2007).
seeking to
to raise
an affirmative
raise an
defense outside
outside the
Further, aa patty
(2007). Further,
court’s scheduling
still
with such
still comply
with the
the court’s
failure to
to comply
result
scheduling orders,
and failure
orders may
such orders
orders, and
comply with
comply with
may result

motion.” Krinitt v.
defendant’s motion.”
in
Dep’t’t of
in the
the denial
the defendant’s
162 Idaho
denial of
of the
Idaho 425,
v. Dep
425, 429,
429,
Game, 162
of Fish & Game,
Court’s scheduling
398
this Court’s
162 (2017).
throughout
Defendants have
scheduling orders
ﬂouted this
orders throughout
P.3d 158,
have flouted
398 P.3d
158, 162
(2017). Defendants
Court’s discretion
this
under Rule
it is
within this
this litigation,
this Court’s
discretion to
to sanction
sanction Defendants
Defendants under
Rule
is well
well within
and it
litigation, and
case.22 Id., 162
16(e)
their latest
into the
attempt to
the case.
162 Idaho
for their
inject new
latest attempt
to inject
at 430,
at
Idaho at
new issues
P.3d at
issues into
398 P.3d
430, 398
16(e) for

163.
163.

22
“Motion to
DEQ
in its
in Response
legal basis
the legal
for sanctions
its December
sanctions in
2016 Memorandum
Memorandum in
to “Motion
to
basis for
December 7,
Response to
discussed the
DEQ discussed
7, 2016
Dismiss” (pp.
Defendants’
39-7404
Dismiss”
5–9),
which
DEQ
incorporates
herein.
Regarding
Defendants’
attempt
to
assert
their
§
attempt
their
Regarding
which
herein.
incorporates
to
assert
DEQ
(pp. 5—9),
§ 39-7404
an appropriate
striking or
after trial,
defense
under Rule
would be
prohibiting Defendants
appropriate sanction
from
sanction under
Defendants from
or prohibiting
Rule 16(e)
defense after
trial, an
be (1)
16(6) would
(1) striking
Defendants’
supporting
Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(ii);
and
(2)
requiring
Defendants,
or
Defendants’
counsel,
requiring
the defense,
and
authorized by
supporting the
as authorized
or
Rule
Defendants,
defense, as
counsel,
by
37(b)(2)(A)(ii);
(2)
DEQ’s attorney
Court’s May
litigating the
to
pay DEQ’s
instant Motion.
This Court’s
for litigating
the instant
gave
Motion. This
2016 Scheduling
to pay
Scheduling Order
Order gave
fees for
attorney fees
16, 2016
May 16,
their counsel
Defendants
potential for
ample notice
and their
the potential
for such
Defendants and
notice of
of the
sanctions. (Scheduling
Order 1]¶ 8.)
such sanctions.
counsel ample
(Scheduling Order
8.)
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Defendants’ preemption
39-7404
This
in refusing
This Court
not err
err in
preemption and
to consider
refusing to
Court did
consider Defendants’
and §
did not
§ 39-7404

“Supplemental Reply.”
Reply.” It
arguments
when they
post-trial “Supplemental
justified
in the
It is
ﬁrst surfaced
the post-trial
arguments when
is likewise
likewise justiﬁed
surfaced in
they first

in
post-judgment.
in refusing
the arguments
to consider
arguments post-judgment.
refusing to
consider the
2.
2.

Court’s Findings.
Defendants
legitimate reason
the Court’s
Findings.
amend the
Defendants identify
no legitimate
reason to
to amend
identify no

“reconsideration” merely
Defendants’ arguments
The
The remainder
for “reconsideration”
remainder of
of Defendants’
arguments for
rehash issues
issues they
merely rehash
they

unsuccessfully argued
before judgment.
judgment. What
present is
fail to
this
legitimate reason
for this
to present
is any
reason for
What they
argued before
unsuccessfully
they fail
any legitimate
Court
that
different conclusion
manifest error
error of
to reach
no manifest
of law
or fact
fact that
Court to
reach aa different
conclusion now.
law or
now. They
identify no
They identify
Court’s Judgment.
would even
justify disturbing
this Court’s
R. Civ.
P. 61.
cite
disturbing this
Idaho R.
Judgment. See
61. They
even arguably
CiV. P.
would
See Idaho
arguably justify
They cite

no
insight into
into authorities
nor do
offer any
authorities previously
no new
cited. They
new authority,
new insight
do they
previously cited.
authority, nor
They
they offer
any new

lengthiwith the
disagreeiat length—with
merely
justify aa complete
the result.
not justify
showing does
result. Such
complete
Such aa flimsy
does not
merely disagree—at
ﬂimsy showing
Court’s considered
reversal
judgment.
this Court’s
of this
reversal of
considered judgment.

B.
B.

Defendants
relief under
are not
not entitled
entitled to
Defendants are
to relief
Rule 60(b).
under Rule
60(b).
Defendants’ Motion
Defendants’
under Rule
it is
That rule
Motion also
fails if it
is considered
Rule 60(b).
considered under
also fails
rule “‘permits aa
60(b). That

district
judgment based
based on
grant relief
from aa judgment
relief from
district court
to grant
or
on mistake,
or newly
court to
discovered evidence,
mistake, or
evidence, or
newly discovered
fraud,
void or
judgments if filed
within six
six
ﬁled within
or misrepresentation,
or misconduct,
or void
or satisfied
satisﬁed judgments
misrepresentation, or
misconduct, or
fraud, or
months’” of
months’”
judgment. Pandrea, 160
the judgment.
of entry
of the
at 176,
at 954
Idaho at
160 Idaho
954 (quoting
P.3d at
369 P.3d
(quoting Parker
entry of
176, 369

party must
112 Idaho
The moving
moving party
at 32,
P.2d at
at 952).
must establish
establish good
Idaho at
and
good cause
cause and
730 P.2d
Bros., 112
952). The
32, 730
grounds
under at
in Rule
either
for relief
relief under
the reasons
Failure to
at least
of the
listed in
Rule 60(b).
to make
make either
least one
one of
grounds for
reasons listed
60(b). Id. Failure
“was not
“catchall” provision
showing
provision in
in Rule
the motion.
the “catchall”
not
fatal to
motion. Id. Further,
showing is
is fatal
to the
Rule 60(b)(6)
Further, the
60(b)(6) “was

intended
basis for
original decision.
the legal
for its
its original
legal basis
intended to
to allow
to reconsider
of
allow aa court
court to
reconsider the
decision. . . . Discovery
Discovery of
.

.

.

motion.” Parker Bros., 112
new
bringing aa 60(b)
112
not constitute
for bringing
legal theories
theories does
constitute grounds
new legal
grounds for
does not
60(b) motion.”

Idaho
at 32,
P.2d at
at 952.
Idaho at
952.
730 P.2d
32, 730
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1.
1.

Defendants
judgment.
from judgment.
failed to
for relief
relief from
Defendants failed
establish good
to establish
cause for
good cause

Relief
judgment is
It is
final judgment
from aa final
that
Relief from
therefore no
is an
an extraordinary
is therefore
no wonder
wonder that
extraordinary remedy.
remedy. It
Rule
the moving
the Idaho
moving party.
Rule 60(b)
an extraordinary
on the
Idaho Supreme
imposes an
burden on
Supreme
extraordinary burden
Indeed, the
party. Indeed,
60(b) imposes
“unique and
Court
provide relief
under Rule
it is
relief under
held it
is an
an abuse
of discretion
discretion to
to provide
Rule 60(b)
Court has
has held
absent “unique
and
abuse of
60(b) absent

compelling” circumstances.
compelling”
Printcraft Press,
Press, Inc.
Inc. v.
Inc., 153
Idaho
circumstances. Printcraﬁ
153 Idaho
v. Sunnyside Park Utilities,
Utilities, Inc,

440,
unique about
party, like
nothing unique
like Defendants,
There is
losing party,
is nothing
283 P.3d
P.3d 757,
about aa losing
76 (2012).
Defendants,
440, 449,
449, 283
757, 76
(2012). There
dissatisfied
with their
bother to
An affirmative
their loss.
the losing
not bother
afﬁrmative defense
losing party
to plead,
or
dissatisﬁed with
did not
defense the
loss. An
plead, or
party did
even
Nor is
it compelling
mention before
compelling reason
compelling
is hardly
to reverse
is it
before trial,
reason to
reverse course.
even mention
course. Nor
trial, is
hardly aa compelling
for
party to
previously rejected
hoping for
for the
the losing
for different
different aa result
losing party
result despite
to recycle
despite
rejected arguments,
arguments, hoping
recycle previously
all
in support
their
that is
all Defendants
all indications
the contrary.
But that
indications to
to the
is all
Defendants have
of their
support of
mustered in
have mustered
contrary. But
Motion,
it falls
falls well
short of
well short
of good
and it
good cause.
cause.
Motion, and
2.
2.

Defendants
for relief
relief cognizable
not specified
Defendants have
cognizable under
reason for
have not
Rule
under Rule
speciﬁed aa reason
60(b).
60(b).

court’s factual
Good
with the
trial court’s
the trial
ﬁndings and
mere disagreement
disagreement With
and
factual findings
Good cause
cause aside,
aside, mere

conclusions
valid basis
basis for
not aa valid
for 60(b)
of law
is not
at 176,
at
relief. Pandrea, 160
Idaho at
conclusions of
law is
160 Idaho
P.3d at
369 P.3d
176, 369
60(b) relief.
954.
what appeals
Airing such
for. Instead
of seeking
seeking reversal
on appeal,
is What
Instead of
disagreements is
reversal on
are for.
954. Airing
such disagreements
appeals are
appeal,
“the evidence”
evidence” it
Defendants
based on
it already
this Court
itself based
Defendants ask
to reverse
on “the
Court to
ask this
and
considered and
reverse itself
already considered

law.” (Defs.’
“correct law.”
(Defs.’ Mem.
newfound,
for reversal
Mem. at
at 2.)
These alleged
reversal
alleged grounds
grounds for
newfound, purportedly
purportedly “correct
2.) These

dissolve
under the
purposes of
in Part
III.D below.
Part III.D
lightest scrutiny,
the lightest
For purposes
of Rule
Rule 60(b),
detailed in
dissolve under
below. For
as detailed
scrutiny, as
60(b),
Defendants’ Motion
however,
it is
that the
the stated
for Defendants’
Motion do
not correspond
is enough
to note
note that
to
enough to
stated reasons
correspond to
reasons for
do not
however, it

any
in Rule
the grounds
for relief
relief enumerated
the
liberal construction
of the
Rule 60(b).
of the
construction of
enumerated in
grounds for
even aa liberal
Thus, even
any of
60(b). Thus,
Motion
it from
from defeat.
Motion does
not save
defeat.
does not
save it
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C.
C.

an existing
Because
valid grounds
existing rule,
failed to
for relief
relief under
Defendants failed
to assert
assert valid
under an
grounds for
Because Defendants
rule,
their Motion.
this
jurisdiction to
entertain their
this Court
lacks jurisdiction
Motion.
to entertain
Court lacks

Defendants
better under
basis they
the only
for the
the
Defendants fare
fare no
no better
legal basis
under the
asserted for
actually asserted
only legal
they actually

MotioniRule 11(a)(2)(B).
Motion—Rule
was rescinded
that rule
Relief also
As noted,
is
rescinded nearly
rule was
also is
two years
ago. Relief
noted, that
nearly two
years ago.
11(a)(2)(B). As
unavailable
under the
Like the
authorizing motions
the
the current
for reconsideration,
current rule
motions for
Rule 11.2(b).
unavailable under
rule authorizing
reconsideration, Rule
11.2(b). Like
old
permits reconsideration
Rule 11(a)(2)(B),
Rule 11.2(b)
of only
of orders:
reconsideration of
01d Rule
categories of
orders:
two categories
only two
11.2(b) permits
11(a)(2)(B), Rule
interlocutory
before final
judgment, and
ﬁnal judgment,
ﬁnal
after entry
of final
entered before
entered after
orders entered
and orders
orders entered
interlocutory orders
entry of
judgment. See
145 Idaho
the former
former
judgment.
Idaho 65,
175 P.3d
P.3d 754,
See Straub v.
v. Smith, 145
760 (2007)
754, 760
71, 175
65, 71,
(applying the
(2007) (applying
Court’s Findings
Rule
because they
This Court’s
Findings and
not interlocutory
Rule 11(a)(2)(B)).
Judgment are
and Judgment
are not
interlocutory because
they
11(a)(2)(B)). This
parties’ dispute.”
dispute.” Lanham v.
“completely adjudicate
“completely
the parties’
Idaho 89,
160 Idaho
P.3d
adjudicate the
v. Lanham, 160
369 P.3d
89, 93,
93, 369

m

307,
judgment.
ﬁnal judgment.
And they
not orders
311 (Ct.
App. 2016).
entered after final
are obviously
orders entered
obviously not
2016). And
they are
307, 311
(Ct. App.

motionia
Consequently,
basic prerequisite
valid motion—a
the most
for aa valid
Defendants failed
failed to
to meet
meet the
most basic
prerequisite for
Consequently, Defendants
“including the
particularized
the grounds
for the
the relief
relief sought,
the number
the
statement of
particularized statement
of the
number of
of the
grounds for
sought, “including
rule.” Idaho
applicable
the relief
relief Defendants
ciVil rule.”
R. Civ.
P. 7(b)(1)(B).
As discussed
Defendants
Idaho R.
applicable civil
CiV. P.
discussed above,
above, the
7(b)(1)(B). As

seek
under different
procedural rules
different procedural
different legal
is available,
at all,
to different
legal
rules and
and subject
seek is
subject to
available, if at
all, under
standards.
Inc., 112
puzzling that
112 Idaho
It is
that
is puzzling
at 32,
P.2d at
at 952.
Idaho at
standards. See
952. It
See Parker Bros.,
730 P.2d
Bros., Inc,
32, 730
Defendants’ experienced
Defendants’
argument yet
neglect to
to provide
of argument
experienced counsel
41pages of
provide one
one
counsel could
could produce
produce 41pages
yet neglect

citation
that even
the relief
relief requested.
citation to
to aa rule
supports the
rule that
even arguably
requested.
arguably supports
Defendants’ failure
But
their Motion
But Defendants’
for their
Motion has
failure to
to identify
valid basis
has consequences
basis for
consequences
identify aa valid

beyond the
party at
In Parker Bros., as
trial sought
the applicable
the losing
losing party
legal standard.
at trial
to
sought to
applicable legal
standard. In
as here,
here, the
beyond
“motion for
reconsideration” with
reverse
post-judgment “motion
with the
ﬁling aa post-judgment
trial result
trial court.
the trial
for reconsideration”
the trial
result by
court.
reverse the
by filing

112
but the
112 Idaho
trial court
The trial
the motion
motion to
the Idaho
P.2d 950.
granted the
to reconsider,
Idaho 30,
court granted
Idaho
730 P.2d
950. The
reconsider, but
30, 730
Supreme
verdict and
judgment. Id. The
original verdict
the original
The Court
reinstated the
Court reversed
Court began
Supreme Court
and reinstated
and judgment.
reversed and
began
reconsider’ has
with the
premise that
validity only
it is
that aa “‘motion to
with
the equivalent
the premise
is the
of one
of
to reconsider’
equivalent of
one of
has validity
only if it
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.” Id., 112
post-trial motions
the
within the
112 Idaho
existing post-trial
the existing
the Idaho
CiVil Procedure
motions within
of Civil
at
Idaho Rules
Rules of
Idaho at
Procedure . . . .”
.

.

.

“motion for
party’s “motion
reconsideration”
31,
then determined
The Court
the losing
for reconsideration”
losing party’s
P.2d at
at 951.
determined the
Court then
951. The
730 P.2d
31, 730

was
under both
both Rule
under Rule
original premise,
its original
the
Returning to
invalid under
Rule 59(e)
Rule 60(b).
to its
and under
was invalid
premise, the
60(b). Returning
59(6) and
“motion for
Court
in aa “motion
failing to
the consequence
for relief
relief in
for
explained the
of failing
to assert
Court explained
valid grounds
assert valid
grounds for
consequence of
reconsideration” of
reconsideration”
trial result:
of aa trial
result:

What
presumably
that such
for reconsideration
motions for
What we
hold is
is that
reconsideration presumably
such motions
we hold
must
be identified
the grounds
for relief
relief
identiﬁed as
must be
asserting one
of the
grounds for
one of
as asserting
recognized
in one
within
then must
existing rules,
of our
must be
ﬁled within
recognized in
one of
our existing
and then
be filed
rules, and
the
provided in
in that
A motion
time provided
that existing
existing rule.
the time
motion for
for reconsideration
reconsideration
rule. A
which
not assert
for relief
relief recognized
which does
recognized under
under
assert some
grounds for
some grounds
does not
another
which is
Within the
time required
existing rule,
not filed
the time
filed within
another existing
or which
is not
required
rule, or
by
not properly
the jurisdiction
the
other rule,
jurisdiction of
invoke the
of the
such other
does not
properlv invoke
rule, does
by such
trial
it toll
trial courts,
toll the
time on
nor does
the running
running of
the appeal
on any
of the
appeal time
does it
courts, nor
any
order
judgment sought
motion for
for
or judgment
to be
order or
sought to
reviewed by
such aa motion
be reviewed
by such
reconsideration.
reconsideration.
while simply
112 Idaho
at 32,
P.2d at
at 952
Idaho at
952 (emphasis
730 P.2d
(footnote omitted).
omitted). Thus,
(emphasis added)
Thus, while
simply
added) (footnote
Id., 112
32, 730
mislabeling
prevent tolling
tolling of
failing
the motion
motion may
not preclude
relief or
the appeal
mislabeling the
or prevent
of the
preclude relief
appeal deadline,
deadline, failing
may not
to
proper legal
basis for
for relief
relief does.
to assert
legal basis
assert aa proper
does.
Defendants’ Motion
Here,
pursuant to
non-existent rule
Motion is
is made
to aa non-existent
detailed above,
made pursuant
rule and,
as detailed
Here, Defendants’
above,
and, as

does
under Rule
it is
not assert
for relief
relief even
is liberally
Rule 59(e)
or Rule
Rule
valid grounds
assert valid
grounds for
even if it
construed under
does not
liberally construed
59(6) or
60(b).
been filed
under
It makes
it been
that the
the motion
motion would
no difference
difference that
ﬁled under
makes no
had it
have been
been timely
would have
timely had
60(b). It
Rule
because the
just its
motion depends
its content,
not just
its
the validity
of aa motion
on its
Rule 59(e)
or 60(b),
depends on
content, not
validity of
59(6) or
60(b), because
timeliness.
been timely
under
that would
motion that
which involved
timeliness. Indeed,
involved aa motion
have been
would have
Indeed, Parker Bros., which
timely under
“motion for
reconsideration” does
Rule
but not
trial
that aa “motion
not 59(e),
for reconsideration”
not invoke
the trial
illustrates that
Rule 60(b)
invoke the
does not
60(b) but
59(6), illustrates
court’s jurisdiction
court’s
jurisdiction if it
it is
not assert
for relief
relief recognized
an
is untimely
recognized under
under an
assert grounds
grounds for
does not
untimely or
m if itit does
Court’s
existing
be denied
properly invoke
this Court’s
existing rule.
for failure
the Motion
Motion must
failure to
to properly
invoke this
must be
denied for
rule. Id. Therefore,
Therefore, the

jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.
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D.
D.

Defendants’ arguments
Alternatively,
lack merit.
merit.
arguments lack
Alternatively, Defendants’

1.
1.

39-7404 does
Idaho
not apply.
Idaho Code
Code §
does not
apply.
§ 39-7404

39-7404 bars
Defendants
bars DEQ
from regulating
the solid
regulating the
claim Idaho
Defendants claim
Idaho Code
solid waste
waste
Code §§ 39-7404
DEQ from

Defendant
uses for
for his
his composting
for three
three independent
Defendant Gibson
composting process.
wrong for
independent
Gibson uses
are wrong
process. They
They are
reasons.
were, With
with one
the Solid
Management Rules
narrow exception
exception discussed
Solid Waste
Rules were,
one narrow
reasons. First,
Waste Management
discussed
First, the
below,
Environmental Protection
the authority
the Environmental
Health Act,
Protection and
of the
under the
Idaho Code
and Health
adopted under
Code
authority of
below, adopted
Act, Idaho
(“EPHA”). The
39-101 to
§§
waste rules
EPHA does
that are
prohibit solid
The EPHA
not prohibit
to 130
more
solid waste
130 (“EPHA”).
are more
rules that
does not
§§ 39-101
39-7402 makes
stringent
broader in
in scope
stringent or
than federal
that Chapter
or broader
Chapter 74,
federal law.
makes clear
clear that
law. Second,
scope than
Second, §
74,
§ 39-7402

“Solid Waste
39-74047 only
Act”)iincluding §§ 39-7404—
Title
Title 39,
Facilities Act”)—including
to
Idaho Code
applies to
Waste Facilities
Code (the
(the “Solid
only applies
39, Idaho
(“MSWLFS”). DEQ
certain
units (“MSWLFs”).
landﬁll units
nor
municipal solid
certain types
of municipal
never claimed,
solid waste
has never
waste landfill
claimed, nor
DEQ has
types of

was
it required
that Defendants
the stringency
operating aa MSWLF.
to claim,
Defendants are
MSWLF. Third,
required to
are operating
and
was it
Third, the
stringency and
Claim, that
“referenced RCRA
39-7404 apply
breadth
in §§ 39-7404
RCRA regulations
limitations in
the United
to specific
regulations of
of the
United
breadth limitations
speciﬁc “referenced
apply to

States
which are
which Defendants
agency,” which
not
not at
environmental protection
protection agency,”
Defendants do
at issue
and which
are not
States environmental
issue and
do not
39-7404 does
cite
upon. In
In short,
not apply.
cite or
or rely
does not
short, §§ 39-7404
rely upon.
apply.

DEQ’s Solid
Defendants’ theory
First,
the legal
for DEQ’s
Management
ignores the
legal authority
Solid Waste
Waste Management
First, Defendants’
authority for
theory ignores
39-105 and
39-107 are
Rules.
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.000,
the primary
As stated
Idaho Code
Rules. As
stated in
and 39-107
are the
Code §§
58.01.06.000, Idaho
primary
§§ 39-105

legal
in the
Both sections
for the
the Rules.
the EPHA,
not the
the Solid
Facilities Act.
authorities for
legal authorities
Act.
Solid Waste
sections are
Rules. Both
are in
Waste Facilities
EPHA, not
The
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.000
The only
other legal
mentioned in
legal authority
is Idaho
Idaho Code
39-7408C,
58.01.06.000 is
Code §§ 39-7408C,
authority mentioned
only other
which is
provision that
waste
that authorizes
the Solid
Act provision
the commercial
which
Facilities Act
is the
authorizes the
commercial solid
Solid Waste
solid waste
Waste Facilities
siting
in IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.994.
siting license
from that
that lone
the remainder
the
remainder of
lone section,
of the
license fee
Aside from
fee in
58.01.06.994. Aside
section, the
“rules as
Solid
problems related
With problems
Management Rules
to deal
related
Solid Waste
Rules are
are “rules
deal with
Waste Management
as may
be necessary
necessary to
may be
thereto,” that
to
pertinent thereto,”
that
certification requirements
requirements pertinent
to . . . solid
licensure and
solid waste
and licensure
and certification
waste disposal,
disposal, and
.

.

.

were formulated
under the
see also
in the
EPHA. Idaho
the authority
the EPHA.
formulated and
Idaho Code
and adopted
were
adopted under
Code §
authority in
39-105(2); see
§ 39-105(2);

PLAINTIFF’S
PLAINTIFF ’S OPPOSITION
DEF ENDANTS’ MOTION
RECONSIDERATION -- 99
MOTION FOR
FOR RECONSIDERATION
OPPOSITION TO
TO DEFENDANTS’
001274

§§ 39-107(7)
“necessary
Environmental Quality
the Board
of Environmental
to adopt
Board of
adopt rules
rules “necessary
(granting the
authority to
39-107(7) (granting
Quality authority
Court’s
provisions” of
and
purposes and
in order
this Court’s
the purposes
the EPHA).
to carry
of the
Even if this
order to
feasible in
and feasible
out the
and provisions”
EPHA). Even
carry out

application
broader in
in scope
stringent or
than
the Solid
application of
Management Rules
of the
more stringent
or broader
Solid Waste
Rules was
Waste Management
was more
scope than
that.33 Because
federal
prohibits that.
in the
EPHA prohibits
nothing in
the Solid
the EPHA
is not),
federal law
Solid Waste
law (it
Waste
Because the
(it is
not), nothing

Management
were not
IDAPA 58.01.06.994)
the exception
not formulated
Management Rules
exception of
of IDAPA
formulated or
or adopted
Rules (with
adopted
58.01.06.994) were
(with the
39-7404 are
under the
breadth limitations
in §§ 39-7404
limitations in
the Solid
the stringency
Facilities Act,
under
Solid Waste
are
and breadth
Waste Facilities
stringency and
Act, the

inapplicable.
inapplicable.
Second,
this is
the applicability
the
the statute
governing the
of the
is reinforced
reinforced by
39-7402, the
statute governing
applicability of
Second, this
by §§ 39-7402,
Solid
In each
the seven
the Legislature
Facilities Act.
to §
39-7402, the
Act. In
of the
Solid Waste
Legislature used
subsections to
each of
seven subsections
Waste Facilities
used
§ 39-7402,
“municipal solid
the
units” or
term “municipal
landﬁll . . . units”
the term
the abbreviation
or the
to delineate
delineate
abbreviation “MSWLF” to
solid waste
waste landfill
.

.

.

“the standards
which facilities
procedures set
forth in” the
the Solid
which
facilities are
to “the
Solid Waste
standards and
and procedures
set forth
are subject
Waste
subject to

Facilities
waste landfill
unit
“[m]unicipal solid
landfill unit
Facilities Act.
Act. See
solid waste
See also id. §
39-7403(31) (defining
(deﬁning “[m]unicipal
§ 39-7403(31)
39-74047applies to
Actiincluding §§ 39-7404—applies
(MSWLF)”).
the Solid
Facilities Act—including
certain
to certain
Solid Waste
Waste Facilities
(MSWLF)”). Thus,
Thus, the
Gibson’s
MSWLFs
it required
that Defendant
nor was
Defendant Gibson’s
MSWLFs only.
to claim,
required to
never claimed,
has never
was it
claimed, nor
claim, that
only. DEQ
DEQ has

facility
brought this
IDAPA 58.01.06.012,
this civil
ciVil action
is a
MSWLF. Rather,
action to
to enforce
enforce IDAPA
a MSWLF.
58.01.06.012,
Rather, DEQ
facility is
DEQ brought
which applies
but not
11 facilities,
Tier II
not MSWLFs.
The Solid
which
Management Rules
to Tier
MSWLFs. The
applies to
Solid Waste
Rules
Waste Management
facilities, but
specifically
IDAPA 58.01.06.012
the sections
not among
to MSWLFs,
is not
among
sections applicable
applicable to
and IDAPA
58.01.06.012 is
specifically identify
identify the
MSWLFS, and
the
IDAPA 58.01.06.004.02.
IDAPA 58.01.06.012
the enumerated
the
is among
among the
enumerated sections.
sections. IDAPA
58.01.06.012 is
58.01.06.004.02. Rather,
Rather, IDAPA
sections
waste facilities
IDAPA 58.01.06.004.01.
than MSWLFs.
facilities other
other than
to solid
MSWLFs. IDAPA
solid waste
sections applicable
applicable to
58.01 .06.004.01.
Because
in the
nothing in
this case
not involve
the Solid
or require
require any
claims about
involve or
Solid
did not
about aa MSWLF,
Because this
case did
MSWLF, nothing
any claims
Waste
Act applies.
Facilities Act
applies.
Waste Facilities

33

“broader in
Idaho
that are
in
for identifying
are “broader
Idaho Code
portions of
of aa proposed
rule that
process for
proposed rule
Code §§ 39-107D(1)
does specify
identifying portions
39-107D(1) does
specify aa process
than federal
an activity
scope
stringent than
the federal
law or
not regulated
federal
federal law
regulate an
or regulations,
or regulate
or more
more stringent
regulated by
regulations, or
scope or
activity not
by the
.” This
government.
process is
This process
prohibition on
not aa prohibition
government. . . .”
is not
on such
however.
such rules,
rules, however.
.

.
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39-7404’s plain
Defendants’ theory.
39-7404 consists
Third,
plain text
text defeats
Idaho Code
consists
defeats Defendants’
Code §
Third, §§ 39-7404’s
theory. Idaho
§ 39-7404

of
paragraphs, which,
when read
limitation on
the Board
three paragraphs,
of three
indicate aa narrow
narrow limitation
on the
of
Board of
read together,
together, indicate
which, when
Environmental
promulgate rules
Environmental Quality’s
for certain
certain solid
Quality’s authority
facilities.
to promulgate
solid waste
disposal facilities.
rules for
waste disposal
authority to
“the state
Legislature’s intent
The
intent that
first paragraph
that “the
The first
the Legislature’s
paragraph states
of Idaho
state of
Idaho enact
enact and
states the
and carry
out aa
carry out

solid
that will
Will enable
with respect
the state
program that
to achieve
to
solid waste
state to
state status
enable the
respect to
achieve approved
waste program
approved state
status with
government.” Idaho
39-7404.
solid
from the
the federal
regulation from
federal government.”
Idaho Code
solid waste
disposal facility
waste disposal
Code §
facility regulation
§ 39-7404.

regulationsi
The
paragraph then
implementing regulations—
then identifies
The second
certain federal
identiﬁes certain
federal statutes
and implementing
statutes and
second paragraph
RCRA” (42
“code of
“subtitle D
namely,
D of
694176949a) and
of RCRA”
of federal
federal regulations,
and “code
U.S.C. §§
regulations,
namely, “subtitle
(42 U.S.C.
§§ 6941—6949a)

258”7and articulates
Legislature’s intent
title
part 257
intent to
title 40,
the Legislature’s
to avoid
articulates the
state regulatory
257 and
and 258”—and
avoid state
regulatory
40, part
requirements
that duplicate,
the referenced
the flexibility
conﬂict with,
requirements that
or reduce
under the
referenced
available under
reduce the
ﬂexibility available
duplicate, conflict
with, or
federal
paragraph prohibits
prohibits the
“promulgat[ing] any
third paragraph
from “promulgat[ing]
the third
the Board
regulations. Id. Lastly,
federal regulations.
Board from
Lastly, the
any
rule
pursuant to
broader
this act
that would
stringent or
requirements more
to this
conditions or
or requirements
more stringent
or broader
impose conditions
act that
rule pursuant
would impose
in
protection
in scope
RCRA regulations
than the
the United
the referenced
environmental protection
regulations of
of the
United States
referenced RCRA
States environmental
scope than
chapter.” Id. (emphasis
agency
this chapter.”
the provisions
or the
of this
provisions of
(emphasis added).
added).
agency or
39-7404 prohibits
According
promulgated under
under the
plain terms,
its plain
the Solid
prohibits rules
According to
to its
Solid
rules promulgated
terms, §
§ 39-7404

Waste
being more
in scope
in
from being
stringent or
than the
Act from
the federal
Facilities Act
more stringent
or broader
regulations in
federal regulations
broader in
Waste Facilities
scope than
39-7404 only
40
the Solid
Act itself.
Facilities Act
Parts 257
itself. Because
40 C.F.R.
or the
Solid Waste
257 and
and 258
258 or
CPR. Parts
Waste Facilities
Because §
only
§ 39-7404

“pursuant to” the
governs
it has
the Solid
Facilities Act,
no effect
effect on
on rules
to
pursuant to
Solid Waste
has no
governs rules
rules pursuant
Waste Facilities
rules “pursuant
Act, it

DEQ’s other
DEQ’s
IDAPA
EPHA. As
the EPHA.
other rulemaking
rulemaking authorities,
As explained
explained above,
such as
authorities, such
as the
above, IDAPA
“pursuant
58.01.06.994
promulgated “pursuant
the only
the Solid
Management Rules
is the
provision of
of the
Solid Waste
Rules promulgated
Waste Management
58.01.06.994 is
only provision

to” aa provision
in the
in this
that rule
this case.
the Solid
not enforcing
enforcing that
Facilities Act,
provision in
is not
Solid Waste
and DEQ
rule in
Waste Facilities
case.
Act, and
DEQ is
39-7404’s stringency
Section
limitations are
other
likewise inapplicable
inapplicable to
to any
breadth limitations
Section 39-7404’s
are likewise
and breadth
stringency and
any other

regulations” at
“referenced RCRA
source
RCRA regulations”
the “referenced
Parts 257
at 40
40 C.F.R.
of federal
federal law
law besides
257 and
and 258,
CPR. Parts
source of
besides the
258,
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meaning” of
39“plain, usual,
both of
usual, and
implement RCRA
RCRA subtitle
The “plain,
which implement
both
of which
subtitle D.
D. The
of §§ 39and ordinary
ordinary meaning”
effect.”44 State v.
“must be
7404’s unambiguous
7404’s
text “must
given effect.”
Idaho 349,
160 Idaho
372 P.3d
unambiguous text
P.3d
be given
v. Leary, 160
349, 352,
352, 372

404,
407 (2016).
404, 407
(2016).
“referenced RCRA
Defendants
provision of
RCRA regulations
the “referenced
failure to
Defendants failure
to cite
cite or
or argue
of the
regulations of
of
argue any
any provision
agency” reveals
39-7404 argument
the
yet
their §§ 39-7404
the United
environmental protection
argument is
protection agency”
is yet
United States
States environmental
reveals their

Court’s resources.
DEQ’s and
another
waste of
this Court’s
The only
another frivolous
regulation
of DEQ’s
frivolous waste
federal regulation
and this
resources. The
only federal
Defs.’ Mem.
Defendants
plainly inapplicable.
That regulation
regulation
is plainly
Mem. at
at 29.)
Defendants cite,
inapplicable. (See
CPR. §§ 6.3,
36 C.F.R.
cite, 36
6.3, is
29.) That
(See Defs.’
“lands and
System” only,
applies
within the
Park System”
the boundaries
all units
the National
National Park
units of
to “lands
of all
of the
applies to
and waters
waters Within
boundaries of
only,

was not
by EPA,
in the
title of
not in
the correct
the code
not issued
is not
of the
of federal
regulations. 36
correct title
federal regulations.
and is
CPR.
issued by
36 C.F.R.
code of
was
EPA, and
“the 2015
Defendants’ attempted
§§ 6.2.
Final Rule
Definition of
unavailing is
Also unavailing
is Defendants’
attempted reliance
reliance on
on “the
2015 Final
Rule Definition
of
6.2. Also
“materials used
Solid
that is
ingredient that
an ingredient
is
exempted “materials
Solid Waste
Waste (DSW),”
used as
as an
(DSW),” which,
which, they
claim, exempted
they claim,
process.” (Defs.’
(Defs.’ Mem.
directly
used in
production process.”
in aa production
The only
Mem. at
at 15
15 (emphasis
support
directly used
(emphasis omitted).)
omitted).) The
only support
Defendants’ Memorandum—
Memorandumi
offered
bulleted language
this claim
for this
claim is
is bulleted
on pages
19 and
of Defendants’
offered for
language on
and 37
pages 19
37 of
regulation.55 Further,
unattributed snippets
website, not
EPA website,
EPA regulation.
from an
text of
not the
the text
unattributed
snippets from
an EPA
of an
an actual
actual EPA
Further,

the
which
in 40
Deﬁnition of
the actual
Parts 260
2015 Definition
of Solid
Rule is
is codified
40 C.F.R.
Solid Waste
260 and
and 261,
actual 2015
codiﬁed in
CPR. Parts
Waste Rule
261, which
are
waste regulations
RCRA subtitle
Parts
subtitle C.
1694 (Jan.
regulations under
under RCRA
are hazardous
hazardous waste
Reg. 1694
Fed. Reg.
C. 80
80 Fed.
2015). Parts
(Jan. 13,
13, 2015).
regulations” in
“referenced RCRA
260
39-7404. In
in Idaho
In fact,
RCRA regulations”
261 are
not the
the “referenced
Idaho Code
260 and
and 261
are not
Code §
fact,
§ 39-7404.
39-7404’s
Defendants
under RCRA
RCRA subtitle
not even
which is
Defendants concede
regulations under
subtitle D,
is §
are not
even regulations
concede they
they are
D, which
§ 39-7404’s

(Defs.’ Mem.
sole
see also Idaho
39-7402A (stating
Title
that Chapter
Chapter 74,
Mem. at
at 18);
Idaho Code
sole focus.
focus. (Defs.’
Code §
(stating that
74, Title
18); see
§ 39-7402A

4
4

DEQ’s reasonable
Even
Even if this
this Court
interpretation of
the statute
its statutory
as
ﬁnds the
reasonable interpretation
of its
statute ambiguous,
Court finds
ambiguous, DEQ’s
statutory authority,
authority, as
presented herein,
J.R. Simplot Co.
State Tax Comm’n,
120 Idaho
entitled to
Idaho 849,
is entitled
to deference.
v. Idaho State
presented
Co. v.
820
deference. J.R.
herein, is
Comm ’n, 120
849, 862,
862, 820
P.2d
1219 (1991).
P.2d 1206,
1206, 1219
(1991).
55

See U.S.
Environmental Protection
Alternative Standards
and Alternative
for the
the Recycling
Protection Agency,
Exclusions and
of
Standards for
See
US. Environmental
Recycling of
Regulatory Exclusions
Agency, Regulatory
Materials,
https://www.epa.gov/hw/regulatorv-exclusions-and—altemativeand Hazardous
Hazardous Wastes,
Solid Wastes
Wastes and
Materials, Solid
Wastes, https://www.epa.gov/hw/regulatory-exclusions-and-alternativestandards-recvcling-materials-solid—wastes-and-hazardous (last
standards-recycling-materials-solid-wastes-and-hazardous
Apr. 13,
updated Apr.
(last updated
2018).
13, 2018).

PLAINTIFF’S
PLAINTIFF ’S OPPOSITION
DEF ENDANTS’ MOTION
12
RECONSIDERATION -- 12
MOTION FOR
FOR RECONSIDERATION
OPPOSITION TO
TO DEFENDANTS’
001277

“shall not
RCRA”).
39,
provisions of
not apply
the provisions
to any
to the
of subtitle
subtitle C
of RCRA”).
Idaho Code
subject to
Code “shall
C of
facility subject
39, Idaho
apply to
any facility
Defendants’ lengthy
39-7404 does
Contrary
not apply.
to Defendants’
does not
arguments, §
conclusory arguments,
Contrary to
lengthy yet
apply.
yet conclusory
§ 39-7404

2.
2.

Defendants’ preemption
Defendants’
argument lacks
merit.
preemption argument
lacks merit.

Similar
under §§ 39-7404,
unspecified
their newfound
that unspecified
Similar to
argument under
to their
39-7404, Defendants
Defendants assert
newfound argument
assert that
“exclusionary
provisions of
preemptive effects
“exclusionary provisions
RCRA . . . control
that federal
the preemptive
control the
enactment to
of RCRA
of that
to
effects of
federal enactment
.

.

.

regulate” the
DEQ’s attempt
[sic]
attempt to
the solid
his
Defendant Gibson
to regulate”
at his
solid waste
Gibson admittedly
waste Defendant
processes at
admittedly processes
[sic] DEQ’s

EPHA’s definition
“solid
(Defs.’ Mem.
facility.
that the
the extent
extent Defendants
the EPHA’s
deﬁnition of
Mem. at
at 8.)
To the
Defendants argue
of “solid
argue that
facility. (Defs.’
8.) To
waste”
Court’s application
waste” or
this Court’s
that definition
that
deﬁnition are
application of
or this
of that
preempted by
federal law,
are somehow
somehow preempted
law, that
by federal

argument
was not
before
from the
that the
merit. Aside
the fact
the argument
not pled
argument is
without merit.
argument was
is without
fact that
or raised
Aside from
pled or
raised before
trial,
At
that Defendants
not identify
for support.
fatal flaw
is that
Defendants do
provision of
of federal
federal law
one fatal
ﬂaw is
law for
support. At
do not
trial, one
identify any
any provision
39-7404 (State
most,
Defendants rely
on §
to inapplicable
inapplicable federal
allusions to
federal
and vague
vague allusions
most, Defendants
(State law)
law) and
rely on
§ 39-7404

regulations.
view, those
way limit
in their
in any
limit the
their View,
But they
explain how,
the
regulations in
regulations. But
never explain
those regulations
how, in
they never
any way
scope
EPHA or
the Solid
the EPHA
Management Rules.
or the
of the
Solid Waste
Rules.
Waste Management
scope of
“presumption that
This
This does
that Congress
not even
the “presumption
not intend
intend to
begin to
to rebut
to
rebut the
Congress does
even begin
does not
does not

law.” N.
supplant
N.Y.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Ins. Co.,
supplant state
state law.”
v. Travelers Ins.
Y. State Conf.
ofBlue
Conf of
Ca,

514
451 U.S.
514 U.S.
746 (1981)).
654 (1995)
v. Louisiana, 451
US. 725,
US. 645,
Further,
(citing Maryland v.
725, 746
645, 654
(1995) (citing
(1981)). Further,
Defendants
with the
fail to
that Congress
the reality
Defendants fail
to grapple
grapple with
state and
local
and local
Congress expressly
allowed state
expressly allowed
reality that
“more stringent”
stringent” solid
governments
waste management
than
management regulations
governments to
to adopt
regulations than
solid and
and hazardous
hazardous waste
adopt “more
“Congress has
mandated
by federal
words, “Congress
42 U.S.C.
In other
other words,
federal law.
mandated by
has set
set only
and
law. 42
6929. In
U.S.C. §§ 6929.
ﬂoor, and
only aa floor,

not
in regulating
the treatment,
not aa ceiling,
regulating the
which states
of
and disposal
states may
disposal of
treatment, storage,
go in
ceiling, beyond
storage, and
beyond which
may go
wastes.” Old Bridge Chemicals,
solid
Inc. v.
N.J. Dep
Dep’t’t of
Envtl. Prot.,
F.2d
solid and
and hazardous
hazardous wastes.”
v. NJ.
965 F.2d
Chemicals, Inc.
ofEnvtl.
Prat, 965

1287,
In short,
1292 (3d
not occupy
the
there is
Cir. 1992).
is no
no express
express preemption,
did not
Congress did
preemption, Congress
short, there
1287, 1292
1992). In
occupy the
(3d Cir.
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entire
with
entire field
not identified
identified any
conﬂict with
ﬁeld of
of solid
Defendants have
solid waste
and Defendants
have not
waste regulation,
regulation, and
any conflict
Defendants’ preemption
federal
preemption argument
argument fails.
fails.
federal law.
law. Thus,
Thus, Defendants’

3.
3.

at trial established
that Defendant
The
The evidence
Defendant Gibson
established that
operated
Gibson unlawfully
evidence at
unlawfully operated
after March
March 29,
aa Tier
Tier II solid
and after
on and
2013.
solid waste
waste processing
processing facility
facility on
29, 2013.

postDefendants
by finding
finding them
this Court
them liable
that postclaim this
Defendants claim
liable based
on evidence
Court erred
erred by
evidence that
based on

DEQ’s pleadings
dates
was error
because DEQ’s
pleadings allege
this was
error because
March 29,
Defendants assert
2013. Defendants
allege aa
assert this
dates March
29, 2013.

violation
was discovered
first visited
the date
the property.
March 29,
staff first
Violation was
on March
when DEQ
Visited the
date when
discovered on
2013, the
property.
29, 2013,
DEQ staff
Defendants’ focus
Defendants’
pleadings is
with
their persistent
the pleadings
stick with
failure to
persistent failure
to stick
on the
is curious,
considering their
focus on
curious, considering

DEQ’s First
the
was no
because DEQ’s
in their
First
their own
the defenses
there was
error because
no error
alleged in
own answer.
answer. Regardless,
defenses alleged
Regardless, there

Amended
present and
violation of
IDAPA 58.01.06.012,
Am.
Complaint alleged
ongoing Violation
of IDAPA
Amended Complaint
alleged aa present
and ongoing
58.01.06.012, (First
(First Am.
Compl.
41, 46, 48), and the evidence at trial established that violation had in fact occurred. As
Comp]. ¶¶
111] 41, 46, 48), and the evidence at trial established that Violation had in fact occurred. As
2015.” (Trial
“Complaint covers
this
this Court
Tr. 406:3.)
the “Complaint
at trial,
Court ruled
ruled at
covers 2015.”
trial, the
(Trial Tr.
406:3.)

Buttressing
property’s
that ruling,
this Court
that evidence
the subject
Buttressing that
of the
Court also
ruled that
evidence of
also ruled
subject property’s
ruling, this
DEQ’s Exhibit
condition
in 2017
Exhibit 18
the subject
condition in
2017 is
is relevant.
on August
18 is
is a
of the
relevant. DEQ’s
August 14,
Video of
subject property
a video
property on
14,

2017.
Exhibit 18
the admission
later attempted
Defendants objected
to the
of Exhibit
18 and
attempted to
to lodge
admission of
2017. Defendants
and later
lodge aa
objected to
“continuing objection”
objection” to
153:217
“continuing
its publication,
Tr. 153:21–
which were
both of
of which
to its
overruled. (Trial
were overruled.
publication, both
(Trial Tr.
“clear
216227217: 14.) Defendants
154:17;
not argued
rulings constitute
Defendants have
constitute aa “clear
these evidentiary
have not
argued these
evidentiary rulings
154:17; 216:22–217:14.)
discretion,” nor
abuse
would such
be supportable.
nor would
140 Idaho
argument be
of discretion,”
Idaho 561,
supportable. Karlson v.
such argument
abuse of
v. Harris, 140
561,
“What is
564,
present at
in August
431 (2004).
the site
is present
at the
site in
of 2017
2017 is
is relevant
relevant
August of
P.3d 428,
97 P.3d
428, 431
564, 97
Clearly, “what
(2004). Clearly,

here.” (Trial
to
what may
been at
in the
that are
the site
the dates
Tr. 154:14–17.)
to What
at the
site in
at issue
154: 14717.)
are at
have been
issue here.”
dates that
(Trial Tr.
may have

4.
4.

Defendants’ recycled
Defendants’
still lack
lack merit.
merit.
arguments still
recycled arguments

This
in several
This Court
to
Court has
has already
several instances,
refused to
instances, refused
considered, rejected,
rejected, and,
already considered,
and, in
Defendants’ arguments.
reconsider
brevity, will
will not
the remainder
for the
the sake
not
remainder of
of Defendants’
of brevity,
arguments. DEQ,
reconsider the
sake of
DEQ, for

reargue
points. Rather,
in
herein the
the arguments
supporting materials
materials in
arguments and
those points.
incorporates herein
and supporting
reargue those
Rather, DEQ
DEQ incorporates
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the
in this
in Support
ﬁlings in
this case:
the following
Motion for
for Summary
following filings
Memorandum in
of Motion
Support of
case: (a)
Summary
(a) Memorandum
Judgment,
Brian Oakey,
the supporting
filed October
supporting affidavits
2016 (including
of Brian
afﬁdavits of
Paula J.
October 11,
J.
(including the
Judgment, filed
11, 2016
Oakey, Paula
Wilson,
in Support
Darrell G.
Dean Ehlert,
of Summary
Memorandum in
Support of
and Darrell
G. Early);
Ehlert, and
Wilson, Dean
Summary
Reply Memorandum
Early); (b)
(b) Reply
Judgment,
November 2,
Pretrial Memorandum,
filed November
March 14,
ﬁled March
Amended Pretrial
Memorandum, filed
Judgment, filed
2016; (c)
2017;
14, 2017;
2, 2016;
(0) Amended
Plaintiff’s Closing
and
the arguments
arguments and
Closing Argument,
ﬁled December
2017. Beyond
December 4,
and
and (d)
Argument, filed
Beyond the
4, 2017.
(d) Plaintiff’s

authorities
in those
it suffices
authorities presented
to note:
those filings,
note:
presented in
sufﬁces to
ﬁlings, it


The
that the
The notion
notion that
the grass,
humus
and/0r humus
grass clippings,
clippings, leaves,
compost, and/or
dirt, compost,
straw, hay,
leaves, straw,
grass, grass
hay, dirt,
Gibson’s composting
“simply
at
not solid
remains “simply
Defendant Gibson’s
materials remains
at Defendant
composting facility
solid materials
are not
facility are

ridiculous” (Findings
ridiculous”
at 8);
(Findings at
8);



Gibson’s composting
Defendant
under IDAPA
IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
not exempt
exempt under
Defendant Gibson’s
composting facility
is not
58.01.06.001.03.b.ii
facility is

(Findings
at 14–15);
14715);
(Findings at


Gibson’s composting
IDAPA
not exempt
exempt under
Defendant
under IDAPA
Defendant Gibson’s
composting facility
is not
facility is

Pl.’s Mot.
for Summ.
58.01.06.001.03.b.iii
Mem. Decision
Decision Reconsidering
Reconsidering Pl.’s
Mot. for
Summ. J.
58.01.06.001.03.b.iii (Supp.
J. &
&
(Supp. Mem.
Pl.’s Mot.
276 (Feb.
Granting Pl.’s
for Summ.
Order
Mot. for
at 2–6
Order Partially
Summ. J.
J. at
Partially Granting
(Feb. 9,
2017));
9, 2017));



in the
Nothing in
Plant Amendment
Farm Act” or
the “Right to
the Soil
Amendment Act
Act supports
Nothing
to Farm
or the
Soil and
and Plant
supports
Defendants’ arguments
Defendants’
arguments (id.
at 3–6);
376);
(id. at



Gibson’s composting
The
The Idaho
Department of
not regulate
Defendant Gibson’s
of Agriculture
Agriculture does
composting
regulate Defendant
Idaho Department
does not

facility
at 4–6);
facility (id.
476);
(id. at


“Mr. Gibson
EPHA.” (Findings
in the
waste as
the EPHA.”
terms are
is processing
defined in
solid waste
those terms
processing solid
Gibson is
are defined
as those
(Findings
at
at 10.)
10.)
IV.
IV.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion
For
be denied.
this Court
For all
all of
the reasons
Motion should
But this
of the
Court need
should be
reasons above,
denied. But
need
above, Defendants’
Defendants’ arguments.
not
be) the
not reach
the case
the merits
merits of
raising new
re-reach, as
of Defendants’
arguments. By
reach (or
new
as the
case may
(or re-reach,
may be)
By raising
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Court’s scheduling
defenses
violation of
in Violation
failing to
trial and
this Court’s
after trial
of this
to identify
legal
scheduling orders,
and in
defenses after
identify aa legal
orders, failing

basis for
for the
the
basis

relief
been
attempting to
that have
relief sought,
to recycle
arguments that
and by
have already
sought, and
recycle arguments
already been
by attempting

“properly invoke
discarded,
jurisdiction” of
their Motion
this Court.
Motion fails
the jurisdiction”
fails to
to “properly
invoke the
of this
Court. Parker Bros.,
discarded, their

112
point, hopefully
112 Idaho
At some
that
learn that
at 32,
P.2d at
at 952.
Defendants must
must learn
Idaho at
952. At
some point,
730 P.2d
hopefully soon,
soon, Defendants
32, 730
flouting
ﬂouting the
the rules
has consequences.
rules has
consequences.
DATED
DATED this
14th day
this 14th
of May,
2018.
day of
May, 2018.
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5/21/2018 10:31 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Louie, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID R. GffiSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOC-1503540
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED MARCH 1, 2018

INTRODUCTION
Defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, as entered on March 1, 2018, the effect of which
entry serves to compromise Mr. Gibson's continuation of his composting activities, and the
imposition of a penalty of $1,000.00 levied against David R. Gibson and $250.00 levied
against VHS Properties, LLC .. Within that Motion, Defendants request the court to review,
reconsider, and to thereby amend its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, as would
necessarily needed to be done in order to correct the judgment that has been entered. As
indicated, the fundamental issue(s) emanating from this controversy is the need to preserve
and protect the jurisdictional and regulatory rights of the Department of Agriculture, and
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what Defendant's believe to be the continuing enforcement of that specific Act within the
Environmental Health Protection Act (EHPA), Title 39, including Chapter 74. identified as
the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), I. C. §39-7404, wherein the Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) is prohibited from seeking a broader definition of "solid
waste" than mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and for these reasons, it remains these Defendants'

position DEQ lacks regulatory authority and jurisdictional standing to bring an action
against Defendants for their agricultural operations upon the pretext they are conducting a
"solid waste" facility, as nothing received at this facility is either an abandoned or discarded
material, as this agricultural facility is not a "solid waste disposal facility", nor is it a facility
designed or intended to receive any "municipal waste" materials.
DEQ does not have any statutory authority to regulate "composting operations", as
this process constitutes a recycling process of incorporating the substances (grass clippings
and leaves) as "direct ingredients" to generate compost and humus, a direct substitute of
commercial fertilizers, each of which constitute an exemption within the RCRA, preempting any attempt to classify these substances as a "solid waste" under either Federal or
state legislation and regulatory authority.
These grass clippings and leaves are substances being used as direct ingredients and
generate the product of compost and humus products, used as a substitute for commercial
fertilizers, the substance and use of which has been declared to be exempt from "solid
waste" when utilized in the recycling process, under Federal law and as processed within
the State of Idaho, given the Federal and State codifications and statutory enactment that has
pre-emptive effects through their declared exemption to such efforts to regulate these

composting ingredients. DEQ has no regulatory jurisdiction by virtue of not only the
legislation that places jurisdiction and statutory regulation for the registry and regulation of
compost and humus products with the Department of Agriculture, but additionally these
substances have been exempted from the definition of "solid waste" by Federal pre-emptive
legislation, as well as not being within the definition of that which is "discarded" and
"abandoned", as a matter of fact and as a matter ofFederal case law.

THE MOTION
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Defendants did use the old reference to the citation regarding Motion for
Reconsideration, citing within the Motion reference to Rule 11(a)(2)(B), IRCP, when the
current citation would correctly refer to Rule 11.2(b), IRCP. The substance of the former
and current Rule is identical, and remains the same as to the application of the relief
requested by Defendants, being the reconsideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and the Judgment entered by the court. The former citation (Rule 11(a)(2)(B)) is
identical to the substance of the current citation (Rule 11.2(b)), as identified below:
Rule 11(a)(2) ([effective until July 1, 2016]
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders
of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but
not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A
motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry of
final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such
order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e),
59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).
Rule 11.2 [effective July I, 20 16]
(b) Motion for Reconsideration.
(1) In General. A motion to reconsider any order of the trial
court entered before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within
14 days after the entry of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order
entered after the entry of final judgment must be made within 14 days after
entry of the order.
(2) Certain Orders Not Subject to Reconsideration. No motion to reconsider an order of
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e),
59.1, 60(a), or 60(b) may be made.
There has been no request of these Defendants to reconsider any prior order of the
trial court entered on any prior motion filed with respect to Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a),
59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). The Motion filed with the court for Reconsideration is
requesting the court to review, reconsider, and as appropriate to the case, to amend the
Findings and Conclusions to be consistent with the applicable law. There has been no
request to reconsider any prior order made pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 52(b),
IRCP, as this court has never been confronted with a prior motion to amend the findings or
conclusions. Had there been one, and had the court entered an Order in response thereto, that
Order could not be reconsidered, but only appealed.
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That said, nonetheless, there has been no prejudice to DEQ, as this is a timely
motion to reconsider the lawful basis for the entry of the Judgment, and a reconsideration of
the Judgment would necessarily require the court to review and reconsider the findings and
conclusions that it has previously entered, not inconsistent with what could be a Rule 52(b)
Motion, and the court, upon such reconsideration of the Judgment, would necessarily
reconsider and amend, as necessary, those aspects that are perceived to be an incorrect
reflection of the applicable law, as these Defendants perceive the law supports the belief
"grass clippings and leaves" are excluded from the regulatory definition of a "solid waste".
It remains the obligation and responsibility of all parties to bring the applicable law

to the attention of the court, and afford this court the appropriate opportunity to clarify,
refme, and to reverse its decision and Judgment, as not only are the factual findings not
supported by the evidence, and fail to support the pleadings and prayer for relief as filed by
DEQ, but the conclusion of law, to the effect that "grass clippings and leaves" are within the
definition of "solid waste", and subject to regulation by DEQ, is inconsistent with
controlling Federal and State law.
Defendants find the Response submitted by DEQ to be an acknowledgement as to
the existence of the State and Federal law that has been cited by Defendants, yet DEQ would
now prefer to define the application of that law as you must treat an affirmative defense,
which DEQ is now claiming such an affirmative defense is being raised for the first time
after trial, rather than recognizing this law is to be the law that must be applied as the
applicable law to determine the merits of the case, from which the Judgment must be
entered in favor of Defendants.
DEQ is confronted with the court's analysis that begins with reference to the
Legislature's definition of"solid waste" which is cited on page 7 of the FF/CL., from which
the Judgment is based. That definition states:
Garbage, refuse, radionuclides and other discarded materials, including solid
waste materials resulting from industrial, commercial and agricultural operations and
from community activities but does not include solid or dissolved materials in domestic
sewage or other significant pollutants in water resources, such as silt, dissolved or
suspended solids in industrial waste water effluents, dissolved materials in irrigation
return flows or other common water pollutants. I.C. § 39- 103(13).
Upon that analysis, the court then concluded:
This Court concludes that the definition of solid waste in I. C. § 39-1 03(13) includes
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materials a possessor no longer has a use for and the possessor is willing to give away,
abandon, or discard, even if those materials may have value or use to another.
Therefore, the fact that Mr. Gibson decomposes the grass and leaves and produces
humus, a useful product, is not determinative of whether or not the grass and leaves are
"solid waste." The determinative question is whether or not the grass and leaves
have been "discarded." (Emphasis added)

The transfer of possession of the grass clippings and leaves is not the criteria for
determining discard and abandonment; it remains to be the intention of the possessor(s)
that is the determining factor. There has been no intent to discard these materials by any

possessor, as if that were the intention of any possessor, these materials would not have
been delivered to this agricultural facility for the production of compost and humus. This
issue of discard has been well addressed in our Memorandum filed with the Motion, as it has
been expressed in American Mining Congress and Engelhard Corporation v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 824 F2d 1177 (1987), the concept of "abandoned" or

"discarded", is to be understood in the context of an intention to accomplish a permanent

disposal, where there is no intention of any further utility, value or use. That court has
addressed the restriction that has existed since 1987, as cited within the following selected
excerpts:
"In plain English, petitioners maintain that EPA has exceeded its regulatory
authority in seeking to bring materials tllat are not discarded or otherwise disposed
of witllin tile compass of "waste."

As will become evident, this case turns on the meaning of the phrase, "and other
discarded material," contained in the statute's definitional provisions.
Petitioners, ... challenge the scope of EPA's final rule. Relying upon the statutory
definition of "solid waste," petitioners contend tllat EPA's authority under RCRA
is limited to controlling materials til at are discarded or intendedfor discard. They
argue that EPA's reuse and recycle rules, as applied to in process secondary
materials, regulate materials tllat have not been discarded, and therefore exceed
EPA's jurisdiction. [3]
Guided by these principles, we tum to the statutory provtston at issue here.
Congress, it will be recalled, granted EPA power to regulate "solid waste."
Congress specifically defined "solid waste" as "discarded material." EPA then
defined "discarded material" to include materials destined for reuse in an industry's
ongoing production processes. Tile challenge to EPA's jurisdictional reaclt is
founded, again, on tile proposition tltat in-process secondary materials are
outside tile bounds of EPA's lawful authority. Notlling lias been discarded, tile
argument goes, and thus RCRAjurisdiction remains untriggered.
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The ordinary, plain-English meaning of the word "discarded" is "disposed of,"
"thrown away" or "abandoned." {7) Encompassing materials retained for
immediate reuse within the scope of"discarded material" strains, to say the least,
the everyday usage ofthat term.
The question we face, then, is whether, in light of the National Legislature's
expressly stated objectives and the underlying problems tlzat motivated it to enact
RCRA in tlze first instance, Congress was using the term "discarded" in its
ordinary sense-"disposed of' or "abandoned"-or whether Congress was using
it in a much n1ore open-ended way, so as to encompass materials no longer
useful in their original capacity though destined for immediate reuse in another
phase ofthe industry~ ongoing production process.
For tile following reasons, we believe tile former to be the case. RCRA was
enacted, as tile Congressional objectives and findings make clear, in an effort to
help States deal with the ever increasing problem of solid waste disposal by
encouraging tlze search for and use of alternatives to existing methods of disposal
(including recycling) and protecting health and tile environment by regulating
hazardous wastes. To fulfill these purposes, it seems clear that EPA need not
regulate "spent" materials tlzat are recycled and reused in an ongoing
manufacturing or industrial process. {11j Tlzese materials have not yet become
part of tlte waste disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial reuse
or recycling in a continuous process by tlze generating industry itself.
After this mind-numbing journey through RCRA, we return to the provision that is,
after all, the one before us for examination. And that definitional section, we
believe, indicates clear Congressional intent to limit EPA's authority. First, the
definition of "solid waste" is situated in a section containing thirty-nine separate,
defined terms. This is definitional specificity of the first order. The very care
evidenced by Congress in defining RCRA's scope certainly suggests that Congress
was concerned about delineating and thus cabining EPA's jurisdictional reach.
Second, the statutory definition of "solid waste" is quite specific. . ... .It
contains three specific terms and then sets forth the broader term, "other discarded
material." That definitional structure brings to mind a long-standing canon of
statutory construction, ejusdem generis ........ Here, the three particular classes-garbage, refuse, and sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility--contain materials that clearly fit within the
ordinary, everyday sense of "discarded." It is most sensible to conclude tlzat
Congress, in adding the concluding plzrase "other discarded material," meant to
grant EPA authority over similar types of waste, but not to open up the federal
regulatory reach of an entirely new category of materials, i.e., materials neither
disposed of nor abandoned, but passing in a continuous stream or flow from one
production process to another.
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In sum, our analysis of the statute reveals clear Congressional intent to extend
EPA's authority only to materials tllat are truly discarded, disposed of, tllrown
away, or abandoned.
We are constrained to conclude that, in light of the language and structure of RCRA,
the problems animating Congress to enact it, and the relevant portions of the
legislative history, Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent til at
"solid waste" (and therefore EPA's regulatory authority) be limited to materials
til at are "discarded" by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or tllrown away.
While we do not lightly overturn an agency's reading of its own statute, we are
persuaded that by regulating in-process secondary materials, EPA has acted in
contravention of Congress' intent." (Emphasis added)
The individuals Mr. Gibson is receiving his direct ingredients (grass clippings and
leaves) from to produce his compost and humus, are from individuals and entities that
specifically and intentionally are bringing those materials to him for that specific purpose of
use, not to a disposal site, but rather to an agricultural facility where these recyclable
materials are there being expressly saved and used as the direct ingredients to produce a
useful product, used as a substitute for other commercial products such as soil amendments
and plant foliar in place of commercial fertilizers and a chemical compound of a foliar.
None of these individuals are delivering these materials to a "disposal facility"
where there is the intention to abandon and permanently discard these materials. These
material substances have exceptional value in the nature of organic substances, and is the
building blocks that generate compost and humus products. None of these substances are
destined for permanent disposal, as they have a future utility, and there is no intention by
anyone to abandon or discard these materials in the sense of a permanent disposal, the
criteria that is fundamentally required to apply the term abandonment and discard, as a
matter of law. If it were their intention to discard and abandon these materials from a useful
and valuable product, then these materials would be delivered to the county landfill, where
there is being operated as a permanent waste disposal site, a facility that is designed and
intended for permanent discard and abandonment.
This court has extensively made reference to a certain Federal case, including a
Ninth Circuit Decision, Safe Air for Everyone V. Meyer, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decision that found the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to be controlling
in its decision. This court has referred to Safe Air as follows:
In Safe Air, the Ninth Circuit determined that whether the grass residue left in the fields after
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farmers harvested Kentucky bluegrass seeds was or was not "solid waste" under RCRA depended
upon whether the grass residue was 'discarded material.' /d. 373 F.3d at 1041. After considering
decisions by other circuits, the Ninth Circuit determined it was appropriate to evaluate three
questions when determining whether a certain material had been "discarded." Those questions are:
(I) whether the material is "destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous
process by the generating industry itself; (2) whether the materials are being actively
reused, or whether they merely have the potential of being reused; (3) whether the
materials are being reused by its original owner, as opposed to use by a salvager or
reclaimer./d. 373 F.3d at I 043 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the grass residue was not "solid waste" under RCRA
because it was actively reused by the original owners, the farmers, in a process beneficial to them.
/d.

The significance of this court's reference to the Federal case law is clear
confirmation that this court does realize that Federal law controls this issue, as the RCRA
has since specifically excluded these recyclable materials (plant residue) from the definition
of what constitutes a "solid waste".
No longer is a question whether the plant residue (grass and. leaves) are being
actively reused by the original owners, (question 3) the farmers, but now the sole emphasis
has been whether it is a material being "destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a
continuous process by the generating industry itself' (question 1); and whether the
materials are being actively reused, (question 2). These materials are being actively reused
for a beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry
itself', as a direct ingredient to produce a product that is intended as a substitute for a
commercial product, as expressly identified in the Federal legislation. This authority was
stated previously in the Reconsideration Memorandum and Objection to attorney fees.
The Federal Regulations have expressly classified three ''types" of materials/substances that
are expressly excluded from the definition of"solid waste", (in which grass clippings and leaves fit
within all three categories) and these Federal exclusions are binding upon Idaho's DEQ regulatory
authority, as a matter of State law, wherein it declares no rule (such as IDAPA Rules DEQ
promulgates) are allowed to impose conditions or requirements more stringent or broader in
scope than the referenced RCRA regulations of the United States environmental protection

agency. the effect of which pre-empts any IDAPHA Rules within EHPA that are in conflict with
the application of Federal enactments. These Federal Legislation/Regulations control what is
defined to "solid waste", and Idaho has unconditionally restricted DEQ by the language used in I.
C. §39-7404, which expressly has stated:
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§39-7404. Consistency with federal law -- Status of appendices.

The legislature intends that the state of Idaho enact and carry out a
solid waste program that will enable the state to achieve approved
state status with respect to solid waste disposal facility regulation
from the federal government.
The legislature finds that subtitle D of RCRA, and in particular the code of
federal regulations, title 40, part 257 and 258, establish complex, detailed
and costly provisions for the disposal of solid waste. By the provisions of
this chapter, the legislature desires to avoid duplicative or conflicting
state and federal regulatory systems and allow local MSWLF unit
owners the maximum flexibility possible under 40 CFR 257 and 258, to
meet the substantive goals of protection of human health and the
environment with consideration for actual site and climatic conditions. At
any time that 40 CFR 257 or 40 CFR 258 is amended, any additional
flexibility or extension otherwise prohibited by this chapter shall be
allowed as applicable.
The board may not promulgate any rule pursuant to this act that
would impose conditions or requirements more stringent or broader
in scope than the referenced RCRA regulations of tlte United States
environmental protection agencv or the provisions of this chapter. Until
regulations are adopted, agency conclusions in appendix B through
appendix H, inclusive, per the "Federal Register" of October 9, 1991, shall
be used for technical guidance for relevant provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis added)
The definition of "solid waste", as addressed within the Code ofFederal Regulation,
Title 40, Chapter 1 of"the Protection of Environment", Sub-part I, (40 CFR 261.2(e)), is the
specific source of authority that identifies these three types of materials used, which are
excluded from "solid waste" substances, as they are within RCRA' s recycling categories
and characteristics.
Those terms and the three categories are expressly being defined and used in 40
CFR 261.2(a)(1), and the exclusions thereafter, wherein it states:
§261.2(a)(l) A solid waste is any discarded material that is not excluded under
§261.4(a) or that is not excluded by a variance granted under §§260.30 and
260.31 or that is not excluded by a non-waste determination under §§260.30 and
260.34.
(2)(i) A discarded material is any material which is:
(A) Abandoned, as explained in paragraph (b) of this section; or
(B) Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section; or
(C) Considered inherently waste-like, as explained in paragraph (d) of this
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section; or
(D) A military munition identified as a solid waste in §266.202.
§ 261.2 (b )Materials are solid waste if they are abandoned by being:
(1) Disposed of; or
(2) Burned or incinerated; or
(3) Accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being
abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or incinerated.
40 CFR 261.2(e) provides their exclusions when relating to "recycled", stating:
§261.2(e) Materials that are not solid waste when recycled.
(1) Materials are not solid wastes when they can be shown to be recycled by
being:
(i) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make a product,
provided the materials are not being reclaimed; or
(ii) Used or reused as effective substitutes for commercial products; or
(iii) Returned to the original process from which they are generated, without
first being reclaimed or land disposed. The material must be returned as a
substitute for feedstock materials.
Given the process at this agricultural facility, "grass clippings and leaves" cannot
meet the definition of having been "discarded" or "disposed of' when delivered to an
agricultural facility that is using the materials as a direct ingredient to produce a product
that will be used as a substitute for a commercial product, i.e. compost and humus in the
place and stead of commercially produced fertilizers where used as a soil amendment and
plant foliar. These ingredients do not meet the criteria of having been an "abandoned"
substance that has been "discarded" or "disposed of' at this agricultural facility, as these
materials are not being disposed of as a final repository for permanent disposal, but rather
being used as "direct ingredients" for the production of compost and humus, and those
products are then used as a substitute for commercial products, and because of that usage,
these materials are expressly excluded from within the purview of a "solid waste" under
the controlling Federal Legislation/Regulations. They are neither a "solid waste", never
"abandoned", never "disposed of', nor ever a "discarded material", as these organic
materials are delivered specifically to an agricultural facility for the specific objective to
be recycled in a composting process as a direct ingredient in the process of producing

compost and humus, then to be used as a substitute for commercial products (a vast
array of commercial fertilizers and foliars ), never regarded as "abandoned or "disposed
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of' materials, at all times treated as a valuable commodity and material that is being used
in a recognized RCRA recycling program.
These materials are being delivered solely to be used directly in the production of
a compost and humus product, products that are designed exclusively for return to the
soil and applied to plant growth, defeating the application of either being "discarded"
"disposed of' or "abandoned", as we find these terms then being defined and used in 40
CFR 261.2(a)(1), with the exclusions therein stated as cited above.
Grass clippings and leaves fit within each of these specific categories and types of
material usage, and any state regulation, registration, licensing, and certification of this
material utilized directly in this composting process, and constitutes the composted product
itself, is not within the jurisdiction or regulatory authority of DEQ, and to any extent this
process or product is to be regulated, it has been intended to be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Idaho State Department of Agricultural (lSDA), where such jurisdiction is
expressed through the enactments of the Right to Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil and Plant

Amendment Act ( SAPAA).
As we have before presented to this court, irrespective of the adoption of RTFA or
SAPAA, the provisions of the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (Title 39, Chapter 74, I. C.
§39-7404), expressly preclude promulgation of any regulation by DEQ with the enactment
of any IDAPA Rules, as DEQ cannot impose greater restrictions or conflict with the preemptive application of EPA's Federal Regulations (40 CFR 261.2(e)) relating to recycled
materials/substances through EPA's Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) which
unconditionally has served to pre-empt IDAPA Rules that are more restrictive or
inconsistent with Federal Legislation/Regulation.
It remains the belief of ISDA agents, their source of experts, and officials that DEQ

acknowledged in 2003 that ISDA has the exclusive right and duty to manage and regulate

their own agricultural wastes, (whether thought to be in the nature of a "solid waste" or
merely referred to as an agricultural "waste"), and that was thought to have been the
intended purpose when DEQ adopted Rule 58 .01.06 (Solid Waste Management Rules),
subpart .001 (Title and Scope), subpart (.03) (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules),
(b) (These Rules Do Not Apply to the following solid wastes .•• ) (b)(ii) and (b)(iii),

(excluding materials from "solid waste", that are substances consisting of manure and crop
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(plant) residues intended to be returned to the soil at agronomic rates, and any agricultural

"solid waste" which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules adopted by the Idaho
Department of Agriculture. DEQ now wants to ignore the intent of those exclusions.
That was the very reason ISDA had before directly informed Mr. Gibson as to their
exclusive authority when DEQ adopted their IDAPA Rules in 2003-04; also the very reason
ISDA initiated the 2011 clarification amendment through the State Legislature to make clear
all composting facilities and activity is among agricultural activity, as defined to be their
exclusive jurisdiction, and language was incorporated into I. C. §22-4502, clarifying the
authority under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), to make clear that activity was among those
they controlled, and was among the statewide permitted use, not subject to any conditional
use permit, as Ada County was attempting (Ada County v Smith, CVOC -2010-2298) to
impose upon the landowner an obligation to secure a conditional use permit (CUP) to
conduct a commercial composting operation at such an agricultural facility, claiming the
county had that regulatory authority to control such activity through their county Ordinance
and conditional use permitting. ISDA put a stop to that claim, as ISDA regulated all aspects
of composting, and all agricultural activities are statewide permitted, and the state legislation
pre-empted any county Ordinance to regulate otherwise.
It has been consistently perceived by ISDA, since the creation of RTFA in 1981, and
thereafter the enactment of SAPAA in 2001, that ISDA, and that agency alone, had the
exclusive authority to regulate these agricultural activities and all agricultural composting
facilities within the State of Idaho.
If there were to be any IDAPA rule that suggests grass clippings and leaves are
"materials" subject to regulation by DEQ as a "solid waste", then whether or not the
provisions of RTFA and SAPAA pre-empt such rules that seek to impact ISDA's regulatory
authority, the fact and law remains that Federal Legislation and their corresponding
Regulations have expressly pre-empted such rule(s), and the Federal Government has
sought to clarify any confusion over the years with their 2003 declaration, then their 2008
clarification, and now, most recently, their 2015 Final Rule clarification, wherein it is stated
that such organic materials/substances are deemed to be "recycled materials", and when they
come within either of the three types of use of such materials (grass clippings and leaves are
within all three categories), those materials/substances are not to be regulated as a "solid
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waste" for any purpose, and are not subject to any "solid waste management rules" by EPA,
and certainly not by any state agency such as DEQ.
In DEQ's response to Defendant's Motion, they argue Defendants' reference to and
reliance upon the controlling body of law is now irrelevant, suggesting this "controlling
law" has been waived, and suggest this body of controlling law is in the nature of an

affirmative defense, which was not pled. Controlling Federal law is never to be regarded as
an affirmative defense, as controlling law must be considered by the court when ruling upon
a Motion for Reconsideration. The Supreme Court has held in Fuquay v. Low, 162 Idaho
373, 397 P.3d (2017):
"[W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower
court in deciding the motion for reconsideration." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153
Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
In Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,281 P.3d 103 (2012) the court stated:
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B). On a
motion for reconsideration, the court must [also] consider any new admissible
evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See
PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184
(2009) (citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho, 118
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)).
In P HH Mortg. Services Corp v. Perreira, 146, Idaho 631, 200 P3d 1180 (2009), the
court stated, with respect to the presentation of new facts:
"The district court held that the new evidence could not be considered. In so
holding it stated, "When the judgment or order is final and appealable and not an
interlocutory order the court in ruling on a motion for reconsideration may not
consider new facts." Whether or not the district court erred in refusing to consider
the new evidence depends upon what the Perreiras wanted the district court to
reconsider. The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the
correctness of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion
under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Coeur d'Alene
Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d
1026, 1037 (1990). However, the trial court cannot consider new evidence when
asked to reconsider a final judgment pursuant to a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e), id., or pursuant to a motion to amend findings of fact
or conclusions of law under Rule 52(b), see Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798, 805,
186 p .3d 654, 661 (2008).
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The Defendants refer to this restriction regarding "new evidence" and "new facts", as
Defendants have secured the affidavit of Dr. Mir M. Seyedbagheri, which affidavit will
support this Motion for Reconsideration in relation to the controlling applicable Federal
Law to be applied in this case. This affidavit is not the presentation of new facts, as the
facts are patently clear that this agricultural facility operated by Mr. Gibson does receive,
upon a seasonal basis, organic substances that are identified to be grass clippings and
leaves, and these organic recycling materials are used as a direct ingredient to produce
compost and humus, to be used as a substitute for commercial products in the nature of
soil amendments and plant foliars. This affidavit goes to the application of law, given the
Conclusion of Law that has been entered by this court that held, to the effect, grass
clippings and leaves are a "solid waste", when as a matter of Federal Law, those
materials are specifically excluded from the definition of "solid waste" when those
materials are being used within any of the three categories identified in 40 CFR
§261.2(e), identified as Materials tllat are not solid waste wllen recycled, wlticll therein

states ( 1) Materials are not solid wastes when they can be shown to be recycled by
being:(i) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make a product,
provided the materials are not being reclaimed; or (ii) Used or reused as effective

substitutes for commercial products; or (iii) Returned to tlte original process from
wlticlt tltey are generated, without first being reclaimed or land disposed. The material
must be returned as a substitute for feedstock materials.

The final judgment is based

upon those conclusions that address the court's analysis of "solid waste", "other such
discarded materials", "discarded", "abandoned" "compost", "humus", "grass clippings",
"leaves", "direct ingredients for the use or reuse", and "substitute for commercial products".
The correct analysis determines whether DEQ has any statutory authority that trumps
Federal Law, so as to allow DEQ to enact Rules to regulate an agricultural facility that is
receiving grass clippings and leaves as a direct ingredient to be used or reused for the sole
purpose of producing compost and humus, a substitute for commercial products that are
used as soil amendments and plant foliars.
Under Federal Law, when using organic materials as the direct organic ingredient to
formulate those products, the materials are excluded from "solid waste".
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The controlling law is being presented to this court as the fundamental basis of this
Reconsideration, the effect of which demonstrates that neither DEQ nor EPA can expand
their statutory jurisdiction to acquire regulatory authority beyond the mandatory and preemptive Federal legislation identified in both the provisions ofEHPA, Chapter 74, as well as
those controlling Federal enactments, as expressly identified within the Idaho Solid Waste

Facilities Act, Title 39, Chapter 74, (I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), defining certain exclusions to
"solid waste" such as "crop residue", and I. C. §39-7404, mandating the application of the

Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), which exempts all recycling ingredients, and
their products that constitute a substitute to commercial fertilizers. These Federal regulations
expressly address composting substances and their ingredients (grass clippings and leaves)
and their exclusion from any definition or regulation as a "solid waste" substance, from any
regulatory capacity.
"Solid wastes" does not include any direct ingredients that form humus, compost,
soil or dirt substances, as mandated by RCRA, and it is worth repeating that this court has
concluded that llumus and compost is not a "solid waste", so upon what authority would
the court rely to conclude that the direct ingredients of those products, also organic
materials, are somehow to be defined to be a "solid waste" upon the pretense these
ingredients are "discarded", when that is not the intended purpose when delivered to this
agricultural facility. This court excluded compost and humus from "solid waste" by
addressing the following analysis on P. 11 of the FF/CL:
Compost and humus are not solid waste as defmed in I.C. § 39-103(13).

Mr. Gibson testified as to the process he uses to decompose leaves and grass
clippings. He arranges them in windrows so the rows can receive oxygen and mixes them
with compost or soil. Rain and snow provide water. In this environment, microorganisms in
the soil rapidly consume the nitrogen and carbon in the grass and leaves. This produces heat
which kills unwanted seeds. When the microorganisms have consumed some portion of the
available organic material, the rows cool. What remains is an organic product useful as a
fertilizer or soil amendment.
Mr. Gibson referred to the end goal of this process as being humus. Mr. Gibson testified it
can take as many as 10 years to create humus. The parties throughout the trial variously
referred to the material in the windrows on the VHS property as compost, humus, and soil.
The Court will explain its understanding of the definition of those terms.
Compost is a mixture that consists largely of decayed [decaying] organic matter used
for fertilizing and conditioning land. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 255.
Compost is the term given to partially decayed organic matter. Humus is the material
remaining at the ultimate stage of decomposition of organic matter, when the material can
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no longer be broken down by organic decomposition. It is that portion of soil organic matter
which is completely amorphous, and has no cellular structure characteristic of plants.
Whitehead, D.C. & Tinsley, J., The Biochemistry of Humus Formation, Journal of the
Science of Food and Agriculture, Vol. 14, Issue 12, 849-857 (1963). Tllus at some point in

tile process of decomposition, tile grass clippings and leaves become 1'compost," at wllicll
stage tlley are useful as a fertilizer or soil amendment. However, compost will continue to
decay until it can decay no more. At tllis point it is properly called humus and it is stable
and remains in soil unchanged for long periods oftime.
Using the same definitions of solid waste discussed above, tlte Court finds neither
compost nor humus are solid waste under tlte EPHA. Certainly there is no evidence that
people have been discarding compost at the VHS property. As is clear from Mr. Gibson's
testimony about the process he uses, compost and humus both require some investment of
energy and time to create. Mr. Gibson is making compost from discarded materials, but
what he creates cannot be said to have been discarded by anyone. The solid waste rules
support this conclusion as well. The Department has defined "Yard Waste" as: "Weeds,
straw, leaves, grass clippings, brush, wood, and other natural, organic, materials typically
derived from general landscape maintenance activities." IDAPA 58.01.06.005(52). This

definition does not include compost or humus made by decomposing any of the materials
listed.
When do grass clippings and leaves stop being grass clippings and leaves and
become compost? There was little evidence presented on this ·issue at trial. As discussed
above, in this case, compost simply consists of partially decayed grass and leaves. MerriamWebster defmes compost as capable of being used for fertilizing and conditioning. As the
trier of fact and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court will simply apply
what it believes to be the plain meaning of compost to this question. Grass clippings and

leaves become compost when they look like soil; it is black, crumbly in texture, and has no
odor of decay, but may smell slightly sweet Compost smells like earth rather titan rotting
plants. This conclusion is consistent with the Department's definition of recycling which is
defined as a process by which waste materials are transformed into a new product in such
a manner that the original identity as a product is lost. IDAPA 58.01.06.005(37).
This Conclusion, to the effect that "grass clippings and leaves" are being perceived
by this court as within the definition of a "solid waste" is entirely predicated upon the
assumption these materials are being "discarded" or "abandoned" when delivered to this
agricultural facility knowing the intended purpose is solely to generate compost and humus,
for use or reuse as an agricultural product, and never intended for any permanent disposal at
a "solid waste disposal facility" Clearly, Mr. Gibson's agricultural facility is not a "solid
waste disposal facility", and not a disposal site designed to dispose of solid waste.
Not only is this conclusion in error, stating that grass clippings and leaves are a
"solid waste", when Federal Law declares such organic substances to be an organic
recyclable material, excluded from that defmition by the Federal Legislation (40 CFR
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§261.2(e),(1), (2), & (3)), but this conclusion cannot support what was located at this
agricultural facility on March 29, 2013. What was seen, if anything, at this agricultural
facility was either a compost substance or a humus substance in the many rows located on
the property on March 29, 2013, This court has concluded those substances (compost and
humus) are not a "solid waste". RCRA has also concluded that direct ingredients (grass
clippings and leaves) used or reused in a recycling program are not a "solid waste".
It remains undisputed from the facts presented at trial confirms that nothing had been
delivered to this agricultural facility for almost a half year by the time DEQ's "attempted an
inspection". This requires the application of the scientific (biological) fact that as a result of
the natural decaying/decomposition process, grass clippings and leaves delivered to this
facility in the early fall months, have entered the decaying stage of compost, and nothing
had been delivered to this facility for a period of between five and six months, when the
"attempted inspection" of March 29, 2013 had occurred. Though the court's conclusion has
held these direct ingredients that generate compost and hun1us were "discarded", and
therefore become a "solid waste", even the use of that disputed conclusion cannot support a
conclusion as to what was seen on March 29, 2013, as there was NO SOILD WASTE, as it
had already entered the stage of being compost or humus. It remains undisputed all grass
varieties go dormant each year in the early fall, so there could be no delivery of grass
clippings, and leaves also cease after early fall collections each year, so delivery to this
facility became a physical impossibility.
No such substances (in the form of grass clippings or leaves) were in existence by
March 29, 2013, so even with this disputed conclusion of law, the court's findings that
declares the existence of a Tier II category processing facility remains erroneous as well.
What could only be seen at this agricultural facility when DEQ arrived on March 29,
2013 (having also admitted they could not detect any foul or offensive odors), would be
organic materials that were in a state of natural decomposition as an organic
(compost/humus) matter, which this court has declared not a solid waste, but merely rows of
humus, compost, soil, and dirt, that had decayed over the preceding period of time, enriched
with nutrients by the introduction of decomposed organic materials, just as the court
concluded regarding "humus" and "compost" materials/substances found to be present in

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION P. 17

001298

the years of 2014-2015, which were recognized to have been transformed from grass
clippings and leaves into hwnus and compost, where the court specifically stated:

Grass clippings and leaves become compost when they look like soil; it is
black, crumbly in texture, and has no odor of decay, but may smell slightly
sweet. Compost smells like earth rather than rotting plants. This conclusion
is consistent with the Department's definition of recycling which is defmed
as a process by which waste materials are transformed into a new product
in such a manner that the original identity as a product is lost. IDAPA
58.01.06.005(37).
Grass clippings and leaves are "direct ingredients" being used or reused to produce a
compost and hwnus product. They are being recycled to make a product, not to transform a
product into another product.
The Department has never demonstrated in what manner grass clippings and leaf
materials, as a material substance, had not transformed from any quantified substance of
what they

~laimed

is a "waste" material on March 29, 2013. nus. deficiency is because

there was no quantified. presence of "grass clippings and leaves" at the facility, i.rrespective
whether they are defined to be a "solid waste" as these ingredients, in that form, were not

present at this agricultural (acilitv on March 29, 2013, In truth, DEQ could not find any
measurable amount of any substance that was not hwnus/compost/soil/dirt within the rows
of these material substances on March 29, 2013, so there exists no factual basis to enter this
Judgment, even with the erroneous belief grass clippings and leaves were being "discarded",
when there was no intent of any permanent disposal, and these recyclable organic materials
have been excluded from the definition of solid waste as a matter of controlling·law.
DEQ officials declined to take any measurements or confirm the identity of any
materials, resulting in a complete lack of factual evidence. DEQ knew they were viewing
compost, dirt, soil, and hwnus in those windrows, as those were the substances they knew
from Gibson's long history of agricultural activities were his product he produced for a
recognized beneficial use as a substitute for commercial fertilizers, and were aware such
products derived from recycling received different treatment by the Department of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through the CFR's under the RCRA. Clearly, the
Federal Legislation and their Regulatory body of law was not enacted to be ignored by the
states. Clearly, Idaho was on board, as these recycled organic materials were not to be
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regulated, as expressed within the mandatory provisions of the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities

Act (Title 39, Chapter 74, including I. C. §39-7404), which by adoption of the RCRA,
incorporated the excluded status of grass clippings and leaves when they are being used as a
direct ingredient and commercial substitute in composted substances under the exclusions
from "solid waste" through the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA).
The RCRA has been enforced consistently since 1976, recently amending their final
rules regarding definitions of "solid wastes" and establishing exemptions from "solid
wastes", promulgating among their Final Rule in 2015, specifically designed to enhance the
recycling processes, the exclusion of such recycled materials from their definition of

"solid wastes". The 2015 Rule that has been announced within the Resource Conservation
Recovery Act (RCRA) was designed to promote recycling practices, thus the reason certain
materials used in that recycling process were being excluded from "solid waste", while at
the same time, some "solid wastes" were even excluded from the definition of hazardous
wastes.
As Defendants before argued, these materials have been historically left to a
regulation within the jurisdiction of the State's Departments of Agriculture, who brought
forth the exemptions of manures and crop residues caused to be announced with the
provisions of the IDAPA Rule 58 .01.06 (Solid Waste Management Rules), subpart .001
(Title and Scope), subpart (.03) (Wastes Not Regulated Under These Rules), (b) (These

Rules Do Not Apply to the following solid wastes ... ) (b)(ii) (the effect of which excluded
those substances from the definition of what is considered a "solid waste" from any
right of regulation by DEQ, those material substances consisting of manure and crop
(plant) residues intended to be returned to the soil at agronomic rates, and (b)(iii),
being anv agricultural solid waste which is managed and regulated pursuant to rules
adopted bv the Idaho Department ofAgriculture.
We cannot overstate the legislative history that compost, and the process of
composting, is "managed and regulated by the Idaho Department of Agriculture, which
these Defendants continue to emphasize to the court, as those statutory enactments are being
expressed by the Legislature in the Soil and Plant Amendment Act, and the Right to Farm

Act, being Title 22, Chapter 45, specifically I. C. §22-4502, which has been cited in detail
in Defendants initial Memorandum.
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Though this court continues to cite IDAPA Rules as a "reliable" source of
definition, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), pre-empts any rule that is
inconsistent with the Federal Legislation and body of Regulatory authority (CFR's).
These Defendants reiterate the fact that DEQ has not provided this court with the
needed evidence or fundamental elements to justify their accusations, and have chosen to
ignore, and now chose to refer to the controlling law a mere "affirmative defense" that was
not pled, rather than to responsibly address the prevailing "Federal legal authority" that
identifies these "agricultural operations and facilities" that engage in the use of these
excluded materials in a composting process are not subject to any solid waste disposal
regulatory authority expressed within any portion of IDAPA 58 .0 1.06. These materials are
direct ingredients and/or a composted product intended as a substitute for a commercial
product as excluded by RCRA, embraced further by (b)(iii), when it remains clear the
Department of Agriculture expressed this jurisdiction over composting activity and
construes it to be an agricultural activities within their Right to Farm Act and the Soil and
Plant Amendment Act, when finding these specific composting ingredients (grass clippings

and leaves) to be expressly excluded by the RCRA and that exclusion expressly adopted by
the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act, Title 39, Chapter 74, I. C. §39-7404, and where there is
also found the exclusion of "crop residues and manure" within I. C. §39-7403(50)(e), and
specifically identified within I. C. §39-7404 regarding the RCRA provisions, wherein the
RCRA does address ingredients in composting activities as being substances/materials that
are excluded from "solid waste" by virtue of definitions within the RCRA , wherein we find
the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act has carried forward these exclusions to the definition of
"solid waste", by the specific language our Legislature used, as also cited in detail in our
initial Memorandum.
These materials are a direct ingredient (grass clippings and leaves), and come within
the substances specifically excluded from the definition of "solid waste", in addition to the
fact these materials were never intended to be abandoned or discarded, and identified in I. C.
§39-7403(50)(e), referring to Agricultural wastes of manures and crop residues, that are
returned to the soils at agronomic rates. I. C. §39-7404, has pre-empted any definition of
"solid wastes" that is excluded by the RCRA, and DEQ cannot promulgate any rule
broader than allowed by the provisions of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
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(RCRA), holding to the effect these organic compos/able materials are excluded by virtue

of the recy cling provisions contained in RCRA, as identified in 40 CFR 261.2(e), (1),
(2) ,&(3).
We provide the specific CFR regulation as identified above, as DEQ has been
critical of Defendants convenient reference to these specific RCRA provisions on the
website, where it was thought by Defendants DEQ would then conveniently access that site
and go to www.epa.gov which identifi es the exclusions (in plain language) from the
definition of"sol id waste" as such "ingredients" as grass cl ippings and leaves are not subject
to RCRA Subtitle C regulation. That site spelled it out for DEQ, but the official reference is

40 CFR 261.2(e), (1), (2)&{3). That website identified the law in a manner that is clearly
understood, wherein it states the fo llowing:
In order to encourage recycling practi ces, certain materials are specifica lly
excluded from the defi nition of solid waste, and some solid wastes are
excluded from the definition of hazardous waste. Furthermore, certain
hazardous wastes are exempt from regulation when recycled. These tlu·ee
categories are discussed below ....
T he 20 15 Definition of Solid Waste (DSW) Final Rule updates some the
recycling exclusions found in the table below and provides clear guidance
on how EPA defines legitimate recycling.
In order to encourage waste recycling, RCRA exempts three types of
wastes from the definition of solid waste:
o

o

o

Waste Used as an Ingredient: I[ a material is directly used as an
ingredient in a production process without first being reclaimed.
then that material is not a solid waste.
Waste Used as a Product S ubstitute: If a material is directly used
as an effective substitute fo r a commercial product (without first
being reclaimed), it is exempt from the definition ofsolid waste.
Wastes R etumed to the Production Process: When a material is
returned directly to the production process (without first being
reclaimed) fo r use as a fe edstock or raw material, it is not a solid
waste.

When these particular substances are not destined to be deposited at landfills for
pennanent disposal, but rather recycled as a composted material as defined by the RCRA
exemptions and exclusions, traditional ly referred to as an "organic waste-derived material",
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defined within the legislation over which the Department of Agriculture has the exclusive
authority under the law, the entire essence of which has been understood in the context of a
"soil nutrient", for use as a "soil amendment" and/or as a "plant foliar", it remains
disingenuous for DEQ to attempt to promote the proposition they have the regulatory
authority over that which is not within the mission statement of the legislation, incapable of
being advanced by any IDAPA Rule, limited by the effects of the enactment of Title 39,
Chapter 74, Statutes of Idaho, specifically I. C. §39-7404, and pre-empted by Federal Law.
When substances (grass clippings and leaves) are recognized within Idaho's law to
be organically decomposed substances and when used as direct ingredients under Federal
Legislation, are destined for the reincorporation into the soils for the benefit of mankind as
compost and humus, it becomes simply irrational to suggest the ingredients are a "solid
waste" but the compost and humus they generate are not.
Grass clippings and leaves are defined in Idaho law (by the Department of
Agriculture enactments) to be· an organic material, referred to in the statutes as "Organic
waste-derived material", not defined to be a "solid" or a "solid waste", or to be deposited
or disposed of in a solid waste landfill disposal site. This became a legal definition of
what these "grass clippings and leaves" may be regarded ("organic waste-derived
material") under Idaho law. This "legal definition" is found in the Soil and Plant
Amendment Act (SAP AA) Title 22, Chapter 22, I. C. §22-2203(26), which includes
those substances that are specifically referred to as being "grass clippings", "leaves",
weeds, bark, plantings, prunings, and other vegetative wastes, wood wastes from logging
and milling operations, and food wastes, identified within subpart (26) as follows:
"(26) "Organic waste-derived material" means grass clippings, leaves,
weeds, bark, plantings, prunings, and other vegetative wastes, wood
wastes from logging and milling operations and food wastes."
DEQ cannot point to any definition that will place "grass clippings" and "leaves"
into a category that alters the exclusion by the recycling provisions of RCRA, and nothing
can get them to where they want to be with any scientific, statutory or case law definition, as
they are restrained by what is contained within the Code of Federal Regulations, the
Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act,

(ISWFA). This failure by them to cite these restrictive effects of the provisions of the
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RCRA, by a scientific, statutory or case authorized definition, reflects a failure upon which
they had premised their hypothesis that such substances as grass clippings and leaves are
"solid wastes".
DEQ is statutorily obligated to follow the restrictive definition(s) of "solid waste"
through the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) RCRA enactment, and within
numerous provisions of the Code of Federal Regulation, including several CFR provisions,
specifically 40 CFR 261.2(e)(l),(2)&(3), which becomes incorporated and maintained
within Idaho's ISWFA legislation.
Title 39, (Health and Safety), Chapter 74, specifically the Idaho Solid Waste
Facilities Act (ISWFA), not only defines "solid waste" (1. C. §39-7403(50)(e)) to exclude

"agricultural waste" ("manures and crop residues" that are "returned to the soils at
agronomic rates"), but also mandates the limitations as to what is a "solid waste" as
excluded within RCRA. I. C. §39-7403(50)(e) states:
(50) "Solid waste" means any garbage or refuse, sludge from a waste water
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility
and other discarded material including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations and from community activities, but does not include
solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials
in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges that are point sources subject
to permit under 33 U .S.C. 1342, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material as defined in the atomic energy act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat.
923). Tllese regulations sltall not applv to tlte following solid wastes:
(e) Agricultural wastes, limited to manures and crop residues, returned to
the soils at agronomic rates;
Nowhere does Idaho legislature define "crop residues" to ever exclude "grass
clippings" that may be derived from residential yard mowing, landscape properties that
are groomed, or clippings harvested from large sod producing farms, or the leaves that
fall from trees in orchards, landscaping and yard collections. Grass clippings and leaves
are a form of a "crop residue", as they are derived from a biological source (grass and
trees), recognized to be agricultural and among various activities of horticulture, and
these grass clippings and tree leaves become a biological residue, specifically mentioned

within the compost process of the definitions within the statutory law, as identified
in the Right to Farm Act and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act.
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With respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the
Federal courts have been stating limitations about the definition of "solid waste" ever
since 1987, as addressed above, as the the controlling description for what constitutes a
"solid waste" begins with whether the substance was intended for unconditional

abandonment and a permanent discard, not otherwise intended as an ingredient for
being processed as an organic substance, as are composted materials, for use as an
agricultural products, just as it has then been addressed in RCRA and reflected also in the
National Park Systems treatment of these organic vegetative materials, as an organic
waste-derived material used as a direct ingredient in the composting-recycling process.
The EPA has been specifically restricted in its authority to regulate certain
substances, recognized by express case authority back as declared within American Mining

Congress and Engelhard Corporation v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
824 F2d 1177 ( 1987).
The EPA has further expressed the limitations to the definition of "solid waste"
from being "only to materials tltat are truly discarded, disposed of, tltrown away, or

abandoned", to also expressly exclude any such application to organic waste-derived
materials that are directly used as an ingredient in the recycling process, i.e compost and
humus products.
CONCLUSION
The court's FF/CL has expressed the recognition that "humus" and "compost" are
not a "solid waste", precisely congruent with the long applied limitations to the definition of
what constitutes a "solid waste", announced within federal regulations, reflected in EPA's

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), This exclusion must apply to the
organic materials that are the direct ingredients to produce compost and humus.
Grass clippings and leaves are direct ingredients used in the production of compost
and humus products; products that are an effective substitute for commercial productsbeing commercial fertilizers and foliars, which composted products are returned to the soil
as a compost "feedstock" to activate the soil by the enhancement of the biological organic
process with the active micro-biological organisms.
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DEQ agents are bound by these Federal regulations and state law that exempt direct
ingredients, "grass clippings and leaves", from a "solid waste". Furthermore, by the court's
own recognition that compost and humus are not "solid wastes", the further recognition this
process consists of a mixture process of these substances (compost, humus, soil, dirt, grass
clippings, leaves, and water), it remains undisputed there has been no competent, material,
and substantial evidence presented to this court to establish a factual basis to conclude any

quantitative presence of 600 cubic yards of any "solid waste", even assuming "grass
clippings and leaves" were a "solid waste", when the "attempted inspection" conducted
March 29, 2013, produced no evidence to prove the presence of any quantitative substance
to give rise to an allegation of any "Tier II violation" on March 29, 2013.
These grass and leaf materials have been directly used in Gibson's recycling process
since 1974, specifically regarded exempt within EPA's RCRA, Idaho's ISWFA, Idaho's
ISDA, the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR's), and have never been abandoned or

permanently discarded, and certainly never abandoned by tlteir acquiring owner, David
R. Gibson.
Grass clippings and leaves have never constituted a hazardous substance, and cannot
be regulated under EPA or DEQ authority, and to bring this spurious action against these
Defendants is unsupported in the law.
This court is requested to amend its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment, so as to properly address the applicable Federal Law (EPA's RCRA) to the
restrictive provisions of Idaho's Law (1. C. §39-7404) prohibiting promulgation of any

Defendants the prevailing parties in this action.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 21 51 day of May, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

(
(
(
( X

Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2"d F
Boise, Idaho 83 702

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
1-Court/E-Filed

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION P. 26

001307

Electronically Filed
5/21/2018 10:31 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Louie, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATIORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax: .
(208) 345-1129

Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
) CASE NO.: CV OC 1503540
)
Plaintiff,
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF
v.
) DR. MIR M. SEYEDBAGHERI
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK DIAMOND
)
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
)
LLC
)
Defendants.

)
)
)

------------------------------~ )
STATE OF IDAHO)
) : ss
)
County of Ada
COMES NOW Dr. Mir M. Seyedbagheri, and being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That Affiant is over the age of majority; competent to testify; and does present this

Affidavit upon his own personal knowledge and scientific research as to the fact and legal
treatment that certain recyclable substances, such as grass clippings and leaves, are not defined to
be or regarded as "solid waste" substances, when being processed into compost and humus
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products for agricultural use.
2.

That your Affiant is a retired University of Idaho Professor, having worked for 32

years with many thousands of farmers, ranchers, commercial horticulturists, and urban
horticulturists, helping them with soil and plant nutrient management. Previously I was a member
of the Idaho State Department of Agriculture's Fertilizer and Soil Amendment Committee,
advancing scientific research and information for the exchange of research information for the
national agriculture community. I have earlier completed scientific compost research and
published Commercial Compost research materials. I also taught composting use and compost
technology for 25 years to hundreds of University of Idaho's Master Gardener program students.
I am attaching a 1-page bio-reference, and do have available my Curriculum resume that consists
of over 70 pages, if requested.
3.

Regarding the formal definition of "compost", this material is a mixture of decayed

or decaying organic matter used to fertilize soil. Composting is a natural biological process,
carried out under controlled aerobic conditions. In this process, various microorganisms, including
beneficial bacteria and fungi, break down organic matter into simple substances. These substances
contain a higher amount of functional carbon and macro-micronutrients that can be used as
fertilizer, therefore returning these resources back to the soil for enhanced crop, fruit and vegetable
production.
4.

Federal Government regulatory provisions for compost have identified three

categories as excluded material from the definition of "solid waste". These categories serve to
incorporate these relevant substances, grass clippings, leaves and plant material, within the
definition of what is to be excluded from "solid waste" substances for disposal. These materials,
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grass clippings, leaves, and plant material, are organic and judged to be recyclable substances,
which are important for soil and plant health. During my time as a committee member with the
Idaho Department of Agriculture Fertilizer and Soil Amendment Committee, we had many
discussions about the definition of and the biochemical differences between "solid waste" and
"organic-based" materials. This was a collective scientific effort to provide an objective, unbiased
set of definitions for all concerned, in particular the taxpaying public. The environmental effort of
this committee was to benefit the health of soil and better enable farmland sustainability for present
and future generations. One can objectively recognize that composting grass clippings, leaves, and
any organic-based material is undertaken in a natural biological decomposition process. Recycling
these plant (residue) based materials provides valuable renewable resources that provide a range
of beneficial functional carbon compounds, including humic and fulvic acid, macronutrients and
micronutrients in the soil for biologically based plant nutrient inputs. According to the F ann
Agricultural Organization, five to seven million hectares of valuable agriculture farmland are lost
every year through erosion, lack of aggregate stability, and deficiency of organic-carbon to
complex, essential to make mineral complexes that are functionally plant available; these are
complex carbon compounds, the biochemical substances that make soil healthy and stable. The
United States has lost about one-third of its topsoil since settlement and farming began in North
America. The deficiency of functional organic carbon compounds has played a pronounced role
in this topsoil loss. To put this into perspective, functional carbon, the by-product of compost, will
help ameliorate this deficiency of valuable organic carbon compounds needed in the soil.
5.

As policy makers defining procedures for the benefit of our citizens and the

environment, the question of sustainable soil health is of vital importance. There are hundreds of

Affidavit of Dr. MIR M. SEYEDDBAGHERI

P.3

001310

thousands of scientific publications that serve to identify and confim1 the lack fimctional carbon
in the soil.
6.

My final evaluation, without going tlu-ough pages of descriptions and defining

terminology, based on the highest level of academic logic, considering nutrient input and resultant
crop outcomes, I do herewith unequivocally state that making compost out of grass clippings,
leaves and other organic matters are functiona lly beneficial to healthy soil and its sustainability.
These are not "solid waste" products, nor are the direct ingredients of grass clippings and leaves;
these materials are not discarded and not abandoned materials when utili zed in an agricultural
facility to generate compost and humus. Grass clippings, leaves and·other organic matter are plant
byproducts, biological substances which can and will continually will be utilized for soil and plant
health - they do not fit within, or intended to be defined to be a "solid waste".
Further your Affinat sayeth not.
Dated iliis 20th day ofMay, 2018.

D · ' 1r M. Seyedbagheri

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me th• 20'" day o·

Affidavit of Dr. MIR M. SEYEDDBAGHERI
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 2Pt day of May, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following addresses as follows:

Clerk of the Court
Fomth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Ipaho 83702

(
(
(

)
)
)

( X

)

Cynthia Y ee-Wallace
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
(

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
E-Filed

U.S. Mail

Fax
Hand-Uelivered
I-Court/E- tied
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Dr. Mir-M Sevedbaglteri, Soil
Agronomist!Biometeorologist

Dr. Mir is a professor emeritus at the University ofldaho, specialized in soil science and
agronomy, as well as biometeorology. He achieved academic recognition on the Dean' s and
National Dean's Lists when he was in graduate school, and as a member of Phi Kappa Phi Honor
Society.
Mir was raised on a fann. He has 36 years of appl ied research experience in conventional and
sustainable ag fanning, with an emphasis on soi l health, plant, and water relationships. He has
reviewed over 30,000 soil, plant tissue, and water analyses fo r organic and conventional farmers,
the ag industry, and various international organic farm projects.
Mir has impl emented countless ag-related projects nationally/internationally on salt remediation
and crop production. He was a pioneer in humic substances research in Idaho and the Pacific
Northwest. His research has been disseminated throughout the state, as well as nationally, and
internationally. He was also invited to present on sustainable ag and organic farming at numerous
national and international conferences. Dr. Mir has also consulted with numerous growers and
industry representatives nationwide and globally on matters of soil health and crop management.
Mir has gained national and inte rnational recognition fo r his creative and innovative appli ed
research on the effects of humic substances (functional carbon) on soil and plant metabolisms. He
has given over 320 talks and had many abstracts, book chapters, and articles published worldwide
on soil health. Mir was also the co-chair of the International Humic Substances Society,
Committee on Applied Research in Soil, Nutrient Management, and Crop Production.
Mir has also been the recipi ent of34 scholarly and prestigious state, regional, national, and
international awards, including the 2016 Hall of Fame Award in Agriculture, Northwest Region,
two Excellence in Research awa rds from the governor ofldaho, and the Excellence in Outreach
and Diversity awards from the Uni versity ofldaho. In addition, Mir has long-standing
memberships in 6 prestigious national and inte rnational scholarly and scientific societies.
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Electronically Filed
5/22/2018 12:03 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

) Case No. CVOC-1503540
)
) SUPPLEMENTAL
) MEMORANDUM IN REGARD
) TO THE MISLABLING OF
) PLEADINGS IN A CIVIL CASE
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
These Defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the district conrl's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, as entered on March I, 2018, the effect
of which entry had served to compromise Mr. Gibson's continuation of his composting
activities, which included the imposition of a penalty of $1,000.00 levied against David R.
Gibson and $250.00 levied against VHS Properties, LLC .. Within that Motion, Defendants
request the court to review, reconsider, and to thereby amend its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, as would necessarily needed to be done in order to correct the
judgment that has been entered. As indicated to the court, the fundamental issue(s)
emanating trom this controversy is the need to preserve and protect the jurisdictional and

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN REGARD TO THE MISLABLING OF
PLEADINGS IN A CIVIL CASE
P. I
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regulatory rights of the Department of Agriculture, and the correct enforcement of that
specific Act within the Environmental Health Protection Act (EHPA), Title 39, including
Chapter 74. identified as the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (JSWFA), J. C. §39-7404,
wherein the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) is prohibited from seeking
broader definitions of "solid waste" than mandated by the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA within the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRi\), justifYing Defendants' position DEQ lacks regulatory authority and jurisdictional
standing to bring an action against Defendants for their agricultural operations upon the
pretext they are conducting a "solid waste" facility, when nothing received at this facility is
either an "abandoned" or "discarded" material, as the delivery of the material to this
agricultural facility was intended to be a recycled used of these ingredients in a composting
operation, as this agricultural facility is not a "solid waste disposal facility", nor a facility
designed or intended to receive any "municipal waste" materials, but rather an organic
recycling facility where nothing is discarded for permanent disposal.
Defendants did use the old reference to the citation regarding Motions for
Reconsideration, citing within the Motion reference to Rule 11 (a)(2)(B), IRCP, when the
current (and correct) reference would have been the recently amended version that is now
referred to as Rule 11.2(b), IRCP. The substance of the former and current Rule is identical,
and remains the same as to the application of the relief requested by Defendants, being the
reconsideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Judgment entered by
the court, seeking an amendment of the findings and conclusion, so as to be consistent with
the applicable law controlling the resolution of this controversy. As before identified by the
Defendants, the former citation (Rule ll(a)(2)(B)) is identical to the substance of the current
citation (Rule 11.2(b)), as they are both identified below, as follows;
Rulell(a)(2) [effective until July I, 2016]
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry
of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the
trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen
(14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no motion
for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion
filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55( c), 59( a), 59( e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN REGARD TO THE MISLABLING OF
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Rule 11.2 [effective July I, 2016]
(b) Motion for Reconsideration.
(1) In General. A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or withinl4 days
after the entry of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered
after the entry of final judgment must be made within 14 days after entry
of the order,
(2) Certain Orders Not Subject to Reconsideration. No motion to
reconsider an order of the trial court entered on any motion filed under
Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59( e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b) may be made.
There has been no request of these Defendants to reconsider any prior order of the
trial court entered on any prior motion filed with respect to Rules 50( a), 52(b), 55( c), 59( a),
59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). The Motion filed with the court for Reconsideration is
requesting the court to review, reconsider, and as appropriate to the case, to amend the
Findings and Conclusions to be consistent with the applicable law. There has been no
request to reconsider any prior order made pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 52(b ),
IRCP, as this court has never been confronted with a prior motion to amend the findings or
conclusions. Had there been one, and had the court entered an Order in response thereto, that
Order could not be reconsidered, but only appealed.
That said, there has been no prejudice to DEQ, as in all civil cases, Idaho follows the
treatment of mislabeled claims/motions in accordance with their substance, and there is no
procedural basis to deny relief based upon that error in the filings.
In Carroll v. MBNA, America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 220 P .3d 1080 (2009), in
headnote 15, the court stated:

[15] Although Capps and Carroll styled their claims for relief as injunctive in
nature, they were motions to vacate arbitration awards pursuant to Idaho
Code section 7-912. An action under section 7-912 is to be presented and
decided as a motion. I. C. § 7-916. Here, despite the fact that the motion was
improperly presented as a complaint for injunctive relief, in any civil case, a
mislabeled claim may be treated according to its substance. See Freeman
v. State, Dept. of Corr., 115 Idaho 78, 79, 764 P .2d 445, 446 (Ct.App.l988).
Accordingly, we will review the action as a motion to vacate an arbitration
award ..... 148 Idaho at 268, 220 P .3d at I 087 (emphasis added).
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In Watlenbarger v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., !50 Idaho 308, 246 P.3d 961
(2010), in headnote 16, 17, 18 and 19, the court therein stated:
[16] [17] [18] [19] The respondents' motion should have been treated
as one for summary judgment. Despite the fact that the respondents
captioned their motion as one to dismiss or compel arbitration, the dismissal
motion, in essence, is also a motion to compel arbitration. This Court treats
mislabeled claims according to their substance in civil cases. Carroll v.
MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 268, 220 P.3d 1080, 1087 (2009).
(Emphasis added).
Additional cases include Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007); In Re
Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279, 127 P.3d 178 (2005); and Mosier v. Mosier, 122 Idaho 37, 830
P.2d 1175 (1992), wherein the court has before emphasized the courts always look to
substance overform.

This is a timely motion to reconsider the lawful basis for the entry of the Judgment,
and a reconsideration of the Judgment necessarily requires the court to review and
reconsider the findings and conclusions that it has previously entered, consistent with what
would be a Rule 52(b) Motion to amend tindings and conclusions, and the court, upon such
reconsideration of the Judgment, would necessarily

er an

those aspects that are perceived to be an inco ect reflection of the~31aJP!llllal~~
Defendants perceive the law supports the elief "grass clippi
from the regulatory definition of a "solid wast '

V emon K. Smith, attorney
for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 22nd day of May, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
REGARD TO THE MTSLABLING OF PLEADINGS IN A CIVIL CASE to be delivered to
the following persons at the following addresses as follows:
Clerk of the Court

(

)

U.S. Mail
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Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

(
(

)
)

( X

)

Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court!E-Filed

Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2"d Floo
Boise, Idaho 83702

(

)

Mail

-----("--~
(
( X

)

Hand
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Filed: 06/21/2018 11:42:59
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Ellis, Janet
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
EXPENSES

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) filed a complaint
alleging that Defendant David Gibson, under the name of Black Diamond Compost
Products, operates a composting facility on property owned by Defendant VHS Properties,
LLC (“VHS”). DEQ alleged that Mr. Gibson’s facility meets the legal definition of a Tier
II Solid Waste Processing facility and that neither Mr. Gibson nor VHS has complied with
the requirements set forth in regulations adopted by DEQ regarding the management of
solid waste processing facilities.
A court trial in this matter was held on September 13, 15, and 20, 2017. Thereafter,
the parties filed written closing arguments. The Court subsequently entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as a Judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
Defendants filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, along with a supporting memorandum. Plaintiff filed
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES - 1
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an opposition to Defendants’ motion on May 14, 2018. On May 21, 2018, Defendants
filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion for reconsideration, and the affidavit of
Dr. Mir M. Seyedbagheri.
On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Request for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses,
along with a memorandum of law in support of the request, and the declaration of Cynthia
Yee-Wallace. Defendants filed an objection to Plaintiff’s request for fees and expenses on
March 28, 2018.

On May 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to

Defendants’ objection.
A hearing on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and Plaintiff’s request for
fees and expenses was held on May 21, 2018, at which time the Court took the matter
under advisement. On May 22, 2018, Defendants filed a document titled “Supplemental
Memorandum in Regard to the Mislabling {sic} of Pleadings in a Civil Case.”
DISCUSSION
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion, Defendants seek reconsideration of the Court’s Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, as well as the Judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). The
Court notes that I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) was rescinded, effective July 1, 2016, and the current
rule is I.R.C.P. 11.2(b). However, I.R.C.P. 11.2(b) does not provide a mechanism for
seeking reconsideration of a final judgment.
Under I.R.C.P. 52(b), upon a motion filed no later than fourteen days after entry of
a judgment, a court “may amend its findings, or make additional findings, and may amend
the judgment accordingly.” Procedurally, I.R.C.P. 52(b) is the appropriate rule under
which to consider Defendants’ request.
Before turning to the motion itself, the Court must address an evidentiary issue. At
the hearing on Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff objected to the Court’s consideration of the
affidavit of Dr. Mir M. Seyedbagheri, which was filed by Defendants on the day of the
hearing. Unlike the procedure for motions presented under I.R.C.P. 11.2(b), a trial court
cannot consider new evidence when asked to amend its findings of fact or conclusions of
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES - 2

001320

law. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184
(2009) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is sustained, and the Court
will not consider Mr. Seyedbagheri’s affidavit.
Having reviewed the arguments presented by Defendants in their motion for
reconsideration, the Court is not persuaded that it should reconsider its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied.
Plaintiff’s Request for Attorney Fees and Expenses
Plaintiff is seeking an award of $77,106.95 for attorney fees and paralegal fees, and
$3,466.53 for expenses. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), in any civil action, the court “may
award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties
as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract.” The
determination of prevailing party status for the purpose of awarding attorney fees and costs
is within the trial court’s sound discretion. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of
Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 831, 367 P.3d 208, 225 (2016) (citation omitted). The trial court
examines and determines the prevailing party question “from an overall view, not a claimby-claim analysis.” Id. at 831, 367 P.3d at 226 (citation omitted). Having considered the
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the parties as
required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B), the Court concludes that Plaintiff is the prevailing party
in this action. Accordingly, the Court must next determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to
an award of fees under any statute or contract.
Plaintiff asserts that an award of attorney fees is warranted under I.C. §§ 12-117
and 12-121. Idaho Code section 12-121 allows a court to “award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Idaho Code section
12-117(1) provides that “in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a
political subdivision and a person,” the court “shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney’s fees … if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.” The requirement of I.C. § 12-117 that the party acted without a reasonable
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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basis in fact or law is similar to the requirement of I.C. § 12-121 that the case was brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Total Success
Investments, LLC v. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 695, 227 P.3d 942, 949 (Ct.
App. 2010) (citations omitted). See also Mendez v. University Health Services Boise State
Univ., 163 Idaho 237, ___, 409 P.3d 817, 827 (2018).
Where there are multiple claims or defenses, “it is not appropriate to segregate
those claims and defenses to determine which were or were not frivolously defended or
pursued. The total defense of a party’s proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous.”
Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Bus. Services, Inc., 119 Idaho
558, 563, 808 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1991). The question is “not whether the position urged by
the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be wrong, but whether it is so plainly
fallacious as to be frivolous.” Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975, 719 P.2d
1231, 1235 (Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted).

Attorney fees will generally not be

awarded where the non-prevailing party’s position is based on a good faith legal argument.
Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 401, 210 P.3d 75, 86 (2009).
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that the total defense presented by
Defendants was unreasonable, frivolous, or without a reasonable basis in fact or law. At
page 19 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court stated that Mr. Gibson
had:
vigorously asserted his position that the EPHA and the solid waste management
rules do not apply to his composting actions. The Court finds that position, while
ultimately unavailing in the Court’s view, was one taken in good faith. The
regulation of composting facilities is a topic of significant debate in various places
and states have taken different approaches to how that should be done. The
application of the EPHA and the Solid Waste Management Rules to Mr. Gibson’s
activities was by no means obvious or straightforward.
Having considered the defense presented in this matter as a whole, the Court, in its
discretion, concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. §
12-117 or I.C. § 12-121.
Plaintiff also seeks an award of “expenses” pursuant to I.C. § 39-108. That statute
provides that in addition to civil penalties, any person who has been determined to have
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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violated the provisions of the EPHA “shall be liable for any expense incurred by the state
in enforcing the act.” I.C. § 39-108(6). An award of expenses under the EPHA is
“mandatory and unqualified.” Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Southfork Lumber
Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 567 (1993). The term “expense” does not include
attorney fees. Id. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that by using the
term “any expense” in I.C. § 39-108(6) rather than “costs,” the legislature “intended a
more extensive recovery of costs” than is contemplated by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Id. (stating
that the trial court should consider the Department’s request for costs according to I.C. §
39-108(6) rather than Rule 54(d)(1)).

The Court retains the discretion, however, to

determine which expenses were reasonably incurred by Plaintiff. See id.
As stated above, Plaintiff is seeking an award of expenses in the total amount of
$3,466.53. That amount includes $256.50 and $2,119.50 for transcripts of portions of the
court trial, $54.00 for service of a trial subpoena upon Mr. Gibson, and $1,036.53 for the
costs associated with taking video recordings and photographs of the property at issue.
[Decl. of Cynthia Yee-Wallace, Ex. 2]. The Court, in its discretion, concludes that these
expenses were reasonably incurred by Plaintiff and should be awarded pursuant to I.C. §
39-108(6).

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and expenses is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The Court awards expenses to Plaintiff in the amount of $3,466.53. The
Court will enter an amended judgment reflecting this award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 6/21/2018 11:23 AM

______________________________
JONATHAN MEDEMA
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
emailed/mailed on _____________________,
one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant
June 21st, 2018
to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Cynthia Yee Wallace
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark Cecchini-Beaver
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
Vernon K. Smith
vvs1900@gmail.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Signed: 6/21/2018 11:44 AM

By: ______________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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Filed: 06/21/2018 11:57:05
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Ellis, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
AMENDED1 JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant David R. Gibson shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.
Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $250.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, jointly and severally, shall
pay expenses to Plaintiff in the sum of $3,466.53.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, are hereby enjoined from
engaging in any of the following activities:
1.

Accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass clippings,

leaves, straw, or hay, or permitting anyone from discarding any quantity of grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw, or hay upon that real property described as the Northwest ¼ of
Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County
Assessor as parcel S1505220000 unless Defendants first comply with the provisions of
IDAPA 58.01.06.010.
1

This Judgment is being amended to reflect the Court’s award of expenses to Plaintiff.
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001327

2.

Accepting or receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding upon that real

property described as the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise
Meridian and identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S1505220000, within any
contiguous twelve-month (12) period a cumulative volume of discarded grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw, or hay that exceeds 300 cubic yards unless Defendants first
comply with those provisions of IDAPA 58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such
material they desire to receive.
This injunction is effective upon the date it is signed. It shall remain effective
permanently.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 6/21/2018 11:23 AM
______________________________
JONATHAN MEDEMA
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
June 21, 2018
emailed/mailed on _____________________,
one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant
to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Cynthia Yee Wallace
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark Cechini-Beaver
mark.cechini-beaver@deq,idaho.gov
Vernon K. Smith
vvs1900@gmail.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Signed: 6/21/2018 11:58 AM

By: ______________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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Electronically Filed
6/21/2018 12:09 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE, ISB #6793
MARK CECCHINI-BEAVER, ISB #9297
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV-OC-2015-03540
)
) PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60 MOTION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”), hereby moves the
Court pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 60(a) to correct the
Amended Judgment in this case as follows:
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant David R. Gibson shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1000.

PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60 MOTION - 1
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Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $250.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, jointly and severally,
shall pay expenses to Plaintiff in the sum of $3,466.53.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, are hereby enjoined from
engaging in any of the following activities:
1.
Accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw or hay, or permitting anyone from discarding any quantity
of grass, grass clippings, leaves, straw, or hay upon that real property described as
the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and
identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S1505220000 unless Defendants
first comply with the provisions of IDAPA 58.01.06.010.
2.
Accepting or receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding upon
that real property described as the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N,
Range 2E, Boise Meridian identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel
S5005220000, within any contiguous twelve-month (12) period a cumulative
volume of discarded grass, grass clippings, leaves, straw, or hay that exceeds 300
cubic yards unless Defendants first comply with those provisions of IDAPA
58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such material that they desire to
received.
3.
At any time having more than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings,
leaves, or hay upon the real property described as the Northwest ¼ of Section 5,
Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County
Assessor as parcel S1505220000, unless Defendants immediately comply with the
siting and operating requirements for a Tier II Facility under IDAPA 58.01.06,
including those found at IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02 and 04.
This injunction is effective upon the date it is signed. It shall remain
effective permanently.
In the alternative, if the Court finds that relief under Rule 60(a) is not appropriate, then in
the alternative, Plaintiff moves the Court to grant Plaintiff relief from the Amended Judgment in
this case and enter another amended Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), consistent with the
corrections set forth above.
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This motion is supported by the files and records in this case, including the Court’s
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment and Amended Judgment entered
herein, as well as the memorandum in support of this motion filed on today’s date.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED: June 21, 2018.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that June 21, 2018, I filed the foregoing electronically through the
iCourt E-File system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic
means, s more fully reflected on the Notification of Service:
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
vvs1900@gmail.com

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
ICourt E-File
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129

/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE
Deputy Attorney General
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Electronically Filed
6/21/2018 2:21 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE, ISB #6793
MARK CECCHINI-BEAVER, ISB #9297
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV-OC-2015-03540
)
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
) PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60 MOTION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This memorandum is submitted by Plaintiff, the Idaho Department of Environmental
Quality (“DEQ”), in support of Plaintiff’s pending Rule 60 Motion.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Court discussed the remedies in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(“Findings”), it concluded that Mr. Gibson is using the VHS property to prepare solid waste for
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reuse through the process of biological decomposition. However, in the Judgment1 and
subsequent Amended Judgment2 entered in this case, the Court included duplicative language
that would require DEQ to again prove that Mr. Gibson desired to have solid waste on VHS
property. The Amended Judgment should be corrected pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a) to reflect, consistent with the Court’s Findings, that if Defendants have solid
waste on the VHS property, they must comply with the IDAPA rules applicable to the volume of
such waste on the property.
The Court also concluded in its Findings that Mr. Gibson did not have to comply with the
siting or operating plan requirements for a Tier II Facility unless he wants to continue having
more than 600 cubic yards of solid waste on the VHS property at any one time. However, this
finding was not memorialized in the Judgment or Amended Judgment entered by the Court. This
finding is critical to permit enforcement of the Court’s ruling in this case. The Court should thus
correct the Amended Judgment consistent with its Findings pursuant to Rule 60(a), in order to
ensure that its purpose is fully implemented.
In the alternative, if the Court finds these oversights or omissions are not apparent from
the record, the Court should grant Plaintiff relief from the Amended Judgment and enter another
amended judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), as set forth below.
II. STANDARD
The standard of review for a claim under either Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) or
60(b) is abuse of discretion. Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 576, 212 P.3d 1001, 1006 (2009)

1
2

Filed in this case on March 1, 2018.
Filed in this case on June 21, 2018.
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(citation omitted); and see Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1987)).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

The Court should correct the Amended Judgment per Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) allows the Court to correct a mistake in a judgment

that arises from oversight or omission. Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(a). “Rule 60(a) applies to those
errors in which the type of mistake or omission is mechanical in nature which is apparent in the
record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney.” Gerdon v.
State, Nos. 40454, 40455, 2014 WL 1572544, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (citing Silsby
v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 412, 95 P.3d 28, 30 (2004) (reversed on other grounds)). The Idaho
Supreme Court has adopted and applied the Ninth Circuit’s construction of Rule 60(a). Silsby,
140 Idaho at 412, 95 P.3d at 30. The Ninth Circuit has found that, “[e]rrors correctable under
Rule 60(a) include those where what is written or recorded is not what the court intended to write
or record. The error can be corrected whether it is made by a clerk or by the judge.” Id. (citing
Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit explained:
The basic distinction between “clerical mistakes” and mistakes that cannot be
corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a) is that the former consist of “blunders in
execution” whereas the latter consist of instances where the court changes its
mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in making its original
determination, or because on second thought it has decided to exercise its
discretion in a manner different from the way it was exercised in the original
determination.
Silsby, 140 Idaho 410 at 412, 95 P.3d 28 at 30 (citing Blanton, 813 F.2d at 1577 n.2). “Thus a
motion under Rule 60(a) can only be used to make the judgment or record speak the truth and
cannot be used to make it say something other than what originally was pronounced.” Id., 140
Idaho at 411, 95 P.3d at 29 (citations omitted).
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“Rule 60(a) allows a court to clarify a judgment in order to correct a ‘failure to
memorialize part of its decision,’ to reflect the ‘necessary implications’ of the original order, to
‘ensure that the court’s purpose is fully implemented,’ or to ‘permit enforcement.’”
Garamendi, 683 F.3d at 1079. “Rule 60(a) allows for clarification and explanation, consistent
with the intent of the original judgment, even in the absence of ambiguity, if necessary for
enforcement.” Id. at 1079. The Rule “does not allow a court to make corrections that, under the
guise of mere clarification, ‘reflect a new and subsequent intent because it perceives its original
judgment to be incorrect. Rather, the interpretation must reflect the contemporaneous intent of
the district court as evidenced by the record.’” Id. (citing Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 694
(10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see also 12 Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.11[2][b]). Courts
have also upheld corrections to a judgment based upon a mistake involving an inconsistency
between the text of an order or judgment and the district court’s intent when it entered the order
or judgment. Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA, 756 F.3d 259, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2014).
In this case, the Court should correct the Amended Judgment consistent with its Findings.
In DEQ’s Complaint, it alleged that it had observed grass clippings, leaves and other organic
material constituting solid waste on the property owned by VHS. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) DEQ
also alleged that it observed amounts of solid waste in excess of 600 cubic yards on the VHS
property. (Id. ¶ 14.) DEQ similarly alleged that some or all of the property is a Tier II Facility
under the Solid Waste Management Rules and that Defendants failed to comply with the siting
requirements of those rules. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 40-41, 44-47.) DEQ asked the Court to enter a
permanent mandatory injunction requiring Defendants Gibson and VHS to submit a siting
application and Operating Plan under applicable IDAPA rules and to comply with the approved
terms of the Operating Plan. (Id. at 9.)
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In its Findings, the Court found that both grass clippings and leaves are solid waste under
Idaho Code § 39-103(13). (Findings at 10.) The Court further found that Mr. Gibson is
operating a processing facility (defined in IDAPA 58.01.06.005.32), stating: “Mr. Gibson is
using the VHS property to prepare that solid waste for reuse through the process of biological
decomposition. Therefore, Mr. Gibson is processing solid waste as those terms are defined in the
EPHA.” (Id.) (emphasis added). The Court concluded that, “Plaintiff has met its burden of
proving the claim set forth in its complaint”—namely, that VHS Properties, LLC is the owner,
and Mr. Gibson is the operator, of a Tier II solid waste processing facility and that Defendants
are in violation of the regulatory requirements for such facilities. (Id. at 14.) When the Court
turned to the remedies in this case, the Court importantly concluded that if Mr. Gibson continues
to have more than 600 cubic yards of solid waste on the VHS property, he would be required to
comply with the Tier II Facilities siting and operating plan requirements, stating:
The Court concludes Mr. Gibson is not required to comply with the siting
requirement and operating plan for Tier II Facilities unless he wants to continue
having at any one time more than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings and leaves.
(Id. at 18 (emphasis added).). The Court further concluded that, “If Mr. Gibson receives less
than 300 cubic yards of grass clippings and leaves and turns them into compost before he gets
any more, then he would qualify as a below regulatory concern facility.” (Id.)
In the resulting Judgment, the Court enjoined both Defendants from accepting or
receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass clippings, leaves, straw or hay, or permitting
anyone from discarding the same, without first complying with the below regulatory concern
requirements in IDAPA 58.01.06.010. (Judgment at 1.) The Court also enjoined both
Defendants from accepting, receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding grass, leaves, or hay
in a 12-month period that exceeds 300 cubic yards unless they first comply with “those
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provisions of IDAPA 58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such material they desire to
receive.” (Id. at 1-2.) However, the Judgment omitted the Court’s finding that if Defendants
continue to have more than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings or leaves on the VHS property,
they must comply with the siting and operating requirements of a Tier II Facility. The Amended
Judgment similarly omitted this finding. The Court should correct the Amended Judgment to be
consistent with this finding.
The Judgment and the Court’s recent Amended Judgment do not permit DEQ to enforce
the Court’s finding that Mr. Gibson must comply with Tier II Facility requirements if he has
more than 600 cubic yards of solid waste existing on the VHS property at any one time. As a
result, without the Court correcting the Amended Judgment consistent with its Findings, it is
nearly impossible for DEQ to ever require Defendants to comply with the siting and operating
requirements of a Tier II Facility in this case. This is true even when DEQ obtains a warrant to
search the VHS property and observes that there is greater than 600 cubic yards of grass
clippings and leaves being processed on that property post-Judgment.
Moreover, under the Judgment and Amended Judgment, DEQ can only require
Defendants to comply with the applicable Solid Waste Management Rules if it gets a continuous
warrant and sends its representatives to the VHS property for a continuous period of up to 12
months to monitor and observe all newly discarded grass clippings or leaves on the property.
Even if DEQ could administratively do this, and even if it observes and monitors additional grass
clippings or leaves being discarded, it would then have to obtain additional evidence or an
admission from Defendants about the volume of waste that they “desire to receive” in order to
enforce the Amended Judgment. (See Judgment ¶ 2.) But the Court has already concluded that
Mr. Gibson is operating a processing facility when it held that he is currently using the VHS property
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to prepare solid waste for reuse through the process of biological decomposition. Thus, requiring
DEQ to again prove that Defendants “desire to receive” solid waste is duplicative. Once the
“cumulative volume of wastes at the facility at any one time that is greater than six hundred
(600) cubic yards,” a processing facility falls into Tier II regardless of whether the owner or
operator subjectively desires to continue accumulating that amount of waste. IDAPA
58.01.06.009.03.b. The Judgment should thus be corrected to reflect the necessary implications
from the Court’s Findings: that once solid waste is received by Defendants, they must comply
with the IDAPA rules applicable to the cumulative volume of waste present at any one time.
These oversights or omissions are apparent from the record and are thus addressable
under Rule 60(a). They can be discerned by merely reading the Court’s Findings and comparing
them to the Judgment and Amended Judgment. The Court has already found that grass clippings
and leaves are solid waste and that Mr. Gibson is using the VHS property to prepare solid waste
for reuse through biological decomposition. (See Findings at 10.) The Court has already found
that Plaintiff has met its burden of proving the claim set forth in the Complaint. (See id. at 14.)
And the Court has already found that Mr. Gibson does not have to comply with the siting and
operating requirements of a Tier II Facility, unless he continues having at any one time more
than 600 cubic yards of solid waste at the VHS property. (See id. at 18 (emphasis added).) The
Court should memorialize its omitted conclusion by correcting the Amended Judgment to permit
enforcement and ensure that the Court’s purpose is fully implemented. Thus, in order for the
Amended Judgment to be consistent with the Court’s Findings, it should be corrected as follows:
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant David R. Gibson shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.
Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $250.
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Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, jointly and severally,
shall pay expenses to Plaintiff in the sum of $3,466.53.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, are hereby enjoined from
engaging in any of the following activities:
1.
Accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw or hay, or permitting anyone from discarding any quantity
of grass, grass clippings, leaves, straw, or hay upon that real property described as
the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and
identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S1505220000 unless Defendants
first comply with the provisions of IDAPA 58.01.06.010.
2.
Accepting or receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding upon
that real property described as the Northwest ¼ of Section 5, Township 2N,
Range 2E, Boise Meridian identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel
S1505220000, within any contiguous twelve-month (12) period a cumulative
volume of discarded grass, grass clippings, leaves, straw, or hay that exceeds 300
cubic yards unless Defendants first comply with those provisions of IDAPA
58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such material that they desire to
received.
3.
At any time having more than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings,
leaves, or hay upon the real property described as the Northwest ¼ of Section 5,
Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County
Assessor as parcel S1505220000, unless Defendants immediately comply with the
siting and operating requirements for a Tier II Facility under IDAPA 58.01.06,
including those found at IDAPA 58.01.06.012.02 and 04.
This injunction is effective upon the date it is signed. It shall remain
effective permanently.
Defendant’s Rule 60 Motion should be granted and the Amended Judgment should be corrected
pursuant to Rule 60(a).
B.

In the alternative, if the Court finds that correcting the Amended Judgment under
Rule 60(a) is not appropriate, then the Court should correct it under Rule 60(b)(1).
If the Court finds that the mistake discussed above is not apparent in the record and that

correcting the Amended Judgment under Rule 60(a) is thus not warranted, then the Court should
correct it under Rule 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(1) allows the Court to relieve a party from a final
judgment on motion and just terms when there has been a mistake or inadvertence. See Idaho R.
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Civ. P. 60(b)(1). “Mistake or inadvertence referred to in Rule 60(b)(1) applies primarily to
errors or omissions committed by an attorney or by the court that are not apparent in the record.
Any claim of mistake must be a mistake of fact and not a mistake of law.” Berg, 147 Idaho at
576-77, 212 P.3d at 1006-07 (citations omitted).
The Court’s conclusion that Mr. Gibson does not have to comply with Tier II Facility
requirements unless he continues to have more than 600 cubic yards of solid waste at the VHS
property is evident in the record. The fact that this conclusion is omitted from the Judgment and
Amended Judgment is also evident from the record. Similarly, the Court’s finding that Mr.
Gibson is operating a processing facility is evident in the record, as is the duplicative
requirement that Plaintiff prove this finding again in order to enforce the Amended Judgment.
However if the Court disagrees that these mistakes are evident from the record, then
alternatively, the Court should grant Plaintiff relief under Rule 12(b)(1) and correct the mistakes
and inadvertence that has arisen between the Findings and Amended Judgment. If the Court
does not grant Plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion pursuant to Rule 60(a), then it should correct the
Amended Judgment as set forth above under Rule 60(b)(1) in the alternative.
DATED: June 21, 2018.

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
By /s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that June 21, 2018, I filed the foregoing electronically through the
iCourt E-File system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic
means, s more fully reflected on the Notification of Service:
Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
vvs1900@gmail.com

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
ICourt E-File
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129

/s/ Cynthia Yee-Wallace
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE
Deputy Attorney General
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
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Fax:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

-· v.
DAVID R. GillSON, dba BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST PRODUCTS, and VHS PROPERTIES,
LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOC-1503540
MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RULE 60, IRCP
RELIEF OF THE COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, JUDGMENT
AND AMENDED JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION
This district court has before entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment on March 1, 2018, the effect of which enjoined Black Diamond from the
composting operations in the capacity at which it had been operating previously, thereby
creating a substantial loss in the accumulation of organic matter directly used in the
composting operations engaged in by Black Diamond, the essence of which is essential to
the soil enrichment of the nutrient concentration within this 520 acres, undertaken in
preparation for further agricultural operations on this land holding, as contemplated for the
future farming/horticultural agricultural activity that will be taking place upon this property
in the near future.
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This property has historically been engaged in an agricultural use, and since 2004, a
portion of this holding has been dedicated to a composting operation to produce compost
and humus substances for future application to the entire holding, the entire operation of
which is an agricultural activity, perceived to be exempt from any DEQ regulatory authority.
Following the entry of the court's Judgment, Defendants filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which this court denied
on June 21, 2018, and simultaneously entered an Amended Judgment, therein awarding
DEQ certain costs, denying DEQ's request for attorney fees.
Following that disposition, and on the same date, DEQ chose to file their Motion
seeking Rule 60 relief, citing several sub-parts as their avenue for review, seeking an
amendment of the Judgment and/or Amended Judgment entered by the court.
At the outset, before responding to this Rule 60 Motion, it would appear the
fundamental issue(s) that have arisen from this controversy, as embraced in this court's FIF,
CIL, Judgment/Amended Judgment, are issues that are sufficiently framed to be adequately
addressed within the appeal of this court's disposition stemming from the denial of
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration entered by this court on June 21,2018.
Such an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court would commence with Defendants
Notice of Appeal, followed by Plaintiffs Cross-Appeal, securing from the Supreme Court
the applicable "law of the case", therein declaring what principles of Federal and State law
apply to the analysis of the facts of this case, and what Federal and State statutory right of
regulation and authority is invoked, together with an expression through judicial
"guidelines" may be expressed upon remand.
Defendants believe there is the need to protect the jurisdiction and regulatory
authority existing within Idaho's statutory framework regarding the rights of the Department
of Agriculture; Defendants believe there is the need to ensure the application of the preemptive effects of Federal legislation (the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA))
and the Federal Code of Federal Regulations (CFR's), the application of which exempts and
excludes "organic recyclable substances" that are being used as a direct ingredient to
produce a product that is providing a substitute for a commercial product (fertilizers and
foliars); Defendants believe there is the need to ensure the mandatory implementation of the
Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), particularly I. C. §39-7404, establishing the pre-
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emptive effects of federal legislation/regulation that serves to constrain the Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) from implementing a broader definition of
what constitutes a "solid waste" and the application of the exemptions/exclusions identified
within the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Resource Conservation Recovery
Act(RCRA).

On the other hand, DEQ will counter those propositions, setting forth their belief,
through a Cross-Appeal, what they believe address the issues regarding the application of
their IDAPA Regulations regarding "solid waste management rules" and their belief as to
the application of any "site Plan" requirement, as they develop their argument as it relates to
what they believe to be the disposition of "solid waste" materials at this agricultural facility.
These issues remain ripe for appellate review. The fundamental issue begins with
whom has the regulatory authority or the jurisdictional standing to regulate organic plant
residue composting operations and activities upon agricultural property. The issue develops
further with the question whether such composting operations are using a "solid waste" as is
to be regulated at a solid waste disposal facility, when the facts in this case demonstrate that
Black Diamond is engaged in the operation of "organic plant residue composting activity"
designed exclusively to produce a product that will be used on agricultural land as a
substitute for commercial products, using grass clippings and leaves as the direct and sole
ingredients to produce such compost, humus and soil substances, pursuant to its registration
and licensure issued under the statutory language and authority vested within the
Department of Agriculture, perceived to be statutorily authorized to regulate this process of
recycling such substances (grass clippings and leaves) as "direct ingredients" to generate
compost, humus, and soil products a direct substitute for commercial fertilizers and foliars.
The facts of this case are clear; the only materials involved are these organic
plant residue substances used as direct ingredients to produce the products of compost and
humus soil amendments and plant foilars, known as substitute products for commercial
fertilizers, undisputed as being exempt from the definition of "solid waste" I the Federal
arena, as Federally defined through RCRA and the CFR's, and the questions remains
whether within the State of Idaho, given the Federal and State codifications and statutory
enactments, is there the pre-emptive effects, through their declared exemption/excluded
status as direct recyclable ingredients, that such determination prohibits DEQ from their

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 60, IRCP
001345
RELIEFP.3

attempt to regulate these composting ingredients, instead leaving the jurisdiction and
statutory regulation exclusively with the Department of Agriculture.

It remains Defendants' position, given the exemption/exclusion within the RCRA,
this Federal enactment is the pre-emptive authority that supersedes the uncertainty that
lingers within the Idaho IDAPA Rules (Section 58 and its sub-parts) and any attempt to
classify these organic ingredients as constituting a "solid waste" under the Federal
legislation and their regulatory authority.
As to DEQ's pending Rule 60 Motion, their concerns seem to identified as follows:
1. The court concluded Mr. Gibson is using the VHS property to prepare solid waste for
reuse through the process of biological decomposition.
2. The Court included duplicative language that would require DEQ to again prove that Mr.
Gibson desired to have solid waste on VHS property.
__

3. If Defendants have solid waste on the VHS property, they must comply with the IDAPA
rules applicable to the volume of such waste on the property.

4. That the Court concluded (Finding) Mr. Gibson did not have to comply with the siting or
operating plan requirements for a Tier II Facility unless he wants to continue having more
than 600 cubic yards of solid waste on the VFIS property at any one time.
5. The court's Finding was not memorialized in the Judgment or Amended Judgment that
has been entered by the Court, which finding is critical to permit enforcement of the Court's
ruling in this case.
6. That because of that, the Court should correct the Judgment/Amended Judgment
consistent with its Finding pursuant to Rule 60(a), or in the· alternative, the Court should
grant Plaintiff relief from the Amended Judgment and enter another amended judgment
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l).
DEQ then further elaborates their concerns in this manner on p. 6 of their Memo:
"[T]he Judgment omitted the Court's finding that if Defendants continue to
have more than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings or leaves on the VHS
property, they must comply with the siting and operating requirements of a
Tier II Facility. The Amended Judgment similarly omitted this finding. The
Court should correct the Amended Judgment to be consistent with this
finding.
The Judgment and the Court's recent Amended Judgment do not permit
DEQ to enforce the Court's fmding that Mr. Gibson must comply with Tier
II Facility requirements if he has more than 600 cubic yards of solid waste
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existing on the VHS property at any one time. As a result, without the Court
correcting the Amended Judgment consistent with its Findings, it is nearly
impossible for DEQ to ever require Defendants to comply with the siting and
operating requirements of a Tier II Facility in this case. This is true even
when DEQ obtains a warrant to search the VHS property and observes that
there is greater than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings and leaves being
processed on that property post-Judgment.
Moreover, under the Judgment and Amended Judgment, DEQ can only
require Defendants to comply with the applicable Solid Waste Management
Rules if it gets a continuous warrant and sends its representatives to the VHS
property for a continuous period of up to I 2 months to monitor and observe
all newly discarded grass clippings or leaves on the property.
Even if DEQ could administratively do this, and even if it observes and
monitors additional grass clippings or leaves being discarded, it would then
have to obtain additional evidence or an admission from Defendants about
the volume of waste that they "desire to receive" in order to enforce the
Amended Judgment."
Aside from DEQ's obsession to "quantify" substan9es known as "grass clippings and
· · ·

leaves" that, once severed from the plant, become in a state of decomposition instantly, and
· losing not only their volume and weight in a continuous process, but are immediately
converted into some state of becoming identified as compost and humus, and are daily
mixed in with soil and dirt substances, such that it remains an absolute impossibility to ever
get a true volumetric measurement of these organic decomposing substances, the very
reason why DEQ never quantified anything at this agricultural facility on March 29, 2013.
DEQ could not even find even a grass blade or a leaf on March 29, 2013, and if they claim
they did, it was a figment of their imagination. All they could see was rows and piles of
compost, humus, soil and dirt, as that all there could be. You could not identify any
substance from any substance, other than to say you saw compost, humus, soil and dirt,
which this court has confirmed is not among the definition of what is characterized to be a
"solid waste".
Because compost and humus is never regarded to be a waste, let alone never defined
to be a solid waste anywhere in any definition or any statutory codification or regulation, it
comes as no surprise that the Federal enactments has expressly excluded and exempted
these organic recycled substances from the definition of "solid waste", as such materials are
neither abandoned nor discarded, not a waste, and could never fit the conventional definition
of a solid, and just as importantly, the organic substances that comprise the ingredients from

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 60, IRCP
001347
RELIEFP. 5

which compost and humus are developed are not abandoned or discarded either, as to
discard those substances would make them unavailable for use as the direct organic
ingredients to make the compost and humus products. These organic substances are directly
used in recycle programs as a direct ingredient to produce a product that is a substitute for a
commercial fertilizer and foliar product.
Those who have any resistance to this logical determination that organic plant
residue substances that are being used as direct ingredients to make compost and humus
somehow must be viewed as constituting a "solid waste" substance, when the product they
formulate (compost and humus) are never considered a "solid waste", is not something well
defined in the law, and those who harbor reluctance to accept the rational why this very
conclusion these organic ingredients are not a "solid waste", as reached by the Federal
authorities when declared in their RCRA enactment and CFR regulatory provisions, (binding
on Idaho by virtue of the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), particularly I. C. §397404), when these organic substances are being used as direct ingredients to produce a
substitute product to a commercial product, serves to give ·raise to the need to further
confront these matters in an appellate setting or federal litigation to ensure the pre-emptive
effects to which the federal enactments are entitled to enjoy.
DEQ has stated in their memorandum that the Judgment has failed to include the
Court's finding that if Defendants continue to have more than 600 cubic yards of grass
clippings or leaves on the VHS property, they must comply with the siting and operating
requirements of a Tier II Facility. DEQ also contends the Amended Judgment similarly
omits that finding, requesting the court to correct the Amended Judgment to be consistent
with this finding.
Without belaboring the point, how is DEQ intending to ever quantify yardage of
"grass clippings and leaves" at this agricultural facility, especially when they are
immediately mixed in with the dirt and soil substances, where they immediately take on the
characteristic of various stages of compost, as those organic substances actually commence
to decompose upon severance from the plant or falling from the tree, and these substances
are never to be regarded as having been discarded, as they are brought to this agricultural
facility for the specific purpose of being used as ingredients to form compost and humus.
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DEQ has not quantified any of these substances at any time, and certainly will be
unable to identify and then quantify at any time any "grass clippings and leaves", especially
while mixed in with the soil and dirt as is done each day. This mixture and incorporation
process is done on a daily basis when the ingredients are received, as they must be mixed in
with soil to introduce the plethora of organisms from the enriched soil into the ingredients to
intensify the decomposition process, create the heat to break down the organic
cellulous/fiber molecular structure, destroy weed seeds and pathogens, and utilize the water
that is released (grass clippings alone are 90% water upon arrival, and leaves vary upon
when delivered) The water content of grass and leaves makes the composition of those
substances a difficult substance to ever classify as a "solid", thus the reason these organic
substances are best excluded from being characterized as a "solid waste".
DEQ then goes on to say the Judgment and the Amended Judgment do not permit
DEQ to enforce the Court's fmding that Mr. Gibson must comply with Tier II Facility
requirements if he has more than 600 cubic yards of solid waste existing on the VHS ·
property ·at any one time, claiming that as a result of that lack of authority, it is nearly
impossible for DEQ to ever require Defendants to comply with the siting and operating
requirements of a Tier II Facility in this case.
Whatever this Judgment and Amended Judgment represents, or does not represent,
regardless

ofD~Q's

requested amendments, there will never be a day that DEQ can get any

meaningful quantification of any grass clippings or leaves, as they are incorporated into the
soils immediately to intensify the decomposition process, so the very idea of taking
measurements/quantifying analysis is but a red herring and an impossibility to perform in
any practical or logical sense.
Additionally, and at this present time, VHS Properties, LLC does not have a titled
interest in this property, as the titled ownership was appropriated by a magistrate under the
entry of the questionable Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment that was entered by the magistrate
presiding in a contested probate proceeding on June 2, 2017, which probate controversy has
now ensnared and entangled the rights of ownership to this property. Currently, by virtue of
this Judgment of that magistrate, title has been placed within the Estate of Victoria H. Smith,
under the direction and control of the appointed Personal Representative. As this court may
be aware this matter is on appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court.
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That disposition by the magistrate has been challenged, due to both the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and the complete absence of personal jurisdiction over VHS
Properties, LLC, and such action taken by that magistrate was perceived to be a due process
violation ofVHS Properties' constitutional rights, all of which challenges are embraced with
other issues within the current appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court.
This court will remember when the VHS "ownership" to this property was initially
disrupted upon the entry of the interlocutory Order of that magistrate on July 19, 2016,
purporting to set aside the transfer of ownership VHS Properties had received by deed
issued to it on July 4, 2012, this court thereafter heard arguments upon the motion filed by
the Estate, who sought to become substituted in place of VHS, or otherwise to intervene in
the case. The Estate was allowed to intervene, and as a consequence of that authorized
intervention, DEQ elected to enter into a settlement with the Estate, rather than to allow it to
proceed with an answer and affirmative defenses. That settlement was placed of record with
, this court, and the Estate was dismissed from the proceedings. Subsequent to that and other
events, the magistrate entered the Rule 70(b) Judgment that purported to transfer ownership
of the property to the Estate on June 2, 2017, and the actual right to the ownership still
remains an undecided issue which remains raised on appeal, awaiting final disposition by
the Idaho Supreme Court.
Consequently, it would now appear the jurisdiction of this court has been
surrendered with respect to the Estate, the current "titled owner" of the property. Therefore
the jurisdiction of the court may be seen as limited to the state of the pleadings and the
ownership interests and operations then in effect on March 29, 2013, as it was then alleged
in the complaint, at which time VHS Properties, LLC had the ownership and authority
relating to or regarding the operation of Black Diamond composting activities on this
property.
The court will remember the Estate, through the Personal Representative, entered
into this settlement agreement, as referenced above, with DEQ, and as a result of that
settlement, the action was dismissed with prejudice as to the involvement of the Estate, and
VHS Properties, LLC has been precluded and thereafter unable to exercise any authority
over the activities on-going on the property, until a final disposition is reached within the
appellate process, and it would appear this court currently has no jurisdiction over the
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Estate, the current owner, and it would appear the Estate would now become a necessary
and indispensable party to any further proceedings that DEQ may have a mind to engage
any future analysis, quantitative or otherwise, over "grass clippings and leaves" or any
related ideas of enforcement over the activities of composting operations on this property.
DEQ may need to await the final disposition of the appellate process before getting geared
up to perform the impossible, seeking to proceed with measurements and quantifications on
property not controlled by VHS Properties.

It would certainly appear the effect of this litigation should be limited to the
operational activity and quantifications that was actually found to exist on this property on
March 29,2013, if it be the belief that these organic ingredients, which become compost and
humus, are of the nature of a "solid waste", With regard to the record in this case, this record
is unable to identify any quantification of anything on that date, be it grass, grass clippings,
leaves, compost, humus, soil or dirt, and we submit it will be no different on any other date,
regardless of the season, as none is present in the fall, winter and spring months, and during
the active ·summer season, what ingredients are received are ,incorporated daily and
immediately become a composting substance, in different stages of decomposition.

It would appear to be an impossibly for DEQ, in good faith and with a clear
conscience, submit any accurate and adequate affidavit of an official that would lawfully
support the issuance of a search warrant upon any theory of some claim of a violation of a
Tier classification,

The search they before conducted upon the issued warrant has never

been shown to have been supported by any affidavit, though Defendants have asked for that
affidavit and it has been withheld. It may come out on the record on appeal, if it exists. The
court must be very suspect if any application is ever made, as it would appear that DEQ may
have difficulty securing any factual basis to seek a warrant to inspect and/or search any of
this property, irrespective of ownership.
This court will do as it deems to be in the best interests ofjustice, in regard to DEQ's
Motion under Rule 60, IRCP, but from Defendants' perspective, the ownership issue as to
the property should first be determined before getting geared up to inspect a property that
VHS Properties, LLC does not currently hold title, and Black Diamond has been in a virtual
holding pattern since this decision has been rendered. It would appear that DEQ has come to
recognize the impossible situation it is facing, trying to quantify a substance that is 90%
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water upon arrival, and is less than 10% in volume and weight when the water within it is
introduced into the soil and biological process is underway. Their very motion reveals that
awareness, and there can be no meaningful inspection from any practical or scientific
standpoint that would enable DEQ to determine that Black Diamond received 300 or 600
cubic yards at any one time, as it simply and literally evaporates before your very eyes,
which we again make clear for the rtecord, the very reason there has never been any
quantification of any material or substance at this facility, as it all appears to be soil, dirt,
compost or humus, which all looks alike.
Whether the relief sought by DEQ from this court is justified or irrelevant, it should
be regarded as premature, as it would be of little value to consider amending this disposition,
for any reason or upon any concern of future activity, until the issue of titled ownership is
resolved, and the appeal over the issue of whether grass clippings and leaves are a "solid
waste" is decided ..
·I

The March: 1, 2018 Judgment of this court did before enjoin the Defendant

operating this agricultural facility from receiving grass clippings and leaves in a quantity
of three hundred (300) cubic yards within a twelve (12) month period. That is not
supported in any law, rule, or regulation. There was no restriction to such quantities
within such a prolonged period, as the IDAPA provisions (should the appellate court
conclude they have any application) are perceived to restrict the receipt of 300 cubic
yards of a solid waste at any one time, not throughout the accumulation over a period of
twelve months. These substances immediately transform into compost and humus,
releasing up to 90% of their weight and volume. It remains Defendants position that, as a
matter of law, the IDAPA Rules should be held to have no application to
materials/substances that create a restriction greater than allowed by EPA's RCRA, which
restrictions are embraced within the express limitations announced in I. C. §39-7404 that
prevents the promulgation ofany rule broader than the coverage ofEPA 's administration
of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Federal Legislation, within

their 2015 Final Rule clarifications, which have expressly declared three categories
(types) of materials/substances expressly exempted from the definition of "solid waste",
which we have repeatedly expressed to this court to be the following:
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RCRA exempts three types of wastes from the definition of solid waste:
o

o

o

Waste Used as an Ingredient: If a material is directly used as an
ingredient in a production process without first being reclaimed. then that
material is not a solid waste.
Waste Used as a Product Substitute: If a material is directly used as an
effective substitute for a commercial product (without first being
reclaimed), it is exempt from the definition ofsolid waste.
Wastes Returned to tlte Production Process: When a material is returned
directly to the production process (without first being reclaimed) for use
as a feedstock or raw material, it is not a solid waste.

Grass clippings and leaves come within each of these three types of exemptions,
as being direct organic ingredients to make compost and humus, without any reclamation
first required; directly used as an effective substitute for a commercial product
(commercial fertilizers and foliars) without any reclamation first required; and are
returned directly to the production process, without being first reclaimed, as they are reincorporated as a "feedstock" into the windrows so as to enhance the micro-biological
process (decomposition and the immediate release of the 90% weight/volume by the
release of water into the mixture with the soils) to accelerate the decomposition to
enhance the nutrient development of the humus production.
Though Defendants maintain the position DEQ cannot promulgate any IDAPA
Rule that broadens the regulatory authority over any exempted substance from the
definition of "solid waste", the Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) identified in IDAPA is
expressed as a limitation of 300 cubic yards at any one time, not a measurable quantify
over a period of any one year. This rationale "at any one time" is premised upon the
existence of a true "solid waste", something that "is known to be" and something that
remains to be in a "fixed state" such that it can be quantified, in its original state, at any
one time.
You can never quantify BY VOLUME OR WEIGHT an "organically derived
waste material" that is in a decomposition state,, as those materials are in a state affluxchange-transformation, and what is delivered one day is mixed into the soil and in a
transformative state from that moment on, never the same volume, never the same
weight, clearly not characteristic of a "solid waste" at all, and with compost and humus
not being a "solid waste", their ingredients cannot be characterized as a "solid waste", the
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essence of which is recognized by the RCRA provisions. Though the entire Judgment of
this court is deemed by Defendants to be in error, the content of the proposed injunction
is in conflict with the specific BRC provisions that are contained within the IDAPA Rules
regarding solid waste management of disposal sit

side to the

concerns now being raised by DEQ.

Vernon K. Smith, attorney
for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 20th day of July, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RULE 60, IRCP RELIEF to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

(
(
(

)
)
)

( X

)

U.S. Mail

Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-Filed

Cynthia Yee-Wallace
Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2nd Floo
Boise, Idaho 83 702
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Electronically Filed
8/1/2018 2:54 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208)345-1129
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee: _ _ _ _ __

)

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (DEQ), and Respondent's attorneys, Steven L. Olsen, Chief of
Civil Litigation, and Cynthia Yee Wallace and Mark Cechini-Beaver, Deputy Attorneys General,
954 W. Jefferson Street, end Floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720, and the Clerk of the
above entitled Court of Ada County Idaho.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost

Products and VHS Properties, LLC, acting through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, do
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appeal against the above-named Respondent, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, JUDGMENT, as initially
entered in the above entitled action on March I, 2018; the ORDER of denial of Defendants'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
entitled ORDER, RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND EXPENSES, entered in the above action on June 21, 2018, and from the AMENDED
JUDGMENT, entered pursuant to Rule 54(a)(2), IRCP, on June 21, 2018, by the Honorable
Jonathan Medema, District Judge presiding, as provided for by Idaho Appellate Ru1e 17e(l ), This
appeal does include an appeal of the award ofDEQ's expenses, awarded as costs, pursuant to I. C.
§39-108(6) as entered on June 21,2018.
2.

That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

as the Judgment, denial of reconsideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, and the Amended Judgment described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable
Judgment/Amended Judgment under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), and Ru1e 14(a) I.A.R., and the
subsequent award of expenses, as costs are appealable, as they were added to the Amended
Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(d)(! )(A)&(F), I.R.C.P ..
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal which Appellants

intend to assert in this appeal; provided, such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent Appellants
from asserting other issues on appeal, include the following:
a.) Whether "grass clippings and leaves", as a matter oflaw, are to be regarded to be
a "solid waste", subject to the jurisdiction and regu1ation by the Idaho Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) when used as a direct ingredient at an agricu1tural composting facility to produce
compost and humus products?
b.) Whether the district court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
declaring that "grass clippings and leaves" are a "solid waste" under the IDAPA Ru1es, Title 58,
Department of Environmental Quality Rules 58.01.01 thru 25, particu1arly Rule 58.01.06 .000 thru
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58.01.06.999 and/or under any of the provisions and chapters of Idaho Statutes, specifically Title
39, Health and Safety, particularly Chapter 1, concerning the Environmental Quality and Health,
identified as the Idaho Environmental Protection Health Act (IEPHA), including I.C. §§39-101 thru
39-175E- from which any basis exists for DEQ to exercise any Jurisdictional or statutory authority
from which to regulate an agricultural composting fucility as a solid waste disposal site?
c.) Whether the district court erred in not concluding, as a matter of law, that
Federal Legislation, identified as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR's) including 40 CFR 261.4(b)(2), pre-empt the enforcement of
any IDAP A Rules or regulatory authority by DEQ under any provisions of Title 39, Chapter I,
Statutes of the State ofldaho, or any IDAPA Rules, by virtue of the pre-emption expressed within
the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act, (ISWFA), as identified in LC §39-7404?
d.)
e. Whether the jurisdiction and regulatory authority over agricultural
composting facilities, where their direct ingredients such organic recyclable substances are grass
clippings and leaves, are to be managed and regulated exclusively within the Idaho Department of
Agriculture (ISDA), pursuant to the Right To Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil and Plant Amendment
Act (SAPAA), as identified in Title 22, Chapters 1, 6, 22, and 45, thereby precluding any usurpation
of that vested ISDA authority or jurisdictional claim by DEQ to regulate such a facility, as further
restricted through implementation within the Environmental Health Protection Act (EHPA), Title
39, expressed within Chapter 74. identified in the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), I. C.
§39-7404, wherein DEQ is prohibited from seeking broader defmitions of "solid waste" than is
mandated or allowed by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), within the enactment
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the result from which DEQ lacks
regulatory authority and jurisdictional standing to bring an action against agricultural composting
facilities/operations upon the pretext they are a "solid waste" facility, when nothing received at this
agricultural composting facility was "abandoned" or "discarded" for disposal, but rather the
delivery of grass clippings and leaves was specifically delivered to be recycled as a direct
ingredient in this composting operation, being operated not as a "solid waste disposal facility", nor
a facility intended to receive "municipal waste", but rather operated as an organic recycling facility
where nothing is being discarded or abandoned for permanent disposal?
e.) Whether the district court erred in its Finding of Fact from the evidence adduced
at trial, expressed through the testimony of the DEQ Official from his "observation" during his
"inspection" of this agricultural composting facility conducted on March 29,2013, that there was a
Tier II presence of "solid waste" (600 cubic yards) to sufficiently demonstrate, without any
measurements or quantification, there was a presence of "grass clippings and leaves", from which
the court could then conclude the operation constituted a Tier II "solid waste" processing facility,
and whether upon that Finding and Conclusion, whether the district court erred in the Conclusion
of Law that the operator of that agricultural composting facility was required to file a "site Plan"
with DEQ, on the pretext this operation was a "solid waste" processing facility, alleged in DEQ's
Amended Complaint, alleging a Tier ll regulatory violation occurring at this agricultural
composting facility on March 29, 2013?
f.) Whether DEQ was precluded from initiating this action by virtue of I. C. §39108(4), whether deemed to be a statute of repose or a statute of limitations, by virtue of DEQ's
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awareness (both when a department of Health and welfare and thereafter as a state agency) as to
the existence of David R. Gibson's composting operations for decades of mixing dirt, soil, leaves,
and grass clippings, identified in the Department/DEQ records and files since 1992 and years
preceding, thereby precluding DEQ from asserting any yardage violation (Tier II 600 cubic
yardage criteria) with full knowledge this agricultural composting facility has been continuously in
operation at that location by Gibson since August, 2004?
g.) Whether the adoption of the IDAPA Rules, Title 58, had therein expressly
intended the unconditional exemption and exclusion from any "solid waste" regulation, any and
all crop (plant) residue and all agricultural waste regulated by ISDA, as it is specifically identified
within IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (b )(iii)?
h.) Whether Title 39, (Health and Safety), Chapter 74, statutes of Idaho,
specifically the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), has defmed "solid waste" (I. C. §397403(50)(e)) to exclude any "agricultural waste" ("manures and crop residues" that are
"returned to the soils at agronomic rates"), precluding any jurisdiction or regulatory authority of
DEQ to inspect or regulate this agricultural composting facility?
i.) Whether the district court erred in its ruling that the DEQ "inspection" of this
agricultural composting facility on March 29, 2013, as conducted by DEQ Officials without a
warrant, without permission or consent, did not constitute a violation of the express restraints set
forth in I. C. §39-108(2)(c), and whether such warrantless entry onto the premises to inspect the
operation constituted a violation of the fourth amendment of the U.S and Idaho constitutions,
regarding the requirement of a search warrant, as set forth in I. C. §39-108(2)(c)?
j.) Whether the district court erred with the imposition of a penalty of $1,000.00
levied against David R. Gibson and a penalty of $250.00 levied against VHS Properties, LLC
under the provisions of I. C. §39-1 08, upon the basis and challenged finding that grass clippings
and leaves" are a "solid waste"?

k.) Whether DEQ was entitled to an award of its claimed costs, as reflected in the
Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and request for attorney fees and expenses, and then
contained in the Amended Judgment entered June 21, 2018?

1.) Whether Appellants are entitled to any award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal?
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes, a reporter's transcript is requested, and there

will be the need for the preparation of a transcript of all in-court civil proceedings conducted on all
motions and hearings held in this matter. With respect to the Reporter's Transcript of the trial
testimony held in this matter, a transcript of the audio-recorded proceedings conducted on
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September 13, 15, and concluding on September 20, 2017, was previously transcribed by Sue
Heronemus, and was lodged with the Clerk of the Court and was provided to the parties, as that
transcript was used in preparation of the written closing arguments submitted to the district court,
and having previously been prepared and lodged with the Court, it is requested this lodged
transcript be submitted as an "Exhibit" to the Record on this Appeal, as permitted by Rule
3l(a)(2), I.A.R. The Hearings, some of which may be identified in the registry of action, include
but are not limited to the following:
a.) November 29, 2016, hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DEQ;
b.) December 13, 2016, Status Conference;
c.) January 10,2016, Pre-trial Conference;
d.) March 21,2017, Pre-trail Conference;
e.) August 2, 2017, Pre-trial Conference;
f.) September 13, 15, and 20, 2017, Court Trial (already transcribed and will be
provided as an Exhibit);
g.) October 10, 2017, hearing on Motion to Suppress;
h.) May 21, 2018, hearing on Motion for Reconsideration of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Attorney Fees and Costs;
i.) July 23,2018, Hearing on Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion;
6.

A Standard Record, provided under I.A.R. 28(b), is requested and as provided by

I.A.R. 28(b)(l), and Appellants do furthermore specifically request the Clerk's Record also include
'
in addition,
without limitation, all pleadings, motions, memoranda, affidavits, written closing

arguments, proposed exhibit lists, and all exhibits and other filed documents of record with the court
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in this case, as filed by any party that entered this controversy, such that all filed documents, and
submitted/lodged memoranda be included in the Clerk's Record on this appeal.

7.

I certify:
a.

lbat a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Sue Heronemus, Judge Medema's Court Reporter, located at the Ada County
Courthouse, 200W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
b.

That the court reporter has been or will be paid the estimated fee, if and as

requested, for preparation of the reporter's transcript, and any balance will be paid thereafter, as
requested.
c. That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the Clerk's Record, when requested, and the balance will be paid thereafter, as
requested.
d. lbat the required filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upo

Rule 20, I.A.R.
Dated this 1" day of August, 2018.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 1st day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Notice of Appeal to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, Ada County, Idaho,
by I-Court!E-File and a copy thereof to be delivered to and served upon the following individuals in
the manner described below:
Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Steven L. 0 !sen,
Mark Cechini-Beaver,
Cynthia Yee-Wallace,
Chief and Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 200 Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Sue Heronemus (court reporter)
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
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Filed:03/01/2018 07:36:35
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Ellis, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant David R. Gibson shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of$1,000.
Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of$250.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, are hereby enjoined from
engaging in any of the following activities:
I.

Accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass clippings, leaves,

straw or hay, or permitting anyone from discarding any quantity of grass, grass clippings, leaves,
straw, or hay upon that real property described as the Northwest V. of Section 5, Township 2N,
Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S 1505220000
unless Defendants first comply with the provisions of JDAPA 58.0 1.06.01 0.
2.

Accepting or receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding upon that real

property described as the Northwest V. of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian
and identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S 1505220000, within any contiguous
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twelve-month ( 12) period a cumulative volume of discarded grass, grass clippings, leaves, straw,
or hay that exceeds 300 cubic yards unless Defendants first comply with those provisions of
IDAPA 58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such material they desire to receive.
This injunction is effective upon the date it is signed. It shall remain effective
permanently.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2128/2018 05:23PM

1;;nathan Medema
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on _0_3_1_0_11_2_0_1_8_, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
within instrument as follows:

Cynthia Y ee-Wallace
Mark Cecchini-Seaver
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-00 I0
Email: Cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Interdepartmental Mail
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

Vernon K. Smith
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Email: wsl900@gmail.com
vkslaw@live.com

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

By:~~
De ty Court Clerk
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk- Ellis, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND Rli:QUEST
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
EXPENSES

Plaintiff,
vs.

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") filed a complaint
alleging that Defendant David Gibson, under the name of Black Diamond Compost
Products, operates a composting facility on property owned by Defendant VHS Properties,
LLC ("VHS"). DEQ alleged that Mr. Gibson's facility meets the legal definition of a Tier
IT Solid Waste Processing facility and that neither Mr. Gibson nor VHS has complied with
the requirements set forth in regulations adopted by DEQ regarding the management of
solid waste processing facilities.
A court trial in this matter was held on September 13, 15, and 20, 2017. Thereafter,
the parties filed written closing arguments. The Court subsequently entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as a Judgment in favor of Plaintiff
Defendants filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, along with a supporting memorandum. Plaintiff filed
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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an opposition to Defendants' motion on May 14, 2018. On May 21, 2018, Defendants
filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion for reconsideration, and the affidavit of
Dr. Mir M. Seyedbagheri.
On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Request for Attorney's Fees and Expenses,
along with a memorandum of law in support of the request, and the declaration of Cynthia
Yee-Wallace. Defendants filed an objection to Plaintiffs request for fees and expenses on
March 28, 2018.

On May 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to

Defendants' objection.
A hearing on Defendants' motion for reconsideration and Plaintiffs request for
fees and expenses was held on May 21, 2018, at which time the Court took the matter
under advisement. On May 22, 2018, Defendants filed a document titled "Supplemental
Memorandum in Regard to the Mislabling {sic} ofP1eadings in a Civil Case."

DISCUSSION
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion, Defendants seek reconsideration of the Court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, as well as the Judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B). The
Court notes that I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) was rescinded, effective July 1, 2016, and the current
rule is T.R.C.P. 11.2(b). However, I.R.C.P. 11.2(b) does not provide a mechanism for
seeking reconsideration of a final judgment.
Under I.R.C.P. 52(b), upon a motion filed no later than fourteen days after entry of
a judgment, a court "may amend its findings, or make additional findings, and may amend
the judgment accordingly."

Procedurally, I.R.C.P. 52(b) is the appropriate rule under

which to consider Defendants' request.
Before turning to the motion itself, the Court must address an evidentiary issue. At
the hearing on Defendants' motion, Plaintiff objected to the Court's consideration of the
affidavit of Dr. Mir M. Seyedbagheri, which was filed by Defendants on the day of the
hearing. Unlike the procedure for motions presented under I.R.C.P. 11.2(b), a trial court
cannot consider new evidence when asked to amend its findings of fact or conclusions of
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law. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184
(2009) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff's objection is sustained, and the Court
will not consider Mr. Seycdbagheri's affidavit.
Having reviewed the arguments presented by Defendants in their motion for
reconsideration, the Court is not persuaded that it should reconsider its findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is denied.

Plaintiffs Request for Attorney Fees and Expenses
Plaintiff is seeking an award of $77,106.95 for attorney fees and paralegal fees, and
$3,466.53 for expenses. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(e)(l), in any civil action, the court "may
award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties
as defined in Rule 54( d)( I )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract."

The

determination of prevailing party status for the purpose of awarding attorney fees and costs
is within the trial court's sound discretion.

Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't of

Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 831, 367 P.3d 208, 225 (2016) (citation omitted). The trial court

examines and determines the prevailing party question "from an overall view, not a claimby-claim analysis." !d. at 831, 367 P.3d at 226 (citation omitted). Having considered the
frnal judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the parties as
required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), the Court concludes that Plaintiff is the prevailing party
in this action. Accordingly, the Court must next determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to
an award of fees under any statute or contract.
Plaintiff asserts that an award of attorney fees is warranted under I.C. §§ 12-117
and 12-121. Idaho Code section 12-121 allows a court to "award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Idaho Code section
12-117(1) provides that "in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a
political subdivision and a person," the court "shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees ... if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law." The requirement of I.C. § 12-117 that the party acted without a reasonable
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR
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basis in fact or law is similar to the requirement of I. C. § 12-121 that the case was brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

Total Success

Investments, LLC v. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 695, 227 P.3d 942, 949 (Ct.
App. 2010) (citations omitted). See also Mendez v. University Health Services Boise State

Univ., 163 Idaho 237, _ , 409 P.3d 817, 827 (2018).
Where there are multiple claims or defenses, "it is not appropriate to segregate
those claims and defenses to determine which were or were not frivolously defended or
pursued. The total defense of a party's proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous."

Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Bus. Services, Inc., 119 Idaho
558, 563, 808 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1991). The question is "not whether the position urged by
the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be wrong, but whether it is so plainly
fallacious as to be frivolous." Herbst v. BothofDairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975,719 P.2d
1231, 1235 (Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted).

Attorney fees will generally not be

awarded where the non-prevailing party's position is based on a good faith legal argument.

Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,401,210 P.3d 75,86 (2009).
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that the total defense presented by
Defendants was unreasonable, frivolous, or without a reasonable basis in fact or law. At
page 19 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court stated that Mr. Gibson
had:
vigorously asserted his position that the EPHA and the solid waste management
rules do not apply to his composting actions. The Court finds that position, while
ultimately unavailing in the Court's view, was one taken in good faith. The
regulation of composting facilities is a topic of significant debate in various places
and states have taken different approaches to how that should be done. The
application ofthe EPHA and the Solid Waste Management Rules to Mr. Gibson's
activities was by no means obvious or straightforward.
Having considered the defense presented in this matter as a whole, the Court, in its
discretion, concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under I. C. §
12-117orl.C. § 12-121.
Plaintiff also seeks an award of "expenses" pursuant to I. C. § 39-108. That statute
provides that in addition to civil penalties, any person who has been determined to have
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violated the provisions of the EPHA "shall be liable for any expense incurred by the state ·
in enforcing the act."

!.C. § 39-108(6).

An award of expenses under the EPHA is

"mandatory and unqualified." Idaho Dep 't of Health and Welfare v. Southfork Lumber

Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 567 (1993). The term "expense" does not include
attorney fees. !d. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that by using the
term "any expense" in I. C. § 39-1 08(6) rather than "costs," the legislature "intended a
more extensive recovery of costs" than is contemplated by LR.C.P. 54( d)(!). !d. (stating
that the trial court should consider the Department's request for costs according to !.C. §
39-108(6) rather than Rule 54(d)(l)).

The Court retains the discretion, however, to

determine which expenses were reasonably incurred by Plaintiff. See id.
As stated above, Plaintiff is seeking an award of expenses in the total amount of
$3,466.53. That amount includes $256.50 and $2,119.50 for transcripts of portions of the
court trial, $54.00 for service of a trial subpoena upon Mr. Gibson, and $1,036.53 for the
costs associated with taking video recordings and photographs of the property at issue.
[Dec!. of Cynthia Yee-Wallace, Ex. 2]. The Court, in its discretion, concludes that these
expenses were reasonably incurred by Plaintiff and should be awarded pursuant to I. C. §
39-108(6).
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for reconsideration of the
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiffs request for attorney fees and expenses is GRANTED m part and
DENIED in part. The Court awards expenses to Plaintiff in the amount of $3,466.53. The
Court will enter an amended judgment reflecting this award.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 612112018 11:23 AM

fbNATHAN MEDEMA
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
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, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant

to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Cynthia Yee Wallace
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark Cecchini-Seaver
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Vernon K. Smith
ws1900@gmail.com
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Clerk of the District Court
Signed: 612112018 11:44 AM
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By: Deputy Clerk- Ellis, Janet
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540

AMENDED 1 JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dib/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant David R. Gibson shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.
Defendant VHS Properties, LLC, shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $250.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, jointly and severally, shall
pay expenses to Plaintiff in the sum of$3,466.53.
Defendants David R. Gibson and VHS Properties, LLC, are hereby enjoined from
engaging in any of the following activities:
1.

Accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded grass, grass clippings,

leaves, straw, or hay, or permitting anyone from discarding any quantity of grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw, or hay upon that real property described as the Northwest V. of
Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian and identified by the Ada County
Assessor as parcel S 1505220000 unless Defendants first comply with the provisions of
IDAPA 58.01.06.010.
1

This Judgment is being amended to reflect the Court's award of expenses to Plaintiff.
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2.

Accepting or receiving, or permitting anyone from discarding upon that real

property described as the Northwest '!. of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise
Meridian and identified by the Ada County Assessor as parcel S 1505220000, within any
contiguous twelve-month (12) period a cumulative volume of discarded grass, grass
clippings, leaves, straw, or hay that exceeds 300 cubic yards unless Defendants first
comply with those provisions ofiDAPA 58.01.06 applicable based on the volume of such
material they desire to receive.
This injunction is effective upon the date it is signed. It shall remain effective
permanently.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

LW"~
Signed:61211201811:23AM
JdtiATHAN MEDEMA
District Judge
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I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
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June 21, 2018

, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant

to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Cynthia Yee Wallace
cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark Cechini-Beaver
mark.cechini-beaver@deq,idaho.gov
Vernon K. Smith
ws 1900@gmail.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Signed: 61211201811:58 AM
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Filed: 08/15/2018 15:10:09
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Ellis, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO CORRECT THE
AMENDED JUDGMENT

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a/ BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS,
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

Plaintiff moves this Court to correct or amend the Amended Judgment entered in this
case. Plaintiff argues such motion is appropriate under I.R.C.P. 60. For the reasons set forth
below, this Court denies the motion.
Plaintiff alleged in this case that Defendant Gibson was receiving, processing, and storing
large quantities of solid waste in the form of discarded grass clippings and leaves on land owned
by Defendant VHS Properties, LLC. Plaintiff alleged Defendant Gibson was processing the grass
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clippings and leaves into compost and humus for resale to the public. Plaintiff alleged the
discarded grass clippings and leaves Defendant Gibson had failed to comply with the appropriate
environmental regulations given the volume of grass clippings and leaves that he was receiving,
storing, and processing. What regulations apply depends on the volume of material being
received, stored, or processed.
Prior to trial, the Court determined that grass clippings and leaves may constitute “solid
waste” as that term is defined under Idaho law if the grass clippings and leaves have been
discarded. For that matter, any material may constitute solid waste so long as that material has
been discarded. Conversely, grass clippings and leaves that have not been discarded do not fall
within the definition of solid waste. The Court also found that once grass clippings and leaves
decompose sufficiently to be more accurately described as compost; they are no longer the same
material that was discarded. Therefore, they no longer fall within the definition of solid waste. In
other words, once waste is processed into something else, particularly something useful and
valuable, it no longer qualifies as waste.1 For reasons this Court explained in its pre-trial
decisions, this conclusion is consistent with how the federal courts have treated discarded
materials that are subsequently processed into another useful material.

1

Of course, given the way the term “solid waste” is defined, compost (like anything else) can be a solid waste if it
has been discarded. Thus, the smelter that collects and stores sludge generated during the smelting process for future
reclamation of the valuable materials it contains is nonetheless storing “solid waste” because the water from which
the sludge precipitated is being discarded, U.S. v. ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1993), but the mine that extracts a
mineral from an ore via some processing method and then stores the once processed ore for future reclamation of the
minerals it still contains is not, because nothing has been discarded. American Min. Congress v. U.S. E.P.A., 824
F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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Therefore, there were several factual issues to be resolved at trial, including how much
grass clippings and leaves had been received on the land, whether those grass clippings and
leaves had been discarded, and how much of the discarded grass clippings and leaves remained.
At trial Plaintiff proved that Defendant had received more than 600 cubic yards of discarded
grass clippings and leaves. Plaintiff failed to prove how much, if any, of those grass clippings
and leaves remained on the property; either being stored for future processing or being actively
processed.2
Because the Court found Defendants had received a sufficient volume of solid waste in
the past without complying with the applicable environmental regulations, the Court imposed a
monetary penalty and enjoined the defendants from receiving grass clippings and leaves in the
future without first complying with the regulations applicable given the volume of grass
clippings and leaves being received.
Plaintiff moves this Court to amend that injunction. Plaintiff asks this Court to further
enjoin Defendants from “[a]t any time having more than 600 cubic yards of grass clippings,
leaves, or hay…unless Defendants immediately comply with the siting and operating
requirements [under the regulations applicable].”
Plaintiff argues that this Court found as a matter of fact at trial that Defendants, as of the
date of the trial, were storing more than 600 cubic yards of discarded grass clippings and leaves.
Plaintiff’s argument rests on a clause in a single sentence used by this Court when discussing

2

Given the natural process of decomposition, it is difficult to make any practical distinction between grass clippings
being stored in a pile and grass clippings being processed into compost. The Court mentions them separately simply
to make clear the applicable environmental regulations cover solid waste that is being stored, as well as solid waste
that is being processed.
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environmental regulations applicable to this case. Plaintiff cites to the following sentence: “The
Court concludes Mr. Gibson is not required to comply with the siting requirement and operating
plan for Tier II Facilities unless he wants to continue having at any one time more than 600 cubic
yards of grass clippings and leaves.”
Plaintiff argues the italicized clause in that sentence means this Court found as a matter
of fact that Mr. Gibson, currently or as of the date of trial, had more than 600 cubic yards of
grass clippings and leaves. Plaintiff has pulled this sentence out of its context. The sentence
appears on the 18th page of the Court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law. It appears
in the section where the Court is explaining what it believes the proper remedy should be and
why. In doing so, the Court had to discuss the applicable regulations and determine their
meaning. It seemed appropriate to the Court to enjoin Mr. Gibson from engaging in regulated
conduct in the future. It seemed equally appropriate to refrain from enjoining him from engaging
in conduct that is not subject to regulation at all. To do so, the Court had to determine what
conduct is and is not regulated.
When making its findings of fact, the Court determined that Plaintiff had proven that
between 2013 and 2015 Defendants had received at the property more than 11,000 cubic yards of
discarded grass clippings and leaves. The Court was persuaded that at some time within that span
of years Defendants, at a given moment, possessed (or received) more than 600 cubic yards of
grass clippings and leaves. [Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5.]
However, the Court also stated:
The Department produced little or no evidence from which the Court could
determine the makeup of the windrows on the VHS property. They contain soil
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(not solid waste); discarded grass clipping and leaves (solid waste); compost (not
solid waste), and humus (not solid waste). Mr. Ehlert offered a very rough
approximation that the windrows have a total volume exceeding 10,000 cubic
yards. However, the Court cannot determine how much of the windrows are
“waste” and how much are not. Mr. Ehlert initially went to the property in March
of 2013 due to a complaint of odor from the property lodged by another
composting operation. Mr. Ehlert detected no foul odor. This suggests to the
Court that either the volume of grass clippings and leaves in the early stages of
decomposition was low or they were well mixed into the windrows. From the
pictures, the windrows appear to be compost. Certainly there are some places
where grass and hay or straw are visible and distinguishable as being such.
However, from the photographs alone, the windrows appear to consist largely of
compost. The Court is unwilling to conclude from the windrows alone that the
VHS property has at any one time had a volume of greater than 600 cubic yards of
waste. Id. at 13.

The Court further held that at some given moment during the year 2013, Defendants
possessed more than 600 cubic yards of discarded grass clippings and leaves. The Court reached
a similar conclusion for the year 2014. Because the applicable environmental regulations are
triggered anytime someone possesses, “at any one time,” the required volume of solid waste, the
Court held Defendants had violated those regulations in 2013 and 2014. The Court explicitly
declined to make such a finding for the year 2015 and nowhere did the Court say anything about
how much of the grass clippings and leaves remained on Defendant VHS’s property as of the
date of trial or how much might remain today. The only thing the Court could conclude is that
Defendants, as of the date of the trial, had a large volume of material on the property. How much
of that material was discarded grass clippings and leaves, and thus solid waste, was not proven.
Plaintiff’s argument is that it is too difficult for Plaintiff to monitor how much discarded
grass clippings and leaves Defendants receive at the property. It is much easier for Plaintiff to
prove how much Defendants currently have on the property, even though Plaintiff failed to do so
at the trial in this case. Plaintiff would like to avoid having to re-allege in a new action that
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Defendants currently have more than 600 cubic yards of discarded grass clippings and leaves
sitting on the property. Plaintiff would much prefer to litigate that issue in a contempt proceeding
alleging a violation of this Court’s injunction.
That is not a basis upon which this Court is willing to amend the injunction it entered.
Storing large volumes of solid waste is a regulated activity; storing large volumes of a useful
material one has made from a solid waste is not.3 See for example, U.S. v ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126
(11th Cir. 1993) (lead components in car batteries discarded by the vehicle owners remain solid
waste, even after being purchased by a recycler from a landfill or other supplier of discarded
things. The “once discarded” lead components remain solid waste until they are melted into
ingots by the recycler.) If Plaintiff’s view is that Defendants currently have a large quantity of
discarded grass clippings and leaves that has not yet decomposed sufficiently to have become
compost, Plaintiff had the opportunity to prove that at trial and failed to do so. The Court will not
amend the injunction it issued in this case simply to allow Plaintiff to re-litigate that issue in a
contempt proceeding.
Of course, if Plaintiff simply disagrees with this Court’s conclusion that discarded grass
clippings and leaves are solid waste, but compost is not; Plaintiff is free to raise that issue on
appeal; or promulgate its own regulation that explicitly states compost is a solid waste if made

3

Unless such useful material is hazardous or radioactive or subject to regulation for a reason other than simply being
‘waste.’
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from discarded organic material;4 or perhaps address this issue in the forum in which it should be
addressed – the legislature.

4

The Department defines “Yard Waste” as “weeds, straw, leaves, grass clippings, brush, wood and other natural
organic materials typically derived from general landscape maintenance activities.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005(52).
Compost is certainly a natural and organic material. However, this Court cannot conclude it is a material “typically
derived from general landscape maintenance activities.” If anything too few landowners are willing to put the work
needed into turning their grass clippings and leaves into compost when doing their landscape maintenance and they
end up simply discarding those materials. It seems a stretch to conclude that the compost Mr. Gibson makes is
“derived” from someone else’s landscaping activities (such as cutting grass and picking up leaves), the way grass
clippings and leaves are derived from those activities, simply because he uses the clippings and leaves to make the
compost. Additionally, not all “Yard Waste” falls within the definition of “Solid Waste.”

The regulations could be stated much more precisely in many respects. For example, ‘solid waste’ is defined as “any
garbage…and other discarded material.” IDAPA 58.01.06.005(44). Garbage is defined as being “any waste
consisting of putrescible animal and vegetable materials resulting from [food preparation and consumption].”
IDAPA 58.01.06.005(15). Thus, the green onion tops I choose not to put in my salad are garbage if they at some
point become “waste;” until then they may be a vegetable material liable to decay, but they can’t be garbage until
they are waste. Waste includes “garbage;” a circular definition that defines nothing. Of course, in order to be waste
even garbage must first be ‘discarded’ because solid waste is defined as “garbage and other discarded materials.”
Thus, in order to be garbage, a material must be discarded; despite the fact the word discarded does not appear in the
definition of “garbage” at all.
My grass clippings are certainly putrescible; they are arguably a vegetable material as well, depending upon which
definition of that term one adopts. (One definition of vegetable refers only to plants or parts of plants used for food.
However, if that was the definition the department adopted there would be no need to clarify that garbage includes
vegetable material from food preparation, unless the department was really worried about making sure the bay leaf I
use to flavor my soup, but don’t actually eat, falls within the definition of garbage). However, the grass clippings
cannot be garbage because they don’t come from food preparation. They are certainly “yard waste” as that term is
defined; but somewhat inconsistently (and certainly unhelpfully) they cannot be “solid waste” until I discard them.
Why the department would call a solid material “yard waste” when it is not “solid waste” is unclear.
To compound the confusion around composting, the Department defines Backyard Composting to include certain
types of composting operations. IDAPA 58.01.06.005(02). “Composting operation” is not defined, but would appear
to fall within the definition of a composting facility, IDAPA 58.01.06.005(05), which is defined as being the same as
a processing facility. Processing facility is not defined, but the definition of “facility” includes an area that is used
for a solid waste management activity including processing (presumably this means processing solid waste; not
processing as yet not discarded paperwork or ‘processing’ job applications (at least before they hit the trash can)).
IDAPA 58.01.006.005(14). Thus, one’s backyard appears to be a solid waste processing facility if one makes
compost in one’s yard. The department however has chosen not to regulate such facilities under certain conditions.
IDAPA 58.01.06.001(04). To avoid regulation one must not let anyone who is not in control of your home make
compost in one’s yard (such as perhaps your children) and one must process only waste generated at your home (No
accepting carrot tops from your neighbor). IDAPA 58.01.06.005(02). Of course, in order to be “waste” at all one’s
grass clippings must first be discarded. If a homeowner takes the grass clippings from his lawnmower bag and
places them in his composter, adds water, adds soil, and aerates the mixture; it seems the homeowner has not
discarded such clippings at all. Thus the clippings, while ‘yard waste’ are not ‘solid waste’ and are not subject to
regulation under the solid waste management rules. Why explicitly exempt from regulation an activity that, by
definition, is not subject to regulation in the first place? If the Department intended this definitional morass to make
clear that commercial composting facilities are subject to the solid waste management rules, it has failed to achieve
that goal.
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This Court tailored its injunction to prevent a recurrence of the violation the Department
proved occurred – Defendants’ accepting and processing, on at least two occasions in the past, of
a sufficient quantity of discarded grass clippings and leaves to trigger various regulatory
requirements without first complying with those requirements.
Plaintiff additionally argues this Court should amend its injunction because the Court
enjoined Defendants from receiving a volume of grass clippings and leaves greater than 300
cubic yards in any given 12 month period unless Defendants first comply with the regulations
applicable based on the volume of material they desire to receive. Plaintiff argues the Court has
inserted an intent component into the regulations that does not exist. Plaintiff argues that in order
to prove a violation of the injunction, Plaintiff should not have to prove a desire to receive that
quantity of material on the part of either defendant. Plaintiff has misread the injunction. This
Court’s injunction precludes Defendants from accepting or receiving any quantity of discarded
grass clippings or leaves unless Defendants first comply with the regulations.
The solid waste management rules require every person receiving any quantity of solid
waste (other than those solid wastes exempted from regulation) to comply with the regulatory
requirements prior to accepting waste. IDAPA 58.01.06.010(01), .011(01), .012, .013. The
Court’s language about desire to receive simply recognizes the requirement under the regulations
that a person must comply prior to accepting any waste; even those who intend to accept a
quantity below regulatory concern must do certain things before they may permissibly receive
the waste. However, what a person planning to receive waste must do depends upon the quantity
of waste the person plans on receiving. The Court considered simply enjoining the Defendants
from accepting any grass clippings and leaves at all, discarded or not, and regardless of
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compliance with the regulations, but that was not the Department’s request at the conclusion of
trial. As a remedy, the Department did not suggest this Court prevent Defendants from receiving
any materials in the future; the Department did not suggest this Court require Defendants to
either immediately file the appropriate paperwork or remove of the material on the property. The
Department simply asked this Court to structure an injunction that would require Defendants to
comply with the various regulations when and if they engage in regulated activity. The Court
attempted to do so in a manner that was somewhat more precise than simply saying: follow the
regulations.
Plaintiff moves this Court to amend the injunction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(a) based on an
oversight or omission. This motion is denied. The omission of the language Plaintiff requests
was not an oversight.
Plaintiff moves this Court to amend the injunction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). That
subsection of Rule 60 permits a court to correct a judgment based on a mistake of fact. Plaintiff
has failed to articulate a mistake in the Court’s findings of fact. Plaintiff has simply reworded its
argument regarding the Court’s decision to refrain from wording its injunction in a manner that
would permit Plaintiff to re-litigate the issue regarding how much grass clippings and leaves (as
opposed to compost) Defendants are storing on the property in a contempt proceeding.
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion is denied.
Signed: 8/15/2018 09:21 AM

_____________________________
JONATHAN MEDEMA
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Signed: 8/15/2018 03:10 PM

I hereby certify that on _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the
within instrument as follows:

Cynthia Y ee-Wallace
Mark Cecchini-Beaver
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0010
Email: Cynthia.wallace@ag.idaho.gov
Mark.cecchini-beaver@deq.idaho.gov

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Interdepartmental Mail
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

V emon K. Smith
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Email: ws1900@gmail.com
vkslaw@live.com

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

By:~~
Dep
Court Clerk
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Electronically Filed
8/22/2018 1:44 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jamie Martin, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
)
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, )
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
)
Defendants-Appellants.
)

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee: _______________

__________________________________________________________________
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (DEQ), and Respondent’s attorneys, Steven L. Olsen, Chief of
Civil Litigation, and Cynthia Yee Wallace and Mark Cechini-Beaver, Deputy Attorneys General,
954 W. Jefferson Street, end Floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720, and the Clerk of the
above entitled Court of Ada County Idaho.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost

Products and VHS Properties, LLC, acting through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, do
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appeal against the above-named Respondent, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, JUDGMENT, as initially
entered in the above entitled action on March 1, 2018; the ORDER of denial of Defendants’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
entitled ORDER, RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND EXPENSES, entered in the above action on June 21, 2018, and from the AMENDED
JUDGMENT, entered pursuant to Rule 54(a)(2), IRCP, on June 21, 2018, the Honorable Jonathan
Medema, District Judge presiding, as provided for by Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1), This appeal
does include appeal of the award of DEQ’s expenses, awarded as costs, pursuant to I. C. §39-108(6)
as entered on June 21, 2018.
2.

That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

as the Judgment, denial of reconsideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, and the Amended Judgment described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable
Judgment/Amended Judgment under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Rule 14(a) I.A.R., and the
subsequent award of expenses, as costs, are appealable, as they were added to the Amended
Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(A)&(F), I.R.C.P..
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal which Appellants

intend to assert in this appeal; provided such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent Appellants
from asserting other issues on appeal, include the following:
a.) Whether “grass clippings and leaves”, as a matter of law, are to be regarded to be
a “solid waste”, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation by the Idaho Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) when used as a direct ingredient at an agricultural composting facility to produce
compost and humus products, intended as a substitute for commercial products?
b.) Whether the district court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
declaring “grass clippings and leaves” to be a “solid waste”, either under the IDAPA Rules, Title
58, Department of Environmental Quality Rules 58.01.01 thru 25, particularly Rule 58.01.06 .000
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thru 58.01.06.999 and/or under any of the provisions and chapters of the Idaho Statutes, specifically
Title 39, Health and Safety, particularly Chapter 1, concerning the Environmental Quality and
Health, identified as the Idaho Environmental Protection Health Act (IEPHA), including I.C. §§39101 thru 39-175E- from which there exists any basis for DEQ to exercise any Jurisdictional or
statutory authority to assert a right to regulate an agricultural composting facility under the pretense
it constitutes a solid waste disposal site?
c.) Whether the district court erred in not finding and concluding, as a matter of law,
that Federal Legislation, identified as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR’s) including 40 CFR 261.4(b)(2), pre-empt the enforcement of
any IDAPA Rules or regulatory authority by DEQ under any provisions of Title 39, Chapter 1,
Statutes of the State of Idaho, by virtue of the further pre-emption expressed within the Idaho Solid
Waste Facility Act, (ISWFA), identified in I.C §39-7404?
d.)
e. Whether the jurisdiction and regulatory authority over agricultural
composting facilities, where direct ingredients such as organic recyclable substances are grass
clippings and leaves, are to be managed and regulated exclusively within the Idaho Department of
Agriculture (ISDA), pursuant to the Right To Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil and Plant Amendment
Act (SAPAA), as identified in Title 22, Chapters 1, 6, 22, and 45, thereby precluding any usurpation
of that vested ISDA authority or jurisdictional claim by DEQ to regulate such a facility, as further
restricted through implementation within the Environmental Health Protection Act (EHPA), Title
39, expressed within Chapter 74. identified in the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), I. C.
§39-7404, wherein DEQ is prohibited from seeking broader definitions of “solid waste” than is
mandated or allowed by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), within the enactment
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the result from which DEQ lacks
regulatory authority and jurisdictional standing to bring an action against agricultural composting
facilities/operations upon the pretext they are a “solid waste” facility, when nothing received at this
agricultural composting facility was “abandoned” or “discarded” for disposal, but rather the
delivery of grass clippings and leaves was specifically delivered to be recycled as a direct
ingredient in this composting operation, being operated not as a “solid waste disposal facility”, nor
a facility intended to receive “municipal waste”, but rather operated as an organic recycling facility
where nothing is being discarded or abandoned for permanent disposal?
e.) Whether the district court erred in its Finding of Fact from the evidence adduced
at trial, expressed through the testimony of the DEQ Official from his “observation” during his
“inspection” of this agricultural composting facility conducted on March 29, 2013, that there was a
Tier II presence of “solid waste” (600 cubic yards) to sufficiently demonstrate, without any
measurements or quantification, there was a presence of “grass clippings and leaves”, from which
the court could then conclude the operation constituted a Tier II “solid waste” processing facility,
and whether upon that Finding and Conclusion, whether the district court erred in the Conclusion
of Law that the operator of that agricultural composting facility was required to file a “site Plan”
with DEQ, on the pretext this operation was a “solid waste” processing facility, alleged in DEQ’s
Amended Complaint, alleging a Tier II regulatory violation occurring at this agricultural
composting facility on March 29, 2013?
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f.) Whether DEQ was precluded from initiating this action by virtue of I. C. §39108(4), whether deemed to be a statute of repose or a statute of limitations, by virtue of DEQ’s
awareness (both when a department of Health and welfare and thereafter as a state agency) as to
the existence of David R. Gibson’s composting operations for decades of mixing dirt, soil, leaves,
and grass clippings, identified in the Department/DEQ records and files since 1992 and years
preceding, thereby precluding DEQ from asserting any yardage violation (Tier II 600 cubic
yardage criteria) with full knowledge this agricultural composting facility has been continuously in
operation at that location by Gibson since August, 2004?
g.) Whether the adoption of the IDAPA Rules, Title 58, had therein expressly
intended the unconditional exemption and exclusion from any “solid waste” regulation, any and
all crop (plant) residue and all agricultural waste regulated by ISDA, as specifically identified
within IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (b)(iii)?
h.) Whether Title 39, (Health and Safety), Chapter 74, statutes of Idaho,
specifically the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), has defined “solid waste” (I. C. §397403(50)(e)) to exclude any “agricultural waste” (“manures and crop residues” that are
“returned to the soils at agronomic rates”), precluding any jurisdiction or regulatory authority of
DEQ to inspect or regulate this agricultural composting facility?
i.) Whether the district court erred in its ruling that the DEQ “inspection” of this
agricultural composting facility on March 29, 2013, as conducted by DEQ Officials without a
warrant, without permission or consent, did not constitute a violation of the express restraints set
forth in I. C. §39-108(2)(c), and whether such warrantless entry onto the premises to inspect the
operation constituted a violation of the fourth amendment of the U.S and Idaho constitutions,
regarding the requirement of a search warrant, as set forth in I. C. §39-108(2)(c)?
j.) Whether the district court erred when imposing a penalty of $1,000.00 levied
against David R. Gibson and a penalty of $250.00 levied against VHS Properties, LLC under the
provisions of I.C. §39-108, upon the basis grass clippings and leaves” are a “solid waste” and
regulated by DEQ?
k.) Whether DEQ was entitled to an award of its claimed costs, as reflected in the
Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and request for attorney fees and expenses, and then
contained in the Amended Judgment entered June 21, 2018?
appeal?

l.) Whether Appellants are entitled to any award of attorney fees and costs on

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes, a reporter’s transcript is requested, and there

will be the need for the preparation of a transcript of those in-court civil proceedings conducted on
all motions and hearings held in this matter. With respect to the Trial Transcript of the trial
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proceedings held in this matter, a transcript of the audio-recorded proceedings conducted on
September 13, 15, and concluding on September 20, 2017, was previously transcribed by Sue
Heronemus, and was lodged with the Clerk of the Court and was provided to the parties, as that
transcript was used in preparation of the written closing arguments submitted to the district court,
and having previously been prepared and lodged with the Court, it is requested this lodged
transcript be submitted as an “Exhibit” to the Record on this Appeal, as permitted by Rule
31(a)(2), I.A.R. The Hearings to be transcribed and included in a Reporter’s Transcript include the
following:
a.) November 29, 2016, hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DEQ;
b.) September 13, 15, and 20, 2017, Court Trial (which has already transcribed and
is to be made an Exhibit to the Record on this Appeal, as permitted by Rule 31(a)(2),
I.A.R.
c.) July 23, 2018, Hearing on Plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion;
6.

More than the Standard Record, as otherwise provided under I.A.R. 28(b), is

requested to be submitted in this Appeal, and Appellants specifically request the Clerk’s Record
include in addition to the Standard Record, all pleadings, motions, memoranda, affidavits, written
closing arguments, proposed exhibit lists, and all exhibits and other filed documents of record in this
case, specifically including within the Clerk's Record those filed documents identified as follows:

7.

I certify:
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a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Sue Heronemus, Judge Medema’s Court Reporter, located at the Ada County
Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
b.

That the court reporter has been paid an estimated fee that was requested in

the amount of $682.50, and the $100.00 initial payment to compile the Clerk’s Record was paid on
August 7, 2018 after being requested by letter on August 3, 2018, and any further payment required
will be paid thereafter, as requested.
c. That the Clerk of the District Court has been the estimated fee for the preparation
of the Clerk’s Record, and the balance will be paid thereafter, when requested.
d. That the required filing fee was paid in conjunction with the I-Court filing system
in the amount of $129.00.
e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20, I.A.R.
Dated this 22nd day of August, 2018.
__Vernon k. Smith__
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 22nd day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Amended Notice of Appeal to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, Ada
County, Idaho, by I-Court/E-File and a copy thereof to be delivered to and served upon the
following individuals in the manner described below:
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Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Steven L. Olsen,
Mark Cechini-Beaver,
Cynthia Yee-Wallace,
Chief and Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
Sue Heronemus (court reporter)
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
( X

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-Filed

(
(
(
( X

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-filed

)
)
)
x )

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-Mail

(
(
(
(

__Vernon K. Smith__
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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Electronically Filed
8/27/2018 12:38 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone:
(208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
)
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, )
and VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
)
Defendants-Appellants.
)

Case No. CVOC-2015-03540
SECOND
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

__________________________________________________________________
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (DEQ), and Respondent’s attorneys, Steven L. Olsen, Chief of
Civil Litigation, and Cynthia Yee Wallace and Mark Cechini-Beaver, Deputy Attorneys General,
954 W. Jefferson Street, end Floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720, and the Clerk of the
above entitled Court of Ada County Idaho.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost

Products and VHS Properties, LLC, acting through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, do

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

P. 1

001392

appeal against the above-named Respondent, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, JUDGMENT, as initially
entered in the above entitled action on March 1, 2018; the ORDER of denial of Defendants’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
entitled ORDER, RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND EXPENSES, entered in the above action on June 21, 2018, and from the AMENDED
JUDGMENT, entered pursuant to Rule 54(a)(2), IRCP, on June 21, 2018, the Honorable Jonathan
Medema, District Judge presiding, as provided for by Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1), This appeal
does include appeal of the award of DEQ’s expenses, awarded as costs, pursuant to I. C. §39-108(6)
as entered on June 21, 2018.
2.

That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

as the Judgment, denial of reconsideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, and the Amended Judgment described in paragraph 1 above, is an appealable
Judgment/Amended Judgment under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Rule 14(a) I.A.R., and the
subsequent award of expenses, as costs, are appealable, as they were added to the Amended
Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(A)&(F), I.R.C.P..
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal which Appellants

intend to assert in this appeal; provided such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent Appellants
from asserting other issues on appeal, include the following:
a.) Whether “grass clippings and leaves”, as a matter of law, are to be regarded to be
a “solid waste”, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation by the Idaho Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) when used as a direct ingredient at an agricultural composting facility to produce
compost and humus products, intended as a substitute for commercial products?
b.) Whether the district court erred in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
declaring “grass clippings and leaves” to be a “solid waste”, either under the IDAPA Rules, Title
58, Department of Environmental Quality Rules 58.01.01 thru 25, particularly Rule 58.01.06 .000
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thru 58.01.06.999 and/or under any of the provisions and chapters of the Idaho Statutes, specifically
Title 39, Health and Safety, particularly Chapter 1, concerning the Environmental Quality and
Health, identified as the Idaho Environmental Protection Health Act (IEPHA), including I.C. §§39101 thru 39-175E- from which there exists any basis for DEQ to exercise any Jurisdictional or
statutory authority to assert a right to regulate an agricultural composting facility under the pretense
it constitutes a solid waste disposal site?
c.) Whether the district court erred in not finding and concluding, as a matter of law,
that Federal Legislation, identified as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR’s) including 40 CFR 261.4(b)(2), pre-empt the enforcement of
any IDAPA Rules or regulatory authority by DEQ under any provisions of Title 39, Chapter 1,
Statutes of the State of Idaho, by virtue of the further pre-emption expressed within the Idaho Solid
Waste Facility Act, (ISWFA), identified in I.C §39-7404?
d.) Whether the jurisdiction and regulatory authority over agricultural composting
facilities, where direct ingredients such as organic recyclable substances are grass clippings and
leaves, are to be managed and regulated exclusively within the Idaho Department of Agriculture
(ISDA), pursuant to the Right To Farm Act (RTFA) and the Soil and Plant Amendment Act
(SAPAA), as identified in Title 22, Chapters 1, 6, 22, and 45, thereby precluding any usurpation of
that vested ISDA authority or jurisdictional claim by DEQ to regulate such a facility, as further
restricted through implementation within the Environmental Health Protection Act (EHPA), Title
39, expressed within Chapter 74. identified in the Idaho Solid Waste Facility Act (ISWFA), I. C.
§39-7404, wherein DEQ is prohibited from seeking broader definitions of “solid waste” than is
mandated or allowed by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), within the enactment
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the result from which DEQ lacks
regulatory authority and jurisdictional standing to bring an action against agricultural composting
facilities/operations upon the pretext they are a “solid waste” facility, when nothing received at this
agricultural composting facility was “abandoned” or “discarded” for disposal, but rather the
delivery of grass clippings and leaves was specifically delivered to be recycled as a direct
ingredient in this composting operation, being operated not as a “solid waste disposal facility”, nor
a facility intended to receive “municipal waste”, but rather operated as an organic recycling facility
where nothing is being discarded or abandoned for permanent disposal?
e.) Whether the district court erred in its Finding of Fact from the evidence adduced
at trial, expressed through the testimony of the DEQ Official from his “observation” during his
“inspection” of this agricultural composting facility conducted on March 29, 2013, that there was a
Tier II presence of “solid waste” (600 cubic yards) to sufficiently demonstrate, without any
measurements or quantification, there was a presence of “grass clippings and leaves”, from which
the court could then conclude the operation constituted a Tier II “solid waste” processing facility,
and whether upon that Finding and Conclusion, whether the district court erred in the Conclusion
of Law that the operator of that agricultural composting facility was required to file a “site Plan”
with DEQ, on the pretext this operation was a “solid waste” processing facility, alleged in DEQ’s
Amended Complaint, alleging a Tier II regulatory violation occurring at this agricultural
composting facility on March 29, 2013?
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f.) Whether DEQ was precluded from initiating this action by virtue of I. C. §39108(4), whether deemed to be a statute of repose or a statute of limitations, by virtue of DEQ’s
awareness (both when a department of Health and welfare and thereafter as a state agency) as to
the existence of David R. Gibson’s composting operations for decades of mixing dirt, soil, leaves,
and grass clippings, identified in the Department/DEQ records and files since 1992 and years
preceding, thereby precluding DEQ from asserting any yardage violation (Tier II 600 cubic
yardage criteria) with full knowledge this agricultural composting facility has been continuously in
operation at that location by Gibson since August, 2004?
g.) Whether the adoption of the IDAPA Rules, Title 58, had therein expressly
intended the unconditional exemption and exclusion from any “solid waste” regulation, any and
all crop (plant) residue and all agricultural waste regulated by ISDA, as specifically identified
within IDAPA 58.01.06.001.03(b)(ii) and (b)(iii)?
h.) Whether Title 39, (Health and Safety), Chapter 74, statutes of Idaho,
specifically the Idaho Solid Waste Facilities Act (ISWFA), has defined “solid waste” (I. C. §397403(50)(e)) excludes any “agricultural waste” (“manures and crop residues” that are “returned
to the soils at agronomic rates”), precluding any jurisdiction or regulatory authority of DEQ to
inspect or regulate this agricultural composting facility?
i.) Whether the district court erred in its ruling that the DEQ “inspection” of this
agricultural composting facility on March 29, 2013, as conducted by DEQ Officials without a
warrant, without permission or consent, did not constitute a violation of the express restraints set
forth in I. C. §39-108(2)(c), and whether such warrantless entry onto the premises to inspect the
operation constituted a violation of the fourth amendment of the U.S and Idaho constitutions,
regarding the requirement of a search warrant, as set forth in I. C. §39-108(2)(c)?
j.) Whether the district court erred when imposing a penalty of $1,000.00 levied
against David R. Gibson and a penalty of $250.00 levied against VHS Properties, LLC under the
provisions of I.C. §39-108, upon the basis grass clippings and leaves” are a “solid waste” and
regulated by DEQ?
k.) Whether DEQ was entitled to an award of its claimed costs, as reflected in the
Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and request for attorney fees and expenses, and then
contained in the Amended Judgment entered June 21, 2018?
appeal?

l.) Whether Appellants are entitled to any award of attorney fees and costs on

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes, a reporter’s transcript is requested, and there

will be the need for the preparation of a transcript of those in-court civil proceedings conducted on
all motions and hearings held in this matter. With respect to the Trial Transcript of the trial

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

P. 4

001395

proceedings held in this matter, a transcript of the audio-recorded proceedings conducted on
September 13, 15, and concluding on September 20, 2017, was previously transcribed by Sue
Heronemus, and was lodged with the Clerk of the Court and was provided to the parties, as that
transcript was used in preparation of the written closing arguments submitted to the district court,
and having previously been prepared and lodged with the Court, it is requested this lodged
transcript be submitted as an “Exhibit” to the Record on this Appeal, as permitted by Rule
31(a)(2), I.A.R. The Hearings to be transcribed and included in a Reporter’s Transcript include the
following:
a.) November 29, 2016, hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DEQ;
b.) September 13, 15, and 20, 2017, Court Trial (which has already transcribed and
is to be made an Exhibit to the Record on this Appeal, as permitted by Rule 31(a)(2),
I.A.R.
c.) July 23, 2018, Hearing on Plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion;
6.

More than the Standard Record, as otherwise provided under I.A.R. 28(b), is

requested to be submitted in this Appeal, and Appellants specifically request the Clerk’s Record
include in addition to the Standard Record, all pleadings, motions, memoranda, affidavits, written
closing arguments, proposed exhibit lists, and all exhibits and other filed documents of record in this
case, specifically including within the Clerk's Record those filed documents identified as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Summons and Complaint, filed on March 5, 2015;
Answer to Complaint, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, filed on April 17, 2015;
Stipulation to Amend Complaint, filed on October 15, 2015;
Order Approving Stipulation to File Amended Complaint, filed on November 12, 2015;
First Amended Complaint, filed on December 2, 2015;
Answer to First Amended Complaint, filed on February 10, 2016;
Plaintiff DEQs Request for Entry Upon Land for Inspection, filed on June 23, 2016;
Notice of Service, filed on June 23, 2017;
Objection to DEQ’s Request for Entry Upon Land for Inspection, filed on July 14, 2016;
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10. Affidavit of Paula J. Wilson, filed on October 11, 2016;
11. Affidavit of Brian Oakley, filed on October 11, 2016;
12. Affidavit of Darrell G. Early, filed on October 11, 2016;
13. Affidavit of Dean Ehlert, filed on October 11, 2016;
14. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 11, 2016;
15. Affidavit of David Gibson, filed on October 24, 2016;
16. Memorandum in Opposition to DEQ’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October
24, 2016;
17. Amended Notice of Hearing, filed on October 27, 2016;
18. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on November 2,
2016;
19. Supplemental Affidavit of Dean Ehlert, filed on November 2, 2016;
20. Affidavit of Jack Gantz, filed on November 2, 2016;
21. Objection and Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of David R. Gibson, filed on
November 3, 2016;
22. Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 11, 2016;
23. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to I.C. 39-108(4) and
I.C. 22-4502, filed on November 11, 2016;
24. Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Summary Judgment Hearing, filed on November 14,
2016;
25. Second Amended Notice of Hearing, filed on November 14, 2016;
26. Notice of Hearing, filed on November 30, 2016;
27. Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 7, 2016;
28. Affidavit of Brian Rayne, filed on December 7, 2016;
29. Supplemental Affidavit of Darrell G. Early, filed on December 7, 2016;
30. Pretrial Memorandum, filed on January 3, 2017;
31. Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, filed one January 9, 2017;
32. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed on January 9, 2017;
33. Supplemental Memorandum Decision regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment; filed on February 9, 2017;
34. Order to Sustain Plaintiff’s Objection and Grant Motion to Strike Portions of the
Affidavit of David Gibson, filed on February 15, 2017;
35. Motion In Limine to Prelude Evidence Concerning Unpled Defenses, filed on March 9,
2017;
36. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Prelude Evidence Concerning Unpled
Defenses, filed on March 9, 2017;
37. Amended Pretrial Memorandum, filed on March 14, 2017;
38. Motion to Vacate Trial and Stay Proceedings, filed on March 17, 2017;
39. Witness and Exhibit List, filed on March 20, 2017;
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40. Defendants Response to Department’s Motion in Limine Regarding the Effects of I.C. 39108(4), and the Summary Judgment Proceedings that Preserve Issues Raised for
Disposition Upon the Merits in the Dispute, filed on March 20, 2017;
41. Motion to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant’s VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate
Trial, filed on March 20, 2017;
42. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene/Substitute, Dismiss Defendant’s VHS
Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial, filed on March 20, 2017;
43. Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of Motion to Intervene/Substitute,
Dismiss Defendant’s VHS Properties, LLC, and Vacate Trial, filed on March 20, 2017;
44. Stipulation for Settlement and for Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims Against Noah
Hillen, Special Administrator of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, filed on May 5, 2017;
45. Motion to Amend Answer to Include the Defense of the Statute of Limitations, filed on
July 28, 2017;
46. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Defendant’s Answer to Allege the
Application and Effects of I.C. 39-108(4), filed on July 28, 2017;
47. Notice of Hearing, filed on August 10, 2017;
48. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Amend Answer, filed on
August 15, 2017;
49. Notice of Special Appearance and Limited Association of Counsel, filed on August 16,
2017;
50. Plaintiff’s Witness List, filed on August 22, 2017;
51. Plaintiff’s Exhibit List, filed on August 22, 2017;
52. Plaintiff’s First Amended Exhibit List, filed on September 7, 2017;
53. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 16.1 Replacement, filed on September 8, 2017;
54. Pretrial Memorandum to Support Motion for Direct Verdict Upon the Conclusion of
Evidence Pursuant to Rule 50(a) I.R.C.P. , filed on September 12, 2017;
55. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Exhibit List, filed on September 12, 2017;
56. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Testimony of Dean Ehlert for Violation of
I.C. 39-108(2)(c) , filed on September 28, 2017;
57. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Strike Testimony, filed on October 6, 2017;
58. Declaration of Mark Cecchini-Beaver in Support of Plaintiffs Response to Defendants
Motion to Strike Testimony, filed on October 6, 2017;
59. Reply Memorandum to Support Defendants Motion to Strike Testimony of Dean Ehlert
for Violation of I.C. 39-108(2)(c) , filed on October 13, 2017;
60. Order Denying Motions Strike Testimony, filed on November 20, 2017;
61. Closing Argument, filed on December 4, 2017;
62. Plaintiff’s Closing Argument, filed on December 4, 2017;
63. Declaration of Cynthia Yee-Wallace in Support of Plaintiff’s Closing Argument, filed on
December 4, 2017;
64. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed December 4, 2017;
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65. Reply to DEQ’s Closing Argument, filed on December 12, 2017;
66. Supplemental Reply to DEQ’s Closing Argument, filed on January 15, 2018;
67. Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law, filed on March 1, 2018;
68. Judgment, filed on March 1, 2018;
69. Motion for Reconsideration of Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
Entered March 1, 2018, filed on March 13, 2018;
70. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed on March 13, 2018;
71. Administrative Warrant for Entry and Inspection, filed on April 11, 2018;
72. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Entered March 1, 2018, filed on May 14, 2018;
73. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Entered March 1, 2018, filed on May 21, 2018;
74. Affidavit of Dr. Mir Seyedbagheri, filed on May 21, 2018;
75. Supplemental Memorandum in Regard to the Mislabeling of Pleadings in Civil Case,
filed on May 22, 2018;
76. Plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion, filed on June 21, 2018;
77. Amended Judgment; filed on June 21, 2018;
78. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion, filed on June 21, 2017;
79. Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Attorney Fees and Expenses, filed
on June 21, 2018;
80. Amended Judgment, filed on
81. Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 60, I.R.C.P. Relief of the
Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Amended Judgment, filed
on July 20, 2018;
82. Notice of Appeal, filed on August 1, 2018;
83. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Correct the Amended Judgment, filed on August 15,
2018;
7.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Sue Heronemus, Judge Medema’s Court Reporter, located at the Ada County
Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
b.

That the court reporter has been paid an estimated fee that was requested in

the amount of $682.50, and the $100.00 initial payment to compile the Clerk’s Record was paid on
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August 7, 2018 after being requested by letter on August 3, 2018, and any further payment required
will be paid thereafter, as requested.
c. That the Clerk of the District Court has been the estimated fee for the preparation
of the Clerk’s Record, and the balance will be paid thereafter, when requested.
d. That the required filing fee was paid in conjunction with the I-Court filing system
in the amount of $129.00.
e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20, I.A.R.
Dated this 27nd day of August, 2018.
__Vernon k. Smith__
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 27th day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing 2nd Amended Notice of Appeal to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, Ada
County, Idaho, by I-Court/E-File and a copy thereof to be delivered to and served upon the
following individuals in the manner described below:
Clerk of the Court
Fourth Judicial District
Ada County
200 W Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
( X

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-Filed

Steven L. Olsen,
Mark Cechini-Beaver,
Cynthia Yee-Wallace,
Chief and Deputy Atty. Gen. DEQ
954 W. Jefferson St. 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(
(
( X

)
)
)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-filed

Sue Heronemus (court reporter)
Fourth Judicial District

(
(

)
)

U.S. Mail
Fax
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Ada County
200 West Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(
(

)
x )

Hand Delivered
I-Court/E-Mail

__Vernon K. Smith__
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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1

TO:

2

CLERK OF THE COURT, IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO
FAX
( 2 0 8 ) 3 3 4-2 616

3

4

Docket No.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

NOTICE OF LODGING

6

vs.

7

DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,

8
9

Case No. CVOC-2015-3540

Plaintiff-Respondent,

5

46217-2018

Defendants-Appellants.

10
11
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT(S)

LODGED

12
13

Notice is hereby given that on October 24,

14

lodged five

(5)

transcripts,

15

the following dates/proceedings:

2018,

totaling 130 pages,

I

for

16
17
18

11-29-16
12-13-16
01-10-17
03-21-17
10-10-17

Motion for Summary Judgment
Status Conference
Pretrial Conference
Pretrial Conference
Motion to Suppress

19
20

for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court

21

Clerk for Ada County,

in the Fourth Judicial District.

22
23
24

Susan M. Heronemus,
RPR, CSR No. 728

25

001402

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY,

SC No.: 46217-2018

Plaintiff/Respondent.
v.
DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC Corporation,
Defendant/Appellants.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on November 14th,
2018,

I lodged a transcript,

61 pages in length,

for the

above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.

(Signature of Reporter)
Christie Valcich, CSR-RPR
November 14, 2018

Dates:

Friday,

September 15, 2017

001403

No.

IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO

OF
IDAHO DEPARTMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
Plaintiff -Respondent

)

' )

~

vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON , d/b/a/
BLACK DIAMOND
COMPOST
PRODUCTS , and VHS
PROPERTIES
, LLC ,
Defendants

NOTICE

-Appellants

Supreme
Court
Docket 46217

J
~)
.!. __ )

OF TRANSCRIPT

LODGED

given that on November
20,
a transcript
33 pages in length
appeal with the
For the above -referenced
District Court Clerk of Ada County in the Fourth
Judicial District .
Notice

is hereby

2018 , I lodged

Penny L.
Tardiff

Digitally signed by Penny L.
Tardiff
Date: 2018.11.20 07:40:36

-07'00'

__________ _

-----------rsl9nafure--~-Reporter)

_____ Penny _.!:.!,_Tardiff __ CSR _______ _

----------11=20=2018 -----------Hearing

Date : July 23 , 2018

1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 46217
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 23rd day of November, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JONATHAN MEDEMA/JANET ELLIS
DISTRICT JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK

September 13/15 & 20, 2017

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Case No. CVOC2015-3540

Plaintiff,
vs.

EXHIBIT LIST
COURT TRIAL EXHIBITS

DAVID R. GIBSON, d/b/a BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS &
VHS pPROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE
Deputy Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR IDEQ

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
STATUS

BY

NO.

DESCRIPTION

PL

1

Letter date 04/2/13 from Jack Gantz to David
Gibson with attachment-map
ADMITTED 09/13/17

PL

3

Letter dated May 8, 2013 from Jack Gantz to David
Gibson with attachment (emails)
ADMITTED 09/13/17

PL

6

PL

11

Letter dated 07/31/13 from McCurdy, DEQ to David
Gibson w/ Notice of Violation attached ADMITTED 09/13/17
2013 Aerial Photo that includes Smith Property w/
Authenticity of Digital Imagery with USGS Archive and
Metadata-NAIP GEOTOFF 20130830
ADMITTED 09/13/17

PL

12

2015 Aerial Photo that includes Smith Property w/
Authenticity of Digital Imagery with the USGS Archive
And metadata-NAIP GEOTIFF 20150613
ADMITTED 09/13/17
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17.1
17.2
17.3
17.4
17.5
17.6
17.7
17.8
17.9
17.10
17.11
17.12
17.13
17.14
17.15

Photo signage/fees/shed1
Photo entry 1/no branches/open/arrow
Signage/follow arrow
Photo Compost rows
Compost rows/space
photo compost rows spaces
photo shed/GMC truck/shed 2
photo signage/fees/shed 2
Photo signage/no branches/shed 2
Photo signage/portals/shed 2

17.16

Photo signage/notice/shed 2

PL
PL
PL
PL

17.17
17.18
17.19
17.20

Photo row/GMC truck/no branches
Photo of tank

PL

17.21

Photo equipment/conveyor belt

PL

17.22

Photo equipment/green boxes

PL

17.23
17.24

Photo equipment/boxes and tank

17.25
17.26
17.27

Photo equipment/red truck
Photo equipment/white truck
Photo mobile structure

17.28

Photo of Loader

PL

PL
PL
P1
PL
PL

PL
PL
PL
PL
PL
PL
PL
PL
PL
PL
PL

Photo
Photo
Photo
Photo
Photo

Signage/Open and shed 1
signage/shed1/sign in & fee
signage/shed 1.all
signage/sign in here/shed 1
signage/shed fees & notice/shed 1

ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED/09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED 09/13/17
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED

09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17

17.29

Photo equipment/screener

ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED
ADMITTED

09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17
09/13/17

PL

17.30

PL
PL

17.31
18

Photo tank
ADMITTED
Photo equipment/red trailer
ADMITTED
Video thumb drive of Smith Property taken
August 14, 2017
ADMITTED
ACHD Annual Report FY 2013
ADMITTED
ACHD Annual Report FY 2014
ADMITTED

09/13/17
09/13/17

PL
PL
PL
PL
PL

PL
PL

21.9
21.10

PL
PL

21.11
22

Photo of compost row
Photo equipment/conveyor belt

Photo equipment/screener

ACHD Annual Report FY 2015
Boise City receipt for payment to
David Gibson 2013/2014

09/13/17
09/20/17
09/20/17

ADMITTED 09/20/17
ADMITTED 09/15/17
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PL

23

PL

57

PL

58.1

Boise City receipt for payment to
David Gibson
2014

ADMITTED 09/15/17

Processing (Composting) Facility Guidance
And checklists for Tier II and Tier III Processing
Facilites, Stae of Idaho, Department of DEQ
NOT ADMITTED
October, 2013
ADMITTED ILLUST.
Google Earth Images
09/13/17

PL

58.2

DEF

A

&

3

Google Earth Images

ADMITTED ILLUST.
09/13/17

Processing(Composting Facility Guidance NOT ADMITTED
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 46217
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys ofRecord in this cause as follows:

VERNON K. SMITH

CYNTHIA YEE-WALLACE
MARK CECCHINI-BEAVER

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
BOISE, IDAHO
BOISE, IDAHO

NOV 2 3 2018

Date of Service: - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Supreme Court Case No. 46217
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
DAVID R. GIBSON, dba BLACK
DIAMOND COMPOST PRODUCTS, and
VHS PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 1st
day of August, 2018.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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